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Title: "De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries

Author: Julius Caesar

Author of introduction, etc.: Thomas De Quincey

Translator: W. A. McDevitte

Release date: January 1, 2004 [eBook #10657]
                Most recently updated: December 20, 2020

Language: English

Credits: Produced by Stan Goodman, Ted Garvin, Carol David and PG Distributed Proofreaders


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[Transcriber's Note:

Typographical errors in the original have been corrected and noted
using the notation ** .

Macrons, breves, umlauts etc have been removed from the body of the text
since they were very obtrusive and made reading difficult. However, they
are retained in the Index for reference.

The convention used for these marks is:
Macron (straight line over letter)  [=x]
Umlaut (2 dots over letter)         [:x]
Grave accent                        [`x]
Acute accent                        ['x]
Circumflex                          [^x]
Breve (u-shaped symbol over letter) [)x]
Cedilla                             [,x]
]

       *       *       *       *       *




EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY

EDITED BY ERNEST RHYS


CLASSICAL



CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES

TRANSLATED BY W. A. MACDEVITT

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THOMAS DE QUINCEY


THIS IS NO. 702 OF _EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY_. THE PUBLISHERS WILL BE PLEASED
TO SEND FREELY TO ALL APPLICANTS A LIST OF THE PUBLISHED AND PROJECTED
VOLUMES ARRANGED UNDER THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS:

       *       *       *       *       *

TRAVEL--SCIENCE--FICTION

THEOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY

HISTORY--CLASSICAL

FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

ESSAYS--ORATORY

POETRY & DRAMA

BIOGRAPHY

REFERENCE

ROMANCE

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THE ORDINARY EDITION IS BOUND IN CLOTH WITH GILT DESIGN AND COLOURED
TOP. THERE IS ALSO A LIBRARY EDITION IN REINFORCED CLOTH




THE SAGES OF OLD LIVE AGAIN IN US

GLANVILL





"DE BELLO GALLICO" & OTHER COMMENTARIES:
OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR


FIRST PUBLISHED IN THIS EDITION, 1915
REPRINTED 1923, 1929



INTRODUCTION

BY THOMAS DE QUINCEY

The character of the First Caesar has perhaps never been worse
appreciated than by him who in one sense described it best; that is,
with most force and eloquence wherever he really _did_ comprehend it.
This was Lucan, who has nowhere exhibited more brilliant rhetoric, nor
wandered more from the truth, than in the contrasted portraits of Caesar
and Pompey. The famous line, _"Nil actum reputans si quid superesset
agendum,"_ is a fine feature of the real character, finely expressed.
But, if it had been Lucan's purpose (as possibly, with a view to
Pompey's benefit, in some respects it was) utterly and extravagantly to
falsify the character of the great Dictator, by no single trait could he
more effectually have fulfilled that purpose, nor in fewer words, than
by this expressive passage, _"Gaudensque viam fecisse ruina."_ Such a
trait would be almost extravagant applied even to Marius, who (though in
many respects a perfect model of Roman grandeur, massy, columnar,
imperturbable, and more perhaps than any one man recorded in History
capable of justifying the bold illustration of that character in Horace,
"_Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae_") had, however,
a ferocity in his character, and a touch of the devil in him, very
rarely united with the same tranquil intrepidity. But, for Caesar, the
all-accomplished statesman, the splendid orator, the man of elegant
habits and polished taste, the patron of the fine arts in a degree
transcending all example of his own or the previous age, and as a man of
general literature so much beyond his contemporaries, except Cicero,
that he looked down even upon the brilliant Sylla as an illiterate
person--to class such a man with the race of furious destroyers exulting
in the desolations they spread is to err not by an individual trait, but
by the whole genus. The Attilas and the Tamerlanes, who rejoice in
avowing themselves the scourges of God, and the special instruments of
his wrath, have no one feature of affinity to the polished and humane
Caesar, and would as little have comprehended his character as he could
have respected theirs. Even Cato, the unworthy hero of Lucan, might have
suggested to him a little more truth in this instance, by a celebrated
remark which he made on the characteristic distinction of Caesar, in
comparison with other revolutionary disturbers; for, said he, whereas
others had attempted the overthrow of the state in a continued paroxysm
of fury, and in a state of mind resembling the lunacy of intoxication,
Caesar, on the contrary, among that whole class of civil disturbers, was
the only one who had come to the task in a temper of sobriety and
moderation _(unum accessisse sobrium ad rempublicam delendam)_....

Great as Caesar was by the benefit of his original nature, there can be
no doubt that he, like others, owed something to circumstances; and
perhaps amongst those which were most favourable to the premature
development of great self-dependence we must reckon the early death of
his father. It is, or it is not, according to the nature of men, an
advantage to be orphaned at as early age. Perhaps utter orphanage is
rarely or never such: but to lose a father betimes may, under
appropriate circumstances, profit a strong mind greatly. To Caesar it
was a prodigious benefit that he lost his father when not much more than
fifteen. Perhaps it was an advantage also to his father that he died
thus early. Had he stayed a year longer, he might have seen himself
despised, baffled, and made ridiculous. For where, let us ask, in any
age, was the father capable of adequately sustaining that relation to
the unique Caius Julius--to him, in the appropriate language of
Shakespeare

  "The foremost man of all this world?"

And, in this fine and Caesarean line, "this world" is to be understood
not of the order of co-existences merely,` but also of the order of
successions; he was the foremost man not only of his contemporaries, but
also, within his own intellectual class, of men generally--of all that
ever should come after him, or should sit on thrones under the
denominations of Czars, Kesars, or Caesars of the Bosphorus and the
Danube; of all in every age that should inherit his supremacy of mind,
or should subject to themselves the generations of ordinary men by
qualities analogous to his. Of this infinite superiority some part must
be ascribed to his early emancipation from paternal control. There are
very many cases in which, simply from considerations of sex, a female
cannot stand forward as the head of a family, or as its suitable
representative. If they are even ladies paramount, and in situations of
command, they are also women. The staff of authority does not annihilate
their sex; and scruples of female delicacy interfere for ever to unnerve
and emasculate in their hands the sceptre however otherwise potent.
Hence we see, in noble families, the merest boys put forward to
represent the family dignity, as fitter supporters of that burden than
their mature mothers. And of Caesar's mother, though little is recorded,
and that little incidentally, this much at least we learn--that, if she
looked down upon him with maternal pride and delight, she looked up to
him with female ambition as the re-edifier of her husband's honours,--
looked with reverence as to a column of the Roman grandeur and with fear
and feminine anxieties as to one whose aspiring spirit carried him but
too prematurely into the fields of adventurous strife. One slight and
evanescent sketch of the relations which subsisted between Caesar and
his mother, caught from the wrecks of time, is preserved both by
Plutarch and Suetonius. We see in the early dawn the young patrician
standing upon the steps of his patrimonial portico, his mother with her
arms wreathed about his neck, looking up to his noble countenance,
sometimes drawing auguries of hope from features so fitted for command,
sometimes boding an early blight to promises so dangerously magnificent.
That she had something of her son's aspiring character, or that he
presumed so much in a mother of his, we learn from the few words which
survive of their conversation. He addressed to her no language that
could tranquillise her fears. On the contrary, to any but a Roman mother
his valedictory words, taken in connexion with the known determination
of his character, were of a nature to consummate her depression, as they
tended to confirm the very worst of her fears. He was then going to
stand his chance in a popular electioneering contest for an office of
the highest dignity, and to launch himself upon the storms of the Campus
Martius. At that period, besides other and more ordinary dangers, the
bands of gladiators, kept in the pay of the more ambitious or turbulent
amongst the Roman nobles, gave a popular tone of ferocity and of
personal risk to the course of such contests; and, either to forestall
the victory of an antagonist, or to avenge their own defeat, it was not
at all impossible that a body of incensed competitors might intercept
his final triumph by assassination. For this danger, however, he had no
leisure in his thoughts of consolation; the sole danger which _he_
contemplated, or supposed his mother to contemplate, was the danger of
defeat, and for that he reserved his consolations. He bade her fear
nothing; for that his determination was to return with victory, and with
the ensigns of the dignity he sought, or to return a corpse.

Early indeed did Caesar's trials commence; and it is probable, that, had
not the death of his father, by throwing him prematurely upon his own
resources, prematurely developed the masculine features of his
character, forcing him whilst yet a boy under the discipline of civil
conflict and the yoke of practical life, even _his_ energies might have
been insufficient to sustain them. His age is not exactly ascertained;
but it is past a doubt that he had not reached his twentieth year when
he had the hardihood to engage in a struggle with Sylla, then Dictator,
and exercising the immoderate powers of that office with the licence and
the severity which History has made so memorable. He had neither any
distinct grounds of hope, nor any eminent example at that time, to
countenance him in this struggle--which yet he pushed on in the most
uncompromising style, and to the utmost verge of defiance. The subject
of the contest gives it a further interest. It was the youthful wife of
the youthful Caesar who stood under the shadow of the great Dictator's
displeasure; not personally, but politically, on account of her
connexions: and her it was, Cornelia, the daughter of a man who had been
four times consul, that Caesar was required to divorce: but he spurned
the haughty mandate, and carried his determination to a triumphant
issue, notwithstanding his life was at stake, and at one time saved only
by shifting his place of concealment every night; and this young lady it
was who afterwards became the mother of his only daughter. Both mother
and daughter, it is remarkable, perished prematurely, and at critical
periods of Caesar's life; for it is probable enough that these
irreparable wounds to Caesar's domestic affections threw him with more
exclusiveness of devotion upon the fascinations of glory and ambition
than might have happened under a happier condition of his private life.
That Caesar should have escaped destruction in this unequal contest with
an enemy then wielding the whole thunders of the state, is somewhat
surprising; and historians have sought their solution of the mystery in
the powerful intercessions of the vestal virgins, and several others of
high rank amongst the connexions of his great house. These may have done
something; but it is due to Sylla, who had a sympathy with everything
truly noble, to suppose him struck with powerful admiration for the
audacity of the young patrician, standing out in such severe solitude
among so many examples of timid concession; and that to this magnanimous
feeling in the Dictator much of the indulgence which he showed may have
been really due. In fact, according to some accounts, it was not Sylla,
but the creatures of Sylla (_adjutores_), who pursued Caesar. We know,
at all events, that Sylla formed a right estimate of Caesar's character,
and that, from the complexion of his conduct in this one instance, he
drew that famous prophecy of his future destiny; bidding his friends
beware of that slipshod boy, "for that in him lay couchant many a
Marius." A grander testimony to the awe which Caesar inspired, or from
one who knew better the qualities of that Cyclopean man by whose scale
he measured the patrician boy, cannot be imagined.

It is not our intention, or consistent with our plan, to pursue this
great man through the whole circumstances of his romantic career; though
it is certain that many parts of his life require investigation much
keener than has ever been applied to them, and that many might be placed
in a new light. Indeed, the whole of this most momentous section of
ancient history ought to be recomposed with the critical scepticism of a
Niebuhr, and the same comprehensive collation, resting, if possible, on
the felicitous interpretation of authorities. In reality it is the hinge
upon which turned the future destiny of the whole earth, and, having
therefore a common relation to all modern nations whatsoever, should
naturally have been cultivated with the zeal which belongs to a personal
concern. In general, the anecdotes which express most vividly the
grandeur of character in the first Caesar are those which illustrate his
defiance of danger in extremity: the prodigious energy and rapidity of
his decisions and motions in the field (looking to which it was that
Cicero called him [Greek: teras] or portentous revelation); the skill
with which he penetrated the designs of his enemies, and the electric
speed with which he met disasters with remedy and reparation, or, where
that was impossible, with relief; the extraordinary presence of mind
which he showed in turning adverse omens to his own advantage, as when,
upon stumbling in coming on shore (which was esteemed a capital omen of
evil), he transfigured as it were in one instant its whole meaning by
exclaiming, "Thus, and by this contact with the earth, do I take
possession of thee, O Africa!" in that way giving to an accident the
semblance of a symbolic purpose. Equally conspicuous was the grandeur of
fortitude with which he faced the whole extent of a calamity when
palliation could do no good, "non negando, minuendove, sed insuper
amplificando, _ementiendoque_"; as when, upon finding his soldiery
alarmed at the approach of Juba, with forces really great, but
exaggerated by their terrors, he addressed them in a military harangue
to the following effect:--"Know that within a few days the king will
come up with us, bringing with him sixty thousand legionaries, thirty
thousand cavalry, one hundred thousand light troops, besides three
hundred elephants. Such being the case, let me hear no more of
conjectures and opinions, for you have now my warrant for the fact,
whose information is past doubting. Therefore, be satisfied; otherwise,
I will put every man of you on board some crazy old fleet, and whistle
you down the tide--no matter under what winds, no matter towards what
shore." Finally, we might seek for _characteristic_ anecdotes of Caesar
in his unexampled liberalities and contempt of money.

Upon this last topic it is the just remark of Casaubon that some
instances of Caesar's munificence have been thought apocryphal, or to
rest upon false readings, simply from ignorance of the heroic scale upon
which the Roman splendours of that age proceeded. A forum which Caesar
built out of the products of his last campaign, by way of a present to
the Roman people, cost him--for the ground merely on which it stood--
nearly eight hundred thousand pounds. To the citizens of Rome he
presented, in one _congiary_, about two guineas and a half a head. To
his army, in one _donation_, upon the termination of the Civil War, he
gave a sum which allowed about two hundred pounds a man to the infantry,
and four hundred to the cavalry. It is true that the legionary troops
were then much reduced by the sword of the enemy, and by the tremendous
hardships of their last campaigns. In this, however, he did perhaps no
more than repay a debt. For it is an instance of military attachment,
beyond all that Wallenstein or any commander, the most beloved amongst
his troops, has ever experienced, that, on the breaking out of the Civil
War, not only did the centurions of every legion severally maintain a
horse soldier, but even the privates volunteered to serve without pay,
and (what might seem impossible) without their daily rations. This was
accomplished by subscriptions amongst themselves, the more opulent
undertaking for the maintenance of the needy. Their disinterested love
for Caesar appeared in another and more difficult illustration: it was a
traditionary anecdote in Rome that the majority of those amongst
Caesar's troops who had the misfortune to fall into the enemy's hands
refused to accept their lives under the condition of serving against
_him_.

In connexion with this subject of his extraordinary munificence, there
is one aspect of Caesar's life which has suffered much from the
misrepresentations of historians, and that is--the vast pecuniary
embarrassments under which he laboured, until the profits of war had
turned the scale even more prodigiously in his favour. At one time of
his life, when appointed to a foreign office, so numerous and so
clamorous were his creditors that he could not have left Rome on his
public duties had not Crassus come forward with assistance in money, or
by guarantees, to the amount of nearly two hundred thousand pounds. And
at another he was accustomed to amuse himself with computing how much
money it would require to make him worth exactly nothing (_i.e._ simply
to clear him of debts); this, by one account, amounted to upwards of two
millions sterling. Now, the error of historians has been to represent
these debts as the original ground of his ambition and his revolutionary
projects, as though the desperate condition of his private affairs had
suggested a civil war to his calculations as the best or only mode of
redressing it. Such a policy would have resembled the last desperate
resource of an unprincipled gambler, who, on seeing his final game at
chess, and the accumulated stakes depending upon it, all on the brink of
irretrievable sacrifice, dexterously upsets the chess-board, or
extinguishes the lights. But Julius, the one sole patriot of Rome, could
find no advantage to his plans in darkness or in confusion. Honestly
supported, he would have crushed the oligarchies of Rome by crushing in
its lairs that venal and hunger-bitten democracy which made oligarchy
and its machineries resistless. Caesar's debts, far from being
stimulants and exciting causes of his political ambition, stood in an
inverse relation to the ambition; they were its results, and represented
its natural costs, being contracted from first to last in the service of
his political intrigues, for raising and maintaining a powerful body of
partisans, both in Rome and elsewhere. Whosoever indeed will take the
trouble to investigate the progress of Caesar's ambition, from such
materials as even yet remain, may satisfy himself that the scheme of
revolutionizing the Republic, and placing himself at its head, was no
growth of accident or circumstances; above all, that it did not arise
upon any so petty and indirect a suggestion as that of his debts; but
that his debts were in their very first origin purely ministerial to his
wise, indispensable, and patriotic ambition; and that his revolutionary
plans were at all periods of his life a direct and foremost object, but
in no case bottomed upon casual impulses. In this there was not only
patriotism, but in fact the one sole mode of patriotism which could have
prospered, or could have found a field of action.

Chatter not, sublime reader, commonplaces of scoundrel moralists against
ambition. In some cases ambition is a hopeful virtue; in others (as in
the Rome of our resplendent Julius) ambition was the virtue by which any
other could flourish. It had become evident to everybody that Rome,
under its present constitution, must fall; and the sole question was--by
whom? Even Pompey, not by nature of an aspiring turn, and prompted to
his ambitious course undoubtedly by circumstances and, the friends who
besieged him, was in the habit of saying, "Sylla potuit: ego non
potero?" _Sylla found it possible: shall I find it not so?_ Possible to
do what? To overthrow the political system of the Republic. This had
silently collapsed into an order of things so vicious, growing also so
hopelessly worse, that all honest patriots invoked a purifying
revolution, even though bought at the heavy price of a tyranny, rather
than face the chaos of murderous distractions to which the tide of feuds
and frenzies was violently tending.

Such a revolution at such a price was not less Pompey's object than
Caesar's. In a case, therefore, where no benefit of choice was allowed
to Rome as respected the thing, but only as respected the person, Caesar
had the same right to enter the arena in the character of combatant as
could belong to any one of his rivals. And that he _did_ enter that
arena constructively, and by secret design, from his very earliest
manhood, may be gathered from this--that he suffered no openings towards
a revolution, provided they had any hope in them, to escape his
participation. It is familiarly known that he was engaged pretty deeply
in the conspiracy of Catiline, and that he incurred considerable risk on
that occasion; but it is less known that he was a party to at least two
other conspiracies. There was even a fourth, meditated by Crassus, which
Caesar so far encouraged as to undertake a journey to Rome from a very
distant quarter merely with a view to such chances as it might offer to
him; but, as it did not, upon examination, seem to him a very promising
scheme, he judged it best to look coldly upon it, or not to embark in it
by any personal co-operation. Upon these and other facts we build our
inference--that the scheme of a revolution was the one great purpose of
Caesar from his first entrance upon public life. Nor does it appear that
he cared much by whom it was undertaken, provided only there seemed to
be any sufficient resources for carrying it through, and for sustaining
the first collision with the regular forces of the existing oligarchies,
taking or _not_ taking the shape of triumvirates. He relied, it seems,
on his own personal superiority for raising him to the head of affairs
eventually, let who would take the nominal lead at first.

To the same result, it will be found, tended the vast stream of Caesar's
liberalities. From the senator downwards to the lowest _faex Romuli_, he
had a hired body of dependents, both in and out of Rome, equal in
numbers to a nation. In the provinces, and in distant kingdoms, he
pursued the same schemes. Everywhere he had a body of mercenary
partisans; kings even are known to have taken his pay. And it is
remarkable that even in his character of commander-in-chief, where the
number of legions allowed to him for the accomplishment of his Gaulish
mission raised him for a number of years above all fear of coercion or
control, he persevered steadily in the same plan of providing for the
distant day when he might need assistance, not _from_ the state, but
_against_ the state. For, amongst the private anecdotes which came to
light under the researches made into his history after his death, was
this--that, soon after his first entrance upon his government in Gaul,
he had raised, equipped, disciplined, and maintained, from his own
private funds, a legion amounting, possibly, to six or seven thousand
men, who were bound to no sacrament of military obedience to the state,
nor owed fealty to any auspices except those of Caesar. This legion,
from the fashion of their crested helmets, which resembled the heads of
a small aspiring bird, received the popular name of the _Alauda_ (or
Lark) legion. And very singular it was that Cato, or Marcellus, or some
amongst those enemies of Caesar who watched his conduct during the
period of his Gaulish command with the vigilance of rancorous malice,
should not have come to the knowledge of this fact; in which case we may
be sure that it would have been denounced to the Senate.

Such, then, for its purpose and its uniform motive, was the sagacious
munificence of Caesar. Apart from this motive, and considered in and for
itself, and simply with a reference to the splendid forms which it often
assumed, this munificence would furnish the materials for a volume. The
public entertainments of Caesar, his spectacles and shows, his
naumachiae, and the pomps of his unrivalled triumphs (the closing
triumphs of the Republic), were severally the finest of their kind which
had then been brought forward. Sea-fights were exhibited upon the
grandest scale, according to every known variety of nautical equipment
and mode of conflict, upon a vast lake formed artificially for that
express purpose. Mimic land-fights were conducted, in which all the
circumstances of real war were so faithfully rehearsed that even
elephants "indorsed with towers," twenty on each side, took part in the
combat. Dramas were represented in every known language (_per omnium
linguarum histriones_). And hence (that is, from the conciliatory
feeling thus expressed towards the various tribes of foreigners resident
in Rome) some have derived an explanation of what is else a mysterious
circumstance amongst the ceremonial observances at Caesar's funeral--
that all people of foreign nations then residing at Rome distinguished
themselves by the conspicuous share which they took in the public
mourning; and that, beyond all other foreigners, the Jews for night
after night kept watch and ward about the Emperor's grave. Never before,
according to traditions which lasted through several generations in
Rome, had there been so vast a conflux of the human race congregated to
any one centre, on any one attraction of business or of pleasure, as to
Rome on occasion of these triumphal spectacles exhibited by Caesar.

In our days, the greatest occasional gatherings of the human race are in
India, especially at the great fair of the _Hurdwar_ on the Ganges in
northern Hindustan: a confluence of some millions is sometimes seen at
that spot, brought together under the mixed influences of devotion and
commercial business, but very soon dispersed as rapidly as they had been
convoked. Some such spectacle of nations crowding upon nations, and some
such Babylonian confusion of dresses, complexions, languages, and
jargons, was then witnessed at Rome. Accommodations within doors, and
under roofs of houses, or roofs of temples, was altogether impossible.
Myriads encamped along the streets, and along the high-roads, fields, or
gardens. Myriads lay stretched on the ground, without even the slight
protection of tents, in a vast circuit about the city. Multitudes of
men, even senators, and others of the highest rank, were trampled to
death in the crowds. And the whole family of man might seem at that time
to be converged at the bidding of the dead Dictator. But these, or any
other themes connected with the public life of Caesar, we notice only in
those circumstances which have been overlooked, or partially
represented, by historians. Let us now, in conclusion, bring forward,
from the obscurity in which they have hitherto lurked, the anecdotes
which describe the habits of his private life, his tastes, and personal
peculiarities.

In person, he was tall, fair, gracile, and of limbs distinguished for
their elegant proportions. His eyes were black and piercing. These
circumstances continued to be long remembered, and no doubt were
constantly recalled to the eyes of all persons in the imperial palaces
by pictures, busts, and statues; for we find the same description of his
personal appearance three centuries afterwards in a work of the Emperor
Julian's. He was a most accomplished horseman, and a master
(_peritissimus_) in the use of arms. But, notwithstanding his skill and
horsemanship, it seems that, when he accompanied his army on marches, he
walked oftener than he rode; no doubt, with a view to the benefit of his
example, and to express that sympathy with his soldiers which gained him
their hearts so entirely. On other occasions, when travelling apart from
his army, he seems more frequently to have ridden in a carriage than on
horseback. His purpose, in this preference, must have been with a view
to the transport of luggage. The carriage which he generally used was a
_rheda_, a sort of gig, or rather curricle; for it was a _four_-wheeled
carriage, and adapted (as we find from the imperial regulations for the
public carriages, etc.) to the conveyance of about half a ton. The mere
personal baggage which Caesar carried with him was probably
considerable; for he was a man of elegant habits, and in all parts of
his life sedulously attentive to elegance of personal appearance. The
length of journeys which he accomplished within a given time appears
even to us at this day, and might well therefore appear to his
contemporaries, truly astonishing. A distance of one hundred miles was
no extraordinary day's journey for him in a _rheda_, such as we have
described it. So refined were his habits, and so constant his demand for
the luxurious accommodations of polished life as it then existed in
Rome, that he is said to have carried with him, as indispensable parts
of his personal baggage, the little ivory lozenges, squares and circles
or ovals, with other costly materials, wanted for the tessellated
flooring of his tent. Habits such as these will easily account for his
travelling in a carriage rather than on horseback.

The courtesy and obliging disposition of Caesar were notorious; and both
were illustrated in some anecdotes which survived for generations in
Rome. Dining on one occasion, as an invited guest, at a table where the
servants had inadvertently, for salad-oil, furnished some sort of coarse
lamp-oil, Caesar would not allow the rest of the company to point out
the mistake to their host, for fear of shocking him too much by exposing
what might have been construed into inhospitality. At another time,
whilst halting at a little _cabaret_, when one of his retinue was
suddenly taken ill, Caesar resigned to his use the sole bed which the
house afforded. Incidents as trifling as these express the urbanity of
Caesar's nature; and hence one is the more surprised to find the
alienation of the Senate charged, in no trifling degree, upon a gross
and most culpable failure in point of courtesy. Caesar, it is alleged--
but might we presume to call upon antiquity for its authority?--
neglected to rise from his seat, on their approaching him with an
address of congratulation. It is said, and we can believe it, that he
gave deeper offence by this one defect in a matter of ceremonial
observance than by all his substantial attacks upon their privileges.
What we find it difficult to believe is not that result from that
offence--this is no more than we should all anticipate--not _that_, but
the possibility of the offence itself, from one so little arrogant as
Caesar, and so entirely a man of the world. He was told of the disgust
which he had given; and we are bound to believe his apology, in which he
charged it upon sickness, that would not at the moment allow him to
maintain a standing attitude. Certainly the whole tenor of his life was
not courteous only, but kind, and to his enemies merciful in a degree
which implied so much more magnanimity than men in general could
understand that by many it was put down to the account of weakness.

Weakness, however, there was none in Caius Caesar; and, that there might
be none, it was fortunate that conspiracy should have cut him off in the
full vigour of his faculties, in the very meridian of his glory, and on
the brink of completing a series of gigantic achievements. Amongst these
are numbered:--a digest of the entire body of laws, even then become
unwieldy and oppressive; the establishment of vast and comprehensive
public libraries, Greek as well as Latin; the chastisement of Dacia
(that needed a cow-hiding for insolence as much as Affghanistan from us
in 1840); the conquest of Parthia; and the cutting a ship canal through
the Isthmus of Corinth. The reformation of the Calendar he had already
accomplished. And of all his projects it may be said that they were
equally patriotic in their purpose and colossal in their proportions.

As an orator, Caesar's merit was so eminent that, according to the
general belief, had he found time to cultivate this department of civil
exertion, the received supremacy of Cicero would have been made
questionable, or the honour would have been divided. Cicero himself was
of that opinion, and on different occasions applied the epithet
_splendidus_ to Caesar, as though in some exclusive sense, or with some
peculiar emphasis, due to him. His taste was much simpler, chaster, and
less inclined to the _florid_ and Asiatic, than that of Cicero. So far
he would, in that condition of the Roman culture and feeling, have been
less acceptable to the public; but, on the other hand, he would have
compensated this disadvantage by much more of natural and Demosthenic
fervour.

In literature, the merits of Caesar are familiar to most readers. Under
the modest title of _Commentaries_, he meant to offer the records of his
Gallic and British campaigns, simply as notes, or memoranda, afterwards
to be worked up by regular historians; but, as Cicero observes, their
merit was such in the eyes of the discerning that all judicious writers
shrank from the attempt to alter them. In another instance of his
literary labours he showed a very just sense of true dignity. Rightly
conceiving that everything patriotic was dignified, and that to
illustrate or polish his native language was a service of real and
paramount patriotism, he composed a work on the grammar and orthoepy of
the Latin language. Cicero and himself were the only Romans of
distinction in that age who applied themselves with true patriotism to
the task of purifying and ennobling their mother tongue. Both were aware
of a transcendent value in the Grecian literature as it then stood; but
that splendour did not depress their hopes of raising their own to
something of the same level. As respected the natural wealth of the two
languages, it was the private opinion of Cicero that the Latin had the
advantage; and, if Caesar did not accompany him to that length--which,
perhaps, under some limitations he ought to have done--he yet felt that
it was but the more necessary to draw forth any special or exceptional
advantage which it really had.

Was Caesar, upon the whole, the greatest of men? We restrict the
question, of course, to the classes of men great in _action_: great by
the extent of their influence over their social contemporaries; great by
throwing open avenues to extended powers that previously had been
closed; great by making obstacles once vast to become trivial, or prizes
that once were trivial to be glorified by expansion. I (said Augustus
Caesar) found Rome built of brick; but I left it built of marble. Well,
my man, we reply, for a wondrously little chap, you did what in
Westmoreland they call a good _darroch_ (day's work); and, if _navvies_
had been wanted in those days, you should have had our vote to a
certainty. But Caius Julius, even under such a limitation of the
comparison, did a thing as much transcending this as it was greater to
project Rome across the Alps and the Pyrenees,--expanding the grand
Republic into crowning provinces of 1. France (_Gallia_), 2. Belgium, 3.
Holland (_Batavia_), 4. England (_Britannia_), 5. Savoy (_Allobroges_),
6. Switzerland (_Helvetia_), 7. Spain (_Hispania_),--than to decorate a
street or to found an amphitheatre. Dr. Beattie once observed that, if
that question as to the greatest man in action upon the rolls of History
were left to be collected from the suffrages already expressed in books
and scattered throughout the literature of all nations, the scale would
be found to have turned prodigiously in Caesar's favour as against any
single competitor; and there is no doubt whatsoever that even amongst
his own countrymen, and his own contemporaries, the same verdict would
have been returned, had it been collected upon the famous principle of
Themistocles, that he should be reputed the first whom the greatest
number of rival voices had pronounced to be the second.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

_Works_: Latin folio, Rome, 1469; Venice, 1471; Florence, 1514; London,
1585. De Bello Gallico, Esslingen (?), 1473. Translations by John
Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester (John Rastell), of Julius Caesar's
Commentaries-"newly translated into Englyshe ... as much as concerneth
thys realme of England"--1530 folio; by Arthur Goldinge, The Eyght
Bookes of C. Julius Caesar, London, 1563, 1565, 1578, 1590; by Chapman,
London, 1604 folio; by Clem. Edmonds, London, 1609; the same, with
Hirtius, 1655, 1670, 1695 folio with commendatory verses by Camden,
Daniel, and Ben Johnson (_sic_). Works: Translated by W. Duncan, 1753,
1755; by M. Bladen, 8th ed., 1770; MacDevitt, Bohn's Library, 1848. De
Bello Gallico, translated by R. Mongan, Dublin, 1850; by J.B. Owgan and
C.W. Bateman, 1882. Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic War, translated
by T. Rice Holmes, London, 1908 (see also Holmes' Caesar's Conquest of
Gaul, 1911). Caesar's Gallic War, translated by Rev. F.P. Long, Oxford,
1911; Books IV. and V. translated by C.H. Prichard, Cambridge, 1912. For
Latin text of De Bello Gallico see Bell's Illustrated Classical Series;
Dent's Temple Series of Classical Texts, 1902; Macmillan and Co., 1905;
and Blackie's Latin Texts, 1905-7.


       *       *       *       *       *


CONTENTS


THE WAR IN GAUL

THE CIVIL WAR





THE COMMENTARIES OF
CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR


THE WAR IN GAUL

BOOK I

I.--All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae
inhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own language are
called Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. All these differ from each other
in language, customs and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gauls
from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from the
Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are
farthest from the civilisation and refinement of [our] Province, and
merchants least frequently resort to them and import those things which
tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Germans,
who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war;
for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in
valour, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, when
they either repel them from their own territories, or themselves wage
war on their frontiers. One part of these, which it has been said that
the Gauls occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone: it is bounded
by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae: it
borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the
river Rhine, and stretches towards the north. The Belgae rise from the
extreme frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine;
and look towards the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from
the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the
ocean which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun and
the north star.

II.--Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished and
wealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso were consuls, incited
by lust of sovereignty, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and
persuaded the people to go forth from their territories with all their
possessions, [saying] that it would be very easy, since they excelled
all in valour, to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this he
the more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii are confined on
every side by the nature of their situation; on one side by the Rhine, a
very broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from
the Germans; on a second side by the Jura, a very high mountain which is
[situated] between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lake
of Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates our Province from the
Helvetii. From these circumstances it resulted that they could range
less widely, and could less easily make war upon their neighbours; for
which reason men fond of war [as they were] were affected with great
regret. They thought, that considering the extent of their population,
and their renown for warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits,
although they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles.

III.--Induced by these considerations, and influenced by the authority
of Orgetorix, they determined to provide such things as were necessary
for their expedition--to buy up as great a number as possible of beasts
of burden and waggons--to make their sowings as large as possible, so
that on their march plenty of corn might be in store--and to establish
peace and friendship with the neighbouring states. They reckoned that a
term of two years would be sufficient for them to execute their designs;
they fix by decree their departure for the third year. Orgetorix is
chosen to complete these arrangements. He took upon himself the office
of ambassador to the states: on this journey he persuades Casticus, the
son of Catamantaledes (one of the Sequani, whose father had possessed
the sovereignty among the people for many years, and had been styled
"_friend_" by the senate of the Roman people), to seize upon the
sovereignty in his own state, which his father had held before him, and
he likewise persuades Dumnorix, an Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus,
who at that time possessed the chief authority in the state, and was
exceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt the same, and gives him
his daughter in marriage. He proves to them that to accomplish their
attempts was a thing very easy to be done, because he himself would
obtain the government of his own state; that there was no doubt that the
Helvetii were the most powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures them
that he will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire the
sovereignty for them. Incited by this speech, they give a pledge and
oath to one another, and hope that, when they have seized the
sovereignty, they will, by means of the three most powerful and valiant
nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole of Gaul.

IV.--When this scheme was disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they,
according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in
chains; it was the law that the penalty of being burned by fire should
await him if condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of his
cause, Orgetorix drew together from all quarters to the court all his
vassals to the number of ten thousand persons; and led together to the
same place, and all his dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had a
great number; by means of these he rescued himself from [the necessity
of] pleading his cause. While the state, incensed at this act, was
endeavouring to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates were
mustering a large body of men from the country, Orgetorix died; and
there is not wanting a suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of his having
committed suicide.

V.--After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which
they had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their territories. When
they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking,
they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve--to their
villages about four hundred--and to the private dwellings that remained;
they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them;
that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more
ready for undergoing all dangers. They order every one to carry forth
from home for himself provisions for three months, ready ground. They
persuade the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, their
neighbours, to adopt the same plan, and after burning down their towns
and villages, to set out with them: and they admit to their party and
unite to themselves as confederates the Boii, who had dwelt on the other
side of the Rhine, and had crossed over into the Norican territory, and
assaulted Noreia.

VI.--There were in all two routes by which they could go forth from
their country--one through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between
Mount Jura and the river Rhone (by which scarcely one waggon at a time
could be led; there was, moreover, a very high mountain overhanging, so
that a very few might easily intercept them); the other, through our
Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the Rhone flows
between the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, who
had lately been subdued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. The
furthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories of
the Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to the
Helvetii. They thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges,
because they did not seem as yet well-affected towards the Roman people,
or compel them by force to allow them to pass through their territories.
Having provided everything for the expedition, they appoint a day on
which they should all meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was the
fifth before the kalends of April [_i.e._ the 28th of March], in the
consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B.C. 58].

VII.--When it was reported to Caesar that they were attempting to make
their route through our Province, he hastens to set out from the city,
and, by as great marches as he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and
arrives at Geneva. He orders the whole Province [to furnish] as great a
number of soldiers as possible, as there was in all only one legion in
Further Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the
Helvetii are apprised of his arrival, they send to him, as ambassadors,
the most illustrious men of their state (in which embassy Numeius and
Verudoctius held the chief place), to say "that it was their intention
to march through the Province without doing any harm, because they had"
[according to their own representations] "no other route:--that they
requested they might be allowed to do so with his consent." Caesar,
inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, had
been slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by the
Helvetii, did not think that [their request] ought to be granted; nor
was he of opinion that men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity of
marching through the Province were given them, would abstain from
outrage and mischief. Yet, in order that a period might intervene, until
the soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished] should assemble, he
replied to the ambassadors, that he would take time to deliberate; if
they wanted anything, they might return on the day before the ides of
April [on April 12th].

VIII.--Meanwhile, with the legion which he had with him and the soldiers
who had assembled from the Province, he carries along for nineteen
[Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles a wall, to the height of
sixteen feet, and a trench, from the lake of Geneva, which flows into
the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories of the
Sequani from those of the Helvetii. When that work was finished, he
distributes garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he
may the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross over
against his will. When the day which he had appointed with the
ambassadors came, and they returned to him, he says that he cannot,
consistently with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, grant
any one a passage through the Province; and he gives them to understand
that, if they should attempt to use violence, he would oppose them. The
Helvetii, disappointed in this hope, tried if they could force a passage
(some by means of a bridge of boats and numerous rafts constructed for
the purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth of the
river was least, sometimes by day, but more frequently by night), but
being kept at bay by the strength of our works, and by the concourse of
the soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this attempt.

IX.--There was left one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, on
account of its narrowness, they could not pass without the consent of
the Sequani. As they could not of themselves prevail on them, they send
ambassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that through his intercession they
might obtain their request from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity
and liberality, had great influence among the Sequani, and was friendly
to the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married the daughter
of Orgetorix; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for a
revolution, and wished to have as many states as possible attached to
him by his kindness towards them. He, therefore, undertakes the affair,
and prevails upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march through
their territories, and arranges that they should give hostages to each
other--the Sequani not to obstruct the Helvetii in their march--the
Helvetii, to pass without mischief and outrage.

X.--It-is again told Caesar that the Helvetii intend to march through
the country of the Sequani and the Aedui into the territories of the
Santones, which are not far distant from those boundaries of the
Tolosates, which [viz. Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province. If
this took place, he saw that it would be attended with great danger to
the Province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, bordering
upon an open and very fertile tract of country. For these reasons he
appointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant, to the command of the
fortification which he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy by forced
marches, and there levies two legions, and leads out from winter-quarters
three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five
legions marches rapidly by the nearest route across the Alps into
Further Gaul. Here the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges,
having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt to obstruct the
army in their march. After having routed these in several battles, he
arrives in the territories of the Vocontii in the Further Province on
the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the most remote town of the Hither
Province; thence he leads his army into the country of the Allobroges,
and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These people are the first
beyond the Province on the opposite side of the Rhone.

XI.--The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the
narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the
territories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui, as
they could not defend themselves and their possessions against them,
send ambassadors to Caesar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they had
at all times so well deserved of the Roman people, that their fields
ought not to have been laid waste--their children carried off into
slavery--their towns stormed, almost within sight of our army. At the
same time the Ambarri, the friends and kinsmen of the Aedui, apprise
Caesar that it was not easy for them, now that their fields had been
devastated, to ward off the violence of the enemy from their towns: the
Allobroges likewise, who had villages and possessions on the other side
of the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Caesar and assure him that
they had nothing remaining, except the soil of their land. Caesar,
induced by these circumstances, decides that he ought not to wait until
the Helvetii, after destroying all the property of his allies, should
arrive among the Santones.

XII.--There is a river [called] the Saone, which flows through the
territories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhone with such incredible
slowness, that it cannot be determined by the eye in which direction it
flows. This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joined
together. When Caesar was informed by spies that the Helvetii had
already conveyed three parts of their forces across that river, but that
the fourth part was left behind on this side of the Saone, he set out
from the camp with three legions during the third watch, and came up
with that division which had not yet crossed the river. Attacking them,
encumbered with baggage, and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great
part of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and concealed
themselves in the nearest woods. That canton [which was cut down] was
called the Tigurine; for the whole Helvetian state is divided into four
cantons. This single canton having left their country, within the
recollection of our fathers, had slain Lucius Cassius the consul, and
had made his army pass under the yoke [B.C. 107]. Thus, whether by
chance, or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of the
Helvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman
people was the first to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not only
the public, but also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini had
slain Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of Lucius
Calpurnius Piso, his [Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle as
Cassius himself.

XIII.--This battle ended, that he might be able to come up with the
remaining forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made across
the Saone, and thus leads his army over. The Helvetii, confused by his
sudden arrival, when they found that he had effected in one day what
they themselves had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty,
namely, the crossing of the river, send ambassadors to him; at the head
of which embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii in
the war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar:--that, "if the
Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to that
part and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be;
but if he should persist in persecuting them with war, that he ought to
remember both the ancient disgrace of the Roman people and the
characteristic valour of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one
canton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had crossed the river
could not bring assistance to their friends, that he ought not on that
account to ascribe very much to his own valour, or despise them; that
they had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to rely more on
valour than on artifice or stratagem. Wherefore let him not bring it to
pass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a name,
from the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction of their army
or transmit the remembrance [of such an event to posterity]."

XIV.--To these words Caesar thus replied:--that "on that very account he
felt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance those circumstances
which the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more
indignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly to
the Roman people: for if they had been conscious of having done any
wrong it would not have been difficult to be on their guard, but for
that very reason had they been deceived, because neither were they aware
that any offence had been given by them, on account of which they should
be afraid, nor did they think that they ought to be afraid without
cause. But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage, could
he also lay aside the remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they had
against his will attempted a route through the Province by force, in
that they had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That
as to their so insolently boasting of their victory, and as to their
being astonished that they had so long committed their outrages with
impunity, [both these things] tended to the same point; for the immortal
gods are wont to allow those persons whom they wish to punish for their
guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer impunity, in order that
they may suffer the more severely from a reverse of circumstances.
Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be given him by
them in order that he may be assured they will do what they promise, and
provided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages which
they had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to the
Allobroges, he [Caesar] will make peace with them." Divico replied, that
"the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors that they were
accustomed to receive, not to give, hostages; of that fact the Roman
people were witness." Having given this reply, he withdrew.

XV.--On the following day they move their camp from that place; Caesar
does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of four
thousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province and
from the Aedui and their allies), to observe towards what parts the
enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the
enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a
disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated
with this battle because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so
large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from
their rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrained
his men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent
the enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about
fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or six
miles between the enemy's rear and our van.

XVI.--Meanwhile, Caesar kept daily importuning the Aedui for the corn
which they had promised in the name of their state; for, in consequence
of the coldness (Gaul being, as before said, situated towards the
north), not only was the corn in the fields not ripe, but there was not
in store a sufficiently large quantity even of fodder: besides he was
unable to use the corn which he had conveyed in ships up the river
Saone, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire, had
diverted their march from the Saone. The Aedui kept deferring from day
to day, and saying that it was being "collected--brought in--on the
road." When he saw that he was put off too long, and that the day was
close at hand on which he ought to serve out the corn to his soldiers,--
having called together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in
his camp, among them Divitiacus, and Liscus who was invested with the
chief magistracy (whom the Aedui style the Vergobretus, and who is
elected annually, and has power of life and death over his countrymen),
he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisted by them on so
urgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at hand, and when
[corn] could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, particularly
as, in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken the
war; much more bitterly, therefore, does he complain of his being
forsaken.

XVII.--Then at length Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses what
he had hitherto kept secret:--that "there are some whose influence with
the people is very great, who, though private men, have more power than
the magistrates themselves: that these by seditious and violent language
are deterring the populace from contributing the corn which they ought
to supply; [by telling them] that, if they cannot any longer retain the
supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the government of Gauls
than of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans should
overpower the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the Aedui
together with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men [said he] are our
plans, and whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that
they could not be restrained by _him_: nay more, he was well aware that,
though compelled by necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at
how great a risk he had done it; and for that reason, he had been silent
as long as he could."

XVIII.--Caesar perceived that, by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the
brother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was unwilling that
these matters should be discussed while so many were present, he
speedily dismisses the council, but detains Liscus: he inquires from him
when alone, about those things which he had said in the meeting. He
[Liscus] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. He [Caesar] makes
inquiries on the same points privately of others, and discovers that it
is all true; that "Dumnorix is the person, a man of the highest daring,
in great favour with the people on account of his liberality, a man
eager for a revolution: that for a great many years he has been in the
habit of contracting for the customs and all the other taxes of the
Aedui at a small cost, because when _he_ bids, no one dares to bid
against him. By these means he has both increased his own private
property and amassed great means for giving largesses; that he maintains
constantly at his own expense and keeps about his own person a great
number of cavalry, and that not only at home, but even among the
neighbouring states, he has great influence, and for the sake of
strengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among the
Bituriges to a man the most noble and most influential there; that he
has himself taken a wife from among the Helvetii, and has given his
sister by the mother's side and his female relations in marriage into
other states; that he favours and wishes well to the Helvetii on account
of this connection; and that he hates Caesar and the Romans, on his own
account, because by their arrival his power was weakened, and his
brother, Divitiacus, restored to his former position of influence and
dignity: that, if anything should happen to the Romans, he entertains
the highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii,
but that under the government of the Roman people he despairs not only
of royalty but even of that influence which he already has." Caesar
discovered too, on inquiring into the unsuccessful cavalry engagement
which had taken place a few days before, that the commencement of that
flight had been made by Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was in
command of the cavalry which the Aedui had sent for aid to Caesar); that
by their flight the rest of the cavalry was dismayed.

XIX.--After learning these circumstances, since to these suspicions the
most unequivocal facts were added, viz., that he had led the Helvetii
through the territories of the Sequani; that he had provided that
hostages should be mutually given; that he had done all these things,
not only without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of his own state's,
but even without their [the Aedui] knowing anything of it themselves;
that he [Dumnorix] was reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of the
Aedui; he [Caesar] considered that there was sufficient reason why he
should either punish him himself, or order the state to do so. One thing
[however] stood in the way of all this--that he had learned by
experience his brother Divitiacus's very high regard for the Roman
people, his great affection towards him, his distinguished faithfulness,
justice, and moderation; for he was afraid lest by the punishment of
this man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus. Therefore, before
he attempted anything, he orders Divitiacus to be summoned to him, and
when the ordinary interpreters had been withdrawn, converses with him
through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province of Gaul, an
intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest confidence in
everything; at the same time he reminds him of what was said about
Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present, and
shows what each had said of him privately in his [Caesar's] own
presence; he begs and exhorts him, that, without offence to his
feelings, he may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix] after
trying the case, or else order the [Aeduan] state to do so.

XX.-Divitiacus, embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with many
tears, that "he would not pass any very severe sentence upon his
brother; saying, that he knows that those [charges] are true, and that
nobody suffered more pain on that account than he himself did; for when
he himself could effect a very great deal by his influence at home and
in the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little on account of his
youth, the latter had become powerful through his means, which power and
strength he used not only to the lessening of his [Divitiacus]
popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influenced
both by fraternal affection and by public opinion. But if anything very
severe from Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no one would think that
it had been done without his consent, since he himself held such a place
in Caesar's friendship; from which circumstance it would arise that the
affections of the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him." As he was
with tears begging these things of Caesar in many words, Caesar takes
his right hand, and, comforting him, begs him to make an end of
entreating, and assures him that his regard for him is so great that he
forgives both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs, at
his desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him; he brings in his
brother; he points out what he censures in him; he lays before him what
he of himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he warns him
for the future to avoid all grounds of suspicion; he says that he
pardons the past, for the sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spies
over Dumnorix that he may be able to know what he does, and with whom he
communicates.

XXI.--Being on the same day informed by his scouts that the enemy had
encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp, he
sent persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and of
what kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back that it was
easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant
with praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain
with two legions, and with those as guides who had examined the road; he
explains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens
to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all
the cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very
experienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius
Sulla, and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with
the scouts.

XXII.--At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the
possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a
mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterwards ascertained
from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been
discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him--
says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by
Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by
the Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next
hill: [and] draws them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had been
ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own
forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy
might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken
possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from
battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned
through spies that the mountain was in possession of his own men, and
that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck with
fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that
day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp
three miles from theirs.

XXIII.--The next day (as there remained in all only two days' space [to
the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not
more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and best-stored
town of the Aedui) he thought that he ought to provide for a
supply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced
rapidly to Bibracte. This circumstance is reported to the enemy by some
deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain of the Gallic horse. The
Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with
terror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before,
though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joined
battle; or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut off
from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, began
to pursue and to annoy our men in the rear.

XXIV.--Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next
hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He
himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of
his four veteran legions in such a manner that he placed above him on
the very summit the two legions which he had lately levied in Hither
Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain
should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be
brought together into one place, and the position be protected by those
who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii, having followed with
all their waggons, collected their baggage into one place: they
themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx,
advanced up to our front line in very close order.

XXV.--Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then
those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away
with the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle. His
soldiers, hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily broke
the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a charge on them
with drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting,
that, when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the
(Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point
of the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with
their left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many,
after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the
buckler from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected. At
length, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and as there was
in the neighbourhood a mountain about a mile off, to betake themselves
thither. When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing
up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's
line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed our
men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them;
upon seeing which, the Helvetii, who had betaken themselves to the
mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans
having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions; the first
and second line to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off
the field; the third to receive those who were just arriving.

XXVI.--Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful
success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the
one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the
mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and waggons. For during
the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh
hour [_i.e._ 12 (noon)--1 P.M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy
with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till
late in the night, for they had set waggons in the way as a rampart, and
from the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came
on, and some from between the waggons and the wheels kept darting their
lances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight
had lasted some time, our men gained possession of their baggage and
camp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were taken.
After that battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, who
marched incessantly during the whole of that night; and after a march
discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of the
Lingones on the fourth day, whilst our men, having stopped for three
days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of
the slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters and
messengers to the Lingones [with orders] that they should not assist
them with corn or with anything else; for that if they should assist
them, he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii. After the
three days' interval he began to follow them himself with all his
forces.

XXVII.--The Helvetii, compelled by the want of everything, sent
ambassadors to him about a surrender. When these had met him in the way
and had thrown themselves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant tone
had with tears sued for peace, and [when] he had ordered them to await
his arrival, in the place where they then were, they obeyed his
commands. When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, their
arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst those things are
being sought for and got together, after a night's interval, about 6000
men of that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified by
fear, lest, after delivering up their arms, they should suffer
punishment, or else induced by the hope of safety, because they supposed
that, amid so vast a multitude of those who had surrendered themselves,
_their_ flight might either be concealed or entirely overlooked, having
at night-fall departed out of the camp of the Helvetii, hastened to the
Rhine and the territories of the Germans.

XXVIII.--But when Caesar discovered this, he commanded those through
whose territories they had gone, to seek them, out and to bring them
back again, if they meant to be acquitted before him; and considered
them, when brought back, in the light of enemies; he admitted all the
rest to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages, arms, and
deserters. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi to
return to their territories from which they had come, and as there was
at home nothing whereby they might support their hunger, all the
productions of the earth having been destroyed, he commanded the
Allobroges to let them have a plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them
to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burnt. This he did,
chiefly on this account, because he was unwilling that the country, from
which the Helvetii had departed, should be untenanted, lest the Germans,
who dwell on the other side of the Rhine, should, on account of the
excellence of the lands, cross over from their own territories into
those of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the province of Gaul
and the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui, that they
might settle the Boii, in their own (_i.e._ in the Aeduan) territories,
as these were known to be of distinguished valour to whom they gave
lands, and whom they afterwards admitted to the same state of rights and
freedom as themselves.

XXIX.--In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek
characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been
drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their
country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the
old men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was:-

Of the _Helvetii_ [lit. of the heads of the Helvetii] 263,000
Of the _Tulingi_                                       36,000
Of the _Latobrigi_                                     14,000
Of the _Rauraci_                                       23,000
Of the _Boii_                                          32,000
                                                      -------
The sum of all amounted to                            368,000

Out of these, such as could bear arms [amounted] to about 92,000. When
the _census_ of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had
commanded, the number was found to be 110,000.

XXX.--When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from
almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to
congratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, although
he had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrongs done
by them to the Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no less
to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the
Helvetii, while their affairs were most flourishing, had quitted their
country with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul, and
seizing the government of it, and selecting, out of a great abundance,
that spot for an abode which they should judge to be the most convenient
and most productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states as
tributaries. They requested that they might be allowed to proclaim an
assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with
Caesar's permission, [stating] that they had some things which, with the
general consent, they wished to ask of him. This request having been
granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and ordained by an oath
with each other, that no one should disclose [their deliberations]
except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by the general
assembly.

XXXI.--When that assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of states, who
had before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they might be
allowed to treat with him privately (in secret) concerning the safety of
themselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threw
themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less begged
and earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosed
than that they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuch
as they saw that, if a disclosure were made, they should be put to the
greatest tortures. For these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him:--
"That there were two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stood
at the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other. After these had
been violently struggling with one another for the superiority for many
years, it came to pass that the Germans were called in for hire by the
Arverni and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them [_i.e._ of the
Germans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after that these wild and
savage men had become enamoured of the lands and the refinement and the
abundance of the Gauls, more were brought over, that there were now as
many as 120,000 of them in Gaul: that with these the Aedui and their
dependants had repeatedly struggled in arms, that they had been routed
and had sustained a great calamity--had lost all their nobility, all
their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such engagements and
calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in Gaul, both
from their own valour and from the Roman people's hospitality and
friendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their
state as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath,
that they would neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid
from the Roman people, nor refuse to be for ever under their sway and
empire. That he was the only one out of all the state of the Aedui who
could not be prevailed upon to take the oath or to give his children as
hostages. On that account he had fled from his state and had gone to the
senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither by oath nor
hostages. But a worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani than the
vanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, had settled
in their territories, and had seized upon a third of their land, which
was the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart
from another third part, because a few months previously 24,000 men of
the Harudes had come to him, for whom room and settlements must be
provided. The consequence would be, that in a few years they would all
be driven from the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross
the Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be compared with the land
of the Germans, nor must the habit of living of the latter be put on a
level with that of the former. Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner
did he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle, which took place at
Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to demand
as hostages the children of all the principal nobles, and wreak on them
every kind of cruelty, if everything was not done at his nod or
pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and that
his commands could no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid in
Caesar and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing that
the Helvetii had done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, and seek
another dwelling place, other settlements remote from the Germans, and
try whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to be
disclosed to Ariovistus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that he
would inflict the most severe punishment on all the hostages who are in
his possession, [and says] that Caesar could, either by his own
influence and by that of his army, or by his late victory, or by name of
the Roman people, intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number of
Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect all Gaul from
the outrages of Ariovistus."

XXXII.--When this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were
present began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar.
Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did none
of those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down,
gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of this
conduct, he inquired of themselves. No reply did the Sequani make, but
silently continued in the same sadness. When he had repeatedly
inquired of them and could not elicit any answer at all, the same
Divitiacus the Aeduan answered, that--"the lot of the Sequani was more
wretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, because
they alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid; and
shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if he
were present; for, to the rest, despite of everything, there was an
opportunity of flight given; but all tortures must be endured by the
Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories, and whose
towns were all in his power."

XXXIII.--Caesar, on being informed of these things, cheered the minds of
the Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be an
object of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ariovistus,
induced both by his kindness and his power, would put an end to his
oppression. After delivering this speech, he dismissed the assembly;
and, besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to think
that this affair ought to be considered and taken up by him; especially
as he saw that the Aedui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by the
senate "brethren" and "kinsmen," were held in the thraldom and dominion
of the Germans, and understood that their hostages were with Ariovistus
and the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman
people he considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic. That,
moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross the
Rhine, and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw
[would be] dangerous to the Roman people, and judged that wild and
savage men would not be likely to restrain themselves, after they had
possessed themselves of all Gaul, from going forth into the province and
thence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before
them), particularly as the Rhone [was the sole barrier that] separated
the Sequani from our province. Against which events he thought he ought
to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus, for his part,
had assumed to himself such pride and arrogance that he was felt to be
quite insufferable.

XXXIV.--He therefore determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to
demand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference between
the two, [saying] that he wished to treat with him on state-business and
matters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassy
Ariovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of anything from
Caesar, he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted anything
from him he ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he go
without an army into those parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of,
nor could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his army together
to one place; that to him, moreover, it appeared strange what business
either Caesar or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which he
had conquered in war.

XXXV.--When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends ambassadors
to him a second time with this message "Since, after having been treated
with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (as he had in his
consulship [B.C. 59] been styled 'king and friend' by the senate), he
makes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the Roman people, [viz.]
that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not think that it
concerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of mutual
interest, these are the things which he requires of him; first, that he
do not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul;
in the next place, that he restore the hostages which he has from the
Aedui, and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with his
consent those hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke the
Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies; if he would
accordingly do this," [Caesar says] that "he himself and the Roman
people will entertain a perpetual feeling of favour and friendship
towards him; but that if he [Caesar] does not obtain [his desires], that
he (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso
[B.C. 61] the senate had decreed that, whoever should have the
administration of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do so
consistently with the interests of the republic, protect the Aedui and
the other friends of the Roman people) will not overlook the wrongs of
the Aedui."

XXXVI.--To this Ariovistus replied, that "the right of war was, that
they who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in
what manner they pleased; that in that way the Roman people were wont to
govern the nations which they had conquered, not according to the
dictation of any other, but according to their own discretion. If he for
his part did not dictate to the Roman people as to the manner in which
they were to exercise their right, he ought not to be obstructed by the
Roman people in his right; that the Aedui, inasmuch as they had tried
the fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been conquered, had
become tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, in
that by his arrival he was making his revenues less valuable to him;
that he should not restore their hostages to the Aedui, but should not
make war wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abided by
that which had been agreed on, and paid their tribute annually: if they
did _not_ continue to do that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers'
would avail them nought. As to Caesar's threatening him that be would
not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui, [he said] that no one had ever
entered into a contest with _him_ [Ariovistus] without utter ruin to
himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose; he would feel
what the invincible Germans, well-trained [as they were] beyond all
others to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof,
could achieve by their valour."

XXXVII.--At the same time that this message was delivered to Caesar,
ambassadors came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the Aedui to
complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul,
were ravaging their territories; that they had not been able to purchase
peace from Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri,
[to state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banks
of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuas
and Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things,
Caesar thought that he ought to use all despatch, lest, if this new band
of Suevi should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus]
might be less easily withstood. Having, therefore, as quickly as he
could, provided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forced
marches.

XXXVIII.--When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was brought to
him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on
Vesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced
three days' journey from his territories. Caesar thought that he ought
to take the greatest precautions lest this should happen, for there was
in that town a most ample supply of everything which was serviceable for
war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to afford a
great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs
almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were traced round it with
a pair of compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in the remaining
space, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, in
such a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank
on either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this
[mountain], and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by
forced marches by night and day, and, after having seized the town,
stations a garrison there.

XXXIX.--Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn
and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the
Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge
stature, of incredible valour and practice in arms, that ofttimes they,
on encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and the
fierceness of their eyes)--so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole
army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree.
This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the
rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of
friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging,
some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary
for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might be
allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order
that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither
compose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but
hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with
their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally
throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of these
men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both
soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command
of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to
be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but
feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which
lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be
brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar that when he
gave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the
soldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance in
consequence of their fear.

XL.--When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and
summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely
reprimanded them, "particularly for supposing that it belonged to them
to inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching,
or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's] consulship,
had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why
should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He
for his part was persuaded that, when his demands were known and the
fairness of the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the
Roman people's favour. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he
should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of?--or why
should they despair either of their own valour or of his zeal? Of that
enemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, on
the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was
regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself.
It had been made lately, too, in Italy; during the rebellion of the
slaves, whom, however, the experience and training which they had
received from us, assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might
be formed of the advantages which resolution carries with it,--inasmuch
as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed,
they had afterwards vanquished, when well armed and flushed with
success. In short, that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in
frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in
theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet cannot have been
a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls
disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when
the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war,
Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the
marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly
upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all
directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than
valour. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savage
and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby
our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a
pretence about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness of the
roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their
general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things
were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to
furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to
the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its
being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or
advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew that in the
case of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either
upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or,
that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearly
proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole
life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would
therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a
more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the
fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a
sense of honour and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them.
But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only the
tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be his
praetorian cohort."--This legion Caesar had both greatly favoured, and
in it, on account of its valour, placed the greatest confidence.

XLI.-Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in
a surprising, manner, and the highest ardour and eagerness for
prosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first
to return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having
expressed this most favourable opinion of them; and assured him that
they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions
endeavoured, through their military tribunes and the centurions of the
principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they
had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination
of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Having
accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by
Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, [he
found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead
his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he
had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his
march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only
four and twenty miles distant from ours.

XLII.--Upon being apprised of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends
ambassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to a
conference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, since
he [Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might now
do it without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and began to
think that he was now returning to a rational state of mind, as he
spontaneously proffered that which he had previously refused to him when
requesting it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his own
and the Roman people's great favours towards him, the issue would be
that he would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made
known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of conference.
Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them,
Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with
him to the conference, [saying] that "he was afraid of being ensnared by
him through treachery; that both should come accompanied by cavalry;
that he would not come on any other condition." Caesar, as he neither
wished that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be
set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, decided
that it would be most expedient to take away from the Gallic cavalry all
their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenth
legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence; in order that he
might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be any
need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the
tenth legion said, not without a touch of humour, "that Caesar did more
for them than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legion
in place of his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into
horse."

XLIII.--There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of
considerable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both
camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference.
Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought [with him] on
horseback, 200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also
took their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded that
they should confer on horseback, and that, besides themselves, they
should bring with them ten men each to the conference. When they were
come to the place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his
own and the senate's favours towards him [Ariovistus], "in that he had
been styled king, in that [he had been styled] friend, by the senate--
in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstance
he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been
bestowed in consideration of important personal services; that he,
although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground for the
request, had obtained these honours through the kindness and munificence
of himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how old and how
just were the grounds of connexion that existed between themselves [the
Romans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the senate had been passed in
their favour, and how frequent and how honourable; how from time
immemorial the Aedui had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even
[said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was the
custom of the Roman people to desire not only that its allies and
friends should lose none of their property, but be advanced in
influence, dignity, and honour: who then could endure that what they had
brought with them to the friendship of the Roman people, should be torn
from them?" He then made the same demands which he had commissioned the
ambassadors to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either upon
the Aedui or their allies, that he should restore the hostages; that, if
he could not send back to their country any part of the Germans, he
should at all events suffer none of them any more to cross the Rhine.

XLIV.--Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Caesar; but
expatiated largely on his own virtues, "that he had crossed the Rhine
not of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls;
that he had not left home and kindred without great expectations and
great rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls
themselves; that the hostages had been given by their own good-will;
that he took by right of war the tribute which conquerors are accustomed
to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but
the Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and
had encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed and
beaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second
trial, he was ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy
peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute, which of their own free-will
they had paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Roman people
ought to prove to him an ornament and a safeguard, not a detriment; and
that he sought it with that expectation. But if through the Roman people
the tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be
seduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman people
no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his leading over a host of
Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securing
himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in
that he did not come without being invited, and in that he did not make
war, but merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the
Roman people. That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the
frontiers of the province of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire?
--why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains?--that this was his province
of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him, if
he were to make an attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that we
were unjust to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar's saying
that the Aedui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was not so
uncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in
the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to
the Romans, nor received any from the Roman people in the struggles
which the Aedui had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He
must feel suspicious that Caesar, though feigning friendship as the
reason for his keeping an army in Gaul; was keeping it with the view of
crushing him. And that unless he depart, and withdraw his army from
these parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe; and
that, even if he should put him to death, he should do what would please
many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he had assurance
of that from themselves through their messengers, and could purchase the
favour and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if he
would depart and resign to him the free possession of Gaul, he would
recompense him with a great reward, and would bring to a close whatever
wars he wished to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him."

XLV.--Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]: "why he
could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman
people's practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies,
nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the
Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by
Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and
had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. And
if the most ancient period was to be regarded--then was the sovereignty
of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the senate was
to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had
conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws."

XLVI.--While these things are being transacted in the conference, it was
announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching
nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones and
weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to
his men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon
upon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry
would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think
proper to engage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be said
that they had been ensnared by him under the sanction of a conference.
When it was spread abroad among the common soldiery with what
haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he had
ordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack
upon our men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater
alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.

XLVII.--Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to state
"that he wished to treat with him about those things which had been
begun to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded"; [and
to beg] that "he would either again appoint a day for a conference; or,
if he were not willing to do that, that he would send one of his
[officers] as an ambassador to him." There did not appear to Caesar any
good reason for holding a conference; and the more so as the day before
the Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our men. He
thought he should not without great danger send to him as ambassador one
of his [Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed
[therefore] most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of
C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and
accomplishments (whose father had been presented with the freedom of the
city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on
account of his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by
long practice, now spoke fluently; and because in his case the Germans
would have no motive for committing violence; and [as his colleague] M.
Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned
them to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him. But when
Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence
of his army, "Why were they come to him? was it for the purpose of
acting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to speak, and cast
them into chains.

XLVIII.--The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a hill
six miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces past
Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design--that
he might cut off Caesar from, the corn and provisions which might be
conveyed to him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For five successive days
from that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the camp, and put them
in battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in
battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this
time kept his army in camp: but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The
method of battle in which the Germans had practised themselves was this.
There were 6000 horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, one
of whom each of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own
protection. By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in their
engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emergency rushed
forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from
his horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary to advance
farther: than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, so great, from
practice, was their swiftness, that, supported by the manes of the
horses, they could keep pace with their speed.

XLIX.--Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he
might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient
position for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped,
at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three
lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines to
be under arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant
from the enemy about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus
sent light troops, about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry;
which forces were to intimidate our men, and hinder them in their
fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged, ordered
two lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute the work. The
camp being fortified, he left there two legions and a portion of the
auxiliaries; and led back the other four legions into the larger camp.

L.--The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces
from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drew
up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting.
When he found that they did not even then come out [from their
entrenchments], he led back his army into camp about noon. Then at last
Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle
was vigorously maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset,
after many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back
his forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners, wherefore
Ariovistus did not come to an engagement, he discovered this to be the
reason--that among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons to
pronounce from lots and divination whether it were expedient that the
battle should be engaged in or not; that they had said, "that it was not
the will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in
battle before the new moon."

LI.--The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard
for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the
enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the
number of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that
[thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He
himself, having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp
of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces
out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the
Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and
surrounded their whole army with their chariots and waggons, that no
hope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who,
with dishevelled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went
forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.

LII.--Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that
every one might have them as witnesses of his valour. He himself began
the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that
part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the
signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the
enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for
casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins,
they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to
their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our
swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the
phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the
enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left
wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the
right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P.
Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry--as he was more
disengaged than those who were employed in the fight--sent the third
line as a relief to our men who were in distress.

LIII.--Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned
their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river
Rhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relying
on their strength, endeavoured to swim over, or, finding boats, procured
their safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who meeting with a small
vessel tied to the bank, escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew all
the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom
he had brought with him from home; the other a Norican, the sister of
king Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thither
for that purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of their
two daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus,
as he was being dragged by his guards in the flight, bound with a triple
chain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the
enemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less
pleasure than the victory itself; because he saw a man of the first rank
in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued
from the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune had
not diminished aught of the joy and exultation [of that day] by his
destruction. He [Procillus] said that in his own presence the lots had
been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately be
put to death by fire, or be reserved for another time: that by the
favour of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found and
brought back to him [Caesar].

LIV.--This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who
had come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when the
Ubii, who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed,
slew a great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very important
wars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among the
Sequani, a little earlier than the season of the year required. He
appointed Labienus over the winter quarters, and set out in person for
Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.



BOOK II

I.--While Caesar was in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown
above, frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also informed by
letters from Labienus, that all the Belgae, who we have said are a third
part of Gaul, were entering into a confederacy against the Roman people,
and giving hostages to one another; that the reasons of the confederacy
were these--first, because they feared that, after all [Celtic] Gaul was
subdued, our army would be led against them; secondly, because they were
instigated by several of the Gauls; some of whom as [on the one hand]
they had been unwilling that the Germans should remain any longer in
Gaul, so [on the other] they were dissatisfied that the army of the
Roman people should pass the winter in it, and settle there; and others
of them, from a natural instability and fickleness of disposition, were
anxious for a revolution; [the Belgae were instigated] by several, also,
because the government in Gaul was generally seized upon by the more
powerful persons and by those who had the means of hiring troops, and
they could less easily effect this object under our dominion.

II.--Alarmed by these tidings and letters, Caesar levied two new legions
in Hither Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius, his
lieutenant, to conduct them further into Gaul. He himself, as soon as
there began to be plenty of forage, came to the army. He gives a
commission to the Senones and the other Gauls who were neighbours of the
Belgae, to learn what is going on amongst them [_i.e._ the Belgae], and
inform him of these matters. These all uniformly reported that troops
were being raised, and that an army was being collected in one place.
Then, indeed, he thought that he ought not to hesitate about proceeding
towards them, and having provided supplies, moves his camp, and in about
fifteen days arrives at the territories of the Belgae.

III.--As he arrived there unexpectedly and sooner than any one
anticipated, the Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic]
Gaul, sent to him Iccius and Antebrogius, [two of] the principal persons
of the state, as their ambassadors: to tell him that they surrendered
themselves and all their possessions to the protection and disposal of
the Roman people: and that they had neither combined with the rest of
the Belgae, nor entered into any confederacy against the Roman people:
and were prepared to give hostages, to obey his commands, to receive him
into their towns, and to aid him with corn and other things; that all
the rest of the Belgae were in arms; and that the Germans, who dwell on
this side the Rhine, had joined themselves to them; and that so great
was the infatuation of them all that they could not restrain even the
Suessiones, their own brethren and kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights,
and the same laws, and who have one government and one magistracy [in
common] with themselves, from uniting with them.

IV.--When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful
they were, and what they could do in war, he received the following
information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung from the
Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had
settled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and had
driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were the
only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was
overrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their
territories; the effect of which was that, from the recollection of
those events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness
in military matters. The Remi said that they had known accurately
everything respecting their number, because, being united to them by
neighbourhood and by alliances, they had learnt what number each state
had in the general council of the Belgae promised for that war. That the
Bellovaci were the most powerful amongst them in valour, influence, and
number of men; that these could muster 100,000 armed men, [and had]
promised 60,000 picked men out of that number, and demanded for
themselves the command of the whole war. That the Suessiones were their
nearest neighbours and possessed a very extensive and fertile country;
that among them, even in our own memory, Divitiacus, the most powerful
man of all Gaul, had been king; who had held the government of a great
part of these regions, as well as of Britain; that their king at present
was Galba; that the direction of the whole war was conferred by the
consent of all upon him, on account of his integrity and prudence; that
they had twelve towns; that they had promised 50,000 armed men; and that
the Nervii, who are reckoned the most warlike among them, and are
situated at a very great distance, [had promised] as many; the
Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapu,
9000; the Caleti, 10,000; the Velocasses and the Veromandui as many; the
Aduatuci, 19,000; that the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the
Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans, [had promised],
they thought, to the number of 40,000.

V.--Caesar, having encouraged the Remi, and addressed them courteously,
ordered the whole senate to assemble before him, and the children of
their chief men to be brought to him as hostages; all which commands
they punctually performed by the day [appointed]. He, addressing himself
to Divitiacus the Aeduan, with great earnestness, points out how much it
concerns the republic and their common security, that the forces of the
enemy should be divided, so that it might not be necessary to engage
with so large a number at one time. [He asserts] that this might be
effected if the Aedui would lead their forces into the territories of
the Bellovaci, and begin to lay waste their country. With these
instructions he dismissed him from his presence. After he perceived that
all the forces of the Belgae, which had been collected in one place,
were approaching towards him, and learnt from the scouts whom he had
sent out, and [also] from the Remi, that they were not then far distant,
he hastened to lead his army over the Aisne, which is on the borders of
the Remi, and there pitched his camp. This position fortified one side
of his camp by the banks of the river, rendered the country which lay in
his rear secure from the enemy, and furthermore ensured that provisions
might without danger be brought to him by the Remi and the rest of the
states. Over that river was a bridge: there he places a guard; and on
the other side of the river he leaves Q. Titurus Sabinus, his
lieutenant, with six cohorts. He orders him to fortify a camp with a
rampart twelve feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in breadth.

VI.--There was a town of the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant
from this camp. This the Belgae on their march began to attack with
great vigour. [The assault] was with difficulty sustained for that day.
The Gauls' mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae: when
after having drawn a large number of men around the whole of the
fortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on all
sides, and the wall has been stript of its defenders, [then], forming a
testudo, they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which was
easily effected on this occasion; for while so large a number were
casting stones and darts, no one was able to maintain his position upon
the wall. When night had put an end to the assault, Iccius, who was then
in command of the town, one of the Remi, a man of the highest rank and
influence amongst his people, and one of those who had come to Caesar as
ambassador [to sue] for a peace, sends messengers to him, [to report]
"That, unless assistance were sent to him, he could not hold out any
longer."

VII.--Thither immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the
same persons who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends some
Numidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearian slingers as a relief to
the townspeople, by whose arrival both a desire to resist together with
the hope of [making good their] defence was infused into the Remi, and,
for the same reason, the hope of gaining the town abandoned the enemy.
Therefore, after staying a short time before the town, and laying waste
the country of the Remi, when all the villages and buildings which they
could approach had been burnt, they hastened with all their forces to
the camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles [of it]; and
their camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more than
eight miles in breadth.

VIII.--Caesar at first determined to decline a battle, as well on
account of the great number of the enemy as their distinguished
reputation for valour: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove to
ascertain by frequent trials what the enemy could effect by their
prowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men were
not inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally convenient and
suitable for marshalling an army (since the hill where the camp was
pitched, rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth as
far as the space which the marshalled army could occupy, and had steep
declines of its side in either direction, and gently sloping in front
gradually sank to the plain), on either side of that hill he drew a
cross trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities of that
trench built forts, and placed there his military engines, lest, after
he had marshalled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful in
point of number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, while
fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legions
which he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they
might be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order
of battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their
forces which they had brought out of the camp.

IX.--There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that of
the enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this;
our men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, if
the first attempt to pass should be made by them. In the meantime battle
was commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neither
army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse
[proving] favourable to our men, led back his forces into the camp. The
enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it
has been stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they
endeavoured to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design,
that, if they could, they might carry by storm the fort which Q.
Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant, commanded, and might cut off the bridge;
but, if they could not do that, they should lay waste the lands of the
Remi, which were of great use to us in carrying on the war, and might
hinder our men from foraging.

X.--Caesar, being apprised of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry
and light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and
hastens towards them. There was a severe struggle in that place. Our
men, attacking in the river the disordered enemy, slew a great part of
them. By the immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest,
who in a most courageous manner were attempting to pass over their
bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who
had first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their
hopes had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town by
storm and also their passing the river, and did not see our men advance
to a more disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when
provisions began to fail them, having called a council, determined that
it was best for each to return to his country, and resolved to assemble
from all quarters to defend those into whose territories the Romans
should first march an army; that they might contend in their own rather
than in a foreign country, and might enjoy the stores of provisions
which they possessed at home. Together with other causes, this
consideration also led them to that resolution, viz.: that they had
learnt that Divitiacus and the Aedui were approaching the territories of
the Bellovaci. And it was impossible to persuade the latter to stay any
longer, or to deter them from conveying succour to their own people.

XI.--That matter being determined on, marching out of their camp at the
second watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor
under any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place in
the journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departure
appear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through his
scouts, [but] fearing an ambuscade, because he had not yet discovered
for what reason they were departing, kept his army and cavalry within
the camp. At daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed by the
scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass their rear; and gave the
command of it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius
Cotta. He ordered T. Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to follow
them closely with three legions. These, attacking their rear, and
pursuing them for many miles, slew a great number of them as they were
fleeing; while those in the rear with whom they had come up, halted, and
bravely sustained the attack of our soldiers; the van, because they
appeared to be removed from danger, and were not restrained by any
necessity or command, as soon as the noise was heard, broke their ranks,
and, to a man, rested their safety in flight. Thus without any risk [to
themselves] our men killed as great a number of them as the length of
the day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betook
themselves into the camp, as they had been commanded.

XII.--On the day following, before the enemy could recover from their
terror and flight, Caesar led his army into the territories of the
Suessiones, which are next to the Remi, and having accomplished a long
march, hastens to the town named Noviodunum. Having attempted to take it
by storm on his march, because he heard that it was destitute of
[sufficient] defenders, he was not able to carry it by assault, on
account of the breadth of the ditch and the height of the wall, though
few were defending it. Therefore, having fortified the camp, he began to
bring up the vineae, and to provide whatever things were necessary for
the storm. In the meantime, the whole body of the Suessiones, after
their flight, came the next night into the town. The vineae having been
quickly brought up against the town, a mound thrown up, and towers
built, the Gauls, amazed by the greatness of the works, such as they had
neither seen nor heard of before, and struck, also, by the despatch of
the Romans, send ambassadors to Caesar respecting a surrender, and
succeed in consequence of the Remi requesting that they [the Suessiones]
might be spared.

XIII.--Caesar, having received as hostages the first men of the state,
and even the two sons of king Galba himself; and all the arms in the
town having been delivered up, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender,
and led his army against the Bellovaci. Who, when they had conveyed
themselves and all their possessions into the town called Bratuspantium,
and Caesar with his army was about five miles distant from that town,
all the old men, going out of the town, began to stretch out their hands
to Caesar, and to intimate by their voice that they would throw
themselves on his protection and power, nor would contend in arms
against the Roman people. In like manner, when he had come up to the
town, and there pitched his camp, the boys and the women from the wall,
with outstretched hands, after their custom, begged peace from the
Romans.

XIV.--For these Divitiacus pleads (for after the departure of the
Belgae, having dismissed the troops of the Aedui, he had returned to
Caesar). "The Bellovaci had at all times been in the alliance and
friendship of the Aeduan state; that they had revolted from the Aedui
and made war upon the Roman people, being urged thereto by their nobles,
who said that the Aedui, reduced to slavery by Caesar, were suffering
every indignity and insult. That they who had been the leaders of that
plot, because they perceived how great a calamity they had brought upon
the state, had fled into Britain. That not only the Bellovaci, but also
the Aedui, entreated him to use his [accustomed] clemency and lenity
towards them [the Bellovaci]: which if he did, he would increase the
influence of the Aedui among all the Belgae, by whose succour and
resources they had been accustomed to support themselves whenever any
wars occurred."

XV.--Caesar said that on account of his respect for Divitiacus and the
Aeduans, he would receive them into his protection, and would spare
them; but, because the state was of great influence among the Belgae,
and pre-eminent in the number of its population, he demanded 600
hostages. When these were delivered, and all the arms in the town
collected, he went from that place into the territories of the Ambiani,
who, without delay, surrendered themselves and all their possessions.
Upon their territories bordered the Nervii, concerning whose character
and customs when Caesar inquired he received the following information:
--That "there was no access for merchants to them; that they suffered no
wine and other things tending to luxury to be imported; because they
thought that by their use the mind is enervated and the courage
impaired: that they were a savage people and of great bravery: that they
upbraided and condemned the rest of the Belgae who had surrendered
themselves to the Roman people and thrown aside their national courage:
that they openly declared they would neither send ambassadors, nor
accept any condition of peace."

XVI.--After he had made three days' march through their territories, he
discovered from some prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more than
ten miles from his camp: that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on
the other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and the
Veromandui, their neighbours, were there awaiting the arrival of the
Romans; for they had persuaded both these nations to try the same
fortune of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci were
also expected by them, and were on their march; that they had put their
women, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place to
which there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes.

XVII.--Having learnt these things, he sends forward scouts and
centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great
many of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar,
marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learnt from the
prisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army's
method of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that
a great number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and
that there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come into
the camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack that
legion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-train
seized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare to
stand their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those who
reported that circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times, because
they were weak in cavalry (for not even at this time do they attend to
it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can), in order that
they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbours if
they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut young
trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] on
to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them,
had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which
it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye.
Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by these
things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected by
them.

XVIII.--The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the camp
was this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extended to the river
Sambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a
[second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to the
former, and open from about 200 paces at the lowest part; but in the
upper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see through it
into the interior. Within those woods the enemy kept themselves in
concealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground,
along the river. The depth of the river was about three feet.

XIX.--Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after
them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was
different from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as
he was approaching the enemy Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as
the van] six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed
the baggage-trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had
been last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train.
Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river,
commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from
time to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, and
again made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to
follow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plain
and open parts extended, in the meantime the six legions which had
arrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp.
When the first part of the baggage-train of our army was seen by those
who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the
time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of
battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one
another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an
attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into
confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed
that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost
at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to
our camp and to those who were employed in the works.

XX.--Caesar had everything to do at one time: the standard to be
displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the
signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from
the works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of
seeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle
to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given.
A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of
time and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under these
difficulties two things proved of advantage; [first] the skill and
experience of the soldiers, because, having been trained by former
engagements, they could suggest to themselves what ought to be done, as
conveniently as receive information from others; and [secondly] that
Caesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the works
and their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, on
account of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not then
wait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed whatever
appeared proper.

XXI.--Caesar, having given the necessary orders, hastened to and fro
into whatever quarter fortune carried him to animate the troops, and
came to the tenth legion. Having encouraged the soldiers with no further
speech than that "they should keep up the remembrance of their wonted
valour, and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assault
of the enemy"; as the latter were not farther from them than the
distance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for
commencing battle. And having gone to another quarter for the purpose of
encouraging [the soldiers], he finds them fighting. Such was the
shortness of the time, and so determined was the mind of the enemy on
fighting, that time was wanting not only for affixing the military
insignia, but even for putting on the helmets and drawing off the covers
from the shields. To whatever part any one by chance came from the works
(in which he had been employed), and whatever standards he saw first, at
these he stood, lest in seeking his own company he should lose the time
for fighting.

XXII.--The army having been marshalled, rather as the nature of the
ground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, than
as the method and order of military matters required; whilst the legions
in the different places were withstanding the enemy, some in one
quarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by the very thick
hedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could proper
reserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in each
part, nor could all the commands be issued by one person. Therefore, in
such an unfavourable state of affairs, various events of fortune
followed.

XXIII.--The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been
stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily
drove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them), who
were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from
the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were
endeavouring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them
while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the
river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle
was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had
returned and were opposing them. In like manner, in another quarter two
different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the
Veromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higher
ground upon the very banks of the river. But, almost the whole camp on
the front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfth
legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great
distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body, with
Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened
towards that place; and part of them began to surround the legions on
their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the
encampment.

XXIV.--At the same time our horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who had
been with those who, as I have related, were routed by the first assault
of the enemy, as they were betaking themselves into the camp, met the
enemy face to face, and again sought flight into another quarter; and
the camp-followers who from the Decuman Gate and from the highest ridge
of the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors, when, after
going out for the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw the
enemy parading in our camp, committed themselves precipitately to
flight; at the same time there arose the cry and shout of those who came
with the baggage-train; and they (affrighted) were carried some one way,
some another. By all these circumstances the cavalry of the Treviri were
much alarmed (whose reputation for courage is extraordinary among the
Gauls, and who had come to Caesar, being sent by their state as
auxiliaries), and, when they saw our camp filled with a large number of
the enemy, the legions hard pressed and almost held surrounded, the
camp-retainers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing on all sides
divided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs, hastened home,
and related to their state that the Romans were routed and conquered,
[and] that the enemy were in possession of their camp and baggage-train.

XXV.--Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right
wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in
consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected
together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to
themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort
were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost,
almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain,
and among them the chief centurion of the legion, P. Sextius Baculus, a
very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that
he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the
rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in
the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that
the enemy [on the other hand], though advancing from the lower ground,
were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on
both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that
there was not any reserve which could be brought up; having therefore
snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himself
had come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, and
addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest of the
soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend the
companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his
arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored,
whilst every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired
to exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little
checked.

XXVI.--Caesar, when he perceived that the seventh legion, which stood
close by him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes
of the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions gradually, and make
their charge upon the enemy with a double front; which having been done,
since they brought assistance the one to the other, nor feared lest
their rear should be surrounded by the enemy, they began to stand their
ground more boldly, and to fight more courageously. In the meantime, the
soldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear of the army, as a
guard for the baggage-train, upon the battle being reported to them,
quickened their pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the hill;
and Titus Labienus, having gained possession of the camp of the enemy,
and observed from the higher ground what was going on in our camp, sent
the tenth legion as a relief to our men, who, when they had learnt from
the flight of the horse and the sutlers in what position the affair was,
and in how great danger the camp and the legion and the commander were
involved, left undone nothing [which tended] to despatch.

XXVI.--By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our
men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leant on
their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though
unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though]
armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valour blot out the
disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary
soldiers in all parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the last
hope of safety, displayed such great courage that when the foremost of
them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from
their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up
together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men
[thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen
between [the armies]; so that it ought not to be concluded, that men of
such great courage had injudiciously dared to pass a very broad river,
ascend very high banks, and come up to a very disadvantageous place;
since their greatness of spirit had rendered these actions easy,
although in themselves very difficult.

XXVIII.--This battle being ended, and the nation and name of the Nervii
being almost reduced to annihilation, their old men, whom together with
the boys and women we have stated to have been collected together in the
fenny places and marshes, on this battle having been reported to them,
since they were convinced that nothing was an obstacle to the
conquerors, and nothing safe to the conquered, sent ambassadors to
Caesar by the consent of all who remained, and surrendered themselves to
him; and in recounting the calamity of their state, said that their
senators were reduced from 600 to three; that from 60,000 men they [were
reduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear arms; whom Caesar, that he might
appear to use compassion towards the wretched and the suppliant, most
carefully spared; and ordered them to enjoy their own territories and
towns, and commanded their neighbours that they should restrain
themselves and their dependants from offering injury or outrage [to
them].

XXIX.--When the Aduatuci, of whom we have written above, were coming
with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, upon this battle
being reported to them, they returned home after they were on the march;
deserting all their towns and forts, they conveyed together all their
possessions into one town, eminently fortified by nature. While this
town had on all sides around it very high rocks and precipices, there
was left on one side a gently ascending approach, of not more than 200
feet in width; which place they had fortified with a very lofty double
wall: besides, they had placed stones of great weight and sharpened
stakes upon the walls. They were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones,
who, when they were marching into our province and Italy, having
deposited on this side the river Rhine such of their baggage-trains as
they could not drive or convey with them, left 6000 of their men as a
guard and defence for them. These having, after the destruction of their
countrymen, been harassed for many years by their neighbours, while one
time they waged war offensively, and at another resisted it when waged
against them, concluded a peace with the consent of all, and chose this
place as their settlement.

XXX.--And on the first arrival of our army they made frequent sallies
from the town, and contended with our men in trifling skirmishes:
afterwards, when hemmed in by a rampart of twelve feet [in height], and
fifteen miles in circuit, they kept themselves within the town. When,
vineae having been brought up and a mound raised, they observed that a
tower also was being built at a distance, they at first began to mock
the Romans from their wall, and to taunt them with the following
speeches. "For what purpose was so vast a machine constructed at so
great a distance?" "With what hands," or "with what strength did they,
especially [as they were] men of such very small stature" (for our
shortness of stature, in comparison with the great size of their bodies,
is generally a subject of much contempt to the men of Gaul), "trust to
place against their walls a tower of such great weight."

XXXI.--But when they saw that it was being moved, and was approaching
their walls, startled by the new and unaccustomed sight, they sent
ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about peace; who spoke in the following
manner: "That they did not believe the Romans waged war without divine
aid, since they were able to move forward machines of such a height with
so great speed, and thus fight from close quarters: that they resigned
themselves and all their possessions to [Caesar's] disposal: that they
begged and earnestly entreated one thing, viz., that if perchance,
agreeably to his clemency and humanity, which they had heard of from
others, he should resolve that the Aduatuci were to be spared, he would
not deprive them of their arms; that all their neighbours were enemies
to them and envied their courage, from whom they could not defend
themselves if their arms were delivered up: that it was better for them,
if they should be reduced to that state, to suffer any fate from the
Roman people, than to be tortured to death by those among whom they had
been accustomed to rule."

XXXII.--To these things Caesar replied, "That he, in accordance with his
custom, rather than owing to their desert, should spare the state, if
they should surrender themselves before the battering-ram should touch
the wall; but that there was no condition of surrender, except upon
their arms being delivered up; that he should do to them that which he
had done in the case of the Nervii, and would command their neighbours
not to offer any injury to those who had surrendered to the Roman
people." The matter being reported to their countrymen, they said that
they would execute his commands. Having cast a very large quantity of
their arms from the wall into the trench which was before the town, so
that the heaps of arms almost equalled the top of the wall and the
rampart, and nevertheless having retained and concealed, as we
afterwards discovered, about a third part in the town, the gates were
opened, and they enjoyed peace for that day.

XXXIII.--Towards evening Caesar ordered the gates to be shut, and the
soldiers to go out of the town, lest the townspeople should receive any
injury from them by night. They [the Aduatuci], by a design before
entered into, as we afterwards understood, because they believed that,
as a surrender had been made, our men would dismiss their guards, or at
least would keep watch less carefully, partly with those arms which they
had retained and concealed, partly with shields made of bark or
interwoven wickers, which they had hastily covered over with skins (as
the shortness of time required) in the third watch, suddenly made a
sally from the town with all their forces [in that direction] in which
the ascent to our fortifications seemed the least difficult. The signal
having been immediately given by fires, as Caesar had previously
commanded, a rush was made thither [_i.e._ by the Roman soldiers] from
the nearest fort; and the battle was fought by the enemy as vigorously
as it ought to be fought by brave men, in the last hope of safety, in a
disadvantageous place, and against those who were throwing their weapons
from a rampart and from towers; since all hope of safety depended on
their courage alone. About 4000 of the men having been slain, the rest
were forced back into the town. The day after, Caesar, after breaking
open the gates, which there was no one then to defend, and sending in
our soldiers, sold the whole spoil of that town. The number of 53,000
persons was reported to him by those who had bought them.

XXXIV.--At the same time he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had sent
with one legion against the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the
Curiosolitae, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci, and the Rhedones, which are
maritime states, and touch upon the [Atlantic] ocean, that all these
nations were brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people.

XXXV.--These things being achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, so
high an opinion of this war was spread among the barbarians, that
ambassadors were sent to Caesar by those nations who dwelt beyond the
Rhine, to promise that they would give hostages and execute his
commands. Which embassies Caesar, because he was hastening into Italy
and Illyricum, ordered to return to him at the beginning of the
following summer. He himself, having led his legions into winter-quarters
among the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, which states
were close to those regions in which he had waged war, set out for
Italy; and a thanksgiving of fifteen days was decreed for those
achievements, upon receiving Caesar's letter; [an honour] which before
that time had been conferred on none.



BOOK III

I.--When Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with
the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, the
Veragri, and Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobroges,
and the lake of Geneva, and the river Rhone to the top of the Alps. The
reason for sending him was, that he desired that the pass along the
Alps, through which [the Roman] merchants had been accustomed to travel
with great danger, and under great imposts, should be opened. He
permitted him, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion in
these places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba having fought some
successful battles, and stormed several of their forts, upon ambassadors
being sent to him from all parts and hostages given and a peace
concluded, determined to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, and to
winter in person with the other cohorts of that legion in a village of
the Veragri, which is called Octodurus; and this village being situated
in a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is bounded on all sides
by very high mountains. As this village was divided into two parts by a
river, he granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other,
which had been left by them unoccupied, to the cohorts to winter in. He
fortified this [latter] part with a rampart and a ditch.

II.--When several days had elapsed in winter quarters, and he had
ordered corn to be brought in, he was suddenly informed by his scouts
that all the people had gone off in the night from that part of the town
which he had given up to the Gauls, and that the mountains which hung
over it were occupied by a very large force of the Sedani and Veragri.
It had happened for several reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed the
design of renewing the war and cutting off that legion. First, because
they despised a single legion, on account of its small number, and that
not quite full (two cohorts having been detached, and several
individuals being absent, who had been despatched for the purpose of
seeking provision); then, likewise, because they thought that on account
of the disadvantageous character of the situation, even their first
attack could not be sustained [by us] when they would rush from the
mountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons upon us. To this
was added, that they were indignant that their children were torn from
them under the title of hostages, and they were persuaded that the
Romans designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps, and unite those
parts to the neighbouring province [of Gaul], not only to secure the
passes, but also as a constant possession.

III.--Having received these tidings, Galba, since the works of the
winter quarters and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor was
sufficient preparation made with regard to corn and other provisions
(since, as a surrender had been made, and hostages received, he had
thought he need entertain no apprehension of a war), speedily summoning
a council, began to anxiously inquire their opinions. In which council,
since so much sudden danger had happened contrary to the general
expectation, and almost all the higher places were seen already covered
with a multitude of armed men, nor could [either] troops come to their
relief, or provisions be brought in, as the passes were blocked up [by
the enemy]; safety being now nearly despaired of, some opinions of this
sort were delivered; that, "leaving their baggage, and making a sally,
they should hasten away for safety by the same routes by which they had
come thither." To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reserving
that measure to the last, to await the issue of the matter, and to
defend the camp.

IV.--A short time only having elapsed, so that time was scarcely given
for arranging and executing those things which they had determined on,
the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our men] from
all parts, and discharged stones and darts upon our rampart. Our men at
first, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did they
cast any weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as any
part of the camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard
pressed, thither they ran, and brought assistance. But they were
over-matched in this, that the enemy when wearied by the long continuance
of the battle, went out of the action, and others with fresh strength
came in their place; none of which things could be done by our men, owing
to the smallness of their number; and not only was permission not given
to the wearied [Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to the
wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where he had been
stationed, and recover.

V.--When they had now been fighting for more than six hours, without
cessation, and not only strength, but even weapons were failing our men,
and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously, and had begun to
demolish the rampart and to fill up the trench, while our men were
becoming exhausted, and the matter was now brought to the last
extremity, P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, whom we
have related to have been disabled by severe wounds in the engagement
with the Nervii, and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a man
of great skill and valour, hasten to Galba, and assure him that the only
hope of safety lay in making a sally, and trying the last resource.
Whereupon, assembling the centurions, he quickly gives orders to the
soldiers to discontinue the fight a short time, and only collect the
weapons flung [at them], and recruit themselves after their fatigue, and
afterwards, upon the signal being given, sally forth from the camp, and
place in their valour all their hope of safety.

VI.--They do what they were ordered; and, making a sudden sally from all
the gates [of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of knowing
what was taking place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune thus taking
a turn, [our men] surround on every side, and slay those who had
entertained the hope of gaining the camp, and having killed more than
the third part of an army of more than 30,000 men (which number of the
barbarians it appeared certain had come up to our camp), put to flight
the rest when panic-stricken, and do not suffer them to halt even upon
the higher grounds. All the forces of the enemy being thus routed, and
stripped of their arms, [our men] betake themselves to their camp and
fortifications. Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba was
unwilling to tempt fortune again, and remembered that he had come into
winter quarters with one design, and saw that he had met with a
different state of affairs; chiefly however urged by the want of corn
and provision, having the next day burned all the buildings of that
village, he hastens to return into the province; and as no enemy opposed
or hindered his march, he brought the legion safe into the [country of
the] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and there
wintered.

VII.--These things being achieved, while Caesar had every reason to
suppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the Belgae
being overcome, the Germans expelled, the Seduni among the Alps
defeated, and when he had, therefore, in the beginning of winter, set
out for Illyricum, as he wished to visit those nations, and acquire a
knowledge of their countries, a sudden war sprang up in Gaul. The
occasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up his
winter quarters with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border upon
the [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of corn in those
parts, sent out some officers of cavalry and several military tribunes
amongst the neighbouring states, for the purpose of procuring corn and
provision; in which number T. Terrasidius was sent amongst the Esubii;
M. Trebius Gallus amongst the Curiosolitae; Q. Velanius, with T. Silius,
amongst the Veneti.

VIII.--The influence of this state is by far the most considerable of
any of the countries on the whole sea coast, because the Veneti both
have a very great number of ships, with which they have been accustomed
to sail to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge and
experience of nautical affairs; and as only a few ports lie scattered
along that stormy and open sea, of which they are in possession, they
hold as tributaries almost all those who are accustomed to traffic in
that sea. With them arose the beginning [of the revolt] by their
detaining Silius and Velanius; for they thought that they should recover
by their means the hostages which they had given to Crassus. The
neighbouring people, led on by their influence (as the measures of the
Gauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the same
motive; and quickly sending ambassadors, by means of their leading men,
they enter into a mutual compact to do nothing except by general
consent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they solicit the other
states to choose rather to continue in that liberty which they had
received from their ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans. All
the sea coast being quickly brought over to their sentiments, they send
a common embassy to P. Crassus [to say], "If he wished to receive back
his officers, let him send back to them their hostages."

IX.--Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus, since he was so
far distant himself, orders ships of war to be built in the meantime on
the river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised from
the province; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters being
quickly executed, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permits,
hastens to the army. The Veneti, and the other states also, being
informed of Caesar's arrival, when they reflected how great a crime they
had committed, in that the ambassadors (a character which had amongst
all nations ever been sacred and inviolable) had by them been detained
and thrown into prison, resolve to prepare for a war in proportion to
the greatness of their danger, and especially to provide those things
which appertain to the service of a navy; with the greater confidence,
inasmuch as they greatly relied on the nature of their situation. They
knew that the passes by land were cut off by estuaries, that the
approach by sea was most difficult, by reason of our ignorance of the
localities, [and] the small number of the harbours, and they trusted
that our army would not be able to stay very long among them, on account
of the insufficiency of corn; and again, even if all these things should
turn out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very powerful in
their navy. They, well understood that the Romans neither had any number
of ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, the harbours, or the
islands of those parts where they would have to carry on the war; and
that navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it was in
the vast and open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortify
their towns, convey corn into them from the country parts, bring
together as many ships as possible to Venetia, where it appeared Caesar
would at first carry on the war. They unite to themselves as allies for
that war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the
Morini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii; and send for auxiliaries from
Britain, which is situated over against those regions.

X.--There were these difficulties which we have mentioned above, in
carrying on the war, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to that
war; the open insult offered to the state in the detention of the Roman
knights, the rebellion raised after surrendering, the revolt after
hostages were given, the confederacy of so many states, but principally,
lest if [the conduct of] this part was overlooked, the other nations
should think that the same thing was permitted them. Wherefore, since he
reflected that almost all the Gauls were fond of revolution, and easily
and quickly excited to war; that all men likewise, by nature, love
liberty and hate the condition of slavery, he thought he ought to divide
and more widely distribute his army, before more states should join the
confederation.

XI.--He therefore sends T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to
the Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him to visit
the Remi and the other Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance
and repel the Germans (who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae
to their aid) if they attempted to cross the river by force in their
ships. He orders P. Crassus to proceed into Aquitania with twelve
legionary cohorts and a great number of the cavalry, lest auxiliaries
should be sent into Gaul by these states, and such great nations be
united. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with three
legions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the Lexovii, to take
care that their forces should be kept separate from the rest. He
appoints D. Brutus, a young man, over the fleet and those Gallic vessels
which he had ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni,
and the other provinces which remained at peace; and commands him to
proceed towards the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself hastens
thither with the land forces.

XII.--The sites of their towns were generally such that, being placed on
extreme points [of land] and on promontories, they neither had an
approach by land when the tide had rushed in from the main ocean, which
always happens twice in the space of twelve hours; nor by ships,
because, upon the tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to be dashed
upon the shoals. Thus, by either circumstance, was the storming of their
towns rendered difficult; and if at any time perchance the Veneti,
overpowered by the greatness of our works (the sea having been excluded
by a mound and large dams, and the latter being made almost equal in
height to the walls of the town), had begun to despair of their
fortunes, bringing up a large number of ships, of which they had a very
great quantity, they carried off all their property and betook
themselves to the nearest towns; there they again defended themselves by
the same advantages of situation. They did this the more easily during a
great part of the summer, because our ships were kept back by storms,
and the difficulty of sailing was very great in that vast and open sea,
with its strong tides and its harbours far apart and exceedingly few in
number.

XIII.--For their ships were built and equipped after this manner. The
keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they could
more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prows
were raised very high, and in like manner the sterns were adapted to the
force of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. The
ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and
violence whatever; the benches, which were made of planks a foot in
breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb;
the anchors were secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and for
sails they used skins and thin dressed leather. These [were used] either
through their want of canvas and their ignorance of its application, or
for this reason, which is more probable, that they thought that such
storms of the ocean, and such violent gales of wind could not be
resisted by sails, nor ships of such great burden be conveniently enough
managed by them. The encounter of our fleet with these ships was of such
a nature that our fleet excelled in speed alone, and the plying of the
oars; other things, considering the nature of the place [and] the
violence of the storms, were more suitable and better adapted on their
side; for neither could our ships injure theirs with their beaks (so
great was their strength), nor on account of their height was a weapon
easily cast up to them; and for the same reason they were less readily
locked in by rocks. To this was added, that whenever a storm began to
rage and they ran before the wind, they both could weather the storm
more easily and heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by the
tide feared nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of all which things
was much to be dreaded by our ships.

XIV.--Caesar, after taking many of their towns, perceiving that so much
labour was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy could not be
prevented on the capture of their towns, and that injury could not be
done them, he determined to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came up
and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully
equipped and appointed with every kind of [naval] implement, sailed
forth from the harbour, and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it appear
clear to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or to the tribunes of the
soldiers and the centurions, to whom the several ships were assigned,
what to do, or what system of tactics to adopt; for they knew that
damage could not be done by their beaks; and that, although turrets were
built [on their decks], yet the height of the stems of the barbarian
ships exceeded these; so that weapons could not be cast up from [our]
lower position with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls fell
the more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by our men was of great
service, [viz.] sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon poles, of a
form not unlike the hooks used in attacking town walls. When the ropes
which fastened the sail-yards to the masts were caught by them and
pulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the oars, they [the
ropes] were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards necessarily
fell down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended on
their sails and rigging, upon these being cut away, the entire
management of the ships was taken from them at the same time. The rest
of the contest depended on courage; in which our men decidedly had the
advantage; and the more so because the whole action was carried on in
the sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act, a little more
valiant than ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all the hills and
higher grounds, from which there was a near prospect of the sea, were
occupied by our army.

XV.--The sail-yards [of the enemy], as we have said, being brought down,
although two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded each
one [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest energy to board the
ships of the enemy: and, after the barbarians observed this taking
place, as a great many of their ships were beaten, and as no relief for
that evil could be discovered, they hastened to seek safety in flight.
And, having now turned their vessels to that quarter in which the wind
blew, so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, that they could not move
out of their place, which circumstance, truly, was exceedingly opportune
for finishing the business; for our men gave chase and took them one by
one, so that very few out of all the number, [and those] by the
intervention of night, arrived at the land, after the battle had lasted
almost from the fourth hour till sunset.

XVI.--By this battle the war with the Veneti and the whole of the sea
coast was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too, of more
advanced age, in whom there was any discretion or rank, had assembled in
that battle; and they had collected in that one place whatever naval
forces they had anywhere; and when these were lost, the survivors had no
place to retreat to, nor means of defending their towns. They
accordingly surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar,
on whom Caesar thought that punishment should be inflicted the more
severely, in order that for the future the rights of ambassadors might
be more carefully respected, by barbarians: having, therefore, put to
death all their senate, he sold the rest for slaves.

XVII.--While these things are going on amongst the Veneti, Q. Titurius
Sabinus with those troops which he had received from Caesar, arrives in
the territories of the Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, and
held the chief command of all those states which had revolted: from
which he had collected a large and powerful army. And in those few days,
the Aulerci and the Sexovii, having slain their senate because they
would not consent to be promoters of the war, shut their gates [against
us] and united themselves to Viridovix; a great multitude besides of
desperate men and robbers assembled out of Gaul from all quarters, whom
the hope of plundering and the love of fighting had called away from
husbandry and their daily labour. Sabinus kept himself within his camp,
which was in a position convenient for everything; while Viridovix
encamped over against him at a distance of two miles, and daily bringing
out his forces, gave him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus had
now not only come into contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhat
taunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and furnished so great a
suspicion of his cowardice that the enemy presumed to approach even to
the very rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for the following
reason: because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage in
battle with so great a force, especially while he who held the chief
command was absent, except on advantageous ground or some favourable
circumstance presented itself.

XVIII.--After having established this suspicion of his cowardice, he
selected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom
he had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts and
promises to go over to the enemy; and informs [him] of what he wished to
be done. Who, when he arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays before
them the fears of the Romans; and informs them by what difficulties
Caesar himself was harassed, and that the matter was not far removed
from this--that Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his army
out of the camp and set forth to Caesar, for the purpose of carrying
[him] assistance, which, when they heard, they all cry out together that
an opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise ought not to
be thrown away; that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many things
persuaded the Gauls to this measure; the delay of Sabinus during the
previous days; the positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter; want
of provisions, for a supply of which they had not taken the requisite
precautions; the hope springing from the Venetic war; and [also] because
in most cases men willingly believe what they wish. Influenced by these
things, they do not discharge Viridovix and the other leaders from the
council, before they gained permission from them to take up arms and
hasten to [our] camp; which being granted, rejoicing as if victory were
fully certain, they collected faggots and brushwood, with which to fill
up the Roman trenches, and hasten to the camp.

XIX.--The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping from
the bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded with great speed (in
order that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans to
collect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus
having encouraged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestly
desired. While the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which
they were carrying, he orders a sally to be suddenly made from two gates
[of the camp]. It happened, by the advantage of situation, by the
unskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valour of our
soldiers, and their experience in former battles, that they could not
stand one attack of our men, and immediately turned their backs: and our
men with full vigour followed them while disordered, and slew a great
number of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who escaped
by flight. Thus at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval
battle and Caesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and all the states
immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius: for as the temper of the
Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their mind is weak,
and by no means resolute in enduring calamities.

XX.--About the same time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania
(which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory and
the great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul),
understanding that he was to wage war in these parts, where a few years
before L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant, had been killed, and his
army routed, and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with
the loss of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be used
by him. Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries and
cavalry, [and] having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa,
Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, that
border on these regions [Aquitania], he led his army into the
territories of the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates
having brought together great forces and [much] cavalry, in which their
strength principally lay, and assailing our army on the march, engaged
first in a cavalry action, then when their cavalry was routed, and our
men pursuing, they suddenly display their infantry forces, which they
had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These attacked our men [while]
disordered, and renewed the fight.

XXI.--The battle was long and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates,
relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the whole
of Aquitania rested on their valour; [and] our men, on the other hand,
desired it might be seen what they could accomplish without their
general and without the other legions, under a very young commander; at
length the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and a
great number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the
[principal] town of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly
resisting, he raised vineae and turrets. They at one time attempting a
sally, at another forming mines to our rampart and vineae (at which the
Aquitani are eminently skilled, because in many places amongst them
there are copper mines); when they perceived that nothing could be
gained by these operations through the perseverance of our men, they
send ambassadors to Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to a
surrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver up their
arms, comply.

XXII.--And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in
another part Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600 devoted
followers, whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose association
are these,--that they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those to
whose friendship they have devoted themselves: if anything calamitous
happen to them, either they endure the same destiny together with them,
or commit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there been
found any one who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he had
devoted himself, refused to die); Adcantuannus, [I say] endeavouring to
make a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms,
upon a shout being raised at that part of the fortification, and a
fierce battle had been fought there, was driven back into the town, yet
he obtained from Crassus [the indulgence] that he should enjoy the same
terms of surrender [as the other inhabitants].

XXIII.--Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, marched into
the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, the
barbarians being alarmed, because they had heard that a town fortified
by the nature of the place and by art had been taken by us in a few days
after our arrival there, began to send ambassadors into all quarters, to
combine, to give hostages one to another, to raise troops. Ambassadors
also are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are nearest to
Aquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders are summoned from them; on whose
arrival they proceed to carry on the war with great confidence, and with
a great host of men. They who had been with Q. Sertorius the whole
period [of his war in Spain] and were supposed to have very great skill
in military matters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the practice of
the Roman people, begin to select [advantageous] places, to fortify
their camp, to cut off our men from provisions, which, when Crassus
observes, [and likewise] that his forces, on account of their small
number, could not safely be separated; that the enemy both made
excursions and beset the passes, and [yet] left sufficient guard for
their camp; that on that account, corn and provision could not very
conveniently be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy was
daily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle.
This matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that all
thought the same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight.

XXIV.--Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day, and
marshalled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in the
centre, and waited to see what measures the enemy would take. They,
although on account of their great number and their ancient renown in
war, and the small number of our men, they supposed they might safely
fight, nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without any
wound, by besetting the passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and if
the Romans, on account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat,
they intended to attack them while encumbered in their march and
depressed in spirit [as being assailed while] under baggage. This
measure being approved of by the leaders and the forces of the Romans
drawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves in their camp. Crassus
having remarked this circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by their
own delay, and by the reputation [_i.e._ for cowardice arising thence]
had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting, and the remarks of
all were heard [declaring] that no longer ought delay to be made in
going to the camp, after encouraging his men, he marches to the camp of
the enemy, to the great gratification of his own troops.

XXV.--There, while some were filling up the ditch, and others, by
throwing a large number of darts, were driving the defenders from the
rampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not
much rely in the battle, by supplying stones and weapons [to the
soldiers], and by conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearance
and character of men engaged in fighting; while also the enemy were
fighting resolutely and boldly, and their weapons, discharged from their
higher position, fell with great effect; the horse, having gone round
the camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus that the camp was not
fortified with equal care on the side of the Decuman gate, and had an
easy approach.

XXVI.--Crassus, having exhorted the commanders of the horse to animate
their men by great rewards and promises, points out to them what he
wished to have done. They, as they had been commanded, having brought
out the four cohorts, which, as they had been left as a guard for the
camp, were not fatigued by exertion, and having led them round by a
somewhat longer way, lest they could be seen from the camp of the enemy,
when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the battle, quickly
arrived at those fortifications which we have spoken of, and, having
demolished these, stood in the camp of the enemy before they were seen
by them, or it was known what was going on. And then, a shout being
heard in that quarter, our men, their strength having been recruited
(which usually occurs on the hope of victory), began to fight more
vigorously. The enemy, surrounded on all sides, [and] all their affairs
being despaired of, made great attempts to cast themselves down over the
ramparts and to seek safety in flight. These the cavalry pursued over
the very open plains, and after leaving scarcely a fourth part out of
the number of 50,000, which it was certain had assembled out of
Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late at night to the camp.

XXVII.--Having heard of this battle, the greatest part of Aquitania
surrendered itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages, in
which number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Preciani, the
Vocasates, the Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the Ausci, the
Garumni, the Sibuzates, the Cocosates. A few [and those] most remote
nations, relying on the time of the year, because winter was at hand,
neglected to do this.

XXVIII.--About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearly
past, yet since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii
alone remained in arms, and had never sent ambassadors to him [to make a
treaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war
might soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very
different method from the rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived that
the greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routed
and overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests and
morasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. When
Caesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had begun to
fortify his camp, and no enemy was in the meantime seen, while our men
were dispersed on their respective duties, they suddenly rushed out from
all parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latter
quickly took up arms and drove them back again to their forests; and
having killed a great many, lost a few of their own men while pursuing
them too far through those intricate places.

XXIX.--During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down
the forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the
soldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed together
(opposite to the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it
up as a rampart on either flank. When a great space had been, with
incredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy]
and the rear of their baggage-train were already seized by our men, and
they themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests,
storms of such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended,
and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers could not any
longer remain in their tents. Therefore, having laid waste all their
country, [and] having burnt their villages and houses, Caesar led back
his army and stationed them in winter-quarters among the Aulerci and
Lexovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last.



BOOK IV

I.-The following winter (this was the year in which Cn. Pompey and M.
Crassus were consuls), those Germans [called] the Usipetes, and likewise
the Tenchtheri, with a great number of men, crossed the Rhine, not far
from the place at which that river discharges itself into the sea. The
motive for crossing [that river] was that, having been for several years
harassed by the Suevi, they were constantly engaged in war, and hindered
from the pursuits of agriculture. The nation of the Suevi is by far the
largest and the most warlike nation of all the Germans. They are said to
possess a hundred cantons, from each of which they yearly send from
their territories for the purpose of war a thousand armed men: the
others who remain at home, maintain [both] themselves and those engaged
in the expedition. The latter again, in their turn, are in arms the year
after: the former remain at home. Thus neither husbandry nor the art and
practice of war are neglected. But among them there exists no private
and separate land; nor are they permitted to remain more than one year
in one place for the purpose of residence. They do not live much on
corn, but subsist for the most part on milk and flesh, and are much
[engaged] in hunting; which circumstance must, by the nature of their
food, and by their daily exercise and the freedom of their life (for
having from boyhood been accustomed to no employment, or discipline,
they do nothing at all contrary to their inclination), both promote
their strength and render them men of vast stature of body. And to such
a habit have they brought themselves, that even in the coldest parts
they wear no clothing whatever except skins, by reason of the scantiness
of which a great portion of their body is bare, and besides they bathe
in open rivers.

II.--Merchants have access to them rather that they may have persons to
whom they may sell those things which they have taken in war, than
because they need any commodity to be imported to them. Moreover, even
as to labouring cattle, in which the Gauls take the greatest pleasure,
and which they procure at a great price, the Germans do not employ such
as are imported, but those poor and ill-shaped animals which belong to
their country; these, however, they render capable of the greatest
labour by daily exercise. In cavalry actions they frequently leap from
their horses and fight on foot; and train their horses to stand still in
the very spot on which they leave them, to which they retreat with great
activity when there is occasion; nor, according to their practice, is
anything regarded as more unseemly, or more unmanly, than to use
housings. Accordingly, they have the courage, though they be themselves
but few, to advance against any number whatever of horse mounted with
housings. They on no account permit wine to be imported to them, because
they consider that men degenerate in their powers of enduring fatigue,
and are rendered effeminate by that commodity.

III.--They esteem it their greatest praise as a nation that the lands
about their territories lie unoccupied to a very great extent, inasmuch
as [they think] that by this circumstance is indicated that a great
number of nations cannot, withstand their power; and thus on one side of
the Suevi the lands are said to lie desolate for about six hundred
miles. On the other side they border on the Ubii, whose state was large
and flourishing, considering the condition of the Germans, and who are
somewhat more refined than those of the same race and the rest [of the
Germans], and that because they border on the Rhine, and are much
resorted to by merchants, and are accustomed to the manners of the
Gauls, by reason of their approximity to them. Though the Suevi, after
making the attempt frequently and in several wars, could not expel this
nation from their territories, on account of the extent and population
of their state, yet they made them tributaries, and rendered them less
distinguished and powerful [than they had ever been].

IV.--In the same condition were the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri (whom we
have mentioned above), who for many years resisted the power of the
Suevi, but being at last driven from their possessions, and having
wandered through many parts of Germany, came to the Rhine, to districts
which the Menapii inhabited, and where they had lands, houses, and
villages on either side of the river. The latter people, alarmed by the
arrival of so great a multitude, removed from those houses which they
had on the other side of the river, and having placed guards on this
side the Rhine, proceeded to hinder the Germans from crossing. They,
finding themselves, after they had tried all means, unable either to
force a passage on account of their deficiency in shipping, or cross by
stealth on account of the guards of the Menapii, pretended to return to
their own settlements and districts; and, after having proceeded three
days' march, returned; and their cavalry having performed the whole of
this journey in one night, cut off the Menapii, who were ignorant of,
and did not expect [their approach, and] who, having moreover been
informed of the departure of the Germans by their scouts, had without
apprehension returned to their villages beyond the Rhine. Having slain
these, and seized their ships, they crossed the river before that part
of the Menapii, who were at peace in their settlements over the Rhine,
were apprised of [their intention]; and seizing all their houses,
maintained themselves upon their provisions during the rest of the
winter.

V.--Caesar, when informed of these matters, fearing the fickle
disposition of the Gauls, who are easily prompted to take up
resolutions, and much addicted to change, considered that nothing was to
be entrusted to them; for it is the custom of that people to compel
travellers to stop, even against their inclination, and inquire what
they may have heard, or may know, respecting any matter; and in towns
the common people throng around merchants and force them to state from
what countries they come, and what affairs they know of there. They
often engage in resolutions concerning the most important matters,
induced by these reports and stories alone; of which they must
necessarily instantly repent, since they yield to mere unauthorised
reports; and since most people give to their questions answers framed
agreeably to their wishes.

VI.--Caesar, being aware of their custom, in order that he might not
encounter a more formidable war, sets forward to the army earlier in the
year than he was accustomed to do. When he had arrived there, he
discovered that those things, which he had suspected would occur, had
taken place; that embassies had been sent to the Germans by some of the
states, and that they had been entreated to leave the Rhine, and had
been promised that all things which they desired should be provided by
the Gauls. Allured by this hope, the Germans were then making excursions
to greater distances, and had advanced to the territories of the
Eburones and the Condrusi, who are under the protection of the Treviri.
After summoning the chiefs of Gaul, Caesar thought proper to pretend
ignorance of the things which he had discovered; and having conciliated
and confirmed their minds, and ordered some cavalry to be raised,
resolved to make war against the Germans.

VII.--Having provided corn and selected his cavalry, he began to direct
his march towards those parts in which he heard the Germans were. When
he was distant from them only a few days' march, ambassadors come to him
from their state; whose speech was as follows:--"That the Germans
neither make war upon the Roman people first, nor do they decline, if
they are provoked, to engage with them in arms; for that this was the
custom of the Germans handed down to them from their forefathers, to
resist whatsoever people make war upon them and not to avert it by
entreaty; this, however, they confessed,--that they had come hither
reluctantly, having been expelled from their country. If the Romans were
disposed to accept their friendship, they might be serviceable allies to
them; and let them either assign them lands, or permit them to retain
those which they had acquired by their arms; that they are inferior to
the Suevi alone, to whom not even the immortal gods can show themselves
equal; that there was none at all besides on earth whom they could not
conquer."

VIII.--To these remarks Caesar replied in such terms as he thought
proper; but the conclusion of his speech was, "That he could make no
alliance with them, if they continued in Gaul; that it was not probable
that they who were not able to defend their own territories, should get
possession of those of others, nor were there any lands lying waste in
Gaul which could be given away, especially to so great a number of men,
without doing wrong [to others]; but they might, if they were desirous,
settle in the territories of the Ubii; whose ambassadors were then with
him, and were complaining of the aggressions of the Suevi, and
requesting assistance from him; and that he would obtain this request
from them."

IX.--The ambassadors said that they would report these things to their
countrymen; and, after having deliberated on the matter, would return to
Caesar after the third day, they begged that he would not in the
meantime advance his camp nearer to them. Caesar said that he could not
grant them even that; for he had learned that they had sent a great part
of their cavalry over the Meuse to the Ambivariti, some days before, for
the purpose of plundering and procuring forage. He supposed that they
were then waiting for these horse, and that the delay was caused on this
account.

X.--The Meuse rises from mount Le Vosge, which is in the territories of
the Lingones; and, having received a branch of the Rhine, which is
called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi, and not more than
eighty miles from it it falls into the ocean. But the Rhine takes its
course among the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and is carried with a
rapid current for a long distance through the territories of the
Sarunates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Tribuci, and Treviri, and
when it approaches the ocean, divides into several branches; and, having
formed many and extensive islands, a great part of which are inhabited
by savage and barbarous nations (of whom there are some who are supposed
to live on fish and the eggs of sea-fowl), flows into the ocean by
several mouths.

XI.--When Caesar was not more than twelve miles distant from the enemy,
the ambassadors return to him, as had been arranged; who meeting him on
the march, earnestly entreated him not to advance any farther. When they
could not obtain this, they begged him to send on a despatch to those
who had marched in advance of the main army, and forbid them to engage;
and grant them permission to send ambassadors to the Ubii, and if the
princes and senate of the latter would give them security by oath, they
assured Caesar that they would accept such conditions as might be
proposed by him; and requested that he would give them the space of
three days for negotiating these affairs. Caesar thought that these
things tended to the self-same point [as their other proposal]; [namely]
that, in consequence of a delay of three days intervening, their horse
which were at a distance might return; however, he said, that he would
not that day advance farther than four miles for the purpose of
procuring water; he ordered that they should assemble at that place in
as large a number as possible the following day, that he might inquire
into their demands. In the meantime he sends messengers to the officers
who had marched in advance with all the cavalry to order them not to
provoke the enemy to an engagement, and if they themselves were
assailed, to sustain the attack until he came up with the army.

XII.--But the enemy, as soon as they saw our horse, the number of which
was 5000, whereas they themselves had not more than 800 horse, because
those which had gone over the Meuse for the purpose of foraging had not
returned, while our men had no apprehensions, because their ambassadors
had gone away from Caesar a little before, and that day had been
requested by them as a period of truce, made an onset on our men, and
soon threw them into disorder. When our men, in their turn, made a
stand, they, according to their practice, leaped from their horses to
their feet, and stabbing our horses in the belly and overthrowing a
great many of our men, put the rest to flight, and drove them forward so
much alarmed that they did not desist from their retreat till they had
come in sight of our army. In that encounter seventy-four of our horse
were slain; among them, Piso, an Aquitanian, a most valiant man, and
descended from a very illustrious family; whose grandfather had held the
sovereignty of his state, and had been styled friend by our senate. He,
while he was endeavouring to render assistance to his brother who was
surrounded by the enemy, and whom he rescued from danger, was himself
thrown from his horse, which was wounded under him, but still opposed
[his antagonists] with the greatest intrepidity, as long as he was able
to maintain the conflict. When at length he fell, surrounded on all
sides and after receiving many wounds, and his brother, who had then
retired from the fight, observed it from a distance, he spurred on his
horse, threw himself upon the enemy, and was killed.

XIII.--After this engagement, Caesar considered that neither ought
ambassadors to be received to audience, nor conditions be accepted by
him from those who, after having sued for peace by way of stratagem and
treachery, had made war without provocation. And to wait till the
enemy's forces were augmented and their cavalry had returned, he
concluded, would be the greatest madness; and knowing the fickleness of
the Gauls, he felt how much influence the enemy had already acquired
among them by this one skirmish. He [therefore] deemed that no time for
converting measures ought to be afforded them. After having resolved on
these things and communicated his plans to his lieutenants and quaestor
in order that he might not suffer any opportunity for engaging to escape
him, a very seasonable event occurred, namely, that on the morning of
the next day, a large body of Germans, consisting of their princes and
old men, came to the camp to him to practise the same treachery and
dissimulation; but, as they asserted, for the purpose of acquitting
themselves for having engaged in a skirmish the day before, contrary to
what had been agreed and to what, indeed, they themselves had requested;
and also if they could by any means obtain a truce by deceiving him.
Caesar, rejoicing that they had fallen into his power, ordered them to
be detained. He then drew all his forces out of the camp, and commanded
the cavalry, because he thought they were intimidated by the late
skirmish, to follow in the rear.

XIV.--Having marshalled his army in three lines, and in a short time
performed a march of eight miles, he arrived at the camp of the enemy
before the Germans could perceive what was going on; who being suddenly
alarmed by all the circumstances, both by the speediness of our arrival
and the absence of their own officers, as time was afforded neither for
concerting measures nor for seizing their arms, are perplexed as to
whether it would be better to lead out their forces against the enemy,
or to defend their camp, or seek their safety by flight. Their
consternation being made apparent by their noise and tumult, our
soldiers, excited by the treachery of the preceding day, rushed into the
camp: such of them as could readily get their arms for a short time
withstood our men, and gave battle among their carts and baggage-waggons;
but the rest of the people, [consisting] of boys and women (for they had
left their country and crossed the Rhine with all their families), began
to fly in all directions; in pursuit of whom Caesar sent the cavalry.

XV.--The Germans when, upon hearing a noise behind them, [they looked
and] saw that their families were being slain, throwing away their arms
and abandoning their standards, fled out of the camp, and when they had
arrived at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, the survivors
despairing of farther escape, as a great number of their countrymen had
been killed, threw themselves into the river and there perished,
overcome by fear, fatigue, and the violence of the stream. Our soldiers,
after the alarm of so great a war, for the number of the enemy amounted
to 430,000, returned to their camp, all safe to a man, very few being
even wounded. Caesar granted those whom he had detained in the camp
liberty of departing. They however, dreading revenge and torture from
the Gauls, whose lands they had harassed, said that they desired to
remain with him. Caesar granted them permission.

XVI.--The German war being finished, Caesar thought it expedient for him
to cross the Rhine, for many reasons; of which this was the most
weighty, that, since he saw the Germans were so easily urged to go into
Gaul, he desired they should have their fears for their own territories
when they discovered that the army of the Roman people both could and
dared pass the Rhine. There was added also, that that portion of the
cavalry of the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri, which I have above related
to have crossed the Meuse for the purpose of plundering and procuring
forage, and was not present at the engagement, had betaken themselves,
after the retreat of their countrymen, across the Rhine into the
territories of the Sigambri, and united themselves to them. When Caesar
sent ambassadors to them, to demand that they should give up to him
those who had made war against him and against Gaul, they replied, "That
the Rhine bounded the empire of the Roman people; if he did not think it
just for the Germans to pass over into Gaul against his consent, why did
he claim that anything beyond the Rhine should be subject to his
dominion or power?" The Ubii also, who alone, out of all the nations
lying beyond the Rhine, had sent ambassadors to Caesar, and formed an
alliance and given hostages, earnestly entreated "that he would bring
them assistance, because they were grievously oppressed by the Suevi;
or, if he was prevented from doing so by the business of the
commonwealth, he would at least transport his army over the Rhine; that
that would be sufficient for their present assistance and their hope for
the future; that so great was the name and the reputation of his army,
even among the most remote nations of the Germans, arising from the
defeat of Ariovistus and this last battle which was fought, that they
might be safe under the fame and friendship of the Roman people." They
promised a large number of ships for transporting the army.

XVII.--Caesar, for those reasons which I have mentioned, had resolved to
cross the Rhine; but to cross by ships he neither deemed to be
sufficiently safe, nor considered consistent with his own dignity or
that of the Roman people. Therefore, although the greatest difficulty in
forming a bridge was presented to him, on account of the breadth,
rapidity, and depth of the river, he nevertheless considered that it
ought to be attempted by him, or that his army ought not otherwise to be
led over. He devised this plan of a bridge. He joined together at the
distance of two feet, two piles, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened
a little at the lower end, and proportioned in length to the depth of
the river. After he had, by means of engines, sunk these into the river,
and fixed them at the bottom, and then driven them in with rammers, not
quite perpendicularly, like a stake, but bending forward and sloping, so
as to incline in the direction of the current of the river; he also
placed two [other piles] opposite to these, at the distance of forty
feet lower down, fastened together in the same manner, but directed
against the force and current of the river. Both these, moreover, were
kept firmly apart by beams two feet thick (the space which the binding
of the piles occupied), laid in at their extremities between two braces
on each side; and in consequence of these being in different directions
and fastened on sides the one opposite to the other, so great was the
strength of the work, and such the arrangement of the materials, that in
proportion as the greater body of water dashed against the bridge, so
much the closer were its parts held fastened together. These beams were
bound together by timber laid over them in the direction of the length
of the bridge, and were [then] covered over with laths and hurdles; and
in addition to this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, at the
lower side of the bridge, and these serving as buttresses, and being
connected with every portion of the work, sustained the force of the
stream: and there were others also above the bridge, at a moderate
distance; that if trunks of trees or vessels were floated down the river
by the barbarians for the purpose of destroying the work, the violence
of such things might be diminished by these defences, and might not
injure the bridge.

XVIII.--Within ten days after the timber began to be collected, the
whole work was completed, and the whole army led over. Caesar, leaving a
strong guard at each end of the bridge, hastens into the territories of
the Sigambri. In the meantime ambassadors from several nations come to
him, whom, on their suing for peace and alliance, he answers in a
courteous manner, and orders hostages to be brought to him. But the
Sigambri, at the very time the bridge was begun to be built, made
preparations for a flight (by the advice of such of the Tenchtheri and
Usipetes as they had amongst them), and quitted their territories and
conveyed away all their possessions, and concealed themselves in deserts
and woods.

XIX.--Caesar, having remained in their territories a few days, and burnt
all their villages and houses, and cut down their corn, proceeded into
the territories of the Ubii; and having promised them his assistance, if
they were ever harassed by the Suevi, he learned from them these
particulars: that the Suevi, after they had by means of their scouts
found that the bridge was being built, had called a council, according
to their custom, and sent orders to all parts of their state to remove
from the towns and convey their children, wives, and all their
possessions into the woods, and that all who could bear arms should
assemble in one place; that the place thus chosen was nearly the centre
of those regions which the Suevi possessed; that in this spot they had
resolved to await the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle there.
When Caesar discovered this, having already accomplished all those
things on account of which he had resolved to lead his army over,
namely, to strike fear into the Germans, take vengeance on the Sigambri,
and free the Ubii from the invasion of the Suevi, having spent
altogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and thinking he had advanced
far enough to serve both honour and interest, he returned into Gaul, and
cut down the bridge.

XX.--During the short part of summer which remained, Caesar, although in
these countries, as all Gaul lies towards the north, the winters are
early, nevertheless resolved to proceed into Britain, because he
discovered that in almost all the wars with the Gauls succours had been
furnished to our enemy from that country; and even if the time of year
should be insufficient for carrying on the war, yet he thought it would
be of great service to him if he only entered the island, and saw into
the character of the people, and got knowledge of their localities,
harbours, and landing-places, all which were for the most part unknown
to the Gauls. For neither does any one except merchants generally go
thither, nor even to them was any portion of it known, except the
sea-coast and those parts which are opposite to Gaul. Therefore, after
having called up to him the merchants from all parts, he could learn
neither what was the size of the island, nor what or how numerous were
the nations which inhabited it, nor what system of war they followed,
nor what customs they used, nor what harbours were convenient for a
great number of large ships.

XXI.--He sends before him Caius Volusenus with a ship of war, to acquire
a knowledge of these particulars before he in person should make a
descent into the island, as he was convinced that this was a judicious
measure. He commissioned him to thoroughly examine into all matters, and
then return to him as soon as possible. He himself proceeds to the
Morini with all his forces. He orders ships from all parts of the
neighbouring countries, and the fleet which the preceding summer he had
built for the war with the Veneti, to assemble in this place. In the
meantime, his purpose having been discovered, and reported to the
Britons by merchants, ambassadors come to him from several states of the
island, to promise that they will give hostages, and submit to the
government of the Roman people. Having given them an audience, he after
promising liberally, and exhorting them to continue in that purpose,
sends them back to their own country, and [despatches] with them
Commius, whom, upon subduing the Atrebates, he had created king there, a
man whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and who he thought would be
faithful to him, and whose influence ranked highly in those countries.
He orders him to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to
embrace the protection of the Roman people, and apprise them that he
would shortly come thither. Volusenus, having viewed the localities as
far as means could be afforded one who dared not leave his ship and
trust himself to barbarians, returns to Caesar on the fifth day, and
reports what he had there observed.

XXII.--While Caesar remains in these parts for the purpose of procuring
ships, ambassadors come to him from a great portion of the Morini, to
plead their excuse respecting their conduct on the late occasion;
alleging that it was as men uncivilised, and as those who were
unacquainted with our custom, that they had made war upon the Roman
people, and promising to perform what he should command. Caesar,
thinking that this had happened fortunately enough for him, because he
neither wished to leave an enemy behind him, nor had an opportunity for
carrying on a war, by reason of the time of year, nor considered that
employment in such trifling matters was to be preferred to his
enterprise on Britain, imposes a large number of hostages; and when
these were brought, he received them to his protection. Having collected
together and provided about eighty transport ships, as many as he
thought necessary for conveying over two legions, he assigned such
[ships] of war as he had besides to the quaestor, his lieutenants, and
officers of cavalry. There were in addition to these eighteen ships of
burden which were prevented, eight miles from that place, by winds, from
being able to reach the same port. These he distributed amongst the
horse; the rest of the army he delivered to Q. Titurius Sabinus and L.
Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to lead into the territories of the
Menapii and those cantons of the Morini from which ambassadors had not
come to him. He ordered P. Sulpicius Rufus, his lieutenant, to hold
possession of the harbour, with such a garrison as he thought
sufficient.

XXIII.--These matters being arranged, finding the weather favourable for
his voyage, he set sail about the third watch, and ordered the horse to
march forward to the farther port, and there embark and follow him. As
this was performed rather tardily by them, he himself reached Britain
with the first squadron of ships, about the fourth hour of the day, and
there saw the forces of the enemy drawn up in arms on all the hills. The
nature of the place was this: the sea was confined by mountains so close
to it that a dart could be thrown from their summit upon the shore.
Considering this by no means a fit place for disembarking, he remained
at anchor till the ninth hour, for the other ships to arrive there.
Having in the meantime assembled the lieutenants and military tribunes,
he told them both what he had learnt from Volusenus, and what he wished
to be done; and enjoined them (as the principle of military matters, and
especially as maritime affairs, which have a precipitate and uncertain
action, required) that all things should be performed by them at a nod
and at the instant. Having dismissed them, meeting both with wind and
tide favourable at the same time, the signal being given and the anchor
weighed, he advanced about seven miles from that place, and stationed
his fleet over against an open and level shore.

XXIV.--But the barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans,
sent forward their cavalry and charioteers, a class of warriors of whom
it is their practice to make great use in their battles, and following
with the rest of their forces, endeavoured to prevent our men landing.
In this was the greatest difficulty, for the following reasons, namely,
because our ships, on account of their great size, could be stationed
only in deep water; and our soldiers, in places unknown to them, with
their hands embarrassed, oppressed with a large and heavy weight of
armour, had at the same time to leap from the ships, stand amidst the
waves, and encounter the enemy; whereas they, either on dry ground, or
advancing a little way into the water, free in all their limbs, in
places thoroughly known to them, could confidently throw their weapons
and spur on their horses, which were accustomed to this kind of service.
Dismayed by these circumstances and altogether untrained in this mode of
battle, our men did not all exert the same vigour and eagerness which
they had been wont to exert in engagements on dry ground.

XXV.--When Caesar observed this, he ordered the ships of war, the
appearance of which was somewhat strange to the barbarians and the
motion more ready for service, to be withdrawn a little from the
transport vessels, and to be propelled by their oars, and be stationed
towards the open flank of the enemy, and the enemy to be beaten off and
driven away with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of great
service to our men; for the barbarians being startled by the form of our
ships and the motions of our oars and the nature of our engines, which
was strange to them, stopped, and shortly after retreated a little. And
while our men were hesitating [whether they should advance to the
shore], chiefly on account of the depth of the sea, he who carried the
eagle of the tenth legion, after supplicating the gods that the matter
might turn out favourably to the legion, exclaimed, "Leap, fellow
soldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, for my
part, will perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general." When he
had said this with a loud voice, he leaped from the ship and proceeded
to bear the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men, exhorting one another
that so great a disgrace should not be incurred, all leaped from the
ship. When those in the nearest vessels saw them, they speedily followed
and approached the enemy.

XXVI.--The battle was maintained vigorously on both sides. Our men,
however, as they could neither keep their ranks, nor get firm footing,
nor follow their standards, and as one from one ship and another from
another assembled around whatever standards they met, were thrown into
great confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the
shallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a ship one by
one, spurred on their horses, and attacked them while embarrassed; many
surrounded a few, others threw their weapons upon our collected forces
on their exposed flank. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats
of the ships of war and the spy sloops to be filled with soldiers, and
sent them up to the succour of those whom he had observed in distress.
Our men, as soon as they made good their footing on dry ground, and all
their comrades had joined them, made an attack upon the enemy, and put
them to flight, but could not pursue them very far, because the horse
had not been able to maintain their course at sea and reach the island.
This alone was wanting to Caesar's accustomed success.

XXVII.--The enemy being thus vanquished in battle, as soon as they
recovered after their flight, instantly sent ambassadors to Caesar to
negotiate about peace. They promised to give hostages and perform what
he should command. Together with these ambassadors came Commius the
Atrebatian, who, as I have above said, had been sent by Caesar into
Britain. Him they had seized upon when leaving his ship, although in the
character of ambassador he bore the general's commission to them, and
thrown into chains: then after the battle was fought, they sent him
back, and in suing for peace cast the blame of that act upon the common
people, and entreated that it might be pardoned on account of their
indiscretion. Caesar, complaining that after they had sued for peace,
and had voluntarily sent ambassadors into the continent for that
purpose, they had made war without a reason, said that he would pardon
their indiscretion, and imposed hostages, a part of whom they gave
immediately; the rest they said they would give in a few days, since
they were sent for from remote places. In the meantime they ordered
their people to return to the country parts, and the chiefs assembled
from all quarters, and proceeded to surrender themselves and their
states to Caesar.

XXVIII.--A peace being established by these proceedings four days after
we had come into Britain, the eighteen ships, to which reference has
been made above, and which conveyed the cavalry, set sail from the upper
port with a gentle gale; when, however, they were approaching Britain
and were seen from the camp, so great a storm suddenly arose that none
of them could maintain their course at sea; and some were taken back to
the same port from which they had started;--others, to their great
danger, were driven to the lower part of the island, nearer to the west;
which, however, after having cast anchor, as they were getting filled
with water, put out to sea through necessity in a stormy night, and made
for the continent.

XXIX.--It happened that night to be full moon, which usually occasions
very high tides in that ocean; and that circumstance was unknown to our
men. Thus, at the same time, the tide began to fill the ships of war
which Caesar had provided to convey over his army, and which he had
drawn up on the strand; and the storm began to dash the ships of burden
which were riding at anchor against each other; nor was any means
afforded our men of either managing them or of rendering any service. A
great many ships having been wrecked, inasmuch as the rest, having lost
their cables, anchors, and other tackling, were unfit for sailing, a
great confusion, as would necessarily happen, arose throughout the army;
for there were no other ships in which they could be conveyed back, and
all things which are of service in repairing vessels were wanting, and
corn for the winter had not been provided in those places, because it
was understood by all that they would certainly winter in Gaul.

XXX.--On discovering these things the chiefs of Britain, who had come up
after the battle was fought to perform those conditions which Caesar had
imposed, held a conference, when they perceived that cavalry, and ships,
and corn were wanting to the Romans, and discovered the small number of
our soldiers from the small extent of the camp (which, too, was on this
account more limited than ordinary because Caesar had conveyed over his
legions without baggage), and thought that the best plan was to renew
the war, and cut off our men from corn and provisions and protract the
affair till winter; because they felt confident that, if they were
vanquished or cut off from a return, no one would afterwards pass over
into Britain for the purpose of making war. Therefore, again entering
into a conspiracy, they began to depart from the camp by degrees and
secretly bring up their people from the country parts.

XXXI.--But Caesar, although he had not as yet discovered their measures,
yet, both from what had occurred to his ships, and from the circumstance
that they had neglected to give the promised hostages, suspected that
the thing would come to pass which really did happen. He therefore
provided remedies against all contingencies; for he daily conveyed corn
from the country parts into the camp, used the timber and brass of such
ships as were most seriously damaged for repairing the rest, and ordered
whatever things besides were necessary for this object to be brought to
him from the continent. And thus, since that business was executed by
the soldiers with the greatest energy, he effected that, after the loss
of twelve ships, a voyage could be made well enough in the rest.

XXXII.--While these things are being transacted, one legion had been
sent to forage, according to custom, and no suspicion of war had arisen
as yet, and some of the people remained in the country parts, others
went backwards and forwards to the camp, they who were on duty at the
gates of the camp reported to Caesar that a greater dust than was usual
was seen in that direction in which the legion had marched. Caesar,
suspecting that which was [really the case],--that some new enterprise
was undertaken by the barbarians, ordered the two cohorts which were on
duty to march into that quarter with him, and two other cohorts to
relieve them on duty; the rest to be armed and follow him immediately.
When he had advanced some little way from the camp, he saw that his men
were overpowered by the enemy and scarcely able to stand their ground,
and that, the legion being crowded together, weapons were being cast on
them from all sides. For as all the corn was reaped in every part with
the exception of one, the enemy, suspecting that our men would repair to
that, had concealed themselves in the woods during the night. Then
attacking them suddenly, scattered as they were, and when they had laid
aside their arms, and were engaged in reaping, they killed a small
number, threw the rest into confusion, and surrounded them with their
cavalry and chariots.

XXXIII.--Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly,
they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generally
break the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the
noise of their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in between
the troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. The
charioteers in the meantime withdraw some little distance from the
battle, and so place themselves with the chariots that, if their masters
are overpowered by the number of the enemy, they may have a ready
retreat to their own troops. Thus they display in battle the speed of
horse, [together with] the firmness of infantry; and by daily practice
and exercise attain to such expertness that they are accustomed, even on
a declining and steep place, to check their horses at full speed, and
manage and turn them in an instant and run along the pole, and stand on
the yoke, and thence betake themselves with the greatest celerity to
their chariots again.

XXXIV.-Under these circumstances, our men being dismayed by the novelty
of this mode of battle, Caesar most seasonably brought assistance; for
upon his arrival the enemy paused, and our men recovered from their
fear; upon which, thinking the time unfavourable for provoking the enemy
and coming to an action, he kept himself in his own quarter, and, a
short time having intervened, drew back the legions into the camp. While
these things were going on, and all our men engaged, the rest of the
Britons, who were in the fields, departed. Storms then set in for
several successive days, which both confined our men to camp and
hindered the enemy from attacking us. In the meantime the barbarians
despatched messengers to all parts and reported to their people the
small number of our soldiers, and how good an opportunity was given for
obtaining spoil and for liberating themselves for ever, if they should
only drive the Romans from their camp. Having by these means speedily
got together a large force of infantry and of cavalry, they came up to
the camp.

XXXV.--Although Caesar anticipated that the same thing which had
happened on former occasions would then occur--that, if the enemy were
routed, they would escape from danger by their speed; still, having got
about thirty horse, which Commius the Atrebatian, of whom mention has
been made, had brought over with him [from Gaul], he drew up the legions
in order of battle before the camp. When the action commenced, the enemy
were unable to sustain the attack of our men long, and turned their
backs; our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength
permitted, and slew a great number of them; then, having destroyed and
burnt everything far and wide, they retreated to their camp.

XXXVI.--The same day, ambassadors sent by the enemy came to Caesar to
negotiate a peace. Caesar doubled the number of hostages which he had
before demanded; and ordered that they should be brought over to the
continent, because, since the time of the equinox was near, he did not
consider that, with his ships out of repair, the voyage ought to be
deferred till winter. Having met with favourable weather he set sail a
little after midnight, and all his fleet arrived safe at the continent,
except two of the ships of burden which could not make the same port
which the other ships did, and were carried a little lower down.

XXXVII.--When our soldiers, about 300 in number, had been drawn out of
these two ships, and were marching to the camp, the Morini, whom Caesar,
when setting forth for Britain, had left in a state of peace, excited by
the hope of spoil, at first surrounded them with a small number of men,
and ordered them to lay down their arms, if they did not wish to be
slain; afterwards however, when they, forming a circle, stood on their
defence, a shout was raised and about 6000 of the enemy soon assembled;
which being reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry in the camp as a
relief to his men. In the meantime our soldiers sustained the attack of
the enemy, and fought most valiantly for more than four hours, and,
receiving but few wounds themselves, slew several of them. But after our
cavalry came in sight, the enemy, throwing away their arms, turned their
backs, and a great number of them were killed.

XXXVIII.--The day following Caesar sent Labienus, his lieutenant, with
those legions which he had brought back from Britain, against the
Morini, who had revolted; who, as they had no place to which they might
retreat, on account of the drying up of their marshes (which they had
availed themselves of as a place of refuge the preceding year), almost
all fell into the power of Labienus. In the meantime Caesar's
lieutenants, Q. Titurius and L. Cotta, who had led the legions into the
territories of the Menapii, having laid waste all their lands, cut down
their corn and burnt their houses, returned to Caesar because the
Menapii had all concealed themselves in their thickest woods. Caesar
fixed the winter quarters of all the legions amongst the Belgae. Thither
only two British states sent hostages; the rest omitted to do so. For
these successes, a thanksgiving of twenty days was decreed by the senate
upon receiving Caesar's letter.



BOOK V

I.--Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius being consuls, Caesar when
departing from his winter quarters into Italy, as he had been accustomed
to do yearly, commands the lieutenants whom he appointed over the
legions to take care that during the winter as many ships as possible
should be built, and the old repaired. He plans the size and shape of
them. For despatch of lading, and for drawing them on shore, he makes
them a little lower than those which we have been accustomed to use in
our sea; and that so much the more, because he knew that, on account of
the frequent changes of the tide, less swells occurred there; for the
purpose of transporting little and a great number of horses, [he makes
them] a little broader than those which we use in other seas. All these
he orders to be constructed for lightness and expedition, to which
object their lowness contributes greatly. He orders those things which
are necessary for equipping ships to be brought thither from Spain. He
himself, on the assizes of Hither Gaul being concluded, proceeds into
Illyricum, because he heard that the part of the province nearest them
was being laid waste by the incursions of the Pirustae. When he had
arrived there, he levies soldiers upon the states, and orders them to
assemble at an appointed place. Which circumstance having been reported
[to them], the Pirustae send ambassadors to him to inform him that no
part of those proceedings was done by public deliberation, and assert
that they were ready to make compensation by all means for the injuries
[inflicted]. Caesar, accepting their defence, demands hostages, and
orders them to be brought to him on a specified day, and assures them
that unless they did so he would visit their state with war. These being
brought to him on the day which he had ordered, he appoints arbitrators
between the states, who should estimate the damages and determine the
reparation.

II.--These things being finished, and the assizes being concluded, he
returns into Hither Gaul, and proceeds thence to the army. When he had
arrived there, having made a survey of the winter quarter, he finds
that, by the extraordinary ardour of the soldiers, amidst the utmost
scarcity of all materials, about six hundred ships of that kind which we
have described above, and twenty-eight ships of war, had been built, and
were not far from that state that they might be launched in a few days.
Having commended the soldiers and those who had presided over the work,
he informs them what he wishes to be done, and orders all the ships to
assemble at port Itius, from which port he had learned that the passage
into Britain was shortest, [being only] about thirty miles from the
continent. He left what seemed a sufficient number of soldiers for that
design; he himself proceeds into the territories of the Treviri with
four legions without baggage, and 800 horse, because they neither came
to the general diets [of Gaul], nor obeyed his commands, and were,
moreover, said to be tampering with the Germans beyond the Rhine.

III.--This state is by far the most powerful of all Gaul in cavalry, and
has great forces of infantry, and as we have remarked above, borders on
the Rhine. In that state, two persons, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were
then contending with each other for the supreme power; one of whom, as
soon as the arrival of Caesar and his legions was known, came to him;
assures him that he and all his party would continue in their
allegiance, and not revolt from the alliance of the Roman people, and
informs him of the things which were going on amongst the Treviri. But
Indutiomarus began to collect cavalry and infantry, and make
preparations for war, having concealed those who by reason of their age
could not be under arms in the forest Arduenna, which is of immense
size, [and] extends from the Rhine across the country of the Treviri to
the frontiers of the Remi. But after that, some of the chief persons of
the state, both influenced by their friendship for Cingetorix, and
alarmed at the arrival of our army, came to Caesar and began to solicit
him privately about their own interests, since they could not provide
for the safety of the state; Indutiomarus, dreading lest he should be
abandoned by all, sends ambassadors to Caesar, to declare that he
absented himself from his countrymen, and refrained from coming to him
on this account, that he might the more easily keep the state in its
allegiance, lest on the departure of all the nobility the commonalty
should, in their indiscretion, revolt. And thus the whole state was at
his control; and that he, if Caesar would permit, would come to the camp
to him, and would commit his own fortunes and those of the state to his
good faith.

IV.--Caesar, though he discerned from what motive these things were
said, and what circumstance deterred him from his meditated plan, still,
in order that he might not be compelled to waste the summer among the
Treviri, while all things were prepared for the war with Britain,
ordered Indutiomarus to come to him with 200 hostages. When these were
brought, [and] among them his son and near relations whom he had
demanded by name, he consoled Indutiomarus, and enjoined him to continue
in his allegiance; yet, nevertheless, summoning to him the chief men of
the Treviri, he reconciled them individually to Cingetorix: this he both
thought should be done by him in justice to the merits of the latter,
and also judged that it was of great importance that the influence of
one whose singular attachment towards him he had fully seen, should
prevail as much as possible among his people. Indutiomarus was very much
offended at this act, [seeing that] his influence was diminished among
his countrymen; and he, who already before had borne a hostile mind
towards us, was much more violently inflamed against us through
resentment at this.

V.--These matters being settled, Caesar went to port Itius with the
legions. There he discovers that forty ships which had been built in the
country of the Meldi, having been driven back by a storm, had been
unable to maintain their course, and had returned to the same port from
which they had set out; he finds the rest ready for sailing, and
furnished with everything. In the same place, the cavalry of the whole
of Gaul, in number 4000, assembles, and [also] the chief persons of all
the states; he had determined to leave in Gaul a very few of them, whose
fidelity towards him he had clearly discerned, and take the rest with
him as hostages; because he feared a commotion in Gaul when he should be
absent.

VI.--There was together with the others, Dumnorix, the Aeduan, of whom
we have made previous mention. Him in particular he had resolved to have
with him, because he had discovered him to be fond of change, fond of
power, possessing great resolution, and great influence among the Gauls.
To this was added that Dumnorix had before said in an assembly of
Aeduans, that the sovereignty of the state had been made over to him by
Caesar; which speech the Aedui bore with impatience and yet dared not
send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of either rejecting or
deprecating [that appointment]. That fact Caesar had learned from his
own personal friends. He at first strove to obtain by every entreaty
that he should be left in Gaul; partly, because, being unaccustomed to
sailing, he feared the sea; partly, because he said he was prevented by
divine admonitions. After he saw that this request was firmly refused
him, all hope of success being lost, he began to tamper with the chief
persons of the Gauls, to call them apart singly and exhort them to
remain on the continent; to agitate them with the fear that it was not
without reason that Gaul should be stript of all her nobility; that it
was Caesar's design to bring over to Britain and put to death all those
whom he feared to slay in the sight of Gaul, to pledge his honour to the
rest, to ask for their oath that they would by common deliberation
execute what they should perceive to be necessary for Gaul. These things
were reported to Caesar by several persons.

VII.--Having learned this fact, Caesar, because he had conferred so much
honour upon the Aeduan state, determined that Dumnorix should be
restrained and deterred by whatever means he could; and that, because he
perceived his insane designs to be proceeding farther and farther, care
should be taken lest he might be able to injure him and the
commonwealth. Therefore, having stayed about twenty-five days in that
place, because the north wind, which usually blows a great part of every
season, prevented the voyage, he exerted himself to keep Dumnorix in his
allegiance [and] nevertheless learn all his measures: having at length
met with favourable weather, he orders the foot soldiers and the horse
to embark in the ships. But, while the minds of all were occupied,
Dumnorix began to take his departure from the camp homewards with the
cavalry of the Aedui, Caesar being ignorant of it. Caesar, on this
matter being reported to him, ceasing from his expedition and deferring
all other affairs, sends a great part of the cavalry to pursue him, and
commands that he be brought back; he orders that if he use violence and
do not submit, that he be slain: considering that Dumnorix would do
nothing as a rational man while he himself was absent, since he had
disregarded his command even when present. He, however, when recalled,
began to resist and defend himself with his hand, and implore the
support of his people, often exclaiming that "he was free and the
subject of a free state." They surround and kill the man as they had
been commanded; but the Aeduan horsemen all return to Caesar.

VIII.--When these things were done [and] Labienus, left on the continent
with three legions and 2000 horse, to defend the harbours and provide
corn, and discover what was going on in Gaul, and take measures
according to the occasion and according to the circumstance; he himself,
with five legions and a number of horse, equal to that which he was
leaving on the continent, set sail at sunset and [though for a time]
borne forward by a gentle south-west wind, he did not maintain his
course, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and being
carried on too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed
on his left. Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged on with
the oars that he might make that port of the island in which he had
discovered the preceding summer that there was the best landing-place,
and in this affair the spirit of our soldiers was very much to be
extolled; for they with the transports and heavy ships, the labour of
rowing not being [for a moment] discontinued, equalled the speed of the
ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day; nor was
there seen a [single] enemy in that place, but, as Caesar afterwards
found from some prisoners, though large bodies of troops had assembled
there, yet being alarmed by the great number of our ships, more than
eight hundred of which, including the ships of the preceding year, and
those private vessels which each had built for his own convenience, had
appeared at one time, they had quitted the coast and concealed
themselves among the higher points.

IX.--Caesar, having disembarked his army and chosen a convenient place
for the camp, when he discovered from the prisoners in what part the
forces of the enemy had lodged themselves, having left ten cohorts and
300 horse at the sea, to be a guard to the ships, hastens to the enemy,
at the third watch, fearing the less for the ships for this reason,
because he was leaving them fastened at anchor upon an even and open
shore; and he placed Q. Atrius over the guard of the ships. He himself,
having advanced by night about twelve miles, espied the forces of the
enemy. They, advancing to the river with their cavalry and chariots from
the higher ground, began to annoy our men and give battle. Being
repulsed by our cavalry, they concealed themselves in woods, as they had
secured a place admirably fortified by nature and by art, which, as it
seemed, they had before prepared on account of a civil war; for all
entrances to it were shut up by a great number of felled trees. They
themselves rushed out of the woods to fight here and there, and
prevented our men from entering their fortifications. But the soldiers
of the seventh legion, having formed a testudo and thrown up a rampart
against the fortification, took the place and drove them out of the
woods, receiving only a few wounds. But Caesar forbade his men to pursue
them in their flight any great distance; both because he was ignorant of
the nature of the ground, and because, as a great part of the day was
spent, he wished time to be left for the fortification of the camp.

X.--The next day, early in the morning, he sent both foot-soldiers and
horse in three divisions on an expedition to pursue those who had fled.
These having advanced a little way, when already the rear [of the enemy]
was in sight, some horse came to Caesar from Quintus Atrius, to report
that the preceding night, a very great storm having arisen, almost all
the ships were dashed to pieces and cast upon the shore, because neither
the anchors and cables could resist, nor could the sailors and pilots
sustain the violence of the storm; and thus great damage was received by
that collision of the ships.

XI.--These things being known [to him], Caesar orders the legions and
cavalry to be recalled and to cease from their march; he himself returns
to the ships: he sees clearly before him almost the same things which he
had heard of from the messengers and by letter, so that, about forty
ships being lost, the remainder seemed capable of being repaired with
much labour. Therefore he selects workmen from the legions, and orders
others to be sent for from the continent; he writes to Labienus to build
as many ships as he could with those legions which were with him. He
himself, though the matter was one of great difficulty and labour, yet
thought it to be most expedient for all the ships to be brought up on
shore and joined with the camp by one fortification. In these matters he
employed about ten days, the labour of the soldiers being unremitting
even during the hours of night. The ships having been brought up on
shore and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same forces which he
did before as a guard for the ships; he sets out in person for the same
place that he had returned from. When he had come thither, greater
forces of the Britons had already assembled at that place, the chief
command and management of the war having been entrusted to
Cassivellaunus, whose territories a river, which is called the Thames,
separates from the maritime states at about eighty miles from the sea.
At an earlier period perpetual wars had taken place between him and the
other states; but, greatly alarmed by our arrival, the Britons had
placed him over the whole war and the conduct of it.

XII.--The interior portion of Britain is inhabited by those of whom they
say that it is handed down by tradition that they were born in the
island itself: the maritime portion by those who had passed over from
the country of the Belgae for the purpose of plunder and making war;
almost all of whom are called by the names of those states from which
being sprung they went thither, and having waged war, continued there
and began to cultivate the lands. The number of the people is countless,
and their buildings exceedingly numerous, for the most part very like
those of the Gauls: the number of cattle is great. They use either brass
or iron rings, determined at a certain weight, as their money. Tin is
produced in the midland regions; in the maritime, iron; but the quantity
of it is small: they employ brass, which is imported. There, as in Gaul,
is timber of every description, except beech and fir. They do not regard
it lawful to eat the hare, and the cock, and the goose; they, however,
breed them for amusement and pleasure. The climate is more temperate
than in Gaul, the colds being less severe.

XIII.--The island is triangular in its form, and one of its sides is
opposite to Gaul. One angle of this side, which is in Kent, whither
almost all ships from Gaul are directed, [looks] to the east; the lower
looks to the south. This side extends about 500 miles. Another side lies
towards Spain and the west, on which part is Ireland, less, as is
reckoned, than Britain by one-half; but the passage [from it] into
Britain is of equal distance with that from Gaul. In the middle of this
voyage is an island, which is called Mona; many smaller islands besides
are supposed to lie [there], of which islands some have written that at
the time of the winter solstice it is night there for thirty consecutive
days. We, in our inquiries about that matter, ascertained nothing,
except that, by accurate measurements with water, we perceived the
nights to be shorter there than on the continent. The length of this
side, as their account states, is 700 miles. The third side is towards
the north, to which portion of the island no land is opposite; but an
angle of that side looks principally towards Germany. This side is
considered to be 800 miles in length. Thus the whole island is [about]
2000 miles in circumference.

XIV.--The most civilised of all these nations are they who inhabit Kent,
which is entirely a maritime district, nor do they differ much from the
Gallic customs. Most of the inland inhabitants do not sow corn, but live
on milk and flesh, and are clad with skins. All the Britons, indeed, dye
themselves with wood, which occasions a bluish colour, and thereby have
a more terrible appearance in fight. They wear their hair long, and have
every part of their body shaved except their head and upper lip. Ten and
even twelve have wives common to them, and particularly brothers among
brothers, and parents among their children; but if there be any issue by
these wives, they are reputed to be the children of those by whom
respectively each was first espoused when a virgin.

XV.--The horse and charioteers of the enemy contended vigorously in a
skirmish with our cavalry on the march; yet so that our men were
conquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods and hills; but,
having slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost some of
their men. But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men were
off their guard, and occupied in the fortification of the camp, rushed
out of the woods, and making an attack upon those who were placed on
duty before the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohorts
being sent by Caesar to their relief, and these severally the first of
two legions, when these had taken up their position at a very small
distance from each other, as our men were disconcerted by the unusual
mode of battle, the enemy broke through the middle of them most
courageously, and retreated thence in safety. That day, Q. Laberius
Durus, a tribune of the soldiers, was slain. The enemy, since more
cohorts were sent against them, were repulsed.

XVI.--In the whole of this method of fighting since the engagement took
place under the eyes of all and before the camp, it was perceived that
our men, on account of the weight of their arms, inasmuch as they could
neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit their
standards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse also
fought with great danger, because they [the Britons] generally retreated
even designedly, and, when they had drawn off our men a short distance
from the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot in
unequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalry
engagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both to
those who retreat and those who pursue. To this was added, that they
never fought in close order, but in small parties and at great
distances, and had detachments placed [in different parts], and then the
one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded the
wearied.

XVII.--The following day the enemy halted on the hills, a distance from
our camp, and presented themselves in small parties, and began to
challenge our horse to battle with less spirit than the day before. But
at noon, when Caesar had sent three legions, and all the cavalry with C.
Trebonius, the lieutenant, for the purpose of foraging, they flew upon
the foragers suddenly from all quarters, so that they did not keep off
[even] from the standards and the legions. Our men making an attack on
them vigorously, repulsed them; nor did they cease to pursue them until
the horse, relying on relief, as they saw the legions behind them, drove
the enemy precipitately before them, and, slaying a great number of
them, did not give them the opportunity either of rallying or halting,
or leaping from their chariots. Immediately after this retreat, the
auxiliaries who had assembled from all sides, departed; nor after that
time did the enemy ever engage with us in very large numbers.

XVIII.--Caesar, discovering their design, leads his army into the
territories of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames; which river can be
forded in one place only, and that with difficulty. When he had arrived
there, he perceives that numerous forces of the enemy were marshalled on
the other bank of the river; the bank also was defended by sharp stakes
fixed in front, and stakes of the same kind fixed under the water were
covered by the river. These things being discovered from [some]
prisoners and deserters, Caesar, sending forward the cavalry, ordered
the legions to follow them immediately. But the soldiers advanced with
such speed and such ardour, though they stood above the water by their
heads only, that the enemy could not sustain the attack of the legions
and of the horse, and quitted the banks, and committed themselves to
flight.

XIX.--Cassivellaunus, as we have stated above, all hope [rising out] of
battle being laid aside, the greater part of his forces being dismissed,
and about 4000 charioteers only being left, used to observe our marches
and retire a little from the road, and conceal himself in intricate and
woody places, and in those neighbourhoods in which he had discovered we
were about to march, he used to drive the cattle and the inhabitants
from the fields into the woods; and, when our cavalry, for the sake of
plundering and ravaging the more freely, scattered themselves among the
fields, he used to send out charioteers from the woods by all the
well-known roads and paths, and, to the great danger of our horse, engage
with them; and this source of fear hindered them from straggling very
extensively. The result was that Caesar did not allow excursions to be
made to a great distance from the main body of the legions, and ordered
that damage should be done to the enemy in ravaging their lands and
kindling fires only so far as the legionary soldiers could, by their own
exertion and marching, accomplish it.

XX.--In the meantime, the Trinobantes, almost the most powerful state of
those parts, from which the young man Mandubratius embracing the
protection of Caesar had come to the continent of Gaul to [meet] him
(whose father, Imanuentius, had possessed the sovereignty in that state,
and had been killed by Cassivellaunus; he himself had escaped death by
flight), send ambassadors to Caesar, and promise that they will
surrender themselves to him and perform his commands; they entreat him
to protect Mandubratius from the violence of Cassivellaunus, and send to
their state some one to preside over it, and possess the government.
Caesar demands forty hostages from them, and corn for his army, and
sends Mandubratius to them. They speedily performed the things demanded,
and sent hostages to the number appointed, and the corn.

XXI.--The Trinobantes being protected and secured from any violence of
the soldiers, the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci,
and the Cassi, sending embassies, surrender themselves to Caesar. From
them he learns that the capital town of Cassivellaunus was not far from
that place, and was defended by woods and morasses, and a very large
number of men and of cattle had been collected in it. (Now the Britons,
when they have fortified the intricate woods, in which they are wont to
assemble for the purpose of avoiding the incursion of an enemy, with an
entrenchment and a rampart, call them a town.) Thither he proceeds with
his legions: he finds the place admirably fortified by nature and art;
he, however, undertakes to attack it in two directions. The enemy,
having remained only a short time, did not sustain the attack of our
soldiers, and hurried away on the other side of the town. A great amount
of cattle was found there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain in
their flight.

XXII.--While these things are going forward in those places,
Cassivellaunus sends messengers into Kent, which, we have observed
above, is on the sea, over which districts four several kings reigned,
Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, and commands them to
collect all their forces, and unexpectedly assail and storm the naval
camp. When they had come to the camp, our men, after making a sally,
slaying many of their men, and also capturing a distinguished leader
named Lugotorix, brought back their own men in safety. Cassivellaunus,
when this battle was reported to him, as so many losses had been
sustained, and his territories laid waste, being alarmed most of all by
the desertion of the states, sends ambassadors to Caesar [to treat]
about a surrender through the mediation of Commius the Atrebatian.
Caesar, since he had determined to pass the winter on the continent, on
account of the sudden revolts of Gaul, and as much of the summer did not
remain, and he perceived that even that could be easily protracted,
demands hostages, and prescribes what tribute Britain should pay each
year to the Roman people; he forbids and commands Cassivellaunus that he
wage not war against Mandubratius or the Trinobantes.

XXIII.--When he had received the hostages, he leads back the army to the
sea, and finds the ships repaired. After launching these, because he had
a large number of prisoners, and some of the ships had been lost in the
storm, he determines to convey back his army at two embarkations. And it
so happened, that out of so large a number of ships, in so many voyages,
neither in this nor in the previous year was any ship missing which
conveyed soldiers; but very few out of those which were sent back to him
from the continent empty, as the soldiers of the former convoy had been
disembarked, and out of those (sixty in number) which Labienus had taken
care to have built, reached their destination; almost all the rest were
driven back, and when Caesar had waited for them for some time in vain,
lest he should be debarred from a voyage by the season of the year,
inasmuch as the equinox was at hand, he of necessity stowed his soldiers
the more closely, and, a very great calm coming on, after he had weighed
anchor at the beginning of the second watch, he reached land at break of
day and brought in all the ships in safety.

XXIV.--The ships having been drawn up and a general assembly of the
Gauls held at Samarobriva, because the corn that year had not prospered
in Gaul by reason of the droughts, he was compelled to station his army
in its winter-quarters, differently from the former years, and to
distribute the legions among several states: one of them he gave to C.
Fabius, his lieutenant, to be marched into the territories of the
Morini; a second to Q. Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L.
Roscius, into those of the Essui; a fourth he ordered to winter with T.
Labienus among the Remi in the confines of the Treviri; he stationed
three in Belgium; over these he appointed M. Crassus, his questor, and
L. Munatius Plancus and C. Trebonius, his lieutenants. One legion which
he had raised last on the other side of the Po, and five cohorts, he
sent amongst the Eburones, the greatest portion of whom lie between the
Meuse and the Rhine, [and] who were under the government of Ambiorix and
Cativolcus. He ordered Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta,
his lieutenants, to take the command of these soldiers. The legions
being distributed in this manner, he thought he could most easily remedy
the scarcity of corn; and yet the winter-quarters of all these legions
(except that which he had given to L. Roscius to be led into the most
peaceful and tranquil neighbourhood) were comprehended within [about]
100 miles. He himself in the meanwhile, until he had stationed the
legions and knew that the several winter-quarters were fortified,
determined to stay in Gaul.

XXV.--There was among the Carnutes a man named Tasgetius, born of very
high rank, whose ancestors had held the sovereignty in his state. To him
Caesar had restored the position of his ancestors, in consideration of
his prowess and attachment towards him, because in all his wars he had
availed himself of his valuable services. His personal enemies had
killed him when in the third year of his reign, many even of his own
state being openly promoters [of that act]. This event is related to
Caesar. He fearing, because several were involved in the act, that the
state might revolt at their instigation, orders Lucius Plancus, with a
legion, to proceed quickly from Belgium to the Carnutes, and winter
there, and arrest and send to him the persons by whose instrumentality
he should discover that Tasgetius was slain. In the meantime, he was
apprised by all the lieutenants and questors to whom he had assigned the
legions, that they had arrived in winter-quarters, and that the place
for the quarters was fortified.

XXVI.--About fifteen days after they had come into winter-quarters, the
beginning of a sudden insurrection and revolt arose from Ambiorix and
Cativolcus, who, though they had met with Sabinus and Cotta at the
borders of their kingdom, and had conveyed corn into our winter-quarters,
induced by the messages of Indutiomarus, one of the Treviri,
excited their people, and after having suddenly assailed the soldiers,
engaged in procuring wood, came with a large body to attack the camp.
When our men had speedily taken up arms and had ascended the rampart,
and sending out some Spanish horse on one side, had proved conquerors in
a cavalry action, the enemy, despairing of success, drew off their
troops from the assault. Then they shouted, according to their custom,
that some of our men should go forward to a conference, [alleging] that
they had some things which they desired to say respecting the common
interest, by which they trusted their disputes could be removed.

XXVII.--C. Arpineius, a Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q.
Titurius, and with him Q. Junius, a certain person from Spain, who
already on previous occasions had been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at
Caesar's mission, is sent to them for the purpose of a conference:
before them Ambiorix spoke to this effect: "That he confessed that for
Caesar's kindness towards him he was very much indebted to him, inasmuch
as by his aid he had been freed from a tribute which he had been
accustomed to pay to the Aduatuci, his neighbours; and because his own
son and the son of his brother had been sent back to him, whom, when
sent in the number of hostages, the Aduatuci had detained among them in
slavery and in chains; and that he had not done that which he had done
in regard to the attacking of the camp, either by his own judgment or
desire, but by the compulsion of his state; and that his government was
of that nature, that the people had as much of authority over him as he
over the people. To the state moreover the occasion of the war was this
--that it could not withstand the sudden combination of the Gauls; that
he could easily prove this from his own weakness, since he was not so
little versed in affairs as to presume that with his forces he could
conquer the Roman people; but that it was the common resolution of Gaul;
that that day was appointed for the storming of all Caesar's
winter-quarters, in order that no legion should be able to come to the
relief of another legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls,
especially when a measure seemed entered into for recovering their common
freedom. Since he had performed his duty to them on the score of patriotism
[he said], he has now regard to gratitude for the kindness of Caesar; that
he warned, that he prayed Titurius by the claims of hospitality, to
consult for his and his soldiers' safety; that a large force of the
Germans had been hired and had passed the Rhine; that it would arrive in
two days; that it was for them to consider whether they thought fit,
before the nearest people perceived it, to lead off their soldiers when
drawn out of winter-quarters, either to Cicero or to Labienus; one of
whom was about fifty miles distant from them, the other rather more;
that this he promised and confirmed by oath, that he would give them a
safe passage through his territories; and when he did that, he was both
consulting for his own state, because it would be relieved from the
winter-quarters, and also making a requital to Caesar for his
obligations."

XXVIII.--Arpineius and Junius relate to the lieutenants what they had
heard. They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, though those
things were spoken by an enemy, still thought they were not to be
disregarded; and they were especially influenced by this consideration,
that it was scarcely credible that the obscure and humble state of the
Eburones had dared to make war upon the Roman people of their own
accord. Accordingly, they refer the matter to a council, and a, great
controversy arises among them. L. Aurunculeius, and several tribunes of
the soldiers and the centurions of the first rank, were of opinion "that
nothing should be done hastily, and that they should not depart from the
camp without Caesar's orders"; they declared, "that any forces of the
Germans, however great, might be encountered by fortified winter-quarters;
that this fact was a proof [of it]; that they had sustained the first
assault of the Germans most valiantly, inflicting many wounds upon them;
that they were not distressed for corn; that in the meantime relief
would come both from the nearest winter-quarters and from Caesar"; lastly,
they put the query, "what could be more undetermined, more undignified,
than to adopt measures respecting the most important affairs on the
authority of an enemy?"

XXIX.--In opposition to those things Titurius exclaimed, "That they
would do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after a
junction with the Germans, should have assembled; or when some disaster
had been received in the neighbouring winter-quarters; that the
opportunity for deliberating was short; that he believed that Caesar had
set forth into Italy, as the Carnutes would not otherwise have taken the
measure of slaying Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he had been
present, have come to the camp with so great defiance of us; that he did
not regard the enemy, but the fact, as the authority; that the Rhine was
near; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories were
subjects of great indignation to the Germans; that Gaul was inflamed,
that after having received so many defeats she was reduced under the
sway of the Roman people, her pristine glory in military matters being
extinguished." Lastly, "who would persuade himself of this, that
Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without sure grounds?
That his own opinion was safe on either side; if there be nothing very
formidable, they would go without danger to the nearest legion; if all
Gaul conspired with the Germans, their only safety lay in despatch. What
issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed from him,
have? from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded, yet
certainly famine, by a protracted siege, was."

XXX.--This discussion having been held on the two sides, when opposition
was offered strenuously by Cotta and the principal officers, "Prevail,"
said Sabinus, "if so you wish it"; and he said it with a louder voice,
that a great portion of the soldiers might hear him; "nor am I the
person among you," he said, "who is most powerfully alarmed by the
danger of death; these will be aware of it, and then, if any thing
disastrous shall have occurred, they will demand a reckoning at your
hands; these, who, if it were permitted by you, united three days hence
with the nearest winter-quarters, may encounter the common condition of
war with the rest, and not, as if forced away and separated far from the
rest, perish either by the sword or by famine."

XXXI.--They rise from the council, detain both, and entreat, that "they
do not bring the matter into the greatest jeopardy by their dissension
and obstinacy; the affair was an easy one, if only they all thought and
approved of the same thing, whether they remain or depart; on the other
hand, they saw no security in dissension." The matter is prolonged by
debate till midnight. At last Cotta, being overruled, yields his assent;
the opinion of Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed that they will march
at day-break; the remainder of the night is spent without sleep, since
every soldier was inspecting his property, [to see] what he could carry
with him, and what, out of the appurtenances of the winter-quarters, he
would be compelled to leave; every reason is suggested to show why they
could not stay without danger, and how that danger would be increased by
the fatigue of the soldiers and their want of sleep. At break of day
they quit the camp, in a very extended line and with a very large amount
of baggage, in such a manner as men who were convinced that the advice
was given by Ambiorix, not as an enemy, but as most friendly [towards
them].

XXXII.--But the enemy, after they had made the discovery of their
intended departure by the noise during the night and their not retiring
to rest, having placed an ambuscade in two divisions in the woods, in a
suitable and concealed place, two miles from the camp, waited for the
arrival of the Romans; and when the greater part of the line of march
had descended into a considerable valley, they suddenly presented
themselves on either side of that valley, and began both to harass the
rear and hinder the van from ascending, and to give battle in a place
exceedingly disadvantageous to our men.

XXXIII.--Then at length Titurius, as one who had provided nothing
beforehand, was confused, ran to and fro, and set about arranging his
troops; these very things, however, he did timidly and in such a manner
that all resources seemed to fail him: which generally happens to those
who are compelled to take council in the action itself. But Cotta, who
had reflected that these things might occur on the march, and on that
account had not been an adviser of the departure, was wanting to the
common safety in no respect; both in addressing and encouraging the
soldiers, he performed the duties of a general, and in the battle those
of a soldier. And since they [Titurius and Cotta] could less easily
perform everything by themselves, and provide what was to be done in
each place, by reason of the length of the line of march, they ordered
[the officers] to give the command that they should leave the baggage
and form themselves into an orb, which measure, though in a contingency
of that nature it was not to be condemned, still turned out
unfortunately; for it both diminished the hope of our soldiers and
rendered the enemy more eager for the fight, because it appeared that
this was not done without the greatest fear and despair. Besides that
happened, which would necessarily be the case, that the soldiers for the
most part quitted their ensigns and hurried to seek and carry off from
the baggage whatever each thought valuable, and all parts were filled
with uproar and lamentation.

XXXIV.--But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for their
leaders ordered [the officers] to proclaim through the ranks "that no
man should quit his place; that the booty was theirs, and for them was
reserved whatever the Romans should leave; therefore let them consider
that all things depended on their victory." Our men were equal to them
in fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they were
deserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope
of safety in their valour, and as often as any cohort sallied forth on
that side, a great number of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he
observed this, orders the command to be issued that they throw their
weapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whatever
direction the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from the
lightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damage
could be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to their
standards again.

XXXV.--Which command having been most carefully obeyed, when any cohort
had quitted the circle and made a charge, the enemy fled very
precipitately. In the meantime, that part of the Roman army, of
necessity, was left unprotected, and the weapons received on their open
flank. Again, when they had begun to return to that place from which
they had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had retreated
and by those who stood next them; but if, on the other hand, they wished
to keep their place, neither was an opportunity left for valour, nor
could they, being crowded together, escape the weapons cast by so large
a body of men. Yet, though assailed by so many disadvantages, [and]
having received many wounds, they withstood the enemy, and, a great
portion of the day being spent, though they fought from day-break till
the eighth hour, they did nothing which was unworthy of them. At length,
each thigh of T. Balventius, who the year before had been chief
centurion, a brave man and one of great authority, is pierced with a
javelin; Q. Lucanius, of the same rank, fighting most valiantly, is
slain while he assists his son when surrounded by the enemy; L. Cotta,
the lieutenant, when encouraging all the cohorts and companies, is
wounded full in the mouth by a sling.

XXXVI.--Much troubled by these events, Q. Titurius, when he had
perceived Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, sends to him his
interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg that he would spare him and his
soldiers. He, when addressed, replied, "If he wished to confer with him,
it was permitted; that he hoped what pertained to the safety of the
soldiers could be obtained from the people; that to him however
certainly no injury would be done, and that he pledged his faith to that
effect." He consults with Cotta, who had been wounded, whether it would
appear right to retire from battle, and confer with Ambiorix; [saying]
that he hoped to be able to succeed respecting his own and the soldiers'
safety. Cotta says he will not go to an armed enemy, and in that
perseveres.

XXXVII.--Sabinus orders those tribunes of the soldiers whom he had at
the time around him, and the centurions of the first ranks, to follow
him, and when he had approached near to Ambiorix, being ordered to throw
down his arms, he obeys the order and commands his men to do the same.
In the meantime, while they treat upon the terms, and a longer debate
than necessary is designedly entered into by Ambiorix, being surrounded
by degrees, he is slain. Then they according to their custom shout out
"Victory," and raise their war-cry, and, making an attack on our men,
break their ranks. There L. Cotta, while fighting, is slain, together
with the greater part of the soldiers; the rest betake themselves to the
camp from which they had marched forth, and one of them, L. Petrosidius,
the standard bearer, when he was overpowered by the great number of the
enemy, threw the eagle within the entrenchments and is himself slain
while fighting with the greatest courage before the camp. They with
difficulty sustain the attack till night; despairing of safety, they all
to a man destroy themselves in the night. A few escaping from the
battle, make their way to Labienus at winter-quarters, after wandering
at random through the woods, and inform him of these events.

XXXVIII.--Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with his
cavalry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither
day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Having
related the exploit and roused the Aduatuci, the next day he arrived
among the Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away the
opportunity of liberating themselves for ever and of punishing the
Romans for those wrongs which they had received from them"; [he tells
them] "that two lieutenants have been slain, and that a large portion of
the army has perished; that it was not a matter of difficulty for the
legion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenly
assaulted; he declares himself ready to co-operate in that design." He
easily gains over the Nervii by this speech.

XXXIX.--Accordingly, messengers having been forthwith despatched to the
Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all
of whom are under their government, they assemble as large bodies as
they can, and rush unexpectedly to the winter-quarters of Cicero, the
report of the death of Titurius not having as yet been conveyed to him.
That also occurred to him which was the consequence of a necessary
work,--that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for the
purpose of procuring timber and therewith constructing fortifications,
were intercepted by the sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. These
having been entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatuci and
all their allies and dependants, begin to attack the legion: our men
quickly run together to arms and mount the rampart: they sustained the
attack that day with great difficulty, since the enemy placed all their
hope in despatch, and felt assured that, if they obtained this victory,
they would be conquerors for ever.

XL.--Letters are immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewards
being offered [to the messengers] if they carried them through. All the
passes having been beset, those who were sent are intercepted. During
the night as many as 120 towers are raised with incredible despatch out
of the timber which they had collected for the purpose of fortification:
the things which seemed necessary to the work are completed. The
following day the enemy, having collected far greater forces, attack the
camp [and] fill up the ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the same
manner as the day before: this same thing is done afterwards during the
remaining days. The work is carried on incessantly in the night: not
even to the sick, or wounded, is opportunity given for rest: whatever
things are required for resisting the assault of the next day are
provided during the night: many stakes burnt at the end, and a large
number of mural pikes are procured: towers are built up, battlements and
parapets are formed of interwoven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he was
in very weak health, did not leave himself the night-time for repose, so
that he was forced to spare himself by the spontaneous movement and
entreaties of the soldiers.

XLI.--Then these leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy
and grounds of friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer with
him. When permission was granted, they recount the same things which
Ambiorix had related to Titurius, namely, "that all Gaul was in arms,
that the Germans had passed the Rhine, that the winter-quarters of
Caesar and of the others were attacked." They report in addition also,
about the death of Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for the purpose of
obtaining credence; "they are mistaken," say they, "if they hoped for
any relief from those who distrust their own affairs; that they bear
such feelings towards Cicero and the Roman people that they deny them
nothing but winter-quarters and are unwilling that this practice should
become constant; that through their [the Nervii's] means it is possible
for them [the Romans] to depart from their winter-quarters safely and to
proceed without fear into whatever parts they desire." To these Cicero
made only one reply: "that it is not the custom of the Roman people to
accept any condition from an armed enemy: if they are willing to lay
down their arms, they may employ him as their advocate and send
ambassadors to Caesar: that he believed, from his [Caesar's] justice,
they would obtain the things which they might request."

XLII.--Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surround the winter-quarters
with a rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen feet in
depth. These military works they had learnt from our men in the
intercourse of former years, and, having taken some of our army
prisoners, were instructed by them: but, as they had no supply of iron
tools which are requisite for this service, they were forced to cut the
turf with their swords, and to empty out the earth with their hands and
cloaks, from which circumstance the vast number of the men could be
inferred; for in less than three hours they completed a fortification of
ten miles in circumference; and during the rest of the days they began
to prepare and construct towers of the height of the ramparts, and
grappling irons, and mantlets, which the same prisoners had taught them.

XLIII.--On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind having sprung
up, they began to discharge by their slings hot balls made of burnt or
hardened clay, and heated javelins, upon the huts, which, after the
Gallic custom, were thatched with straw. These quickly took fire, and by
the violence of the wind, scattered their flames in every part of the
camp. The enemy following up their success with a very loud shout, as if
victory were already obtained and secured, began to advance their towers
and mantlets, and climb the rampart with ladders. But so great was the
courage of our soldiers, and such their presence of mind, that though
they were scorched on all sides, and harassed by a vast number of
weapons, and were aware that their baggage and their possessions were
burning, not only did no one quit the rampart for the purpose of
withdrawing from the scene, but scarcely did any one even then look
behind; and they all fought most vigorously and most valiantly. This day
was by far the most calamitous to our men; it had this result, however,
that on that day the largest number of the enemy was wounded and slain,
since they had crowded beneath the very rampart, and the hindmost did
not afford the foremost a retreat. The flame having abated a little, and
a tower having been brought up in a particular place and touching the
rampart, the centurions of the third cohort retired from the place in
which they were standing, and drew off all their men: they began to call
on the enemy by gestures and by words, to enter if they wished; but none
of them dared to advance. Then stones having been cast from every
quarter, the enemy were dislodged, and their tower set on fire.

XLIV.--In that legion there were two very brave men, centurions, who
were now approaching the first ranks, T. Pulfio, and L. Varenus. These
used to have continual disputes between them which of them should be
preferred, and every year used to contend for promotion with the utmost
animosity. When the fight was going on most vigorously before the
fortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says, "Why do you hesitate,
Varenus? or what [better] opportunity of signalising your valour do you
seek? This very day shall decide our disputes." When he had uttered
these words, he proceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on that
part of the enemy which appeared the thickest. Nor does Varenus remain
within the rampart, but respecting the high opinion of all, follows
close after. Then, when an inconsiderable space intervened, Pulfio
throws his javelin at the enemy, and pierces one of the multitude who
was running up, and while the latter was wounded and slain, the enemy
cover him with their shields, and all throw their weapons at the other
and afford him no opportunity of retreating. The shield of Pulfio is
pierced and a javelin is fastened in his belt. This circumstance turns
aside his scabbard and obstructs his right hand when attempting to draw
his sword: the enemy crowd around him when [thus] embarrassed. His rival
runs up to him and succours him in this emergency. Immediately the whole
host turn from Pulfio to him, supposing the other to be pierced through
by the javelin. Varenus rushes on briskly with his sword and carries on
the combat hand to hand, and having slain one man, for a short time
drove back the rest: while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into a
hollow, he fell. To him, in his turn, when surrounded, Pulfio brings
relief; and both having slain a great number, retreat into the
fortifications amidst the highest applause. Fortune so dealt with both
in this rivalry and conflict, that the one competitor was a succour and
a safeguard to the other, nor could it be determined which of the two
appeared worthy of being preferred to the other.

XLV.--In proportion as the attack became daily more formidable and
violent, and particularly because, as a great number of the soldiers
were exhausted with wounds, the matter had come to a small number of
defenders, more frequent letters and messengers were sent to Caesar; a
part of which messengers were taken and tortured to death in the sight
of our soldiers. There was within our camp a certain Nervian, by name
Vertico, born in a distinguished position, who in the beginning of the
blockade had deserted to Cicero, and had exhibited his fidelity to him.
He persuades his slave, by the hope of freedom, and by great rewards, to
convey a letter to Caesar. This he carries out bound about his javelin,
and mixing among the Gauls without any suspicion by being a Gaul, he
reaches Caesar. From him they received information of the imminent
danger of Cicero and the legion.

XLVI.--Caesar having received the letter about the eleventh hour of the
day, immediately sends a messenger to the Bellovaci, to M. Crassus,
questor there, whose winter-quarters were twenty-five miles distant from
him. He orders the legion to set forward in the middle of the night and
come to him with despatch. Crassus set out with the messenger. He sends
anther to C. Fabius, the lieutenant, ordering him to lead forth his
legion into the territories of the Atrebates, to which he knew his march
must be made. He writes to Labienus to come with his legion to the
frontiers of the Nervii, if he could do so to the advantage of the
commonwealth: he does not consider that the remaining portion of the
army, because it was somewhat farther distant, should be waited for; but
assembles about 400 horse from the nearest winter-quarters.

XLVII.--Having been apprised of the arrival of Crassus by the scouts at
about the third hour, he advances twenty miles that day. He appoints
Crassus over Samarobriva and assigns him a legion, because he was
leaving there the baggage of the army, the hostages of the states, the
public documents, and all the corn, which he had conveyed thither for
passing the winter. Fabius, without delaying a moment, meets him on the
march with his legion, as he had been commanded. Labienus, having learnt
the death of Sabinus and the destruction of the cohorts, as all the
forces of the Treviri had come against him, beginning to fear lest, if
he made a departure from his winter-quarters, resembling a flight, he
should not be able to support the attack of the enemy, particularly
since he knew them to be elated by their recent victory, sends back a
letter to Caesar, informing him with what great hazard he would lead out
his legion from winter-quarters; he relates at large the affair which
had taken place among the Eburones; he informs him that all the infantry
and cavalry of the Treviri had encamped at a distance of only three
miles from his own camp.

XLVIII.--Caesar, approving of his motives, although he was disappointed
in his expectation of three legions, and reduced to two, yet placed his
only hopes of the common safety in despatch. He goes into the
territories of the Nervii by long marches. There he learns from some
prisoners what things are going on in the camp of Cicero, and in how
great jeopardy the affair is. Then with great rewards he induces a
certain man of the Gallic horse to convey a letter to Cicero. This he
sends written in Greek characters, lest the letter being intercepted,
our measures should be discovered by the enemy. He directs him, if he
should be unable to enter, to throw his spear with the letter fastened
to the thong inside the fortifications of the camp. He writes in the
letter, that he having set out with his legions, will quickly be there:
he entreats him to maintain his ancient valour. The Gaul apprehending
danger, throws his spear as he had been directed. It by chance stuck in
a tower, and, not being observed by our men for two days, was seen by a
certain soldier on the third day: when taken down, it was carried to
Cicero. He, after perusing it, reads it out in an assembly of the
soldiers, and fills all with the greatest joy. Then the smoke of the
fires was seen in the distance, a circumstance which banished all doubt
of the arrival of the legions.

XLIX.--The Gauls, having discovered the matter through their scouts,
abandon the blockade, and march towards Caesar with all their forces:
these were about 60,000 armed men. Cicero, an opportunity being now
afforded, again begs of that Vertico, the Gaul, whom we mentioned above,
to convey back a letter to Caesar; he advises him to perform his journey
warily; he writes in the letter that the enemy had departed and had
turned their entire force against him. When this letter was brought to
him about the middle of the night, Caesar apprises his soldiers of its
contents, and inspires them with courage for fighting: the following
day, at the dawn, he moves his camp, and, having proceeded four miles,
he espies the forces of the enemy on the other side of a considerable
valley and rivulet. It was an affair of great danger to fight with such
large forces in a disadvantageous situation. For the present, therefore,
inasmuch as he knew that Cicero was released from the blockade, and
thought that he might, on that account, relax his speed, he halted there
and fortifies a camp in the most favourable position he can. And this,
though it was small in itself, [there being] scarcely 7000 men, and
these too without baggage, still by the narrowness of the passages, he
contracts as much as he can, with this object, that he may come into the
greatest contempt with the enemy. In the meanwhile, scouts having been
sent in all directions, he examines by what most convenient path he
might cross the valley.

L.--That day, slight skirmishes of cavalry having taken place near the
river, both armies kept in their own positions: the Gauls, because they
were awaiting larger forces which had not then arrived; Caesar, [to see]
if perchance by pretence of fear he could allure the enemy towards his
position, so that he might engage in battle, in front of his camp, on
this side of the valley; if he could not accomplish this, that, having
inquired about the passes, he might cross the valley and the river with
the less hazard. At day-break the cavalry of the enemy approaches to the
camp and joins battle with our horse. Caesar orders the horse to give
way purposely, and retreat to the camp: at the same time he orders the
camp to be fortified with a higher rampart in all directions, the gates
to be barricaded, and in executing these things as much confusion to be
shown as possible, and to perform them under the pretence of fear.

LI.--Induced by all these things the enemy lead over their forces and
draw up their line in a disadvantageous position; and as our men also
had been led down from the ramparts, they approach nearer, and throw
their weapons into the fortification from all sides, and sending heralds
round, order it to be proclaimed that, if "any, either Gaul or Roman,
was willing to go over to them before the third hour, it was permitted;
after that time there would not be permission"; and so much did they
disregard our men, that the gates having been blocked up with single
rows of turf as a mere appearance, because they did not seem able to
burst in that way, some began to pull down the rampart with their hands,
others to fill up the trenches. Then Caesar, making a sally from all the
gates, and sending out the cavalry, soon puts the enemy to flight, so
that no one at all stood his ground with the intention of fighting; and
he slew a great number of them, and deprived all of their arms.

LII.--Caesar, fearing to pursue them very far, because woods and
morasses intervened, and also [because] he saw that they suffered no
small loss in abandoning their position, reaches Cicero the same day
with all his forces safe. He witnesses with surprise the towers,
mantlets, and [other] fortifications belonging to the enemy: the legion
having been drawn out, he finds that even every tenth soldier had not
escaped without wounds. From all these things he judges with what danger
and with what great courage matters had been conducted; he commends
Cicero according to his desert and likewise the legion; he addresses
individually the centurions and the tribunes of the soldiers, whose
valour he had discovered to have been signal. He receives information of
the death of Sabinus and Cotta from the prisoners. An assembly being
held the following day, he states the occurrence; he consoles and
encourages the soldiers; he suggests that the disaster, which had been
occasioned by the misconduct and rashness of his lieutenant, should be
borne with a patient mind, because by the favour of the immortal gods
and their own valour, neither was lasting joy left to the enemy, nor
very lasting grief to them.

LIII.--In the meanwhile the report respecting the victory of Caesar is
conveyed to Labienus through the country of the Remi with incredible
speed, so that, though he was about sixty miles distant from the
winter-quarter of Cicero, and Caesar had arrived there after the ninth
hour, before midnight a shout arose at the gates of the camp, by which
shout an indication of the victory and a congratulation on the part of
the Remi were given to Labienus. This report having been carried to the
Treviri, Indutiormarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus
the following day, flies by night and leads back all his forces into the
country of the Treviri. Caesar sends back Fabius with his legion to his
winter-quarters; he himself determines to winter with three legions near
Samarobriva in three different quarters, and, because such great
commotions had arisen in Gaul, he resolved to remain during the whole
winter with the army himself. For the disaster respecting the death of
Sabinus having been circulated among them, almost all the states of Gaul
were deliberating about war, sending messengers and embassies into all
quarters, inquiring what further measure they should take, and holding
councils by night in secluded places. Nor did any period of the whole
winter pass over without fresh anxiety to Caesar, or without his
receiving some intelligence respecting the meetings and commotions of
the Gauls. Among these, he is informed by L. Roscius, the lieutenant
whom he had placed over the thirteenth legion, that large forces of
those states of the Gauls, which are called the Armoricae, had assembled
for the purpose of attacking him and were not more than eight miles
distant; but intelligence respecting the victory of Caesar being carried
[to them], had retreated in such a manner that their departure appeared
like a flight.

LIV.--But Caesar, having summoned to him the principal persons of each
state, in one case by alarming them, since he declared that he knew what
was going on, and in another case by encouraging them, retained a great
part of Gaul in its allegiance. The Senones, however, which is a state
eminently powerful and one of great influence among the Gauls,
attempting by general design to slay Cavarinus whom Caesar had created
king among them (whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the sovereignty at
the period of the arrival of Caesar in Gaul, and whose ancestors had
also previously held it) when he discovered their plot and fled, pursued
him even to the frontiers [of the state], and drove him from his kingdom
and his home; and, after having sent ambassadors to Caesar for the
purpose of concluding a peace, when he ordered all their senate to come
to him, did not obey that command. So far did it operate among those
barbarian people, that there were found some to be the first to wage
war; and so great a change of inclinations did it produce in all, that
except the Aedui and the Remi, whom Caesar had always held in especial
honour, the one people for their long standing and uniform fidelity
towards the Roman people, the other for their late service in the Gallic
war, there was scarcely a state which was not suspected by us. And I do
not know whether that ought much to be wondered at, as well for several
other reasons, as particularly because they who ranked above all nations
for prowess in war, most keenly regretted that they had lost so much of
that reputation as to submit to commands from the Roman people.

LV.--But the Treviri and Indutiomarus let no part of the entire winter
pass without sending ambassadors across the Rhine, importuning the
states, promising money, and asserting that, as a large portion of our
army had been cut off, a much smaller portion remained. However, none of
the German states could be induced to cross the Rhine, since "they had
twice essayed it," they said, "in the war with Ariovistus and in the
passage of the Tenchtheri there; that fortune was not to be tempted any
more." Indutiomarus disappointed in this expectation, nevertheless began
to raise troops, and discipline them, and procure horses from the
neighbouring people and allure to him by great rewards the outlaws and
convicts throughout Gaul. And such great influence had he already
acquired for himself in Gaul by these means, that embassies were
flocking to him in all directions, and seeking, publicly and privately,
his favour and friendship.

LVI.--When he perceived that they were coming to him voluntarily; that
on the one side the Senones and the Carnutes were stimulated by their
consciousness of guilt, on the other side the Nervii and the Aduatuci
were preparing war against the Romans, and that forces of volunteers
would not be wanting to him if he began to advance from his own
territories, he proclaims an armed council (this according to the custom
of the Gauls is the commencement of war) at which, by a common law, all
the youth were wont to assemble in arms; whoever of them comes last is
killed in the sight of the whole assembly after being racked with every
torture. In that council he declares Cingetorix, the leader of the other
faction, his own son-in-law (whom we have above mentioned, as having
embraced the protection of Caesar, and never having deserted him) an
enemy and confiscates his property. When these things were finished, he
asserts in the council that he, invited by the Senones and the Carnutes,
and several other states of Gaul, was about to march thither through the
territories of the Remi, devastate their lands, and attack the camp of
Labienus: before he does that, he informs them of what he desires to be
done.

LVII.--Labienus, since he was confining himself within a camp strongly
fortified by the nature of the ground and by art, had no apprehensions
as to his own and the legion's danger, but was devising that he might
throw away no opportunity of conducting the war successfully.
Accordingly, the speech of Indutiomarus, which he had delivered in the
council, having been made known [to him] by Cingetorix and his allies,
he sends messengers to the neighbouring states and summons horse from
all quarters: he appoints to them a fixed day for assembling. In the
meantime, Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, nearly every day used to
parade close to his [Labienus's] camp; at one time, that he might inform
himself of the situation of the camp; at another time, for the purpose
of conferring with or of intimidating him. Labienus confined his men
within the fortifications and promoted the enemy's belief of his fear by
whatever methods he could.

LVIII.--Since Indutiomarus was daily advancing up to the camp with
greater defiance, all the cavalry of the neighbouring states which he
[Labienus] had taken care to have sent for, having been admitted in one
night, he confined all his men within the camp by guards with such great
strictness, that that fact could by no means be reported or carried to
the Treviri. In the meanwhile Indutiomarus, according to his daily
practice, advances up to the camp and spends a great part of the day
there: his horse cast their weapons, and with very insulting language
call out our men to battle. No reply being given by our men, the enemy
when they thought proper, depart towards evening in a disorderly and
scattered manner, Labienus unexpectedly sends out all the cavalry by two
gates; he gives this command and prohibition, that, when the enemy
should be terrified and put to flight (which he foresaw would happen, as
it did), they should all make for Indutiomarus, and no one wound any man
before he should have seen him slain, because he was unwilling that he
should escape, in consequence of gaining time by the delay [occasioned
by the pursuit] of the rest. He offers great rewards for those who
should kill him: he sends up the cohorts as a relief to the horse. The
issue justifies the policy of the man, and, since all aimed at one,
Indutiomarus is slain, having been overtaken at the very ford of the
river, and his head is carried to the camp: the horse, when returning,
pursue and slay all whom they can. This affair having been known, all
the forces of the Eburones and the Nervii which had assembled, depart;
and for a short time after this action, Caesar was less harassed in the
government of Gaul.



BOOK VI

I.--Caesar, expecting for many reasons a greater commotion in Gaul,
resolves to hold a levy by the means of M. Silanus, C. Antistius
Reginus, and T. Sextius, his lieutenants: at the same time he requested
of Cn. Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was remaining near the city
invested with military command for the interests of the commonwealth, he
would command those men whom when consul he had levied by the military
oath in Cisalpine Gaul, to join their respective corps, and to proceed
to him; thinking it of great importance, as far as regarded the opinion
which the Gauls would entertain for the future, that the resources of
Italy should appear so great, that if any loss should be sustained in
war, not only could it be repaired in a short time, but likewise be
further supplied by still larger forces. And when Pompey had granted
this to the interests of the commonwealth and the claims of friendship,
Caesar having quickly completed the levy by means of his lieutenants,
after three legions had been both formed and brought to him before the
winter [had] expired, and the number of those cohorts which he had lost
under Q. Titurius had been doubled, taught the Gauls, both by his
dispatch and by his forces, what the discipline and the power of the
Roman people could accomplish.

II.--Indutiomarus having been slain, as we have stated, the government
was conferred upon his relatives by the Treviri. They cease not to
importune the neighbouring Germans and to promise them money: when they
could not obtain [their object] from those nearest them, they try those
more remote. Having found some states willing to accede to their wishes,
they enter into a compact with them by a mutual oath, and give hostages
as a security for the money: they attach Ambiorix to them by an alliance
and confederacy. Caesar, on being informed of their acts, since he saw
that war was being prepared on all sides, that the Nervii, Aduatuci, and
Menapii, with the addition of all the Germans on this side of the Rhine
were under arms, that the Senones did not assemble according to his
command, and were concerting measures with the Carnutes and the
neighbouring states, that the Germans were importuned by the Treviri in
frequent embassies, thought that he ought to take measures for the war
earlier [than usual].

III.-Accordingly, while the winter was not yet ended, having
concentrated the four nearest legions, he marched unexpectedly into the
territories of the Nervii, and before they could either assemble, or
retreat, after capturing a large number of cattle and of men, and
wasting their lands and giving up that booty to the soldiers, compelled
them to enter into a surrender and give him hostages. That business
having been speedily executed, he again led his legions back into
winter-quarters. Having proclaimed a council of Gaul in the beginning of
the spring, as he had been accustomed [to do], when the deputies from
the rest, except the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri, had come,
judging this to be the commencement of war and revolt, that he might
appear to consider all things of less consequence [than that war], he
transfers the council to Lutetia of the Parisii. These were adjacent to
the Senones, and had united their state to them during the memory of
their fathers, but were thought to have no part in the present plot.
Having proclaimed this from the tribunal, he advances the same day
towards the Senones with his legions and arrives among them by long
marches.

IV.--Acco, who had been the author of that enterprise, on being informed
of his arrival, orders the people to assemble in the towns; to them,
while attempting this and before it could be accomplished, news is
brought that the Romans are close at hand: through necessity they give
over their design and send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of
imploring pardon; they make advances to him through the Aedui, whose
state was from ancient times under the protection of Rome. Caesar
readily grants them pardon and receives their excuse at the request of
the Aedui; because he thought that the summer season was one for an
impending war, not for an investigation. Having imposed one hundred
hostages, he delivers these to the Aedui to be held in charge by them.
To the same place the Carnutes send ambassadors and hostages, employing
as their mediators the Remi, under whose protection they were: they
receive the same answers. Caesar concludes the council and imposes a
levy of cavalry on the states.

V.--This part of Gaul having been tranquillized, he applies himself
entirely both in mind and soul to the war with the Treviri and Ambiorix.
He orders Cavarinus to march with him with the cavalry of the Senones,
lest any commotion should arise either out of his hot temper, or out of
the hatred of the state which he had incurred. After arranging these
things, as he considered it certain that Ambiorix would not contend in
battle, he watched his other plans attentively. The Menapii bordered on
the territories of the Eburones, and were protected by one continued
extent of morasses and woods; and they alone out of Gaul had never sent
ambassadors to Caesar on the subject of peace. Caesar knew that a tie of
hospitality subsisted between them and Ambiorix: he also discovered that
the latter had entered into an alliance with the Germans by means of the
Treviri. He thought that these auxiliaries ought to be detached from him
before he provoked him to war; lest he, despairing of safety, should
either proceed to conceal himself in the territories of the Menapii, or
should be driven to coalesce with the Germans beyond the Rhine. Having
entered upon this resolution, he sends the baggage of the whole army to
Labienus, in the territories of the Treviri and orders two legions to
proceed to him: he himself proceeds against the Menapii with five
lightly-equipped legions. They, having assembled no troops, as they
relied on the defence of their position, retreat into the woods and
morasses, and convey thither all their property.

VI.--Caesar, having divided his forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant,
and M. Crassus, his questor, and having hastily constructed some
bridges, enters their country in three divisions, burns their houses and
villages, and gets possession of a large number of cattle and men.
Constrained by these circumstances, the Menapii send ambassadors to him
for the purpose of suing for peace. He, after receiving hostages,
assures them that he will consider them in the number of his enemies if
they shall receive within their territories either Ambiorix or his
ambassadors. Having determinately settled these things, he left among
the Menapii, Commius the Atrebatian with some cavalry as a guard; he
himself proceeds toward the Treviri.

VII.--While these things are being performed by Caesar, the Treviri,
having drawn together large forces of infantry and of cavalry, were
preparing to attack Labienus and the legion which was wintering in their
territories, and were already not further distant from him than a
journey of two days, when they learn that two legions had arrived by the
order of Caesar. Having pitched their camp fifteen miles off, they
resolve to await the support of the Germans. Labienus, having learned
the design of the enemy, hoping that through their rashness there would
be some opportunity of engaging, after leaving a guard of five cohorts
for the baggage, advances against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and
a large body of cavalry, and, leaving the space of a mile between them,
fortifies his camp. There was between Labienus and the enemy a river
difficult to cross and with steep banks: this neither did he himself
design to cross, nor did he suppose the enemy would cross it. Their hope
of auxiliaries was daily increasing. He [Labienus] openly says in a
council that "since the Germans are said to be approaching, he would not
bring into uncertainty his own and the army's fortunes, and the next day
would move his camp at early dawn. These words are quickly carried to
the enemy, since out of so large a number of cavalry composed of Gauls,
nature compelled some to favour the Gallic interests. Labienus, having
assembled the tribunes of the soldiers and principal centurions by
night, states what his design is, and, that he may the more easily give
the enemy a belief of his fears, he orders the camp to be moved with
greater noise and confusion than was usual with the Roman people. By
these means he makes his departure [appear], like a retreat. These
things, also, since the camps were so near, are reported to the enemy by
scouts before daylight.

VIII.--Scarcely had the rear advanced beyond the fortifications when the
Gauls, encouraging one another "not to cast from their hands the
anticipated booty, that it was a tedious thing, while the Romans were
panic stricken, to be waiting for the aid of the Germans, and that their
dignity did not suffer them to fear to attack with such great forces so
small a band, particularly when retreating and encumbered," do not
hesitate to cross the river and give battle in a disadvantageous
position. Labienus suspecting that these things would happen, was
proceeding quietly, and using the same pretence of a march, in order
that he might entice them across the river. Then, having sent forward
the baggage some short distance and placed it on a certain eminence, he
says, "Soldiers, you have the opportunity you have sought: you hold the
enemy in an encumbered and disadvantageous position: display to us your
leaders the same valour you have ofttimes displayed to your general:
imagine that he is present and actually sees these exploits." At the
same time he orders the troops to face about towards the enemy and form
in line of battle, and, despatching a few troops of cavalry as a guard
for the bag gage, he places the rest of the horse on the wings. Our men,
raising a shout, quickly throw their javelins at the enemy. They, when,
contrary to their expectation, they saw those whom they believed to be
retreating, advance towards them with threatening banners, were not able
to sustain even the charge, and, being put to flight at the first
onslaught, sought the nearest woods: Labienus pursuing them with the
cavalry, upon a large number being slain, and several taken prisoners,
got possession of the state a few days after; for the Germans who were
coming to the aid of the Treviri, having been informed of their flight,
retreated to their homes. The relations of Indutiomarus, who had been
the promoters of the revolt, accompanying them, quitted their own state
with them. The supreme power and government were delivered to
Cingetorix, whom we have stated to have remained firm in his allegiance
from the commencement.

IX.--Caesar, after he came from the territories of the Menapii into
those of the Treviri, resolved for two reasons to cross the Rhine; one
of which was, because they had sent assistance to the Treviri against
him; the other, that Ambiorix might not have a retreat among them.
Having determined on these matters, he began to build a bridge a little
above that place, at which he had before conveyed over his army. The
plan having been known and laid down, the work is accomplished in a few
days by the great exertion of the soldiers. Having left a strong guard
at the bridge on the side of the Treviri, lest any commotion should
suddenly arise among them, he leads over the rest of the forces and the
cavalry. The Ubii, who before had sent hostages and come to a
capitulation, send ambassadors to him, for the purpose of vindicating
themselves, to assure him that "neither had auxiliaries been sent to the
Treviri from their state, nor had they violated their allegiance"; they
entreat and beseech him "to spare them, lest, in his common hatred of
the Germans, the innocent should suffer the penalty of the guilty: they
promise to give more hostages, if he desire them." Having investigated
the case, Caesar finds that the auxiliaries had been sent by the Suevi;
he accepts the apology of the Ubii, and makes minute inquiries
concerning the approaches and the routes to the territories of the
Suevi. X.--In the meanwhile he is informed by the Ubii, a few days
after, that the Suevi are drawing all their forces into one place, and
are giving orders to those nations which are under their government to
send auxiliaries of infantry and of cavalry. Having learned these
things, he provides a supply of corn, selects a proper place for his
camp, and commands the Ubii to drive off their cattle and carry away all
their possessions from the country parts into the towns, hoping that
they, being a barbarous and ignorant people, when harassed by the want
of provisions, might be brought to an engagement on disadvantageous
terms: he orders them to send numerous scouts among the Suevi, and learn
what things are going on among them. They execute the orders, and, a few
days having intervened, report that all the Suevi, after certain
intelligence concerning the army of the Romans had come, retreated with
all their own forces and those of their allies, which they had
assembled, to the utmost extremities of their territories: that there is
a wood there of very great extent, which is called Bacenis; that this
stretches a great way into the interior, and, being opposed as a natural
barrier, defends from injuries and incursions the Cherusci against the
Suevi, and the Suevi against the Cherusci: that at the entrance of that
forest the Suevi had determined to await the coming up of the Romans.

XI.--Since we have come to this place, it does not appear to be foreign
to our subject to lay before the reader an account of the manners of
Gaul and Germany, and wherein these nations differ from each other. In
Gaul there are factions not only in all the states, and in all the
cantons and their divisions, but almost in each family, and of these
factions those are the leaders who are considered according to their
judgment to possess the greatest influence, upon whose will and
determination the management of all affairs and measures depends. And
that seems to have been instituted in ancient times with this view, that
no one of the common people should be in want of support against one
more powerful; for none [of those leaders] suffers his party to be
oppressed and defrauded, and if he do otherwise, he has no influence
among his party. This same policy exists throughout the whole of Gaul;
for all the states are divided into two factions.

XII.--When Caesar arrived in Gaul, the Aedui were the leaders of one
faction, the Sequani of the other. Since the latter were less powerful
by themselves, inasmuch as the chief influence was from of old among the
Aedui, and their dependencies were great, they had united to themselves
the Germans and Ariovistus, and had brought them over to their party by
great sacrifices and promises. And having fought several successful
battles and slain all the nobility of the Aedui, they had so far
surpassed them in power, that they brought over, from the Aedui to
themselves, a large portion of their dependants and received from them
the sons of their leading men as hostages, and compelled them to swear
in their public character that they would enter into no design against
them; and held a portion of the neighbouring land, seized on by force,
and possessed the sovereignty of the whole of Gaul. Divitiacus urged by
this necessity, had proceeded to Rome to the senate, for the purpose of
entreating assistance, and had returned without accomplishing his
object. A change of affairs ensued on the arrival of Caesar, the
hostages were returned to the Aedui, their old dependencies restored,
and new acquired through Caesar (because those who had attached
themselves to their alliance saw that they enjoyed a better state and a
milder government), their other interests, their influence, their
reputation were likewise increased, and in consequence, the Sequani lost
the sovereignty. The Remi succeeded to their place, and, as it was
perceived that they equalled the Aedui in favour with Caesar, those, who
on account of their old animosities could by no means coalesce with the
Aedui, consigned themselves in clientship to the Remi. The latter
carefully protected them. Thus they possessed both a new and suddenly
acquired influence. Affairs were then in that position, that the Aedui
were considered by far the leading people, and the Remi held the second
post of honour.

XIII.--Throughout all Gaul there are two orders of those men who are of
any rank and dignity: for the commonality is held almost in the
condition of slaves, and dares to undertake nothing of itself and is
admitted to no deliberation. The greater part, when they are pressed
either by debt, or the large amount of their tributes, or the oppression
of the more powerful, give themselves up in vassalage to the nobles, who
possess over them the same rights without exception as masters over
their slaves. But of these two orders, one is that of the Druids, the
other that of the knights. The former are engaged in things sacred,
conduct the public and the private sacrifices, and interpret all matters
of religion. To these a large number of the young men resort for the
purpose of instruction, and they [the Druids] are in great honour among
them. For they determine respecting almost all controversies, public and
private; and if any crime has been perpetrated, if murder has been
committed, if there be any dispute about an inheritance, if any about
boundaries, these same persons decide it; they decree rewards and
punishments if any one, either in a private or public capacity, has not
submitted to their decision, they interdict him from the sacrifices.
This among them is the most heavy punishment. Those who have been thus
interdicted are esteemed in the number of the impious and the criminal:
all shun them, and avoid their society and conversation, lest they
receive some evil from their contact; nor is justice administered to
them when seeking it, nor is any dignity bestowed on them. Over all
these Druids one presides, who possesses supreme authority among them.
Upon his death, if any individual among the rest is pre-eminent in
dignity, he succeeds; but, if there are many equal, the election is made
by the suffrages of the Druids; sometimes they even contend for the
presidency with arms. These assemble at a fixed period of the year in a
consecrated place in the territories of the Carnutes, which is reckoned
the central region of the whole of Gaul. Hither all, who have disputes,
assemble from every part, and submit to their decrees and
determinations. This institution is supposed to have been devised in
Britain, and to have been brought over from it into Gaul; and now those
who desire to gain a more accurate knowledge of that system generally
proceed thither for the purpose of studying it.

XIV.--The Druids do not go to war, nor pay tribute together with the
rest; they have an exemption from military service and a dispensation in
all matters. Induced by such great advantages, many embrace this
profession of their own accord, and [many] are sent to it by their
parents and relations. They are said there to learn by heart a great
number of verses; accordingly some remain in the course of training
twenty years. Nor do they regard it lawful to commit these to writing,
though in almost all other matters, in their public and private
transactions, they use Greek characters. That practice they seem to me
to have adopted for two reasons; because they neither desire their
doctrines to be divulged among the mass of the people, nor those who
learn, to devote themselves the less to the efforts of memory, relying
on writing; since it generally occurs to most men, that, in their
dependence on writing, they relax their diligence in learning
thoroughly, and their employment of the memory. They wish to inculcate
this as one of their leading tenets, that souls do not become extinct,
but pass after death from one body to another, and they think that men
by this tenet are in a great degree excited to valour, the fear of death
being disregarded. They likewise discuss and impart to the youth many
things respecting the stars and their motion, respecting the extent of
the world and of our earth, respecting the nature of things, respecting
the power and the majesty of the immortal gods.

XV.--The other order is that of the knights. These, when there is
occasion and any war occurs (which before Caesar's arrival was for the
most part wont to happen every year, as either they on their part were
inflicting injuries or repelling those which others inflicted on them),
are all engaged in war. And those of them most distinguished by birth
and resources, have the greatest number of vassals and dependants about
them. They acknowledge this sort of influence and power only.

XVI.--The nation of all the Gauls is extremely devoted to superstitious
rites; and on that account they who are troubled with unusually severe
diseases and they who are engaged in battles and dangers, either
sacrifice men as victims, or vow that they will sacrifice them, and
employ the Druids as the performers of those sacrifices; because they
think that unless the life of a man be offered for the life of a man,
the mind of the immortal gods cannot be rendered propitious, and they
have sacrifices of that kind ordained for national purposes. Others have
figures of vast size, the limbs of which formed of osiers they fill with
living men, which being set on fire, the men perish enveloped in the
flames. They consider that the oblation of such as have been taken in
theft, or in robbery, or any other offence, is more acceptable to the
immortal gods; but when a supply of that class is wanting, they have
recourse to the oblation of even the innocent.

XVII.--They worship as their divinity, Mercury in particular, and have
many images of him, and regard him as the inventor of all arts, they
consider him, the guide of their journeys and marches, and believe him
to have very great influence over the acquisition of gain and mercantile
transactions. Next to him they worship Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter,
and Minerva; respecting these deities they have for the most part the
same belief as other nations: that Apollo averts diseases, that Minerva
imparts the invention of manufactures, that Jupiter possesses the
sovereignty of the heavenly powers; that Mars presides over wars. To him
when they have determined to engage in battle, they commonly vow those
things they shall take in war. When they have conquered, they sacrifice
whatever captured animals may have survived the conflict, and collect
the other things into one place. In many states you may see piles of
these things heaped up in their consecrated spots; nor does it often
happen that any one, disregarding the sanctity of the case, dares either
to secrete in his house things captured, or take away those deposited;
and the most severe punishment, with torture, has been established for
such a deed.

XVIII.--All the Gauls assert that they are descended from the god Dis,
and say that this tradition has been handed down by the Druids. For that
reason they compute the divisions of every season, not by the number of
days, but of nights; they keep birthdays and the beginnings of months
and years in such an order that the day follows the night. Among the
other usages of their life, they differ in this from almost all other
nations, that they do not permit their children to approach them openly
until they are grown up so as to be able to bear the service of war; and
they regard it as indecorous for a son of boyish age to stand in public
in the presence of his father.

XIX.--Whatever sums of money the husbands have received in the name of
dowry from their wives, making an estimate of it, they add the same
amount out of their own estates. An account is kept of all this money
conjointly, and the profits are laid by: whichever of them shall have
survived [the other], to that one the portion of both reverts, together
with the profits of the previous time. Husbands have power of life and
death over their wives as well as over their children: and when the
father of a family, born in a more than commonly distinguished rank, has
died, his relations assemble, and, if the circumstances of his death are
suspicious, hold an investigation upon the wives in the manner adopted
towards slaves; and if proof be obtained, put them to severe torture,
and kill them. Their funerals, considering the state of civilization
among the Gauls, are magnificent and costly; and they cast into the fire
all things, including living creatures, which they suppose to have been
dear to them when alive; and, a little before this period, slaves and
dependants, who were ascertained to have been beloved by them, were,
after the regular funeral rites were completed, burnt together with
them.

XX.--Those states which are considered to conduct their commonwealth
more judiciously, have it ordained by their laws, that, if any person
shall have heard by rumour and report from his neighbours anything
concerning the commonwealth, he shall convey it to the magistrate and
not impart it to any other; because it has been discovered that
inconsiderate and inexperienced men were often alarmed by false reports
and driven to some rash act, or else took hasty measures in affairs of
the highest importance. The magistrates conceal those things which
require to be kept unknown; and they disclose to the people whatever
they determine to be expedient. It is not lawful to speak of the
commonwealth, except in council.

XXI.--The Germans differ much from these usages, for they have neither
Druids to preside over sacred offices, nor do they pay great regard to
sacrifices. They rank in the number of the gods those alone whom they
behold, and by whose instrumentality they are obviously benefited,
namely, the sun, fire, and the moon; they have not heard of the other
deities even by report. Their whole life is occupied in hunting and in
the pursuits of the military art; from childhood they devote themselves
to fatigue and hardships. Those who have remained chaste for the longest
time, receive the greatest commendation among their people: they think
that by this the growth is promoted, by this the physical powers are
increased and the sinews are strengthened. And to have had knowledge of
a woman before the twentieth year they reckon among the most disgraceful
acts; of which matter there is no concealment, because they bathe
promiscuously in the rivers and [only] use skins or small cloaks of
deers' hides, a large portion of the body being in consequence naked.

XXII.--They do not pay much attention to agriculture, and a large
portion of their food consists in milk, cheese, and flesh; nor has any
one a fixed quantity of land or his own individual limits; but the
magistrates and the leading men each year apportion to the tribes and
families, who have united together, as much land as, and in the place in
which, they think proper, and the year after compel them to remove
elsewhere. For this enactment they advance many reasons--lest seduced by
long-continued custom, they may exchange their ardour in the waging of
war for agriculture; lest they may be anxious to acquire extensive
estates, and the more powerful drive the weaker from their possessions;
lest they construct their houses with too great a desire to avoid cold
and heat; lest the desire of wealth spring up, from which cause
divisions and discords arise; and that they may keep the common people
in a contented state of mind, when each sees his own means placed on an
equality with [those of] the most powerful.

XXIII.--It is the greatest glory to the several states to have as wide
deserts as possible around them, their frontiers having been laid waste.
They consider this the real evidence of their prowess, that their
neighbours shall be driven out of their lands and abandon them, and that
no one dare settle near them; at the same time they think that they
shall be on that account the more secure, because they have removed the
apprehension of a sudden incursion. When a state either repels war waged
against it, or wages it against another, magistrates are chosen to
preside over that war with such authority, that they have power of life
and death. In peace there is no common magistrate, but the chiefs of
provinces and cantons administer justice and determine controversies
among their own people. Robberies which are committed beyond the
boundaries of each state bear no infamy, and they avow that these are
committed for the purpose of disciplining their youth and of preventing
sloth. And when any of their chiefs has said in an assembly "that he
will be their leader, let those who are willing to follow, give in their
names"; they who approve of both the enterprise and the man arise and
promise their assistance and are applauded by the people; such of them
as have not followed him are accounted in the number of deserters and
traitors, and confidence in all matters is afterwards refused them. To
injure guests they regard as impious; they defend from wrong those who
have come to them for any purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable;
to them the houses of all are open and maintenance is freely supplied.

XXIV.--And there was formerly a time when the Gauls excelled the Germans
in prowess, and waged war on them offensively, and, on account of the
great number of their people and the insufficiency of their land, sent
colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the Volcae Tectosages seized on
those parts of Germany which are the most fruitful [and lie] around the
Hercynian forest (which, I perceive, was known by report to Eratosthenes
and some other Greeks, and which they call Orcynia) and settled there.
Which nation to this time retains its position in those settlements, and
has a very high character for justice and military merit: now also they
continue in the same scarcity, indigence, hardihood, as the Germans, and
use the same food and dress; but their proximity to the Province and
knowledge of commodities from countries beyond the sea supplies to the
Gauls many things tending to luxury as well as civilization. Accustomed
by degrees to be overmatched and worsted in many engagements, they do
not even compare themselves to the Germans in prowess.

XXV.--The breadth of this Hercynian forest, which has been referred to
above, is to a quick traveller, a journey of nine days. For it cannot be
otherwise computed, nor are they acquainted with the measures of roads.
It begins at the frontiers of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and
extends in a right line along the river Danube to the territories of the
Daci and the Anartes: it bends thence to the left in a different
direction from the river, and owing to its extent touches the confines
of many nations; nor is there any person belonging to this part of
Germany who says that he either has gone to the extremity of that
forest, though he had advanced a journey of sixty days, or has heard in
what place it begins. It is certain that many kinds of wild beasts are
produced in it which have not been seen in other parts; of which the
following are such as differ principally from other animals, and appear
worthy of being committed to record.

XXVI.--There is an ox of the shape of a stag, between whose ears a horn
rises from the middle of the forehead, higher and straighter than those
horns which are known to us. From the top of this, branches, like palms;
stretch out a considerable distance. The shape of the female and of the
male is the same; the appearance and the size of the horns is the same.

XXVII.--There are also [animals] which are called elks. The shape of
these, and the varied colour of their skins, is much like roes, but in
size they surpass them a little and are destitute of horns, and have
legs without joints and ligatures; nor do they lie down for the purpose
of rest, nor, if they have been thrown down by any accident, can they
raise or lift themselves up. Trees serve as beds to them; they lean
themselves against them, and thus reclining only slightly, they take
their rest; when the huntsmen have discovered from the footsteps of
these animals whither they are accustomed to betake themselves, they
either undermine all the trees at the roots, or cut into them so far
that the upper part of the trees may appear to be left standing. When
they have leant upon them, according to their habit, they knock down by
their weight the unsupported trees, and fall down themselves along with
them.

XXVIII.-There is a third kind, consisting of those animals which are
called uri. These are a little below the elephant in size, and of the
appearance, colour, and shape of a bull. Their strength and speed are
extraordinary; they spare neither man nor wild beast which they have
espied. These the Germans take with much pains in pits and kill them.
The young men harden themselves with this exercise, and practice
themselves in this kind of hunting, and those who have slain the
greatest number of them, having produced the horns in public, to serve
as evidence, receive great praise. But not even when taken very young
can they be rendered familiar to men and tamed. The size, shape, and
appearance of their horns differ much from the horns of our oxen. These
they anxiously seek after, and bind at the tips with silver, and use as
cups at their most sumptuous entertainments.

XXIX.--Caesar, after he discovered through the Ubian scouts that the
Suevi had retired into their woods, apprehending a scarcity of corn,
because, as we have observed above, all the Germans pay very little
attention to agriculture, resolved not to proceed any farther; but, that
he might not altogether relieve the barbarians from the fear of his
return, and that he might delay their succours, having led back his
army, he breaks down, to the length of 200 feet, the farther end of the
bridge, which joined the banks of the Ubii, and, at the extremity of the
bridge raises towers of four stories, and stations a guard of twelve
cohorts for the purpose of defending the bridge, and strengthens the
place with considerable fortifications. Over that fort and guard he
appointed C. Volcatius Tullus, a young man; he himself, when the corn
began to ripen, having set forth for the war with 40 Ambiorix (through
the forest Arduenna, which is the largest of all Gaul, and reaches from
the banks of the Rhine and the frontiers of the Treviri to those of the
Nervii, and extends over more than 500 miles), he sends forward L.
Minucius Basilus with all the cavalry, to try if he might gain any
advantage by rapid marches and the advantage of time, he warns him to
forbid fires being made in the camp, lest any indication of his approach
be given at a distance: he tells him that he will follow immediately.

XXX.--Basilus does as he was commanded; having performed his march
rapidly, and even surpassed the expectations of all, he surprises in the
fields many not expecting him; through their information he advances
towards Ambiorix himself, to the place in which he was said to be with a
few horse. Fortune accomplishes much, not only in other matters, but
also in the art of war. For as it happened by a remarkable chance, that
he fell upon [Ambiorix] himself unguarded and unprepared, and that his
arrival was seen by the people before the report or information of his
arrival was carried thither; so it was an incident of extraordinary
fortune that, although every implement of war which he was accustomed to
have about him was seized, and his chariots and horses surprised, yet he
himself escaped death. But it was effected owing to this circumstance,
that his house being surrounded by a wood, (as are generally the
dwellings of the Gauls, who, for the purpose of avoiding heat, mostly
seek the neighbourhood of woods and rivers) his attendants and friends
in a narrow spot sustained for a short time the attack of our horse.
While they were fighting, one of his followers mounted him on a horse:
the woods sheltered him as he fled. Thus fortune tended much both
towards his encountering and his escaping danger.

XXXI.--Whether Ambiorix did not collect his forces from cool
deliberation, because he considered he ought not to engage in a battle,
or [whether] he was debarred by time and prevented by the sudden arrival
of our horse, when he supposed the rest of the army was closely
following, is doubtful; but certainly, despatching messengers through
the country, he ordered every one to provide for himself; and a part of
them fled into the forest Arduenna, a part into the extensive morasses;
those who were nearest the ocean, concealed themselves in the islands
which the tides usually form; many, departing from their territories,
committed themselves and all their possessions to perfect strangers.
Cativolcus, king of one-half of the Eburones, who had entered into the
design together with Ambiorix, since, being now worn out by age, he was
unable to endure the fatigue either of war or flight, having cursed
Ambiorix with every imprecation, as the person who had been the
contriver of that measure, destroyed himself with the juice of the yew
tree, of which there is a great abundance in Gaul and Germany.

XXXII.--The Segui and Condrusi, of the nation and number of the Germans,
and who are between the Eburones and the Treviri, sent ambassadors to
Caesar to entreat that he would not regard them in the number of his
enemies, nor consider that the cause of all the Germans on this side the
Rhine was one and the same; that they had formed no plans of war, and
had sent no auxiliaries to Ambiorix. Caesar, having ascertained this
fact by an examination of his prisoners commanded that if any of the
Eburones in their flight had repaired to them, they should be sent back
to him; he assures them that if they did that, he will not injure their
territories. Then, having divided his forces into three parts, he sent
the baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca. That is the name of a fort.
This is nearly in the middle of the Eburones, where Titurius and
Aurunculeius had been quartered for the purpose of wintering. This place
he selected as well on other accounts as because the fortifications of
the previous year remained, in order that he might relieve the labour of
the soldiers. He left the fourteenth legion as a guard for the baggage,
one of those three which he had lately raised in Italy and brought over.
Over that legion and camp he places Q. Tullius Cicero and gives him 200
horse.

XXXIII.--Having divided the army, he orders T. Labienus to proceed with
three legions towards the ocean into those parts which border on the
Menappii; he sends C. Trebonius with a like number of legions to lay
waste that district which lies contiguous to the Aduatuci; he himself
determines to go with the remaining three to the river Sambre, which
flows into the Meuse, and to the most remote parts of Arduenna, whither
he heard that Ambiorix had gone with a few horse. When departing, he
promises that he will return before the end of the seventh day, on which
day he was aware corn was due to that legion which was being left in
garrison. He directs Labienus and Trebonius to return by the same day,
if they can do so agreeably to the interests of the republic; so that
their measures having been mutually imparted, and the plans of the enemy
having been discovered, they might be able to commence a different line
of operations.

XXXIV.--There was, as we have above observed, no regular army, nor a
town, nor a garrison which could defend itself by arms; but the people
were scattered in all directions. Where either a hidden valley, or a
woody spot, or a difficult morass furnished any hope of protection or of
security to any one, there he had fixed himself. These places were known
to those that dwelt in the neighbourhood, and the matter demanded great
attention, not so much in protecting the main body of the army (for no
peril could occur to them altogether from those alarmed and scattered
troops), as in preserving individual soldiers; which in some measure
tended to the safety of the army. For both the desire of booty was
leading many too far, and the woods with their unknown and hidden routes
would not allow them to go in large bodies. If he desired the business
to be completed and the race of those infamous people to be cut off,
more bodies of men must be sent in several directions and the soldiers
must be detached on all sides; if he were disposed to keep the companies
at their standards, as the established discipline and practice of the
Roman army required, the situation itself was a safeguard to the
barbarians, nor was there wanting to individuals the daring to lay
secret ambuscades and beset scattered soldiers. But amidst difficulties
of this nature as far as precautions could be taken by vigilance, such
precautions were taken; so that some opportunities of injuring the enemy
were neglected, though the minds of all were burning to take revenge,
rather than that injury should be effected with any loss to our
soldiers. Caesar despatches messengers to the neighbouring states; by
the hope of booty he invites all to him, for the purpose of plundering
the Eburones, in order that the life of the Gauls might be hazarded in
the woods rather than the legionary soldiers; at the same time, in order
that a large force being drawn around them, the race and name of that
state may be annihilated for such a crime. A large number from all
quarters speedily assembles.

XXXV.--These things were going on in all parts of the territories of the
Eburones, and the seventh day was drawing near, by which day Caesar had
purposed to return to the baggage and the legion. Here it might be
learned how much fortune achieves in war, and how great casualties she
produces. The enemy having been scattered and alarmed, as we related
above, there was no force which might produce even a slight occasion of
fear. The report extends beyond the Rhine to the Germans that the
Eburones are being pillaged, and that all were without distinction
invited to the plunder. The Sigambri, who are nearest to the Rhine, by
whom, we have mentioned above, the Tenchtheri and Usipetes were received
after their retreat, collect 2000 horse; they cross the Rhine in ships
and barks thirty miles below that place where the bridge was entire and
the garrison left by Caesar; they arrive at the frontiers of the
Eburones, surprise many who were scattered in flight, and get possession
of a large amount of cattle, of which barbarians are extremely covetous.
Allured by booty, they advance farther; neither morass nor forest
obstructs these men, born amidst war and depredations; they inquire of
their prisoners in what parts Caesar is; they find that he has advanced
farther, and learn that all the army has removed. Thereon one of the
prisoners says, "Why do you pursue such wretched and trifling spoil;
you, to whom it is granted to become even now most richly endowed by
fortune? In three hours you can reach Aduatuca; there the Roman army has
deposited all its fortunes; there is so little of a garrison that not
even the wall can be manned, nor dare any one go beyond the
fortifications." A hope having been presented them, the Germans leave in
concealment the plunder they had acquired; they themselves hasten to
Aduatuca, employing as their guide the same man by whose information
they had become informed of these things.

XXXVI.--Cicero, who during all the foregoing days had kept his soldiers
in camp with the greatest exactness, and agreeably to the injunctions of
Caesar, had not permitted even any of the camp-followers to go beyond
the fortification, distrusting on the seventh day that Caesar would keep
his promise as to the number of days, because he heard that he had
proceeded farther, and no report as to his return was brought to him,
and being urged at the same time by the expressions of those who called
his tolerance almost a siege, if, forsooth, it was not permitted them to
go out of the camp, since he might expect no disaster, whereby he could
be injured, within three miles of the camp, while nine legions and all
the cavalry were under arms, and the enemy scattered and almost
annihilated, sent five cohorts into the neighbouring cornlands, between
which and the camp only one hill intervened, for the purpose of
foraging. Many soldiers of the legions had been left invalided in the
camp, of whom those who had recovered in this space of time, being about
300, are set together under one standard; a large number of soldiers'
attendants besides, with a great number of beasts of burden, which had
remained in the camp, permission being granted, follow them.

XXXVII.--At this very time, the German horse by chance come up, and
immediately, with the same speed with which they had advanced, attempt
to force the camp at the Decuman gate, nor were they seen, in
consequence of woods lying in the way on that side, before they were
just reaching the camp: so much so, that the sutlers who had their
booths under the rampart had not an opportunity of retreating within the
camp. Our men, not anticipating it, are perplexed by the sudden affair,
and the cohort on the outpost scarcely sustains the first attack. The
enemy spread themselves on the other sides to ascertain if they could
find any access. Our men with difficulty defend the gates; the very
position of itself and the fortification secures the other accesses.
There is a panic in the entire camp, and one inquires of another the
cause of the confusion, nor do they readily determine whither the
standards should be borne, nor into what quarter each should betake
himself. One avows that the camp is already taken, another maintains
that, the enemy having destroyed the army and commander-in-chief, are
come thither as conquerors; most form strange superstitious fancies from
the spot, and place before their eyes the catastrophe of Cotta and
Titurius, who had fallen in the same fort. All being greatly
disconcerted by this alarm, the belief of the barbarians is strengthened
that there is no garrison within, as they had heard from their prisoner.
They endeavour to force an entrance and encourage one another not to
cast from their hands so valuable a prize.

XXXVIII.-P. Sextius Baculus, who had led a principal century under
Caesar (of whom we have made mention in previous engagements), had been
left an invalid in the garrison, and had now been five days without
food. He, distrusting his own safety and that of all, goes forth from
his tent unarmed; he sees that the enemy are close at hand and that the
matter is in the utmost danger; he snatches arms from those nearest, and
stations himself at the gate. The centurions of that cohort which was on
guard follow him; for a short time they sustain the fight together.
Sextius faints, after receiving many wounds; he is with difficulty
saved, drawn away by the hands of the soldiers. This space having
intervened, the others resume courage, so far as to venture to take
their place on the fortifications and present the aspect of defenders.

XXXIX.--The foraging having in the meantime been completed, our soldiers
distinctly hear the shout; the horse hasten on before and discover in
what danger the affair is. But here there is no fortification to receive
them, in their alarm: those last enlisted and unskilled in military
discipline turn their faces to the military tribune and the centurions;
they wait to find what orders may be given by them. No one is so
courageous as not to be disconcerted by the suddenness of the affair.
The barbarians, espying our standard in the distance, desist from the
attack; at first they suppose that the legions, which they had learned
from their prisoners had removed farther off, had returned; afterwards,
despising their small number, they make an attack on them at all sides.

XL.-The camp-followers run forward to the nearest rising ground; being
speedily driven from this they throw themselves among the standards and
companies: they thus so much the more alarm the soldiers already
affrighted. Some propose that, forming a wedge, they suddenly break
through, since the camp was so near; and if any part should be
surrounded and slain, they fully trust that at least the rest may be
saved; others, that they take their stand on an eminence, and all
undergo the same destiny. The veteran soldiers, whom we stated to have
set out together [with the others] under a standard, do not approve of
this. Therefore encouraging each other, under the conduct of Caius
Trebonius, a Roman knight, who had been appointed over them, they break
through the midst of the enemy, and arrive in the camp safe to a man.
The camp-attendants and the horse following close upon them with the
same impetuosity, are saved by the courage of the soldiers. But those
who had taken their stand upon the eminence having even now acquired no
experience of military matters, neither could persevere in that
resolution which they approved of, namely, to defend themselves from
their higher position, nor imitate that vigour and speed which they had
observed to have availed others; but, attempting to reach the camp, had
descended into an unfavourable situation. The Centurions, some of whom
had been promoted for their valour from the lower ranks of other legions
to higher ranks in this legion, in order that they might not forfeit
their glory for military exploits previously acquired, fell together
fighting most valiantly. The enemy having been dislodged by their
valour, a part of the soldiers arrived safe in camp contrary to their
expectations; a part perished, surrounded by the barbarians.

XLI.--The Germans, despairing of taking the camp by storm, because they
saw that our men had taken up their position on the fortifications,
retreated beyond the Rhine with that plunder which they had deposited in
the woods. And so great was the alarm, even after the departure of the
enemy, that when C. Volusenus, who had been sent with the cavalry,
arrived that night, he could not gain credence that Caesar was close at
hand with his army safe. Fear had so pre-occupied the minds of all,
that, their reason being almost estranged, they said that all the other
forces having been cut off, the cavalry alone had arrived there by
flight, and asserted that, if the army were safe, the Germans would not
have attacked the camp: which fear the arrival of Caesar removed.

XLII.--He, on his return, being well aware of the casualties of war,
complained of one thing [only], namely, that the cohorts had been sent
away from the outposts and garrison [duty], and pointed out that room
ought not to have been left for even the most trivial casualty; that
fortune had exercised great influence in the sudden arrival of their
enemy; much greater, in that she had turned the barbarians away from the
very rampart and gates of the camp. Of all which events, it seemed the
most surprising that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with this
object, that they might plunder the territories of Ambiorix, being led
to the camp of the Romans, rendered Ambiorix a most acceptable service.

XLIII.--Caesar, having again marched to harass the enemy, after
collecting a large number [of auxiliaries] from the neighbouring states,
despatches them in all directions. All the villages and all the
buildings, which each beheld, were on fire: spoil was being driven off
from all parts; the corn not only was being consumed by so great numbers
of cattle and men, but also had fallen to the earth, owing to the time
of the year and the storms; so that if any had concealed themselves for
the present, still, it appeared likely that they must perish through
want of all things, when the army should be drawn off. And frequently it
came to that point, as so large a body of cavalry had been sent abroad
in all directions, that the prisoners declared Ambiorix had just then
been seen by them in flight, and had not even passed out of sight, so
that the hope of overtaking him being raised, and unbounded exertions
having been resorted to, those who thought they should acquire the
highest favour with Caesar, nearly overcame nature by their ardour, and
continually a little only seemed wanting to complete success; but he
rescued himself by [means of] lurking-places and forests, and, concealed
by the night, made for other districts and quarters, with no greater
guard than that of four horsemen, to whom alone he ventured to confide
his life.

XLIV.--Having devastated the country in such a manner, Caesar leads back
his army with the loss of two cohorts to Durocortorum of the Remi, and,
having summoned a council of Gaul to assemble at that place, he resolved
to hold an investigation respecting the conspiracy of the Senones and
Carnutes, and having pronounced a most severe sentence upon Acco, who
had been the contriver of that plot, he punished him after the custom of
our ancestors. Some fearing a trial, fled; when he had forbidden these
fire and water, he stationed in winter quarters two legions at the
frontiers of the Treviri, two among the Lingones, the remaining six at
Agendicum, in the territories of the Senones; and, having provided corn
for the army, he set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the
assizes.



BOOK VII

I.--Gaul being tranquil, Caesar, as he had determined, sets out for
Italy to hold the provincial assizes. There he receives intelligence of
the death of Clodius; and, being informed of the decree of the senate
[to the effect] that all the youth of Italy should take the military
oath, he determined to hold a levy throughout the entire province.
Report of these events is rapidly borne into Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls
themselves add to the report, and invent what the case seemed to
require, [namely] that Caesar was detained by commotions in the city,
and could not, amidst so violent dissensions, come to his army. Animated
by this opportunity, they who already, previously to this occurrence,
were indignant that they were reduced beneath the dominion of Rome,
begin to organize their plans for war more openly and daringly. The
leading men of Gaul, having convened councils among themselves in the
woods, and retired places, complain of the death of Acco: they point out
that this fate may fall in turn on themselves: they bewail the unhappy
fate of Gaul; and by every sort of promises and rewards, they earnestly
solicit some to begin the war, and assert the freedom of Gaul at the
hazard of their lives. They say that special care should be paid to
this, that Caesar should be cut off from his army, before their secret
plans should be divulged. That this was easy, because neither would the
legions, in the absence of their general, dare to leave their winter
quarters, nor could the general reach his army without a guard: finally,
that it was better to be slain in battle than not to recover their
ancient glory in war, and that freedom which they had received from
their forefathers.

II.--Whilst these things are in agitation, the Carnutes declare "that
they would decline no danger for the sake of the general safety," and
promise that they would be the first of all to begin the war; and since
they cannot at present take precautions, by giving and receiving
hostages, that the affair shall not be divulged they require that a
solemn assurance be given them by oath and plighted honour, their
military standards being brought together (in which manner their most
sacred obligations are made binding), that they should not be deserted
by the rest of the Gauls on commencing the war.

III.--When the appointed day came, the Carnutes, under the command of
Cotuatus and Conetodunus, desperate men, meet together at Genabum, and
slay the Roman citizens who had settled there for the purpose of trading
(among the rest, Caius Fusius Cita, a distinguished Roman knight, who by
Caesar's orders had presided over the provision department), and plunder
their property. The report is quickly spread among all the states of
Gaul; for, whenever a more important and remarkable event takes place,
they transmit the intelligence through their lands and districts by a
shout; the others take it up in succession, and pass it to their
neighbours, as happened on this occasion; for the things which were done
at Genabum at sunrise were heard in the territories of the Arverni
before the end of the first watch, which is an extent of more than a
hundred and sixty miles.

IV.--There in like manner, Vercingetorix the son of Celtillus the
Arvernian, a young man of the highest power (whose father had held the
supremacy of entire Gaul, and had been put to death by his fellow
citizens, for this reason, because he aimed at sovereign power),
summoned together his dependents, and easily excited them. On his design
being made known, they rush to arms: he is expelled from the town of
Gergovia by his uncle Gobanitio and the rest of the nobles, who were of
opinion, that such an enterprise ought not to be hazarded: he did not
however desist, but held in the country a levy of the needy and
desperate. Having collected such a body of troops, he brings over to his
30 sentiments such of his fellow citizens as he has access to: he
exhorts them to take up arms in behalf of the general freedom, and
having assembled great forces he drives from the state his opponents, by
whom he had been expelled a short time previously. He is saluted king by
his partisans; he sends ambassadors in every direction, he conjures them
to adhere firmly to their promise. He quickly attaches to his interests
the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovice, and
all the others who border on the ocean; the supreme command is conferred
on him by unanimous consent. On obtaining this authority, he demands
hostages from all these states, he orders a fixed number of soldiers to
be sent to him immediately; he determines what quantity of arms each
state shall prepare at home, and before what time; he pays particular
attention to the cavalry. To the utmost vigilance he adds the utmost
rigour of authority; and by the severity of his punishments brings over
the wavering: for on the commission of a greater crime he puts the
perpetrators to death by fire and every sort of tortures; for a slighter
cause, he sends home the offenders with their ears cut off, or one of
their eyes put out, that they may be an example to the rest, and
frighten others by the severity of their punishment.

V.--Having quickly collected an army by their punishments, he sends
Lucterius, one of the Cadurci, a man of the utmost daring, with part of
his forces, into the territory of the Ruteni; and marches in person into
the country of the Bituriges. On his arrival, the Bituriges send
ambassadors to the Aedui, under whose protection they were, to solicit
aid in order that they might more easily resist the forces of the enemy.
The Aedui, by the advice of the lieutenants whom Caesar had left with
the army, send supplies of horse and foot to succour the Bituriges. When
they came to the river Loire, which separates the Bituriges from the
Aedui, they delayed a few days there, and, not daring to pass the river,
return home, and send back word to the lieutenants that they had
returned through fear of the treachery of the Bituriges, who, they
ascertained, had formed this design, that if the Aedui should cross the
river, the Bituriges on the one side, and the Arverni on the other,
should surround them. Whether they did this for the reason which they
alleged to the lieutenants, or influenced by treachery, we think that we
ought not to state as certain, because we have no proof. On their
departure, the Bituriges immediately unite themselves to the Arverni.

VI.--These affairs being announced to Caesar in Italy at the time when
he understood that matters in the city had been reduced to a more
tranquil state by the energy of Cneius Pompey, he set out for
Transalpine Gaul. After he had arrived there, he was greatly at a loss
to know by what means he could reach his army. For if he should summon
the legions into the province, he was aware that on their march they
would have to fight in his absence; he foresaw too, that if he himself
should endeavour to reach the army, he would act injudiciously, in
trusting his safety even to those who seemed to be tranquillized.

VII.--In the meantime Lucterius the Cadurcan, having been sent into the
country of the Ruteni, gains over that state to the Arverni. Having
advanced into the country of the Nitiobriges, and Gabali, he receives
hostages from both nations, and, assembling a numerous force, marches to
make a descent on the province in the direction of Narbo. Caesar, when
this circumstance was announced to him, thought that the march to Narbo
ought to take the precedence of all his other plans. When he arrived
there, he encourages the timid, and stations garrisons among the Ruteni,
in the province of the Volcae Arecomici, and the country around Narbo
which was in the vicinity of the enemy; he orders a portion of the
forces from the province, and the recruits which he had brought from
Italy, to rendezvous among the Helvii who border on the territories of
the Arverni.

VIII.--These matters being arranged, and Lucterius now checked and
forced to retreat, because he thought it dangerous to enter the line of
Roman garrisons, Caesar marches into the country of the Helvii; although
mount Cevennes, which separates the Arverni from the Helvii, blocked up
the way with very deep snow, as it was the severest season of the year;
yet having cleared away the snow to the depth of six feet, and having
opened the roads, he reaches the territories of the Arverni, with
infinite labour to his soldiers. This people being surprised, because
they considered themselves defended by the Cevennes as by a wall, and
the paths at this season of the year had never before been passable even
to individuals, he orders the cavalry to extend themselves as far as
they could, and strike as great a panic as possible into the enemy.
These proceedings are speedily announced to Vercingetorix by rumour and
his messengers. Around him all the Arverni crowd in alarm, and solemnly
entreat him to protect their property, and not to suffer them to be
plundered by the enemy, especially as he saw that all the war was
transferred into their country. Being prevailed upon by their entreaties
he moves his camp from the country of the Bituriges in the direction of
the Arverni.

IX.--Caesar, having delayed two days in that place, because he had
anticipated that, in the natural course of events, such would be the
conduct of Vercingetorix, leaves the army under pretence of raising
recruits and cavalry: he places Brutus, a young man, in command of these
forces; he gives him instructions that the cavalry should range as
extensively as possible in all directions; that he would exert himself
not to be absent from the camp longer than three days. Having arranged
these matters, he marches to Vienna by as long journeys as he can, when
his own soldiers did not expect him. Finding there a fresh body of
cavalry, which he had sent on to that place several days before,
marching incessantly night and day, he advanced rapidly through the
territory of the Aedui into that of the Lingones, in which two legions
were wintering, that, if any plan affecting his own safety should have
been organised by the Aedui, he might defeat it by the rapidity of his
movements. When he arrived there, he sends information to the rest of
the legions, and gathers all his army into one place before intelligence
of his arrival could be announced to the Arverni.

Vercingetorix, on hearing this circumstance, leads back his army into
the country of the Bituriges; and after marching from it to Gergovia, a
town of the Boii, whom Caesar had settled there after defeating them in
the Helvetian war, and had rendered tributary to the Aedui, he
determined to attack it.

X.--This action caused great perplexity to Caesar in the selection of
his plans; [he feared] lest, if he should confine his legions in one
place for the remaining portion of the winter, all Gaul should revolt
when the tributaries of the Aedui were subdued, because it would appear
that there was in him no protection for his friends; but if he should
draw them too soon out of their winter quarters, he might be distressed
by the want of provisions, in consequence of the difficulty of
conveyance. It seemed better, however, to endure every hardship than to
alienate the affections of all his allies, by submitting to such an
insult. Having, therefore, impressed on the Aedui the necessity of
supplying him with provisions, he sends forward messengers to the Boii
to inform them of his arrival, and encourage them to remain firm in
their allegiance, and resist the attack of the enemy with great
resolution. Having left two legions and the luggage of the entire army
at Agendicum, he marches to the Boii.

XI.--On the second day, when he came to Vellaunodunum, a town of the
Senones, he determined to attack it, in order that he might not leave an
enemy in his rear, and might the more easily procure supplies of
provisions, and drew a line of circumvallation around it in two days: on
the third day, ambassadors being sent from the town to treat of a
capitulation, he orders their arms to be brought together, their cattle
to be brought forth, and six hundred hostages to be given. He leaves
Caius Trebonius, his lieutenant, to complete these arrangements; he
himself sets out with the intention of marching as soon as possible to
Genabum, a town of the Carnutes, who having then for the first time
received information of the siege of Vellaunodunum, as they thought that
it would be protracted to a longer time, were preparing a garrison to
send to Genabum for the defence of that town. Caesar arrived here in two
days; after pitching his camp before the town, being prevented by the
time of the day, he defers the attack to the next day, and orders his
soldiers to prepare whatever was necessary for that enterprise; and as a
bridge over the Loire connected the town of Genabum with the opposite
bank, fearing lest the inhabitants should escape by night from the town,
he orders two legions to keep watch under arms. The people of Genabum
came forth silently from the city before midnight, and began to cross
the river. When this circumstance was announced by scouts, Caesar,
having set fire to the gates, sends in the legions which he had ordered
to be ready, and obtains possession of the town so completely, that very
few of the whole number of the enemy escaped being taken alive, because
the narrowness of the bridge and the roads prevented the multitude from
escaping. He pillages and burns the town, gives the booty to the
soldiers, then leads his army over the Loire, and marches into the
territories of the Bituriges.

XII.--Vercingetorix, when he ascertained the arrival of Caesar, desisted
from the siege [of Gergovia], and marched to meet Caesar. The latter had
commenced to besiege Noviodunum; and when ambassadors came from this
town to beg that he would pardon them and spare their lives, in order
that he might execute the rest of his designs with the rapidity by which
he had accomplished most of them, he orders their arms to be collected,
their horses to be brought forth, and hostages to be given. A part of
the hostages being now delivered up, when the rest of the terms were
being performed, a few centurions and soldiers being sent into the town
to collect the arms and horses, the enemy's cavalry, which had
outstripped the main body of Vercingetorix's army, was seen at a
distance; as soon as the townsmen beheld them, and entertained hopes of
assistance, raising a shout, they began to take up arms, shut the gates,
and line the walls. When the centurions in the town understood from the
signal-making of the Gauls that they were forming some new design, they
drew their swords and seized the gates, and recovered all their men
safe.

XIII.--Caesar orders the horse to be drawn out of the camp, and
commences a cavalry action. His men being now distressed, Caesar sends
to their aid about four hundred German horse, which he had determined,
at the beginning, to keep with himself. The Gauls could not withstand
their attack, but were put to flight, and retreated to their main body,
after losing a great number of men. When they were routed, the townsmen,
again intimidated, arrested those persons by whose exertions they
thought that the mob had been roused, and brought them to Caesar, and
surrendered themselves to him. When these affairs were accomplished,
Caesar marched to the Avaricum, which was the largest and best fortified
town in the territories of the Bituriges, and situated in a most fertile
tract of country; because he confidently expected that on taking that
town, he would reduce beneath his dominion the state of the Bituriges.

XIV.--Vercingetorix, after sustaining such a series of losses at
Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum, summons his men to a council. He
impresses on them "that the war must be prosecuted on a very different
system from that which had been previously adopted; but they should by
all means aim at this object, that the Romans should be prevented from
foraging and procuring provisions; that this was easy, because they
themselves were well supplied with cavalry and were likewise assisted by
the season of the year; that forage could not be cut; that the enemy
must necessarily disperse, and look for it in the houses, that all these
might be daily destroyed by the horse. Besides that the interests of
private property must be neglected for the sake of the general safety;
that the villages and houses ought to be fired, over such an extent of
country in every direction from Boia, as the Romans appeared capable of
scouring in their search for forage. That an abundance of these
necessaries could be supplied to them, because they would be assisted by
the resources of those in whose territories the war would be waged: that
the Romans either would not bear the privation, or else would advance to
any distance from the camp with considerable danger; and that it made no
difference whether they slew them or stripped them of their baggage,
since, if it was lost, they could not carry on the war. Besides that,
the towns ought to be burnt which were not secured against every danger
by their fortifications or natural advantages; that there should not be
places of retreat for their own countrymen for declining military
service, nor be exposed to the Romans as inducements to carry off
abundance of provisions and plunder. If these sacrifices should appear
heavy or galling, that they ought to consider it much more distressing
that their wives and children should be dragged off to slavery, and
themselves slain; the evils which must necessarily befall the conquered.

XV.--This opinion having been approved of by unanimous consent, more
than twenty towns of the Bituriges are burnt in one day. Conflagrations
are beheld in every quarter; and although all bore this with great
regret, yet they laid before themselves this consolation, that, as the
victory was certain, they could quickly recover their losses. There is a
debate concerning Avaricum in the general council, whether they should
decide that it should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges threw
themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, and entreat that they should
not be compelled to set fire with their own hands to the fairest city of
almost the whole of Gaul, which was both a protection and ornament to
the state; they say that "they could easily defend it, owing to the
nature of the ground, for, being enclosed almost on every side by a
river and a marsh, it had only one entrance, and that very narrow."
Permission being granted to them at their earnest request, Vercingetorix
at first dissuades them from it, but afterwards concedes the point,
owing to their entreaties and the compassion of the soldiers. A proper
garrison is selected for the town.

XVI.--Vercingetorix follows closely upon Caesar by shorter marches, and
selects for his camp a place defended by woods and marshes, at the
distance of fifteen miles from Avaricum. There he received intelligence
by trusty scouts, every hour in the day, of what was going on at
Avaricum, and ordered whatever he wished to be done; he closely watched
all our expeditions for corn and forage, and whenever they were
compelled to go to a greater distance, he attacked them when dispersed,
and inflicted severe loss upon them; although the evil was remedied by
our men, as far as precautions could be taken, by going forth at
irregular times, and by different ways.

XVII.--Caesar pitching his camp at that side of the town which was not
defended by the river and marsh, and had a very narrow approach, as we
have mentioned, began to raise the vineae and erect two towers; for the
nature of the place prevented him from drawing a line of
circumvallation. He never ceased to importune the Boii and Aedui for
supplies of corn; of whom the one [the Aedui], because they were acting
with no zeal, did not aid him much; the others [the Boii], as their
resources were not great, quickly consumed what they had. Although the
army was distressed by the greatest want of corn, through the poverty of
the Boii, the apathy of the Aedui, and the burning of the houses, to
such a degree, that for several days the soldiers were without corn, and
satisfied their extreme hunger with cattle driven from the remote
villages; yet no language was heard from them unworthy of the majesty of
the Roman people and their former victories. Moreover, when Caesar
addressed the legions, one by one, when at work, and said that he would
raise the siege, if they felt the scarcity too severely, they
unanimously begged him "not to do so; that they had served for several
years under his command in such a manner, that they never submitted to
insult, and never abandoned an enterprise without accomplishing it; that
they should consider it a disgrace if they abandoned the siege after
commencing it; that it was better to endure every hardship than not to
avenge the manes of the Roman citizens who perished at Genabum by the
perfidy of the Gauls." They entrusted the same declarations to the
centurions and military tribunes, that through them they might be
communicated to Caesar.

XVIII.--When the towers had now approached the walls, Caesar ascertained
from the captives that Vercingetorix, after destroying the forage, had
pitched his camp nearer Avaricum, and that he himself with the cavalry
and light-armed infantry, who generally fought among the horse, had gone
to lay an ambuscade in that quarter to which he thought that our troops
would come the next day to forage. On learning these facts, he set out
from the camp secretly at midnight, and reached the camp of the enemy
early in the morning. They having quickly learned the arrival of Caesar
by scouts, hid their cars and baggage in the thickest parts of the
woods, and drew up all their forces in a lofty and open space: which
circumstance being announced, Caesar immediately ordered the baggage to
be piled, and the arms to be got ready.

XIX.--There was a hill of a gentle ascent from the bottom; a dangerous
and impassable marsh, not more than fifty feet broad, begirt it on
almost every side. The Gauls, having broken down the bridges, posted
themselves on this hill, in confidence of their position, and being
drawn up in tribes according to their respective states, held all the
fords and passages of that marsh with trusty guards, thus determined
that if the Romans should attempt to force the marsh, they would
overpower them from the higher ground while sticking in it, so that
whoever saw the nearness of the position, would imagine that the two
armies were prepared to fight on almost equal terms; but whoever should
view accurately the disadvantage of position, would discover that they
were showing off an empty affectation of courage. Caesar clearly points
out to his soldiers, who were indignant that the enemy could bear the
sight of them at the distance of so short a space, and were earnestly
demanding the signal for action, "with how great loss and the death of
how many gallant men the victory would necessarily be purchased: and
when he saw them so determined to decline no danger for his renown, that
he ought to be considered guilty of the utmost injustice if he did not
hold their life dearer than his own personal safety." Having thus
consoled his soldiers, he leads them back on the same day to the camp,
and determined to prepare the other things which were necessary for the
siege of the town.

XX.--Vercingetorix, when he had returned to his men, was accused of
treason, in that he had moved his camp nearer the Romans, in that he had
gone away with all the cavalry, in that he had left so great forces
without a commander, in that, on his departure, the Romans had come at
such a favourable season, and with such despatch; that all these
circumstances could not have happened accidentally or without design;
that he preferred holding the sovereignty of Gaul by the grant of
Caesar, to acquiring it by their favour. Being accused in such a manner,
he made the following reply to these charges:--"That his moving his camp
had been caused by want of forage, and had been done even by their
advice; that his approaching near the Romans had been a measure dictated
by the favourable nature of the ground, which would defend him by its
natural strength; that the service of the cavalry could not have been
requisite in marshy ground, and was useful in that place to which they
had gone; that he, on his departure, had given the supreme command to no
one intentionally, lest he should be induced by the eagerness of the
multitude to hazard an engagement, to which he perceived that all were
inclined, owing to their want of energy, because they were unable to
endure fatigue any longer. That, if the Romans in the meantime came up
by chance, they [the Gauls] should feel grateful to fortune; if invited
by the information of some one they should feel grateful to him, because
they were enabled to see distinctly from the higher ground the smallness
of the number of their enemy, and despise the courage of those who, not
daring to fight, retreated disgracefully into their camp. That he
desired no power from Caesar by treachery, since he could have it by
victory, which was now assured to himself and to all the Gauls; nay,
that he would even give them back the command, if they thought that they
conferred honour on him, rather then received safety from him. That you
may be assured," said he, "that I speak these words with truth;--listen
to these Roman soldiers!" He produces some camp-followers whom he had
surprised on a foraging expedition some days before, and had tortured by
famine and confinement. They being previously instructed in what answers
they should make when examined, say, "That they were legionary soldiers,
that, urged by famine and want, they had recently gone forth from the
camp, [to see] if they could find any corn or cattle in the fields; that
the whole army was distressed by a similar scarcity, nor had any one now
sufficient strength, nor could bear the labour of the work; and
therefore that the general was determined, if he made no progress in the
siege, to draw off his army in three days." "These benefits," says
Vercingetorix, "you receive from me, whom you accuse of treason--me, by
whose exertions you see so powerful and victorious an army almost
destroyed by famine, without shedding one drop of your blood; and I have
taken precautions that no state shall admit within its territories this
army in its ignominious flight from this place."

XXI.--The whole multitude raise a shout and clash their arms, according
to their custom, as they usually do in the case of him whose speech they
approve; [they exclaim] that Vercingetorix was a consummate general, and
that they had no doubt of his honour; that the war could not be
conducted with greater prudence. They determine that ten thousand men
should be picked out of the entire army and sent into the town, and
decide that the general safety should not be entrusted to the Bituriges
alone, because they were aware that the glory of the victory must rest
with the Bituriges, if they made good the defence of the town.

XXII.--To the extraordinary valour of our soldiers, devices of every
sort were opposed by the Gauls; since they are a nation of consummate
ingenuity, and most skilful in imitating and making those things which
are imparted by any one; for they turned aside the hooks with nooses,
and when they had caught hold of them firmly, drew them on by means of
engines, and undermined the mound the more skilfully on this account,
because there are in their territories extensive iron mines, and
consequently every description of mining operations is known and
practised by them. They had furnished, moreover, the whole wall on every
side with turrets, and had covered them with skins. Besides, in their
frequent sallies by day and night, they attempted either to set fire to
the mound, or attack our soldiers when engaged in the works; and,
moreover, by splicing the upright timbers of their own towers, they
equalled the height of ours, as fast as the mound had daily raised them,
and countermined our mines, and impeded the working of them by stakes
bent and sharpened at the ends, and boiling pitch, and stones of very
great weight, and prevented them from approaching the walls.

XXIII.--But this is usually the form of all the Gallic walls. Straight
beams, connected lengthwise and two feet distant from each other at
equal intervals, are placed together on the ground; these are mortised
on the inside, and covered with plenty of earth. But the intervals which
we have mentioned, are closed up in front by large stones. These being
thus laid and cemented together, another row is added above, in such a
manner that the same interval may be observed, and that the beams may
not touch one another, but equal spaces intervening, each row of beams
is kept firmly in its place by a row of stones. In this manner the whole
wall is consolidated, until the regular height of the wall be completed.
This work, with respect to appearance and variety, is not unsightly,
owing to the alternate rows of beams and stones, which preserve their
order in right lines; and, besides, it possesses great advantages as
regards utility and the defence of cities; for the stone protects it
from fire, and the wood from the battering ram, since it [the wood]
being mortised in the inside with rows of beams, generally forty feet
each in length, can neither be broken through nor torn asunder.

XXIV.--The siege having been impeded by so many disadvantages, the
soldiers, although they were retarded during the whole time, by the mud,
cold, and constant showers, yet by their incessant labour overcame all
these obstacles, and in twenty-five days raised a mound three hundred
and thirty feet broad and eighty feet high. When it almost touched the
enemy's walls, and Caesar, according to his usual custom, kept watch at
the work, and encouraged the soldiers not to discontinue the work for a
moment: a little before the third watch they discovered that the mound
was sinking, since the enemy had set it on fire by a mine; and at the
same time a shout was raised along the entire wall, and a sally was made
from two gates on each side of the turrets. Some at a distance were
casting torches and dry wood from the wall on the mound, others were
pouring on it pitch, and other materials, by which the flame might be
excited, so that a plan could hardly be formed, as to where they should
first run to the defence, or to what part aid should be brought.
However, as two legions always kept guard before the camp by Caesar's
orders, and several of them were at stated times at the work, measures
were promptly taken, that some should oppose the sallying party, others
draw back the towers and make a cut in the rampart; and moreover, that
the whole army should hasten from the camp to extinguish the flames.

XXV.--When the battle was going on in every direction, the rest of the
night being now spent, and fresh hopes of victory always arose before
the enemy: the more so on this account because they saw the coverings of
our towers burnt away, and perceived that we, being exposed, could not
easily go to give assistance, and they themselves were always relieving
the weary with fresh men, and considered that all the safety of Gaul
rested on this crisis; there happened in my own view a circumstance
which, having appeared to be worthy of record, we thought it ought not
to be omitted. A certain Gaul before the gate of the town, who was
casting into the fire opposite the turret balls of tallow and fire which
were passed along to him, was pierced with a dart on the right side and
fell dead. One of those next him stepped over him as he lay, and
discharged the same office: when the second man was slain in the same
manner by a wound from a cross-bow, a third succeeded him, and a fourth
succeeded the third: nor was this post left vacant by the besieged,
until, the fire of the mound having been extinguished, and the enemy
repulsed in every direction, an end was put to the fighting.

XXVI.--The Gauls having tried every expedient, as nothing had succeeded,
adopted the design of fleeing from the town the next day, by the advice
and order of Vercingetorix. They hoped that, by attempting it at the
dead of night, they would effect it without any great loss of men,
because the camp of Vercingetorix was not far distant from the town, and
the extensive marsh which intervened was likely to retard the Romans in
the pursuit. And they were now preparing to execute this by night, when
the matrons suddenly ran out into the streets, and weeping cast
themselves at the feet of their husbands, and requested of them, with
every entreaty, that they should not abandon themselves and their common
children to the enemy for punishment, because the weakness of their
nature and physical powers prevented them from taking to flight. When
they saw that they (as fear does not generally admit of mercy in extreme
danger) persisted in their resolution, they began to shout aloud, and
give intelligence of their flight to the Romans. The Gauls being
intimidated by fear of this, lest the passes should be pre-occupied by
the Roman cavalry, desisted from their design.

XXVII.--The next day Caesar, the tower being advanced, and the works
which he had determined to raise being arranged, a violent storm
arising, thought this no bad time for executing his designs, because he
observed the guards arranged on the walls a little too negligently, and
therefore ordered his own men to engage in their work more remissly, and
pointed out what he wished to be done. He drew up his soldiers in a
secret position within the vineae, and exhorts them to reap, at least,
the harvest of victory proportionate to their exertions. He proposed a
reward for those who should first scale the walls, and gave the signal
to the soldiers. They suddenly flew out from all quarters and quickly
filled the wall.

XXVIII.--The enemy being alarmed by the suddenness of the attack, were
dislodged from the wall and towers, and drew up, in form of a wedge, in
the market-place and the open streets, with this intention that, if an
attack should be made on any side, they should fight with their line
drawn up to receive it. When they saw no one descending to the level
ground, and the enemy extending themselves along the entire wall in
every direction, fearing lest every hope of flight should be cut off,
they cast away their arms, and sought, without stopping, the most remote
parts of the town. A part was then slain by the infantry when they were
crowding upon one another in the narrow passage of the gates; and a part
having got without the gates, were cut to pieces by the cavalry: nor was
there one who was anxious for the plunder. Thus, being excited by the
massacre at Genabum and the fatigue of the siege, they spared neither
those worn out with years, women, or children. Finally, out of all that
number, which amounted to about forty thousand, scarcely eight hundred,
who fled from the town when they heard the first alarm, reached
Vercingetorix in safety: and he, the night being now far spent, received
them in silence after their flight (fearing that any sedition should
arise in the camp from their entrance in a body and the compassion of
the soldiers), so that, having arranged his friends and the chiefs of
the states at a distance on the road, he took precautions that they
should be separated and conducted to their fellow countrymen, to
whatever part of the camp had been assigned to each state from the
beginning.

XXIX.--Vercingetorix having convened an assembly on the following day,
consoled and encouraged his soldiers in the following words:--"That they
should not be too much depressed in spirit, nor alarmed at their loss;
that the Romans did not conquer by valour nor in the field, but by a
kind of art and skill in assault, with which they themselves were
unacquainted; that whoever expected every event in the war to be
favourable, erred; that it never was his opinion that Avaricum should be
defended, of the truth of which statement he had themselves as
witnesses, but that it was owing to the imprudence of the Bituriges, and
the too ready compliance of the rest, that this loss was sustained;
that, however, he would soon compensate it by superior advantages; for
that he would, by his exertions, bring over those states which severed
themselves from the rest of the Gauls, and would create a general
unanimity throughout the whole of Gaul, the union of which not even the
whole earth could withstand, and that he had it already almost effected;
that in the meantime it was reasonable that he should prevail on them,
for the sake of the general safety, to begin to fortify their camp, in
order that they might the more easily sustain the sudden attacks of the
enemy."

XXX.--This speech was not disagreeable to the Gauls, principally,
because he himself was not disheartened by receiving so severe a loss,
and had not concealed himself, nor shunned the eyes of the people: and
he was believed to possess greater foresight and sounder judgment than
the rest, because, when the affair was undecided, he had at first been
of opinion that Avaricum should be burnt, and afterwards that it should
be abandoned. Accordingly, as ill success weakens the authority of other
generals, so, on the contrary, his dignity increased daily, although a
loss was sustained: at the same time they began to entertain hopes, on
his assertion, of uniting the rest of the states to themselves, and on
this occasion, for the first time, the Gauls began to fortify their
camps, and were so alarmed that although they were men unaccustomed to
toil, yet they were of opinion that they ought to endure and suffer
everything which should be imposed upon them.

XXXI.--Nor did Vercingetorix use less efforts than he had promised, to
gain over the other states, and [in consequence] endeavoured to entice
their leaders by gifts and promises. For this object he selected fitting
emissaries by whose subtle pleading or private friendship each of the
nobles could be most easily influenced. He takes care that those who
fled to him on the storming of Avaricum should be provided with arms and
clothes. At the same time, that his diminished forces should be
recruited, he levies a fixed quota of soldiers from each state, and
defines the number and day before which he should wish them brought to
the camp, and orders all the archers, of whom there was a very great
number in Gaul, to be collected and sent to him. By these means, the
troops which were lost at Avaricum are speedily replaced. In the
meantime, Teutomarus, the son of Ollovicon, the king of the Nitiobriges,
whose father had received the appellation of friend from our senate,
came to him with a great number of his own horse and those whom he had
hired from Aquitania.

XXXII.--Caesar, after delaying several days at Avaricum, and finding
there the greatest plenty of corn and other provisions, refreshed his
army after their fatigue and privation. The winter being almost ended,
when he was invited by the favourable season of the year to prosecute
the war and march against the enemy, [and try] whether he could draw
them from the marshes and woods, or else press them by a blockade; some
noblemen of the Aedui came to him as ambassadors to entreat "that in an
extreme emergency he should succour their state; that their affairs were
in the utmost danger, because, whereas single magistrates had been
usually appointed in ancient times and held the power of king for a
single year, two persons now exercised this office, and each asserted
that he was appointed according to their laws. That one of them was
Convictolitanis, a powerful and illustrious youth; the other Cotus,
sprung from a most ancient family, and personally a man of very great
influence and extensive connections. His brother Valetiacus had borne
the same office during the last year: that the whole state was up in
arms; the senate divided, the people divided; that each of them had his
own adherents; and that, if the animosity would be fomented any longer
the result would be that one part of the state would come to a collision
with the other; that it rested with his activity and influence to
prevent it."

XXXIII.--Although Caesar considered it ruinous to leave the war and the
enemy, yet, being well aware what great evils generally arise from
internal dissensions, lest a state so powerful and so closely connected
with the Roman people, which he himself had always fostered and honoured
in every respect, should have recourse to violence and arms, and that
the party which had less confidence in its own power should summon aid
from Vercingetorix, he determined to anticipate this movement; and
because, by the laws of the Aedui, it was not permitted those who held
the supreme authority to leave the country, he determined to go in
person to the Aedui, lest he should appear to infringe upon their
government and laws, and summoned all the senate, and those between whom
the dispute was, to meet him at Decetia. When almost all the state had
assembled there, and he was informed that one brother had been declared
magistrate by the other, when only a few persons were privately summoned
for the purpose, at a different time and place from what he ought,
whereas the laws not only forbade two belonging to one family to be
elected magistrates while each was alive, but even deterred them from
being in the senate, he compelled Cotus to resign his office; he ordered
Convictolitanis, who had been elected by the priests, according to the
usage of the state, in the presence of the magistrates, to hold the
supreme authority.

XXXIV.--Having pronounced this decree between [the contending parties],
he exhorted the Aedui to bury in oblivion their disputes and
dissensions, and, laying aside all these things, devote themselves to
the war, and expect from him, on the conquest of Gaul, those rewards
which they should have earned, and send speedily to him all their
cavalry and ten thousand infantry, which he might place in different
garrisons to protect his convoys of provisions, and then divided his
army into two parts: he gave Labienus four legions to lead into the
country of the Senones and Parisii; and led in person six into the
country of the Arverni, in the direction of the town of Gergovia, along
the banks of the Allier. He gave part of the cavalry to Labienus, and
kept part to himself. Vercingetorix, on learning this circumstance,
broke down all the bridges over the river and began to march on the
other bank of the Allier.

XXXV.--When each army was in sight of the other, and was pitching their
camp almost opposite that of the enemy, scouts being distributed in
every quarter, lest the Romans should build a bridge and bring over
their troops; it was to Caesar a matter attended with great
difficulties, lest he should be hindered from passing the river during
the greater part of the summer, as the Allier cannot generally be forded
before the autumn. Therefore, that this might not happen, having pitched
his camp in a woody place opposite to one of those bridges which
Vercingetorix had taken care should be broken down, the next day he
stopped behind with two legions in a secret place: he sent on the rest
of the forces as usual, with all the baggage, after having selected some
cohorts, that the number of the legions might appear to be complete.
Having ordered these to advance as far as they could, when now, from the
time of day, he conjectured they had come to an encampment, he began to
rebuild the bridge on the same piles, the lower part of which remained
entire. Having quickly finished the work and led his legions across, he
selected a fit place for a camp, and recalled the rest of his troops.
Vercingetorix, on ascertaining this fact, went before him by forced
marches, in order that he might not be compelled to come to an action
against his will.

XXXVI.--Caesar, in five days' march, went from that place to Gergovia,
and after engaging in a slight cavalry skirmish that day, on viewing the
situation of the city, which, being built on a very high mountain, was
very difficult of access, he despaired of taking it by storm, and
determined to take no measures with regard to besieging it before he
should secure a supply of provisions. But Vercingetorix, having pitched
his camp on the mountain near the town, placed the forces of each state
separately and at small intervals around himself, and having occupied
all the hills of that range as far as they commanded a view [of the
Roman encampment], he presented a formidable appearance; he ordered the
rulers of the states, whom he had selected as his council of war, to
come to him daily at the dawn, whether any measure seemed to require
deliberation or execution. Nor did he allow almost any day to pass
without testing in a cavalry action, the archers being intermixed, what
spirit and valour there was in each of his own men. There was a hill
opposite the town, at the very foot of that mountain, strongly fortified
and precipitous on every side (which if our men could gain, they seemed
likely to exclude the enemy from a great share of their supply of water,
and from free foraging; but this place was occupied by them with a weak
garrison): however, Caesar set out from the camp in the silence of
night, and dislodging the garrison before succour could come from the
town, he got possession of the place and posted two legions there, and
drew from the greater camp to the less a double trench twelve feet
broad, so that the soldiers could even singly pass secure from any
sudden attack of the enemy.

XXXVII.--Whilst these affairs were going on at Gergovia,
Convictolitanis, the Aeduan, to whom we have observed the magistracy was
adjudged by Caesar, being bribed by the Arverni, holds a conference with
certain young men, the chief of whom were Litavicus and his brothers,
who were born of a most noble family. He shares the bribe with them, and
exhorts them to "remember that they were free and born for empire; that
the state of the Aedui was the only one which retarded the most certain
victory of the Gauls; that the rest were held in check by its authority;
and, if it was brought over, the Romans would not have room to stand on
in Gaul; that he had received some kindness from Caesar, only so far,
however, as gaining a most just cause by his decision; but that he
assigned more weight to the general freedom; for, why should the Aedui
go to Caesar to decide concerning their rights and laws, rather than the
Romans come to the Aedui?" The young men being easily won over by the
speech of the magistrate and the bribe, when they declared that they
would even be leaders in the plot, a plan for accomplishing it was
considered, because they were confident their state could not be induced
to undertake the war on slight grounds. It was resolved that Litavicus
should have the command of the ten thousand which were being sent to
Caesar for the war, and should have charge of them on their march, and
that his brothers should go before him to Caesar. They arrange the other
measures, and the manner in which they should have them done.

XXXVIII.--Litavicus, having received the command of the army, suddenly
convened the soldiers, when he was about thirty miles distant from
Gergovia, and, weeping, said, "Soldiers, whither are we going? All our
knights and all our nobles have perished. Eporedorix and Viridomarus,
the principal men of the state, being accused of treason, have been
slain by the Romans without even permission to plead their cause. Learn
this intelligence from those who have escaped from the massacre; for I,
since my brothers and all my relations have been slain, am prevented by
grief from declaring what has taken place." Persons are brought forward
whom he had instructed in what he would have them say, and make the same
statements to the soldiery as Litavicus had made: that all the knights
of the Aedui were slain because they were said to have held conferences
with the Arverni; that they had concealed themselves among the multitude
of soldiers, and had escaped from the midst of the slaughter. The Aedui
shout aloud and conjure Litavicus to provide for their safety. "As if,"
said he, "it were a matter of deliberation, and not of necessity, for us
to go to Gergovia and unite ourselves to the Arverni. Or have we any
reasons to doubt that the Romans, after perpetrating the atrocious
crime, are now hastening to slay us? Therefore, if there be any spirit
in us, let us avenge the death of those who have perished in a most
unworthy manner, and let us slay these robbers." He points to the Roman
citizens, who had accompanied them, in reliance on his protection. He
immediately seizes a great quantity of corn and provisions, cruelly
tortures them, and then puts them to death, sends messengers throughout
the entire state of the Aedui, and rouses them completely by the same
falsehood concerning the slaughter of their knights and nobles; he
earnestly advises them to avenge, in the same manner as he did, the
wrongs which they had received.

XXXIX.--Eporedorix, the Aeduan, a young man born in the highest rank and
possessing very great influence at home, and, along with Viridomarus, of
equal age and influence, but of inferior birth, whom Caesar had raised
from a humble position to the highest rank, on being recommended to him
by Divitiacus, had come in the number of horse, being summoned by Caesar
by name. These had a dispute with each other for precedence, and in the
struggle between the magistrates they had contended with their utmost
efforts, the one for Convictolitanis, the other for Cotus. Of these
Eporedorix, on learning the design of Litavicus, lays the matter before
Caesar almost at midnight; he entreats that Caesar should not suffer
their state to swerve from the alliance with the Roman people, owing to
the depraved counsels of a few young men, which he foresaw would be the
consequence if so many thousand men should unite themselves to the
enemy, as their relations could not neglect their safety, nor the state
regard it as a matter of slight importance.

XL.--Caesar felt great anxiety on this intelligence, because he had
always especially indulged the state of the Aedui, and, without any
hesitation, draws out from the camp four light-armed legions and all the
cavalry: nor had he time, at such a crisis, to contract the camp,
because the affair seemed to depend upon despatch. He leaves Caius
Fabius, his lieutenant, with two legions to guard the camp. When he
ordered the brothers of Litavicus to be arrested, he discovers that they
had fled a short time before to the camp of the enemy. He encouraged his
soldiers "not to be disheartened by the labour of the journey on such a
necessary occasion," and, after advancing twenty-five miles, all being
most eager, he came in sight of the army of the Aedui, and, by sending
on his cavalry, retards and impedes their march; he then issues strict
orders to all his soldiers to kill no one. He commands Eporedorix and
Viridomarus, who they thought were killed, to move among the cavalry and
address their friends. When they were recognized and the treachery of
Litavicus discovered, the Aedui began to extend their hands to intimate
submission, and, laying down their arms, to deprecate death. Litavicus,
with his clansmen, who after the custom of the Gauls consider it a crime
to desert their patrons, even in extreme misfortune, flees forth to
Gergovia.

XLI.--Caesar, after sending messengers to the state of the Aedui, to
inform them that they whom he could have put to death by the right of
war were spared through his kindness, and after giving three hours of
the night to his army for his repose, directed his march to Gergovia.
Almost in the middle of the journey, a party of horse that were sent by
Fabius stated in how great danger matters were; they inform him that the
camp was attacked by a very powerful army, while fresh men were
frequently relieving the wearied, and exhausting our soldiers by the
incessant toil, since, on account of the size of the camp, they had
constantly to remain on the rampart; that many had been wounded by the
immense number of arrows and all kinds of missiles; that the engines
were of great service in withstanding them; that Fabius, at their
departure, leaving only two gates open, was blocking up the rest, and
was adding breast-works to the ramparts, and was preparing himself for a
similar casualty on the following day. Caesar, after receiving this
information, reached the camp before sunrise owing to the very great
zeal of his soldiers.

XLII.--Whilst these things are going on at Gergovia, the Aedui, on
receiving the first announcements from Litavicus, leave themselves no
time to ascertain the truth of these statements. Some are stimulated by
avarice, others by revenge and credulity, which is an innate propensity
in that race of men to such a degree that they consider a slight rumour
as an ascertained fact. They plunder the property of the Roman citizens,
and either massacre them or drag them away to slavery. Convictolitanis
increases the evil state of affairs, and goads on the people to fury,
that by the commission of some outrage they may be ashamed to return to
propriety. They entice from the town of Cabillonus, by a promise of
safety, Marcus Aristius, a military tribune, who was on his march to his
legion; they compel those who had settled there for the purpose of
trading to do the same. By constantly attacking them on their march they
strip them of all their baggage; they besiege day and night those that
resisted; when many were slain on both sides, they excite a greater
number to arms.

XLIII.--In the meantime, when intelligence was brought that all their
soldiers were in Caesar's power, they run in a body to Aristius; they
assure him that nothing had been done by public authority; they order an
inquiry to be made about the plundered property; they confiscate the
property of Litavicus and his brothers; they send ambassadors to Caesar
for the purpose of clearing themselves. They do all this with a view to
recover their soldiers; but being contaminated by guilt, and charmed by
the gains arising from the plundered property, as that act was shared in
by many, and being tempted by the fear of punishment, they began to form
plans of war and stir up the other states by embassies. Although Caesar
was aware of this proceeding, yet he addresses the ambassadors with as
much mildness as he can: "That he did not think worse of the state on
account of the ignorance and fickleness of the mob, nor would diminish
his regard for the Aedui." He himself, fearing a greater commotion in
Gaul, in order to prevent his being surrounded by all the states, began
to form plans as to the manner in which he should return from Gergovia
and again concentrate his forces, lest a departure arising from the fear
of a revolt should seem like a flight.

XLIV.--Whilst he was considering these things an opportunity of acting
successfully seemed to offer. For, when he had come into the smaller
camp for the purpose of securing the works, he noticed that the hill in
the possession of the enemy was stript of men, although, on the former
days, it could scarcely be seen on account of the numbers on it. Being
astonished, he inquires the reason of it from the deserters, a great
number of whom flocked to him daily. They all concurred in asserting,
what Caesar himself had already ascertained by his scouts, that the back
of that hill was almost level; but likewise woody and narrow, by which
there was a pass to the other side of the town; that they had serious
apprehensions for this place, and had no other idea, on the occupation
of one hill by the Romans, than that, if they should lose the other,
they would be almost surrounded, and cut off from all egress and
foraging; that they were all summoned by Vercingetorix to fortify this
place.

XLV.--Caesar, on being informed of this circumstance, sends several
troops of horse to the place immediately after midnight; he orders them
to range in every quarter with more tumult than usual. At dawn he orders
a large quantity of baggage to be drawn out of the camp, and the
muleteers with helmets, in the appearance and guise of horsemen, to ride
round the hills. To these he adds a few cavalry, with instructions to
range more widely to make a show. He orders them all to seek the same
quarter by a long circuit; these proceedings were seen at a distance
from the town, as Gergovia commanded a view of the camp, nor could the
Gauls ascertain at so great a distance what certainty there was in the
manoeuvre. He sends one legion to the same hill, and after it had
marched a little, stations it in the lower ground, and conceals it in
the woods. The suspicions of the Gauls are increased, and all their
forces are marched to that place to defend it. Caesar, having perceived
the camp of the enemy deserted, covers the military insignia of his men,
conceals the standards, and transfers his soldiers in small bodies from
the greater to the less camp, and points out to the lieutenants whom he
had placed in command over the respective legions, what he should wish
to be done; he particularly advises them to restrain their men from
advancing too far, through their desire of fighting, or their hope of
plunder; he sets before them what disadvantages the unfavourable nature
of the ground carries with it; that they could be assisted by despatch
alone: that success depended on a surprise, and not on a battle. After
stating these particulars, he gives the signal for action, and detaches
the Aedui at the same time by another ascent an the right.

XLVI.--The town wall was 1200 paces distant from the plain and foot of
the ascent, in a straight line, if no gap intervened; whatever circuit
was added to this ascent, to make the hill easy, increased the length of
the route. But almost in the middle of the hill, the Gauls had
previously built a wall six feet high, made of large stones, and
extending in length as far as the nature of the ground permitted, as a
barrier to retard the advance of our men; and leaving all the lower
space empty, they had filled the upper part of the hill, as far as the
wall of the town, with their camps very close to one another. The
soldiers, on the signal being given, quickly advance to this
fortification, and passing over it, make themselves masters of the
separate camps. And so great was their activity in taking the camps,
that Teutomarus, the king of the Nitiobriges, being suddenly surprised
in his tent, as he had gone to rest at noon, with difficulty escaped
from the hands of the plunderers, with the upper part of his person
naked, and his horse wounded.

XLVII.--Caesar, having accomplished the object which he had in view,
ordered the signal to be sounded for a retreat; and the soldiers of the
tenth legion, by which he was then accompanied, halted. But the soldiers
of the other legions, not hearing the sound of the trumpet, because
there was a very large valley between them, were however kept back by
the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants, according to Caesar's
orders; but being animated by the prospect of speedy victory, and the
flight of the enemy, and the favourable battles of former periods, they
thought nothing so difficult that their bravery could not accomplish it;
nor did they put an end to the pursuit, until they drew nigh to the wall
of the town and the gates. But then, when a shout arose in every quarter
of the city, those who were at a distance being alarmed by the sudden
tumult, fled hastily from the town, since they thought that the enemy
were within the gates. The matrons begin to cast their clothes and
silver over the wall, and bending over as far as the lower part of the
bosom, with outstretched hands beseech the Romans to spare them, and not
to sacrifice to their resentment even women and children, as they had
done at Avaricum. Some of them let themselves down from the walls by
their hands, and surrendered to our soldiers. Lucius Fabius, a centurion
of the eighth legion, who, it was ascertained, had said that day among
his fellow soldiers that he was excited by the plunder of Avaricum, and
would not allow any one to mount the wall before him, finding three men
of his own company, and being raised up by them, scaled the wall. He
himself, in turn, taking hold of them one by one, drew them up to the
wall.

XLVIII.--In the meantime those who had gone to the other part of the
town to defend it, as we have mentioned above, at first, aroused by
hearing the shouts, and, afterwards, by frequent accounts that the town
was in possession of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry, and
hastened in larger numbers to that quarter. As each first came he stood
beneath the wall, and increased the number of his countrymen engaged in
action. When a great multitude of them had assembled, the matrons, who a
little before were stretching their hands from the walls to the Romans,
began to beseech their countrymen, and after the Gallic fashion to show
their dishevelled hair, and bring their children into public view.
Neither in position nor in numbers was the contest an equal one to the
Romans; at the same time, being exhausted by running and the long
continuation of the fight, they could not easily withstand fresh and
vigorous troops.

XLIX.--Caesar, when he perceived that his soldiers were fighting on
unfavourable ground, and that the enemy's forces were increasing, being
alarmed for the safety of his troops, sent orders to Titus Sextius, one
of his lieutenants, whom he had left to guard the smaller camp, to lead
out his cohorts quickly from the camp, and post them at the foot of the
hill, on the right wing of the enemy; that if he should see our men
driven from the ground, he should deter the enemy from following too
closely. He himself, advancing with the legion a little from that place
where he had taken his post, awaited the issue of the battle.

L.--While the fight was going on most vigorously, hand to hand, and the
enemy depended on their position and numbers, our men on their bravery,
the Aedui suddenly appeared on our exposed flank, as Caesar had sent
them by another ascent on the right, for the sake of creating a
diversion. These, from the similarity of their arms, greatly terrified
our men; and although they were discovered to have their right shoulders
bare, which was usually the sign of those reduced to peace, yet the
soldiers suspected that this very thing was done by the enemy to deceive
them. At the same time Lucius Fabius the centurion, and those who had
scaled the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were cast from the
wall. Marcus Petreius, a centurion of the same legion, after attempting
to hew down the gates, was overpowered by numbers, and, despairing of
his safety, having already received many wounds, said to the soldiers of
his own company who followed him: "Since I cannot save you as well as
myself, I shall at least provide for your safety, since I allured by the
love of glory, led you into this danger, do you save yourselves when an
opportunity is given." At the same time he rushed into the midst of the
enemy, and slaying two of them, drove back the rest a little from the
gate. When his men attempted to aid him, "In vain," he says, "you
endeavour to procure my safety since blood and strength are now failing
me, therefore leave this, while you have the opportunity, and retreat to
the legion." Thus he fell fighting a few moments after, and saved his
men by his own death.

LI.--Our soldiers, being hard pressed on every side, were dislodged from
their position, with the loss of forty-six centurions; but the tenth
legion, which had been posted in reserve on ground a little more level,
checked the Gauls in their eager pursuit. It was supported by the
cohorts of the thirteenth legion, which, being led from the smaller
camp, had, under the command of Titus Sextius, occupied the higher
ground. The legions, as soon as they reached the plain, halted and faced
the enemy. Vercingetorix led back his men from the part of the hill
within the fortifications. On that day little less than seven hundred of
the soldiers were missing.

LII.--On the next day, Caesar, having called a meeting, censured the
rashness and avarice of his soldiers, "In that they had judged for
themselves how far they ought to proceed, or what they ought to do, and
could not be kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the
lieutenants;" and stated, "what the disadvantage of the ground could
effect, what opinion he himself had entertained at Avaricum, when having
surprised the enemy without either general or cavalry, he had given up a
certain victory, lest even a trifling loss should occur in the contest
owing to the disadvantage of position. That as much as he admired the
greatness of their courage, since neither the fortifications of the
camp, nor the height of the mountain, nor the wall of the town could
retard them; in the same degree he censured their licentiousness and
arrogance, because they thought that they knew more than their general
concerning victory, and the issue of actions: and that he required in
his soldiers forbearance and self-command, not less than valour and
magnanimity."

LIII.--Having held this assembly, and having encouraged the soldiers at
the conclusion of his speech, "That they should not be dispirited on
this account, nor attribute to the valour of the enemy what the
disadvantage of position had caused;" entertaining the same views of his
departure that he had previously had, he led forth the legions from the
camp, and drew up his army in order of battle in a suitable place. When
Vercingetorix, nevertheless, would not descend to the level ground, a
slight cavalry action, and that a successful one, having taken place, he
led back his army into the camp. When he had done this, the next day,
thinking that he had done enough to lower the pride of the Gauls, and to
encourage the minds of his soldiers, he moved his camp in the direction
of the Aedui. The enemy not even then pursuing us, on the third day he
repaired the bridge over the river Allier, and led over his whole army.

LIV.--Having then held an interview with Viridomarus and Eporedorix the
Aeduans, he learns that Litavicus had set out with all the cavalry to
raise the Aedui; that it was necessary that they too should go before
him to confirm the state in their allegiance. Although he now saw
distinctly the treachery of the Aedui in many things, and was of opinion
that the revolt of the entire state would be hastened by their
departure; yet he thought that they should not be detained, lest he
should appear either to offer an insult, or betray some suspicion of
fear. He briefly states to them when departing his services towards the
Aedui: in what a state and how humbled he had found them, driven into
their towns, deprived of their lands, stripped of all their forces, a
tribute imposed on them, and hostages wrested from them with the utmost
insult; and to what condition and to what greatness he had raised them,
[so much so] that they had not only recovered their former position, but
seemed to surpass the dignity and influence of all the previous eras of
their history. After giving these admonitions he dismissed them.

LV.--Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui, advantageously situated on the
banks of the Loire. Caesar had conveyed hither all the hostages of Gaul,
the corn, public money, a great part of his own baggage and that of his
army; he had sent hither a great number of horses, which he had
purchased in Italy and Spain on account of this war. When Eporedorix and
Viridomarus came to this place, and received information of the
disposition of the state, that Litavicus had been admitted by the Aedui
into Bibracte, which is a town of the greatest importance among them,
that Convictolitanis the chief magistrate and a great part of the senate
had gone to meet him, that ambassadors had been publicly sent to
Vercingetorix to negotiate a peace and alliance; they thought that so
great an opportunity ought not to be neglected. Therefore, having put to
the sword the garrison of Noviodunum and those who had assembled there
for the purpose of trading or were on their march, they divided the
money and horses among themselves; they took care that the hostages of
the [different] states should be brought to Bibracte, to the chief
magistrate; they burnt the town to prevent its being of any service to
the Romans, as they were of opinion that they could not hold it; they
carried away in their vessels whatever corn they could in the hurry;
they destroyed the remainder, by [throwing it] into the river or setting
it on fire; they themselves began to collect forces from the
neighbouring country, to place guards and garrisons in different
positions along the banks of the Loire, and to display the cavalry on
all sides to strike terror into the Romans, [to try] if they could cut
them off from a supply of provisions. In which expectation they were
much aided, from the circumstance that the Loire had swollen to such a
degree from the melting of the snows, that it did not seem capable of
being forded at all.

LVI.--Caesar on being informed of these movements was of opinion that he
ought to make haste, even if he should run some risk in completing the
bridges, in order that he might engage before greater forces of the
enemy should be collected in that place. For no one even then considered
it an absolutely necessary act, that changing his design he should
direct his march into the Province, both because the infamy and disgrace
of the thing, and the intervening mount Cevennes, and the difficulty of
the roads prevented him; and especially because he had serious
apprehensions for the safety of Labienus whom he had detached, and those
legions whom he had sent with him. Therefore, having made very long
marches by day and night, he came to the river Loire, contrary to the
expectation of all; and having by means of the cavalry found out a ford,
suitable enough considering the emergency, of such depth that their arms
and shoulders could be above water for supporting their accoutrements,
he dispersed his cavalry in such a manner as to break the force of the
current, and having confounded the enemy at the first sight, led his
army across the river in safety; and finding corn and cattle in the
fields, after refreshing his army with them, he determined to march into
the country of the Senones.

LVII.--Whilst these things are being done by Caesar, Labienus, leaving
at Agendicum the recruits who had lately arrived from Italy, to guard
the baggage, marches with four legions to Lutetia (which is a town of
the Parisii, situated on an island of the river Seine), whose arrival
being discovered by the enemy, numerous forces arrived from the
neighbouring states. The supreme command is entrusted to Camulogenus,
one of the Aulerci, who, although almost worn out with age, was called
to that honour on account of his extraordinary knowledge of military
tactics. He, when he observed that there was a large marsh which
communicated with the Seine, and rendered all that country impassable,
encamped there, and determined to prevent our troops from passing it.

LVIII.--Labienus at first attempted to raise vineae, fill up the marsh
with hurdles and clay, and secure a road. After he perceived that this
was too difficult to accomplish, he issued in silence from his camp at
the third watch, and reached Melodunum by the same route by which he
came. This is a town of the Senones, situated on an island in the Seine,
as we have just before observed of Lutetia. Having seized upon about
fifty ships and quickly joined them together, and having placed soldiers
in them, he intimidated by his unexpected arrival the inhabitants, of
whom a great number had been called out to the war, and obtains
possession of the town without a contest. Having repaired the bridge,
which the enemy had broken down during the preceding days, he led over
his army, and began to march along the banks of the river to Lutetia.
The enemy, on learning the circumstance from those who had escaped from
Melodunum, set fire to Lutetia, and order the bridges of that town to be
broken down: they themselves set out from the marsh, and take their
position on the banks of the Seine, over against Lutetia and opposite
the camp of Labienus.

LIX.--Caesar was now reported to have departed from Gergovia;
intelligence was likewise brought to them concerning the revolt of the
Aedui, and a successful rising in Gaul; and that Caesar, having been
prevented from prosecuting his journey and crossing the Loire, and
having been compelled by the want of corn, had marched hastily to the
province. But the Bellovaci, who had been previously disaffected of
themselves, on learning the revolt of the Aedui, began to assemble
forces and openly to prepare for war; Then Labienus, as the change in
affairs was so great, thought that he must adopt a very different system
from what he had previously intended, and he did not now think of making
any new acquisitions, or of provoking the enemy to an action; but that
he might bring back his army safe to Agendicum. For, on one side, the
Bellovaci, a state which held the highest reputation for prowess in
Gaul, were pressing on him; and Camulogenus, with a disciplined and
well-equipped army, held the other side; moreover, a very great river
separated and cut off the legions from the garrison and baggage. He saw
that, in consequence of such great difficulties being thrown in his way,
he must seek aid from his own energy of disposition.

LX.--Having, therefore, called a council of war a little before evening,
he exhorted his soldiers to execute with diligence and energy such
commands as he should give; he assigns the ships which he had brought
from Melodunum to Roman knights, one to each, and orders them to fall
down the river silently for four miles, at the end of the fourth watch,
and there wait for him. He leaves the five cohorts, which he considered
to be the most steady in action, to guard the camp; he orders the five
remaining cohorts of the same legion to proceed a little after midnight
up the river with all their baggage, in a great tumult. He collects also
some small boats; and sends them in the same direction, with orders to
make a loud noise in rowing. He himself, a little after, marched out in
silence, and, at the head of three legions, seeks that place to which he
had ordered the ships to be brought.

LXI.--When he had arrived there, the enemy's scouts, as they were
stationed along every part of the river, not expecting an attack,
because a great storm had suddenly arisen, were surprised by our
soldiers: the infantry and cavalry are quickly transported, under the
superintendence of the Roman knights, whom he had appointed to that
office. Almost at the same time, a little before daylight, intelligence
was given to the enemy that there was an unusual tumult in the camp of
the Romans, and that a strong force was marching up the river, and that
the sound of oars was distinctly heard in the same quarter, and that
soldiers were being conveyed across in ships a little below. On hearing
these things, because they were of opinion that the legions were passing
in three different places, and that the entire army, being terrified by
the revolt of the Aedui, were preparing for flight, they divided their
forces also into three divisions. For leaving a guard opposite to the
camp and sending a small body in the direction of Metiosedum, with
orders to advance as far as the ships would proceed, they led the rest
of their troops against Labienus.

LXII.--By day-break all our soldiers were brought across and the army of
the enemy was in sight. Labienus, having encouraged his soldiers "to
retain the memory of their ancient valour, and so many most successful
actions, and imagine Caesar himself, under whose command they had so
often routed the enemy, to be present," gives the signal for action. At
the first onset the enemy are beaten and put to flight in the right
wing, where the seventh legion stood: on the left wing, which position
the twelfth legion held, although the first ranks fell transfixed by the
javelins of the Romans, yet the rest resisted most bravely; nor did any
one of them show the slightest intention of flying. Camulogenus, the
general of the enemy, was present and encouraged his troops. But when
the issue of the victory was still uncertain, and the circumstances
which were taking place on the left wing were announced to the tribunes
of the seventh legion, they faced about their legion to the enemy's rear
and attacked it: not even then did any one retreat, but all were
surrounded and slain. Camulogenus met the same fate. But those who were
left as a guard opposite the camp of Labienus, when they heard that the
battle was commenced, marched to aid their countrymen and take
possession of a hill, but were unable to withstand the attack of the
victorious soldiers. In this manner, mixed with their own fugitives,
such as the woods and mountains did not shelter were cut to pieces by
our cavalry. When this battle was finished, Labienus returns to
Agendicum, where the baggage of the whole army had been left: from it he
marched with all his forces to Caesar.

LXIII.--The revolt of the Aedui being known, the war grows more
dangerous. Embassies are sent by them in all directions: as far as they
can prevail by influence, authority, or money, they strive to excite the
state [to revolt]. Having got possession of the hostages whom Caesar had
deposited with them, they terrify the hesitating by putting them to
death. The Aedui request Vercingetorix to come to them and communicate
his plans of conducting the war. On obtaining this request they insist
that the chief command should be assigned to them; and when the affair
became a disputed question, a council of all Gaul is summoned to
Bibracte. They come together in great numbers and from every quarter to
the same place. The decision is left to the votes of the mass: all to a
man approve of Vercingetorix as their general. The Remi, Lingones, and
Treviri were absent from this meeting; the two former because they
attached themselves to the alliance of Rome; the Treviri because they
were very remote and were hard pressed by the Germans; which was also
the reason of their being absent during the whole war, and their sending
auxiliaries to neither party. The Aedui are highly indignant at being
deprived of the chief command; they lament the change of fortune, and
miss Caesar's indulgence towards them; however, after engaging in the
war, they do not dare to pursue their own measures apart from the rest.
Eporedorix and Viridomarus, youths of the greatest promise, submit
reluctantly to Vercingetorix.

LXIV.--The latter demands hostages from the remaining states: nay, more,
appointed a day for this proceeding; he orders all the cavalry, fifteen
thousand in number, to quickly assemble here; he says that he will be
content with the infantry which he had before, and would not tempt
fortune nor come to a regular engagement; but since he had abundance of
cavalry, it would be very easy for him to prevent the Romans from
obtaining forage or corn, provided that they themselves should
resolutely destroy their corn and set fire to their houses, by which
sacrifice of private property they would evidently obtain perpetual
dominion and freedom. After arranging these matters he levies ten
thousand infantry on the Aedui and Segusiani, who border on our
province: to these he adds eight hundred horse. He sets over them the
brother of Eporedorix, and orders him to wage war against the
Allobroges. On the other side he sends the Gabali and the nearest
cantons of the Arverni against the Helvii; he likewise sends the Ruteni
and Cadurci to lay waste the territories of the Volcae Arecomici.
Besides, by secret messages and embassies, he tampers with the
Allobroges, whose minds, he hopes, had not yet settled down after the
excitement of the late war. To their nobles he promises money, and to
their state the dominion of the whole province.

LXV.--The only guards provided against all these contingencies were
twenty-two cohorts, which were collected from the entire province by
Lucius Caesar, the lieutenant, and opposed to the enemy in every
quarter. The Helvii, voluntarily engaging in battle with their
neighbours, are defeated, and Caius Valerius Donotaurus, the son of
Caburus, the principal man of the state, and several others, being
slain, they are forced to retire within their towns and fortifications.
The Allobroges, placing guards along the course of the Rhine, defend
their frontiers with great vigilance and energy. Caesar, as he perceived
that the enemy were superior in cavalry, and he himself could receive no
aid from the province or Italy, while all communication was cut off,
sends across the Rhine into Germany to those states which he had subdued
in the preceding campaigns, and summons from them cavalry and the
light-armed infantry, who were accustomed to engage among them. On their
arrival, as they were mounted on unserviceable horses, he takes horses
from the military tribunes and the rest, nay, even from the Roman
knights and veterans, and distributes them among the Germans.

LXVI.--In the meantime, whilst these things are going on, the forces of
the enemy from the Arverni, and the cavalry which had been demanded from
all Gaul, meet together. A great number of these having been collected,
when Caesar was marching into the country of the Sequani, through the
confines of the Lingones, in order that he might the more easily render
aid to the province, Vercingetorix encamped in three camps, about ten
miles from the Romans: and having summoned the commanders of the cavalry
to a council, he shows that the time of victory was come; that the
Romans were fleeing into the province and leaving Gaul; that this was
sufficient for obtaining immediate freedom; but was of little moment in
acquiring peace and tranquillity for the future; for the Romans would
return after assembling greater forces, and would not put an end to the
war; Therefore they should attack them on their march, when encumbered.
If the infantry should [be obliged to] relieve their cavalry, and be
retarded by doing so, the march could not be accomplished: if,
abandoning their baggage, they should provide for their safety (a result
which, he trusted, was more likely to ensue), they would lose both
property and character. For as to the enemy's horse, they ought not to
entertain a doubt that none of them would dare to advance beyond the
main body. In order that they [the Gauls] may do so with greater spirit,
he would marshal all their forces before the camp, and intimidate the
enemy. The cavalry unanimously shout out, "That they ought to bind
themselves by a most sacred oath, that he should not be received under a
roof, nor have access to his children, parents, or wife, who shall not
twice have ridden through the enemy's army."

LXVII.--This proposal receiving general approbation, and all being
forced to take the oath, on the next day the cavalry were divided into
three parts, and two of these divisions made a demonstration on our two
flanks; while one in front began to obstruct our march. On this
circumstance being announced, Caesar orders his cavalry also to form
three divisions and charge the enemy. Then the action commences
simultaneously in every part: the main body halts; the baggage is
received within the ranks of the legions. If our men seemed to be
distressed, or hard pressed in any quarter, Caesar usually ordered the
troops to advance, and the army to wheel round in that quarter; which
conduct retarded the enemy in the pursuit, and encouraged our men by the
hope of support. At length the Germans, on the right wing, having gained
the top of the hill, dislodge the enemy from their position and pursue
them even as far as the river at which Vercingetorix with the infantry
was stationed, and slay several of them. The rest, on observing this
action, fearing lest they should be surrounded, betake themselves to
flight. A slaughter ensues in every direction, and three of the noblest
of the Audi are taken and brought to Caesar: Cotus, the commander of the
cavalry, who had been engaged in the contest with Convictolitanis the
last election, Cavarillus, who had held the command of the infantry
after the revolt of Litavicus, and Eporedorix, under whose command the
Aedui had engaged in war against the Sequani, before the arrival of
Caesar.

LXVIII.--All his cavalry being routed, Vercingetorix led back his troops
in the same order as he had arranged them before the camp, and
immediately began to march to Alesia, which is a town of the Mandubii;
and ordered the baggage to be speedily brought forth from the camp, and
follow him closely. Caesar, having conveyed his baggage to the nearest
hill, and having left two legions to guard it, pursued as far as the
time of day would permit, and after slaying about three thousand of the
rear of the enemy, encamped at Alesia on the next day. On reconnoitring
the situation of the city, finding that the enemy were panic-stricken,
because the cavalry in which they placed their chief reliance were
beaten, he encouraged his men to endure the toil, and began to draw a
line of circumvallation round Alesia.

LXIX.--The town itself was situated on the top of a hill, in a very
lofty position, so that it did not appear likely to be taken, except by
a regular siege. Two rivers, on two different sides, washed the foot of
the hill. Before the town lay a plain of about three miles in length; on
every other side hills at a moderate distance, and of an equal degree of
height, surrounded the town. The army of the Gauls had filled all the
space under the wall, comprising the part of the hill which looked to
the rising sun, and had drawn in front a trench and a stone wall six
feet high. The circuit of that fortification, which was commenced by the
Romans, comprised eleven miles. The camp was pitched in a strong
position, and twenty-three redoubts were raised in it, in which
sentinels were placed by day, lest any sally should be made suddenly;
and by night the same were occupied by watches and strong guards.

LXX.-The work having been begun, a cavalry action ensues in that plain,
which we have already described as broken by hills, and extending three
miles in length. The contest is maintained on both sides with the utmost
vigour; Caesar sends the Germans to aid our troops when distressed, and
draws up the legions in front of the camp, lest any sally should be
suddenly made by the enemy's infantry. The courage of our men is
increased by the additional support of the legions; the enemy being put
to flight, hinder one another by their numbers, and as only the narrower
gates were left open, are crowded together in them; then the Germans
pursue them with vigour even to the fortifications. A great slaughter
ensues; some leave their horses, and endeavour to cross the ditch and
climb the wall. Caesar orders the legions which he had drawn up in front
of the rampart to advance a little. The Gauls, who were within the
fortifications, were no less panic-stricken, thinking that the enemy
were coming that moment against them, and unanimously shout "to arms;"
some in their alarm rush into the town; Vercingetorix orders the gates
to be shut, lest the camp should be left undefended. The Germans
retreat, after slaying many and taking several horses.

LXXI.--Vercingetorix adopts the design of sending away all his cavalry
by night, before the fortifications should be completed by the Romans.
He charges them when departing "that each of them should go to his
respective state, and press for the war all who were old enough to bear
arms; he states his own Merits, and conjures them to consider his
safety, and not surrender him, who had deserved so well of the general
freedom, to the enemy for torture; he points out to them that, if they
should be remiss, eighty thousand chosen men would perish with him;
that, upon making a calculation, he had barely corn for thirty days, but
could hold out a little longer by economy." After giving these
instructions he silently dismisses the cavalry in the second watch, [on
that side] where our works were not completed; he orders all the corn to
be brought to himself; he ordains capital punishment to such as should
not obey; he distributes among them, man by man, the cattle, great
quantities of which had been driven there by the Mandubii; he began to
measure out the corn sparingly, and by little and little; he receives
into the town all the forces which he had posted in front of it. In this
manner he prepares to await the succours from Gaul, and carry on the
war.

LXXII.--Caesar, on learning these proceedings from the deserters and
captives, adopted the following system of fortification; he dug a trench
twenty feet deep, with perpendicular sides, in such a manner that the
base of this trench should extend so far as the edges were apart at the
top. He raised all his other works at a distance of four hundred feet
from that ditch; [he did] that with this intention, lest (since he
necessarily embraced so extensive an area, and the whole works could not
be easily surrounded by a line of soldiers) a large number of the enemy
should suddenly, or by night, sally against the fortifications; or lest
they should by day cast weapons against our men while occupied with the
works. Having left this interval, he drew two trenches fifteen feet
broad, and of the same depth; the innermost of them, being in low and
level ground, he filled with water conveyed from the river. Behind these
he raised a rampart and wall twelve feet high: to this he added a
parapet and battlements, with large stakes cut like stags' horns,
projecting from the junction of the parapet and battlements, to prevent
the enemy from scaling it, and surrounded the entire work with turrets,
which were eighty feet distant from one another.

LXXIII.--It was necessary, at one and the same time, to procure timber
[for the rampart], lay in supplies of corn, and raise also extensive
fortifications, and the available troops were in consequence of this
reduced in number, since they used to advance to some distance from the
camp, and sometimes the Gauls endeavoured to attack our works, and to
make a sally from the town by several gates and in great force. On which
Caesar thought that further additions should be made to these works, in
order that the fortifications might be defensible by a small number of
soldiers. Having, therefore, cut down the trunks of trees or very thick
branches, and having stripped their tops of the bark, and sharpened them
into a point, he drew a continued trench everywhere five feet deep.
These stakes being sunk into this trench, and fastened firmly at the
bottom, to prevent the possibility of their being torn up, had their
branches only projecting from the ground. There were five rows in
connection with, and intersecting each other; and whoever entered within
them were likely to impale themselves on very sharp stakes. The soldiers
called these "cippi." Before these, which were arranged in oblique rows
in the form of a quincunx, pits three feet deep were dug, which
gradually diminished in depth to the bottom. In these pits tapering
stakes, of the thickness of a man's thigh, sharpened at the top and
hardened in the fire, were sunk in such a manner as to project from the
ground not more than four inches; at the same time for the purpose of
giving them strength and stability, they were each filled with trampled
clay to the height of one foot from the bottom: the rest of the pit was
covered over with osiers and twigs, to conceal the deceit. Eight rows of
this kind were dug, and were three feet distant from each other. They
called this a lily from its resemblance to that flower. Stakes a foot
long, with iron hooks attached to them, were entirely sunk in the ground
before these, and were planted in every place at small intervals; these
they called spurs.

LXXIV.--After completing these works, having selected as level ground as
he could, considering the nature of the country, and having enclosed an
area of fourteen miles, he constructed, against an external enemy,
fortifications of the same kind in every respect, and separate from
these, so that the guards of the fortifications could not be surrounded
even by immense numbers, if such a circumstance should take place owing
to the departure of the enemy's cavalry; and in order that the Roman
soldiers might not be compelled to go out of the camp with great risk,
he orders all to provide forage and corn for thirty days.

LXXV.--Whilst those things are carried on at Alesia, the Gauls, having
convened a council of their chief nobility, determine that all who could
bear arms should not be called out, which was the opinion of
Vercingetorix, but that a fixed number should be levied from each state;
lest, when so great a multitude assembled together, they could neither
govern nor distinguish their men, nor have the means of supplying them
with corn. They demand thirty-five thousand men from the Aedui and their
dependents, the Segusiani, Ambivareti, and Aulerci Brannovices; an equal
number from the Arverni in conjunction with the Eleuteti Cadurci,
Gabali, and Velauni, who were accustomed to be under the command of the
Arverni; twelve thousand each from the Senones, Sequani, Bituriges,
Santones, Ruteni, and Carnutes; ten thousand from the Bellovaci; the
same number from the Lemovici; eight thousand each from the Pictones,
and Turoni, and Parisii, and Helvii; five thousand each from the
Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, and
Nitiobriges; the same number from the Aulerci Cenomani; four thousand
from the Atrebates; three thousand each from the Bellocassi, Lexovii,
and Aulerci Eburovices; thirty thousand from the Rauraci, and Boii; six
thousand, from all the states together which border on the Atlantic, and
which in their dialect are called Armoricae (in which number are
comprehended the Curisolites, Rhedones, Ambibari, Caltes, Osismii,
Lemovices, Veneti, and Unelli). Of these the Bellovaci did not
contribute their number, as they said that they would wage war against
the Romans on their own account, and at their own discretion, and would
not obey the order of any one: however, at the request of Commius, they
sent two thousand, in consideration of a tie of hospitality which
subsisted between him and them.

LXXVI.--Caesar had, as we have previously narrated, availed himself of
the faithful and valuable services of this Commius, in Britain, in
former years: in consideration of which merits he had exempted from
taxes his [Commius's] state, and had conferred on Commius himself the
country of the Morini. Yet such was the unanimity of the Gauls in
asserting their freedom, and recovering their ancient renown in war,
that they were influenced neither by favours, nor by the recollection of
private friendship; and all earnestly directed their energies and
resources to that war, and collected eight thousand cavalry, and about
two hundred and forty thousand infantry. These were reviewed in the
country of the Aedui, and a calculation was made of their numbers:
commanders were appointed: the supreme command is entrusted to Commius
the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedorix the Aeduans, and
Vergasillaunus the Arvernian, the cousin-german of Vercingetorix. To
them are assigned men selected from each state, by whose advice the war
should be conducted. All march to Alesia, sanguine and full of
confidence: nor was there a single individual who imagined that the
Romans could withstand the sight of such an immense host: especially in
an action carried on both in front and rear, when [on the inside] the
besieged would sally from the town and attack the enemy, and on the
outside so great forces of cavalry and infantry would be seen.

LXXVII.--But those who were blockaded at Alesia, the day being past on
which they had expected auxiliaries from their countrymen, and all their
corn being consumed, ignorant of what was going on among the Aedui,
convened an assembly and deliberated on the exigency of their situation.
After various opinions had been expressed among them, some of which
proposed a surrender, others a sally, whilst their strength would
support it, the speech of Critognatus ought not to be omitted for its
singular and detestable cruelty. He sprung from the noblest family among
the Arverni, and possessing great influence, says, "I shall pay no
attention to the opinion of those who call a most disgraceful surrender
by the name of a capitulation; nor do I think that they ought to be
considered as citizens, or summoned to the council. My business is with
those who approve of a sally: in whose advice the memory of our ancient
prowess seems to dwell in the opinion of you all. To be unable to bear
privation for a short time is disgraceful cowardice, not true valour.
Those who voluntarily offer themselves to death are more easily found
than those who would calmly endure distress. And I would approve of this
opinion (for honour is a powerful motive with me), could I foresee no
other loss, save that of life: but let us, in adopting our design, look
back on all Gaul, which we have stirred up to our aid. What courage do
you think would our relatives and friends have, if eighty thousand men
were butchered in one spot, supposing that they should be forced to come
to an action almost over our corpses? Do not utterly deprive them of
your aid, for they have spurned all thoughts of personal danger on
account of your safety; nor by your folly, rashness, and cowardice,
crush all Gaul and doom it to an eternal slavery. Do you doubt their
fidelity and firmness because they have not come at the appointed day?
What then? Do you suppose that the Romans are employed every day in the
outer fortifications for mere amusement? If you cannot be assured by
their despatches, since every avenue is blocked up, take the Romans as
evidence that their approach is drawing near; since they, intimidated by
alarm at this, labour night and day at their works. What, therefore, is
my design? To do as our ancestors did in the war against the Cimbri and
Teutones, which was by no means equally momentous; who, when driven into
their towns, and oppressed by similar privations, supported life by the
corpses of those who appeared useless for war on account of their age,
and did not surrender to the enemy: and even if we had not a precedent
for such cruel conduct, still I should consider it most glorious that
one should be established, and delivered to posterity. For in what was
that war like this? The Cimbri, after laying Gaul waste, and inflicting
great calamities, at length departed from our country, and sought other
lands; they left us our rights, laws, lands, and liberty. But what other
motive or wish have the Romans, than, induced by envy, to settle in the
lands and states of those whom they have learned by fame to be noble and
powerful in war, and impose on them perpetual slavery? For they never
have carried on wars on any other terms. But if you know not these
things which are going on in distant countries, look to the neighbouring
Gaul, which being reduced to the form of a province, stripped of its
rights and laws, and subjected to Roman despotism, is oppressed by
perpetual slavery."

LXXVIII.--When different opinions were expressed, they determined that
those who, owing to age or ill health, were unserviceable for war,
should depart from the town, and that themselves should try every
expedient before they had recourse to the advice of Critognatus:
however, that they would rather adopt that design, if circumstances
should compel them and their allies should delay, than accept any terms
of a surrender or peace. The Mandubii, who had admitted them into the
town, are compelled to go forth with their wives and children. When
these came to the Roman fortifications, weeping, they begged of the
soldiers by every entreaty to receive them as slaves and relieve them
with food. But Caesar, placing guards on the rampart, forbade them to be
admitted.

LXXIX.--In the meantime, Commius and the rest of the leaders, to whom
the supreme command had been intrusted, came with all their forces to
Alesia, and having occupied the entire hill, encamp not more than a mile
from our fortifications. The following day, having led forth their
cavalry from the camp, they fill all that plain, which, we have related,
extended three miles in length, and draw out their infantry a little
from that place, and post them on the higher ground. The town Alesia
commanded a view of the whole plain. The besieged run together when
these auxiliaries were seen; mutual congratulations ensue, and the minds
of all are elated with joy. Accordingly, drawing out their troops, they
encamp before the town, and cover the nearest trench with hurdles and
fill it up with earth, and make ready for a sally and every casualty.

LXXX.--Caesar, having stationed his army on both sides of the
fortifications, in order that, if occasion should arise, each should
hold and know his own post, orders the cavalry to issue forth from the
camp and commence action. There was a commanding view from the entire
camp, which occupied a ridge of hills; and the minds of all the soldiers
anxiously awaited the issue of the battle. The Gauls had scattered
archers and light-armed infantry here and there, among their cavalry, to
give relief to their retreating troops, and sustain the impetuosity of
our cavalry. Several of our soldiers were unexpectedly wounded by these,
and left the battle. When the Gauls were confident that their countrymen
were the conquerors in the action, and beheld our men hard pressed by
numbers, both those who were hemmed in by the line of circumvallation
and those who had come to aid them, supported the spirits of their men
by shouts and yells from every quarter. As the action was carried on in
sight of all, neither a brave nor cowardly act could be concealed; both
the desire of praise and the fear of ignominy, urged on each party to
valour. After fighting from noon almost to sunset, without victory
inclining in favour of either, the Germans, on one side, made a charge
against the enemy in a compact body, and drove them back; and, when they
were put to flight, the archers were surrounded and cut to pieces. In
other parts, likewise, our men pursued to the camp the retreating enemy,
and did not give them an opportunity of rallying. But those who had come
forth from Alesia returned into the town dejected and almost despairing
of success.

LXXXI.--The Gauls, after the interval of a day, and after making, during
that time, an immense number of hurdles, scaling ladders, and iron
hooks, silently went forth from the camp at midnight and approached the
fortifications in the plain. Raising a shout suddenly, that by this
intimation those who were besieged in the town might learn their
arrival, they began to cast down hurdles and dislodge our men from the
rampart by slings, arrows, and stones, and executed the other movements
which are requisite in storming. At the same time, Vercingetorix having
heard the shout, gives the signal to his troops by a trumpet, and leads
them forth from the town. Our troops, as each man's post had been
assigned him some days before, man the fortifications; they intimidate
the Gauls by slings, large stones, stakes which they had placed along
the works, and bullets. All view being prevented by the darkness, many
wounds are received on both sides; several missiles are thrown from the
engines. But Marcus Antonius, and Caius Trebonius, the lieutenants, to
whom the defence of these parts had been allotted, draughted troops from
the redoubts which were more remote, and sent them to aid our troops, in
whatever direction they understood that they were hard pressed.

LXXXII.--Whilst the Gauls were at a distance from the fortification,
they did more execution, owing to the immense number of their weapons:
after they came nearer, they either unawares empaled themselves on the
spurs, or were pierced by the mural darts from the ramparts and towers,
and thus perished. After receiving many wounds on all sides, and having
forced no part of the works, when day drew nigh, fearing lest they
should be surrounded by a sally made from the higher camp on the exposed
flank, they retreated to their countrymen. But those within, whilst they
bring forward those things which had been prepared by Vercingetorix for
a sally, fill up the nearest trenches; having delayed a long time in
executing these movements, they learned the retreat of their countrymen
before they drew nigh to the fortifications. Thus they returned to the
town without accomplishing their object.

LXXXIII.--The Gauls, having been twice repulsed with great loss, consult
what they should do: they avail themselves of the information of those
who were well acquainted with the country; from them they ascertain the
position and fortification of the upper camp. There was, on the north
side, a hill, which our men could not include in their works, on account
of the extent of the circuit, and had necessarily made their camp in
ground almost disadvantageous, and pretty steep. Caius Antistius
Reginus, and Caius Caninius Rebilus, two of the lieutenants, with two
legions, were in possession of this camp. The leaders of the enemy,
having reconnoitred the country by their scouts, select from the entire
army sixty thousand men; belonging to those states which bear the
highest character for courage: they privately arrange among themselves
what they wished to be done, and in what manner; they decide that the
attack should take place when it should seem to be noon. They appoint
over their forces Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, one of the four
generals, and a near relative of Vercingetorix. He, having issued from
the camp at the first watch, and having almost completed his march a
little before the dawn, hid himself behind the mountain, and ordered his
soldiers to refresh themselves after their labour during the night. When
noon now seemed to draw nigh, he marched hastily against that camp which
we have mentioned before; and, at the same time, the cavalry began to
approach the fortifications in the plain, and the rest of the forces to
make a demonstration in front of the camp.

LXXXIV.--Vercingetorix, having beheld his countrymen from the citadel of
Alesia, issues forth from the town; he brings forth from the camp long
hooks, movable pent-houses, mural hooks, and other things, which he had
prepared for the purpose of making a sally. They engage on all sides at
once, and every expedient is adopted. They flocked to whatever part of
the works seemed weakest. The army of the Romans is distributed along
their extensive lines, and with difficulty meets the enemy in every
quarter. The shouts which were raised by the combatants in their rear,
had a great tendency to intimidate our men, because they perceived that
their danger rested on the valour of others: for generally all evils
which are distant most powerfully alarm men's minds.

LXXXV.--Caesar, having selected a commanding situation, sees distinctly
whatever is going on in every quarter, and sends assistance to his
troops when hard pressed. The idea uppermost in the minds of both
parties is, that the present is the time in which they would have the
fairest opportunity of making a struggle; the Gauls despairing of all
safety, unless they should succeed in forcing the lines: the Romans
expecting an end to all their labours if they should gain the day. The
principal struggle is at the upper lines, to which, we have said,
Vergasillaunus was sent. The least elevation of ground, added to a
declivity, exercises a momentous influence. Some are casting missiles,
others, forming a testudo, advance to the attack; fresh men by turns
relieve the wearied. The earth, heaped up by all against the
fortifications, gives the means of ascent to the Gauls, and covers those
works which the Romans had concealed in the ground. Our men have no
longer arms or strength.

LXXXVI.--Caesar, on observing these movements, sends Labienus with six
cohorts to relieve his distressed soldiers: he orders him, if he should
be unable to withstand them, to draw off the cohorts and make a sally;
but not to do this except through necessity. He himself goes to the
rest, and exhorts them not to succumb to the toil; he shows them that
the fruits of all former engagements depend on that day and hour. The
Gauls within, despairing of forcing the fortifications in the plains on
account of the greatness of the works, attempt the places precipitous in
ascent: hither they bring the engines which they had prepared; by the
immense number of their missiles they dislodge the defenders from the
turrets: they fill the ditches with clay and hurdles, then clear the
way; they tear down the rampart and breast-work with hooks.

LXXXVII.--Caesar sends at first young Brutus, with six cohorts, and
afterwards Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with seven others: finally, as
they fought more obstinately, he leads up fresh men to the assistance of
his soldiers. After renewing the action, and repulsing the enemy, he
marches in the direction in which he had sent Labienus, drafts four
cohorts from the nearest redoubt, and orders part of the cavalry to
follow him, and part to make the circuit of the external fortifications
and attack the enemy in the rear. Labienus, when neither the ramparts or
ditches could check the onset of the enemy, informs Caesar by messengers
of what he intended to do. Caesar hastens to share in the action.

LXXXVIII.--His arrival being known from the colour of his robe, and the
troops of cavalry, and the cohorts which he had ordered to follow him
being seen, as these low and sloping grounds were plainly visible from
the eminences, the enemy join battle. A shout being raised by both
sides, it was succeeded by a general shout along the ramparts and whole
line of fortifications. Our troops, laying aside their javelins, carry
on the engagement with their swords. The cavalry is suddenly seen in the
rear of the Gauls: the other cohorts advance rapidly; the enemy turn
their backs; the cavalry intercept them in their flight, and a great
slaughter ensues. Sedulius the general and chief of the Lemovices is
slain; Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, is taken alive in the flight,
seventy-four military standards are brought to Caesar, and few out of so
great a number return safe to their camp. The besieged, beholding from
the town the slaughter and flight of their countrymen, despairing of
safety, lead back their troops from the fortifications. A flight of the
Gauls from their camp immediately ensues on hearing of this disaster,
and had not the soldiers been wearied by sending frequent
reinforcements, and the labour of the entire day, all the enemy's forces
could have been destroyed. Immediately after midnight, the cavalry are
sent out and overtake the rear, a great number are taken or cut to
pieces, the rest by flight escape in different directions to their
respective states. Vercingetorix, having convened a council the
following day, declares, "That he had undertaken that war, not on
account of his own exigencies, but on account of the general freedom;
and since he must yield to fortune, he offered himself to them for
either purpose, whether they should wish to atone to the Romans by his
death, or surrender him alive." Ambassadors are sent to Caesar on this
subject. He orders their arms to be surrendered, and their chieftains
delivered up. He seated himself at the head of the lines in front of the
camp, the Gallic chieftains are brought before him. They surrender
Vercingetorix, and lay down their arms. Reserving the Aedui and Arverni,
[to try] if he could gain over, through their influence, their
respective states, he distributes one of the remaining captives to each
soldier, throughout the entire army, as plunder.

XC.--After making these arrangements, he marches into the [country of
the] Aedui, and recovers that state. To this place ambassadors are sent
by the Arverni, who promise that they will execute his commands. He
demands a great number of hostages. He sends the legions to winter
quarters; he restores about twenty thousand captives to the Aedui and
Arverni; he orders Titus Labienus to march into the [country of the]
Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and to him he attaches Marcus
Sempronius Rutilus; he places Caius Fabius, and Lucius Minucius Basilus,
with two legions in the country of the Remi, lest they should sustain
any loss from the Bellovaci in their neighbourhood. He sends Caius
Antistius Reginus into the [country of the] Ambivareti, Titus Sextius
into the territories of the Bituriges, and Caius Caninius Rebilus into
those of the Ruteni, with one legion each. He stations Quintus Tullius
Cicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the Aedui at Cabillo and Matisco on
the Saone, to procure supplies of corn. He himself determines to winter
at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty days is decreed by the senate at
Rome, on learning these successes from Caesar's despatches.



BOOK VIII

CONTINUATION OF CAESAR'S GALLIC WAR ASCRIBED TO AULUS HIRTIUS

PREFACE

Prevailed on by your continued solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged in
a most difficult task, as my daily refusals appear to plead not my
inability, but indolence, as an excuse. I have compiled a continuation
of the Commentaries of our Caesar's Wars in Gaul, not indeed to be
compared to his writings, which either precede or follow them; and
recently, I have completed what he left imperfect after the transactions
in Alexandria, to the end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which we
see no issue, but of Caesar's life. I wish that those who may read them
could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I might
the more readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, in
presuming to intrude among Caesar's writings. For it is agreed on all
hands, that no composition was ever executed with so great care, that it
is not exceeded in elegance by these Commentaries, which were published
for the use of historians, that they might not want memoirs of such
achievements; and they stand so high in the esteem of all men, that
historians seem rather deprived of than furnished with materials. At
which we have more reason to be surprised than other men; for they can
only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which he finished
them, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar possessed not
only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also a
thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had not
even the good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war; and
though these were partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, in
conversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention to
those things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and those
which we design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, whilst I urge
every apology, that I may not be compared to Caesar, I incur the charge
of vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the judgment of any one
be put in competition with him. Farewell.

I.--Gaul being entirely reduced, when Caesar having waged war
incessantly during the former summer, wished to recruit his soldiers
after so much fatigue, by repose in winter quarters, news was brought
him that several states were simultaneously renewing their hostile
intentions, and forming combinations. For which a probable reason was
assigned: namely, that the Gauls were convinced that they were not able
to resist the Romans with any force they could collect in one place; and
hoped that if several states made war in different places at the same
time, the Roman army would neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, to
prosecute them all: nor ought any single state to decline any
inconveniences that might befall them, provided that by such delay the
rest should be enabled to assert their liberty.

II.--That this notion might not be confirmed among the Gauls, Caesar
left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, in charge of his quarters, and set
out himself with a guard of horse, the day before the kalends of
January, from the town Bibracte, to the thirteenth legion, which he had
stationed in the country of the Bituriges, not far from the territories
of the Aedui, and joined to it the eleventh legion which was next it.
Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of his army
into the most plentiful part of the country of the Bituriges; who,
possessing an extensive territory and several towns, were not to be
deterred, by a single legion quartered among them, from making warlike
preparation, and forming combinations.

III.-By Caesar's sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, to
an unprovided and dispersed people, that they were surprised by our
horse, whilst cultivating the fields without any apprehensions, before
they had time to fly to their towns. For the usual sign of an enemy's
invasion, which is generally intimated by the burning of their towns,
was forbidden by Caesar's orders: lest if he advanced far, forage and
corn should become scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires to make
their escape. Many thousands being taken, as many of the Bituriges as
were able to escape the first coming of the Romans, fled to the
neighbouring states, relying either on private friendship, or public
alliance. In vain; for Caesar, by hasty marches, anticipated them in
every place, nor did he allow any state leisure to consider the safety
of others, in preference to their own. By this activity, he both
retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear, obliged the wavering
to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the Bituriges, when
they perceived that through Caesar's clemency, an avenue was open to his
friendship, and that the neighbouring states had given hostages, without
incurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection,
they did the same.

IV.-Caesar promises his soldiers, as a reward for their labour and
patience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships from the severity of the
winter, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, two
hundred sestertii each, and to every centurian two thousand, to be given
instead of plunder; and sending his legions back to quarters, he himself
returned on the fortieth day to Bibracte. Whilst he was dispensing
justice there, the Bituriges send ambassadors to him, to entreat his aid
against the Carnutes, who they complained had made war against them.
Upon this intelligence, though he had not remained more than eighteen
days in winter quarters, he draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out of
quarters on the Saone, where he had posted them as mentioned in a former
Commentary to procure supplies of corn. With these two legions he
marches in pursuit of the Carnutes.

V.--When the news of the approach of our army reached the enemy, the
Carnutes, terrified by the sufferings of other states, deserted their
villages and towns (which were small buildings, raised in a hurry, to
meet the immediate necessity, in which they lived to shelter themselves
against the winter, for, being lately conquered, they had lost several
towns), and dispersed and fled. Caesar, unwilling to expose his soldiers
to the violent storms that break out, especially at that season, took up
his quarters at Genabum, a town of the Carnutes; and lodged his men in
houses, partly belonging to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter the
tents, and hastily covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he
sends to all parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and not
without effect, as our men generally returned loaded with booty. The
Carnutes, overpowered by the severity of the winter, and the fear of
danger, and not daring to continue long in any place, as they were
driven from their houses, and not finding sufficient protection in the
woods, from the violence of the storms, after losing a considerable
number of their men, disperse, and take refuge among the neighbouring
states.

VI.--Caesar, being contented, at so severe a season, to disperse the
gathering foes, and prevent any new war from breaking out, and being
convinced, as far as reason could foresee, that no war of consequence
could be set on foot in the summer campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius,
with the two legions which he had with him, in quarters at Genabum: and
being informed by frequent embassies from the Remi, that the Bellovaci
(who exceed all the Gauls and Belgae in military prowess), and the
neighbouring states, headed by Correus, one of the Bellovaci, and
Comius, the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and assembling at a
general rendezvous, designing with their united forces to invade the
territories of the Suessiones, who were put under the patronage of the
Remi: and moreover, considering that not only his honour, but his
interest was concerned, that such of his allies, as deserved well of the
republic, should suffer no calamity; he again draws the eleventh legion
out of quarters and writes besides to Caius Fabius, to march with his
two legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he sends to Trebonius
for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of the
quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden of
the expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to his
own toils.

VII.--As soon as his troops were collected, he marched against the
Bellovaci: and pitching his camp in their territories, detached troops
of horse all round the country, to take prisoners, from whom he might
learn the enemy's plan. The horse, having executed his orders, bring him
back word that but few were found in the houses: and that even these had
not stayed at home to cultivate their lands (for the emigration was
general from all parts), but had been sent back to watch our motions.
Upon Caesar's inquiring from them, where the main body of the Bellovaci
were posted, and what was their design: they made answer, "that all the
Bellovaci, fit for carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and along
with them the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, and
that they had chosen for their camp an elevated position, surrounded by
a dangerous morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into the
most remote woods: that several noblemen were united in the management
of the war; but that the people were most inclined to be governed by
Correus, because they knew that he had the strongest aversion to the
name of the Roman people: that a few days before Comius had left the
camp to engage the Germans to their aid whose nation bordered on theirs,
and whose numbers were countless: that the Bellovaci had come to a
resolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest desire
of the people, if Caesar should come with only three legions, as was
reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged to
encounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in a
more wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger
force, they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and by
ambuscade to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which at that
season was both scarce and much scattered), corn, and other
necessaries."

VIII.--When Caesar was convinced of the truth of this account from the
concurring testimony of several persons, and perceived that the plans
which were proposed were full of prudence, and very unlike the rash
resolves of a barbarous people, he considered it incumbent on him to use
every exertion, in order that the enemy might despise his small force
and come to an action. For he had three veteran legions of distinguished
valour, the seventh, eighth, and ninth. The eleventh consisted of chosen
youth of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but who, compared
with the others, had not yet acquired any great reputation for
experience and valour. Calling therefore a council, and laying before it
the intelligence which he had received, he encouraged his soldiers. In
order if possible to entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearance
of only three legions, he ranged his army in the following manner: that
the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions should march before all the
baggage; that then the eleventh should bring up the rear of the whole
train of baggage (which however was but small, as is usual on such
expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a sight of a greater
number than they themselves were willing to encounter. By this
disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought them
within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated.

IX.--When the Gauls, whose bold resolutions had been reported to Caesar,
saw the legions advance with a regular motion, drawn up in battle array;
either from the danger of an engagement, or our sudden approach, or with
the design of watching our movements, they drew up their forces before
the camp, and did not quit the rising ground. Though Caesar wished to
bring them to battle, yet being surprised to see so vast a host of the
enemy, he encamped opposite to them, with a valley between them, deep
rather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with a
rampart twelve feet high, with breast-works built on it proportioned to
its height; and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with
perpendicular sides to be sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories
high, to be raised, with a communication to each other by galleries laid
across and covered over; which should be guarded in front by small
parapets of osiers; that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows of
soldiers. The one of whom, being more secure from danger by their
height, might throw their darts with more daring and to a greater
distance; the other, which was nearer the enemy, being stationed on the
rampart, would be protected by their galleries from darts falling on
their heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of a
considerable height.

X.-Caesar had a double design in this fortification; for he both hoped
that the strength of his works, and his [apparent] fears would raise
confidence in the barbarians; and when there should be occasion to make
a distant excursion to get forage or corn, he saw that his camp would be
secured by the works with a very small force. In the meantime there were
frequent skirmishes across the marsh, a few on both sides sallying out
between the two camps. Sometimes, however, our Gallic or German
auxiliaries crossed the marsh, and furiously pursued the enemy; or on
the other hand the enemy passed it and beat back our men. Moreover there
happened in the course of our daily foraging, what must of necessity
happen, when corn is to be collected by a few scattered men out of
private houses, that our foragers dispersing in an intricate country
were surrounded by the enemy; by which, though we suffered but an
inconsiderable loss of cattle and servants, yet it raised foolish hopes
in the barbarians; but more especially, because Comius, who I said had
gone to get aid from the Germans, returned with some cavalry, and though
the Germans were only 500, yet the barbarians were elated by their
arrival.

XI.-Caesar, observing that the enemy kept for several days within their
camp, which was well secured by a morass and its natural situation, and
that it could not be assaulted without a dangerous engagement, nor the
place enclosed with lines without an addition to his army, wrote to
Trebonius to send with all despatch for the thirteenth legion which was
in winter-quarters among the Bituriges under Titus Sextius, one of his
lieutenants; and then to come to him by forced marches with the three
legions. He himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, and Lingones, and
other states, from whom he had required a vast number, to guard his
foraging parties, and to support them in case of any sudden attack of
the enemy.

XII.--As this continued for several days, and their vigilance was
relaxed by custom (an effect which is generally produced by time), the
Bellovaci, having made themselves acquainted with the daily stations of
our horse, lie in ambush with a select body of foot in a place covered
with woods; to it they sent their horse the next day, who were first to
decoy our men into the ambuscade, and then when they were surrounded, to
attack them. It was the lot of the Remi to fall into this snare, to whom
that day had been allotted to perform this duty; for, having suddenly
got sight of the enemy's cavalry, and despising their weakness, in
consequence of their superior numbers, they pursued them too eagerly,
and were surrounded on every side by the foot. Being by this means
thrown into disorder they returned with more precipitation than is usual
in cavalry actions, with the loss of Vertiscus, the governor of their
state, and the general of their horse, who, though scarcely able to sit
on horseback through years, neither, in accordance with the custom of
the Gauls, pleaded his age in excuse for not accepting the command, nor
would he suffer them to fight without him. The spirits of the barbarians
were puffed up and inflated at the success of this battle, in killing
the prince and general of the Remi; and our men were taught by this
loss, to examine the country, and post their guards with more caution,
and to be more moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy.

XIII.--In the meantime daily skirmishes take place continually in view
of both camps; these were fought at the ford and pass of the morass. In
one of these contests the Germans, whom Caesar had brought over the
Rhine, to fight intermixed with the horse, having resolutely crossed the
marsh, and slain the few who made resistance, and boldly pursued the
rest, so terrified them, that not only those who were attacked hand to
hand, or wounded at a distance, but even those who were stationed at a
greater distance to support them, fled disgracefully; and being often
beaten from the rising grounds, did not stop till they had retired into
their camp, or some, impelled by fear, had fled farther. Their danger
drew their whole army into such confusion, that it was difficult to
judge whether they were more insolent after a slight advantage, or more
dejected by a trifling calamity.

XIV.--After spending several days in the same camp, the guards of the
Bellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was advancing nearer with his
legions, and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, send off by night all
who were disabled by age or infirmity, or unarmed, and along with them
their whole baggage. Whilst they are preparing their disorderly and
confused troop for march (for the Gauls are always attended by a vast
multitude of waggons, even when they have very light baggage), being
overtaken by daylight, they drew their forces out before their camp, to
prevent the Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their baggage
had advanced to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not think it
prudent to attack them when standing on their defence, with such a steep
hill in their favour, nor keep his legions at such a distance that they
could quit their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was
divided from the enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he
could not pursue with expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass,
which extended almost to the enemy's camp, was separated from it only by
a small valley, he laid a bridge over the morass and led his army
across, and soon reached the plain on the top of the hill, which was
fortified on either side by a steep ascent. Having there drawn up his
army in order of battle, he marched to the furthest hill, from which he
could, with his engines, shower darts upon the thickest of the enemy.

XV.--The Gauls, confiding in the natural strength of their position,
though they would not decline an engagement if the Romans attempted to
ascend the hill, yet dared not divide their forces into small parties,
lest they should be thrown into disorder by being dispersed, and
therefore remained in order of battle. Caesar, perceiving that they
persisted in their resolution, kept twenty cohorts in battle array, and,
measuring out ground there for a camp, ordered it to be fortified.
Having completed his works, he drew up his legions before the rampart
and stationed the cavalry in certain positions, with their horses
bridled. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans prepared to pursue them, and
that they could not wait the whole night, or continue longer in the same
place without provisions, they formed the following plan to secure a
retreat. They handed to one another the bundles of straw and sticks on
which they sat (for it is the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn up
in order of battle, as has been asserted in former commentaries), of
which they had great plenty in their camp, and piled them in the front
of their line; and at the close of the day, on a certain signal, set
them all on fire at one and the same time. The continued blaze soon
screened all their forces from the sight of the Romans, which no sooner
happened than the barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation.

XVI.--Though Caesar could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for the
intervention of the fire, yet, suspecting that they had adopted that
method to favour their escape, he made his legions advance, and sent a
party of horse to pursue them; but, apprehensive of an ambuscade, and
that the enemy might remain in the same place and endeavour to draw our
men into a disadvantageous situation, he advances himself but slowly.
The horse, being afraid to venture into the smoke and dense line of
flame, and those who were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able
to see their horses' heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat,
through fear of an ambuscade. Thus, by a flight, full at once of
cowardice and address, they advanced without any loss about ten miles,
and encamped in a very strong position. From which, laying numerous
ambuscades, both of horse and foot, they did considerable damage to the
Roman foragers.

XVII.--After this had happened several times, Caesar discovered, from a
certain prisoner, that Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, had
selected six thousand of his bravest foot and a thousand horse, with
which he designed to lie in ambush in a place to which he suspected the
Romans would send to look for forage, on account of the abundance of
corn and grass. Upon receiving information of their design Caesar drew
out more legions than he usually did, and sent forward his cavalry as
usual, to protect the foragers. With these he intermixed a guard of
light infantry, and himself advanced with the legions as fast as he
could.

XVIII.--The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action a
level piece of bound, not more than a mile in extent, enclosed on every
side by a thick wood or a very deep river, as by a toil, and this they
surrounded. Our men, apprised of the enemy's design, marched in good
order to the ground, ready both in heart and hand to give battle, and
willing to hazard any engagement when the legions were at their back. On
their approach, as Correus supposed that he had got an opportunity of
effecting his purpose, he at first shows himself with a small party and
attacks the foremost troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, and
did not crowd together in one place, as commonly happens from surprise
in engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious to
themselves.

XIX.--When by the judicious arrangement of our forces only a few of our
men fought by turns, and did not suffer themselves to be surrounded, the
rest of the enemy broke out from the woods whilst Correus was engaged.
The battle was maintained in different parts with great vigour, and
continued for a long time undecided, till at length a body of foot
gradually advanced from the woods in order of battle and forced our
horse to give ground: the light infantry, which were sent before the
legions to the assistance of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing with
the horse, fought with great courage. The battle was for some time
doubtful, but, as usually happens, our men, who stood the enemy's first
charge, became superior from this very circumstance that, though
suddenly attacked from an ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In the
meantime the legions were approaching, and several messengers arrived
with notice to our men and the enemy that the [Roman] general was near
at hand, with his forces in battle array. Upon this intelligence, our
men, confiding in the support of the cohorts, fought most resolutely,
fearing, lest if they should be slow in their operations they should let
the legions participate in the glory of the conquest. The enemy lose
courage and attempt to escape by different ways. In vain; for they were
themselves entangled in that labyrinth in which they thought to entrap
the Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and having lost the
greater part of their men, they fled in consternation whither-soever
chance carried them; some sought the woods, others the river, but were
vigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in the
meantime, Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on to
quit the field and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers of
quarter, but, fighting courageously and wounding several, provoked our
men, elated with victory, to discharge their weapons against him.

XX.--After this transaction, Caesar, having come up immediately after
the battle, and imagining that the enemy, upon receiving the news of so
great a defeat, would be so depressed that they would abandon their
camp, which was not above eight miles distant from the scene of action,
though he saw his passage obstructed by the river, yet he marched his
army over and advanced. But the Bellovaci and the other states, being
informed of the loss they had sustained by a few wounded men who having
escaped by the shelter of the woods, had returned to them after the
defeat, and learning that everything had turned out unfavourable, that
Correus was slain, and the horse and most valiant of their foot cut off,
imagined that the Romans were marching against them, and calling a
council in haste by sound of trumpet, unanimously cry out to send
ambassadors and hostages to Caesar.

XXI.--This proposal having met with general approbation, Comius the
Atrebatian fled to those Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries
for that war. The rest instantly send ambassadors to Caesar; and
requested that he would be contented with that punishment of his enemy,
which if he had possessed the power to inflict on them before the
engagement, when they were yet uninjured, they were persuaded from his
usual clemency and mercy, he never would have inflicted; that the power
of the Bellovaci was crushed by the cavalry action; that many thousands
of their choicest foot had fallen, that scarce a man had escaped to
bring the fatal news. That, however, the Bellovaci had derived from the
battle one advantage, of some importance, considering their loss; that
Correus, the author of the rebellion, and agitator of the people, was
slain: for that whilst he lived, the senate had never equal influence in
the state with the giddy populace.

XXII.--Caesar reminded the ambassadors who made these supplications,
that the Bellovaci had at the same season the year before, in
conjunction with other states of Gaul, undertaken a war, and that they
had persevered the most obstinately of all in their purpose, and were
not brought to a proper way of thinking by the submission of the rest;
that he knew and was aware that the guilt of a crime was easily
transferred to the dead; but that no one person could have such
influence, as to be able by the feeble support of the multitude to raise
a war and carry it on without the consent of the nobles, in opposition
to the senate, and in despite of every virtuous man; however he was
satisfied with the punishment which they had drawn upon themselves.

XXIII.--The night following the ambassadors bring back his answer to
their countrymen, and prepare the hostages. Ambassadors flock in from
the other states, which were waiting for the issue of the [war with the]
Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive his orders; all except
Comius, whose fears restrained him from entrusting his safety to any
person's honour. For the year before, while Caesar was holding the
assizes in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus, having discovered that Comius
was tampering with the states, and raising a conspiracy against Caesar,
thought he might punish his infidelity without perfidy; but judging that
he would not come to his camp at his invitation, and unwilling to put
him on his guard by the attempt, he sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, with
orders to have him put to death under pretence of a conference. To
effect his purpose, he sent with him some chosen centurions. When they
came to the conference, and Volusenus, as had been agreed on, had taken
hold of Comius by the hand, and one of the centurions, as if surprised
at so uncommon an incident, attempted to kill him, he was prevented by
the friends of Comius, but wounded him severely in the head by the first
blow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much with a design to
fight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius had received
a mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they had seen,
dreading that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this transaction, it
was said that Comius made a resolution never to come within sight of any
Roman.

XXIV.--When Caesar, having completely conquered the most warlike
nations, perceived that there was now no state which could make
preparations for war to oppose him, but that some were removing and
fleeing from their country to avoid present subjection, he resolved to
detach his army into different parts of the country. He kept with
himself Marcus Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh legion; Caius
Fabius was detached with twenty-five cohorts into the remotest part of
Gaul, because it was rumoured that some states had risen in arms, and he
did not think that Caius Caninius Rebilus, who had the charge of that
country, was strong enough to protect it with two legions. He ordered
Titus Labienus to attend himself, and sent the twelfth legion which had
been under him in winter quarters, to Hither Gaul, to protect the Roman
colonies, and prevent any loss by the inroads of barbarians, similar to
that which had happened the year before to the Tergestines, who were cut
off by a sudden depredation and attack. He himself marched to depopulate
the country of Ambiorix, whom he had terrified and forced to fly, but
despaired of being able to reduce under his power; but he thought it
most consistent with his honour to waste his country both of
inhabitants, cattle, and buildings, so that from the abhorrence of his
countrymen, if fortune suffered any to survive, he might be excluded
from a return to his state for the calamities which he had brought on
it.

XXV.--After he had sent either his legions or auxiliaries through every
part of Ambiorix's dominions, and wasted the whole country by sword,
fire, and rapine, and had killed or taken prodigious numbers, he sent
Labienus with two legions against the Treviri, whose state, from its
vicinity to Germany, being engaged in constant war, differed but little
from the Germans, in civilization and savage barbarity; and never
continued in its allegiance, except when awed by the presence of his
army.

XXVI.--In the meantime Caius Caninius, a lieutenant, having received
information by letters and messages from Duracius, who had always
continued in friendship to the Roman people, though a part of his state
had revolted, that a great multitude of the enemy were in arms in the
country of the Pictones, marched to the town Limonum. When he was
approaching it, he was informed by some prisoners, that Duracius was
shut up by several thousand men, under the command of Dumnacus, general
of the Andes, and that Limonum was besieged, but not daring to face the
enemy with his weak legions, he encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus,
having notice of Caninius's approach, turned his whole force against the
legions, and prepared to assault the Roman camp. But after spending
several days in the attempt, and losing a considerable number of men,
without being able to make a breach in any part of the works, he
returned again to the siege of Limonum.

XXVII.--At the same time, Caius Fabius, a lieutenant, brings back many
states to their allegiance, and confirms their submission by taking
hostages; he was then informed by letters from Caninius, of the
proceedings among the Pictones. Upon which he set off to bring
assistance to Duracius. But Dumnacus hearing of the approach of Fabius,
and despairing of safety, if at the same time he should be forced to
withstand the Roman army without, and observe, and be under apprehension
from the town's people, made a precipitate retreat from that place with
all his forces. Nor did he think that he should be sufficiently secure
from danger, unless he led his army across the Loire, which was too deep
a river to pass except by a bridge. Though Fabius had not yet come
within sight of the enemy, nor joined Caninius; yet being informed of
the nature of the country, by persons acquainted with it, he judged it
most likely that the enemy would take that way, which he found they did
take. He therefore marched to that bridge with his army, and ordered his
cavalry to advance no further before the legions, than that they could
return to the same camp at night, without fatiguing their horses. Our
horse pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear, and
attacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden with
baggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Having
executed the affair so successfully, they retired to the camp.

XXVIII.--The night following, Fabius sent his horse before him, with
orders to engage the enemy, and delay their march till he himself should
come up. That his orders might be faithfully performed, Quintus Atius
Varus, general of the horse, a man of uncommon spirit and skill,
encouraged his men, and pursuing the enemy, disposed some of his troops
in convenient places, and with the rest gave battle to the enemy. The
enemy's cavalry made a bold stand, the foot relieving each other, and
making a general halt, to assist their horse against ours. The battle
was warmly contested. For our men, despising the enemy whom they had
conquered the day before, and knowing that the legions were following
them, animated both by the disgrace of retreating, and a desire of
concluding the battle expeditiously by their own courage, fought most
valiantly against the foot: and the enemy, imagining that no more forces
would come against them, as they had experienced the day before, thought
they had got a favourable opportunity of destroying our whole cavalry.

XXIX.-After the conflict had continued for some time with great
violence, Dumnacus drew out his army in such a manner, that the foot
should by turns assist the horse. Then the legions, marching in close
order, came suddenly in sight of the enemy. At this sight, the barbarian
horse were so astonished, and the foot so terrified, that breaking
through the line of baggage, they betook themselves to flight with a
loud shout, and in great disorder. But our horse, who a little before
had vigorously engaged them, whilst they made resistance, being elated
with joy at their victory, raising a shout on every side, poured round
them as they ran, and as long as their horses had strength to pursue, or
their arms to give a blow, so long did they continue the slaughter of
the enemy in that battle, and having killed above twelve thousand men in
arms, or such as threw away their arms through fear, they took their
whole train of baggage.

XXX.--After this defeat, when it was ascertained that Drapes, a Senonian
(who in the beginning of the revolt of Gaul, had collected from all
quarters men of desperate fortunes, invited the slaves to liberty,
called in the exiles of the whole kingdom, given an asylum to robbers,
and intercepted the Roman baggage and provisions), was marching to the
province with five thousand men, being all he could collect after the
defeat, and that Luterius a Cadurcian who, as it has been observed in a
former commentary, had designed to make an attack on the Province in the
first revolt of Gaul, had formed a junction with him, Caius Caninius
went in pursuit of them with two legions, lest great disgrace might be
incurred from the fears or injuries done to the Province by the
depredations of a band of desperate men.

XXXI.--Caius Fabius set off with the rest of the army to the Carnutes
and those other states, whose forces he was informed had served as
auxiliaries in that battle, which he fought against Dumnacus. For he had
no doubt that they would be more submissive after their recent
sufferings, but if respite and time were given them, they might be
easily excited by the earnest solicitations of the same Dumnacus. On
this occasion Fabius was extremely fortunate and expeditious in
recovering the states. For the Carnutes, who, though often harassed had
never mentioned peace, submitted and gave hostages: and the other
states, which lie in the remotest parts of Gaul, adjoining the ocean,
and which are called Armoricae, influenced by the example of the
Carnutes, as soon as Fabius arrived with his legions, without delay
comply with his command. Dumnacus, expelled from his own territories,
wandering and skulking about, was forced to seek refuge by himself in
the most remote parts of Gaul.

XXXII.--But Crapes in conjunction with Literius, knowing that Caninius
was at hand with the legions, and that they themselves could not without
certain destruction enter the boundaries of the province, whilst an army
was in pursuit of them, and being no longer at liberty to roam up and
down and pillage, halt in the country of the Cadurci, as Luterius had
once in his prosperity possessed a powerful influence over the
inhabitants, who were his countrymen, and being always the author of new
projects, had considerable authority among the barbarians; with his own
and Drapes' troops he seized Uxellodunum, a town formerly in vassalage
to him and strongly fortified by its natural situation; and prevailed on
the inhabitants to join him.

XXXIII.--After Caninius had rapidly marched to this place, and perceived
that all parts of the town were secured by very craggy rocks, which it
would be difficult for men in arms to climb even if they met with no
resistance; and, moreover, observing that the town's people were
possessed of effects, to a considerable amount, and that if they
attempted to convey them away in a clandestine manner, they could not
escape our horse, nor even our legions; he divided his forces into three
parts, and pitched three camps on very high ground, with the intention
of drawing lines round the town by degrees, as his forces could bear the
fatigue.

XXXIV.--When the townsmen perceived his design, being terrified by the
recollection of the distress at Alesia, they began to dread similar
consequences from a siege; and above all Luterius, who had experienced
that fatal event, cautioned them to make provision of corn; they
therefore resolve by general consent to leave part of their troops
behind, and set out with their light troops to bring in corn. The scheme
having met with approbation, the following night Drapes and Luterius,
leaving two thousand men in the garrison, marched out of the town with
the rest. After a few days' stay in the country of the Cadurci (some of
whom were disposed to assist them with corn, and others were unable to
prevent their taking it) they collected a great store. Sometimes also
attacks were made on our little forts by sallies at night. For this
reason Caninius deferred drawing his works round the whole town, lest he
should be unable to protect them when completed, or by disposing his
garrisons in several places, should make them too weak.

XXXV.--Drapes and Luterius, having laid in a large supply of corn,
occupy a position at about ten miles distance from the town, intending
from it to convey the corn into the town by degrees. They chose each his
respective department. Drapes stayed behind in the camp with part of the
army to protect it; Luterius conveys the train with provisions into the
town. Accordingly, having disposed guards here and there along the road,
about the tenth hour of the night, he set out by narrow paths through
the woods, to fetch the corn into the town. But their noise being heard
by the sentinels of our camp, and the scouts which we had sent out,
having brought an account of what was going on, Caninius instantly with
the ready-armed cohorts from the nearest turrets made an attack on the
convoy at the break of day. They, alarmed at so unexpected an evil, fled
by different ways to their guard: which as soon as our men perceived,
they fell with great fury on the escort, and did not allow a single man
to be taken alive. Luterius escaped thence with a few followers, but did
not return to the camp.

XXXVI.--After this success, Caninius learnt from some prisoners, that a
part of the forces was encamped with Drapes, not more than ten miles
off; which being confirmed by several, supposing that after the defeat
of one general, the rest would be terrified, and might be easily
conquered, he thought it a most fortunate event that none of the enemy
had fled back from the slaughter to the camp, to give Drapes notice of
the calamity which had befallen him. And as he could see no danger in
making the attempt, he sent forward all his cavalry and the German foot,
men of great activity, to the enemy's camp. He divides one legion among
the three camps, and takes the other without baggage along with him.
When he had advanced near the enemy, he was informed by scouts, which he
had sent before him, that the enemy's camp, as is the custom of
barbarians, was pitched low, near the banks of a river, and that the
higher grounds were unoccupied: but that the German horse had made a
sudden attack on them, and had begun the battle. Upon this intelligence,
he marched up with his legion, armed and in order of battle. Then, on a
signal being suddenly given on every side, our men took possession of
the higher grounds. Upon this, the German horse observing the Roman
colours, fought with great vigour. Immediately all the cohorts attack
them on every side; and having either killed or made prisoners of them
all, gained great booty. In that battle, Drapes himself was taken
prisoner.

XXXVII.--Caninius, having accomplished the business so successfully,
without having scarcely a man wounded, returned to besiege the town;
and, having destroyed the enemy without, for fear of whom he had been
prevented from strengthening his redoubts, and surrounding the enemy
with his lines, he orders the work to be completed on every side. The
next day, Caius Fabius came to join him with his forces, and took upon
him the siege of one side.

XXXVIII.--In the meantime, Caesar left Caius Antonius in the country of
the Bellovaci, with fifteen cohorts, that the Belgae might have no
opportunity of forming new plans in future. He himself visits the other
states, demands a great number of hostages, and by his encouraging
language allays the apprehensions of all. When he came to the Carnutes,
in whose state he has in a former commentary mentioned that the war
first broke out; observing, that from a consciousness of their guilt,
they seemed to be in the greatest terror: to relieve the state the
sooner from its fear, he demanded that Guturvatus, the promoter of that
treason, and the instigator of that rebellion, should be delivered up to
punishment. And though the latter did not dare to trust his life even to
his own countrymen, yet such diligent search was made by them all, that
he was soon brought to our camp. Caesar was forced to punish him, by the
clamours of the soldiers, contrary to his natural humanity, for they
alleged that all the dangers and losses incurred in that war, ought to
be imputed to Guturvatus. Accordingly, he was whipped to death, and his
head cut off.

XXXIX.--Here Caesar was informed by numerous letters from Caninius of
what had happened to Drapes and Luterius, and in what conduct the town's
people persisted: and though he despised the smallness of their numbers,
yet he thought their obstinacy deserving a severe punishment, lest Gaul
in general should adopt an idea that she did not want strength but
perseverance to oppose the Romans; and lest the other states, relying on
the advantage of situation, should follow their example and assert their
liberty; especially as he knew that all the Gauls understood that his
command was to continue but one summer longer, and if they could hold
out for that time, that they would have no further danger to apprehend.
He therefore left Quintus Calenus, one of his lieutenants behind him,
with two legions, and instructions to follow him by regular marches. He
hastened as much as he could with all the cavalry to Caninius.

XL.--Having arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary to the general expectation,
and perceiving that the town was surrounded by the works, and that the
enemy had no possible means of retiring from the assault, and being
likewise informed by the deserters that the townsmen had abundance of
corn; he endeavoured to prevent their getting water. A river divided the
valley below, which almost surrounded the steep craggy mountain on which
Uxellodunum was built. The nature of the ground prevented his turning
the current; for it ran so low down at the foot of the mountain, that no
drains could be sunk deep enough to draw it off in any direction. But
the descent to it was so difficult, that if we made opposition, the
besieged could neither come to the river, nor retire up the precipice
without hazard of their lives. Caesar, perceiving the difficulty,
disposed archers and slingers, and in some places, opposite to the
easiest descents, placed engines, and attempted to hinder the townsmen
from getting water at the river, which obliged them afterwards to go all
to one place to procure water.

XLI.--Close under the walls of the town, a copious spring gushed out on
that part, which for the space of nearly three hundred feet, was not
surrounded by the river. Whilst every other person wished that the
besieged could be debarred from this spring, Caesar alone saw that it
could be effected, though not without great danger. Opposite to it he
began to advance the vineae towards the mountain, and to throw up a
mound, with great labour and continual skirmishing. For the townsmen ran
down from the high ground, and fought without any risk, and wounded
several of our men, yet they obstinately pushed on and were not deterred
from moving forward the vineae, and from surmounting by their assiduity
the difficulties of situation. At the same time they work mines, and
move the crates and vineae to the source of the fountain. This was the
only work which they could do without danger or suspicion. A mound sixty
feet high was raised; on it was erected a turret of ten stories, not
with the intention that it should be on a level with the wall (for that
could not be effected by any works), but to rise above the top of the
spring. When our engines began to play from it upon the paths that led
to the fountain, and the townsmen could not go for water without danger,
not only the cattle designed for food and the working cattle, but a
great number of men also died of thirst.

XLII.--Alarmed at this calamity, the townsmen fill barrels with tallow,
pitch, and dried wood; these they set on fire, and roll down on our
works. At the same time, they fight most furiously, to deter the Romans,
by the engagement and danger, from extinguishing the flames. Instantly a
great blaze arose in the works. For whatever they threw down the
precipice, striking against the vine and agger, communicated the fire to
whatever was in the way. Our soldiers on the other hand, though they
were engaged in a perilous sort of encounter, and labouring under the
disadvantages of position, yet supported all with very great presence of
mind. For the action happened in an elevated situation, and in sight of
our army; and a great shout was raised on both sides; therefore every
man faced the weapons of the enemy and the flames in as conspicuous a
manner as he could, that his valour might be the better known and
attested.

XLIII.--Caesar, observing that several of his men were wounded, ordered
the cohorts to ascend the mountain on all sides, and, under pretence of
assailing the walls, to raise a shout: at which the besieged being
frightened, and not knowing what was going on in other places, call off
their armed troops from attacking our works, and dispose them on the
walls. Thus our men, without hazarding a battle, gained time partly to
extinguish the works which had caught fire, and partly to cut off the
communication. As the townsmen still continued to make an obstinate
resistance, and even, after losing the greatest part of their forces by
drought, persevered in their resolution: At last the veins of the spring
were cut across by our mines, and turned from their course. By this
their constant spring was suddenly dried up, which reduced them to such
despair that they imagined that it was not done by the art of man, but
the will of the gods; forced, therefore, by necessity, they at length
submitted.

XLIV.--Caesar, being convinced that his lenity was known to all men, and
being under no fears of being thought to act severely from a natural
cruelty, and perceiving that there would be no end to his troubles if
several states should attempt to rebel in like manner and in different
places, resolved to deter others by inflicting an exemplary punishment
on these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of those who had borne arms
against him. Their lives he spared, that the punishment of their
rebellion might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who I have said was
taken by Caninius, either through indignation and grief arising from his
captivity, or through fear of severer punishments, abstained from food
for several days, and thus perished. At the same time, Luterius, who, I
have related, had escaped from the battle, having fallen into the hands
of Epasnactus, an Arvernian (for he frequently changed his quarters, and
threw himself on the honour of several persons, as he saw that he dare
not remain long in one place, and was conscious how great an enemy he
deserved to have in Caesar), was by this Epasnactus, the Arvernian, a
sincere friend of the Roman people, delivered without any hesitation, a
prisoner to Caesar.

XLV.--In the meantime, Labienus engages in a successful cavalry action
among the Treviri; and, having killed several of them and of the
Germans, who never refused their aid to any person against the Romans,
he got their chiefs alive into his power, and, amongst them, Surus, an
Aeduan, who was highly renowned both for his valour and birth, and was
the only Aeduan that had continued in arms till that time. Caesar, being
informed of this, and perceiving that he had met with good success in
all parts of Gaul, and reflecting that, in former campaigns, [Celtic]
Gaul had been conquered and subdued; but that he had never gone in
person to Aquitania, but had made a conquest of it, in some degree, by
Marcus Crassus, set out for it with two legions, designing to spend the
latter part of the summer there. This affair he executed with his usual
despatch and good fortune. For all the states of Aquitania sent
ambassadors to him and delivered hostages. These affairs being
concluded, he marched with a guard of cavalry towards Narbo, and drew
off his army into winter quarters by his lieutenants. He posted four
legions in the country of the Belgae, under Marcus Antonius, Caius
Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius, his lieutenants. Two
he detached to the Aedui, knowing them to have a very powerful influence
throughout all Gaul. Two he placed among the Turoni, near the confines
of the Carnutes, to keep in awe the entire tract of country bordering on
the ocean; the other two he placed in the territories of the Lemovices,
at a small distance from the Arverni, that no part of Gaul might be
without an army. Having spent a few days in the province, he quickly ran
through all the business of the assizes, settled all public disputes,
and distributed rewards to the most deserving; for he had a good
opportunity of learning how every person was disposed towards the
republic during the general revolt of Gaul, which he had withstood by
the fidelity and assistance of the Province.

XLVII.--Having finished these affairs, he returned to his legions among
the Belgae and wintered at Nemetocenna: there he got intelligence that
Comius, the Atrebatian had had an engagement with his cavalry. For when
Antonius had gone into winter quarters, and the state of the Atrebates
continued in their allegiance, Comius, who, after that wound which I
before mentioned, was always ready to join his countrymen upon every
commotion, that they might not want a person to advise and head them in
the management of the war, when his state submitted to the Romans,
supported himself and his adherents on plunder by means of his cavalry,
infested the roads, and intercepted several convoys which were bringing
provisions to the Roman quarters.

XLVIII.--Caius Volusenus Quadratus was appointed commander of the horse
under Antonius, to winter with him: Antonius sent him in pursuit of the
enemy's cavalry; now Volusenus added to that valour which was pre-eminent
in him, a great aversion to Comius, on which account he executed
the more willingly the orders which he received. Having, therefore, laid
ambuscades, he had several encounters with his cavalry and came off
successful. At last, when a violent contest ensued, and Volusenus,
through eagerness to intercept Comius, had obstinately pursued him with
a small party; and Comius had, by the rapidity of his flight, drawn
Volusenus to a considerable distance from his troops, he, on a sudden,
appealed to the honour of all about him for assistance not to suffer the
wound, which he had perfidiously received, to go without vengeance; and,
wheeling his horse about, rode unguardedly before the rest up to the
commander. All his horse following his example, made a few of our men
turn their backs and pursued them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse,
rode up to Volusenus, and, pointing his lance, pierced him in the thigh
with great force. When their commander was wounded, our men no longer
hesitated to make resistance, and, facing about, beat back the enemy.
When this occurred, several of the enemy, repulsed by the great
impetuosity of our men, were wounded, and some were trampled to death in
striving to escape, and some were made prisoners. Their general escaped
this misfortune by the swiftness of his horse. Our commander, being
severely wounded, so much so that he appeared to run the risk of losing
his life, was carried back to the camp. But Comius, having either
gratified his resentment, or, because he had lost the greatest part of
his followers, sent ambassadors to Antonius, and assured him that he
would give hostages as a security that he would go wherever Antonius
should prescribe, and would comply with his orders, and only entreated
that this concession should be made to his fears, that he should not be
obliged to go into the presence of any Roman. As Antonius judged that
his request originated in a just apprehension, he indulged him in it and
accepted his hostages.

 * * * * *

Caesar, I know, has made a separate commentary of each year's
transactions, which I have not thought it necessary for me to do,
because the following year, in which Lucius Paulus and Caius Marcellus
were consuls, produced no remarkable occurrences in Gaul. But that no
person may be left in ignorance of the place where Caesar and his army
were at that time, I have thought proper to write a few words in
addition to this commentary.

 * * * * *

XLIX.--Caesar, whilst in winter quarters in the country of the Belgae,
made it his only business to keep the states in amity with him, and to
give none either hopes of, or pretext for, a revolt. For nothing was
further from his wishes than to be under the necessity of engaging in
another war at his departure; lest, when he was drawing his army out of
the country, any war should be left unfinished, which the Gauls would
cheerfully undertake, when there was no immediate danger. Therefore, by
treating the states with respect, making rich presents to the leading
men, imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of their subjection
lighter, he easily kept Gaul (already exhausted by so many unsuccessful
battles) in obedience.

L.--When the winter quarters were broken up, he himself, contrary to his
usual practice, proceeded to Italy, by the longest possible stages, in
order to visit the free towns and colonies, that he might recommend to
them the petition of Marcus Antonius, his treasurer, for the priesthood.
For he exerted his interest both cheerfully in favour of a man strongly
attached to him, whom he had sent home before him to attend the
election, and zealously to oppose the faction and power of a few men,
who, by rejecting Marcus Antonius, wished to undermine Caesar's
influence when going out of office. Though Caesar heard on the road,
before he reached Italy, that he was created augur, yet he thought
himself in honour bound to visit the free town and colonies, to return
them thanks for rendering such service to Antonius by their presence in
such great numbers [at the election], and at the same time to recommend
to them himself, and his honour in his suit for the consulate the
ensuing year. For his adversaries arrogantly boasted that Lucius
Lentulus and Caius Marcellus had been appointed consuls, who would strip
Caesar of all honour and dignity: and that the consulate had been
injuriously taken from Sergius Galba, though he had been much superior
in votes and interest, because he was united to Caesar, both by
friendship, and by serving as lieutenant under him.

LI.--Caesar, on his arrival, was received by the principal towns and
colonies with incredible respect and affection; for this was the first
time he came since the war against united Gaul. Nothing was omitted
which could be thought of for the ornament of the gates, roads, and
every place through which Caesar was to pass. All the people with their
children went out to meet him. Sacrifices were offered up in every
quarter. The market places and temples were laid out with
entertainments, as if anticipating the joy of a most splendid triumph.
So great was the magnificence of the richer and zeal of the poorer ranks
of the people.

LII.--When Caesar had gone through all the states of Cisalpine Gaul, he
returned with the greatest haste to the army at Nemetocenna; and having
ordered all his legions to march from winter quarters to the territories
of the Treviri, he went thither and reviewed them. He made Titus
Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul, that he might be the more inclined
to support him in his suit for the consulate. He himself made such
journeys, as he thought would conduce to the health of his men by change
of air; and though he was frequently told that Labienus was solicited by
his enemies, and was assured that a scheme was in agitation by the
contrivance of a few, that the senate should interpose their authority
to deprive him of a part of his army; yet he neither gave credit to any
story concerning Labienus, nor could be prevailed upon to do anything in
opposition to the authority of the senate; for he thought that his cause
would be easily gained by the free voice of the senators. For Caius
Curio, one of the tribunes of the people, having undertaken to defend
Caesar's cause and dignity, had often proposed to the senate, "that if
the dread of Caesar's arms rendered any apprehensive, as Pompey's
authority and arms were no less formidable to the forum, both should
resign their command, and disband their armies. That then the city would
be free, and enjoy its due rights." And he not only proposed this, but
of himself called upon the senate to divide on the question. But the
consuls and Pompey's friends interposed to prevent it; and regulating
matters as they desired, they broke up the meeting.

LIII.--This testimony of the unanimous voice of the senate was very
great, and consistent with their former conduct; for the preceding year,
when Marcellus attacked Caesar's dignity, he proposed to the senate,
contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to dispose of Caesar's
province, before the expiration of his command, and when the votes were
called for, and Marcellus, who endeavoured to advance his own dignity,
by raising envy against Caesar, wanted a division, the full senate went
over to the opposite side. The spirit of Caesar's foes was not broken by
this, but it taught them, that they ought to strengthen their interest
by enlarging their connections, so as to force the senate to comply with
whatever they resolved on.

LIV.--After this a decree was passed by the senate, that one legion
should be sent by Pompey, and another by Caesar, to the Parthian war.
But these two legions were evidently drawn from Caesar alone. For the
first legion which Pompey sent to Caesar, he gave Caesar, as if it
belonged to himself, though it was levied in Caesar's province. Caesar,
however, though no one could doubt the design of his enemies, sent the
legion back to Cneius Pompey, and in compliance with the decree of the
senate, ordered the fifteenth, belonging to himself, and which was
quartered in Cisalpine Gaul, to be delivered up. In its room he sent the
thirteenth into Italy, to protect the garrisons from which he had
drafted the fifteenth. He disposed his army in winter quarters, placed
Caius Trebonius, with four legions among the Belgae, and detached Caius
Fabius, with four more, to the Aedui; for he thought that Gaul would be
most secure if the Belgae, a people of the greatest valour, and the
Aedui, who possessed the most powerful influence, were kept in awe by
his armies.

LV.--He himself set out for Italy; where he was informed on his arrival,
that the two legions sent home by him, and which by the senate's decree,
should have been sent to the Parthian war, had been delivered over to
Pompey, by Caius Marcellus the consul, and were retained in Italy.
Although from this transaction it was evident to every one that war was
designed against Caesar, yet he resolved to submit to any thing, as long
as there were hopes left of deciding the dispute in an equitable manner,
rather than have recourse to arms.


       *       *       *       *       *


THE CIVIL WAR

BOOK I

I.--When Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, they were with
great difficulty, and a hard struggle of the tribunes, prevailed on to
suffer it to be read in the senate; but the tribunes could not prevail,
that any question should be put to the senate on the subject of the
letter. The consuls put the question on the regulation of the state.
Lucius Lentulus the consul promises that he will not fail the senate and
republic, "if they declared their sentiments boldly and resolutely, but
if they turned their regard to Caesar, and courted his favour, as they
did on former occasions, he would adopt a plan for himself, and not
submit to the authority of the senate: that he too had a means of
regaining Caesar's favour and friendship." Scipio spoke to the same
purport, "that it was Pompey's intention not to abandon the republic, if
the senate would support him; but if they should hesitate and act
without energy, they would in vain implore his aid, if they should
require it hereafter."

II.--This speech of Scipio's, as the senate was convened in the city,
and Pompey was near at hand, seemed to have fallen from the lips of
Pompey himself. Some delivered their sentiments with more moderation, as
Marcellus first, who in the beginning of his speech, said, "that the
question ought not to be put to the senate on this matter, till levies
were made throughout all Italy, and armies raised under whose protection
the senate might freely and safely pass such resolutions as they thought
proper": as Marcus Calidius afterwards, who was of opinion, "that Pompey
should set out for his province, that there might be no cause for arms:
that Caesar was naturally apprehensive as two legions were forced from
him, that Pompey was retaining those troops, and keeping them near the
city to do him injury": as Marcus Rufus, who followed Calidius almost
word for word. They were all harshly rebuked by Lentulus, who
peremptorily refused to propose Calidius's motion. Marcellus, overawed
by his reproofs, retracted his opinion. Thus most of the senate,
intimidated by the expressions of the consul, by the fears of a present
army, and the threats of Pompey's friends, unwillingly and reluctantly
adopted Scipio's opinion, that Caesar should disband his army by a
certain day, and should he not do so, he should be considered as acting
against the state. Marcus Antonius, and Quintus Cassius, tribunes of the
people, interposed. The question was immediately put on their
interposition. Violent opinions were expressed: whoever spoke with the
greatest acrimony and cruelty, was most highly commended by Caesar's
enemies.

III.--The senate having broken up in the evening, all who belonged to
that order were summoned by Pompey. He applauded the forward, and
secured their votes for the next day; the more moderate he reproved and
excited against Caesar. Many veterans, from all parts, who had served in
Pompey's armies, were invited to his standard by the hopes of rewards
and promotions. Several officers belonging to the two legions, which had
been delivered up by Caesar, were sent for. The city and the Comitium
were crowded with tribunes, centurions, and veterans. All the consuls'
friends, all Pompey's connections, all those who bore any ancient enmity
to Caesar, were forced into the senate house. By their concourse and
declarations the timid were awed, the irresolute confirmed, and the
greater part deprived of the power of speaking their sentiments with
freedom. Lucius Piso, the censor, offered to go to Caesar: as did
likewise Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of these affairs,
and require only six days' time to finish the business. Opinions were
expressed by some to the effect that commissioners should be sent to
Caesar to acquaint him with the senate's pleasure.

IV.--All these proposals were rejected, and opposition made to them all,
in the speeches of the consul, Scipio, and Cato. An old grudge against
Caesar and chagrin at a defeat actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought upon
by the magnitude of his debts, and the hopes of having the government of
an army and provinces, and by the presents which he expected from such
princes as should receive the title of friends of the Roman people, and
boasted amongst his friends, that he would be a second Sylla, to whom
the supreme authority should return. Similar hopes of a province and
armies, which he expected to share with Pompey on account of his
connection with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover, [he was influenced
by] the fear of being called to trial, and the adulation and an
ostentatious display of himself and his friends in power, who at that
time had great influence in the republic, and courts of judicature.
Pompey himself, incited by Caesar's enemies, because he was unwilling
that any person should bear an equal degree of dignity, had wholly
alienated himself from Caesar's friendship, and procured a
reconciliation with their common enemies; the greatest part of whom he
had himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity with him. At the
same time, chagrined at the disgrace which he had incurred by converting
the two legions from their expedition through Asia and Syria, to
[augment] his own power and authority, he was anxious to bring matters
to a war.

V.--For these reasons everything was done in a hasty and disorderly
manner, and neither was time given to Caesar's relations to inform him
[of the state of affairs] nor liberty to the tribunes of the people to
deprecate their own danger, nor even to retain the last privilege, which
Sylla had left them, the interposing their authority; but on the seventh
day they were obliged to think of their own safety, which the most
turbulent tribunes of the people were not accustomed to attend to, nor
to fear being called to an account for their actions, till the eighth
month. Recourse is had to that extreme and final decree of the senate
(which was never resorted to even by daring proposers except when the
city was in danger of being set on fire, or when the public safety was
despaired of). "That the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and
proconsuls in the city should take care that the state received no
injury." These decrees are dated the eighth day before the ides of
January; therefore, in the first five days, on which the senate could
meet, from the day on which Lentulus entered into his consulate, the two
days of election excepted, the severest and most virulent decrees were
passed against Caesar's government, and against those most illustrious
characters, the tribunes of the people. The latter immediately made
their escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar, who was then at
Ravenna, awaiting an answer to his moderate demands; [to see] if matters
could be brought to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on the
part of the enemies.

VI.--During the succeeding days the senate is convened outside the city.
Pompey repeated the same things which he had declared through Scipio. He
applauded the courage and firmness of the senate, acquainted them with
his force, and told them that he had ten legions ready; that he was
moreover informed and assured that Caesar's soldiers were disaffected,
and that he could not persuade them to defend or even follow him.
Motions were made in the senate concerning other matters; that levies
should be made through all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent as
propraetor into Mauritania; that money should be granted to Pompey from
the public treasury. It was also put to the vote that king Juba should
be [honoured with the title of] friend and ally. But Marcellus said that
he would not allow this motion for the present. Philip, one of the
tribunes, stopped [the appointment of] Sylla; the resolutions respecting
the other matters passed. The provinces, two of which were consular, the
remainder praetorian, were decreed to private persons; Scipio got Syria,
Lucius Domitius Gaul: Philip and Marcellus were omitted, from a private
motive, and their lots were not even admitted. To the other provinces
praetors were sent, nor was time granted as in former years, to refer to
the people on their appointment, nor to make them take the usual oath,
and march out of the city in a public manner, robed in the military
habit, after offering their vows; a circumstance which had never before
happened. Both the consuls leave the city, and private men had lictors
in the city and capital, contrary to all precedents of former times.
Levies were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted from
the municipal towns, and violently taken from the temples. All
distinctions between things human and divine are confounded.

VII.--These things being made known to Caesar, he harangued his
soldiers; he reminded them "of the wrongs done to him at all times by
his enemies, and complained that Pompey had been alienated from him and
led astray by them through envy and a malicious opposition to his glory,
though he had always favoured and promoted Pompey's honour and dignity.
He complained that an innovation had been introduced into the republic,
that the intercession of the tribunes, which had been restored a few
years before by Sylla, was branded as a crime, and suppressed by force
of arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the tribunes of every other power,
had, nevertheless, left the privilege of intercession unrestrained; that
Pompey, who pretended to restore what they had lost, had taken away the
privileges which they formerly had; that whenever the senate decreed,
"that the magistrates should take care that the republic sustained no
injury" (by which words and decree the Roman people were obliged to
repair to arms), it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; when
the tribunes attempted violent measures; when the people seceded, and
possessed themselves of the temples and eminences of the city; (and
these instances of former times, he showed them were expiated by the
fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi): that nothing of this kind was
attempted now, nor even thought of: that no law was promulgated, no
intrigue with the people going forward, no secession made; he exhorted
them to defend from the malice of his enemies, the reputation and honour
of that general, under whose command they had for nine years most
successfully supported the state; fought many successful battles, and
subdued all Gaul and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth legion,
which was present (for in the beginning of the disturbances he had
called it out, his other legions not having yet arrived), all cry out
that they are ready to defend their general, and the tribunes of the
commons, from all injuries.

VIII.--Having made himself acquainted with the disposition of his
soldiers, Caesar set off with that legion to Ariminum, and there met the
tribunes, who had fled to him for protection; he called his other
legions from winter quarters, and ordered them to follow him. Thither
came Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was a lieutenant general
under Caesar. He, after concluding the rest of his speech, and stating
for what purpose he had come, told Caesar that he had commands of a
private nature for him from Pompey; that Pompey wished to clear himself
to Caesar, lest he should impute those actions which he did for the
republic, to a design of affronting him; that he had ever preferred the
interest of the state to his own private connections; that Caesar, too,
for his own honour, ought to sacrifice his desires and resentment to the
public good, and not vent his anger so violently against his enemies,
lest in his hopes of injuring them, he should injure the republic. He
spoke a few words to the same purport from himself, in addition to
Pompey's apology. Roscius, the praetor, conferred with Caesar almost in
the same words, and on the same subject, and declared that Pompey had
empowered him to do so.

IX.--Though these things seemed to have no tendency towards redressing
his injuries, yet having got proper persons by whom he could communicate
his wishes to Pompey; he required of them both, that as they had
conveyed Pompey's demands to him, they should not refuse to convey his
demands to Pompey; if by so little trouble they could terminate a great
dispute, and liberate all Italy from her fears.

"That the honour of the republic had ever been his first object, and
dearer to him than life; that he was chagrined, that the favour of the
Roman people was wrested from him by the injurious reports of his
enemies; that he was deprived of a half-year's command, and dragged back
to the city, though the people had ordered that regard should be paid to
his suit for the consulate at the next election, though he was not
present; that, however, he had patiently submitted to this loss of
honour for the sake of the republic; that when he wrote letters to the
senate, requiring that all persons should resign the command of their
armies, he did not obtain even that request; that levies were made
throughout Italy; that the two legions which had been taken from him,
under the pretence of the Parthian war, were kept at home, and that the
state was in arms. To what did all these things tend, unless to his
ruin? But, nevertheless, he was ready to condescend to any terms, and to
endure everything for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his own
province; let them both disband their armies; let all persons in Italy
lay down their arms; let all fears be removed from the city; let free
elections, and the whole republic be resigned to the direction of the
senate and Roman people. That these things might be the more easily
performed, and conditions secured and confirmed by oath, either let
Pompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar to go to him; it might be that
all their disputes would be settled by an interview."

X.--Roscius and Lucius Caesar, having received this message, went to
Capua, where they met the consuls and Pompey, and declared to them
Caesar's terms. Having deliberated on the matter, they replied, and sent
written proposals to him by the same persons, the purport of which was,
that Caesar should return into Gaul, leave Ariminum, and disband his
army: if he complied with this, that Pompey would go to Spain. In the
meantime, until security was given that Caesar would perform his
promises, that the consuls and Pompey would not give over their levies.

XI.--It was not an equitable proposal, to require that Caesar should
quit Ariminum and return to his province; but that he [Pompey] should
himself retain his province and the legions that belonged to another,
and desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded, whilst he himself was
making new levies: and that he should merely promise to go to his
province, without naming the day on which he would set out; so that if
he should not set out till after Caesar's consulate expired, yet he
would not appear bound by any religious scruples about asserting a
falsehood. But his not granting time for a conference, nor promising to
set out to meet him, made the expectation of peace appear very hopeless.
Caesar, therefore, sent Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts from Ariminum
to Arretium; he himself stayed at Ariminum with two legions, with the
intention of raising levies there. He secured Pisaurus, Fanum, and
Ancona, with a cohort each.

XII.--In the meantime, being informed that Thermus the praetor was in
possession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the town,
but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclined
towards himself; he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had at
Ariminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrusting
the affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it, and made his
escape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio
recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants.
Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on the
affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of the
thirteenth legion from the garrisons, and set out for Auximum, a town
into which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken
possession, and from which he had sent senators round about the country
of Picenum, to raise new levies.

XIII.--Upon news of Caesar's approach, the senate of Auximum went in a
body to Attius Varus; and told him that it was not a subject for them to
determine upon: yet neither they, nor the rest of the freemen would
suffer Caius Caesar, a general, who had merited so well of the republic,
after performing such great achievements, to be excluded from their town
and walls; wherefore he ought to pay some regard to the opinion of
posterity, and his own danger. Alarmed at this declaration, Attius Varus
drew out of the town the garrison which he had introduced, and fled. A
few of Caesar's front rank having pursued him, obliged him to halt, and
when the battle began, Varus is deserted by his troops: some of them
disperse to their homes, the rest come over to Caesar; and along with
them, Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion, is taken prisoner and brought
to Caesar. He had held the same rank before in Cneius Pompey's army. But
Caesar applauded the soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at liberty, returned
thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised to be grateful for their
conduct.

XIV.--Intelligence of this being brought to Rome, so great a panic
spread on a sudden that when Lentulus, the consul, came to open the
treasury, to deliver money to Pompey by the senate's decree, immediately
on opening the hallowed door he fled from the city. For it was falsely
rumoured that Caesar was approaching, and that his cavalry were already
at the gates. Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and so did most of
the magistrates. Cneius Pompey had left the city the day before, and was
on his march to those legions which he had received from Caesar, and had
disposed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levies were stopped within
the city. No place on this side of Capua was thought secure. At Capua
they first began to take courage and to rally, and determined to raise
levies in the colonies, which had been sent thither by the Julian law:
and Lentulus brought into the public market-place the gladiators which
Caesar maintained there for the entertainment of the people, and
confirmed them in their liberty, and gave them horses and ordered them
to attend him; but afterwards, being warned by his friends that this
action was censured by the judgment of all, he distributed them among
the slaves of the districts of Campania, to keep guard there.

XV.--Caesar, having moved forward from Auximum, traversed the whole
country of Picenum. All the governors in these countries most cheerfully
received him, and aided his army with every necessary. Ambassadors came
to him even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had laid out and built
at his own expense, and offered most earnestly to comply with his
orders. He demanded soldiers: they sent them. In the meantime, the
twelfth legion came to join Caesar; with these two he marched to
Asculum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus Spinther occupied that town
with ten cohorts; but, on being informed of Caesar's approach, he fled
from the town, and, in attempting to bring off his cohorts with him, was
deserted by a great part of his men. Being left on the road with a small
number, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by Pompey into
Picenum to confirm the people [in their allegiance]. Vibullius, being
informed by him of the transactions in Picenum, takes his soldiers from
him and dismisses him. He collects, likewise, from the neighbouring
countries, as many cohorts as he can from Pompey's new levies. Amongst
them he meets with Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum, with six
cohorts, which he had in the garrison there; by a junction with which he
made up thirteen cohorts. With them he marched by hasty journeys to
Corfinium, to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed him that Caesar was
advancing with two legions. Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts
from Alba, and the Marsians, Pelignians, and neighbouring states.

XVI.--Caesar, having recovered Asculum and driven out Lentulus, ordered
the soldiers that had deserted from him to be sought out and a muster to
be made; and, having delayed for one day there to provide corn, he
marched to Corfinium. On his approach, five cohorts, sent by Domitius
from the town, were breaking down a bridge which was over the river, at
three miles' distance from it. An engagement taking place there with
Caesar's advanced-guard, Domitius's men were quickly beaten off from the
bridge and retreated precipitately into the town. Caesar, having marched
his legions over, halted before the town and encamped close by the
walls.

XVII.--Domitius, upon observing this, sent messengers well acquainted
with the country, encouraged by a promise of being amply rewarded, with
despatches to Pompey to Apulia, to beg and entreat him to come to his
assistance. That Caesar could be easily enclosed by the two armies,
through the narrowness of the country, and prevented from obtaining
supplies: unless he did so, that he and upwards of thirty cohorts, and a
great number of senators and Roman knights, would be in extreme danger.
In the meantime he encouraged his troops, disposed engines on the walls,
and assigned to each man a particular part of the city to defend. In a
speech to the soldiers he promised them lands out of his own estate; to
every private soldier four acres, and a corresponding share to the
centurions and veterans.

XVIII.--In the meantime, word was brought to Caesar that the people of
Sulmo, a town about seven miles distant from Corfinium, were ready to
obey his orders, but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and
Attius, a Pelignian, who were in possession of the town with a garrison
of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius thither, with five cohorts of
the eighth legion. The inhabitants, as soon as they saw our standards,
threw open their gates, and all the people, both citizens and soldiers,
went out to meet and welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Attius leaped off
the walls. Attius, being brought before Antonius, begged that he might
be sent to Caesar. Antonius returned the same day on which he had set
out with the cohorts and Attius. Caesar added these cohorts to his own
army, and sent Attius away in safety. The three first days Caesar
employed in fortifying his camp with strong works, in bringing in corn
from the neighbouring free towns, and waiting for the rest of his
forces. Within the three days the eighth legion came to him, and
twenty-two cohorts of the new levies in Gaul, and about three hundred
horse from the king of Noricum. On their arrival he made a second camp
on another part of the town, and gave the command of it to Curio. He
determined to surround the town with a rampart and turrets during the
remainder of the time. Nearly at the time when the greatest part of the
work was completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey returned.

XIX.--Having read Pompey's letter, Domitius, concealing the truth, gave
out in council that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance; and
encouraged them not to despond, but to provide everything necessary for
the defence of the town. He held private conferences with a few of his
most intimate friends, and determined on the design of fleeing. As
Domitius's countenance did not agree with his words, and he did
everything with more confusion and fear than he had shown on the
preceding days, and as he had several private meetings with his friends,
contrary to his usual practice, in order to take their advice, and as he
avoided all public councils and assemblies of the people, the truth
could be no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had written back in
answer, "That he would not put matters to the last hazard; that Domitius
had retreated into the town of Corfinium, without either his advice or
consent. Therefore, if any opportunity should offer, he [Domitius]
should come to him with the whole force." But the blockade and works
round the town prevented his escape.

XX.--Domitius's design being noised abroad, the soldiers in Confinium
[**error in original: should be CORFINIUM] early in the evening began to
mutiny, and held a conference with each other by their tribunes and
centurions, and the most respectable amongst themselves: "that they were
besieged by Caesar; that his works and fortifications were almost
finished; that their general, Domitius, on whose hopes and expectations
they had confided, had thrown them off, and was meditating his own
escape; that they ought to provide for their own safety." At first the
Marsians differed in opinion, and possessed themselves of that part of
the town which they thought the strongest. And so violent a dispute
arose between them, that they attempted to fight and decide it by arms.
However, in a little time, by messengers sent from one side to the
other, they were informed of Domitius's meditated flight, of which they
were previously ignorant. Therefore they all with one consent brought
Domitius into public view, gathered round him, and guarded him; and sent
deputies out of their number to Caesar, to say that they were ready to
throw open their gates, to do whatever he should order, and to deliver
up Domitius alive into his hands.

XXI.--Upon intelligence of these matters, though Caesar thought it of
great consequence to become master of the town as soon as possible, and
to transfer the cohorts to his own camp, lest any change should be
wrought on their inclinations by bribes, encouragement, or fictitious
messages, because in war great events are often brought about by
trifling circumstances; yet, dreading lest the town should be plundered
by the soldiers entering into it, and taking advantage of the darkness
of the night, he commended the persons who came to him, and sent them
back to the town, and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. He
disposed his soldiers on the works, which he had begun, not at certain
intervals, as was his practice before, but in one continued range of
sentinels and stations, so that they touched each other, and formed a
circle round the whole fortification; he ordered the tribunes and
general officers to ride round; and exhorted them not only to be on
their guard against sallies from the town, but also to watch that no
single person should get out privately. Nor was any man so negligent or
drowsy as to sleep that night. To so great height was their expectation
raised, that they were carried away, heart and soul, each to different
objects, what would become of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of
Lentulus, what of the rest; what event would be the consequence of
another.

XXII.--About the fourth watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our sentinels
and guards from the walls, that he desired to have an interview with
Caesar, if permission were given him. Having obtained it, he was
escorted out of town; nor did the soldiers of Domitius leave him till
they brought him into Caesar's presence. He pleaded with Caesar for his
life, and entreated him to spare him, and reminded him of their former
friendship; and acknowledged that Caesar's favours to him were very
great; in that through his interest he had been admitted into the
college of priests; in that after his praetorship he had been appointed
to the government of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him in his
suit for the consulate. Caesar interrupted him in his speech, and told
him, "that he had not left his province to do mischief [to any man], but
to protect himself from the injuries of his enemies; to restore to their
dignity the tribunes of the people who had been driven out of the city
on his account, and to assert his own liberty, and that of the Roman
people, who were oppressed by a few factious men." Encouraged by this
address, Lentulus begged leave to return to the town, that the security
which he had obtained for himself might be an encouragement to the rest
to hope for theirs; saying that some were so terrified that they were
induced to make desperate attempts on their own lives. Leave being
granted him, he departed.

XXIII.--When day appeared Caesar ordered all the senators and their
children, the tribunes of the soldiers, and the Roman knights, to be
brought before him. Among the persons of senatorial rank were Lucius
Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Vibullius Rufus, Sextus
Quintilius Varus, the quaestor, and Lucius Rubrius, besides the son of
Domitius, and several other young men, and a great number of Roman
knights and burgesses, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal
towns. When they were brought before him he protected them from the
insolence and taunts of the soldiers; told them in few words that they
had not made him a grateful return, on their part, for his very
extraordinary kindness to them, and dismissed them all in safety. Sixty
sestertia, which Domitius had brought with him and lodged in the public
treasury, being brought to Caesar by the magistrates of Corfinium, he
gave them back to Domitius, that he might not appear more moderate with
respect to the life of men than in money matters, though he knew that it
was public money, and had been given by Pompey to pay his army. He
ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the oath to himself, and that day
decamped and performed the regular march. He stayed only seven days
before Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the country of the
Marrucinians, Frentanians, and Larinates.

XXIV.--Pompey, being informed of what had passed at Corfinium, marches
from Luceria to Canusium, and thence to Brundusium. He orders all the
forces raised everywhere by the new levies to repair to him. He gives
arms to the slaves that attended the flocks, and appoints horses for
them. Of these he made up about three hundred horse. Lucius, the
praetor, fled from Alba, with six cohorts: Rutilus Lupus, the praetor,
from Tarracina, with three. These having descried Caesar's cavalry at a
distance, which were commanded by Bivius Curius, and having deserted the
praetor, carried their colours to Curius and went over to him. In like
manner during the rest of his march, several cohorts fell in with the
main body of Caesar's army, others with his horse. Cneius Magius, from
Cremona, engineer-general to Pompey, was taken prisoner on the road and
brought to Caesar, but sent back by him to Pompey with this message: "As
hitherto he had not been allowed an interview, and was now on his march
to him at Brundusium, that it deeply concerned the commonwealth and
general safety that he should have an interview with Pompey; and that
the same advantage could not be gained at a great distance when the
proposals were conveyed to them by others, as if terms were argued by
them both in person."

XXV.--Having delivered this message he marched to Brundusium with six
legions, four of them veterans: the rest those which he had raised in
the late levy and completed on his march, for he had sent all Domitius's
cohorts immediately from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the
consuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable part of the army,
and that Pompey remained at Brundusium with twenty cohorts; but could
not find out, for a certainty, whether Pompey stayed behind to keep
possession of Brundusium, that he might the more easily command the
whole Adriatic sea, with the extremities of Italy and the coast of
Greece, and be able to conduct the war on either side of it, or whether
he remained there for want of shipping; and, being afraid that Pompey
would come to the conclusion that he ought not to relinquish Italy, he
determined to deprive him of the means of communication afforded by the
harbour of Brundusium. The plan of his work was as follows:--Where the
mouth of the port was narrowest he threw up a mole of earth on either
side, because in these places the sea was shallow. Having gone out so
far that the mole could not be continued in the deep water, he fixed
double floats, thirty feet on either side, before the mole. These he
fastened with four anchors at the four corners, that they might not be
carried away by the waves. Having completed and secured them, he then
joined to them other floats of equal size. These he covered over with
earth and mould, that he might not be prevented from access to them to
defend them, and in the front and on both sides he protected them with a
parapet of wicker work; and on every fourth one raised a turret, two
stories high, to secure them the better from being attacked by the
shipping and set on fire.

XXVI.--To counteract this, Pompey fitted out large merchant ships, which
he found in the harbour of Brundusium: on them he erected turrets three
stories high, and, having furnished them with several engines and all
sorts of weapons, drove them amongst Caesar's works, to break through
the floats and interrupt the works; thus there happened skirmishes every
day at a distance with slings, arrows, and other weapons. Caesar
conducted matters as if he thought that the hopes of peace were not yet
to be given up. And though he was very much surprised that Magius, whom
he had sent to Pompey with a message, was not sent back to him; and
though his attempting a reconciliation often retarded the vigorous
prosecution of his plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means to
persevere in the same line of conduct. He therefore sent Caninius
Rebilus to have an interview with Scribonius Libo, his intimate friend
and relation. He charges him to exhort Libo to effect a peace, but,
above all things, requires that he should be admitted to an interview
with Pompey. He declared that he had great hopes, if that were allowed
him, that the consequence would be that both parties would lay down
their arms on equal terms; that a great share of the glory and
reputation of that event would redound to Libo, if, through his advice
and agency, hostilities should be ended. Libo, having parted from the
conference with Caninius, went to Pompey, and, shortly after, returns
with answer that, as the consuls were absent, no treaty of compositions
could be engaged in without them. Caesar therefore thought it time at
length to give over the attempt which he had often made in vain, and act
with energy in the war.

XXVII.--When Caesar's works were nearly half finished, and after nine
days were spent in them, the ships which had conveyed the first division
of the army to Dyrrachium being sent back by the consuls, returned to
Brundusium. Pompey, either frightened at Caesar's works or determined
from the beginning to quit Italy, began to prepare for his departure on
the arrival of the ships; and the more effectually to retard Caesar's
attack, lest his soldiers should force their way into the town at the
moment of his departure, he stopped up the gates, built walls across the
streets and avenues, sunk trenches across the ways, and in them fixed
palisadoes and sharp stakes, which he made level with the ground by
means of hurdles and clay. But he barricaded with large beams fastened
in the ground and sharpened at the ends two passages and roads without
the walls, which led to the port. After making these arrangements, he
ordered his soldiers to go on board without noise, and disposed here and
there, on the wall and turrets, some light-armed veterans, archers and
slingers. These he designed to call off by a certain signal, when all
the soldiers were embarked, and left row-galleys for them in a secure
place.

XXVIII.--The people of Brundusium, irritated by the insolence of
Pompey's soldiers, and the insults received from Pompey himself, were in
favour of Caesar's party. Therefore, as soon as they were aware of
Pompey's departure, whilst his men were running up and down, and busied
about their voyage, they made signs from the tops of the houses: Caesar,
being apprized of the design by them, ordered scaling ladders to be got
ready, and his men to take arms, that he might not lose any opportunity
of coming to an action. Pompey weighed anchor at nightfall. The soldiers
who had been posted on the wall to guard it, were called off by the
signal which had been agreed on, and knowing the roads, ran down to the
ships. Caesar's soldiers fixed their ladders and scaled the walls: but
being cautioned by the people to beware of the hidden stakes and covered
trenches, they halted, and being conducted by the inhabitants by a long
circuit, they reached the port, and captured with their long boats and
small craft two of Pompey's ships, full of soldiers, which had struck
against Caesar's moles.

XXIX.-Though Caesar highly approved of collecting a fleet, and crossing
the sea, and pursuing Pompey before he could strengthen himself with his
transmarine auxiliaries, with the hope of bringing the war to a
conclusion, yet he dreaded the delay and length of time necessary to
effect it: because Pompey, by collecting all his ships, had deprived him
of the means of pursuing him at present. The only resource left to
Caesar, was to wait for a fleet from the distant regions of Gaul,
Picenum, and the straits of Gibraltar. But this, on account of the
season of the year, appeared tedious and troublesome. He was unwilling
that, in the meantime, the veteran army, and the two Spains, one of
which was bound to Pompey by the strongest obligations, should be
confirmed in his interest; that auxiliaries and cavalry should be
provided and Gaul and Italy reduced in his absence.

XXX.--Therefore, for the present, he relinquished all intention of
pursuing Pompey, and resolved to march to Spain, and commanded the
magistrates of the free towns to procure him ships, and to have them
conveyed to Brundusium. He detached Valerius, his lieutenant, with one
legion to Sardinia; Curio, the proprietor, to Sicily with three legions;
and ordered him, when he had recovered Sicily, to immediately transport
his army to Africa. Marcus Cotta was at this time governor of Sardinia:
Marcus Cato, of Sicily: and Tubero, by the lots, should have had the
government of Africa. The Caralitani, as soon as they heard that
Valerius was sent against them, even before he left Italy, of their own
accord drove Cotta out of the town; who, terrified because he understood
that the whole province was combined [against him], fled from Sardinia
to Africa. Cato was in Sicily, repairing the old ships of war, and
demanding new ones from the states, and these things he performed with
great zeal. He was raising levies of Roman citizens, among the Lucani
and Brutii, by his lieutenants, and exacting a certain quota of horse
and foot from the states of Sicily. When these things were nearly
completed, being informed of Curio's approach, he made a complaint that
he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who had undertaken an
unnecessary war, without making any preparation, and when questioned by
him and other members in the senate, had assured them that every thing
was ready and provided for the war. After having made these complaints
in a public assembly, he fled from his province.

XXXI.--Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio, Sicily, deserted by their
governors when they arrived there with their armies. When Tubero arrived
in Africa, he found Attius Varus in the government of the province, who,
having lost his cohorts, as already related, at Auximum, had straightway
fled to Africa, and finding it without a governor, had seized it of his
own accord, and making levies, had raised two legions. From his
acquaintance with the people and country, and his knowledge of that
province, he found the means of effecting this; because a few years
before, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had obtained that
province. He, when Tubero came to Utica with his fleet, prevented his
entering the port or town, and did not suffer his son, though labouring
under sickness, to set foot on shore; but obliged him to weigh anchor
and quit the place.

XXXIL.--When these affairs were despatched, Caesar, that there might be
an intermission from labour for the rest of the season, drew off his
soldiers to the nearest municipal towns, and set off in person for Rome.
Having assembled the senate, he reminded them of the injustice of his
enemies; and told them, "That he aimed at no extraordinary honour, but
had waited for the time appointed by law, for standing candidate for the
consulate, being contented with what was allowed to every citizen. That
a bill had been carried by the ten tribunes of the people
(notwithstanding the resistance of his enemies, and a very violent
opposition from Cato, who in his usual manner, consumed the day by a
tedious harangue) that he should be allowed to stand candidate, though
absent, even in the consulship of Pompey; and if the latter disapproved
of the bill, why did he allow it to pass? if he approved of it, why
should he debar him [Caesar] from the people's favour? He made mention
of his own patience, in that he had freely proposed that all armies
should be disbanded, by which he himself would suffer the loss both of
dignity and honour. He urged the virulence of his enemies, who refused
to comply with what they required from others, and had rather that all
things should be thrown into confusion, than that they should lose their
power and their armies. He expatiated on their injustice, in taking away
his legions: their cruelty and insolence in abridging the privileges of
the tribunes; the proposals he had made, and his entreaties of an
interview, which had been refused him: For which reasons, he begged and
desired that they would undertake the management of the republic, and
unite with him in the administration of it. But if through fear they
declined it, he would not be a burden to them, but take the management
of it on himself. That deputies ought to be sent to Pompey, to propose a
reconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey had lately asserted in
the senate, that authority was acknowledged to be vested in those
persons to whom ambassadors were sent, and fear implied in those that
sent them. That these were the sentiments of low, weak minds: that for
his part, as he had made it his study to surpass others in glory, so he
was desirous of excelling them in justice and equity."

XXXIII.--The senate approved of sending deputies, but none could be
found fit to execute the commission: for every person, from his own
private fears, declined the office. For Pompey, on leaving the city, had
declared in the open senate, that he would hold in the same degree of
estimation, those who stayed in Rome and those in Caesar's camp. Thus
three days were wasted in disputes and excuses. Besides, Lucius
Metellus, one of the tribunes, was suborned by Caesar's enemies, to
prevent this, and to embarrass everything else which Caesar should
propose. Caesar having discovered his intention, after spending several
days to no purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose any
more time, and went to Transalpine Gaul, without effecting what he had
intended.

XXXIV.--On his arrival there, he was informed that, Vibullius Rufus,
whom he had taken a few days before at Corfinium, and set at liberty,
was sent by Pompey into Spain; and that Domitius also was gone to seize
Massilia with seven row-galleys, which were fitted up by some private
persons at Igilium and Cosa, and which he had manned with his own
slaves, freedmen, and colonists: and that some young noblemen of
Massilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey, when leaving Rome had
exhorted, that the late services of Caesar should not erase from their
minds the memory of his former favours. On receiving this message, the
Massilians had shut their gates against Caesar, and invited over to them
the Albici, who had formerly been in alliance with them, and who
inhabited the mountains that overhung Massilia: they had likewise
conveyed the corn from the surrounding country, and from all the forts
into the city; had opened armouries in the city: and were repairing the
walls, the fleet, and the gates.

XXXV.--Caesar sent for fifteen of the principal persons of Massilia to
attend him. To prevent the war commencing among them, he remonstrates
[in the following language]; "that they ought to follow the precedent
set by all Italy, rather than submit to the will of any one man." He
made use of such arguments as he thought would tend to bring them to
reason. The deputies reported his speech to their countrymen, and by the
authority of the state bring him back this answer: "That they understood
that the Roman people was divided into two factions: that they had
neither judgment nor abilities to decide which had the juster cause; but
that the heads of these factions were Cneius Pompey and Caius Caesar,
the two patrons of the state: the former of whom had granted to their
state the lands of the Volcae Arecomici, and Helvii; the latter had
assigned them a part of his conquests in Gaul, and had augmented their
revenue. Wherefore, having received equal favours from both, they ought
to show equal affection to both, and assist neither against the other,
nor admit either into their city or harbours."

XXXVI.--Whilst this treaty was going forward, Domitius arrived at
Massilia with his fleet, and was received into the city, and made
governor of it. The chief management of the war was entrusted to him. At
his command they send the fleet to all parts; they seize all the
merchantmen they could meet with, and carry them into the harbour; they
apply the nails, timber, and rigging, with which they were furnished to
rig and refit their other vessels. They lay up in the public stores, all
the corn that was found in the ships, and reserve the rest of their
lading and convoy for the siege of the town, should such an event take
place. Provoked at such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions against
Massilia, and resolved to provide turrets, and vinae to assault the
town, and to build twelve ships at Arelas, which being completed and
rigged in thirty days (from the time the timber was cut down), and being
brought to Massilia, he put under the command of Decimus Brutus; and
left Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to invest the city.

XXXVII.--Whilst he was preparing and getting these things in readiness,
he sent Caius Fabius one of his lieutenants into Spain with three
legions, which he had disposed in winter quarters in Narbo, and the
neighbouring country; and ordered him immediately to seize the passes of
the Pyrenees, which were at that time occupied by detachments from
Lucius Afranius, one of Pompey's lieutenants. He desired the other
legions, which were passing the winter at a great distance, to follow
close after him. Fabius, according to his orders, by using expedition,
dislodged the party from the hills, and by hasty marches came up with
the army of Afranius.

XXXVIII.--On the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have already
mentioned, Pompey had sent into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro,
his lieutenants (one of whom had the command of Hither Spain, with three
legions; the second of the country from the forest of Castulo to the
river Guadiana with two legions; the third from the river Guadiana to
the country of the Vettones and Lusitania, with the like number of
legions), divided amongst themselves their respective departments.
Petreius was to march from Lusitania through the Vettones, and join
Afranius with all his forces; Varro was to guard all Further Spain with
what legions he had. These matters being settled, reinforcements of
horse and foot were demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius; from the
Celtiberi, Cantabri, and all the barbarous nations which border on the
ocean, by Afranius. When they were raised, Petreius immediately marched
through the Vettones to Afranius. They resolved by joint consent to
carry on the war in the vicinity of Ilerda, on account of the advantages
of its situation.

XXXIX.--Afranius, as above mentioned, had three legions, Petreius two.
There were besides about eighty cohorts raised in Hither and Further
Spain (of which, the troops belonging to the former province had
shields, those of the latter targets), and about five thousand horse
raised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions into Spain, with
about six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, which had
served under him in all his former wars, and the same number from Gaul,
which he himself had provided, having expressly called out all the most
noble and valiant men of each state. The bravest of these were from the
Aquitani and the mountaineers, who border on the Province in Gaul. He
had been informed that Pompey was marching through Mauritania with his
legions to Spain, and would shortly arrive. He at the same time borrowed
money from the tribunes and centurions, which he distributed amongst his
soldiers. By this proceeding he gained two points; he secured the
interest of the centurions by this pledge in his hands, and by his
liberality he purchased the affections of his army.

XL.--Fabius sounded the inclinations of the neighbouring states by
letters and messengers. He had made two bridges over the river Segre, at
the distance of four miles from each other. He sent foraging parties
over these bridges, because he had already consumed all the forage that
was on his side of the river. The generals of Pompey's army did almost
the same thing, and for the same reason: and the horse had frequent
skirmishes with each other. When two of Fabius's legions had, as was
their constant practice, gone forth as the usual protection to the
foragers, and had crossed the river, and the baggage, and all the horse
were following them, on a sudden, from the weight of the cattle, and the
mass of water, the bridge fell, and all the horse were cut off from the
main army, which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from the timber
and hurdles that were carried down the river, Afranius immediately
crossed his own bridge, which communicated between his camp and the
town, with four legions and all the cavalry, and marched against
Fabius's two legions. When his approach was announced, Lucius Plancus,
who had the command of those legions, compelled by the emergency, took
post on a rising ground; and drew up his army with two fronts, that it
might not be surrounded by the cavalry. Thus, though engaged with
superior numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions and the
horse. When the battle was begun by the horse, there were observed at a
distance by both sides the colours of two legions, which Caius Fabius
had sent round by the further bridge to reinforce our men, suspecting,
as the event verified, that the enemy's generals would take advantage of
the opportunity which fortune had put in their way, to attack our men.
Their approach put an end to the battle, and each general led back his
legions to their respective camps.

XLI.--In two days after Caesar came to the camp with nine hundred horse,
which he had retained for a bodyguard. The bridge which had been broken
down by the storm was almost repaired, and he ordered it to be finished
in the night. Being acquainted with the nature of the country, he left
behind him six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and all his
baggage, and the next day set off in person for Ilerda, with all his
forces drawn up in three lines, and halted just before the camp of
Afranius, and having remained there a short time under arms, he offered
him battle on equal terms. When this offer was made, Afranius drew out
his forces, and posted them on the middle of a hill, near his camp. When
Caesar perceived that Afranius declined coming to an engagement, he
resolved to encamp at somewhat less than half a mile's distance from the
very foot of the mountain; and that his soldiers whilst engaged in their
works, might not be terrified by any sudden attack of the enemy, or
disturbed in their work, he ordered them not to fortify it with a wall,
which must rise high, and be seen at a distance, but draw, on the front
opposite the enemy, a trench fifteen feet broad. The first and second
lines continued under arms as was from the first appointed. Behind them
the third line was carrying on the work without being seen; so that the
whole was completed before Afranius discovered that the camp was being
fortified.

XLII.--In the evening Caesar drew his legions within this trench, and
rested them under arms the next night. The day following he kept his
whole army within it, and as it was necessary to bring materials from a
considerable distance, he for the present pursued the same plan in his
work; and to each legion, one after the other, he assigned one side of
the camp to fortify, and ordered trenches of the same magnitude to be
cut: he kept the rest of the legions under arms without baggage to
oppose the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, to frighten us and obstruct the
work, drew out their forces at the very foot of the mountain, and
challenged us to battle. Caesar, however, did not interrupt his work,
relying on the protection of the three legions, and the strength of the
fosse. After staying for a short time, and advancing no great distance
from the bottom of the hill, they led back their forces to their camp.
The third day Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, and ordered the
other cohorts which he had left in the upper camp, and his baggage to be
removed to it.

XLIIL-Between the town of Ilerda and the next hill, on which Afranius
and Petreius were encamped, there was a plain about three hundred paces
broad, and near the middle of it an eminence somewhat raised above the
level: Caesar hoped that if he could get possession of this and fortify
it, he should be able to cut off the enemy from the town, the bridge,
and all the stores which they had laid up in the town. In expectation of
this he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his army in
an advantageous position, he ordered the advanced men of one legion to
hasten forward and seize the eminence. Upon intelligence of this the
cohorts which were on guard before Afranius's camp were instantly sent a
nearer way to occupy the same post. The two parties engage, and as
Afranius's men had reached the eminence first, our men were repulsed,
and, on a reinforcement being sent, they were obliged to turn their
backs and retreat to the standards of legions.

XLIV.--The manner of fighting of those soldiers was to run forward with
great impetuosity and boldly take a post, and not to keep their ranks
strictly, but to fight in small scattered parties: if hard pressed they
thought it no disgrace to retire and give up the post, being accustomed
to this manner of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarous
nations; for it commonly happens that soldiers are strongly influenced
by the customs of those countries in which they have spent much time.
This method, however, alarmed our men, who were not used to such a
description of warfare. For they imagined that they were about to be
surrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who ran forward from
their ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their ranks, and not
to quit their colours, nor, without good reason, to give up the post
which they had taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the
legion which was stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, but
retreated to the next hill.

XLV.--Almost the whole army being daunted at this, because it had
occurred contrary to their expectations and custom, Caesar encouraged
his men and led the ninth legion to their relief, and checked the
insolent and eager pursuit of the enemy, and obliged them, in their
turn, to show their backs and retreat to Ilerda, and take post under the
walls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, being over zealous to
repair the dishonour which had been sustained, having rashly pursued the
fleeing enemy, advanced into disadvantageous ground and went up to the
foot of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built. And when they
wished to retire they were again attacked by the enemy from the rising
ground. The place was craggy in the front and steep on either side, and
was so narrow that even three cohorts, drawn up in order of battle,
would fill it; but no relief could be sent on the flanks, and the horse
could be of no service to them when hard pressed. From the town, indeed,
the precipice inclined with a gentle slope for near four hundred paces.
Our men had to retreat this way, as they had, through their eagerness,
advanced too inconsiderately. The greatest contest was in this place,
which was much to the disadvantage of our troops, both on account of its
narrowness, and because they were posted at the foot of the mountain, so
that no weapon was thrown at them without effect: yet they exerted their
valour and patience, and bore every wound. The enemy's forces were
increasing, and cohorts were frequently sent to their aid from the camp
through the town, that fresh men might relieve the weary. Caesar was
obliged to do the same, and relieve the fatigued by sending cohorts to
that post.

XLVI.--After the battle had in this manner continued incessantly for
five hours, and our men had suffered much from superior numbers, having
spent all their javelins, they drew their swords and charged the enemy
up the hill, and, having killed a few, obliged the rest to fly. The
cohorts being beaten back to the wall, and some being driven by their
fears into the town, an easy retreat was afforded to our men. Our
cavalry also, on either flank, though stationed on sloping or low
ground, yet bravely struggled up to the top of the hill, and, riding
between the two armies, made our retreat more easy and secure. Such were
the various turns of fortune in the battle. In the first encounter about
seventy of our men fell: amongst them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurion
of the second line of the fourteenth legion, who, for his extraordinary
valour, had been promoted from the lower ranks to that post. About six
hundred were wounded. Of Afranius's party there were killed Titus
Caecilius, principal centurion, and four other centurions, and above two
hundred men.

XLVII.--But this opinion is spread abroad concerning this day, that each
party thought that they came off conquerors. Afranius's soldiers,
because, though they were esteemed inferior in the opinion of all, yet
they had stood our attack and sustained our charge, and, at first, had
kept the post and the hill which had been the occasion of the dispute;
and, in the first encounter, had obliged our men to fly: but ours,
because, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground and the
disparity of numbers, they had maintained the battle for five hours, had
advanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced the enemy to fly from
the higher ground and driven them into the town. The enemy fortified the
hill, about which the contest had been, with strong works, and posted a
garrison on it.

XLVIII.--In two days after this transaction, there happened an
unexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed
that there were never seen higher floods in those countries; it swept
down the snow from all the mountains, and broke over the banks of the
river, and in one day carried away both the bridges which Fabius had
built,--a circumstance which caused great difficulties to Caesar's army.
For as our camp, as already mentioned, was pitched between two rivers,
the Segre and Cinca, and as neither of these could be forded for the
space of thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined within these
narrow limits. Neither could the states, which had espoused Caesar's
cause, furnish him with corn, nor the troops, which had gone far to
forage, return, as they were stopped by the waters: nor could the
convoys, coming from Italy and Gaul, make their way to the camp.
Besides, it was the most distressing season of the year, when there was
no corn in the blade, and it was nearly ripe: and the states were
exhausted, because Afranius had conveyed almost all the corn, before
Caesar's arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left, had been
already consumed by Caesar. The cattle, which might have served as a
secondary resource against want, had been removed by the states to a
great distance on account of the war. They who had gone out to get
forage or corn, were chased by the light troops of the Lusitanians, and
the targeteers of Hither Spain, who were well acquainted with the
country, and could readily swim across the river, because it is the
custom of all those people not to join their armies without bladders.

XLIX.--But Afranius's army had abundance of everything; a great stock of
corn had been provided and laid in long before, a large quantity was
coming in from the whole province: they had a good store of forage. The
bridge of Ilerda afforded an opportunity of getting all these without
any danger, and the places beyond the bridge, to which Caesar had no
access, were as yet untouched.

L.--Those floods continued several days. Caesar endeavoured to repair
the bridges, but the height of the water did not allow him: and the
cohorts disposed along the banks did not suffer them to be completed;
and it was easy for them to prevent it, both from the nature of the
river and the height of the water, but especially because their darts
were thrown from the whole course of the bank on one confined spot; and
it was no easy matter at one and the same time to execute a work in a
very rapid flood, and to avoid the darts.

LI.--Intelligence was brought to Afranius that the great convoys, which
were on their march to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the
Rutheni, and horse from the Gauls, with a long train of baggage,
according to the Gallic custom of travelling, had arrived there; there
were besides about six thousand people of all descriptions, with slaves
and freed men. But there was no order, or regular discipline, as every
one followed his own humour, and all travelled without apprehension,
taking the same liberty as on former marches. There were several young
noblemen, sons of senators, and of equestrian rank; there were
ambassadors from several states; there were lieutenants of Caesar's. The
river stopped them all. To attack them by surprise, Afranius set out in
the beginning of the night, with all his cavalry and three legions, and
sent the horse on before, to fall on them unawares; but the Gallic horse
soon got themselves in readiness, and attacked them. Though but few,
they withstood the vast number of the enemy, as long as they fought on
equal terms: but when the legions began to approach, having lost a few
men, they retreated to the next mountains. The delay occasioned by this
battle was of great importance to the security of our men; for having
gained time, they retired to the higher grounds. There were missing that
day about two hundred bow-men, a few horse, and an inconsiderable number
of servants and baggage.

LII.--However, by all these things, the price of provisions was raised,
which is commonly a disaster attendant, not only on a time of present
scarcity, but on the apprehension of future want. Provisions had now
reached fifty denarii each bushel; and the want of corn had diminished
the strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were increasing
every day: and so great an alteration was wrought in a few days, and
fortune had so changed sides, that our men had to struggle with the want
of every necessary; while the enemy had an abundant supply of all
things, and were considered to have the advantage. Caesar demanded from
those states which had acceded to his alliance, a supply of cattle, as
they had but little corn. He sent away the camp followers to the more
distant states, and endeavoured to remedy the present scarcity by every
resource in his power.

LIII.--Afranius and Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller and more
circumstantial accounts of these things to Rome, to their acquaintances.
Report exaggerated them so that the war appeared to be almost at an end.
When these letters and despatches were received at Rome, a great
concourse of people resorted to the house of Afranius, and
congratulations ran high: several went out of Italy to Cneius Pompey;
some of them, to be the first to bring him the intelligence; others,
that they might not be thought to have waited the issue of the war, and
to have come last of all.

LIV.--When Caesar's affairs were in this unfavourable position, and all
the passes were guarded by the soldiers and horse of Afranius, and the
bridges could not be prepared, Caesar ordered his soldiers to make ships
of the kind that his knowledge of Britain a few years before had taught
him. First, the keels and ribs were made of light timber, then, the rest
of the hulk of the ships was wrought with wicker-work, and covered over
with hides. When these were finished, he drew them down to the river in
waggons in one night, a distance of twenty-two miles from his camp, and
transported in them some soldiers across the river, and on a sudden took
possession of a hill adjoining the bank. This he immediately fortified,
before he was perceived by the enemy. To this he afterwards transported
a legion: and having begun a bridge on both sides, he finished it in two
days. By this means, he brought safe to his camp the convoys, and those
who had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a conveyance for the
provisions.

LV.--The same day he made a great part of his horse pass the river, who,
falling on the foragers by surprise as they were dispersed without any
suspicions, intercepted an incredible number of cattle and people; and
when some Spanish light-armed cohorts were sent to reinforce the enemy,
our men judiciously divided themselves into two parts, the one to
protect the spoil, the other to resist the advancing foe, and to beat
them back, and they cut off from the rest and surrounded one cohort,
which had rashly ventured out of the line before the others, and after
putting it to the sword, returned safe with considerable booty to the
camp over the same bridge.

LVI.--Whilst these affairs are going forward at Ilerda, the Massilians,
adopting the advice of Domitius, prepared seventeen ships of war, of
which eleven were decked. To these they add several smaller vessels,
that our fleet might be terrified by numbers: they man them with a great
number of archers and of the Albici, of whom mention has been already
made, and these they incited by rewards and promises. Domitius required
certain ships for his own use, which he manned with colonists and
shepherds, whom he had brought along with him. A fleet being thus
furnished with every necessary, he advanced with great confidence
against our ships, commanded by Decimus Brutus. It was stationed at an
island opposite to Massilia.

LVII.--Brutus was much inferior in number of ships; but Caesar had
appointed to that fleet the bravest men selected from all his legions,
antesignani and centurions, who had requested to be employed in that
service. They had provided iron hooks and harpoons, and had furnished
themselves with a vast number of javelins, darts, and missiles. Thus
prepared, and being apprised of the enemy's approach, they put out from
the harbour, and engaged the Massilians. Both sides fought with great
courage and resolution; nor did the Albici, a hardy people, bred on the
highlands and inured to arms, fall much short of our men in valour: and
being lately come from the Massilians, they retained in their minds
their recent promises: and the wild shepherds, encouraged by the hope of
liberty, were eager to prove their zeal in the presence of their
masters.

LVIII.--The Massilians themselves, confiding in the quickness of their
ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the shock,
and as long as they were permitted by clear space, lengthening their
line they endeavoured to surround us, or to attack single ships with
several of theirs, or to run across our ships, and carry away our oars,
if possible; but when necessity obliged them to come nearer, they had
recourse, from the skill and art of the pilots, to the valour of the
mountaineers. But our men, not having such expert seamen, or skilful
pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, and
were not yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging, were
moreover impeded by the heaviness and slowness of our vessels, which
having been built in a hurry and of green timber, were not so easily
manoeuvred. Therefore, when Caesar's men had an opportunity of a close
engagement, they cheerfully opposed two of the enemy's ships with one of
theirs. And throwing in the grappling irons, and holding both ships
fast, they fought on both sides of the deck, and boarded the enemy's;
and having killed numbers of the Albici and shepherds, they sank some of
their ships, took others with the men on board, and drove the rest into
the harbour. That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including those
that were taken.

LIX.--When news of this battle was brought to Caesar at Ilerda, the
bridge being completed at the same time, fortune soon took a turn. The
enemy, daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the country as
freely or as boldly as before: but sometimes advancing a small distance
from the camp, that they might have a ready retreat, they foraged within
narrower bounds: at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid our
outposts and parties of horse; or having sustained some loss, or
descried our horse at a distance, they fled in the midst of their
expedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at length they resolved
to leave off foraging for several days, and, contrary to the practice of
all nations, to go out at night.

LX.--In the meantime the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were under
the government of the Oscenses, send ambassadors to Caesar, and offer to
submit to his orders. They are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani,
and Ausetani, and in a few days more by the Illurgavonenses, who dwell
near the river Ebro. He requires of them all to assist him with corn, to
which they agreed, and having collected all the cattle in the country,
they convey them into his camp. One entire cohort of the
Illurgavonenses, knowing the design of their state, came over to Caesar,
from the place where they were stationed, and carried their colours with
them. A great change is shortly made in the face of affairs. The bridge
being finished, five powerful states being joined to Caesar, a way
opened for the receiving of corn, and the rumours of the assistance of
legions which were said to be on their march, with Pompey at their head,
through Mauritania, having died away, several of the more distant states
revolt from Afranius, and enter into league with Caesar.

LXI.--Whilst the spirits of the enemy were dismayed at these things,
Caesar, that he might not be always obliged to send his horse a long
circuit round by the bridge, having found a convenient place, began to
sink several drains, thirty feet deep, by which he might draw off a part
of the river Segre, and make a ford over it. When these were almost
finished, Afranius and Petreius began to be greatly alarmed, lest they
should be altogether cut off from corn and forage, because Caesar was
very strong in cavalry. They therefore resolved to quit their posts, and
to transfer the war to Celtiberia. There was, moreover, a circumstance
that confirmed them in this resolution: for of the two adverse parties,
that which had stood by Sertorius in the late war, being conquered by
Pompey, still trembled at his name and sway, though absent: the other
which had remained firm in Pompey's interest, loved him for the favours
which they had received: but Caesar's name was not known to the
barbarians. From these they expected considerable aid, both of horse and
foot, and hoped to protract the war till winter, in a friendly country.
Having come to this resolution, they gave orders to collect all the
ships in the river Ebro, and to bring them to Octogesa, a town situated
on the river Ebro, about twenty miles distant from their camp. At this
part of the river, they ordered a bridge to be made of boats fastened
together, and transported two legions over the river Segre, and
fortified their camp with a rampart, twelve feet high.

LXII.--Notice of this being given by the scouts, Caesar continued his
work day and night, with very great fatigue to the soldiers, to drain
the river, and so far effected his purpose, that the horse were both
able and bold enough, though with some difficulty and danger, to pass
the river; but the foot had only their shoulders and upper part of their
breast above the water, so that their fording it was retarded, not only
by the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of the current.
However, almost at the same instant, news was received of the bridge
being nearly completed over the Ebro, and a ford was found in the Segre.

LXIII.--Now indeed the enemy began to think that they ought to hasten
their march. Accordingly, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the garrison
at Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with their whole force, and formed one
camp with the two legions which they had led across a few days before.
Caesar had no resource, but to annoy and cut down their rear; since with
his cavalry to go by the bridge, required him to take a long circuit; so
that they would arrive at the Ebro by a much shorter route. The horse,
which he had detached, crossed the ford, and when Afranius and Petreius
had broken up their camp about the third watch, they suddenly appeared
on their rear, and spreading round them in great numbers, began to
retard and impede their march.

LXIV.--At break of day, it was perceived from the rising grounds which
joined Caesar's camp, that their rear was vigorously pressed by our
horse; that the last line sometimes halted and was broken; at other
times, that they joined battle and that our men were beaten back by a
general charge of their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued them when
they wheeled about: but through the whole camp the soldiers gathered in
parties, and declared their chagrin that the enemy had been suffered to
escape from their hands and that the war had been unnecessarily
protracted. They applied to their tribunes and centurions, and entreated
them to inform Caesar that he need not spare their labour or consider
their danger; that they were ready and able, and would venture to ford
the river where the horse had crossed. Caesar, encouraged by their zeal
and importunity, though he felt reluctant to expose his army to a river
so exceedingly large, yet judged it prudent to attempt it and make a
trial. Accordingly, he ordered all the weaker soldiers, whose spirit or
strength seemed unequal to the fatigue, to be selected from each
century, and left them, with one legion besides, to guard the camp: the
rest of the legions he drew out without any baggage, and, having
disposed a great number of horses in the river, above and below the
ford, he led his army over. A few of his soldiers being carried away by
the force of the current, were stopped by the horse and taken up, and
not a man perished. His army being safe on the opposite bank, he drew
out his forces and resolved to lead them forward in three battalions:
and so great was the ardour of the soldiers that, notwithstanding the
addition of a circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fording
the river, before the ninth hour of the day they came up with those who
had set out at the third watch.

LXV.--When Afranius, who was in company with Petreius, saw them at a
distance, being affrighted at so unexpected a sight, he halted on a
rising ground and drew up his army. Caesar refreshed his army on the
plain that he might not expose them to battle whilst fatigued; and when
the enemy attempted to renew their march, he pursued and stopped them.
They were obliged to pitch their camp sooner than they had intended, for
there were mountains at a small distance; and difficult and narrow roads
awaited them about five miles off. They retired behind these mountains
that they might avoid Caesar's cavalry, and, placing parties in the
narrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead their own forces
across the Ebro without danger or apprehension. This it was their
interest to attempt and to effect by any means possible; but, fatigued
by the skirmishes all day, and by the labour of their march, they
deferred it till the following day: Caesar likewise encamped on the next
hill.

LXVI.--About midnight a few of their men who had gone some distance from
the camp to fetch water, being taken by our horse, Caesar is informed by
them that the generals of the enemy were drawing their troops out of the
camp without noise. Upon this information Caesar ordered the signal to
be given and the military shout to be raised for packing up the baggage.
When they heard the shout, being afraid lest they should be stopped in
the night and obliged to engage under their baggage, or lest they should
be confined in the narrow roads by Caesar's horse, they put a stop to
their march and kept their forces in their camp. The next day Petreius
went out privately with a few horse to reconnoitre the country. A
similar movement was made from Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa was
detached with a small party to explore the nature of the country. Each
returned with the same account to his camp, that there was a level road
for the next five miles, that there then succeeded a rough and
mountainous country. Whichever should first obtain possession of the
defiles would have no trouble in preventing the other's progress.

LXVII.--There was a debate in the council between Afranius and Petreius,
and the time of marching was the subject. The majority were of opinion
that they should begin their march at night, "for they might reach the
defiles before they should be discovered." Others, because a shout had
been raised the night before in Caesar's camp, used this as an argument
that they could not leave the camp unnoticed: "that Caesar's cavalry
were patrolling the whole night, and that all the ways and roads were
beset; that battles at night ought to be avoided, because in civil
dissension, a soldier once daunted is more apt to consult his fears than
his oath; that the daylight raised a strong sense of shame in the eyes
of all, and that the presence of the tribunes and centurions had the
same effect: by these things the soldiers would be re strained and awed
to their duty. Wherefore they should, by all means, attempt to force
their way by day; for, though a trifling loss might be sustained, yet
the post which they desired might be secured with safety to the main
body of the army." This opinion prevailed in the council, and the next
day, at the dawn, they resolved to set forward.

LXVIII.--Caesar, having taken a view of the country, the moment the sky
began to grow white, led his forces from the camp and marched at the
head of his army by a long circuit, keeping to no regular road; for the
road which led to the Ebro and Octogesa was occupied by the enemy's
camp, which lay in Caesar's way. His soldiers were obliged to cross
extensive and difficult valleys. Craggy cliffs, in several places,
interrupted their march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed to
one another, and the soldiers were forced to perform a great part of
their march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. But not
a man murmured at the fatigue, because they imagined that there would be
a period to all their toils if they could cut off the enemy from the
Ebro and intercept their convoys.

LXIX.--At first, Afranius's soldiers ran in high spirits from their camp
to look at us, and in contumelious language upbraided us, "that we were
forced, for want of necessary subsistence, to run away, and return to
Ilerda." For our route was different from what we proposed, and we
appeared to be going a contrary way. But their generals applauded their
own prudence in keeping within their camp, and it was a strong
confirmation of their opinion, that they saw we marched without waggons
or baggage, which made them confident that we could not long endure
want. But when they saw our army gradually wheel to the right, and
observed our van was already passing the line of their camp, there was
nobody so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think it necessary to
march from the camp immediately, and oppose us. The cry to arms was
raised, and all the army, except a few which were left to guard the
camp, set out and marched the direct road to the Ebro.

LXX.--The contest depended entirely on despatch, which should first get
possession of the defile and the mountain. The difficulty of the roads
delayed Caesar's army, but his cavalry pursuing Afranius's forces,
retarded their march. However, the affair was necessarily reduced to
this point, with respect to Afranius's men, that if they first gained
the mountains, which they desired, they would themselves avoid all
danger, but could not save the baggage of their whole army, nor the
cohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which, being
intercepted by Caesar's army, by no means could assistance be given.
Caesar first accomplished the march, and having found a plain behind
large rocks, drew up his army there in order of battle and facing the
enemy. Afranius, perceiving that his rear was galled by our cavalry, and
seeing the enemy before him, having come to a hill, made a halt on it.
Thence he detached four cohorts of Spanish light infantry to the highest
mountain which was in view: to this he ordered them to hasten with all
expedition, and to take possession of it, with the intention of going to
the same place with all his forces, then altering his route, and
crossing the hills to Octogesa. As the Spaniards were making towards it
in an oblique direction, Caesar's horse espied them and attacked them,
nor were they able to withstand the charge of the cavalry even for a
moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces in the sight of the
two armies.

LXXI.--There was now an opportunity for managing affairs successfully,
nor did it escape Caesar, that an army daunted at suffering such a loss
before their eyes, could not stand, especially as they were surrounded
by our horse, and the engagement would take place on even and open
ground. To this he was importuned on all sides. The lieutenants,
centurions, and tribunes, gathered round him, and begged "that he would
not hesitate to begin the battle: that the hearts of all the soldiers
were very anxious for it: that Afranius's men had by several
circumstances betrayed signs of fear; in that they had not assisted
their party; in that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did not
sustain the charge of our cavalry, but crowding their standards into one
place, did not observe either rank or order. But if he had any
apprehensions from the disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunity
would be given him of coming to battle in some other place: for that
Afranius must certainly come down, and would not be able to remain there
for want of water."

LXXII.--Caesar had conceived hopes of ending the affair without an
engagement, or without striking a blow, because he had cut off the
enemy's supplies. Why should he hazard the loss of any of his men, even
in a successful battle? Why should he expose soldiers to be wounded; who
had deserved so well of him? Why, in short, should he tempt fortune?
especially when it was as much a general's duty to conquer by tactics,
as by the sword. Besides, he was moved with compassion for those
citizens, who, he foresaw, must fall: and he had rather gain his object
without any loss or injury to them. This resolution of Caesar was not
generally approved of; but the soldiers openly declared to each other,
that since such an opportunity of victory was let pass, they would not
come to an engagement, even when Caesar should wish it. He persevered
however in his resolution, and retired a little from that place to abate
the enemy's fears. Petreius and Afranius, having got this opportunity,
retired to their camp. Caesar, having disposed parties on the mountains,
and cut off all access to the Ebro, fortified his camp as close to the
enemy as he could.

LXXIII.--The day following, the generals of his opponents, being alarmed
that they had lost all prospect of supplies, and of access to the Ebro,
consulted as to what other course they should take. There were two
roads, one to Ilerda, if they chose to return, the other to Tarraco, if
they should march to it. Whilst they were deliberating on these matters,
intelligence was brought them that their watering parties were attacked
by our horse: upon which information, they dispose several parties of
horse and auxiliary foot along the road, and intermix some legionary
cohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart from the camp to the water,
that they might be able to procure water within their lines, both
without fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius divided this
task between themselves, and went in person to some distance from their
camp for the purpose of seeing it accomplished.

LXXIV.--The soldiers having obtained by their absence a free opportunity
of conversing with each other, came out in great numbers, and inquired
each for whatever acquaintance or fellow citizen he had in our camp, and
invited him to him. First they returned them general thanks for sparing
them the day before, when they were greatly terrified, and acknowledged
that they were alive through their kindness; then they inquired about
the honour of our general, and whether they could with safety entrust
themselves to him; and declared their sorrow that they had not done so
in the beginning, and that they had taken up arms against their
relations and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conferences, they desired the
general's parole for the lives of Petreius and Afranius, that they might
not appear guilty of a crime, in having betrayed their generals. When
they were assured of obtaining their demands, they promised that they
would immediately remove their standards, and sent centurions of the
first rank as deputies to treat with Caesar about a peace. In the
meantime some of them invite their acquaintances, and bring them to
their camp, others are brought away by their friends, so that the two
camps seemed to be united into one, and several of the tribunes and
centurions came to Caesar, and paid their respects to him. The same was
done by some of the nobility of Spain, whom they summoned to their
assistance, and kept in their camp as hostages. They inquired after
their acquaintance and friends, by whom each might have the means of
being recommended to Caesar. Even Afranius's son, a young man,
endeavoured by means of Sulpitius the lieutenant, to make terms for his
own and his father's life. Every place was filled with mirth and
congratulations; in the one army, because they thought they had escaped
so impending danger; in the other, because they thought they had
completed so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in every
man's judgment, reaped the advantage of his former lenity, and his
conduct was applauded by all.

LXXV.--When these circumstances were announced to Afranius, he left the
work which he had begun, and returned to his camp determined, as it
appeared, whatever should be the event to bear it with an even and
steady mind. Petreius did not neglect himself; he armed his domestics;
with them and the praetorian cohort of Spaniards, and a few foreign
horse, his dependants, whom he commonly kept near him to guard his
person, he suddenly flew to the rampart, interrupted the conferences of
the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put to death as many as
he caught. The rest formed into a body, and, being alarmed by the
unexpected danger, wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and drew
their swords, and in this manner, depending on the nearness of their
camp, defended themselves against the Spaniards, and the horse, and made
good their retreat to the camp, where they were protected by the
cohorts, which were on guard.

LXXVI.--Petreius, after accomplishing this, went round every maniple,
calling the soldiers by their names and entreating with tears, that they
would not give up him and their absent general Pompey, as a sacrifice to
the vengeance of their enemies. Immediately they ran in crowds to the
general's pavilion, when he required them all to take an oath that they
would not desert nor betray the army nor the generals, nor form any
design distinct from the general interest. He himself swore first to the
tenor of those words, and obliged Afranius to take the same oath. The
tribunes and centurions followed their example; the soldiers were
brought out by centuries, and took the same oath. They gave orders, that
whoever had any of Caesar's soldiers should produce them; as soon as
they were produced, they put them to death publicly in the praetorium,
but most of them concealed those that they had entertained, and let them
out at night over the rampart. Thus the terror raised by the generals,
the cruelty of the punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removed
all hopes of surrender for the present, changed the soldiers' minds, and
reduced matters to the former state of war.

LXXVII.--Caesar ordered the enemy's soldiers, who had come into his camp
to hold a conference, to be searched for with the strictest diligence,
and sent back. But of the tribunes and centurions, several voluntarily
remained with him, and he afterwards treated them with great respect.
The centurions he promoted to higher ranks, and conferred on the Roman
knights the honour of tribunes.

LXXVIII.--Afranius's men were distressed in foraging, and procured water
with difficulty. The legionary soldiers had a tolerable supply of corn,
because they had been ordered to bring from Ilerda sufficient to last
twenty-two days; the Spanish and auxiliary forces had none, for they had
but few opportunities of procuring any, and their bodies were not
accustomed to bear burdens; and therefore a great number of them came
over to Caesar every day. Their affairs were under these difficulties;
but of the two schemes proposed, the most expedient seemed to be to
return to Ilerda, because they had left some corn there; and there they
hoped to decide on a plan for their future conduct. Tarraco lay at a
greater distance; and in such a space they knew affairs might admit of
many changes. Their design having met with approbation, they set out
from their camp. Caesar having sent forward his cavalry, to annoy and
retard their rear, followed close after with his legions. Not a moment
passed in which their rear was not engaged with our horse.

LXXIX.--Their manner of fighting was this: the light cohorts closed
their rear, and frequently made a stand on the level grounds. If they
had a mountain to ascend, the very nature of the place readily secured
them from any danger; for the advanced guards, from the rising grounds,
protected the rest in their ascent. When they approached a valley or
declivity, and the advanced men could not impart assistance to the
tardy, our horse threw their darts at them from the rising grounds with
advantage; then their affairs were in a perilous situation; the only
plan left was, that whenever they came near such places, they should
give orders to the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse our
horse; and these being forced to give way, they should suddenly, with
the utmost speed, run all together down to the valley, and having passed
it, should face about again on the next hill. For so far were they from
deriving any assistance from their horse (of which they had a large
number), that they were obliged to receive them into the centre of their
army, and themselves protect them, as they were daunted by former
battles. And on their march no one could quit the line without being
taken by Caesar's horse.

LXXX.--Whilst skirmishes were fought in this manner, they advanced but
slowly and gradually, and frequently halted to help their rear, as then
happened. For having advanced four miles, and being very much harassed
by our horse, they took post on a high mountain, and there entrenched
themselves on the front only, facing the enemy; and did not take their
baggage off their cattle. When they perceived that Caesar's camp was
pitched, and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to forage, they
suddenly rushed out about twelve o'clock the same day, and, having hopes
that we should be delayed by the absence of our horse, they began to
march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with the legions that
remained. He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and ordered the
foragers to be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to follow
him. The horse shortly returned to their daily duty on march, and
charged the rear so vigorously, that they almost forced them to fly; and
several privates and some centurions were killed. The main body of
Caesar's army was at hand, and universal ruin threatened them.

LXXXI.--Then indeed, not having opportunity either to choose a
convenient position for their camp, or to march forward, they were
obliged to halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and on ground
naturally unfavourable. But for the reasons already given, Caesar did
not attack them, nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his men
might be the readier to pursue them whether they attempted to run off by
night or by day. Observing the defect in their position, they spent the
whole night in extending their works, and turn their camp to ours. The
next day, at dawn, they do the same, and spend the whole day in that
manner, but in proportion as they advanced their works, and extended
their camp, they were farther distant from the water; and one evil was
remedied by another. The first night, no one went out for water. The
next day, they left a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces to
water: but not a person was sent to look for forage. Caesar was more
desirous that they should be humbled by these means, and forced to come
to terms, than decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavoured to
surround them with a wall and trench, that he might be able to check
their most sudden sally, to which he imagined that they must have
recourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that they might be the
readier for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.

LXXXII.--In this work, and the deliberations on it, two days were spent.
By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's works was finished. To
interrupt his progress, they drew out their legions about the eighth
hour, by a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle before
their camp. Caesar calling his legions off from their work, and ordering
the horse to hold themselves in readiness, marshalled his army: for to
appear to decline an engagement contrary to the opinion of the soldiers
and the general voice, would have been attended with great disadvantage.
But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded from wishing to
engage, and the more especially, because the short space between the
camps, even if the enemy were put to flight, would not contribute much
to a decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from each
other above two thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by the
armies, and one third left for the soldiers to charge and make their
attack. If a battle should be begun, the nearness of the camps would
afford a ready retreat to the conquered party in the flight. For this
reason Caesar had resolved to make resistance, if they attacked him, but
not to be the first to provoke the battle.

LXXXIII.--Afranius's five legions were drawn up in two lines, the
auxiliary cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves. Caesar
had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the
first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and
three others were behind these. The slingers and archers were stationed
in the centre of the line; the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostile
armies being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined to adhere
to his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a battle, unless forced to
it; Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the matter was
deferred, and both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they both
returned to their camp. The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works
which he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the river Segre by a
ford. Caesar, having perceived this, sent some light-armed Germans and a
party of horse across the river, and disposed several parties along the
banks to guard them.

LXXXIV.--At length, beset on all sides, their cattle having been four
days without fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg a
conference; and that, if possible, in a place remote from the soldiers.
When this was refused by Caesar, but a public interview offered if they
chose it, Afranius's son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met in
the place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing of both armies, Afranius
spoke thus: "That Caesar ought not to be displeased either with him or
his soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment to their general,
Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently discharged their duty to
him, and had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the want of
every necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts, they were
prevented from procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; and
were not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: but
confessed themselves vanquished: and begged and entreated, if there was
any room left for mercy, that they should not be necessitated to suffer
the most severe penalties." These sentiments were delivered in the most
submissive and humble language.

LXXXV.--Caesar replied, "That either to complain or sue for mercy became
no man less than him: for that every other person had done their duty:
himself, in having declined to engage on favourable terms, in an
advantageous situation and time, that all things tending to a peace
might be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having preserved and
protected the men whom they had in their power, notwithstanding the
injuries which they had received, and the murder of their comrades; and
even Afranius's soldiers, who of themselves treated about concluding a
peace, by which they thought that they would secure the lives of all.
Thus, that the parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that the
generals only were averse to peace: that they paid no regard to the laws
either of conference or truce; and had most inhumanly put to death
ignorant persons, who were deceived by a conference: that therefore,
they had met that fate which usually befalls men from excessive
obstinacy and arrogance; and were obliged to have recourse, and most
earnestly desire that which they had shortly before disdained. That for
his part, he would not avail himself of their present humiliation, or
his present advantage, to require terms by which his power might be
increased, but only that those armies, which they had maintained for so
many years to oppose him, should be disbanded: for six legions had been
sent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many and powerful
fleets provided, and generals of great military experience sent to
command them, for no other purpose than to oppose him; that none of
these measures were adopted to keep the Spains in peace, or for the use
of the province, which, from the length of the peace, stood in need of
no such aid; that all these things were long since designed against him:
that against him a new sort of government was established, that the same
person should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of the
city; and though absent, have the government of two most warlike
provinces for so many years: that against him the laws of the
magistrates had been altered; that the late praetors and consuls should
not be sent to govern the provinces as had been the constant custom, but
persons approved of and chosen by a faction. That against him the excuse
of age was not admitted: but persons of tried experience in former wars
were called up to take the command of the armies, that with respect to
him only, the routine was not observed which had been allowed to all
generals, that, after a successful war, they should return home and
disband their armies, if not with some mark of honour, at least without
disgrace: that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and would
still submit to them: nor did he now desire to take their army from them
and keep it to himself (which, however, would not be a difficult
matter), but only that they should not have it to employ against him:
and therefore, as he said before, let them quit the provinces, and
disband their army. If this was complied with, he would injure no
person; that these were the last and only conditions of peace."

LXXXVI.--It was very acceptable and agreeable to Afranius's soldiers, as
might be easily known from their signs of joy, that they who expected
some injury after this defeat, should obtain without solicitation the
reward of a dismissal. For when a debate was introduced about the place
and time of their dismissal, they all began to express, both by words
and signs, from the rampart where they stood, that they should be
discharged immediately: for although every security might be given that
they would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain, if it was
deferred to a future day. After a short debate on either side, it was
brought to this issue: that those who had any settlement or possession
in Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest at the river Var.
Caesar gave security that they should receive no damage, and that no
person should be obliged against his inclination to take the military
oath under him.

LXXXVII.--Caesar promised to supply them with corn from the present
time, till they arrived at the river Var. He further adds, that whatever
any of them lost in the war, which was in the possession of his
soldiers, should be restored to those that lost them. To his soldiers he
made a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation being
made. Whatever disputes Afranius's soldiers had afterwards amongst
themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar's decision. Afranius
and Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions, a sedition almost
breaking out, asserted that the time had not yet come, and required that
Caesar should take cognizance of it: and both parties were content with
his decision. About a third part of their army being dismissed in two
days, Caesar ordered two of his legions to go before, the rest to follow
the vanquished enemy: that they should encamp at a small distance from
each other. The execution of this business he gave in charge to Quintus
Fufius Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to his directions,
they marched from Spain to the river Var, and there the rest of the army
was disbanded.



BOOK II

I.--Whilst these things were going forward in Spain, Caius Trebonius,
Caesar's lieutenant, who had been left to conduct the assault of
Massilia, began to raise a mound, vineae, and turrets against the town,
on two sides: one of which was next the harbour and docks, the other on
that part where there is a passage from Gaul and Spain to that sea which
forces itself up the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed almost
on three sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is the only side
which has access by land. A part even of this space, which reaches to
the fortress, being fortified by the nature of the country, and a very
deep valley, required a long and difficult siege. To accomplish these
works, Caius Trebonius sends for a great quantity of carriages and men
from the whole Province, and orders hurdles and materials to be
furnished. These things being provided, he raised a mound eighty feet in
height.

II.--But so great a store of everything necessary for a war had been a
long time before laid up in the town, and so great a number of engines,
that no vineae made of hurdles could withstand their force. For poles
twelve feet in length, pointed with iron, and these too shot from very
large engines, sank into the ground through four rows of hurdles.
Therefore the arches of the vineae were covered over with beams a foot
thick, fastened together, and under this the materials of the agger were
handed from one to another. Before this was carried a testudo sixty feet
long, for levelling the ground, made also of very strong timber, and
covered over with every thing that was capable of protecting it against
the fire and stones thrown by the enemy. But the greatness of the works,
the height of the wall and towers, and the multitude of engines retarded
the progress of our works. Besides, frequent sallies were made from the
town by the Albici, and fire was thrown on our mound and turrets. These
our men easily repulsed, and, doing considerable damage to those who
sallied, beat them back into the town.

III.--In the meantime, Lucius Nasidius, being sent by Cneius Pompey with
a fleet of sixteen sail, a few of which had beaks of brass, to the
assistance of Lucius Domitius and the Massilians, passed the straits of
Sicily without the knowledge or expectation of Curio, and, putting with
his fleet into Messana, and making the nobles and senate take flight
with the sudden terror, carried off one of their ships out of dock.
Having joined this to his other ships, he made good his voyage to
Massilia, and, having sent in a galley privately, acquaints Domitius and
the Massilians of his arrival, and earnestly encourages them to hazard
another battle with Brutus's fleet with the addition of his aid.

IV.--The Massilians, since their former loss, had brought the same
number of old ships from the docks, and had repaired and fitted them out
with great industry: they had a large supply of seamen and pilots. They
had got several fishing-smacks, and covered them over, that the seamen
might be secure against darts: these they filled with archers and
engines. With a fleet thus appointed, encouraged by the entreaties and
tears of all the old men, matrons, and virgins to succour the state in
this hour of distress, they went on board with no less spirit and
confidence than they had fought before. For it happens, from a common
infirmity of human nature, that we are more flushed with confidence, or
more vehemently alarmed at things unseen, concealed, and unknown, as was
the case then. For the arrival of Lucius Nasidius had filled the state
with the most sanguine hopes and wishes. Having got a fair wind, they
sailed out of port and went to Nasidius to Taurois, which is a fort
belonging to the Massilians, and there ranged their fleet and again
encouraged each other to engage, and communicated their plan of
operation. The command of the right division was given to the
Massilians, that of the left to Nasidius.

V.--Brutus sailed to the same place with an augmented fleet: for to
those made by Caesar at Arelas were added six ships taken from the
Massilians, which he had refitted since the last battle and had
furnished with every necessary. Accordingly, having encouraged his men
to despise a vanquished people whom they had conquered when yet
unbroken, he advanced against them full of confidence and spirit. From
Trebonius's camp and all the higher grounds it was easy to see into the
town--how all the youth which remained in it, and all persons of more
advanced years, with their wives and children, and the public guards,
were either extending their hands from the wall to the heavens, or were
repairing to the temples of the immortal gods, and, prostrating
themselves before their images, were entreating them to grant them
victory. Nor was there a single person who did not imagine that his
future fortune depended on the issue of that day; for the choice of
their youth and the most respectable of every age, being expressly
invited and solicited, had gone on board the fleet, that if any adverse
fate should befall them they might see that nothing was left for them to
attempt, and, if they proved victorious, they might have hopes of
preserving the city, either by their internal resources or by foreign
assistance.

VI-.-When the battle was begun, no effort of valour was wanting to the
Massilians, but, mindful of the instructions which they had a little
before received from their friends, they fought with such spirit as if
they supposed that they would never have another opportunity to attempt
a defence, and as if they believed that those whose lives should be
endangered in the battle would not long precede the fate of the rest of
the citizens, who, if the city was taken, must undergo the same fortune
of war. Our ships being at some distance from each other, room was
allowed both for the skill of their pilots and the manoeuvring of their
ships; and if at any time ours, gaining an advantage by casting the iron
hooks on board their ships, grappled with them, from all parts they
assisted those who were distressed. Nor, after being joined by the
Albici, did they decline coming to close engagement, nor were they much
inferior to our men in valour. At the same time, showers of darts,
thrown from a distance from the lesser ships, suddenly inflicted several
wounds on our men when off their guard and otherwise engaged; and two of
their three-decked galleys, having descried the ship of Decimus Brutus,
which could be easily distinguished by its flag, rowed up against him
with great violence from opposite sides: but Brutus, seeing into their
designs, by the swiftness of his ship extricated himself with such
address as to get clear, though only by a moment. From the velocity of
their motion they struck against each other with such violence that they
were both excessively injured by the shock; the beak, indeed, of one of
them being broken off, the whole ship was ready to founder, which
circumstance being observed, the ships of Brutus's fleet, which were
nearest that station, attack them when in this disorder and sink them
both.

VII.--But Nasidius's ships were of no use, and soon left the fight; for
the sight of their country, or the entreaties of their relations, did
not urge them to run a desperate risk of their lives. Therefore, of the
number of the ships not one was lost: of the fleet of the Massilians
five were sunk, four taken, and one ran off with Nasidius: all that
escaped made the best of their way to Hither Spain, but one of the rest
was sent forward to Massilia for the purpose of bearing this
intelligence, and when it came near the city, the whole people crowded
out to hear the tidings, and on being informed of the event, were so
oppressed with grief, that one would have imagined that the city had
been taken by an enemy at the same moment. The Massilians, however,
began to make the necessary preparations for the defence of their city
with unwearied energy.

VIII.--The legionary soldiers who had the management of the works on the
right side observed, from the frequent sallies of the enemy, that it
might prove a great protection to them to build a turret of brick under
the wall for a fort and place of refuge, which they at first built low
and small, [to guard them] against sudden attacks. To it they retreated,
and from it they made defence if any superior force attacked them; and
from it they sallied out either to repel or pursue the enemy. It
extended thirty feet on every side, and the thickness of the walls was
five feet. But afterwards, as experience is the best master in
everything on which the wit of man is employed, it was found that it
might be of considerable service if it was raised to the usual height of
turrets, which was effected in the following manner.

IX.-When the turret was raised to the height for flooring, they laid it
on the walls in such a manner that the ends of the joists were covered
by the outer face of the wall, that nothing should project to which the
enemy's fire might adhere. They, moreover, built over the joists with
small bricks as high as the protection of the plutei and vineae
permitted them; and on that place they laid two beams across, angle-ways,
at a small distance from the outer walls, to support the rafters
which were to cover the turret, and on the beams they laid joists across
in a direct line, and on these they fastened down planks. These joists
they made somewhat longer, to project beyond the outside of the wall,
that they might serve to hang a curtain on them to defend and repel all
blows whilst they were building the walls between that and the next
floor, and the floor of this story they faced with bricks and mortar,
that the enemy's fire might do them no damage; and on this they spread
mattresses, lest the weapons thrown from engines should break through
the flooring, or stones from catapults should batter the brickwork.
They, moreover, made three mats of cable ropes, each of them the length
of the turret walls, and four feet broad, and, hanging them round the
turret on the three sides which faced the enemy, fastened them to the
projecting joists. For this was the only sort of defence which, they had
learned by experience in other places, could not be pierced by darts or
engines. But when that part of the turret which was completed was
protected and secured against every attempt of the enemy, they removed
the plutei to other works. They began to suspend gradually, and raise by
screws from the first-floor, the entire roof of the turret, and then
they elevated it as high as the length of the mats allowed. Hid and
secured within these coverings, they built up the walls with bricks, and
again, by another turn of the screw, cleared a place for themselves to
proceed with the building; and, when they thought it time to lay another
floor, they laid the ends of the beams, covered in by the outer bricks
in like manner as in the first story, and from that story they again
raised the uppermost floor and the mat-work. In this manner, securely
and without a blow or danger, they raised it six stories high, and in
laying the materials left loop-holes in such places as they thought
proper for working their engines.

X.--When they were confident that they could protect the works which lay
around from this turret, they resolved to build a musculus, sixty feet
long, of timber, two feet square, and to extend it from the brick tower
to the enemy's tower and wall. This was the form of it: two beams of
equal length were laid on the ground, at the distance of four feet from
each other; and in them were fastened small pillars, five feet high,
which were joined together by braces, with a gentle slope, on which the
timber which they must place to support the roof of the musculus should
be laid: upon this were laid beams, two feet square, bound with iron
plates and nails. To the upper covering of the musculus and the upper
beams, they fastened laths, four fingers square, to support the tiles
which were to cover the musculus. The roof being thus sloped and laid
over in rows in the same manner as the joists were laid on the braces,
the musculus was covered with tiles and mortar, to secure it against
fire, which might be thrown from the wall. Over the tiles hides are
spread, to prevent the water let in on them by spouts from dissolving
the cement of the bricks. Again, the hides were covered over with
mattresses, that they might not be destroyed by fire or stones. The
soldiers under the protection of the vineae, finish this whole work to
the very tower, and suddenly, before the enemy were aware of it, moved
it forward by naval machinery, by putting rollers under it, close up to
the enemy's turret, so that it even touched the building.

XI.--The townsmen, affrighted at this unexpected stroke, bring forward
with levers the largest stones they can procure; and pitching them from
the wall, roll them down on the musculus. The strength of the timber
withstood the shock; and whatever fell on it slid off, on account of the
sloping roof. When they perceived this, they altered their plan and set
fire to barrels, filled with resin and tar, and rolled them down from
the wall on the musculus. As soon as they fell on it, they slid off
again, and were removed from its side by long poles and forks. In the
meantime, the soldiers, under cover of the musculus, were looting out
with crowbars the lowest stones of the enemy's turret, with which the
foundation was laid. The musculus was defended by darts, thrown from
engines by our men from the brick tower, and the enemy were beaten off
from the wall and turrets; nor was a fair opportunity of defending the
walls given them. At length several stones being picked away from the
foundation of that turret next the musculus, part of it fell down
suddenly, and the rest, as if following it, leaned forward.

XII.--Hereupon, the enemy, distressed at the sudden fall of the turret,
surprised at the unforeseen calamity, awed by the wrath of the gods, and
dreading the pillage of their city, rush all together out of the gate
unarmed, with their temples bound with fillets, and suppliantly stretch
out their hands to the officers and the army. At this uncommon
occurrence, the whole progress of the war was stopped, and the soldiers,
turning away from the battle, ran eagerly to hear and listen to them.
When the enemy came up to the commanders and the army, they all fell
down at their feet, and besought them "to wait till Caesar's arrival;
they saw that their city was taken, our works completed, and their tower
undermined, therefore they desisted from a defence; that no obstacle
could arise, to prevent their being instantly plundered at a beck, as
soon as he arrived, if they refused to submit to his orders." They
inform them that, "if the turret had entirely fallen down, the soldiers
could not be withheld from forcing into the town and sacking it, in
hopes of getting spoil." These and several other arguments to the same
effect were delivered, as they were a people of great learning, with
great pathos and lamentations.

XIII.--The lieutenants, moved with compassion, draw off the soldiers
from the work, desist from the assault, and leave sentinels on the
works. A sort of a truce having been made through compassion for the
besieged, the arrival of Caesar is anxiously awaited; not a dart was
thrown from the walls or by our men, but all remit their care and
diligence, as if the business was at an end. For Caesar had given
Trebonius strict charge not to suffer the town to be taken by storm,
lest the soldiers, too much irritated both by abhorrence of their
revolt, by the contempt shown to them, and by their long labour, should
put to the sword all the grown-up inhabitants, as they threatened to do.
And it was with difficulty that they were then restrained from breaking
into the town, and they were much displeased, because they imagined that
they were prevented by Trebonius from taking possession of it.

XIV.--But the enemy, destitute of all honour, only waited a time and
opportunity for fraud and treachery. And after an interval of some days,
when our men were careless and negligent, on a sudden, at noon, when
some were dispersed, and others indulging themselves in rest on the very
works, after the fatigue of the day, and their arms were all laid by and
covered up, they sallied out from the gates, and, the wind being high
and favourable to them, they set fire to our works; and the wind spread
it in such a manner that, in the same instant, the agger, plutei,
testudo, tower, and engines all caught the flames and were consumed
before we could conceive how it had occurred. Our men, alarmed at such
an unexpected turn of fortune, lay hold on such arms as they could find.
Some rush from the camp; an attack is made on the enemy: but they were
prevented, by arrows and engines from the walls, from pursuing them when
they fled. They retired to their walls, and there, without fear, set the
musculus and brick tower on fire. Thus, by the perfidy of the enemy and
the violence of the storm, the labour of many months was destroyed in a
moment. The Massilians made the same attempt the next day, having got
such another storm. They sallied out against the other tower and agger,
and fought with more confidence. But as our men had on the former
occasion given up all thoughts of a contest, so, warned by the event of
the preceding day, they had made every preparation for a defence.
Accordingly, they slew several, and forced the rest to retreat into the
town without effecting their design.

XV.--Trebonius began to provide and repair what had been destroyed, with
much greater zeal on the part of the soldiers; for when they saw that
their extraordinary pains and preparations had an unfortunate issue,
they were fired with indignation that, in consequence of the impious
violation of the truce, their valour should be held in derision. There
was no place left them from which the materials for their mound could be
fetched, in consequence of all the timber, far and wide, in the
territories of the Massilians, having been cut down and carried away;
they began therefore to make an agger of a new construction, never heard
of before, of two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and to lay floors
over them of almost the same breadth with the agger, made of timber. But
wherever the space between the walls, or the weakness of the timber,
seemed to require it, pillars were placed underneath and traversed beams
laid on to strengthen the work, and the space which was floored was
covered over with hurdles, and the hurdles plastered over with mortar.
The soldiers, covered overhead by the floor, on the right and left by
the wall, and in the front by the mantlets, carried whatever materials
were necessary for the building without danger: the business was soon
finished--the loss of their laborious work was soon repaired by the
dexterity and fortitude of the soldiers. Gates for making sallies were
left in the wall in such places as they thought proper.

XVI.--But when the enemy perceived that those works, which they had
hoped could not be replaced without a great length of time, were put
into so thorough repair by a few days' labour and diligence, that there
was no room for perfidy or sallies, and that no means were left them by
which they could either hurt the men by resistance or the works by fire,
and when they found by former examples that their town could be
surrounded with a wall and turrets on every part by which it was
accessible by land, in such a manner that they could not have room to
stand on their own fortifications, because our works were built almost
on the top of their walls by our army, and darts could be thrown from
our hands, and when they perceived that all advantage arising from their
engines, on which they had built great hopes, was totally lost, and that
though they had an opportunity of fighting with us on equal terms from
walls and turrets, they could perceive that they were not equal to our
men in bravery, they had recourse to the same proposals of surrender as
before.

XVII.--In Further Spain, Marcus Varro, in the beginning of the
disturbances, when he heard of the circumstances which took place in
Italy, being diffident of Pompey's success, used to speak in a very
friendly manner of Caesar. That though, being pre-engaged to Cneius
Pompey in quality of lieutenant, he was bound in honour to him, that,
nevertheless, there existed a very intimate tie between him and Caesar;
that he was not ignorant of what was the duty of a lieutenant, who bore
an office of trust; nor of his own strength, nor of the disposition of
the whole province to Caesar. These sentiments he constantly expressed
in his ordinary conversation, and did not attach himself to either
party. But afterwards, when he found that Caesar was detained before
Massilia, that the forces of Petreius had effected a junction with the
army of Afranius, that considerable reinforcements had come to their
assistance, that there were great hopes and expectations, and heard that
the whole Hither province had entered into a confederacy, and of the
difficulties to which Caesar was reduced afterwards at Ilerda for want
of provisions, and Afranius wrote to him a fuller and more exaggerated
account of these matters, he began to regulate his movements by those of
fortune.

XVIII.--He made levies throughout the province; and, having completed
his two legions, he added to them about thirty auxiliary cohorts: he
collected a large quantity of corn to send partly to the Massilians,
partly to Afranius and Petreius. He commanded the inhabitants of Gades
to build ten ships of war; besides, he took care that several others
should be built in Spain. He removed all the money and ornaments from
the temple of Hercules to the town of Gades, and sent six cohorts
thither from the province to guard them, and gave the command of the
town of Gades to Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, and friend of
Domitius, who had come thither sent by Domitius to recover an estate for
him; and he deposited all the arms, both public and private, in
Gallonius's house. He himself [Varro] made severe harangues against
Caesar. He often pronounced from his tribunal that Caesar had fought
several unsuccessful battles, and that a great number of his men had
deserted to Afranius. That he had these accounts from undoubted
messengers, and authority on which he could rely. By these means he
terrified the Roman citizens of that province, and obliged them to
promise him for the service of the state one hundred and ninety thousand
sesterces, twenty thousand pounds weight of silver, and a hundred and
twenty thousand bushels of wheat. He laid heavier burdens on those
states which he thought were friendly disposed to Caesar, and billeted
troops on them; he passed judgment against some private persons, and
condemned to confiscation the properties of those who had spoken or made
orations against the republic, and forced the whole province to take an
oath of allegiance to him and Pompey. Being informed of all that
happened in Hither Spain, he prepared for war. This was his plan of
operations. He was to retire with his two legions to Gades, and to lay
up all the shipping and provisions there. For he had been informed that
the whole province was inclined to favour Caesar's party. He thought
that the war might be easily protracted in an island, if he was provided
with corn and shipping. Caesar, although called back to Italy by many
and important matters, yet had determined to leave no dregs of war
behind him in Spain, because he knew that Pompey had many dependants and
clients in the Hither province.

XIX.--Having therefore sent two legions into Further Spain under the
command of Quintus Cassius, tribune of the people; he himself advances
with six hundred horse by forced marches, and issues a proclamation,
appointing a day on which the magistrates and nobility of all the states
should attend him at Corduba. This proclamation being published through
the whole province, there was not a state that did not send a part of
their senate to Corduba, at the appointed time; and not a Roman citizen
of any note but appeared that day. At the same time the senate at
Corduba shut the gates of their own accord against Varro, and posted
guards and sentinels on the wall and in the turrets, and detained two
cohorts (called Colonicae, which had come there accidentally), for the
defence of the town. About the same time the people of Carmona, which is
by far the strongest state in the whole province, of themselves drove
out of the town the cohorts, and shut the gates against them, although
three cohorts had been detached by Varro to garrison the citadel.

XX.--But Varro was in greater haste on this account to reach Gades with
his legion as soon as possible, lest he should be stopped either on his
march or on crossing over to the island. The affection of the province
to Caesar proved so great and so favourable, that he received a letter
from Gades, before he was far advanced on his march: that as soon as the
nobility of Gades heard of Caesar's proclamation, they had combined with
the tribune of the cohorts, which were in garrison there, to drive
Gallonius out of the town, and to secure the city and island for Caesar.
That having agreed on the design they had sent notice to Gallonius, to
quit Gades of his own accord whilst he could do it with safety; if he
did not, they would take measures for themselves; that for fear of this
Gallonius had been induced to quit the town. When this was known, one of
Varro's two legions, which was called Vernacula, carried off the colours
from Varro's camp, he himself standing by and looking on, and retired to
Hispalis, and took post in the market and public places without doing
any injury, and the Roman citizens residing there approved so highly of
this act, that every one most earnestly offered to entertain them in
their houses. When Varro, terrified at these things, having altered his
route, proposed going to Italica, he was informed by his friends that
the gates were shut against him. Then indeed, when intercepted from
every road, he sends word to Caesar that he was ready to deliver up the
legion which he commanded. He sends to him Sextus Caesar, and orders him
to deliver it up to him. Varro, having delivered up the legion, went to
Caesar to Corduba, and having laid before him the public accounts,
handed over to him most faithfully whatever money he had, and told him
what quantity of corn and shipping he had, and where.

XXI.--Caesar made a public oration at Corduba, in which he returned
thanks to all severally: to the Roman citizens, because they had been
zealous to keep the town in their own power; to the Spaniards, for
having driven out the garrison; to the Gaditani, for having defeated the
attempts of his enemies, and asserted their own liberty; to the Tribunes
and Centurions who had gone there as a guard, for having by their valour
confirmed them in their purpose. He remitted the tax which the Roman
citizens had promised to Varro for the public use: he restored their
goods to those who he was informed had incurred that penalty by speaking
too freely, having given public and private rewards to some: he filled
the rest with flattering hopes of his future intentions; and having
stayed two days at Corduba, he set out for Gades: he ordered the money
and ornaments which had been carried away from the temple of Hercules,
and lodged in the houses of private persons, to be replaced in the
temple. He made Quintus Cassius governor of the province, and assigned
him four legions. He himself, with those ships which Marcus Varro had
built, and others which the Gaditani had built by Varro's orders,
arrived in a few days at Tarraco, where ambassadors from the greatest
part of the nearer province waited his arrival. Having in the same
manner conferred marks of honour both publicly and privately on some
states, he left Tarraco, and went thence by land to Narbo, and thence to
Massilia. There he was informed that a law was passed for creating a
dictator, and that he had been nominated dictator by Marcus Lepidus the
praetor.

XXII.--The Massilians, wearied out by misfortunes of every sort, reduced
to the lowest ebb for want of corn, conquered in two engagements at sea,
defeated in their frequent sallies, and struggling moreover with a fatal
pestilence, from their long confinement and change of victuals (for they
all subsisted on old millet and damaged barley, which they had formerly
provided and laid up in the public stores against an emergency of this
kind), their turret being demolished, a great part of their wall having
given way, and despairing of any aid, either from the provinces or their
armies, for these they had heard had fallen into Caesar's power,
resolved to surrender now without dissimulation. But a few days before,
Lucius Domitius, having discovered the intention of the Massilians, and
having procured three ships, two of which he gave up to his friends,
went on board the third himself, having got a brisk wind, put out to
sea. Some ships, which by Brutus's orders were constantly cruising near
the port, having espied him, weighed anchor, and pursued him. But of
these, the ship on board of which he was, persevered itself, and
continuing its flight, and by the aid of the wind got out of sight: the
other two, affrighted by the approach of our galleys, put back again
into the harbour. The Massilians conveyed their arms and engines out of
the town, as they were ordered: brought their ships out of the port and
docks, and delivered up the money in their treasury. When these affairs
were despatched, Caesar, sparing the town more out of regard to their
renown and antiquity than to any claim they could lay to his favour,
left two legions in garrison there, sent the rest to Italy, and set out
himself for Rome.

XXIII.--About the same time Caius Curio, having sailed from Sicily to
Africa, and from the first despising the forces of Publius Attius Varus,
transported only two of the four legions which he had received from
Caesar, and five hundred horse, and having spent two days and three
nights on the voyage, arrived at a place called Aquilaria, which is
about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, and in the summer season has
a convenient harbour, and is enclosed by two projecting promontories.
Lucius Caesar, the son, who was waiting his arrival near Clupea with ten
ships which had been taken near Utica in a war with the pirates, and
which Publius Attius had had repaired for this war, frightened at the
number of our ships, fled the sea, and running his three-decked covered
galley on the nearest shore, left her there and made his escape by land
to Adrumetum. Caius Considius Longus, with a garrison of one legion,
guarded this town. The rest of Caesar's fleet, after his flight, retired
to Adrumetum. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor, pursued him with twelve ships,
which Curio had brought from Sicily as convoy to the merchantmen, and
seeing a ship left on the shore, he brought her off by a towing rope,
and returned with his fleet to Curio.

XXIV.--Curio detached Marcus before with the fleet to Utica, and marched
thither with his army. Having advanced two days, he came to the river
Bagrada, and there left Caius Caninius Rebilus, the lieutenant, with the
legions; and went forward himself with the horse to view the Cornelian
camp, because that was reckoned a very eligible position for encamping.
It is a straight ridge, projecting into the sea, steep and rough on both
sides, but the ascent is more gentle on that part which lies opposite
Utica. It is not more than a mile distant from Utica in a direct line.
But on this road there is a spring, to which the sea comes up, and
overflows; an extensive morass is thereby formed; and if a person would
avoid it, he must make a circuit of six miles to reach the town.

XXV.--Having examined this place, Curio got a view of Varus's camp,
joining the wall and town, at the gate called Bellica, well fortified by
its natural situation, on one side by the town itself, on the other by a
theatre which is before the town, the approaches to the town being
rendered difficult and narrow by the very extensive out-buildings of
that structure. At the same time he observed the roads very full of
carriages and cattle which they were conveying from the country into the
town on the sudden alarm. He sent his cavalry after them to plunder them
and get the spoil. And at the same time Varus had detached as a guard
for them six hundred Numidian horse, and four hundred foot, which king
Juba had sent to Utica as auxiliaries a few days before. There was a
friendship subsisting between his [Juba's] father and Pompey, and a feud
between him and Curio, because he, when a tribune of the people, had
proposed a law, in which he endeavoured to make public property of the
kingdom of Juba. The horse engaged; but the Numidians were not able to
stand our first charge; but a hundred and twenty being killed, the rest
retreated into their camp near the town. In the meantime, on the arrival
of his men-of-war, Curio ordered proclamation to be made to the merchant
ships, which lay at anchor before Utica, in number about two hundred,
that he would treat as enemies all that did not set sail immediately for
the Cornelian camp. As soon as the proclamation was made, in an instant
they all weighed anchor and left Utica, and repaired to the place
commanded them. This circumstance furnished the army with plenty of
everything.

XXVI.--After these transactions, Curio returned to his camp at Bagrada;
and by a general shout of the whole army was saluted imperator. The next
day he led his army to Utica, and encamped near the town. Before the
works of the camp were finished, the horse upon guard brought him word
that a large supply of horse and foot sent by king Juba were on their
march to Utica, and at the same time a cloud of dust was observed, and
in a moment the front of the line was in sight. Curio, surprised at the
suddenness of the affair, sent on the horse to receive their first
charge, and detain them. He immediately called off his legions from the
work, and put them in battle array. The horse began the battle: and
before the legions could be completely marshalled and take their ground,
the king's entire forces being thrown into disorder and confusion,
because they had marched without any order, and were under no
apprehensions, betake themselves to flight: almost all the enemy's horse
being safe, because they made a speedy retreat into the town along the
shore, Caesar's soldiers slay a great number of their infantry.

XXVII.--The next night two Marsian centurions, with twenty-two men
belonging to the companies, deserted from Curio's camp to Attius Varus.
They, whether they uttered the sentiments which they really entertained,
or wished to gratify Varus (for what we wish we readily give credit to,
and what we think ourselves, we hope is the opinion of other men),
assured him, that the minds of the whole army were disaffected to Curio,
that it was very expedient that the armies should be brought in view of
each other, and an opportunity of a conference be given. Induced by
their opinion, Varus the next day led his troops out of the camp: Curio
did so in like manner, and with only one small valley between them, each
drew up his forces.

XXVIII.--In Varus's army there was one Sextus Quintilius Varus who, as
we have mentioned before, was at Corfinium. When Caesar gave him his
liberty, he went over to Africa; now, Curio had transported to Africa
those legions which Caesar had received under his command a short time
before at Corfinium: so that the officers and companies were still the
same, excepting the change of a few centurions. Quintilius, making this
a pretext for addressing them, began to go round Curio's lines, and to
entreat the soldiers "not to lose all recollection of the oath which
they took first to Domitius and to him their quaestor, nor bear arms
against those who had shared the same fortune, and endured the same
hardships in a siege, nor fight for those by whom they had been
opprobriously called deserters." To this he added a few words by way of
encouragement, what they might expect from his own liberality, if they
should follow him and Attius. On the delivery of this speech, no
intimation of their future conduct is given by Curio's army, and thus
both generals led back their troops to their camp.

XXIX.--However, a great and general fear spread through Curio's camp,
for it is soon increased by the various discourses of men. For every one
formed an opinion of his own; and to what he had heard from others,
added his own apprehensions. When this had spread from a single author
to several persons, and was handed from one another, there appeared to
be many authors for such sentiments as these: ["That it was a civil war;
that they were men; and therefore that it was lawful for them to act
freely, and follow which party they pleased." These were the legions
which a short time before had belonged to the enemy; for the custom of
offering free towns to those who joined the opposite party had changed
Caesar's kindness. For the harshest expressions of the soldiers in
general did not proceed from the Marsi and Peligni, as those which
passed in the tents the night before; and some of their fellow soldiers
heard them with displeasure. Some additions were also made to them by
those who wished to be thought more zealous in their duty.]

XXX.--For these reasons, having called a council, Curio began to
deliberate on the general welfare. There were some opinions, which
advised by all means an attempt to be made, and an attack on Varus's
camp; for when such sentiments prevailed among the soldiers, they
thought idleness was improper. In short, they said, "that it was better
bravely to try the hazard of war in a battle, than to be deserted and
surrounded by their own troops, and forced to submit to the greatest
cruelties." There were some who gave their opinion, that they ought to
withdraw at the third watch to the Cornelian camp; that by a longer
interval of time the soldiers might be brought to a proper way of
thinking; and also, that if any misfortune should befall them, they
might have a safer and readier retreat to Sicily, from the great number
of their ships.

XXXI.--Curio, censuring both measures, said, "that the one was as
deficient in spirit, as the other exceeded in it: that the latter
advised a shameful flight, and the former recommended us to engage at a
great disadvantage. For on what, says he, can we rely that we can storm
a camp, fortified both by nature and art? Or, indeed, what advantage do
we gain if we give over the assault, after having suffered considerable
loss; as if success did not acquire for a general the affection of his
army, and misfortune their hatred? But what does a change of camp imply
but a shameful flight, and universal despair, and the alienation of the
army? For neither ought the obedient to suspect that they are
distrusted, nor the insolent to know that we fear them; because our
fears augment the licentiousness of the latter, and diminish the zeal of
the former. But if, says he, we were convinced of the truth of the
reports of the disaffection of the army (which I indeed am confident are
either altogether groundless, or at least less than they are supposed to
be), how much better to conceal and hide our suspicions of it, than by
our conduct confirm it? Ought not the defects of an army to be as
carefully concealed as the wounds in our bodies, lest we should increase
the enemy's hopes? but they moreover advise us to set out at midnight,
in order, I suppose, that those who attempt to do wrong may have a
fairer opportunity; for conduct of this kind is restrained either by
shame or fear, to the display of which the night is most adverse.
Wherefore, I am neither so rash as to give my opinion that we ought to
attack their camp without hopes of succeeding; nor so influenced by fear
as to despond: and I imagine that every expedient ought first to be
tried; and I am in a great degree confident that I shall form the same
opinion as yourselves on this matter."

XXXII.--Having broken up the council he called the soldiers together,
and reminded them "what advantage Caesar had derived from their zeal at
Corfinium; how by their good offices and influence he had brought over a
great part of Italy to his interest. For, says he, all the municipal
towns afterwards imitated you and your conduct; nor was it without
reason that Caesar judged so favourably, and the enemy so harshly of
you. For Pompey, though beaten in no engagement, yet was obliged to
shift his ground, and leave Italy, from the precedent established by
your conduct. Caesar committed me, whom he considered his dearest
friend, and the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he was not
able to protect Rome or Italy, to your protection. There are some here
present who encourage you to revolt from us; for what can they wish for
more, than at once to ruin us, and to involve you in a heinous crime? or
what baser opinions could they in their resentment entertain of you,
than that you would betray those who acknowledged themselves indebted to
you for everything, and put yourselves in the power of those who think
they have been ruined by you? Have you not heard of Caesar's exploits in
Spain? that he routed two armies, conquered two generals, recovered two
provinces, and effected all this within forty days after he came in
sight of the enemy? Can those who were not able to stand against him
whilst they were uninjured resist him when they are ruined? Will you,
who took part with Caesar whilst victory was uncertain, take part with
the conquered enemy when the fortune of the war is decided, and when you
ought to reap the reward of your services? For they say that they have
been deserted and betrayed by you, and remind you of a former oath. But
did you desert Lucius Domitius, or did Lucius Domitius desert you? Did
he not, when you were ready to submit to the greatest difficulties, cast
you off? Did he not, without your privacy, endeavour to effect his own
escape? When you were betrayed by him, were you not preserved by
Caesar's generosity? And how could he think you bound by your oath to
him, when, after having thrown up the ensigns of power, and abdicated
his government, he became a private person, and a captive in another's
power? A new obligation is left upon you, that you should disregard the
oath, by which you are at present bound; and have respect only to that
which was invalidated by the surrender of your general, and his
diminution of rank. But I suppose, although you are pleased with Caesar,
you are offended with me; however I shall not boast of my services to
you, which still are inferior to my own wishes or your expectations.
But, however, soldiers have ever looked for the rewards of labour at the
conclusion of a war; and what the issue of it is likely to be, not even
you can doubt. But why should I omit to mention my own diligence and
good fortune, and to what a happy crisis affairs are now arrived? Are
you sorry that I transported the army safe and entire, without the loss
of a single ship? That on my arrival, in the very first attack, I routed
the enemy's fleet? That twice in two days I defeated the enemy's horse?
That I carried out of the very harbour and bay, two hundred of the
enemy's victuallers, and reduced them to that situation that they can
receive no supplies either by land or sea? Will you divorce yourselves
from this fortune and these generals; and prefer the disgrace of
Corfinium, the defeat of Italy, the surrender of both Spains, and the
prestige of the African war? I, for my part, wished to be called a
soldier of Caesar's; you honoured me with the title of Imperator. If you
repent your bounty, I give it back to you; restore to me my former name
that you may not appear to have conferred the honour on me as a
reproach."

XXXIII.--The soldiers, being affected by this oration, frequently
attempted to interrupt him whilst he was speaking, so that they appeared
to bear with excessive anguish the suspicion of treachery, and when he
was leaving the assembly they unanimously besought him to be of good
spirits, and not hesitate to engage the enemy and put their fidelity and
courage to a trial. As the wishes and opinions of all were changed by
this act, Curio, with the general consent, determined, whenever
opportunity offered, to hazard a battle. The next day he led out his
forces and ranged them in order of battle on the same ground where they
had been posted the preceding day; nor did Attius Varus hesitate to draw
out his men, that, if any occasion should offer, either to tamper with
our men or to engage on equal terms, he might not miss the opportunity.

XXXIV.-There lay between the two armies a valley, as already mentioned,
not very deep, but of a difficult and steep ascent. Each was waiting
till the enemy's forces should attempt to pass it, that they might
engage with the advantage of the ground. At the same time, on the left
wing, the entire cavalry of Publius Attius, and several light-armed
infantry intermixed with them, were perceived descending into the
valley. Against them Curio detached his cavalry and two cohorts of the
Marrucini, whose first charge the enemy's horse were unable to stand,
but, setting spurs to their horses, fled back to their friends: the
light-infantry being deserted by those who had come out along with them,
were surrounded and cut to pieces by our men. Varus's whole army, facing
that way, saw their men flee and cut down. Upon which Rebilus, one of
Caesar's lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily
knowing that he had great experience in military matters, cried out,
"You see the enemy are daunted, Curio! why do you hesitate to take
advantage of the opportunity?" Curio, having merely "expressed this,
that the soldiers should keep in mind the professions which they had
made to him the day before," then ordered them to follow him, and ran
far before them all. The valley was so difficult of ascent that the
foremost men could not struggle up it unless assisted by those behind.
But the minds of Attius's soldiers being prepossessed with fear and the
flight and slaughter of their men, never thought of opposing us; and
they all imagined that they were already surrounded by our horse, and,
therefore, before a dart could be thrown or our men come near them,
Varus's whole army turned their backs and retreated to their camp.

XXXV.-In this flight one Fabius, a Pelignian and common soldier in
Curio's army, pursuing the enemy's rear, with a loud voice shouted to
Varus by his name, and often called him, so that he seemed to be one of
his soldiers, who wished to speak to him and give him advice. When
Varus, after being repeatedly called, stopped and looked at him, and
inquired who he was and what he wanted, he made a blow with his sword at
his naked shoulder and was very near killing Varus, but he escaped the
danger by raising his shield to ward off the blow. Fabius was surrounded
by the soldiers near him and cut to pieces; and by the multitude and
crowds of those that fled, the gates of the camps were thronged and the
passage stopped, and a greater number perished in that place without a
stroke than in the battle and flight. Nor were we far from driving them
from this camp; and some of them ran straightway to the town without
halting. But both the nature of the ground and the strength of the
fortifications prevented our access to the camp; for Curio's soldiers,
marching out to battle, were without those things which were requisite
for storming a camp. Curio, therefore, led his army back to the camp,
with all his troops safe except Fabius. Of the enemy about six hundred
were killed and a thousand wounded, all of whom, after Curio's return,
and several more under pretext of their wounds, but in fact through
fear, withdrew from the camp into the town, which Varus perceiving and
knowing the terror of his army, leaving a trumpeter in his camp and a
few tents for show, at the third watch led back his army quietly into
the town.

XXXVI.--The next day Curio resolved to besiege Utica, and to draw lines
about it. In the town there was a multitude of people, ignorant of war,
owing to the length of the peace; some of them Uticans, very well
inclined to Caesar, for his favours to them; the Roman population was
composed of persons differing widely in their sentiments. The terror
occasioned by former battles was very great; and therefore they openly
talked of surrendering, and argued with Attius that he should not suffer
the fortune of them all to be ruined by his obstinacy. Whilst these
things were in agitation, couriers, who had been sent forward, arrived
from king Juba, with the intelligence that he was on his march, with
considerable forces, and encouraged them to protect and defend their
city, a circumstance which greatly comforted their desponding hearts.

XXXVII.--The same intelligence was brought to Curio; but for some time
he could not give credit to it, because he had so great confidence in
his own good fortune. And at this time Caesar's success in Spain was
announced in Africa by messages and letters. Being elated by all these
things, he imagined that the king would not dare to attempt anything
against him. But when he found out, from undoubted authority, that his
forces were less than twenty miles distant from Utica, abandoning his
works, he retired to the Cornelian camp. Here he began to lay in corn
and wood, and to fortify his camp, and immediately despatched orders to
Sicily, that his two legions and the remainder of his cavalry should be
sent to him. His camp was well adapted for protracting a war, from the
nature and strength of the situation, from its proximity to the sea, and
the abundance of water and salt, of which a great quantity had been
stored up from the neighbouring salt-pits. Timber could not fail him
from the number of trees, nor corn, with which the lands abounded.
Wherefore, with the general consent, Curio determined to wait for the
rest of his forces, and protract the war.

XXXVIII.--This plan being settled, and his conduct approved of, he is
informed by some deserters from the town that Juba had stayed behind in
his own kingdom, being called home by a neighbouring war, and a dispute
with the people of Leptis; and that Sabura, his commander-in-chief, who
had been sent with a small force, was drawing near to Utica. Curio
rashly believing this information, altered his design, and resolved to
hazard a battle. His youth, his spirits, his former good fortune and
confidence of success, contributed much to confirm this resolution.
Induced by these motives, early in the night he sent all his cavalry to
the enemy's camp near the river Bagrada, of which Sabura, of whom we
have already spoken, was the commander. But the king was coming after
them with all his forces, and was posted at a distance of six miles
behind Sabura. The horse that were sent perform their march that night,
and attack the enemy unawares and unexpectedly; for the Numidians, after
the usual barbarous custom, encamped here and there without any
regularity. The cavalry having attacked them, when sunk in sleep and
dispersed, killed a great number of them; many were frightened and ran
away. After which the horse returned to Curio, and brought some
prisoners with them.

XXXIX.--Curio had set out at the fourth watch with all his forces,
except five cohorts which he left to guard the camp. Having advanced six
miles, he met the horse, heard what had happened, and inquired from the
captives who commanded the camp at Bagrada. They replied Sabura. Through
eagerness to perform his journey, he neglected to make further
inquiries, but looking back to the company next him, "Don't you see,
soldiers," says he, "that the answer of the prisoners corresponds with
the account of the deserters, that the king is not with him, and that he
sent only a small force which was not able to withstand a few horse?
Hasten then to spoil, to glory; that we may now begin to think of
rewarding you, and returning you thanks." The achievements of the horse
were great in themselves, especially if their small number be compared
with the vast host of Numidians. However, the account was enlarged by
themselves, as men are naturally inclined to boast of their own merit.
Besides, many spoils were produced; the men and horses that were taken
were brought into their sight, that they might imagine that every moment
of time which intervened was a delay to their conquest. By this means
the hopes of Curio were seconded by the ardour of the soldiers. He
ordered the horse to follow him, and hastened his march, that he might
attack them as soon as possible, while in consternation after their
flight. But the horse, fatigued by the expedition of the preceding
night, were not able to keep up with him, but fell behind in different
places. Even this did not abate Curio's hopes.

XL.--Juba, being informed by Sabura of the battle in the night, sent to
his relief two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, which he was
accustomed to keep near him to guard his person, and that part of his
infantry on which he had the greatest dependence, and he himself
followed slowly after with the rest of his forces and forty elephants,
suspecting that as Curio had sent his horse before, he himself would
follow them. Sabura drew up his army, both horse and foot, and commanded
them to give way gradually and retreat through the pretence of fear;
that when it was necessary he would give them the signal for battle, and
such orders as he found circumstances required. Curio, as his idea of
their present behaviour was calculated to confirm his former hopes,
imagined that the enemy were running away, and led his army from the
rising grounds down to the plain.

XLI.--And when he had advanced from this place about sixteen miles, his
army being exhausted with the fatigue, he halted. Sabura gave his men
the signal, marshalled his army, and began to go around his ranks and
encourage them. But he made use of the foot only for show; and sent the
horse to the charge: Curio was not deficient in skill, and encouraged
his men to rest all their hopes in their valour. Neither were the
soldiers, though wearied, nor the horse, though few and exhausted with
fatigue, deficient in ardour to engage, and courage: but the latter were
in number but two hundred: the rest had dropped behind on the march.
Wherever they charged they forced the enemy to give ground, but they
were not able to pursue them far when they fled, or to press their
horses too severely. Besides, the enemy's cavalry began to surround us
on both wings and to trample down our rear. When any cohorts ran forward
out of the line, the Numidians, being fresh, by their speed avoided our
charge, and surrounded ours when they attempted to return to their post,
and cut them off from the main body. So that it did not appear safe
either to keep their ground and maintain their ranks, or to issue from
the line, and run the risk. The enemy's troops were frequently
reinforced by assistance sent from Juba; strength began to fail our men
through fatigue; and those who had been wounded could neither quit the
field nor retire to a place of safety, because the whole field was
surrounded by the enemy's cavalry. Therefore, despairing of their own
safety, as men usually do in the last moment of their lives, they either
lamented their unhappy deaths, or recommended their parents to the
survivors, if fortune should save any from the impending danger. All
were full of fear and grief.

XLII.--When Curio perceived that in the general consternation neither
his exhortations nor entreaties were attended to, imagining that the
only hope of escaping in their deplorable situation was to gain the
nearest hills, he ordered the colours to be borne that way. But a party
of horse, that had been sent by Sabura, had already got possession of
them. Now indeed our men were reduced to extreme despair: and some of
them were killed by the cavalry in attempting to escape: some fell to
the ground unhurt. Cneius Domitius, commander of the cavalry, standing
round Curio with a small party of horse, urged Curio to endeavour to
escape by flight, and to hasten to his camp; and assured him that he
would not forsake him. But Curio declared that he would never more
appear in Caesar's sight, after losing the army which had been committed
by Caesar to his charge, and accordingly fought till he was killed. Very
few of the horse escaped from that battle, but those who had stayed
behind to refresh their horses having perceived at a distance the defeat
of the whole army, retired in safety to their camp.

XLIII.--The soldiers were all killed to a man. Marcus Rufus, the
quaestor, who was left behind in the camp by Curio, having got
intelligence of these things, encouraged his men not to be disheartened.
They beg and entreat to be transported to Sicily. He consented, and
ordered the masters of the ships to have all the boats brought close to
the shore early in the evening. But so great was the terror in general
that some said that Juba's forces were marching up, others that Varus
was hastening with his legions, and that they already saw the dust
raised by their coming; of which not one circumstance had happened:
others suspected that the enemy's fleet would immediately be upon them.
Therefore, in the general consternation, every man consulted his own
safety. Those who were on board of the fleet, were in a hurry to set
sail, and their flight hastened the masters of the ships of burden. A
few small fishing boats attended their duty and his orders. But as the
shores were crowded, so great was the struggle to determine who of such
a vast number should first get on board, that some of the vessels sank
with the weight of the multitude, and the fears of the rest delayed them
from coming to the shore.

XLIV.--From which circumstances it happened that a few foot and aged
men, that could prevail either through interest or pity, or who were
able to swim to the ships, were taken on board, and landed safe in
Sicily. The rest of the troops sent their centurions as deputies to
Varus at night, and surrendered themselves to him. But Juba, the next
day having spied their cohorts before the town, claimed them as his
booty, and ordered a great part of them to be put to the sword; a few he
selected and sent home to his own realm. Although Varus complained that
his honour was insulted by Juba, yet he dare not oppose him: Juba rode
on horseback into the town, attended by several senators, amongst whom
were Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, and in a few days
arranged and ordered what he would have done in Utica, and in a few days
more returned to his own kingdom, with all his forces.



BOOK III

I.--Julius Caesar, holding the election as dictator, was himself
appointed consul with Publius Servilius; for this was the year in which
it was permitted by the laws that he should be chosen consul. This
business being ended, as credit was beginning to fail in Italy, and the
debts could not be paid, he determined that arbitrators should be
appointed: and that they should make an estimate of the possessions and
properties [of the debtors], how much they were worth before the war,
and that they should be handed over in payment to the creditors. This he
thought the most likely method to remove and abate the apprehension of
an abolition of debt, the usual consequence of civil wars and
dissensions, and to support the credit of the debtors. He likewise
restored to their former condition (the praetors and tribunes first
submitting the question to the people) some persons condemned for
bribery at the elections, by virtue of Pompey's law, at the time when
Pompey kept his legions quartered in the city (these trials were
finished in a single day, one judge hearing the merits, and another
pronouncing the sentences), because they had offered their service to
him in the beginning of the civil war, if he chose to accept them;
setting the same value on them as if he had accepted them, because they
had put themselves in his power. For he had determined that they ought
to be restored, rather by the judgment of the people, than appear
admitted to it by his bounty: that he might neither appear ungrateful in
repaying an obligation, nor arrogant in depriving the people of their
prerogative of exercising this bounty.

II.--In accomplishing these things, and celebrating the Latin festival,
and holding all the elections, he spent eleven days; and having resigned
the dictatorship, set out from the city, and went to Brundisium, where
he had ordered twelve legions and all his cavalry to meet him. But he
scarcely found as many ships as would be sufficient to transport fifteen
thousand legionary soldiers and five hundred horse. This [the scarcity
of shipping] was the only thing that prevented Caesar from putting a
speedy conclusion to the war. And even these troops embarked very short
of their number, because several had fallen in so many wars in Gaul, and
the long march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and a
severe autumn in Apulia and the district about Brundisium, after the
very wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul, had impaired the health of
the whole army.

III.--Pompey having got a year's respite to provide forces, during which
he was not engaged in war, nor employed by an enemy, had collected a
numerous fleet from Asia, and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens,
Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had given
directions that a great number should be built in every other place. He
had exacted a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and all the kings,
dynasts, tetrarchs, and free states of Achaia; and had obliged the
corporations of those provinces, of which he himself had the government,
to count down to him a large sum.

IV.--He had made up nine legions of Roman citizens; five from Italy,
which he had brought with him; one veteran legion from Sicily, which
being composed of two, he called the Gemella; one from Crete and
Macedonia, of veterans who had been discharged by their former generals,
and had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, which had been levied
by the activity of Lentulus. Besides he had distributed among his
legions a considerable number, by way of recruits, from Thessaly,
Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus: with his legions he also intermixed the
soldiers taken from Caius Antonius. Besides these, he expected two
legions from Syria, with Scipio; from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria,
and other states, he got about three thousand archers, six cohorts of
slingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and seven thousand horse; six
hundred of which, Deiotarus had brought from Gaul; Ariobarzanes, five
hundred from Cappadocia. Cotus had given him about the same number from
Thrace, and had sent his son Sadalis with them. From Macedonia there
were two hundred, of extraordinary valour, commanded by Rascipolis; five
hundred Gauls and Germans; Gabinius's troops from Alexandria, whom Aulus
Gabinius had left with king Ptolemy, to guard his person. Pompey, the
son, had brought in his fleet eight hundred, whom he had raised among
his own and his shepherds' slaves. Tarcundarius, Castor and Donilaus had
given three hundred from Gallograecia: one of these came himself, the
other sent his son. Two hundred were sent from Syria by Comagenus
Antiochus, whom Pompey rewarded amply. The most of them were archers. To
these were added Dardanians, and Bessians, some of them mercenaries;
others procured by power and influence: also, Macedonians, Thessalians,
and troops from other nations and states, which completed the number
which we mentioned before.

V.--He had laid in vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt,
Crete, Cyrene, and other countries. He had resolved to fix his winter
quarters at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other sea-ports, to hinder
Caesar from passing the sea: and for this purpose had stationed his
fleet along the sea-coast. The Egyptian fleet was commanded by Pompey,
the son: the Asiatic, by Decimus Laelius, and Caius Triarius: the
Syrian, by Caius Cassius: the Rhodian, by Caius Marcellus, in
conjunction with Caius Coponius; and the Liburnian, and Achaian, by
Scribonius Libo, and Marcus Octavius. But Marcus Bibulus was appointed
commander-in-chief of the whole maritime department, and regulated every
matter. The chief direction rested upon him.

VI.--When Caesar came to Brundisium, he made a speech to the soldiers:
"That since they were now almost arrived at the termination of their
toils and dangers, they should patiently submit to leave their slaves
and baggage in Italy, and to embark without luggage, that a greater
number of men might be put on board: that they might expect everything
from victory and his liberality." They cried out with one voice, "he
might give what orders he pleased, that they would cheerfully fulfil
them." He accordingly set sail the fourth day of January, with seven
legions on board, as already remarked. The next day he reached land,
between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places; meeting with a
safe road for his shipping to ride in, and dreading all other ports
which he imagined were in possession of the enemy, he landed his men at
a place called Pharsalus, without the loss of a single vessel.

VII.--Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were at Oricum, with
eighteen Asiatic ships, which were given into their charge by the orders
of Decimus Laelius: Marcus Bibulus at Corcyra, with a hundred and ten
ships. But they had not the confidence to dare to move out of the
harbour; though Caesar had brought only twelve ships as a convoy, only
four of which had decks; nor did Bibulus, his fleet being disordered and
his seamen dispersed, come up in time: for Caesar was seen at the
continent before any account whatsoever of his approach had reached
those regions.

VIII.--Caesar, having landed his soldiers, sent back his ships the same
night to Brundisium, to transport the rest of his legions and cavalry.
The charge of this business was committed to lieutenant Fufius Kalenus,
with orders to be expeditious in transporting the legions. But the ships
having put to sea too late, and not having taken advantage of the night
breeze, fell a sacrifice on their return. For Bibulus, at Corcyra, being
informed of Caesar's approach, hoped to fall in with some part of our
ships, with their cargoes, but found them empty; and having taken about
thirty, vented on them his rage at his own remissness, and set them all
on fire: and, with the same flames, he destroyed the mariners and
masters of the vessels, hoping by the severity of the punishment to
deter the rest. Having accomplished this affair, he filled all the
harbours and shores from Salona to Oricum with his fleets. Having
disposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself in the depth
of winter, declining no fatigue or duty, and not waiting for
reinforcements, in hopes that he might come within Caesar's reach.

IX.--But after the departure of the Liburnian fleet, Marcus Octavius
sailed from Illyricum with what ships he had to Salona; and having
spirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations, he drew Issa
off from its connection with Caesar; but not being able to prevail with
the council of Salona, either by promises or menaces, he resolved to
storm the town. But it was well fortified by its natural situation, and
a hill. The Roman citizens built wooden towers, the better to secure it;
but when they were unable to resist, on account of the smallness of
their numbers, being weakened by several wounds, they stooped to the
last resource, and set at liberty all the slaves old enough to bear
arms; and cutting the hair off the women's heads, made ropes for their
engines. Octavius, being informed of their determination, surrounded the
town with five encampments, and began to press them at once with a siege
and storm. They were determined to endure every hardship, and their
greatest distress was the want of corn. They, therefore, sent deputies
to Caesar, and begged a supply from him; all other inconveniences they
bore by their own resources, as well as they could: and after a long
interval, when the length of the siege had made Octavius's troops more
remiss than usual, having got an opportunity at noon, when the enemy
were dispersed, they disposed their wives and children on the walls, to
keep up the appearance of their usual attention; and forming themselves
into one body, with the slaves whom they had lately enfranchised, they
made an attack on Octavius's nearest camp, and having forced that,
attacked the second with the same fury; and then the third and the
fourth, and then the other, and beat them from them all: and having
killed a great number, obliged the rest and Octavius himself to fly for
refuge to their ships. This put an end to the blockade. Winter was now
approaching, and Octavius, despairing of capturing the town, after
sustaining such considerable losses, withdrew to Pompey, to Dyrrachium.

X.--We have mentioned that Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's, had
fallen twice into Caesar's power; first at Corfinium, and afterwards in
Spain. Caesar thought him a proper person, on account of his favours
conferred on him, to send with proposals to Pompey: and he knew that he
had an influence over Pompey. This was the substance of his proposals:
"That it was the duty of both, to put an end to their obstinacy, and
forbear hostilities, and not tempt fortune any further; that sufficient
loss had been suffered on both sides, to serve as a lesson and
instruction to them, to render them apprehensive of future calamities,
by Pompey, in having been driven out of Italy, and having lost Sicily,
Sardinia, and the two Spains, and one hundred and thirty cohorts of
Roman citizens, in Italy and Spain: by himself, in the death of Curio,
and the loss of so great an army in Africa, and the surrender of his
soldiers in Corcyra. Wherefore, they should have pity on themselves, and
the republic: for, from their own misfortunes, they had sufficient
experience of what fortune can effect in war. That this was the only
time to treat of peace; when each had confidence in his own strength,
and both seemed on an equal footing. Since, if fortune showed ever so
little favour to either, he who thought himself superior, would not
submit to terms of accommodation; nor would he be content with an equal
division, when he might expect to obtain the whole. That, as they could
not agree before, the terms of peace ought to be submitted to the senate
and people in Rome. That in the meantime, it ought to content the
republic and themselves, if they both immediately took oath in a public
assembly, that they would disband their forces within the three
following days. That having divested themselves of the arms and
auxiliaries, on which they placed their present confidence, they must
both of necessity acquiesce in the decision of the people and senate. To
give Pompey the fuller assurance of his intentions, he would dismiss all
his forces on land, even his garrisons.

XI.--Vibullius, having received this commission from Caesar, thought it
no less necessary to give Pompey notice of Caesar's sudden approach,
that he might adopt such plans as the circumstance required, than to
inform him of Caesar's message; and therefore continuing his journey by
night as well as by day, and taking fresh horses for despatch, he posted
away to Pompey, to inform him that Caesar was marching towards him with
all his forces. Pompey was at this time in Candavia, and was on his
march from Macedonia to his winter quarters in Apollonia and Dyrrachium;
but surprised at the unexpected news, he determined to go to Apollonia
by speedy marches, to prevent Caesar from becoming master of all the
maritime states. But as soon as Caesar had landed his troops, he set off
the same day for Oricum: when he arrived there, Lucius Torquatus, who
was governor of the town by Pompey's appointment, and had a garrison of
Parthinians in it, endeavoured to shut the gates and defend the town,
and ordered the Greeks to man the walls, and to take arms. But as they
refused to fight against the power of the Roman people, and as the
citizens made a spontaneous attempt to admit Caesar, despairing of any
assistance, he threw open the gates, and surrendered himself and the
town to Caesar, and was preserved safe from injury by him.

XII.--Having taken Oricum, Caesar marched without making any delay to
Apollonia. Staberius the governor, hearing of his approach, began to
bring water into the citadel, and to fortify it, and to demand hostages
of the town's people. But they refuse to give any, or to shut their
gates against the consul, or to take upon them to judge contrary to what
all Italy and the Roman people had judged. As soon as he knew their
inclinations, he made his escape privately. The inhabitants of Apollonia
sent ambassadors to Caesar, and gave him admission into their town.
Their example was followed by the inhabitants of Bullis, Amantia, and
the other neighbouring states, and all Epirus: and they sent ambassadors
to Caesar, and promised to obey his commands.

XIII.--But Pompey having received information of the transactions at
Oricum and Apollonia, began to be alarmed for Dyrrachium, and
endeavoured to reach it, marching day and night. As soon as it was said
that Caesar was approaching, such a panic fell upon Pompey's army,
because in his haste he had made no distinction between night and day,
and had marched without intermission, that they almost every man
deserted their colours in Epirus and the neighbouring countries; several
threw down their arms, and their march had the appearance of a flight.
But when Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium, and had given orders for
measuring out the ground for his camp, his army even yet continuing in
their fright, Labienus first stepped forward and swore that he would
never desert him, and would share whatever fate fortune should assign to
him. The other lieutenants took the same oath, and the tribunes and
centurions followed their example: and the whole army swore in like
manner. Caesar, finding the road to Dyrrachium already in the possession
of Pompey, was in no great haste, but encamped by the river Apsus, in
the territory of Apollonia, that the states which had deserved his
support might be certain of protection from his out-guards and forts;
and there he resolved to wait the arrival of his other legions from
Italy, and to winter in tents. Pompey did the same; and pitching his
camp on the other side of the river Apsus, collected there all his
troops and auxiliaries.

XIV.--Kalenus, having put the legions and cavalry on board at
Brundisium, as Caesar had directed him, as far as the number of his
ships allowed, weighed anchor: and having sailed a little distance from
port, received a letter from Caesar, in which he was informed, that all
the ports and the whole shore was occupied by the enemy's fleet: on
receiving this information he returned into the harbour, and recalled
all the vessels. One of them, which continued the voyage and did not
obey Kalenus's command, because it carried no troops, but was private
property, bore away for Oricum, and was taken by Bibulus, who spared
neither slaves nor free men, nor even children; but put all to the
sword. Thus the safety of the whole army depended on a very short space
of time and a great casualty.

XV.--Bibulus, as has been observed before, lay with his fleet near
Oricum, and as he debarred Caesar of the liberty of the sea and
harbours, so he was deprived of all intercourse with the country by
land; for the whole shore was occupied by parties disposed in different
places by Caesar. And he was not allowed to get either wood or water, or
even anchor near the land. He was reduced to great difficulties, and
distressed with extreme scarcity of every necessary; insomuch that he
was obliged to bring, in transports from Corcyra, not only provisions,
but even wood and water; and it once happened that, meeting with violent
storms, they were forced to catch the dew by night which fell on the
hides that covered their decks; yet all these difficulties they bore
patiently and without repining, and thought they ought not to leave the
shores and harbours free from blockade. But when they were suffering
under the distress which I have mentioned, and Libo had joined Bibulus,
they both called from on ship-board to Marcus Acilius and Statius
Marcus, the lieutenants, one of whom commanded the town, the other the
guards on the coast, that they wished to speak to Caesar on affairs of
importance, if permission should be granted them. They add something
further to strengthen the impression that they intended to treat about
an accommodation. In the meantime they requested a truce, and obtained
it from them; for what they proposed seemed to be of importance, and it
was well known that Caesar desired it above all things, and it was
imagined that some advantage would be derived from Bibulus's proposals.

XVI.--Caesar having set out with one legion to gain possession of the
more remote states, and to provide corn, of which he had but a small
quantity, was at this time at Buthrotum, opposite to Corcyra. There
receiving Acilius and Marcus's letters, informing him of Libo's and
Bibulus's demands, he left his legion behind him, and returned himself
to Oricum. When he arrived, they were invited to a conference. Libo came
and made an apology for Bibulus, "that he was a man of strong passion,
and had a private quarrel against Caesar, contracted when he was aedile
and praetor; that for this reason he had avoided the conference, lest
affairs of the utmost importance and advantage might be impeded by the
warmth of his temper. That it now was and ever had been Pompey's most
earnest wish, that they should be reconciled, and lay down their arms;
but they were not authorized to treat on that subject, because they
resigned the whole management of the war, and all other matters, to
Pompey, by order of the council. But when they were acquainted with
Caesar's demands, they would transmit them to Pompey, who would conclude
all of himself by their persuasions. In the meantime, let the truce be
continued till the messengers could return from him; and let no injury
be done on either side." To this he added a few words of the cause for
which they fought, and of his own forces and resources.

XVII.--To this, Caesar did not then think proper to make any reply, nor
do we now think it worth recording. But Caesar required "that he should
be allowed to send commissioners to Pompey, who should suffer no
personal injury; and that either they should grant it, or should take
his commissioners in charge, and convey them to Pompey. That as to the
truce, the war in its present state was so divided, that they by their
fleet deprived him of his shipping and auxiliaries; while he prevented
them from the use of the land and fresh water; and if they wished that
this restraint should be removed from them, they should relinquish their
blockade of the seas, but if they retained the one, he in like manner
would retain the other; that nevertheless, the treaty of accommodation
might still be carried on, though these points were not conceded, and
that they need not be an impediment to it." They would neither receive
Caesar's commissioners, nor guarantee their safety, but referred the
whole to Pompey. They urged and struggled eagerly to gain the one point
respecting a truce. But when Caesar perceived that they had proposed the
conference merely to avoid present danger and distress, but that they
offered no hopes or terms of peace, he applied his thoughts to the
prosecution of the war.

XVIII.--Bibulus, being prevented from landing for several days, and
being seized with a violent distemper from the cold and fatigue, as he
could neither be cured on board, nor was willing to desert the charge
which he had taken upon him, was unable to bear up against the violence
of the disease. On his death, the sole command devolved on no single
individual, but each admiral managed his own division separately, and at
his own discretion. Vibullius, as soon as the alarm, which Caesar's
unexpected arrival had raised, was over, began again to deliver Caesar's
message in the presence of Libo, Lucius Lucceius, and Theophanes, to
whom Pompey used to communicate his most confidential secrets. He had
scarcely entered on the subject when Pompey interrupted him, and forbade
him to proceed. "What need," says he, "have I of life or Rome, if the
world shall think I enjoy them by the bounty of Caesar; an opinion which
can never be removed whilst it shall be thought that I have been brought
back by him to Italy, from which I set out." After the conclusion of the
war, Caesar was informed of these expressions by some persons who were
present at the conversation. He attempted, however, by other means to
bring about a negotiation of peace.

XIX.--Between Pompey's and Caesar's camp there was only the river Apsus,
and the soldiers frequently conversed with each other; and by a private
arrangement among themselves, no weapons were thrown during their
conferences. Caesar sent Publius Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to
the bank of the river, to make such proposals as should appear most
conducive to peace; and to cry out frequently with a loud voice
[asking], "Are citizens permitted to send deputies to citizens to treat
of peace? a concession which had been made even to fugitives on the
Pyrenean mountains, and to robbers, especially when by so doing they
would prevent citizens from fighting against citizens." Having spoken
much in humble language, as became a man pleading for his own and the
general safety, and being listened to with silence by the soldiers of
both armies, he received an answer from the enemy's party that Aulus
Varro proposed coming the next day to a conference, and that deputies
from both sides might come without danger, and explain their wishes, and
accordingly a fixed time was appointed for the interview. When the
deputies met the next day, a great multitude from both sides assembled,
and the expectations of every person concerning this subject were raised
very high, and their minds seemed to be eagerly disposed for peace.
Titus Labienus walked forward from the crowd, and in submissive terms
began to speak of peace, and to argue with Vatinius. But their
conversation was suddenly interrupted by darts thrown from all sides,
from which Vatinius escaped by being protected by the arms of the
soldiers. However, several were wounded; and among them Cornelius
Balbus, Marcus Plotius, and Lucius Tiburtius, centurions, and some
privates; hereupon Labienus exclaimed, "Forbear, then, to speak any more
about an accommodation, for we can have no peace unless we carry
Caesar's head back with us."

XX.--At the same time in Rome, Marcus Caelius Rufus, one of the
praetors, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on entering into
his office, fixed his tribunal near the bench of Caius Trebonius, the
city praetor, and promised if any person appealed to him in regard to
the valuation and payment of debts made by arbitration, as appointed by
Caesar when in Rome, that he would relieve them. But it happened, from
the justice of Trebonius's decrees and his humanity (for he thought that
in such dangerous times justice should be administered with moderation
and compassion), that not one could be found who would offer himself the
first to lodge an appeal. For to plead poverty, to complain of his own
private calamities, or the general distresses of the times, or to assert
the difficulty of setting the goods to sale, is the behaviour of a man
even of a moderate temper; but to retain their possessions entire, and
at the same time acknowledge themselves in debt, what sort of spirit,
and what impudence would it not have argued! Therefore nobody was found
so unreasonable as to make such demands. But Caelius proved more severe
to those very persons for whose advantage it had been designed; and
starting from this beginning, in order that he might not appear to have
engaged in so dishonourable an affair without effecting something, he
promulgated a law, that all debts should be discharged in six equal
payments, of six months each, without interest.

XXI.--When Servilius, the consul, and the other magistrates opposed him,
and he himself effected less than he expected, in order to raise the
passions of the people, he dropped it, and promulgated two others; one,
by which he remitted the annual rents of the houses to the tenants, the
other, an act of insolvency: upon which the mob made an assault on Caius
Trebonius, and having wounded several persons, drove him from his
tribunal. The consul Servilius informed the senate of his proceedings,
who passed a decree that Caelius should be removed from the management
of the republic. Upon this decree, the consul forbade him the senate;
and when he was attempting to harangue the people, turned him out of the
rostrum. Stung with the ignominy and with resentment, he pretended in
public that he would go to Caesar, but privately sent messengers to
Milo, who had murdered Clodius, and had been condemned for it; and
having invited him into Italy, because he had engaged the remains of the
gladiators to his interest, by making them supple presents, he joined
him, and sent him to Thurinum to tamper with the shepherds. When he
himself was on his road to Casilinum, at the same time that his military
standards and arms were seized at Capua, his slaves seen at Naples, and
the design of betraying the town discovered: his plots being revealed,
and Capua shut against him, being apprehensive of danger, because the
Roman citizens residing there had armed themselves, and thought he ought
to be treated as an enemy to the state, he abandoned his first design,
and changed his route.

XXII.--Milo in the meantime despatched letters to the free towns,
purporting that he acted as he did by the orders and commands of Pompey,
conveyed to him by Bibulus: and he endeavoured to engage in his interest
all persons whom he imagined were under difficulties by reason of their
debts. But not being able to prevail with them, he set at liberty some
slaves from the work-houses, and began to assault Cosa in the district
of Thurinum. There having received a blow of a stone thrown from the
wall of the town which was commanded by Quintus Pedius with one legion,
he died of it; and Caelius having set out, as he pretended for Caesar,
went to Thurii, where he was put to death as he was tampering with some
of the freemen of the town, and was offering money to Caesar's Gallic
and Spanish horse, which he had sent there to strengthen the garrison.
And thus these mighty beginnings, which had embroiled Italy, and kept
the magistrates employed, found a speedy and happy issue.

XXIII.--Libo having sailed from Oricum, with a fleet of fifty ships,
which he commanded, came to Brundisium, and seized an island, which lies
opposite to the harbour; judging it better to guard that place, which
was our only pass to sea, than to keep all the shores and ports blocked
up by a fleet. By his sudden arrival, he fell in with some of our
transports, and set them on fire, and carried off one laden with corn;
he struck great terror into our men, and having in the night landed a
party of soldiers and archers, he beat our guard of horse from their
station, and gained so much by the advantage of situation, that he
despatched letters to Pompey, that if he pleased he might order the rest
of the ships to be hauled upon shore and repaired; for that with his own
fleet he could prevent Caesar from receiving his auxiliaries.

XXIV.--Antonius was at this time at Brundisium, and relying on the
valour of his troops, covered about sixty of the long-boats belonging to
the men-of-war with penthouses and bulwarks of hurdles, and put on board
them select soldiers; and disposed them separately along the shore: and
under the pretext of keeping the seamen in exercise, he ordered two
three-banked galleys, which he had built at Brundisium, to row to the
mouth of the port. When Libo saw them advancing boldly towards him, he
sent five four-banked galleys against them, in hopes of intercepting
them. When these came near our ships, our veteran soldiers retreated
within the harbour. The enemy, urged by their eagerness to capture them,
pursued them unguardedly; for instantly the boats of Antonius, on a
certain signal, rowed with great violence from all parts against the
enemy; and at the first charge took one of the four-banked galleys, with
the seamen and marines, and forced the rest to flee disgracefully. In
addition to this loss, they were prevented from getting water by the
horse which Antonius had disposed along the sea-coast. Libo, vexed at
the distress and disgrace, departed from Brundisium, and abandoned the
blockade.

XXV.--Several months had now elapsed, and winter was almost gone, and
Caesar's legions and shipping were not coming to him from Brundisium,
and he imagined that some opportunities had been neglected, for the
winds had at least been often favourable, and he thought that he must
trust to them at last. And the longer it was deferred, the more eager
were those who commanded Pompey's fleet to guard the coast, and were
more confident of preventing our getting assistance: they receive
frequent reproofs from Pompey by letter, that as they had not prevented
Caesar's arrival at the first, they should at least stop the remainder
of his army: and they were expecting that the season for transporting
troops would become more unfavourable every day, as the winds grew
calmer. Caesar, feeling some trouble on this account, wrote in severe
terms to his officers at Brundisium, [and gave them orders] that as soon
as they found the wind to answer, they should not let the opportunity of
setting sail pass by, if they were even to steer their course to the
shore of Apollonia: because there they might run their ships on ground.
That these parts principally were left unguarded by the enemy's fleet,
because they dare not venture too far from the harbour.

XXVI.--They [his officers], exerting boldness and courage, aided by the
instructions of Marcus Antonius, and Fufius Kalenus, and animated by the
soldiers strongly encouraging them, and declining no danger for Caesar's
safety, having got a southerly wind, weighed anchor, and the next day
were carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, and being seen from the
continent, Quintus Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian fleet at
Dyrrachium, put out of the port with his ships; and when they had almost
come up with us, in consequence of the breeze dying away, the south wind
sprang up afresh, and rescued us. However, he did not desist from his
attempt, but hoped by the labour and perseverance of his seamen to be
able to bear up against the violence of the storm; and although we were
carried beyond Dyrrachium, by the violence of the wind, he nevertheless
continued to chase us. Our men, taking advantage of fortune's kindness,
for they were still afraid of being attacked by the enemy's fleet, if
the wind abated, having come near a port, called Nymphaeum, about three
miles beyond Lissus, put into it (this port is protected from a
south-west wind, but is not secure against a south wind); and thought less
danger was to be apprehended from the storm than from the enemy. But as
soon as they were within the port, the south wind, which had blown for
two days, by extraordinary good luck veered round to the south-west.

XXVII.--Here one might observe the sudden turns of fortune. We who, a
moment before, were alarmed for ourselves, were safely lodged in a very
secure harbour: and they who had threatened ruin to our fleet, were
forced to be uneasy on their own account: and thus, by a change of
circumstances, the storm protected our ships, and damaged the Rhodian
fleet to such a degree, that all their decked ships, sixteen in number,
foundered, without exception, and were wrecked: and of the prodigious
number of seamen and soldiers, some lost their lives by being dashed
against the rocks, others were taken by our men: but Caesar sent them
all safe home.

XXVIII.--Two of our ships, that had not kept up with the rest, being
overtaken by the night, and not knowing what port the rest had made to,
came to an anchor opposite Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded
Pompey's fleet, detached after them several barges and small craft, and
attempted to take them. At the same time, he treated with them about
capitulating, and promised them their lives if they would surrender. One
of them carried two hundred and twenty recruits, the other was manned
with somewhat less than two hundred veterans. Here it might be seen what
security men derive from a resolute spirit. For the recruits, frightened
at the number of vessels, and fatigued with the rolling of the sea; and
with sea-sickness, surrendered to Otacilius, after having first received
his oath, that the enemy would not injure them; but as soon as they were
brought before him, contrary to the obligation of his oath, they were
inhumanly put to death in his presence. But the soldiers of the veteran
legion, who had also struggled, not only with the inclemency of the
weather, but by labouring at the pump, thought it their duty to remit
nothing of their former valour: and having protracted the beginning of
the night in settling the terms, under pretence of surrendering, they
obliged the pilot to run the ship aground: and having got a convenient
place on the shore, they spent the rest of the night there, and at
daybreak, when Otacilius had sent against them a party of the horse, who
guarded that part of the coast, to the number of four hundred, besides
some armed men, who had followed them from the garrison, they made a
brave defence, and having killed some of them, retreated in safety to
our army.

XXIX.--After this action, the Roman citizens, who resided at Lissus, a
town which Caesar had before assigned them, and had carefully fortified,
received Antony into their town, and gave him every assistance.
Otacilius, apprehensive for his own safety, escaped out of the town, and
went to Pompey. All his forces, whose number amounted to three veteran
legions, and one of recruits, and about eight hundred horse, being
landed, Antony sent most of his ships back to Italy, to transport the
remainder of the soldiers and horse. The pontons, which are a sort of
Gallic ships, he left at Lissus with this object, that if Pompey,
imagining Italy defenceless, should transport his army thither (and this
notion was spread among the common people), Caesar might have some means
of pursuing him; and he sent messengers to him with great despatch, to
inform him in what part of the country he had landed his army, and what
number of troops he had brought over with him.

XXX.--Caesar and Pompey received this intelligence almost at the same
time; for they had seen the ships sail past Apollonia and Dyrrachium.
They directed their march after them by land; but at first they were
ignorant to what part they had been carried; but when they were informed
of it, they each adopted a different plan; Caesar, to form a junction
with Antonius as soon as possible, Pompey, to oppose Antonius's forces
on their march to Caesar, and, if possible, to fall upon them
unexpectedly from ambush. And the same day they both led out their
armies from their winter encampment along the river Apsus; Pompey,
privately by night; Caesar, openly by day. But Caesar had to march a
longer circuit up the river to find a ford. Pompey's route being easy,
because he was not obliged to cross the river, he advanced rapidly and
by forced marches against Antonius, and being informed of his approach,
chose a convenient situation, where he posted his forces; and kept his
men close within camp, and forbade fires to be kindled, that his arrival
might be the more secret. An account of this was immediately carried to
Antonius by the Greeks. He despatched messengers to Caesar, and confined
himself in his camp for one day. The next day Caesar came up with him.
On learning his arrival, Pompey, to prevent his being hemmed in between
two armies, quitted his position, and went with all his forces to
Asparagium, in the territory of Dyrrachium, and there encamped in a
convenient situation.

XXXI.--During these times, Scipio, though he had sustained some losses
near mount Amanus, had assumed to himself the title of imperator, after
which he demanded large sums of money from the states and princes. He
had also exacted from the tax-gatherers two years' rents that they owed;
and enjoined them to lend him the amount of the next year, and demanded
a supply of horse from the whole province. When they were collected,
leaving behind him his neighbouring enemies, the Parthians (who shortly
before had killed Marcus Crassus, the imperator, and had kept Marcus
Bibulus besieged), he drew his legions and cavalry out of Syria; and
when he came into the province, which was under great anxiety and fear
of the Parthian war, and heard some declarations of the soldiers, "That
they would march against an enemy, if he would lead them on; but would
never bear arms against a countryman and consul"; he drew off his
legions to winter quarters to Pergamus, and the most wealthy cities, and
made them rich presents: and in order to attach them more firmly to his
interest, permitted them to plunder the cities.

XXXII.--In the meantime, the money which had been demanded from the
province at large, was most rigorously exacted. Besides, many new
imposts of different kinds were devised to gratify his avarice. A tax of
so much a head was laid on every slave and child. Columns, doors, corn,
soldiers, sailors, arms, engines, and carriages, were made subject to a
duty. Wherever a name could be found for anything, it was deemed a
sufficient reason for levying money on it. Officers were appointed to
collect it, not only in the cities, but in almost every village and
fort: and whosoever of them acted with the greatest rigour and
inhumanity, was esteemed the best man, and best citizen. The province
was overrun with bailiffs and officers, and crowded with overseers and
tax-gatherers; who, besides the duties imposed, exacted a gratuity for
themselves; for they asserted, that being expelled from their own homes
and countries, they stood in need of every necessary; endeavouring by a
plausible pretence to colour the most infamous conduct. To this was
added the most exorbitant interest, as usually happens in times of war;
the whole sums being called in, on which occasion they alleged that the
delay of a single day was a donation. Therefore, in those two years, the
debt of the province was doubled: but notwithstanding, taxes were
exacted, not only from the Roman citizens, but from every corporation
and every state. And they said that these were loans, exacted by the
senate's decree. The taxes of the ensuing year were demanded beforehand
as a loan from the collectors, as on their first appointment.

XXXIII.--Moreover, Scipio ordered the money formerly lodged in the
temple of Diana at Ephesus, to be taken out with the statues of that
goddess which remained there. When Scipio came to the temple, letters
were delivered to him from Pompey, in the presence of several senators,
whom he had called upon to attend him; [informing him] that Caesar had
crossed the sea with his legions; that Scipio should hasten to him with
his army, and postpone all other business. As soon as he received the
letter, he dismissed his attendants, and began to prepare for his
journey to Macedonia; and a few days after set out. This circumstance
saved the money at Ephesus.

XXXIV.--Caesar, having effected a junction with Antonius's army, and
having drawn his legion out of Oricum, which he had left there to guard
the coast, thought he ought to sound the inclination of the provinces,
and march farther into the country; and when ambassadors came to him
from Thessaly and Aetolia, to engage that the states in those countries
would obey his orders, if he sent a garrison to protect them, he
despatched Lucius Cassius Longinus, with the twenty-seventh, a legion
composed of young soldiers, and two hundred horse, to Thessaly: and
Caius Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a small party of horse,
into Aetolia. He recommended them to be especially careful to provide
corn, because those regions were nearest to him. He ordered Cneius
Domitius Calvinus to march into Macedonia with two legions, the eleventh
and twelfth, and five hundred horse; from which province, Menedemus, the
principal man of those regions, on that side which is called the Free,
having come as ambassador, assured him of the most devoted affection of
all his subjects.

XXXV.--Of these Calvisius, on his first arrival in Aetolia, being very
kindly received, dislodged the enemy's garrisons in Calydon and
Naupactus, and made himself master of the whole country. Cassius went to
Thessaly with his legion. As there were two factions there, he found the
citizens divided in their inclinations. Hegasaretus, a man of
established power, favoured Pompey's interest. Petreius, a young man of
a most noble family, warmly supported Caesar with his own and his
friends' influence.

XXXVI.--At the same time, Domitius arrived in Macedonia: and when
numerous embassies had begun to wait on him from many of the states,
news was brought that Scipio was approaching with his legions, which
occasioned various opinions and reports; for in strange events, rumour
generally goes before. Without making any delay in any part of
Macedonia, he marched with great haste against Domitius; and when he was
come within about twenty miles of him, wheeled on a sudden towards
Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. He effected this with such celerity, that
news of his march and arrival came together; for to render his march
expeditious, he left the baggage of his legions behind him at the river
Haliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, under the care of
Marcus Favonius, with a guard of eight cohorts, and ordered him to build
a strong fort there. At the same time, Cotus's cavalry, which used to
infest the neighbourhood of Macedonia, flew to attack Cassius's camp, at
which Cassius being alarmed, and having received information of Scipio's
approach, and seen the horse, which he imagined to be Scipio's, he
betook himself to the mountains that environ Thessaly, and thence began
to make his route towards Ambracia. But when Scipio was hastening to
pursue him, despatches overtook him from Favonius, that Domitius was
marching against him with his legions, and that he could not maintain
the garrison over which he was appointed, without Scipio's assistance.
On receipt of these despatches, Scipio changed his designs and his
route, desisted from his pursuit of Cassius, and hastened to relieve
Favonius. Accordingly, continuing his march day and night, he came to
him so opportunely, that the dust raised by Domitius's army, and
Scipio's advanced guard, were observed at the same instant. Thus, the
vigilance of Domitius saved Cassius, and the expedition of Scipio,
Favonius.

XXXVII--Scipio, having stayed for two days in his camp, along the river
Haliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius's camp, on the third day,
at dawn, led his army across a ford, and having made a regular
encampment the day following, drew up his forces in front of his camp.
Domitius thought he ought not to show any reluctance, but should draw
out his forces and hazard a battle. But as there was a plain six miles
in breadth between the two camps, he posted his army before Scipio's
camp; while the latter persevered in not quitting his entrenchment.
However, Domitius with difficulty restrained his men, and prevented
their beginning a battle; the more so as a rivulet with steep banks,
joining Scipio's camp, retarded the progress of our men. When Scipio
perceived the eagerness and alacrity of our troops to engage, suspecting
that he should be obliged the next day, either to fight, against his
inclination, or to incur great disgrace by keeping within his camp,
though he had come with high expectation, yet by advancing rashly, made
a shameful end; and at night crossed the river, without even giving the
signal for breaking up the camp, and returned to the ground from which
he came, and there encamped near the river, on an elevated situation.
After a few days, he placed a party of horse in ambush in the night,
where our men had usually gone to forage for several days before. And
when Quintus Varus, commander of Domitius's horse, came there as usual,
they suddenly rushed from their ambush. But our men bravely supported
their charge, and returned quickly every man to his own rank, and in
their turn, made a general charge on the enemy: and having killed about
eighty of them, and put the rest to flight, retreated to their camp with
the loss of only two men.

XXXVIII.--After these transactions, Domitius, hoping to allure Scipio to
a battle, pretended to be obliged to change his position through want of
corn, and having given the signal for decamping, advanced about three
miles, and posted his army and cavalry in a convenient place, concealed
from the enemy's view. Scipio being in readiness to pursue him, detached
his cavalry and a considerable number of light infantry to explore
Domitius's route. When they had marched a short way, and their foremost
troops were within reach of our ambush, their suspicions being raised by
the neighing of the horses, they began to retreat: and the rest who
followed them, observing with what speed they retreated, made a halt.
Our men, perceiving that the enemy had discovered their plot, and
thinking it in vain to wait for any more, having got two troops in their
power, intercepted them. Among them was Marcus Opimius, general of the
horse, but he made his escape: they either killed or took prisoners all
the rest of these two troops, and brought them to Domitius.

XXXIX.--Caesar, having drawn his garrisons out of the sea-ports, as
before mentioned, left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town, and
committed to them the charge of his ships of war, which he had
transported from Italy. Acilius, as lieutenant-general, had the charge
of this duty and the command of the town; he drew the ships into the
inner part of the harbour, behind the town, and fastened them to the
shore, and sank a merchant-ship in the mouth of the harbour to block it
up; and near it he fixed another at anchor, on which he raised a turret,
and faced it to the entrance of the port, and filled it with soldiers,
and ordered them to keep guard against any sudden attack.

XL.--Cneius, Pompey's son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having got
intelligence of these things, came to Oricum, and weighed up the ship,
that had been sunk, with a windlass, and by straining at it with several
ropes, and attacked the other which had been placed by Acilius to watch
the port with several ships, on which he had raised very high turrets,
so that fighting as it were from an eminence, and sending fresh men
constantly to relieve the fatigued, and at the same time attempting the
town on all sides by land, with ladders and his fleet, in order to
divide the force of his enemies, he overpowered our men by fatigue, and
the immense number of darts, and took the ship, having beat off the men
who were put on board to defend it, who, however, made their escape in
small boats; and at the same time he seized a natural mole on the
opposite side, which almost formed an island over against the town. He
carried over land, into the inner part of the harbour, four galleys, by
putting rollers under them, and driving them on with levers. Then
attacking on both sides the ships of war which were moored to the shore,
and were not manned, he carried off four of them, and set the rest on
fire. After despatching this business, he left Decimus Laelius, whom he
had taken away from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to hinder
provisions from being brought into the town from Biblis and Amantia, and
went himself to Lissus, where he attacked thirty merchantmen, left
within the port by Antonius, and set them on fire. He attempted to storm
Lissus, but being delayed three days by the vigorous defence of the
Roman citizens who belonged to that district, and of the soldiers which
Caesar had sent to keep garrison there, and having lost a few men in the
assault, he returned without effecting his object.

XLI.--As soon as Caesar heard that Pompey was at Asparagium, he set out
for that place with his army, and having taken the capital of the
Parthinians on his march, where there was a garrison of Pompey's, he
reached Pompey in Macedonia, on the third day, and encamped beside him;
and the day following, having drawn out all his forces before his camp,
he offered Pompey battle. But perceiving that he kept within his
trenches, he led his army back to his camp, and thought of pursuing some
other plan. Accordingly, the day following, he set out with all his
forces by a long circuit, through a difficult and narrow road to
Dyrrachium; hoping, either that Pompey would be compelled to follow him
to Dyrrachium, or that his communication with it might be cut off,
because he had deposited there all his provisions and mat['e]riel of
war. And so it happened; for Pompey, at first not knowing his design,
because he imagined he had taken a route in a different direction from
that country, thought that the scarcity of provisions had obliged him to
shift his quarters; but having afterwards got true intelligence from his
scouts, he decamped the day following, hoping to prevent him by taking a
shorter road; which Caesar suspecting might happen, encouraged his
troops to submit cheerfully to the fatigue, and having halted a very
small part of the night, he arrived early in the morning at Dyrrachium,
when the van of Pompey's army was visible at a distance, and there he
encamped.

XLII.--Pompey, being cut off from Dyrrachium, as he was unable to effect
his purpose, took a new resolution, and entrenched himself strongly on a
rising ground, which is called Petra, where ships of a small size can
come in, and be sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of his
men-of-war to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought from
Asia, and from all the countries of which he kept possession. Caesar,
imagining that the war would be protracted to too great a length, and
despairing of his convoys from Italy, because all the coasts were
guarded with great diligence by Pompey's adherents; and because his own
fleets, which he had built during the winter, in Sicily, Gaul, and
Italy, were detained; sent Lucius Canuleius into Epirus to procure corn;
and because these countries were too remote, he fixed granaries in
certain places, and regulated the carriage of the corn for the
neighbouring states. He likewise gave directions that search should be
made for whatever corn was in Lissus, the country of the Parthini, and
all the places of strength. The quantity was very small, both from the
nature of the land (for the country is rough and mountainous, and the
people commonly import what grain they use); and because Pompey had
foreseen what would happen, and some days before had plundered the
Parthini, and having ravaged and dug up their houses, carried off all
the corn, which he collected by means of his horse.

XLIII.--Caesar, on being informed of these transactions, pursued
measures suggested by the nature of the country. For round Pompey's
camps there were several high and rough hills. These he first of all
occupied with guards, and raised strong forts on them. Then drawing a
fortification from one fort to another, as the nature of each position
allowed, he began to draw a line of circumvallation round Pompey; with
these views; as he had but a small quantity of corn, and Pompey was
strong in cavalry, that he might furnish his army with corn and other
necessaries from all sides with less danger: secondly, to prevent Pompey
from foraging, and thereby render his horse ineffectual in the
operations of the war; and thirdly, to lessen his reputation, on which
he saw he depended greatly, among foreign nations, when a report should
have spread throughout the world that he was blockaded by Caesar, and
dare not hazard a battle.

XLIV.--Neither was Pompey willing to leave the sea and Dyrrachium,
because he had lodged his mat['e]riel there, his weapons, arms, and
engines; and supplied his army with corn from it by his ships: nor was
he able to put a stop to Caesar's works without hazarding a battle,
which at that time he had determined not to do. Nothing was left but to
adopt the last resource, namely, to possess himself of as many hills as
he could, and cover as great an extent of country as possible with his
troops, and divide Caesar's forces as much as possible; and so it
happened: for having raised twenty-four forts, and taken in a compass of
fifteen miles, he got forage in this space, and within this circuit
there were several fields lately sown, in which the cattle might feed in
the meantime. And as our men, who had completed their works by drawing
lines of communication from one fort to another, were afraid that
Pompey's men would sally out from some part, and attack us in the rear;
so the enemy were making a continued fortification in a circuit within
ours to prevent us from breaking in on any side, or surrounding them on
the rear. But they completed their works first; both because they had a
greater number of men, and because they had a smaller compass to
enclose. When Caesar attempted to gain any place, though Pompey had
resolved not to oppose him with his whole force or to come to a general
engagement; yet he detached to particular places slingers and archers,
with which his army abounded, and several of our men were wounded, and
filled with great dread of the arrows; and almost all the soldiers made
coats or coverings for themselves of hair cloths, tarpaulins, or raw
hides to defend them against the weapons.

XLV.--In seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost power: Caesar, to
confine Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible; Pompey, to occupy
as many hills as he could in as large a circuit as possible, and several
skirmishes were fought in consequence of it. In one of these, when
Caesar's ninth legion had gained a certain post, and had begun to
fortify it; Pompey possessed himself of a hill near to and opposite the
same place, and endeavoured to annoy the men while at work; and as the
approach on one side was almost level, he first surrounded it with
archers and slingers, and afterwards by detaching a strong party of
light infantry, and using his engines, he stopped our works: and it was
no easy matter for our men at once to defend themselves, and to proceed
with their fortifications. When Caesar perceived that his troops were
wounded from all sides, he determined to retreat and give up the post;
his retreat was down a precipice, on which account they pushed on with
more spirit, and would not allow us to retire, because they imagined
that we resigned the place through fear. It is reported that Pompey said
that day in triumph to his friends about him, "That he would consent to
be accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions effected a
retreat without considerable loss from that ground into which they had
rashly advanced."

XLVI.--Caesar, being uneasy about the retreat of his soldiers, ordered
hurdles to be carried to the further side of the hill, and to be placed
opposite to the enemy, and behind them a trench of a moderate breadth to
be sunk by his soldiers under shelter of the hurdles: and the ground to
be made as difficult as possible. He himself disposed slingers in
convenient places to cover our men in their retreat. These things being
completed, he ordered his legions to file off. Pompey's men insultingly
and boldly pursued and chased us, levelling the hurdles that were thrown
up in the front of our works, in order to pass over the trench. Which as
soon as Caesar perceived, being afraid that his men would appear not to
retreat, but to be repulsed, and that greater loss might be sustained,
when his men were almost half way down the hill, he encouraged them by
Antonius, who commanded that legion, ordered the signal of battle to be
sounded, and a charge to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth
legion suddenly closing their files threw their javelins, and advancing
impetuously from the low ground up the steep, drove Pompey's men
precipitately before them, and obliged them to turn their backs; but
their retreat was greatly impeded by the hurdles that lay in a long line
before them, and the pallisadoes which were in their way, and the
trenches that were sunk. But our men being contented to retreat without
injury, having killed several of the enemy, and lost but five of their
own, very quietly retired, and having seized some other hills somewhat
on this side of that place, completed their fortifications.

XLVII.--This method of conducting a war was new and unusual, as well on
account of the number of forts, the extent and greatness of the works,
and the manner of attack and defence, as on account of other
circumstances. For all who have attempted to besiege any person, have
attacked the enemy when they were frightened or weak, or after a defeat;
or have been kept in fear of some attack, when they themselves have had
a superior force both of foot and horse. Besides, the usual design of a
siege is to cut off the enemy's supplies. On the contrary, Caesar, with
an inferior force, was enclosing troops sound and unhurt, and who had
abundance of all things. For there arrived every day a prodigious number
of ships, which brought them provisions: nor could the wind blow from
any point that would not be favourable to some of them. Whereas, Caesar,
having consumed all the corn far and near, was in very great distress,
but his soldiers bore all with uncommon patience. For they remembered
that they lay under the same difficulties last year in Spain, and yet by
labour and patience had concluded a dangerous war. They recollected too
that they had suffered an alarming scarcity at Alesia, and a much
greater at Avaricum, and yet had returned victorious over mighty
nations. They refused neither barley nor pulse when offered them, and
they held in great esteem cattle, of which they got great quantities
from Epirus.

XLVIII.--There was a sort of root, called chara, discovered by the
troops which served under Valerius. This they mixed up with milk, and it
greatly contributed to relieve their want. They made it into a sort of
bread. They had great plenty of it: loaves made of this, when Pompey's
men upbraided ours with want, they frequently threw among them to damp
their hopes.

XLIX.--The corn was now beginning to ripen, and their hope supported
their want, as they were confident of having abundance in a short time.
And there were frequently heard declarations of the soldiers on guard,
in discourse with each other, that they would rather live on the bark of
the trees, than let Pompey escape from their hands. For they were often
told by deserters, that they could scarcely maintain their horses, and
that their other cattle was dead: that they themselves were not in good
health from their confinement within so narrow a compass, from the
noisome smell, the number of carcasses, and the constant fatigue to
them, being men unaccustomed to work, and labouring under a great want
of water. For Caesar had either turned the course of all the rivers and
streams which ran to the sea, or had dammed them up with strong works.
And as the country was mountainous, and the valleys narrow at the
bottom, he enclosed them with piles sunk in the ground, and heaped up
mould against them to keep in the water. They were therefore obliged to
search for low and marshy grounds, and to sink wells, and they had this
labour in addition to their daily works. And even these springs were at
a considerable distance from some of their posts, and soon dried up with
the heat. But Caesar's army enjoyed perfect health and abundance of
water, and had plenty of all sorts of provisions except corn; and they
had a prospect of better times approaching, and saw greater hopes laid
before them by the ripening of the grain.

L.--In this new kind of war, new methods of managing it were invented by
both generals. Pompey's men, perceiving by our fires at night, at what
part of the works our cohorts were on guard, coming silently upon them
discharged their arrows at random among the whole multitude, and
instantly retired to their camp: as a remedy against which our men were
taught by experience to light their fires in one place, and keep guard
in another.

 * * * * *

LI.--In the meantime, Publius Sylla, whom Caesar at his departure had
left governor of his camp, came up with two legions to assist the
cohort; upon whose arrival Pompey's forces were easily repulsed. Nor did
they stand the sight and charge of our men, and the foremost falling,
the rest turned their backs and quitted the field. But Sylla called our
men in from the pursuit, lest their ardour should carry them too far,
but most people imagine, that if he had consented to a vigorous pursuit,
the war might have been ended that day. His conduct however does not
appear to deserve censure; for the duties of a lieutenant-general and of
a commander-in-chief are very different; the one is bound to act
entirely according to his instructions, the other to regulate his
conduct without control, as occasion requires. Sylla, being deputed by
Caesar to take care of the camp, and having rescued his men, was
satisfied with that, and did not desire to hazard a battle (although
this circumstance might probably have had a successful issue), that he
might not be thought to have assumed the part of the general. One
circumstance laid the Pompeians under great difficulty in making good a
retreat: for they had advanced from disadvantageous ground, and were
posted on the top of a hill. If they attempted to retire down the steep,
they dreaded the pursuit of our men from the rising ground, and there
was but a short time till sunset: for in hopes of completing the
business, they had protracted the battle almost till night. Taking
therefore measures suited to their exigency, and to the shortness of the
time, Pompey possessed himself of an eminence, at such a distance from
our fort, that no weapon discharged from an engine could reach him. Here
he took up a position, and fortified it, and kept all his forces there.

LII.--At the same time, there were engagements in two other places; for
Pompey had attacked several forts at once, in order to divide our
forces; that no relief might be sent from the neighbouring posts. In one
place, Volcatius Tullus sustained the charge of a legion with three
cohorts, and beat them off the field. In another, the Germans, having
sallied over our fortifications, slew several of the enemy, and
retreated safe to our camp.

LIII.--Thus six engagements having happened in one day, three at
Dyrrachium, and three at the fortifications, when a computation was made
of the number of slain, we found that about two thousand fell on
Pompey's side, several of them volunteer veterans and centurions. Among
them was Valerius, the son of Lucius Flaccus, who as praetor had
formerly had the government of Asia, and six military standards were
taken. Of our men, not more than twenty were missing in all the action.
But in the fort, not a single soldier escaped without a wound; and in
one cohort, four centurions lost their eyes. And being desirous to
produce testimony of the fatigue they underwent, and the danger they
sustained, they counted to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had
been thrown into the fort; and in the shield of the centurion Scaeva,
which was brought to him, were found two hundred and thirty holes. In
reward for this man's services both to himself and the republic, Caesar
presented to him two hundred thousand pieces of copper money, and
declared him promoted from the eighth to the first centurion. For it
appeared that the fort had been in a great measure saved by his
exertions; and he afterwards very amply rewarded the cohorts with double
pay, corn, clothing, and other military honours.

LIV.--Pompey, having made great additions to his works in the night, the
following days built turrets, and having carried his works fifteen feet
high, faced that part of his camp with mantlets; and after an interval
of five days, taking advantage of a second cloudy night, he barricaded
all the gates of his camp to hinder a pursuit, and about midnight
quietly marched off his army, and retreated to his old fortifications.

LV.--Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochis, being reduced, as we have
related, by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, Caesar thought he
ought to attempt the conquest of Achaia, and to advance farther into the
country. Accordingly, he detached Fufius thither, and ordered Quintus
Sabinus and Cassius to join him with their cohorts. Upon notice of their
approach, Rutilius Lupus, who commanded in Achaia, under Pompey, began
to fortify the Isthmus, to prevent Fufius from coming into Achaia.
Kalenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus, by a voluntary
submission of those states. Some he subdued by force, the rest he
endeavoured to win over to Caesar's interest, by sending deputies round
to them. In these things, principally, Fufius was employed.

LVI.--Every day afterwards, Caesar drew up his army on a level ground,
and offered Pompey battle, and led his legions almost close to Pompey's
camp; and his front line was at no greater distance from the rampart
than that no weapons from their engines could reach it. But Pompey, to
save his credit and reputation with the world, drew out his legions, but
so close to his camp that his rear lines might touch the rampart, and
that his whole army, when drawn up, might be protected by the darts
discharged from it.

LVII.--Whilst these things were going forward in Achaia and at
Dyrrachium, and when it was certainly known that Scipio was arrived in
Macedonia, Caesar, never losing sight of his first intention, sends
Clodius to him, an intimate friend to both, whom Caesar, on the
introduction and recommendation of Pompey, had admitted into the number
of his acquaintance. To this man he gave letters and instructions to
Pompey, the substance of which was as follows: "That he had made every
effort towards peace, and imputed the ill success of those efforts to
the fault of those whom he had employed to conduct those negotiations:
because they were afraid to carry his proposals to Pompey at an improper
time. That Scipio had such authority, that he could not only freely
explain what conduct met his approbation, but even in some degree
enforce his advice, and govern him [Pompey] if he persisted in error;
that he commanded an army independent of Pompey, so that besides his
authority, he had strength to compel; and if he did so, all men would be
indebted to him for the quiet of Italy, the peace of the provinces, and
the preservation of the empire." These proposals Clodius made to him,
and for some days at the first appeared to have met with a favourable
reception, but afterwards was not admitted to an audience; for Scipio
being reprimanded by Favonius, as we found afterwards when the war was
ended, and the negotiation having miscarried, Clodius returned to
Caesar.

LVIII.--Caesar, that he might the more easily keep Pompey's horse
enclosed within Dyrrachium, and prevent them from foraging, fortified
the two narrow passes already mentioned with strong works, and erected
forts at them. Pompey perceiving that he derived no advantage from his
cavalry, after a few days had them conveyed back to his camp by sea.
Fodder was so exceedingly scarce that he was obliged to feed his horses
upon leaves stripped off the trees, or the tender roots of reeds
pounded. For the corn which had been sown within the lines was already
consumed, and they would be obliged to supply themselves with fodder
from Corcyra and Acarnania, over a long tract of sea; and as the
quantity of that fell short, to increase it by mixing barley with it,
and by these methods support their cavalry. But when not only the barley
and fodder in these parts were consumed, and the herbs cut away, when
the leaves too were not to be found on the trees, the horses being
almost starved, Pompey thought he ought to make some attempt by a sally.

LIX.--In the number of Caesar's cavalry were two Allobrogians, brothers,
named Roscillus and Aegus, the sons of Abducillus, who for several years
possessed the chief power in his own state; men of singular valour,
whose gallant services Caesar had found very useful in all his wars in
Gaul. To them, for these reasons, he had committed the offices of
greatest honour in their own country, and took care to have them chosen
into the senate at an unusual age, and had bestowed on them lands taken
from the enemy, and large pecuniary rewards, and from being needy had
made them affluent. Their valour had not only procured them Caesar's
esteem, but they were beloved by the whole army. But presuming on
Caesar's friendship, and elated with the arrogance natural to a foolish
and barbarous people, they despised their countrymen, defrauded their
cavalry of their pay, and applied all the plunder to their own use.
Displeased at this conduct, their soldiers went in a body to Caesar, and
openly complained of their ill usage; and to their other charges added,
that false musters were given in to Caesar, and the surcharged pay
applied to their own use.

LX.--Caesar, not thinking it a proper time to call them to account, and
willing to pardon many faults, on account of their valour, deferred the
whole matter, and gave them a private rebuke, for having made a traffic
of their troops, and advised them to expect everything from his
friendship, and by his past favours to measure their future hopes. This,
however, gave them great offence, and made them contemptible in the eyes
of the whole army. Of this they became sensible, as well from the
reproaches of others, as from the judgment of their own minds, and a
consciousness of guilt. Prompted then by shame, and perhaps imagining
that they were not liberated from trial, but reserved to a future day,
they resolved to break off from us, to put their fortune to a new
hazard, and to make trial of new connections. And having conferred with
a few of their clients, to whom they could venture to entrust so base an
action, they first attempted to assassinate Caius Volusenus, general of
the horse (as was discovered at the end of the war), that they might
appear to have fled to Pompey after conferring an important service on
him. But when that appeared too difficult to put in execution, and no
opportunity offered to accomplish it, they borrowed all the money they
could, as if they designed to make satisfaction and restitution for what
they had defrauded: and having purchased a great number of horses, they
deserted to Pompey along with those whom they had engaged in their plot.

LXI.--As they were persons nobly descended and of liberal education, and
had come with a great retinue, and several cattle, and were reckoned men
of courage, and had been in great esteem with Caesar, and as it was a
new and uncommon event, Pompey carried them round all his works, and
made an ostentatious show of them, for till that day, not a soldier,
either horse or foot, had deserted from Caesar to Pompey, though there
were desertions almost every day from Pompey to Caesar: but more
commonly among the soldiers levied in Epirus and Aetolia, and in those
countries which were in Caesar's possession. But the brothers, having
been acquainted with all things, either what was incomplete in our
works, or what appeared to the best judges of military matters to be
deficient, the particular times, the distance of places, and the various
attention of the guards, according to the different temper and character
of the officer who commanded the different posts, gave an exact account
of all to Pompey.

LXII.--Upon receiving this intelligence, Pompey, who had already formed
the design of attempting a sally, as before mentioned, ordered the
soldiers to make ozier coverings for their helmets, and to provide
fascines. These things being prepared, he embarked on board small boats
and row galleys by night, a considerable number of light infantry and
archers, with all their fascines, and immediately after midnight, he
marched sixty cohorts drafted from the greater camp and the outposts, to
that part of our works which extended towards the sea, and were at the
farthest distance from Caesar's greater camp. To the same place he sent
the ships, which he had freighted with the fascines and light-armed
troops; and all the ships of war that lay at Dyrrachium; and to each he
gave particular instructions: at this part of the lines Caesar had
posted Lentulus Marcellinus, the quaestor, with the ninth legion, and as
he was not in a good state of health, Fulvius Costhumus was sent to
assist him in the command.

LXIII.--At this place, fronting the enemy, there was a ditch fifteen
feet wide, and a rampart ten feet high, and the top of the rampart was
ten feet in breadth. At an interval of six hundred feet from that there
was another rampart turned the contrary way, with the works lower. For
some days before, Caesar, apprehending that our men might be surrounded
by sea, had made a double rampart there, that if he should be attacked
on both sides, he might have the means in defending himself. But the
extent of the lines, and the incessant labour for so many days, because
he had enclosed a circuit of seventeen miles with his works, did not
allow time to finish them. Therefore the transverse rampart which should
make a communication between the other two, was not yet completed. This
circumstance was known to Pompey, being told to him by the Allobrogian
deserters, and proved of great disadvantage to us. For when our cohorts
of the ninth legion were on guard by the sea-side, Pompey's army arrived
suddenly by break of day, and their approach was a surprise to our men,
and at the same time, the soldiers that came by sea cast their darts on
the front rampart; and the ditches were filled with fascines: and the
legionary soldiers terrified those that defended the inner rampart, by
applying the scaling ladders, and by engines and weapons of all sorts,
and a vast multitude of archers poured round upon them from every side.
Besides, the coverings of oziers, which they had laid over their
helmets, were a great security to them against the blows of stones which
were the only weapons that our soldiers had. And therefore, when our men
were oppressed in every manner, and were scarcely able to make
resistance, the defect in our works was observed, and Pompey's soldiers,
landing between the two ramparts, where the work was unfinished,
attacked our men in the rear, and having beat them from both sides of
the fortification, obliged them to flee.

LXIV.--Marcellinus, being informed of this disorder, detached some
cohorts to the relief of our men, who seeing them flee from the camp,
were neither able to persuade them to rally at their approach, nor
themselves to sustain the enemy's charge. And in like manner, whatever
additional assistance was sent, was infected by the fears of the
defeated, and increased the terror and danger. For retreat was prevented
by the multitude of the fugitives. In that battle, when the eagle-bearer
was dangerously wounded, and began to grow weak, having got sight of our
horse, he said to them, "This eagle have I defended with the greatest
care for many years, at the hazard of my life, and now in my last
moments restore it to Caesar with the same fidelity. Do not, I conjure
you, suffer a dishonour to be sustained in the field, which never before
happened to Caesar's army, but deliver it safe into his hands." By this
accident the eagle was preserved, but all the centurions of the first
cohorts were killed, except the principal.

LXV.--And now the Pompeians, after great havoc of our troops, were
approaching Marcellinus's camp, and had struck no small terror into the
rest of the cohorts, when Marcus Antonius, who commanded the nearest
fort, being informed of what had happened, was observed descending from
the rising ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival checked the
Pompeians, and encouraged our men to recover from their extreme
affright. And shortly after, Caesar having got notice by the smoke from
all the forts, which was the usual signal on such occasions, drafted off
some cohorts from the outposts, and went to the scene of action. And
having there learnt the loss he had sustained, and perceiving that
Pompey had forced our works, and had encamped along the coast, so that
he was at liberty to forage, and had a communication with his shipping,
he altered his plan for conducting the war, as his design had not
succeeded, and ordered a strong encampment to be made near Pompey.

LXVI.--When this work was finished, Caesar's scouts observed that some
cohorts, which to them appeared like a legion, were retired behind the
wood, and were on their march to the old camp. The situation of the two
camps was as follows: a few days before, when Caesar's ninth legion had
opposed a party of Pompey's troops, and were endeavouring to enclose
them, Caesar's troops formed a camp in that place. This camp joined a
certain wood, and was not above four hundred paces distant from the sea.
Afterwards, changing his design for certain reasons, Caesar removed his
camp to a small distance beyond that place; and after a few days, Pompey
took possession of it, and added more extensive works, leaving the inner
rampart standing, as he intended to keep several legions there. By this
means, the lesser camp included within the greater, answered the purpose
of a fort and citadel. He had also carried an entrenchment from the left
angle of the camp to the river, about four hundred paces, that his
soldiers might have more liberty and less danger in fetching water. But
he too, changing his design for reasons not necessary to be mentioned,
abandoned the place. In this condition the camp remained for several
days, the works being all entire.

LXVII.--Caesar's scouts brought him word that the standard of a legion
was carried to this place. That the same thing was seen he was assured
by those in the higher forts. This place was half a mile distant from
Pompey's new camp. Caesar, hoping to surprise this legion, and anxious
to repair the loss sustained that day, left two cohorts employed in the
works to make an appearance of entrenching himself, and by a different
route, as privately as he could, with his other cohorts amounting to
thirty-three, among which was the ninth legion, which had lost so many
centurions, and whose privates were greatly reduced in number, he
marched in two lines against Pompey's legion and his lesser camp. Nor
did this first opinion deceive him. For he reached the place before
Pompey could have notice of it; and though the works were strong, yet
having made the attack with the left wing, which he commanded in person,
he obliged the Pompeians to quit the rampart in disorder. A barricade
had been raised before the gates, at which a short contest was
maintained, our men endeavouring to force their way in, and the enemy to
defend the camp; Titus Pulcio, by whose means we have related that Caius
Antonius's army was betrayed, defending them with singular courage. But
the valour of our men prevailed, and having cut down the barricade, they
first forced the greater camp, and after that the fort which was
enclosed within it: and as the legion on its repulse had retired to
this, they slew several defending themselves there.

LXVIII.--But Fortune, who exerts a powerful influence as well in other
matters, as especially in war, effects great changes from trifling
causes, as happened at this time. For the cohorts on Caesar's right
wing, through ignorance of the place, followed the direction of that
rampart, which ran along from the camp to the river, whilst they were in
search of a gate, and imagined that it belonged to the camp. But when
they found that it led to the river, and that nobody opposed them, they
immediately climbed over the rampart, and were followed by all our
cavalry.

LXIX.--In the meantime Pompey, by the great delay which this occasioned,
being informed of what had happened, marched with the fifth legion,
which he called away from their work to support his party; and at the
same time his cavalry were advancing up to ours, and an army in order of
battle was seen at a distance by our men who had taken possession of the
camp, and the face of affairs was suddenly changed. For Pompey's legion,
encouraged by the hope of speedy support, attempted to make a stand at
the Decuman gate, and made a bold charge on our men. Caesar's cavalry,
who had mounted the rampart by a narrow breach, being apprehensive of
their retreat, were the first to flee. The right wing, which had been
separated from the left, observing the terror of the cavalry, to prevent
their being overpowered within the lines, were endeavouring to retreat
by the same way as they burst in; and most of them, lest they should be
engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves down a rampart ten feet
high into the trenches; and the first being trodden to death, the rest
procured their safety and escaped over their bodies. The soldiers of the
left wing, perceiving from the rampart that Pompey was advancing, and
their own friends fleeing, being afraid that they should be enclosed
between the two ramparts, as they had an enemy both within and without,
strove to secure their retreat the same way they came. All was disorder,
consternation, and flight; insomuch that, when Caesar laid hold of the
colours of those who were running away, and desired them to stand, some
left their horses behind, and continued to run in the same manner;
others through fear even threw away their colours, nor did a single man
face about.

LXX.--In this calamity, the following favourable circumstance occurred
to prevent the ruin of our whole army, viz., that Pompey suspecting an
ambuscade (because, as I suppose, the success had far exceeded his
hopes, as he had seen his men a moment before fleeing from the camp),
durst not for some time approach the fortification; and that his horse
were retarded from pursuing, because the passes and gates were in
possession of Caesar's soldiers. Thus a trifling circumstance proved of
great importance to each party; for the rampart drawn from the camp to
the river, interrupted the progress and certainty of Caesar's victory,
after he had forced Pompey's camp. The same thing, by retarding the
rapidity of the enemy's pursuit, preserved our army.

LXXI.--In the two actions of this day, Caesar lost nine hundred and
sixty rank and file, several Roman knights of distinction, Felginas
Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son; Caius Felginas from Placentia; Aulus
Gravius from Puteoli; Marcus Sacrativir from Capua; and thirty-two
military tribunes and centurions. But the greatest part of all these
perished without a wound, being trodden to death in the trenches, on the
ramparts and banks of the river by reason of the terror and flight of
their own men. Pompey, after this battle, was saluted Imperator; this
title he retained, and allowed himself to be addressed by it afterwards.
But neither in his letters to the senate, nor in the fasces, did he use
the laurel as a mark of honour. But Labienus, having obtained his
consent that the prisoners should be delivered up to him, had them all
brought out, as it appeared, to make a show of them, and that Pompey
might place a greater confidence in him who was a deserter; and calling
them fellow soldiers, and asking them in the most insulting manner
whether it was usual with veterans to flee, ordered them to be put to
death in the sight of the whole army.

LXXII.-Pompey's party were so elated with confidence and spirit at this
success, that they thought no more of the method of conducting the war,
but thought that they were already conquerors. They did not consider
that the smallness of our numbers, and the disadvantage of the place and
the confined nature of the ground occasioned by their having first
possessed themselves of the camp, and the double danger both from within
and without the fortifications, and the separation of the army into two
parts, so that the one could not give relief to the other, were the
cause of our defeat. They did not consider, in addition, that the
contest was not decided by a vigorous attack, nor a regular battle; and
that our men had suffered greater loss from their numbers and want of
room, than they had sustained from the enemy. In fine, they did not
reflect on the common casualties of war; how trifling causes, either
from groundless suspicions, sudden affright, or religious scruples, have
oftentimes been productive of considerable losses; how often an army has
been unsuccessful either by the misconduct of the general, or the
oversight of a tribune; but as if they had proved victorious by their
valour, and as if no change could ever take place, they published the
success of the day throughout the world by reports and letters.

LXXIII.--Caesar, disappointed in his first intentions, resolved to
change the whole plan of his operations. Accordingly, he at once called
in all out-posts, gave over the siege, and collecting his army into one
place, addressed his soldiers and encouraged them "not to be troubled at
what had happened, nor to be dismayed at it, but to weigh their many
successful engagements against one disappointment, and that, too, a
trifling one. That they ought to be grateful to Fortune, through whose
favour they had recovered Italy without the effusion of blood; through
whose favour they had subdued the two Spains, though protected by a most
warlike people under the command of the most skilful and experienced
generals: through whose favour they had reduced to submission the
neighbouring states that abounded with corn: in fine, that they ought to
remember with what success they had been all transported safe through
blockading fleets of the enemy, which possessed not only the ports, but
even the coasts: that if all their attempts were not crowned with
success, the defects of Fortune must be supplied by industry; and
whatever loss had been sustained, ought to be attributed rather to her
caprices than to any faults in him: that he had chosen a safe ground for
the engagement, that he had possessed himself of the enemy's camp; that
he had beaten them out, and overcome them when they offered resistance;
but whether their own terror or some mistake, or whether Fortune herself
had interrupted a victory almost secured and certain, they ought all now
to use their utmost efforts to repair by their valour the loss which had
been incurred; if they did so, their misfortunes would turn to their
advantage, as it happened at Gergovia, and those who feared to face the
enemy would be the first to offer themselves to battle.

LXXIV.--Having concluded his speech, he disgraced some standard-bearers,
and reduced them to the ranks; for the whole army was seized with such
grief at their loss, and with such an ardent desire of repairing their
disgrace, that not a man required the command of his tribune or
centurion, but they imposed each on himself severer labours than usual
as a punishment, and at the same time were so inflamed with eagerness to
meet the enemy, that the officers of the first rank, sensibly affected
at their entreaties, were of opinion that they ought to continue in
their present posts, and commit their fate to the hazard of a battle.
But, on the other hand, Caesar could not place sufficient confidence in
men so lately thrown into consternation, and thought he ought to allow
them time to recover their dejected spirits; and having abandoned his
works, he was apprehensive of being distressed for want of corn.

LXXV.--Accordingly, suffering no time to intervene but what was
necessary for a proper attention to be paid to the sick and wounded, he
sent on all his baggage privately in the beginning of the night from his
camp to Apollonia, and ordered them not to halt till they had performed
their journey; and he detached one legion with them as a convoy. This
affair being concluded, having retained only two legions in his camp; he
marched the rest of his army out at three o'clock in the morning by
several gates, and sent them forward by the same route; and in a short
space after, that the military practice might be preserved, and his
march known as late as possible, he ordered the signal for decamping to
be given; and setting out immediately, and following the rear of his own
army, he was soon out of sight of the camp. Nor did Pompey, as soon as
he had notice of his design, make any delay to pursue him; but with a
view to surprise them whilst encumbered with baggage on their march, and
not yet recovered from their fright, he led his army out of his camp,
and sent his cavalry on to retard our rear; but was not able to come up
with them, because Caesar had got far before him, and marched without
baggage. But when we reached the river Genusus, the banks being steep,
their horse overtook our rear, and detained them by bringing them to
action. To oppose whom, Caesar sent his horse, and intermixed with them
about four hundred of his advanced light troops, who attacked their
horse with such success, that having routed them all, and killed
several, they returned without any loss to the main body.

LXXVI.--Having performed the exact march which he had proposed that day,
and having led his army over the river Genusus, Caesar posted himself in
his old camp opposite Asparagium; and kept his soldiers close within the
entrenchments; and ordered the horse, who had been sent out under
pretence of foraging, to retire immediately into the camp, through the
Decuman gate. Pompey, in like manner, having completed the same day's
march, took post in his old camp at Asparagium; and his soldiers, as
they had no work (the fortifications being entire), made long
excursions, some to collect wood and forage; others, invited by the
nearness of the former camp, laid up their arms in their tents, and
quitted the entrenchments in order to bring what they had left behind
them, because the design of marching being adopted in a hurry, they had
left a considerable part of their waggons and luggage behind. Being thus
incapable of pursuing, as Caesar had foreseen, about noon he gave the
signal for marching, led out his army, and doubling that day's march, he
advanced eight miles beyond Pompey's camp; who could not pursue him,
because his troops were dispersed.

LXXVII.--The next day Caesar sent his baggage forward early in the
night, and marched off himself immediately after the fourth watch: that
if he should be under the necessity of risking an engagement, he might
meet a sudden attack with an army free from incumbrance. He did so for
several days successively, by which means he was enabled to effect his
march over the deepest rivers, and through the most intricate roads
without any loss. For Pompey, after the first day's delay, and the
fatigue which he endured for some days in vain, though he exerted
himself by forced marches, and was anxious to overtake us, who had got
the start of him, on the fourth day desisted from the pursuit, and
determined to follow other measures.

LXXVIII.--Caesar was obliged to go to Apollonia, to lodge his wounded,
pay his army, confirm his friends, and leave garrisons in the towns. But
for these matters, he allowed no more time than was necessary for a
person in haste. And being apprehensive for Domitius, lest he should be
surprised by Pompey's arrival, he hastened with all speed and
earnestness to join him; for he planned the operations of the whole
campaign on these principles: that if Pompey should march after him, he
would be drawn off from the sea, and from those forces which he had
provided in Dyrrachium, and separated from his corn and magazines, and
be obliged to carry on the war on equal terms; but if he crossed over
into Italy, Caesar, having effected a junction with Domitius, would
march through Illyricum to the relief of Italy; but if he endeavoured to
storm Apollonia and Oricum, and exclude him from the whole coast, he
hoped, by besieging Scipio, to oblige him, of necessity, to come to his
assistance. Accordingly, Caesar despatching couriers, writes to
Domitius, and acquaints him with his wishes on the subject: and having
stationed a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and
three at Oricum, besides those who were sick of their wounds, he set
forward on his march through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, also,
guessing at Caesar's design, determined to hasten to Scipio, that if
Caesar should march in that direction, he might be ready to relieve him;
but that if Caesar should be unwilling to quit the sea-coast and
Corcyra, because he expected legions and cavalry from Italy, he himself
might fall on Domitius with all his forces.

LXXIX.--For these reasons, each of them studied despatch, that he might
succour his friends, and not miss an opportunity of surprising his
enemies. But Caesar's engagements at Apolloma had carried him aside from
the direct road. Pompey had taken the short road to Macedonia, through
Candavia. To this was added another unexpected disadvantage, that
Domitius, who for several days had been encamped opposite Scipio, had
quitted that post for the sake of provisions, and had marched to
Heraclea Sentica, a city subject to Candavia; so that fortune herself
seemed to throw him in Pompey's way. Of this, Caesar was ignorant up to
this time. Letters likewise being sent by Pompey through all the
provinces and states, with an account of the action at Dyrrachium, very
much enlarged and exaggerated beyond the real facts, a rumour had been
circulated, that Caesar had been defeated and forced to flee, and had
lost almost all his forces. These reports had made the roads dangerous,
and drawn off some states from his alliance: whence it happened, that
the messengers despatched by Caesar, by several different roads to
Domitius, and by Domitius to Caesar, were not able by any means to
accomplish their journey. But the Allobroges, who were in the retinue of
Aegus and Roscillus, and who had deserted to Pompey, having met on the
road a scouting party of Domitius; either from old acquaintance, because
they had served together in Gaul, or elated with vain glory, gave them
an account of all that had happened, and informed them of Caesar's
departure, and Pompey's arrival. Domitius, who was scarce four hours'
march distant, having got intelligence from these, by the courtesy of
the enemy, avoided the danger, and met Caesar coming to join him at
Aeginium, a town on the confines of and opposite to Thessaly.

LXXX.--The two armies being united, Caesar marched to Gomphi, which is
the first town of Thessaly on the road from Epirus. Now, the
Thessalians, a few months before, had of themselves sent ambassadors to
Caesar, offering him the free use of everything in their power, and
requesting a garrison for their protection. But the report, already
spoken of, of the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had exaggerated in many
particulars, had arrived before him. In consequence of which,
Androsthenes, the praetor of Thessaly, as he preferred to be the
companion of Pompey's victory, rather than Caesar's associate in his
misfortunes, collected all the people, both slaves and freemen, from the
country into the town and shut the gates, and despatched messengers to
Scipio and Pompey "to come to his relief, that he could depend on the
strength of the town, if succour was speedily sent; but that it could
not withstand a long siege." Scipio, as soon as he received advice of
the departure of the armies from Dyrrachium, had marched with his
legions to Larissa: Pompey was not yet arrived near Thessaly. Caesar
having fortified his camp, ordered scaling ladders and pent-houses to be
made for a sudden assault, and hurdles to be provided. As soon as they
were ready, he exhorted his soldiers, and told them of what advantage it
would be to assist them with all sorts of necessaries if they made
themselves masters of a rich and plentiful town: and, at the same time,
to strike terror into other states by the example of this, and to effect
this with speed, before auxiliaries could arrive. Accordingly, taking
advantage of the unusual ardour of the soldiers, he began his assault on
the town at a little after three o'clock on the very day on which he
arrived, and took it, though defended with very high walls, before
sunset, and gave it up to his army to plunder, and immediately decamped
from before it, and marched to Metropolis, with such rapidity as to
outstrip any messenger or rumour of the taking of Gomphi.

LXXXI.--The inhabitants of Metropolis, at first influenced by the same
rumours, followed the same measures, shut the gates and manned their
walls. But when they were made acquainted with the fate of the city of
Gomphi by some prisoners, whom Caesar had ordered to be brought up to
the walls, they threw open their gates. As he preserved them with the
greatest care, there was not a state in Thessaly (except Larissa, which
was awed by a strong army of Scipio's), but on comparing the fate of the
inhabitants of Metropolis with the severe treatment of Gomphi, gave
admission to Caesar, and obeyed his orders. Having chosen a position
convenient for procuring corn, which was now almost ripe on the ground,
he determined there to wait Pompey's arrival, and to make it the centre
of all his warlike operations.

LXXXII.--Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days after, and having
harangued the combined army, returned thanks to his own men, and
exhorted Scipio's soldiers, that as the victory was now secured, they
should endeavour to merit a part of the rewards and booty. And receiving
all the legions into one camp, he shared his honours with Scipio,
ordered the trumpet to be sounded at his tent, and a pavilion to be
erected for him. The forces of Pompey being thus augmented, and two such
powerful armies united, their former expectations were confirmed, and
their hopes of victory so much increased, that whatever time intervened
was considered as so much delay to their return into Italy: and whenever
Pompey acted with slowness and caution, they used to exclaim, that it
was the business only of a single day, but that he had a passion for
power, and was delighted in having persons of consular and praetorian
rank in the number of his slaves. And they now began to dispute openly
about rewards and priesthoods, and disposed of the consulate for several
years to come. Others put in their claims for the houses and properties
of all who were in Caesar's camp, and in that council there was a warm
debate, whether Lucius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompey against the
Parthians, should be admitted a candidate for the praetorship in his
absence at the next election; his friends imploring Pompey's honour to
fulfil the engagements which he had made to him at his departure, that
he might not seem deceived through his authority: whilst others,
embarked in equal labour and danger, pleaded that no individual ought to
have a preference before all the rest.

LXXXIII.--Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinthur, in their
daily quarrels about Caesar's priesthood, openly abused each other in
the most scurrilous language. Lentulus urging the respect due to his
age, Domitius boasting his interest in the city and his dignity, and
Scipio presuming on his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus charged
Lucius Afranius before Pompey with betraying the army in the action that
happened in Spain, and Lucius Domitius declared in the council that it
was his wish that, when the war should be ended, three billets should be
given to all the senators who had taken part with them in the war, and
that they should pass sentence on every single person who had stayed
behind at Rome, or who had been within Pompey's garrisons and had not
contributed their assistance in the military operations; that by the
first billet they should-have power to acquit, by the second to pass
sentence of death, and by the third to impose a pecuniary fine. In
short, Pompey's whole army talked of nothing but the honours or sums of
money which were to be their rewards, or of vengeance on their enemies;
and never considered how they were to defeat their enemies, but in what
manner they should use their victory.

LXXXIV.--Corn being provided, and his soldiers refreshed, and a
sufficient time having elapsed since the engagement at Dyrrachium, when
Caesar thought he had sufficiently sounded the disposition of his
troops, he thought that he ought to try whether Pompey had any intention
or inclination to come to a battle. Accordingly he led his troops out of
the camp, and ranged them in order of battle, at first on their own
ground, and at a small distance from Pompey's camp: but afterwards for
several days in succession he advanced from his own camp, and led them
up to the hills on which Pompey's troops were posted, which conduct
inspired his army every day with fresh courage. However he adhered to
his former purpose respecting his cavalry, for as he was by many degrees
inferior in number, he selected the youngest and most active of the
advanced guard, and desired them to fight intermixed with the horse, and
they by constant practice acquired experience in this kind of battle. By
these means it was brought to pass that a thousand of his horse would
dare, even on open ground, to stand against seven thousand of Pompey's,
if occasion required, and would not be much terrified by their number.
For even on one of those days he was successful in a cavalry action, and
killed one of the two Allobrogians who had deserted to Pompey, as we
before observed, and several others.

LXXXV.--Pompey, because he was encamped on a hill, drew up his army at
the very foot of it, ever in expectation, as may be conjectured, that
Caesar would expose himself to this disadvantageous situation. Caesar,
seeing no likelihood of being able to bring Pompey to an action, judged
it the most expedient method of conducting the war, to decamp from that
post, and to be always in motion: with this hope, that by shifting his
camp and removing from place to place, he might be more conveniently
supplied with corn, and also, that by being in motion he might get some
opportunity of forcing them to battle, and might by constant marches
harass Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to fatigue. These matters
being settled, when the signal for marching was given, and the tents
struck, it was observed that shortly before, contrary to his daily
practice, Pompey's army had advanced farther than usual from his
entrenchments, so that it appeared possible to come to an action on
equal ground. Then Caesar addressed himself to his soldiers, when they
were at the gates of the camp, ready to march out. "We must defer," says
he, "our march at present, and set our thoughts on battle, which has
been our constant wish; let us then meet the foe with resolute souls. We
shall not hereafter easily find such an opportunity." He immediately
marched out at the head of his troops.

LXXXVI.--Pompey also, as was afterward known, at the unanimous
solicitation of his friends, had determined to try the fate of a battle.
For he had even declared in council a few days before that, before the
battalions came to battle, Caesar's army would be put to the rout. When
most people expressed their surprise at it, "I know," says he, "that I
promise a thing almost incredible; but hear the plan on which I proceed,
that you may march to battle with more confidence and resolution. I have
persuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to execute it, as soon as
the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right wing on the flank, and
enclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put them
to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy. By this
means we shall put an end to the war, without endangering the legions,
and almost without a blow. Nor is this a difficult matter, as we far
outnumber them in cavalry." At the same time he gave them notice to be
ready for battle on the day following, and since the opportunity which
they had so often wished for was now arrived, not to disappoint the
opinion generally entertained of their experience and valour.

LXXXVII.--After him Labienus spoke, as well to express his contempt of
Caesar's forces, as to extol Pompey's scheme with the highest encomiums.
"Think not, Pompey," says he, "that this is the army which conquered
Gaul and Germany; I was present at all those battles and do not speak at
random on a subject to which I am a stranger: a very small part of that
army now remains, great numbers lost their lives, as must necessarily
happen in so many battles, many fell victims to the autumnal pestilence
in Italy, many returned home, and many were left behind on the
continent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundisium are
composed of invalids? The forces which you now behold, have been
recruited by levies lately made in Hither Spain, and the greater part
from the colonies beyond the Po; moreover, the flower of the forces
perished in the two engagements at Dyrrachium." Having so said, he took
an oath, never to return to his camp unless victorious; and he
encouraged the rest to do the like. Pompey applauded his proposal, and
took the same oath; nor did any person present hesitate to take it.
After this had passed in the council they broke up full of hopes and
joy, and in imagination anticipated victory; because they thought that
in a matter of such importance, no groundless assertion could be made by
a general of such experience.

LXXXVIII.--When Caesar had approached near Pompey's camp, he observed
that his army was drawn up in the following manner:--On the left wing
were the two legions delivered over by Caesar at the beginning of the
disputes in compliance with the senate's decree, one of which was called
the first, the other the third. Here Pompey commanded in person. Scipio
with the Syrian legions commanded the centre. The Cilician legion in
conjunction with the Spanish cohorts, which we said were brought over by
Afranius, were disposed on the right wing. These Pompey considered his
steadiest troops. The rest he had interspersed between the centre and
the wing, and he had a hundred and ten complete cohorts; these amounted
to forty-five thousand men. He had besides two cohorts of volunteers,
who having received favours from him in former wars, flocked to his
standard: these were dispersed through his whole army. The seven
remaining cohorts he had disposed to protect his camp, and the
neighbouring forts. His right wing was secured by a river with steep
banks; for which reason he placed all his cavalry, archers, and
slingers, on his left wing.

LXXXIX.--Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth
legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much
weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so
close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them
to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a
total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp.
He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P.
Sulla, and of the centre to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post
opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the
enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be
surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort
from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a
fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them
with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended
on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the
entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the
signal whenever he wished them to do so.

XC.--When he was exhorting his army to battle, according to the military
custom, and spoke to them of the favours that they had constantly
received from him, he took especial care to remind them "that he could
call his soldiers to witness the earnestness with which he had sought
peace, the efforts that he had made by Vatinius to gain a conference
[with Labienus], and likewise by Claudius to treat with Scipio, in what
manner he had exerted himself at Oricum, to gain permission from Libo to
send ambassadors; that he had been always reluctant to shed the blood of
his soldiers, and did not wish to deprive the republic of one or other
of her armies." After delivering this speech, he gave by a trumpet the
signal to his soldiers, who were eagerly demanding it, and were very
impatient for the onset.

XCI.--There was in Caesar's army a volunteer of the name of Crastinus,
who the year before had been first centurion of the tenth legion, a man
of pre-eminent bravery. He, when the signal was given, says, "Follow me,
my old comrades, and display such exertions in behalf of your general as
you have determined to do: this is our last battle, and when it shall be
won, he will recover his dignity, and we our liberty." At the same time
he looked back to Caesar, and said, "General, I will act in such a
manner to-day, that you will feel grateful to me living or dead." After
uttering these words he charged first on the right wing, and about one
hundred and twenty chosen volunteers of the same century followed.

XCII.--There was so much space left between the two lines, as sufficed
for the onset of the hostile armies: but Pompey had ordered his soldiers
to await Caesar's attack, and not to advance from their position, or
suffer their line to be put into disorder. And he is said to have done
this by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the impetuosity of the charge
of Caesar's soldiers might be checked, and their line broken, and that
Pompey's troops remaining in their ranks, might attack them while in
disorder; and he thought that the javelins would fall with less force if
the soldiers were kept in their ground, than if they met them in their
course; at the same time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, after
running over double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted
by the fatigue. But to me Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient
reason: for there is a certain impetuosity of spirit and an alacrity
implanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by a
desire to meet the foe. This a general should endeavour not to repress,
but to increase; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that
the trumpets should sound on all sides, and a general shout be raised;
by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with terror, and their
own army inspired with courage.

XCIII.--But our men, when the signal was given, rushed forward with
their javelins ready to be launched, but perceiving that Pompey's men
did not run to meet their charge, having acquired experience by custom,
and being practised in former battles, they of their own accord
repressed their speed, and halted almost midway, that they might not
come up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after a
short respite they again renewed their course, and threw their javelins,
and instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them. Nor did
Pompey's men fail in this crisis, for they received our javelins, stood
our charge, and maintained their ranks: and having launched their
javelins, had recourse to their swords. At the same time Pompey's horse,
according to their orders, rushed out at once from his left wing, and
his whole host of archers poured after them. Our cavalry did not
withstand their charge: but gave ground a little, upon which Pompey's
horse pressed them more vigorously, and began to file off in troops, and
flank our army. When Caesar perceived this, he gave the signal to his
fourth line, which he had formed of the six cohorts. They instantly
rushed forward and charged Pompey's horse with such fury, that not a man
of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but
galloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By their
retreat the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenceless,
were all cut to pieces. The cohorts, pursuing their success, wheeled
about upon Pompey's left wing, whilst his infantry still continued to
make battle, and attacked them in the rear.

XCIV.--At the same time Caesar ordered his third line to advance, which
till then had not been engaged, but had kept their post. Thus, new and
fresh troops having come to the assistance of the fatigued, and others
having made an attack on their rear, Pompey's men were not able to
maintain their ground, but all fled, nor was Caesar deceived in his
opinion that the victory, as he had declared in his speech to his
soldiers, must have its beginning from those six cohorts which he had
placed as a fourth line to oppose the horse. For by them the cavalry
were routed; by them the archers and slingers were cut to pieces; by
them the left wing of Pompey's army was surrounded, and obliged to be
the first to flee. But when Pompey saw his cavalry routed, and that part
of his army on which he reposed his greatest hopes thrown into
confusion, despairing of the rest, he quitted the field, and retreated
straightway on horseback to his camp, and calling to the centurions,
whom he had placed to guard the praetorian gate, with a loud voice, that
the soldiers might hear: "Secure the camp," says he, "defend it with
diligence, if any danger should threaten it; I will visit the other
gates, and encourage the guards of the camp." Having thus said, he
retired into his tent in utter despair, yet anxiously waiting the issue.

XCV.--Caesar having forced the Pompeians to flee into their
entrenchment, and thinking that he ought not to allow them any respite
to recover from their fright, exhorted his soldiers to take advantage of
fortune's kindness, and to attack the camp. Though they were fatigued by
the intense heat, for the battle had continued till mid-day, yet, being
prepared to undergo any labour, they cheerfully obeyed his command. The
camp was bravely defended by the cohorts which had been left to guard
it, but with much more spirit by the Thracians and foreign auxiliaries.
For the soldiers who had fled for refuge to it from the field of battle,
affrighted and exhausted by fatigue, having thrown away their arms and
military standards, had their thoughts more engaged on their further
escape than on the defence of the camp. Nor could the troops who were
posted on the battlements long withstand the immense number of our
darts, but fainting under their wounds, quitted the place, and under the
conduct of their centurions and tribunes, fled, without stopping, to the
high mountains which joined the camp.

XCVI.--In Pompey's camp you might see arbours in which tables were laid,
a large quantity of plate set out, the floors of the tents covered with
fresh sods, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and others shaded with ivy, and
many other things which were proofs of excessive luxury, and a
confidence of victory, so that it might readily be inferred that they
had no apprehensions of the issue of the day, as they indulged
themselves in unnecessary pleasures, and yet upbraided with luxury
Caesar's army, distressed and suffering troops, who had always been in
want of common necessaries. Pompey, as soon as our men had forced the
trenches, mounting his horse, and stripping off his general's habit,
went hastily out of the back gate of the camp, and galloped with all
speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there, but with the same despatch
collecting a few of his flying troops, and halting neither day nor
night, he arrived at the sea-side, attended by only thirty horse, and
went on board a victualling barque, often complaining, as we have been
told, that he had been so deceived in his expectation, that he was
almost persuaded that he had been betrayed by those from whom he had
expected victory, as they began the flight.

XCVII.--Caesar having possessed himself of Pompey's camp, urged his
soldiers not to be too intent on plunder, and lose the opportunity of
completing their conquest. Having obtained their consent, he began to
draw lines round the mountain. The Pompeians distrusting the position,
as there was no water on the mountain, abandoned it, and all began to
retreat towards Larissa; which Caesar perceiving, divided his troops,
and ordering part of his legions to remain in Pompey's camp, sent back a
part to his own camp, and taking four legions with him, went by a
shorter road to intercept the enemy: and having marched six miles, drew
up his army. But the Pompeians observing this, took post on a mountain
whose foot was washed by a river. Caesar having encouraged his troops,
though they were greatly exhausted by incessant labour the whole day,
and night was now approaching, by throwing up works cut off the
communication between the river and the mountain, that the enemy might
not get water in the night. As soon as the work was finished, they sent
ambassadors to treat about a capitulation. A few senators who had
espoused that party, made their escape by night.

XCVIII.--At break of day, Caesar ordered all those who had taken post on
the mountain, to come down from the higher grounds into the plain, and
pile their arms. When they did this without refusal, and with
outstretched arms, prostrating themselves on the ground, with tears,
implored his mercy: he comforted them and bade them rise, and having
spoken a few words of his own clemency to alleviate their fears, he
pardoned them all, and gave orders to his soldiers that no injury should
be done to them, and nothing taken from them. Having used this
diligence, he ordered the legions in his camp to come and meet him, and
those which were, with him to take their turn of rest, and go back to
the camp; and the same day went to Larissa.

XCIX.--In that battle, no more than two hundred privates were missing,
but Caesar lost about thirty centurions, valiant officers. Crastinus,
also, of whom mention was made before, fighting most courageously, lost
his life by the wound of a sword in the mouth; nor was that false which
he declared when marching to battle: for Caesar entertained the highest
opinion of his behaviour in that battle, and thought him highly
deserving of his approbation. Of Pompey's army, there fell about fifteen
thousand; but upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners: for
even the cohorts which were stationed in the forts, surrendered to
Sylla. Several others took shelter in the neighbouring states. One
hundred and eighty stands of colours, and nine eagles, were brought to
Caesar. Lucius Domitius, fleeing from the camp to the mountains, his
strength being exhausted by fatigue, was killed by the horse.

C.--About this time, Decimus Laelius arrived with his fleet at
Brundisium and in the same manner as Libo had done before, possessed
himself of an island opposite the harbour of Brundisium. In like manner,
Valimus, who was then governor of Brundisium, with a few decked barques,
endeavoured to entice Laelius's fleet, and took one five-benched galley
and two smaller vessels that had ventured farther than the rest into a
narrow part of the harbour: and likewise disposing the horse along the
shore, strove to prevent the enemy from procuring fresh water. But
Laelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for his
expedition, supplied himself with water brought in transports from
Corcyra and Dyrrachium, and was not deterred from his purpose; and till
he had received advice of the battle in Thessaly, he could not be forced
either by the disgrace of losing his ships, or by the want of
necessaries, to quit the port and islands.

CI.--Much about the same time, Cassius arrived in Sicily with a fleet of
Syrians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians: and as Caesar's fleet was divided
into two parts, Publius Sulpicius the praetor commanding one division at
Vibo near the straits, Pomponius the other at Messana, Cassius got into
Messana with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of his arrival, and
having found him in disorder, without guards or discipline, and the wind
being high and favourable, he filled several transports with fir, pitch,
and tow, and other combustibles, and sent them against Pomponius's
fleet, and set fire to all his ships, thirty-five in number, twenty of
which were armed with beaks: and this action struck such terror, that
though there was a legion in garrison at Messana, the town with
difficulty held out, and had not the news of Caesar's victory been
brought at that instant by the horse stationed along the coast, it was
generally imagined that it would have been lost, but the town was
maintained till the news arrived very opportunely; and Cassius set sail
from thence to attack Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, and our ships being
moored to the land, to strike the same terror, he acted in the same
manner as before. The wind being favourable, he sent into the port about
forty ships provided with combustibles, and the flame catching on both
sides, five ships were burnt to ashes. And when the fire began to spread
wider by the violence of the wind, the soldiers of the veteran legions,
who had been left to guard the fleet, being considered as invalids,
could not endure the disgrace, but of themselves went on board the ships
and weighed anchor, and having attacked Cassius's fleet, captured two
five-banked galleys, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he made
his escape by taking to a boat. Two three-banked galleys were taken
besides. Intelligence was shortly after received of the action in
Thessaly, so well authenticated, that the Pompeians themselves gave
credit to it; for they had hitherto believed it a fiction of Caesar's
lieutenants and friends. Upon which intelligence Cassius departed with
his fleet from that coast.

CII.--Caesar thought he ought to postpone all business and pursue
Pompey, whithersoever he should retreat; that he might not be able to
provide fresh forces, and renew the war; he therefore marched on every
day, as far as his cavalry were able to advance, and ordered one legion
to follow him by shorter journeys. A proclamation was issued by Pompey
at Amphipolis, that all the young men of that province, Grecians and
Roman citizens, should take the military oath; but whether he issued it
with an intention of preventing suspicion, and to conceal as long as
possible his design of fleeing farther, or to endeavour to keep
possession of Macedonia by new levies, if nobody pursued him, it is
impossible to judge. He lay at anchor one night, and calling together
his friends in Amphipolis, and collecting a sum of money for his
necessary expenses, upon advice of Caesar's approach, set sail from that
place, and arrived in a few days at Mitylene. Here he was detained two
days, and having added a few galleys to his fleet he went to Cilicia,
and thence to Cyprus. There he is informed that, by the consent of all
the inhabitants of Antioch and Roman citizens who traded there, the
castle had been seized to shut him out of the town; and that messengers
had been despatched to all those who were reported to have taken refuge
in the neighbouring states, that they should not come to Antioch; that
if they did that, it would be attended with imminent danger to their
lives. The same thing had happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had been
consul the year before, and to Publius Lentulus a consular senator, and
to several others at Rhodes, who having followed Pompey in his flight,
and arrived at the island, were not admitted into the town or port; and
having received a message to leave that neighbourhood, set sail much
against their will; for the rumour of Caesar's approach had now reached
those states.

CIII.--Pompey, being informed of these proceedings, laid aside his
design of going to Syria, and having taken the public money from the
farmers of the revenue, and borrowed more from some private friends, and
having put on board his ships a large quantity of brass for military
purposes, and two thousand armed men, whom he partly selected from the
slaves of the tax farmers, and partly collected from the merchants, and
such persons as each of his friends thought fit on this occasion, he
sailed for Pelusium. It happened that king Ptolemy, a minor, was there
with a considerable army, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, whom
a few months before, by the assistance of his relations and friends, he
had expelled from the kingdom; and her camp lay at a small distance from
his. To him Pompey applied to be permitted to take refuge in Alexandria,
and to be protected in his calamity by his powerful assistance, in
consideration of the friendship and amity which had subsisted between
his father and him. But Pompey's deputies having executed their
commission, began to converse with less restraint with the king's
troops, and to advise them to act with friendship to Pompey, and not to
think meanly of his bad fortune. In Ptolemy's army were several of
Pompey's soldiers, of whom Gabinius had received the command in Syria,
and had brought them over to Alexandria, and at the conclusion of the
war had left with Ptolemy the father of the young king.

CIV.--The king's friends, who were regents of the kingdom during the
minority, being informed of these things, either induced by fear, as
they afterwards declared, lest Pompey should corrupt the king's army,
and seize on Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his bad fortune, as in
adversity friends commonly change to enemies, in public gave a
favourable answer to his deputies, and desired him to come to the king;
but secretly laid a plot against him, and despatched Achillas, captain
of the king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and Lucius Septimius a
military tribune to assassinate him. Being kindly addressed by them, and
deluded by an acquaintance with Septimius, because in the war with the
pirates the latter had commanded a company under him, he embarked in a
small boat with a few attendants, and was there murdered by Achillas and
Septimius. In like manner, Lucius Lentulus was seized by the king's
order, and put to death in prison.

CV.--When Caesar arrived in Asia, he found that Titus Ampius had
attempted to remove the money from the temple of Diana at Ephesus; and
for this purpose had convened all the senators in the province that he
might have them to attest the sum, but was interrupted by Caesar's
arrival, and had made his escape. Thus, on two occasions, Caesar saved
the money of Ephesus. It was also remarked at Elis, in the temple of
Minerva, upon calculating and enumerating the days, that on the very day
on which Caesar had gained his battle, the image of Victory which was
placed before Minerva, and faced her statue, turned about towards the
portal and entrance of the temple; and the same day, at Antioch in
Syria, such a shout of an army and sound of trumpets was twice heard,
that the citizens ran in arms to the walls. The same thing happened at
Ptolemais; a sound of drums too was heard at Pergamus, in the private
and retired parts of the temple, into which none but the priests are
allowed admission, and which the Greeks call Adyta (the inaccessible),
and likewise at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, in which there stood
a statue consecrated to Caesar; a palm-tree at that time was shown that
had sprouted up from the pavement, through the joints of the stones, and
shot up above the roof.

CVI.--After a few days' delay in Asia, Caesar, having heard that Pompey
had been seen in Cyprus, and conjecturing that he had directed his
course into Egypt, on account of his connection with that kingdom, set
out for Alexandria with two legions (one of which he ordered to follow
him from Thessaly, the other he called in from Achaia, from Fufius, the
lieutenant-general) and with eight hundred horse, ten ships of war from
Rhodes, and a few from Asia. These legions amounted but to three
thousand two hundred men; the rest, disabled by wounds received in
various battles, by fatigue and the length of their march, could not
follow him. But Caesar, relying on the fame of his exploits; did not
hesitate to set forward with a feeble force, and thought that he would
be secure in any place. At Alexandria he was informed of the death of
Pompey: and at his landing there, heard a cry among the soldiers whom
the king had left to garrison the town, and saw a crowd gathering
towards him, because the fasces were carried before him; for this the
whole multitude thought an infringement of the king's dignity. Though
this tumult was appeased, frequent disturbances were raised for several
days successively, by crowds of the populace, and a great many of his
soldiers were killed in all parts of the city.

CVIL--Having observed this, he ordered other legions to be brought to
him from Asia, which he had made up out of Pompey's soldiers; for he was
himself detained against his will, by the etesian winds, which are
totally unfavourable to persons on a voyage from Alexandria. In the
meantime, considering that the disputes of the princes belonged to the
jurisdiction of the Roman people, and of him as consul, and that it was
a duty more incumbent on him, as in his former consulate a league had
been made with Ptolemy the late king, under sanction both of a law, and
a decree of the senate, he signified that it was his pleasure, that king
Ptolemy, and his sister Cleopatra, should disband their armies, and
decide their disputes in his presence by justice, rather than by the
sword.

CVIII.--A eunuch named Pothinus, the boy's tutor, was regent of the
kingdom on account of his youthfulness. He at first began to complain
amongst his friends, and to express his indignation, that the king
should be summoned to plead his cause: but afterwards, having prevailed
on some of those whom he had made acquainted with his views to join him,
he secretly called the army away from Pelusium to Alexandria, and
appointed Achillas, already spoken of, commander-in-chief of the forces.
Him he encouraged and animated by promises both in his own and the
king's name, and instructed him both by letters and messages how he
should act. By the will of Ptolemy the father, the elder of his two sons
and the more advanced in years of his two daughters were declared his
heirs, and for the more effectual performance of his intention, in the
same will he conjured the Roman people by all the gods, and by the
league which he had entered into at Rome, to see his will executed. One
of the copies of his will was conveyed to Rome by his ambassadors to be
deposited in the treasury, but the public troubles preventing it, it was
lodged with Pompey: another was left sealed up, and kept at Alexandria.

CIX.--Whilst these things were debated before Caesar, and he was very
anxious to settle the royal disputes as a common friend and arbitrator;
news was brought on a sudden that the king's army and all his cavalry
were on their march to Alexandria. Caesar's forces were by no means so
strong that he could trust to them, if he had occasion to hazard a
battle without the town. His only resource was to keep within the town
in the most convenient places, and get information of Achillas's
designs. However he ordered his soldiers to repair to their arms; and
advised the king to send some of his friends, who had the greatest
influence, as deputies to Achillas and to signify his royal pleasure.
Dioscorides and Serapion, the persons sent by him, who had both been
ambassadors at Rome, and had been in great esteem with Ptolemy the
father, went to Achillas. But as soon as they appeared in his presence,
without hearing them, or learning the occasion of their coming, he
ordered them to be seized and put to death. One of them, after receiving
a wound, was taken up and carried off by his attendants as dead: the
other was killed on the spot. Upon this, Caesar took care to secure the
king's person, both supposing that the king's name would have great
influence with his subjects, and to give the war the appearance of the
scheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been begun by the
king's consent.

CX.--The forces under Achillas did not seem despicable, either for
number, spirit, or military experience; for he had twenty thousand men
under arms. They consisted partly of Gabinius's soldiers, who were now
become habituated to the licentious mode of living at Alexandria, and
had forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman people, and had
married wives there, by whom the greatest part of them had children. To
these was added a collection of highwaymen and free-booters, from Syria,
and the province of Cilicia, and the adjacent countries. Besides several
convicts and transports had been collected: for at Alexandria all our
runaway slaves were sure of finding protection for their persons on the
condition that they should give in their names, and enlist as soldiers:
and if any of them was apprehended by his master, he was rescued by a
crowd of his fellow soldiers, who being involved in the same guilt,
repelled, at the hazard of their lives, every violence offered to any of
their body. These by a prescriptive privilege of the Alexandrian army,
used to demand the king's favourites to be put to death, pillage the
properties of the rich to increase their pay, invest the king's palace,
banish some from the kingdom, and recall others from exile. Besides
these, there were two thousand horse, who had acquired the skill of
veterans by being in several wars in Alexandria. These had restored
Ptolemy the father to his kingdom, had killed Bibulus's two sons; and
had been engaged in war with the Egyptians; such was their experience in
military affairs.

CXI.--Full of confidence in his troops, and despising the small number
of Caesar's soldiers, Achillas seized Alexandria, except that part of
the town which Caesar occupied with his troops. At first he attempted to
force the palace; but Caesar had disposed his cohorts through the
streets, and repelled his attack. At the same time there was an action
at the port: where the contest was maintained with the greatest
obstinacy. For the forces were divided, and the fight maintained in
several streets at once, and the enemy endeavoured to seize with a
strong party the ships of war; of which fifty had been sent to Pompey's
assistance, but after the battle in Thessaly had returned home. They
were all of either three or five banks of oars, well equipped and
appointed with every necessary for a voyage. Besides these, there were
twenty-two vessels with decks, which were usually kept at Alexandria, to
guard the port. If they made themselves masters of these, Caesar being
deprived of his fleet, they would have the command of the port and whole
sea, and could prevent him from procuring provisions and auxiliaries.
Accordingly that spirit was displayed, which ought to be displayed when
the one party saw that a speedy victory depended on the issue, and the
other their safety. But Caesar gained the day, and set fire to all those
ships, and to others which were in the docks, because he could not guard
so many places with so small a force; and immediately he conveyed some
troops to the Pharos by his ships.

CXIL--The Pharos is a tower on an island, of prodigious height, built
with amazing works, and takes its name from the island. This island
lying over against Alexandria forms a harbour; but on the upper side it
is connected with the town by a narrow way eight hundred paces in
length, made by piles sunk in the sea, and by a bridge. In this island
some of the Egyptians have houses, and a village as large as a town; and
whatever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the channel,
or by the storm, have been driven from their course upon the coast, they
constantly plunder like pirates. And without the consent of those who
are masters of the Pharos, no vessels can enter the harbour, on account
of its narrowness. Caesar being greatly alarmed on this account, whilst
the enemy were engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized the
Pharos, and placed a garrison in it. By this means he gained this point,
that he could be supplied without danger with corn and auxiliaries: for
he sent to all the neighbouring countries, to demand supplies. In other
parts of the town, they fought so obstinately, that they quitted the
field with equal advantage, and neither were beaten (in consequence of
the narrowness of the passes); and a few being killed on both sides,
Caesar secured the most necessary posts, and fortified them in the
night. In this quarter of the town was a wing of the king's palace, in
which Caesar was lodged on his first arrival, and a theatre adjoining
the house which served as for citadel, and commanded an avenue to the
port and other docks. These fortifications he increased during the
succeeding days, that he might have them before him as a rampart, and
not be obliged to fight against his will. In the meantime Ptolemy's
younger daughter, hoping the throne would become vacant, made her escape
from the palace to Achillas, and assisted him in prosecuting the war.
But they soon quarrelled about the command, which circumstance enlarged
the presents to the soldiers, for each endeavoured by great sacrifices
to secure their affection. Whilst the enemy was thus employed, Pothinus,
tutor to the young king, and regent of the kingdom, who was in Caesar's
part of the town, sent messengers to Achillas, and encouraged him not to
desist from his enterprise, nor to despair of success; but his
messengers being discovered and apprehended, he was put to death by
Caesar. Such was the commencement of the Alexandrian war.



       *       *       *       *       *


INDEX

N.B. The numerals refer to the book, the figures to the chapter. G.
stands for the Gallic War, C. for the Civil.

Acarn[=a]n[)i]a, a region of Greece, _Carnia_

Acco, prince of the Sen[)o]nes, his conduct on Caesar's approach, G. vi.
4; condemned in a council of the Gauls, vi. 44

Achaia, sometimes taken for all Greece, but most commonly for a part of
it only; in Peloponnesus, _Romania alta_

Achillas, captain of Ptolemy's guards, sent to kill Pompey, C. iii. 104;
appointed by Pothinus commander of all the Egyptian forces, _ibid_. 108;
heads an army of twenty thousand veteran troops, _ibid_. 110

Acilla, or Achilla, or Acholla. There were two cities in Africa of this
name, one inland, the other on the coast. The modern name of the latter
is _Elalia_

Acilius, Caesar's lieutenant, C. iii. 15

Act[)i]um, a promontory of Epirus, now called the _Cape of Tigalo_,
famous for a naval victory gained near it, by Augustus, over M. Antony

Act[)i]us, a Pelignian, one of Pompey's followers, taken by Caesar, and
dismissed in safety, C. i. 18

Act[)i]us Rufus accuses L. Apanius of treachery, C. iii. 83

Act[)i]us Varus prevents Tubero from landing in Africa, C. i. 31; his
forces, C. ii. 23; his camp, _ibid_. 25; engages Curio, _ibid_. 34; his
danger, defeat, and stratagem, _ibid_. 35

Adcant[)u]annus sallies upon Crassus at the head of a chosen body of
troops, G. iii. 22

Add[)u]a, the _Adda_, a river that rises in the Alps, and, separating
the duchy of Milan from the state of Venice, falls into the Po above
Cremona

Adriatic Sea, the _Gulf of Venice_, at the extremity of which that city
is situated

Adrum[=e]tum, a town in Africa, _Mahometta_; held by Considius Longus
with a garrison of one legion, C. ii. 23

Aduat[)u]uci (in some editions Atuatici), descendants of the Teutones
and Cimbri, G. ii. 29; they furnish twenty-nine thousand men to the
general confederacy of Gaul, _ibid_. 4; Caesar obliges them to submit,
_ibid_. 29

Aed[)u]i, the _Autunois_, a people of Gaul, near _Autun_, in the country
now called _Lower Burgundy_; they complain to Caesar of the ravages
committed in their territories by the Helvetii, G. i. 11; join in a
petition against Ariovistus, _ibid_. 33; at the head of one of the two
leading factions of Gaul, G. vi. 12; Caesar quiets an intestine
commotion among them, C. vii. 33; they revolt from the Romans, G. vii.
54; their law concerning magistrates, _ibid_. 33; their clients, i. 31;
vii. 75

Aeg[=e]an Sea, the _Archipelago_, a part of the Mediterranean which lies
between Greece, Asia Minor, and the Isle of Crete

Aeg[=i]n[)i]um, a town of Thessaly; Domitius joins Caesar near that
place, C. iii. 79

Aegus and Roscillus, their perfidious behaviour towards Caesar, C. iii.
59, 60

Aegyptus, _Egypt,_ an extensive country of Africa, bounded on the west
by part of Marmarica and the deserts of Lybia, on the north by the
Mediterranean, on the east by the Sinus Arabicus, and a line drawn from
Arsino[)e] to Rhinocolura, and on the south by Aethiopia. Egypt,
properly so called, may be described as consisting of the long and
narrow valley which follows the course of the Nile from Syene
(_Assooan_) to _Cairo,_ near the site of the ancient Memphis. The name
by which this country is known to Europeans comes from the Greeks, some
of whose writers inform us that it received this appellation from
Aegyptus, son of Belus, it having been previously called Aeria. In the
Hebrew scriptures it is called Mitsraim, and also Matsor and Harets
Cham; of these names, however, the first is the one most commonly
employed

Aemilia Via, a Roman road in Italy, from Rimini to Aquileia, and from
Pisa to Dertona

Aet[=o]lia, a country of Greece, _Despotato;_ recovered from Pompey by
the partisans of Caesar, C. iii. 35

Afr[=a]nius, Pompey's lieutenant, his exploits in conjunction with
Petreius, C. i. 38; resolves to carry the war into Celtiberia, _ibid_.
61; surrenders to Caesar, _ibid_. 84

Afr[)i]ca, one of the four great continents into which the earth is
divided; the name seems to have been originally applied by the Romans to
the country around Carthage, the first part of the continent with which
they became acquainted, and is said to have been derived from a small
Carthaginian district on the northern coast, called _Frigi._ Hence, even
when the name had become applied to the whole continent, there still
remained in Roman geography the district of Africa Proper, on the
Mediterranean coast, corresponding to the modem kingdom of _Tunis,_ with
part of that of _Tripoli_

Agend[)i]cum, a city of the Senones, _Sens_; Caesar quarters four
legions there, G. vi. 44; Labienus leaves his baggage in it under a
guard of new levies, and sets out for Lutetia, G. vii. 57

Alba, a town of Latium, in Italy, _Albano_; Domitius levies troops in
that neighbourhood, C. i. 15

Alb[=i]ci, a people of Gaul, unknown; some make them the same with the
_Vivarois_; taken into the service of the Marseillians, C. i. 34

Albis, the _Elbe,_ a large and noble river in Germany, which has its
source in the Giant's Mountains in Silesia, on the confines of Bohemia,
and passing through Bohemia, Upper and Lower Saxony, falls into the
North Sea at Ritzbuttel, about sixty miles below Hamburg

Alces, a species of animals somewhat resembling an elk, to be found in
the Hercynian forests, C. vi. 27

Alemanni, or Alamanni, a name assumed by a confederacy of German tribes,
situated between the Neckar and the Upper Rhine, who united to resist
the encroachments of the Roman power. According to Mannert, they derived
their origin from the shattered remains of the army of Ariovistus
retired, after the defeat and death of their leader, to the mountainous
country of the Upper Rhine. After their overthrow by Clovis, king of the
Salian Franks, they ceased to exist as one nation, and were dispersed
over Gaul, Switzerland, and Nether Italy. From them L'Allemagne, the
French name for Germany, is derived

Alemannia, the country inhabited by the Alemanni

Alesia, or Alexia, a town of the Mandubians, _Alise_; Caesar shuts up
Vercingetorix there, C. vii. 68; surrounds it with lines of
circumvallation and contravallation, _ibid_. 69, 72; obliges it to
surrender, _ibid_. 89

Alexandr[=i]a, a city of Egypt, _Scanderia_. It was built by Alexander
the Great, 330 years before Christ; Caesar pursues Pompey thither, C.
iii. 106

Aliso, by some supposed to be the town now called _Iselburg_; or,
according to Junius, _Wesel_, in the duchy of Cleves, but more probably
_Elsen_

Allier (El[=a]ver), Caesar eludes the vigilance of Vercingetorix, and by
an artifice passes that river, G. vii. 35

All[)o]br[)o]ges, an ancient people of Gallia Transalp[=i]na, who
inhabited the country which is now called _Dauphiny, Savoy,_ and
_Piedmont_. The name, Allobroges, means highlanders, and is derived from
Al, "high," and Broga, "land." They are supposed to be disaffected to
the Romans, G. i. 6; complain to Caesar of the ravages of the
Helvetians, _ibid_. 11

Alps, a ridge of high mountains, which separates France and Germany from
Italy. That part of them which separates Dauphiny from Piedmont was
called the Cottian Alps. Their name is derived from their height, Alp
being an old Celtic appellation for "a lofty mountain"; Caesar crosses
them with five legions, G. i. 10; sends Galba to open a free passage
over them to the Roman merchants, G. iii. 1

Alsati[)a], a province of Germany, in the upper circle of the Rhine,
_Alsace_

Amagetobr[)i]a, a city of Gaul, unknown; famous for a defeat of the
Gauls there by Ariovistus, G. i. 31

Amant[)i]a, a town in Macedonia, _Porto Raguseo_; it submits to Caesar,
and sends ambassadors to know his pleasure, C. iii. 12

Am[=a]nus, a mountain of Syria, _Alma Daghy,_ near which Scipio sustains
some losses, C. iii. 31

Am[=a]ni Pylae, or Am[=a]nicae Portae, _Straits of Scanderona_

Ambarri, a people of Gaul, uncertain; they complain to Caesar of the
ravages committed in their territories by the Helvetii, G. i. 11

Ambialites, a people of Gaul, of _Lamballe in Bretagne_. Others take the
word to be only a different name for the Ambiani; they join in a
confederacy with the Veneti against Caesar, G. iii. 9

Ambi[=a]ni, or Ambianenses, the people of _Amiens;_ they furnish ten
thousand men to the general confederacy of the Belgians against Caesar,
G. ii. 4; sue for peace, and submit themselves to Caesar's pleasure, G.
ii. 15

Ambi[=a]num, a city of Belgium, _Amiens_

Amb[)i]b[)a]ri, a people of Gaul, inhabiting _Ambie_, in Normandy
Amb[)i][)o]rix, his artful speech to Sabinus and Cotta, G. v. 27; Caesar
marches against him, G. vi. 249. Ravages and lays waste his territories,
_ibid_. 34; endeavours in vain to get him into his hands, _ibid_. 43

Ambivar[)e]ti, a people of Gaul, the _Vivarais_. They are ordered to
furnish their contingent for raising the siege of Alesia, G. vii. 75

Ambivar[=i]ti, an ancient people of _Brabant_, between the Rhine and the
Maese; the German cavalry sent to forage among them, G. iv. 9

Ambr[)a]c[)i]a, a city of Epirus, _Arta_; Cassius directs his march
thither, C. iii. 36

Ambrones, an ancient people, who lived in the country which is now
called the _Canton of Bern_, in Switzerland

Amph[)i]l[)o]chia, a region of Epirus, _Anfilocha_. Its inhabitants
reduced by Cassius Longinus, C. iii. 55

Amph[)i]p[)o]lis, a city of Macedonia, _Cristopoli_, or _Emboli_. An
edict in Pompey's name published there, C. iii. 102

Anartes, a people of Germany, _Walachians_, _Servians_, or _Bulgarians_,
bordering upon the Hercynian Forest, G. vi. 25

Anas, a river of Spain, the _Guadiana_, or _Rio Roydera_, bounding that
part of Spain under the government of Petreius, C. i. 38

Anc[)a]l[=i]tes, a people of Britain, of the hundred of _Henley_, in
Oxfordshire; they send ambassadors to Caesar with an offer of
submission, G. v. 21

Anch[)i][)a]los, a city of Thrace, near the Euxine Sea, now called
_Kenkis_

Ancibarii, or Ansivarii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, of and
about the town of _Ansestaet_, or _Amslim_

Anc[=o]na, _Ancona_, a city of Italy, on the coast of Pisenum. It is
supposed to derive its name from the Greek word [Greek: agkon], an angle
or elbow, on account of the angular form of the promontory on which it
is built. The foundation of Ancona is ascribed by Strabo to some
Syracusans, who were fleeing from the tyranny of Dionysius. Livy speaks
of it as a naval station of great importance in the wars of Rome with
the Illyrians. We find it occupied by Caesar (C. i. 2) shortly after
crossing the Rubicon; Caesar takes possession of it with a garrison of
one cohort, C. i. 11

Andes, _Angers_, in France, the capital of the duchy of Anjou

Andes, a people of Gaul, the ancient inhabitants of the duchy of Anjou;
Caesar puts his troops into winter quarters among them, G. ii. 35

Andomad[=u]num Ling[)o]num, a large and ancient city of Champagne, at
the source of the river Marne, _Langres_

Anglesey (Mona), an island situated between Britain and Ireland, where
the night, during the winter, is said to be a month long, G. v. 13

Angrivarii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, who dwelt between the
Ems and the Weser, below the Lippe

Ansivarii, see _Ancibarii_

Antioch[=i]a, _Antachia_, an ancient and famous city, once the capital
of Syria, or rather of the East. It is situate on two rivers, the
Orontes and the Phaspar, not far from the Mediterranean; refuses to
admit the fugitives after the battle of Pharsalia, C. iii. 102

Ant[=o]nius (Mark Antony), Caesar's lieutenant, G. vii. i i; quaestor,
G. viii. 2; governor of Brundusium, C. iii. 24; his standing for that
priesthood, G. vii. 50; obliges Libo to raise the siege of Brundusium,
C. iii. 24; and in conjunction with Kalenus transports Caesar's troops
to Greece, _ibid_. 26

Apam[=e]a, _Apami_, a city of Bithynia, built by Nicomedes, the son of
Prusias

Apennine Mountains, a large chain of mountains, branching off from the
Maritime Alps, in the neighbourhood of Genoa, running diagonally from
the Ligurian Gulf to the Adriatic, in the vicinity of Ancona; from which
it continues nearly parallel with the latter gulf, as far as the
promontory of Garg[=a]nus, and again inclines to Mare Inf[)e]rum, till
it finally terminates in the promontory of Leucopetra, near Rhegium. The
etymology of the name given to these mountains must be traced to the
Celtic, and appears to combine two terms of that language nearly
synonymous, Alp, or Ap, "a high mountain," and Penn, "a summit"

Apoll[=o]n[)i]a, a city of Macedonia, _Piergo_. Pompey resolves to
winter there, C. iii. 5; Caesar makes himself master of it, _ibid_. iii.
12

Appia Via, the Appian road which led from Rome to Campania, and from the
sea to Brundusium. It was made, as Livy informs us, by the censor,
Appius Caecus, A.U.C. 442, and was, in the first instance, only laid
down as far as Capua, a distance of about 125 miles. It was subsequently
carried on to Beneventum, and finally to Brundusium. According to
Eustace (_Classical Tour_, vol. iii.), such parts of the Appian Way as
have escaped destruction, as at _Fondi_ and _Mola_, show few traces of
wear and decay after a duration of two thousand years

Apsus, a river of Macedonia, the _Aspro_. Caesar and Pompey encamp over
against each other on the banks of that river, C. iii. 13

Apulia, a region of Italy, _la Puglia_. Pompey quarters there the
legions sent by Caesar, C. i. 14

Aquil[=a]ria, a town of Africa, near Clupea. Pompey quarters there the
legions sent by Caesar, C. i. 14; Curio arrives there with the troops
designed against Africa. C. ii. 23

Aquileia, formerly a famous and considerable city of Italy, not far from
the Adriatic, now little more than a heap of ruins, _Aquilegia_. Caesar
draws together the troops quartered there, G. i. 10

Aquitania, a third part of ancient Gaul, now containing _Guienne_,
_Gascony_, etc.

Aquit[=a]ni, the Aquitanians reduced under the power of the Romans by
Crassus, G. iii. 20-22; very expert in the art of mining, _ibid_. 21

Arar, or Araris, a river of Gaul, the Sa[^o]ne; the Helvetians receive a
considerable check in passing this river, G. i. 12

Arduenna Silva, the forest of _Ardenne_, in France, reaching from the
Rhine to the city of Tournay, in the low countries; Indutiom[)a]rus
conceals in it the infirm and aged, G. v. 3; Caesar crosses it in quest
of Ambiorix, G. vi. 29

Arecomici Volcae, Caesar plants garrisons among them, G. vii. 7

Arel[=a]te, or Arel[=a]tum, or Arelas, a city of Gaul, _Arles_. Caesar
orders twelve galleys to be built there, C. i. 36

Ar[)i]m[)i]num, a city of Italy, _Rimini_; Caesar having sounded the
disposition of his troops, marches thither, C. i. 8

Ar[)i][)o]vistus, king of the Germans, his tyrannical conduct towards
the Gauls, G. i. 31; Caesar sends ambassadors to him demanding an
interview, _ibid_. 34; he is defeated and driven entirely out of Gaul,
_ibid_. 52

Arles, see _Arelate_

Arm[)e]n[)i]a, a country of Asia, divided into the greater or lesser,
and now called _Turcomania_

Armorici, the ancient people of Armorica, a part of Gallia Celtica, now
_Bretagne_; they assemble in great numbers to attack L. Roscius in his
winter quarters, G. v. 53

Arr[=e]t[)i]um, a city of Etruria, in Italy, _Arezzo_; Antony sent
thither with five cohorts, C. i. 10

Arverni, an ancient people of France, on the Loire, whose chief city was
Arvernum, now _Clermont_, the capital of _Auvergne_; suddenly invaded,
and their territories ravaged by Caesar, G. vii. 8

Asculum, a town of Italy, _Ascoli_; Caesar takes possession of it, C. i.
16

Asparagium, a town in Macedonia, unknown; Pompey encamps near it with
all his forces, C. iii. 30

Astigi, or Astingi, a people of Andalusia, in Spain

Athens, one of the most ancient and noble cities of Greece, the capital
of Attica. It produced some of the most distinguished statesmen,
orators, and poets that the world ever saw, and its sculptors and
painters have been rarely rivalled, never surpassed. No city on the
earth has ever exercised an equal influence on the educated men of all
ages. It contributes to fit out a fleet for Pompey, C. iii. 3

Atreb[)a]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, who lived in that part of the
Netherlands which is now called _Artois_; they furnish fifteen thousand
men to the general confederacy of Gaul, G. ii. 4

Attica, a country of Greece, between Achaia and Macedonia, famous on
account of its capital, Athens

Attuarii, a people of ancient Germany, who inhabited between the Maese
and the Rhine, whose country is now a part of the duchy of _Gueldes_

Atuatuca, a strong castle, where Caesar deposited all his baggage, on
setting out in pursuit of Ambiorix, G. vi. 32; the Germans unexpectedly
attack it, _ibid_. 35

Augustod[=u]num, _Autun_, a very ancient city of Burgundy, on the river
Arroux

Aulerci Eburovices, a people of Gaul, in the country of _Evreux_, in
Normandy

Aulerci Brannovices, a people of Gaul, _Morienne_

Aulerci Cenomanni, a people of Gaul, the country of _Maine_

Aulerci Diablintes, a people of Gaul, _le Perche_

Aulerci reduced by P. Crassus, G, ii. 34; massacre their senate, and
join Viridovix, G. iii. 17; Aulerci Brannovices ordered to furnish their
contingent to the relief of Alesia, G. vii. 7; Aulerci Cenomanni furnish
five thousand, _ibid_.; Aulerci Eburovices three thousand, _ibid_.

Ausci, a people of Gaul, those of _Auchs_ or _Aux_, in Gascony; they
submit to Crassus and send hostages, G. iii. 27

Auset[=a]ni, a people of Spain, under the Pyrenean mountains; they send
ambassadors to Caesar, with an offer of submission, C. i. 60

Aux[)i]mum, a town in Italy, _Osimo_, or _Osmo_; Caesar makes himself
master of it, C. i. 15

Av[=a]r[)i]cum, a city of Aquitaine, the capital of the Biturigians,
_Bourges_; besieged by Caesar, G. vii. 13; and at last taken by storm,
_ibid_. 31

Ax[)o]na, the river _Aisne_, Caesar crosses it in his march against the
Belgians, G. ii. 5, 6

Bac[=e]nis, a forest of ancient Germany, which parted the Suevi from the
Cherusci; by some supposed to be the Forests of _Thuringia_, by others
the _Black Forest_; the Suevians encamp at the entrance of that wood,
resolving there to await the approach of the Romans, G vi. 10

Bac[)u]lus, P. Sextius, his remarkable bravery, G. vi. 38

Baet[)i]ca, in the ancient geography, about a third part of Spain,
containing _Andalusia_, and a part of _Granada_

Bagr[)a]das, a river of Africa, near Ut[)i]ca, the _Begrada_; Curio
arrives with his army at that river, C. ii. 38

Bale[=a]res Ins[)u]lae, several islands in the Mediterranean Sea,
formerly so called, of which _Majorca_ and _Minorca_ are the chief; the
inhabitants famous for their dexterity in the use of the sling, G. ii. 7

Bat[)a]vi, the ancient inhabitants of the island of Batavia

Batavia, or Batavorum Insula, _Holland_, a part of which still retains
the name of _Betuwe_; formed by the Meuse and the Wal, G. iv. 10

Belgae, the inhabitants of Gallia Belgica. The original Belgae were
supposed to be of German extraction; but passing the Rhine, settled
themselves in Gaul. The name Belgae belongs to the Cymric language, in
which, under the form _Belgiaid_, the radical of which is _Belg_, it
signifies warlike; they are the most warlike people of Gaul, G. i. 1;
withstand the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, G. ii. 4; originally
of German extraction, _ibid_.; Caesar obliges them to decamp and return
to their several habitations, _ibid_. 11

Belgia, Belgium, or Gallia Belgica, the _Low Countries_, or
_Netherlands_

Bellocassi, or Velocasses, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of
_Bayeux_, in Normandy; they furnish three thousand men to the relief of
Alesia, G. vii. 75

Bell[)o]v[)a]ci, an ancient renowned people among the Belgae, inhabiting
the country now called _Beauvais_ in France; they furnish a hundred
thousand men to the general confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4; join in
the general defection under Vercingetorix, G. vii. 59; again take up
arms against Caesar, viii. 7; but are compelled to submit and sue for
pardon

Bergea, a city of Macedonia, now called _Veria_

Berones, see _Retones_

Bessi, a people of Thrace, _Bessarabia_; they make part of Pompey's
army, C. iii. 4

Bethuria, a region of Hispania Lusitanica, _Estremadura_

Bibracte, a town of Burgundy, now called _Autun_, the capital of the
Aedui; Caesar, distressed for want of corn, marches thither to obtain a
supply, G. i. 23

Bibrax, a town of Rheims, _Braine_, or _Bresne_; attacked with great
fury by the confederate Belgians, G. ii. 6

Bibr[)o]ci, a people of Britain; according to Camden, _the hundred of
Bray_, in Berkshire; they send ambassadors to Caesar to sue for peace,
G. v. 21

Bib[)u]lus burns thirty of Caesar's ships, C. iii. 8; his hatred of
Caesar, _ibid_. 8, 16; his cruelty towards the prisoners that fell into
his hands, _ibid_. 14; his death, _ibid_. 18; death of his two sons,
_ibid_. 110

Bigerriones, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country now called
_Bigorre,_ in Gascony; they surrender and give hostages to Crassus, G.
iii. 27

Bithynia, a country of Asia Minor, adjoining to Troas, over against
Thrace, _Becsangial_

Bit[:u]r[)i]ges, a people of Guienne, in France, of the country of
_Berry;_ they join with the Arverni in the general defection under
Vercingetorix, G. vii. 5

Boeotia, a country in Greece; separated from Attica by Mount Citheron.
It had formerly several other names and was famous for its capital,
Thebes; it is now called _Stramulipa_

Boii, an ancient people of Germany who, passing the Rhine, settled in
Gaul, the _Bourbonnois;_ they join with the Helvetians in their
expedition against Gaul, G. i. 5; attack the Romans in flank, _ibid_.
25; Caesar allows them to settle among the Aeduans, _ibid_. 28

Bor[=a]ni, an ancient people of Germany, supposed by some to be the same
as the Burii

Bosphor[=a]ni, a people bordering upon the Euxine Sea, _the Tartars_

Bosph[)o]rus, two straits of the sea so called, one Bosphorus Thracius,
now the _Straits of Constantinople;_ the other Bosphorus Climerius, now
the _Straits of Caffa_

Brannov[=i]ces, the people of _Morienne,_ in France

Brannovii furnished their contingent to the relief of Alesia, C. vii. 75

Bratuspant[)i]um, a city of Gaul, belonging to the Bellov[)a]ci,
_Beauvais;_ it submits, and obtains pardon from Caesar, G. ii. 13

Bridge built by Caesar over the Rhine described, G. iv. 7

Br[)i]tannia, Caesar's expedition thither, G. iv. 20; description of the
coast, 23; the Romans land in spite of the vigorous opposition of the
islanders, 26; the Britons send ambassadors to Caesar to desire a peace,
which they obtain on delivery of hostages, 27; they break the peace on
hearing that Caesar's fleet was destroyed by a storm, and set upon the
Roman foragers, 30; their manner of fighting in chariots; they fall upon
the Roman camp, but are repulsed, and petition again for peace, which
Caesar grants them, 33-35; Caesar passes over into their island a second
time, v. 8; drives them from the woods where they had taken refuge, 9;
describes their manners and way of living, 12; defeats them in several
encounters, 15-21; grants them a peace, on their giving hostages, and
agreeing to pay a yearly tribute, 22

Brundusium, a city of Italy, _Brindisi._ By the Greeks it was called
[Greek: Brentesion], which in the Messapian language signified a stag's
head, from the resemblance which its different harbours and creeks bore
to that object; Pompey retires thither with his forces, C. i. 24; Caesar
lays siege to it, 26; Pompey escapes from it by sea, upon which it
immediately surrenders to Caesar, 28; Libo blocks up the port with a
fleet, C. iii. 24; but by the valour of Antony is obliged to retire,
_ibid_.

Brutii, a people of Italy, _the Calabrians._ They were said to be
runaway slaves and shepherds of the Lucanians, who, after concealing
themselves for a time, became at last numerous enough to attack their
masters, and succeeded at length in gaining their independence. Their
very name is said to indicate that they were revolted slaves: [Greek:
Brettious gar kalousi apostatas], says Strabo, speaking of the Lucanians

Br[=u]tus, appointed to command the fleet in the war against the people
of Vannes, G. iii. 11; engages and defeats at sea the Venetians, 14; and
also the people of Marseilles, C. i. 58; engages them a second time with
the same good fortune, ii. 3

Bullis, a town in Macedonia, unknown; it sends ambassadors to Caesar
with an offer of submission, C. iii. 12

Buthr[=o]tum, a city of Epirus, _Butrinto,_ or _Botronto_

Byzantium, an ancient city of Thrace, called at different times Ligos,
Nova Roma, and now _Constantinople_

Cabill[=o]num, a city of ancient Gaul, _Chalons sur Sa[^o]ne_

Cad[=e]tes, a people of Gaul, unknown

Cadurci, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of _Quercy_

Caeraesi, a people of Belgic Gaul, inhabiting the country round Namur;
they join in the general confederacy of Belgium against Caesar, G. i. 4

Caesar, hastens towards Gaul, C. i. 7; refuses the Helvetians a passage
through the Roman province, _ibid_.; his answer to their ambassadors,
14; defeats and sends them back into their own country, 25-27; sends
ambassadors to Ariovistus, 34; calls a council of war: his speech, 40;
begins his march, 41; his speech to Ariovistus, 43; totally routs the
Germans, and obliges them to repass the Rhine, 53; his war with the
Belgians, ii. 2; reduces the Suessi[)o]nes and Bellov[)a]ci, 12, 13; his
prodigious slaughter of the Nervians, 20-27; obliges the Atuatici to
submit, 32; prepares for the war against the Venetians, iii. 9; defeats
them in a naval engagement, and totally subdues them, 14, 15; is obliged
to put his army into winter quarters, before he can complete the
reduction of the Menapians and Morini, 29; marches to find out the
Germans; his answer to their ambassadors, iv. 8; attacks them in their
camp and routs them, 14, 15; crosses the Rhine, and returns to Gaul, 17
--19; his expedition into Britain described, 22; refits his navy, 31;
comes to the assistance of his foragers whom the Britons had attacked,
34; returns to Gaul, 36; gives orders for building a navy, v. 1; his
preparations for a second expedition into Britain, 2; marches into the
country of Treves to prevent a rebellion, 3; marches to Port Itius, and
invites all the princes of Gaul to meet him there, 5; sets sail for
Britain, 8; describes the country and customs of the inhabitants, 12;
fords the river Thames, and puts Cassivellaunus, the leader of the
Britons, to flight, 18; imposes a tribute upon the Britons and returns
into Gaul, 23; routs the Nervians, and relieves Cicero, 51; resolves to
winter in Gaul, 53; his second expedition into Germany, vi. 9; his
description of the manners of the Gauls and Germans, 13; his return into
Gaul, and vigorous prosecution of the war against Ambiorix, 27; crosses
the mountains of the Cevennes in the midst of winter, and arrives at
Auvergne, which submits, vii. 8; takes and sacks Genabum, 11; takes
Noviodunum, and marches from thence to Avaricum, 12; his works before
Alesia, 69; withstands all the attacks of the Gauls, and obliges the
place to surrender, 89; marches into the country of the Biturigians, and
compels them to submit, viii. 2; demands Guturvatus, who is delivered up
and put to death, 38; marches to besiege Uxellodunum, 39; cuts off the
hands of the besieged at Uxellodunum, 44; marches to Corfinium, and
besieges it, C. i. 16, which in a short time surrenders, 22; he marches
through Abruzzo, and great part of the kingdom of Naples, 23; his
arrival at Brundusium, and blockade of the haven, 24; commits the siege
of Marseilles to the case of Brutus and Trebonius, 36; his expedition to
Spain, 37; his speech to Afranius, 85; comes to Marseilles, which
surrenders. C. ii. 22; takes Oricum, iii. 8; marches to Dyrrhachium to
cut off Pompey's communication with that place, 41; sends Canuleius into
Epirus for corn, 42; besieges Pompey in his camp, his reasons for it,
43; encloses Pompey's works within his fortifications: a skirmish
between them, 45; his army reduced to great straits for want of
provisions, 47; offers Pompey battle, which he declines, 56; sends
Clodius to Scipio, to treat about a peace, whose endeavours prove
ineffectual, 57; joins Domitius, storms and takes the town of Gomphis in
Thessaly, in four hours' time, 80; gains a complete victory over Pompey
in the battle of Pharsalia, 93; summons Ptolemy and Cleopatra to attend
him, 107; burns the Alexandrian fleet, 111

Caesar[=e]a, the chief city of Cappadocia

Caesia Sylva, the _Caesian_ Forest, supposed to be a part of the
Hercynian Forest, about the duchy of Cleves and Westphalia

Calagurritani, a people of Hispania Tarraconensis, inhabiting the
province of _Calahorra;_ send ambassadors to Caesar with an offer of
submission, C. i. 60

Cal[)e]tes, an ancient people of Belgic Gaul, inhabiting the country
called _Le Pais de Caulx,_ in Normandy, betwixt the Seine and the sea;
they furnish ten thousand men in the general revolt of Belgium, G. ii. 4

Cal[)y]don, a city of Aetolia, _Ayton,_ C. iii. 35

C[)a]m[)e]r[=i]num, a city of Umbria, in Italy, _Camarino_

Camp[=a]n[)i]a, the most pleasant part of Italy, in the kingdom of
Naples, now called _Terra di Lavoro_

Campi Can[=i]ni, a place in the Milanese, in Italy, not far from
Belizona

Campi Catalaunici, supposed to be the large plain which begins about two
miles from Chalons sur Marne

Cam[=u]l[)o]g[=e]nus appointed commander-in-chief by the Parisians, G.
vii. 57; obliges Labienus to decamp from before Paris, _ibid.;_ is
slain, 62

Cadav[)i]a, a country of Macedonia, _Canovia_

Caninefates, an ancient people of the lower part of Germany, near
Batavia, occupying the country in which Gorckum, on the Maese, in South
Holland, now is

Can[=i]nius sets Duracius at liberty, who had been shut up in Limonum by
Dumnacus, G. viii. 26; pursues Drapes, 30; lays siege to Uxellodunum, 33

Cant[)a]bri, the Cantabrians, an ancient warlike people of Spain,
properly of the provinces of _Guipuscoa_ and _Biscay_; they are obliged
by Afranius to furnish a supply of troops, C. i. 38

Cantium, a part of England, _the county of Kent_

C[)a]nus[=i]um, a city of Apulia, in Italy, _Canosa_. The splendid
remains of antiquity discovered among the ruins of Canosa, together with
its coins, establish the Grecian origin of the place

Cappadocia, a large country in Asia Minor, upon the Euxine Sea

Capr[)e]a, _Capri_, an island on the coast of Campania

Cap[)u]a, _Capha_, a city in the kingdom of Naples, in the Provincia di
Lavoro

C[)a]r[)a]les, a city of Sardinia, _Cagliari_

C[)a]r[)a]l[)i]t[=a]ni, the people of _Cagliari_, in Sardinia; they
declare against Pompey, and expel Cotta with his garrison, C. i. 30

Carc[)a]so, a city of Gaul, _Carcassone_

Carm[=o]na, a town of Hispania Baetica, _Carmone_; declares for Caesar,
and expels the enemy's garrison, C. ii. 19

Carni, an ancient people, inhabiting a part of Noricum, whose country is
still called _Carniola_

Carn[=u]tes, an ancient people of France, inhabiting the territory now
called _Chartres_; Caesar quarters some troops among them, G. ii. 35;
they openly assassinate Tasgetins, G. v. 25; send ambassadors to Caesar
and submit, vi. 4; offer to be the first in taking up alms against the
Romans, vii. 2; attack the Biturigians, but are dispersed and put to
flight by Caesar. viii. 5

Carpi, an ancient people near the Danube

Cassandr[)e]a, a city of Macedonia, _Cassandria_

Cassi, a people of ancient Britain, _the hundred of Caishow_, in
_Hertfordshire_; they send ambassadors and submit to Caesar, G. v. 21

Caesil[=i]num, a town in Italy, _Castelluzzo_

Cassivellaunus, chosen commander-in-chief of the confederate Britons, G.
v. 11; endeavours in vain to stop the course of Caesar's conquests, 18;
is obliged to submit, and accept Caesar's terms, 22

Cassius, Pompey's lieutenant, burns Caesar's fleet in Sicily, C. iii.
101

Castellum Menapiorum, _Kessel_, a town in Brabant, on the river Neerse,
not far from the Maese

Cast[)i]cus, the son of Catam['a]ntaledes, solicited by Orgetorix to
invade the liberty of his country, G. i. 3

Castra Posthumiana, a town in Hispania Baetica, _Castro el Rio_

Castra Vetera, an ancient city in Lower Germany, in the duchy of Cleves;
some say where _Santon_, others where _Byrthon_ now is

Castulonensis Saltus, a city of Hispania Tarraconensis, _Castona la
Vieja_

Cativulcus takes up arms against the Romans at the instigation of
Indutiomarus, G. v. 24; poisons himself, vi. 31

Cato of Utica, the source of his hatred to Caesar, C. i. 4; made praetor
of Sicily, prepares for war, and abdicates his province, 30

Catur[)i]ges, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of
_Embrun_, or _Ambrun_, or _Chagres_; oppose Caesar's passage over the
Alps, G. i. 10

Cavalry, their institution and manner of fighting among the Germans, G.
i. 48, iv. 2

Cavarillus taken and brought before Caesar, G. vii. 62

Cavarinus, the Senones attempt to assassinate him, G. v. 54; Caesar
orders him to attend him with the cavalry of the Senones, vi. 5

Cebenna Mons, the mountains of the _Cevennes_, in Gaul, separating the
Helvians from Auvergne

Celeja, a city of Noricum Mediterraneum, now _Cilley_

Celtae, a people of Thrace, about the mountains of Rhodope and Haemus

Celtae, an ancient people of Gaul, in that part called Gallia Comata,
between the Garumna (_Garonne_) and Sequana (_Seine_), from whom that
country was likewise called Gallia Celtica. They were the most powerful
of the three great nations that inhabited Gaul, and are supposed to be
the original inhabitants of that extensive country. It is generally
supposed that they called themselves _Gail_, or _Gael_, out of which
name the Greeks formed their [Greek: Keltai], and the Romans Galli.
Some, however, deduce the name from the Gaelic "_Ceilt,_" an inhabitant
of the forest

Celt[)i]b[=e]ri, an ancient people of Spain, descended from the Celtae,
who settled about the River Iberus, or _Ebro_, from whom the country was
called Celtiberia, now _Arragon_; Afranius obliges them to furnish a
supply of troops, C. i. 38

Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix, assassinated by the Arverni, G.
vii. 4

Cenimagni, or Iceni, an ancient people of Britain, inhabiting the
counties of _Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridgeshire_, and _Huntingdonshire_

Cenis Mons, that part of the Alps which separates Savoy from Piedmont

Cenni, an ancient people of Celtic extraction

Cenom[=a]ni, a people of Gallia Celtica, in the country now called _Le
Manseau_, adjoining to that of the Insubres

Centr[=o]nes, an ancient people of Flanders, about the city of
_Courtray_, dependent on the Nervians

Centr[=o]nes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of
Tarantaise

Cerauni Montes, Mountains of Epirus, _Monti di Chimera_

Cerc[=i]na, an island on the coast of Africa, _Chercara, Cercare_

Cevennes, mountains of, Caesar passes them in the midst of winter,
though covered with snow six feet deep, G. vii. 8

Chara, a root which served to support Caesar's army in extreme
necessity, C. iii. 48; manner of preparing it, _ibid_.

Chariots, manner of fighting with them among the Britons, G. iv. 33;
dexterity of the British charioteers, _ibid_.

Cherron[=e]sus, a peninsula of Africa, near Alexandria

Cherson[=e]sus Cimbr[=i]ca, a peninsula on the Baltic, now _Jutland_,
part of _Holstein, Ditmarsh_, and _Sleswic_

Cherusci, a great and warlike people of ancient Germany, between the
Elbe and the Weser, about the country now called _Mansfield_, part of
the duchy of _Brunswick_, and the dioceses of _Hildesheim_ and
_Halberstadt_. The Cherusci, under the command of Arminius (Hermann),
lured the unfortunate Varus into the wilds of the Saltus Teutoburgiensis
(Tutinger Wold), where they massacred him and his whole army. They were
afterwards defeated by Germanicus, who, on his march through the forest
so fatal to his countrymen, found the bones of the legions where they
had been left to blanch by their barbarian conqueror.--See Tacitus's
account of the March of the Roman Legions through the German forests,
_Annals,_ b. i. c. 71

Cicero, Quintus, attacked in his winter quarters by Ambi[)o]rix, G. v.
39; informs Caesar of his distress, who marches to relieve him, 46;
attacked unexpectedly by the Sigambri, who are nevertheless obliged to
retire, vi. 36

Cimbri, _the Jutlanders,_ a very ancient northern people, who inhabited
Chersonesus Cimbrica

Cing[)e]t[)o]rix, the leader of one of the factions among the Treviri,
and firmly attached to Caesar, G. v. 3; declared a public enemy, and his
goods confiscated by Indutiom[)a]rus, 56

Cing[)u]lum, a town of Pic[=e]num, in Italy, _Cingoli_

Cleopatra, engaged in a war with her brother Ptolemy, C. iii. 103

Clod[)i]us sent by Caesar to Scipio, to treat about a peace, but without
effect, C. iii. 90

Cocas[=a]tes, a people of Gaul, according to some the _Bazadois_

Caelius Rufus raises a sedition in Rome, C. iii. 20; is expelled that
city, then joins with Milo, 21; he is killed, 22

C[)o]imbra, an ancient city of Portugal, once destroyed, but now
rebuilt, on the river _Mendego_

Colchis, a country in Asia, near Pontus, including the present
_Mingrelia_ and _Georgia_

Com[=a]na Pont[)i]ca, a city of Asia Minor, _Com,_ or, _Tabachzan_

Com[=a]na of Cappadocia, _Arminacha_

Comius sent by Caesar into Britain to dispose the British states to
submit, G. iv. 21; persuades the Bellov[)a]ci to furnish their
contingent to the relief of Alesia, vii. 76; his distrust of the Romans,
occasioned by an attempt to assassinate him, viii. 23; harasses the
Romans greatly, and intercepts their convoys, 47; attacks Volusenus
Quadratus, and runs him through the thigh, 48; submits to Antony, on
condition of not appearing in the presence of any Roman, _ibid_.

Compsa, a city of Italy, _Conza,_ or _Consa_

Concordia, an ancient city of the province of _Triuli,_ in Italy, now in
ruins

Condr[=u]si, or Condr[=u]s[=o]nes, an ancient people of Belgium,
dependent on the Treviri, whose country is now called _Condrotz_,
between Liege and Namur

Conetod[=u]nus heads the Carnutes in their revolt from the Romans, and
the massacre at Genabum, G. vii. 3

Confluens Mosae et Rheni, the confluence of the Meuse and Rhine, or the
point where the Meuse joins the Vahalis, or Waal, which little river
branches out from the Rhine

Convictolit[=a]nis, a division on his account among the Aeduans, C. vii.
32; Caesar confirms his election to the supreme magistracy, 33; he
persuades Litavicus and his brothers to rebel, 37

Corc[=y]ra, an island of Epirus, _Corfu_

Cord[)u]ba, a city of Hispania Baetica, _Cordova;_ Caesar summons the
leading men of the several states of Spain to attend him there, C. ii.
19; transactions of that assembly, 21

Corf[=i]n[)i]um, a town belonging to the Peligni, in Italy, _St.
Pelino,_ al. _Penlina;_ Caesar lays siege to it, C. i. 16; and obliges
it to surrender, 24

Corinth, a famous and rich city of Achaia, in Greece, in the middle of
the Isthmus going into Peloponnesus

Corneli[=a]na Castra, a city of Africa, between Carthage and Utica

Correus, general of the Bellov[)a]ci, with six thousand foot, and a
thousand horse, lies in ambush for the Roman foragers, and attacks the
Roman cavalry with a small party, but is routed and killed, G. viii. 19

Cors[)i]ca, a considerable island in the Mediterranean Sea, near
Sardinia, which still retains its name

Cosanum, a city of Calabria, in Italy, _Cassano_

Cotta, L. Aurunculeius, dissents from Sabinus in relation to the advice
given them by Ambiorix, G. v. 28; his behaviour when attacked by the
Gauls, 33; is slain, with the great part of his men, after a brave
resistance, 37

Cotuatus and Conetodunus massacre all the Roman merchants at Genabum, G.
vii. 3

Cotus, a division on his account among the Aeduans, G. vii. 32; obliged
to desist from his pretensions to the supreme magistracy, 33

Crassus, P., his expedition into Aquitaine, G. iii. 20; reduces the
Sotiates, 22; and other states, obliging them to give hostages, 27

Crast[)i]nus, his character, and courage at the battle of Pharsalia, C.
iii. 91; where he is killed, 99

Cr[)e]m[=o]na, an ancient city of Gallia Cisalpina, which retains its
name to this day, and is the metropolis of the _Cremonese_, in Italy

Crete, one of the noblest islands in the Mediterranean Sea, now called
_Candia_

Critognatus, his extraordinary speech and proposal to the garrison of
Alesia, G. vii. 77

Curio obliges Cato to abandon the defence of Cicily, C. i. 30; sails for
Africa, and successfully attacks Varus, ii. 25; his speech to revive the
courage of his men, 32; defeats Varus, 34; giving too easy credit to a
piece of false intelligence, is cut off with his whole army, 42

Curiosol[=i]tae, a people of Gaul, inhabiting _Cornoualle,_ in Bretagne

Cycl[)a]des, islands in the Aegean Sea, _L'Isole dell' Archipelago_

Cyprus, an island in the Mediterranean Sea, between Syria and Cilicia,
_Cipro_

Cyr[=e]ne, an ancient and once a fine city of Africa, situate over
against Matapan, the most southern cape of Morea, _Cairoan_

Cyz[=i]cus, Atraki, formerly one of the largest cities of Asia Minor, in
an island of the same name, in the Black Sea

Dacia, an ancient country of Scythia, beyond the Danube, containing part
of _Hungary, Transylvania, Walachia,_ and _Moldavia_

Dalm[=a]tia, a part of Illyricum, now called _Sclavonia_, lying between
Croatia, Bosnia, Servia, and the Adriatic Gulf

D[=a]n[)u]b[)i]us, the largest river in Europe, which rises in the Black
Forest, and after flowing through that country, Bavaria, Austria,
Hungary, Servia, Bulgaria, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, receiving in its
course a great number of noted rivers, some say sixty, and 120 minor
streams, falls into the Black or Euxine Sea, in two arms

Dard[=a]nia, the ancient name of a country in Upper Moesia, which became
afterwards a part of Dacia; _Rascia_, and part of _Servia_

Dec[=e]tia, a town in Gaul,_Decise_, on the Loire

Delphi, a city of Achaia, _Delpho_, al. _Salona_

Delta, a very considerable province of Egypt, at the mouth of the Nile,
_Errif_

Diablintes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country called _Le
Perche_; al. _Diableres_, in Bretagne; al. _Lintes_ of Brabant; al.
_Lendoul_, over against Britain

Divit[)i][)a]cus, the Aeduan, his attachment to the Romans and Caesar,
G. i. 19; Caesar, for his sake, pardons his brother Dumnorix, _ibid_.;
he complains to Caesar, in behalf of the rest of the Gauls, of the
cruelty of Ariovistus, 31; marches against the Bellov[)a]ci create a
diversion in favour of Caesar, ii. 10; intercedes for the Bellov[)a]ci,
and obtains their pardon from Caesar, 14; goes to Rome to implore aid of
the senate, but without effect, vi. 12

Domitius Ahenobarbus, besieged by Caesar in Corfinium, writes to Pompey
for assistance, C. i. 15; seized by his own troops, who offer to deliver
him up to Caesar, 20; Caesar's generous behaviour towards him, 23; he
enters Marseilles, and is entrusted with the supreme command, 36; is
defeated in a sea fight by Decimus Brutus, 58; escapes with great
difficulty a little before the surrender of Marseilles, ii. 22

Domitius Calvinus, sent by Caesar into Macedonia, comes very opportunely
to the relief of Cassius Longinus, C. iii. 34; gains several advantages
over Scipio, 32

Drapes, in conjunction with Luterius, seizes Uxellodunum, G. viii. 30;
his camp stormed, and himself made prisoner, 29; he starves himself, 44

Druids, priests so called, greatly esteemed in Gaul, and possessed of
many valuable privileges, G. vi. 13

D[=u]bis, a river of Burgundy, _Le Doux_

Dumn[)a]cus besieges Duracius in Limonum, G. viii. 26; is defeated by
Fabius, 27

Dumn[)o]rix, the brother of Divitiacus, his character, G. i. 15;
persuades the noblemen of Gaul not to go with Caesar into Britain, v. 5;
deserts, and is killed for his obstinacy, 6

Duracius besieged in Limonum by Dumnacus, general of the Andes, G. viii.
26

Durocort[=o]rum, a city of Gaul, _Rheims_

D[)y]rrh[)a]ch[)i]um, a city of Macedonia, _Durazzo, Drazzi_; Caesar
endeavours to enclose Pompey within his lines near that place, C. iii.
41

Ebur[=o]nes, an ancient people of Germany, inhabiting part of the
country, now the bishopric of _Liege_, and the county of _Namur_. Caesar
takes severe vengeance on them for their perfidy, G. vi. 34, 35

Eb[=u]r[)o]v[=i]ces, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of
_Evreux_, in Normandy; they massacre their senate, and join with
Viridovix, G. iii. 17

Egypt, see _Aegypt_

El[=a]ver, a river of Gaul, the _Allier_

Eleut[=e]ti Cadurci, a branch of the Cadurci, in Aquitania. They are
called in many editions Eleutheri Cadurci, but incorrectly, since
Eleutheri is a term of Greek origin, and besides could hardly be applied
to a Gallic tribe like the Eleuteti, who, in place of being free [Greek:
eleutheroi], seem to have been clients of the Arverni; they furnish
troops to the relief of Alesia, G. vii. 75

Elis, a city of Peloponnesus, _Belvidere_

Elus[=a]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of
_Euse_, in Gascony

Eph[)e]sus, an ancient and celebrated city of Asia Minor, _Efeso_; the
temple of Diana there in danger of being stripped, G. iii. 32

Epidaurus, a maritime city of Dalmatia, _Ragusa_

Ep[=i]rus, a country in Greece, between Macedonia, Achaia, and the
Ionian Sea, by some now called _Albania inferior_

Eporedorix, treacherously revolts from Caesar, G. vii. 54

Essui, a people of Gaul; the word seems to be a corruption from Aedui,
C. v. 24

Etesian winds detain Caesar at Alexandria, which involves him in a new
war, C. iii. 107

Eusubii, corrupted from _Unelli_, or _Lexovii_, properly the people of
_Lisieux_, in Normandy

Fabius, C., one of Caesar's lieutenants, sent into Spain, with three
legions, C. i. 37; builds two bridges over the Segre for the convenience
of foraging, 40

Fanum, a city of Umbria in Italy, _Fano_, C. i. 11

Fortune, her wonderful power and influence on matters of war, G. vi. 30

Faesulae, _Fiesoli_, an ancient city of Italy, in the duchy of Florence,
anciently one of the twelve considerable cities of Etruria.

Flavum, anciently reckoned the eastern mouth of the Rhine, now called
the _Ulie_, and is a passage out of the Zuyder Sea into the North Sea

Gab[)a]li, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of
_Givaudan_. Their chief city was Anduitum, now _Mende_, G. vii. 64; they
join the general confederacy of Vercingetorix, and give hostages to
Luterius, G. vii. 7

Gadit[=a]ni, the people of Gades, C. ii. 18

Gal[=a]tia, a country in Asia Minor, lying between Cappadocia, Pontus,
and Paphlagonia, now called _Chiangare_

Galba Sergius, sent against the Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni, G.
iii. 1; the barbarians attack his camp unexpectedly, but are repulsed
with great loss, iii. 6

Galli, the Gauls, the people of ancient Gaul, now _France_; their
country preferable to that of the Germans, G. i. 31; their manner of
attacking towns, ii.6; of greater stature than the Romans, 30; quick and
hasty in their resolves, iii.8; forward in undertaking wars, but soon
fainting under misfortunes, 19; their manners, chiefs, druids,
discipline, cavalry, religion, origin, marriages, and funerals, vi.13;
their country geographically described, i.1

Gall[=i]a, the ancient and renowned country of Gaul, now _France_. It
was divided by the Romans into--

Gallia Cisalpina, Tonsa, or Togata, now _Lombardy_, between the Alps and
the river Rubicon: and--

Gallia Transalpina, or Com[=a]ta, comprehending _France, Holland, the
Netherlands_: and farther subdivided into--

Gallia Belg[)i]ca, now a part of _Lower Germany_, and the _Netherlands_,
with _Picardy_; divided by Augustus into Belgica and Germania__ and the
latter into Prima and Secunda

Gallia Celt[)i]ca, now _France_ properly so called, divided by Augustus
into Lugdun[=e]nsis, and Rothomagensis

Gallia Aquitan[)i]ca, now _Gascony_; divided by Augustus into Prima,
Secunda, and Tertia: and--

Gallia Narbonensis, or Bracc[=a]ta, now _Languedoc, Dauphiny_, and
_Provence_

Gallograecia, a country of Asia Minor, the same as _Galatia_

Gar[=i]tes, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country now called _Gavre,
Gavaraan_

Garoceli, or Graioc[)e]li, an ancient people of Gaul, about _Mount
Genis_, or _Mount Genevre_ others place them in the _Val de Gorienne_;
they oppose Caesar's passage over the Alps, G. i. 10

Garumna, the _Garonne_, one of the largest rivers of France, which,
rising in the Pyrenees, flows through Guienne, forms the vast Bay of
Garonne, and falls, by two mouths, into the British Seas. The Garonne is
navigable as far as _Toulouse_, and communicates with the Mediterranean
by means of the great canal, G. i. 1

Garumni, an ancient people of Gaul, in the neighbourhood of the
_Garonne_, G. iii. 27

Geld[=u]ra, a fortress of the Ubii, on the Rhine, not improbably the
present village of _Gelb_, on that river eleven German miles from
N[=e]us

Gen[)a]bum, _Orleans_, an ancient town in Gaul, famous for the massacre
of the Roman citizens committed there by the Carn[=u]tes

Gen[=e]va, a city of Savoy, now a free republic, upon the borders of
Helvetia, where the Rhone issues from the Lake Lemanus, anciently a city
of the Allobr[)o]ges

Gen[=u]sus, a river of Macedonia, uncertain

Gerg[=o]via, the name of two cities in ancient Gaul, the one belonging
to the Boii, the other to the Arverni. The latter was the only Gallic
city which baffled the attacks of Caesar

Gerg[=o]via of the Averni, Vercingetorix expelled thence by Gobanitio,
G. vii. 4; the Romans attacking it eagerly, are repulsed with great
slaughter, 50

Gerg[=o]via of the Boii, besieged in vain by Vercingetorix, G. vii. 9

Germania, _Germany_, one of the largest countries of Europe, and the
mother of those nations which, on the fall of the Roman empire,
conquered all the rest. The name appears to be derived from _wer_, war,
and _man_, a man, and signifies the country of warlike men

Germans, habituated from their infancy to arms, G. i. 36; their manner
of training their cavalry, 48; their superstition 50; defeated by
Caesar, 53; their manners, religion, vi. 23; their huge stature and
strength, G. i. 39

G[=e]tae, an ancient people of Scythia, who inhabited betwixt Moesia and
Dacia, on each side of the Danube. Some think their country the same
with the present _Walachia_, or _Moldavia_

Getulia, a province in the kingdom of Morocco, in Barbary

Gomphi, a town in Thessaly, _Gonfi_, refusing to open its gates to
Caesar, is stormed and taken, C. iii. 80

Gord[=u]ni, a people of Belgium, the ancient inhabitants of _Ghent_,
according to others of _Courtray_; they join with Ambiorix in his attack
of Cicero's camp, G. v. 39

Got[=i]ni, an ancient people of Germany, who were driven out of their
country by Maroboduus  Graecia, _Greece,_ a large part of Europe, called
by the Turks _Rom[=e]lia,_ containing many countries, provinces, and
islands, once the nursery of arts, learning, and sciences

Graioc[)e]li, see _Garoceli_

Grudii, the inhabitants about _Louvaine,_ or, according to some, about
_Bruges;_ they join with Ambiorix in his attack of Cicero's camp, G. v.
39

Gugerni, a people of ancient Germany, who dwelt on the right banks of
the Rhine, between the Ubii and the Batavi

Gutt[=o]nes, or Gyth[=o]nes, an ancient people of Germany, inhabiting
about the Vistula

Haemus, a mountain dividing Moesia and Thrace, _Argentaro_

Haliacmon, a river of Macedonia, uncertain; Scipio leaves Favonius with
orders to build a fort on that river, C. iii. 36

Har[=u]des, or Har[=u]di, a people of Gallia Celtica, supposed to have
been originally Germans: and by some to have inhabited the country about
_Constance_ Helv[=e]tia, _Switzerland,_ now divided into thirteen
cantons

Helv[=e]tii, _the Helvetians, or Switzers,_ ancient inhabitants of the
country of _Switzerland;_ the most warlike people of Gaul, G. i. 1;
their design of abandoning their own country, 2; attacked with
considerable loss near the river Sa[^o]ne, 12; vanquished and obliged to
return home by Caesar, 26

Helvii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country now possessed
by the _Vivarois;_ Caesar marches into their territories, G. vii. 7

Heracl[=e]a, a city of Thrace, on the Euxine Sea, _Pantiro_

Heracl[=e]a Sent[)i]ca, a town in Macedonia, _Chesia_

Hercynia Silva, _the Hercinian Forest,_ the largest forest of ancient
Germany, being reckoned by Caesar to have been sixty days' journey in
length, and nine in breadth. Many parts of it have been since cut down,
and many are yet remaining; of which, among others, is that called the
_Black Forest;_ its prodigious extent, G. vi. 4

Hermand[=u]ri, an ancient people of Germany, particularly in the country
now called _Misnia,_ in Upper Saxony; though they possessed a much
larger tract of land, according to some, all _Bohemia_

Hermin[)i]us Mons, a mountain of _Lusitania, Monte Arm[)i]no;_ according
to others, _Monte della Strella_

Her[)u]li, an ancient northern people, who came first out of Scandavia,
but afterwards inhabited the country now called _Mecklenburg_ in Lower
Saxony, towards the Baltic

Hibernia, _Ireland,_ a considerable island to the west of Great Britain,
G. v. 13

Hisp[=a]n[)i]a, Spain, one of the most considerable kingdoms of Europe,
divided by the ancients into Tarraconensis, Baetica, and Lusitania. This
name appears to be derived from the Phoenician _Saphan,_ a rabbit, vast
numbers of these animals being found there by the Phoenician colonists

Ib[=e]rus, a river of Hispania Tarraconensis, the _Ebro,_ C. i. 60

Iccius, or Itius Portus, a seaport town of ancient Gaul; _Boulogne,_ or,
according to others, _Calais_

Ig[)i]l[)i]um, an island in the Tuscan Sea, _il Giglio, l'Isle du Lys_

Ig[)u]v[)i]um, a city of Umbria in Italy, _Gubio;_ it forsakes Pompey,
and submits to Caesar, C. i. 12

Illurgavonenses, a people of Hispania Tarraconensis, near the Iberus;
they submit to Caesar, and supply him with corn, C. i. 60

Illurgis, a town of Hispania Baetica, _Illera_

Induti[)o]m[)a]rus, at the head of a considerable faction among the
Treviri, G. v. 3; endeavouring to make himself master of Labienus's
camp, is repulsed and slain, 53

Is[)a]ra, the _Is[`e]re,_ a river of France, which rises in Savoy, and
falls into the Rhone above Valance

Isauria, a province anciently of Asia Minor, now a part of _Caramania,_
and subject to the Turks

Issa (an island of the Adriatic Sea, _Lissa_), revolts from Caesar at
the instigation of Octavius, C. iii. 9

Ister, that part of the Danube which passed by Illyricum

Istr[)i]a, a country now in Italy, under the Venetians, bordering on
Illyricum, so called from the river Ister

Istr[)o]p[)o]lis, a city of Lower Moesia, near the south entrance of the
Danube, _Prostraviza_

It[)a]l[)i]a, _Italy,_ one of the most famous countries in Europe, once
the seat of the Roman empire, now under several princes, and free
commonwealths

It[)a]l[)i]ca, a city of Hispania Baetica, _Servila la Veja;_ according
to others, _Alcala del Rio;_ shuts its gates against Varro, C. ii. 20

Itius Portus, Caesar embarks there for Britain, G. v. 5

It[=u]raea, a country of Palestine, _Sacar_

Jacet[=a]ni, or Lacet[=a]ni, a people of Spain, near the Pyrenean
Mountains; revolt from Afranius and submit to Caesar, C. i. 60

Jadert[=i]ni, a people so called from their capital Jadera, a city of
Illyricum, _Zara_

Juba, king of Numidia, strongly attached to Pompey, C. ii. 25; advances
with a large army to the relief of Utica, 36; detaches a part of his
troops to sustain Sabura, 40; defeats Cario, ii. 42; his cruelty, ii. 44

J[=u]ra, a mountain in Gallia Belgica, which separated the Sequani from
the Helvetians, most of which is now called _Mount St. Claude._ The name
appears to be derived from the Celtic, _jou-rag,_ which signifies the
"domain of God;" the boundary of the Helvetians towards the Sequani, G.
i. 2

Labi[=e]nus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, is attacked in his camp, G. v.
58, vi. 6; his stratagem, G. vii. 60; battle with the Gauls, G. vii. 59;
is solicited by Caesar's enemies to join their party, G. viii. 52; built
the town of Cingulum, C. i. 15; swears to follow Pompey, C. iii. 13; his
dispute with Valerius about a peace, C. iii. 19; his cruelty towards
Caesar's followers, C. iii. 71; flatters Pompey, C. iii. 87

Lacus B[)e]n[=a]cus, _Lago di Guardo,_ situated in the north of Italy,
between Verona, Brescia, and Trent

Lacus Lem[)a]nus, the lake upon which Geneva stands, formed by the River
Rhone, between _Switzerland_ to the north, and Savoy to the south,
commonly called the _Lake of Geneva_, G. i. 2, 8

Larin[=a]tes, the people of Larinum, a city of Italy, _Larino_; C. i. 23

Larissa, the principal city of Thessaly, a province of Macedonia, on the
river Peneo

L[)a]t[=i]ni, the inhabitants of Latium, an ancient part of Italy,
whence the Latin tongue is so called

Lat[=o]br[)i]gi, a people of Gallia Belgica, between the Allobroges and
Helvetii, in the country called _Lausanne_; abandon their country, G. i.
5; return, G. i. 28; their number, G. i. 29

Lemnos, an island in the Aegean Sea, now called _Stalimane_

Lemov[=i]ces, an ancient people of Gaul, _le Limosin_, G. vii. 4

Lemov[=i]ces Armorici, the people of _St. Paul de Leon_

Lenium, a town in Lusitania, unknown

Lent[)u]lus Marcellinus, the quaestor, one of Caesar's followers, C.
iii. 62

Lentulus and Marcellus, the consuls, Caesar's enemies, G. viii. 50;
leave Rome through fear of Caesar, C. i. 14

Lenunc[)u]li, fishing-boats, C. ii. 43

Lepontii, a people of the Alps, near the valley of _Leventini_, G. iv.
10

Leuci, a people of Gallia Belgica, where now Lorrain is, well skilled in
darting. Their chief city is now called _Toul_, G. i. 40

Lev[)a]ci, a people of Brabant, not far from Louvain, whose chief town
is now called _Leew_; dependants on the Nervii, G. v. 39

Lex, law of the Aedui respecting the election of magistrates, G. vii. 33

Lex, Julian law, C. ii. 14

Lex, the Pompeian law respecting bribery, C. iii. 1

Lex, two Caelian laws, C. iii. 20, 21

Lexovii, an ancient people of Gaul, _Lisieux_ in Normandy, G. iii. 11,
17

Liberty of the Gauls, G. iii. 8; the desire of, G. v. 27; the sweetness
of, G. iii. 10; the incitement to, G. vii. 76; C. i. 47

Libo, praefect of Pompey's fleet, C. iii. 5; converses with Caesar at
Oricum, C. iii. 16; takes possession of the Island at Brundisium, C.
iii. 23; threatens the partisans of Caesar, C. iii. 24; withdraws from
Brundisium, _ibid_.

Liburni, an ancient people of Illyricum, inhabiting part of the present
_Croatia_

Liger, or Ligeris, the _Loire_; one of the greatest and most celebrated
rivers of France, said to receive one hundred and twelve rivers in its
course; it rises in Velay, and falls into the Bay of Aquitain, below
Nantz, G. iii. 5

Lig[)u]ria, a part of ancient Italy, extending from the Apennines to the
Tuscan Sea, containing _Ferrara_, and the territories of _Genoa_

Limo, or Lim[=o]num, a city of ancient Gaul, _Poitiers_

Ling[)o]nes, a people of Gallia Belgica, inhabiting in and about
_Langres_, in Champagne, G. i. 26, 40

Liscus, one of the Aedui, accuses Dumnorix to Caesar, G. i. 16, 17

Lissus, an ancient city of Macedonia, _Alessio_

Litavicus, one of the Aedui, G. vii. 37; his treachery and flight, G.
vii. 38

Lucani, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the country now called
_Basilicate_

Luceria, an ancient city of Italy, _Lucera_

Lucretius Vespillo, one of Pompey's followers, C. iii. 7

Lucterius or Laterius, one of the Cadurci, vii. 5, 7

Lusit[=a]nia, _Portugal_, a kingdom on the west of Spain, formerly a
part of it

Lusitanians, light-armed troops, C. i. 48

Lutetia, _Paris_, an ancient and famous city, now the capital of all
France, on the river _Seine_

Lygii, an ancient people of Upper Germany, who inhabited the country now
called _Silesia_, and on the borders of _Poland_

M[)a]c[)e]d[=o]nia, a large country, of great antiquity and fame,
containing several provinces, now under the Turks

Macedonian cavalry among Pompey's troops, C. iii. 4

Mae[=o]tis Palus, a vast lake in the north part of Scythia, now called
_Marbianco_, or _Mare della Tana_. It is about six hundred miles in
compass, and the river Tanais disembogues itself into it

Maget[)o]br[)i]a, or Amagetobria, a city of Gaul, near which Ariovistus
defeated the combined forces of the Gauls. It is supposed to correspond
to the modern _Moigte de Broie_, near the village of _Pontailler_

Mandub[)i]i, an ancient people of Gaul, _l'Anxois_, in Burgundy; their
famine and misery, G. vii. 78

Mandubratius, a Briton, G. v. 20

Marcellus, Caesar's enemy, G. viii 53

Marcius Crispus, is sent for a protection to the inhabitants of Thabena

Marcomanni, a nation of the Suevi, whom Cluverius places between the
Rhine, the Danube and the Neckar; who settled, however, under
Maroboduus, in _Bohemia_ and _Moravia_. The name Marcomanni signifies
border-men. Germans, G. i. 51

Marruc[=i]ni, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the country now
called _Abruzzo_, C. i. 23; ii. 34

Mars, G. vi. 17

Marsi, an ancient people of Italy inhabiting the country now called
_Ducato de Marsi_, C. ii. 27

Massilia, _Marseilles_, a large and flourishing city of Provence, in
France, on the Mediterranean, said to be very ancient, and, according to
some, built by the Phoenicians, but as Justin will have it, by the
Phocaeans, in the time of Tarquinius, king of Rome

Massilienses, the inhabitants of Marseilles, C. i. 34-36

Matisco, an ancient city of Gaul, _Mascon_, G. vii. 90

Matr[)o]na, a river in Gaul, the _Marne_, G. i. 1

Mauritania, _Barbary_, an extensive region of Africa, divided into M.
Caesariensis, Tingitana, and Sitofensis

Mediomatr[=i]ces, a people of Lorrain, on the Moselle, about the city of
_Mentz_, G. iv. 10

Mediterranean Sea, the first discovered sea in the world, still very
famous, and much frequented, which breaks in from the Atlantic Ocean,
between Spain and Africa, by the straits of Gibraltar, or Hercules'
Pillar, the _ne plus ultra_ of the ancients

Meldae, according to some the people of _Meaux_; but more probably
corrupted from _Belgae_

Melodunum, an ancient city of Gaul, upon the Seine, above Paris,
_Melun_, G. vii. 58, 60

Menapii, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, who inhabited on both
sides of the Rhine. Some take them for the inhabitants of _Cleves_, and
others of _Antwerp, Ghent_, etc., G. ii. 4; iii. 9

Menedemus, C. iii. 34

Mercurius, G. v. 17

Mes[)o]p[)o]t[=a]mia, a large country in the middle of Asia, between the
Tigris and the Euphrates, _Diarbeck_

Mess[=a]na, an ancient and celebrated city of Sicily, still known by the
name of _Messina_, C. iii. 101

M[)e]taurus, a river of Umbria, now called _Metoro_, in the duchy of
Urbino

Metios[=e]dum, an ancient city of Gaul, on the Seine, below Paris,
_Corbeil_, G. vii. 61

Metr[)o]p[)o]lis, a city of Thessaly, between Pharsalus and Gomphi, C.
iii. 11

Milo, C. iii. 21

Minerva, G. vi. 12

Minutius Rufus, C. iii. 7

Mitylene, a city of Lesbos, _Metelin_

Moesia, a country of Europe, and a province of the ancient Illyricum,
bordering on Pannonia, divided into the Upper, containing _Bosnia_ and
_Servia_, and the Lower, called _Bulgaria_

Mona, in Caesar, the Isle of _Man_; in Ptolemy, _Anglesey_, G. v. 13

Mor[)i]ni, an ancient people of the Low Countries, who probably
inhabited on the present coast of _Bologne_, on the confines of
_Picardy_ and _Artois_, because Caesar observes that from their country
was the nearest passage to Britain, G. ii. 4

Moritasgus, G. v. 54

Mosa, the _Maess_, or _Meuse_, a large river of Gallia Belgica, which
falls into the German Ocean below the Briel, G. iv. 10

Mosella, the _Moselle_, a river which, running through Lorrain, passes
by Triers and falls unto the Rhine at Coblentz, famous for the vines
growing in the neighbourhood of it

Mysia, a country of Asia Minor, not far from the Hellespont, divided
Into Major and Minor

Nabathaei, an ancient people of Arabia, uncertain

Nann[=e]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country about
_Nantes_, G. iii. 9

Nantu[=a]tes, an ancient people of the north part of Savoy, whose
country is now called _Le Chablais_, G. iii. 1

Narbo, _Narbonne_, an ancient Roman city in Languedoc, in France, said
to be built a hundred and thirty-eight years before the birth of Christ,
G. iii. 20

Narisci, the ancient people of the country now called _Nortgow_, in
Germany, the capital of which is the famous city of Nuremburg

Nasua, the brother of Cimberius, and commander of the hundred cantons of
the Suevi, who encamped on the banks of the Rhine with the intention of
crossing that river, G. i. 37

Naupactus, an ancient and considerable city of Aetolia, now called
_Lepanto_, C. iii. 35

Nem[=e]tes, a people of ancient Germany, about the city of Spire, on the
Rhine, G. i. 51

Nemetocenna, a town of Belgium, not known for certain; according to
some, _Arras_, G. viii, 47

Neocaesarea, the capital of Ponts, on the river Licus, now called
_Tocat_

Nervii, an ancient people of _Gallia Belgica_, thought to have dwelt in
the now diocese of _Cambray_. They attacked Caesar on his march, and
fought until they were almost annihilated, G. ii. 17

Nessus, or Nestus, a river is Thrace, _Nesto_ Nicaea, a city of
Bithynia, now called _Isnick_, famous for the first general council,
anno 324, against Arianism

Nit[=o]br[)i]ges, an ancient people of Gaul, whose territory lay on
either side of the Garonne, and corresponded to the modern Agennois, in
the department of Lot-et-Garonne. Their capital was Agrimum, now
_Agen_, G. vii. 7, 31, 46, 75

Noreia, a city on the borders of Illyricum, in the province of Styria,
near the modern village of Newmarket, about nine German miles from
Aquileia, G. i. 5

N[=o]r[)i]cae Alpes, that part of the Alps which were in, or bordering
upon, Noricum

N[=o]r[)i]cum, anciently a large country, and now comprehending a great
part of _Austria, Styria, Carinthia_, part of _Tyrol, Bavaria_, etc.,
and divided into Noricum Mediterraneum and Ripense. It was first
conquered by the Romans under Tiberius, in the reign of Augustus, and
was celebrated for its mineral treasures, especially iron

N[)o]v[)i][)o]d[=u]num Belgarum, an ancient city of Belgic Gaul, now
called _Noyon_

N[)o]v[)i][)o]d[=u]num Bitur[)i]gum, _Neuvy_, or _Neufvy_, G. vii. 12

N[)o]v[)i][)o]d[=u]num Aeduorum, _Nevers_, G. vii. 55

N[)o]v[)i][)o]d[=u]num Suessionum, _Soissons, al. Noyon_, G. ii. 12

N[)o]v[)i]om[=a]gum, _Spire_, an ancient city of Germany, in the now
upper circle of the Rhine, and on that river

Numantia, a celebrated city of ancient Spain, famous for a gallant
resistance against the Romans, in a siege of fourteen years; _Almasan_

Numeius, G. i. 7

Num[)i]dae, the inhabitants of, G. ii. 7

Numid[)i]a, an ancient and celebrated kingdom of Africa, bordering on
Mauritania; _Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli_, etc.

N[=y]mphaeum, a promontory of Illyricum, exposed to the south wind, and
distant about three miles from Lissus, _Alessio_, C. iii. 26

Oc[)e]lum, a town situated among the Cottian Alps, Usseau in Piedmont,
G. i. 10

Octavius, C. iii. 9

Octod[=u]rus, a town belonging to the Veragrians, among the Pennine
Alps, now _Martigny_ in the Valois, G. iii. 1  Octog[=e]sa, a city of
Hispania Tarraconensis, _Mequinenza_, C. i. 61

Ollovico, G. vii. 31

Orch[)o]m[)e]nus, a town in Boeotia, _Orcomeno_, C. iii. 5 5

Orcynia, the name given by Greek writers to the Hercynian forest

Orget[=o]rix, G. i. 2, 3

Or[)i]cum, a town in Epirus, _Orco, or Orcha_, C. iii. 11, 12

Osc[=e]nses, the people of Osca, a town in Hispania Tarraconensis, now
_Huescar_, C. i. 60

Os[=i]sm[)i]i, an ancient people of Gaul, one of the Gentes Armoricae.
Their country occupied part of Neodron Brittany; capital Vorganium,
afterwards Osismii, and now _Korbez_. In this territory also stood
Brivatas Portus, now _Brest_, G. i. 34

Otacilii, C. iii. 28

Padua, the _Po_, the largest river in Italy, which rises in Piedmont,
and dividing Lombardy into two parts, falls into the Adriatic Sea, by
many mouths; south of Venice

Paem[=a]ni, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica; according to some,
those of _Luxemburg_; according to others, the people of _Pemont_, near
the Black Forest, in part of the modern _Lugen_, G. ii. 4

P[)a]laeste, a town in Epirus, near Oricurn

Pann[=o]n[)i]a, a very large country in the ancient division of Europe,
divided into the Upper and Lower, and comprehended betwixt Illyricum,
the Danube, and the mountains Cethi

P[)a]ris[)i]i, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country now
called the _Isle of France_. Their capital was Lutetia, afterwards
Parisii, now _Paris_, G. vi. 3

P[=a]rth[)i]a, a country in Asia, lying between Media, Caramania, and
the Hyreanian Sea

Parthians at war with Rome, C. iii. 31

P[=a]rth[=i]ni, a people of Macedonia; their chief city taken by storm,
C. iii. 41

P[=e]l[=i]gni, a people of Italy in Abruzzo, C. i. 15

P[)e]l[)o]ponn[=e]sus, the _Morea_, a famous, large, and fruitful
peninsula of Greece, now belonging to the Venetians

P[=e]l[=u]s[)i]um, an ancient and celebrated city of Egypt, _Belbais_;
Pompey goes to it, C. iii. 103; taken by Mithridates

P[=e]rg[)a]mus, an ancient and famous city of Mysia, _Pergamo_

Per[)i]nthus, a city of Thrace, about a day's journey west of
Constantinople, now in a decaying condition, and called _Heraclea_

P[=e]rs[)i]a, one of the largest, most ancient and celebrated kingdoms
of Asia

P[=e]tra, an ancient city of Macedonia, uncertain

Petreius, one of Pompey's lieutenants, C. i. 38

P[=e]tr[)o]g[)o]r[)i]i, a country in Gaul, east of the mouth of the
Garumna; their chief city was Vesuna, afterwards Petrocorii, now
_Perigueux_, the capital of Perigord

Pe[=u]c[=i]ni, the inhabitants of the islands of Peuce, in one of the
mouths of the Danube

Ph[=a]rs[=a]l[)i]a, a part of Thessaly, famous for the battle between
Caesar and Pompey, which decided the fate of the Roman commonwealth

Pharus, an isle facing the port of Alexandria in ancient Egypt; _Farion_

Phasis, a large river in Colchis, now called _Fasso_, which flows into
the Euxine Sea

Ph[)i]lippi, a city of Macedonia, on the confines of Thrace, _Filippo_

Ph[)i]l[=i]pp[)o]p[)o]lis, a city of Thrace, near the river Hebrus,
_Filippopoli_

Phr[)y]g[)i]a, two countries in Asia Minor, one called Major, the other
Minor

P[=i]c[=e]num, an ancient district of Italy, lying eastward of Umbria;
_the March of Ancona_; according to others, _Piscara_

P[=i]cti, _Picts_, an ancient barbarous northern people, who by
inter-marriages became, in course of time, one nation with the Scots; but
are originally supposed to have come out of Denmark or Scythia, to the
Isles of Orkney, and from thence into Scotland

P[=i]ct[)o]nes, an ancient people of Gaul, along the southern bank of
the Liger, or Loire. Their capital was Limonum, afterwards Pictones, now
_Paitross_, in the department _de la Vienne_, G. iii. 11

Pir[=u]stae, an ancient people of Dalmatia, Illyricum, on the confines
of Pannonia. They are the same as the Pyraci of Pliny (H. N. iii. 22),
G. v. i

P[)i]saurum, a city of Umbria in Italy, _Pisaro_

Piso, an Aquitanian, slain, G. iv. 12

Placentia, an ancient city of Gallia Cisalpina, near the Po, now the
metropolis of the duchy of _Piacenza_, which name it also bears

Pleum[)o]si, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, subject to the
Nervians, and inhabiting near _Tournay_

Pompey, at first friendly to Caesar, G. vi. 1; subsequently estranged,
G. viii. 53; could not bear an equal his authority, power, and
influence, C. i. 61; sends ambassadors to Caesar, C. i. 8, 10; always
received great respect from Caesar, C. i. 8; Caesar desires to bring him
to an engagement, C. iii. 66; his unfortunate flight, C. iii. 15, 94,
102; his death, C. iii. 6, 7.

Pomponius, C. iii. 101

Pontus Eux[=i]nus, the _Euxine,_ or _Black Sea_, from the Aegean along
the Hellespont, to the Maeotic Lake, between Europe and Asia

Posth[)u]m[)i][=a]na Castra, an ancient town in Hispania Baetica, now
called _Castro el Rio_

Pothinus, king Ptolemy's tutor, C. iii. 108; his death, C. iii. 112

Praeciani, an ancient people of Gaul, _Precius_; they surrendered to the
Romans, G. iii. 27

Provincia Rom[=a]na, or Romanorum, one of the southern provinces of
France, the first the Romans conquered and brought into the form of a
province, whence it obtained its name; which it still in some degree
retains, being called at this day _Provence_. It extended from the
Pyrenees to the Alps, along the coast. _Provence_ is only part of the
ancient Provincia, which in its full extent included the departments of
Pyr['e]n['e]es-Orientales, l'Arri[`e]ge, Aude[**Note: misprint "Ande" in
the original], Haute Garonne, Tarn, Herault, Gard, Vaucluse, Bouches-du-
Rh[^o]ne, Var, Basses-Alpes, Hautes-Alpes, La Dr[^o]me, l'Is[`e]re,
l'Ain

Prusa, or Prusas, _Bursa_, a city of Bithynia, at the foot of Olympus,
built by Hannibal

Ptolemaeius, Caesar interferes between him and Cleopatra, C. iii. 107;
his father's will, C. iii. 108; Caesar takes the royal youth into his
power, C. iii. 109

Pt[)o]l[)e]m[=a]is, an ancient city of Africa, _St. Jean d'Acre_

Publius Attius Varus, one of Pompey's generals, C. ii. 23  Pyrenaei
Montes, the _Pyrenees_, or _Pyrenean mountains_, one of the largest
chains of mountains in Europe, which divide Spain from France, running
from east to west eighty-five leagues in length. The name is derived
from the _Celtic Pyren_ or _Pyrn_, a high mountain, hence also Brenner,
in the Tyrol

Ravenna, a very ancient city of Italy, near the coast of the Adriatic
Gulf, which still retains its ancient name. In the decline of the Roman
empire, it was sometimes the seat of the emperors of the West; as it was
likewise of the Visi-Gothic kingdom, C. i. 5

Raur[=a]ci, a people of ancient Germany, near the Helvetii, who
inhabited near where _Basle_ in Switzerland now is; they unite with the
Helvetii, and leave home, G. i. 5, 29

Rebilus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, a man of great military
experience, C. ii. 34

Remi, the people of _Rheims_, a very ancient, fine, and populous city of
France, in the province of Champagne, on the river Vesle; surrender to
Caesar, G. ii. 3; their influence and power with Caesar, G. v. 54; vi.
64; they fall into an ambuscade of the Bellovaci, G. viii. 12

Rh[-e][)d]ones, an ancient people of Gaul inhabiting about _Rennes,_ in
Bretagne; they surrender to the Romans, G. ii. 34

Rhaetia, the country of the _Grisons,_ on the Alps, near the Hercynian
Forest

Rhenus, the _Rhine,_ a large and famous river in Germany, which it
formerly divided from Gaul. It springs out of the Rhaetian Alps, in the
western borders of Switzerland, and the northern of the Grisons, from
two springs which unite near Coire, and falls into the Meuse and the
German Ocean, by two mouths, whence Virgil calls it Rhenus bicornis. It
passes through Lacus Brigantinus, or the Lake of Constance, and Lacus
Acronius or the Lake of Zell, and then continues its westerly direction
to Basle (Basiliae). It then bends northward, and separates Germany from
France, and further down Germany from Belgium. At Schenk the Rhine sends
off its left-hand branch, the Vahalis (Waal), by a western course to
join the Mosa or Meuse. The Rhine then flows on a few miles, and again
separates into two branches--the one to the right called the Flevo, or
Felvus, or Flevum--now the Yssel, and the other called the Helium, now
the _Leek_. The latter joins the Mosa above Rotterdam. The Yssel was
first connected with the Rhine by the canal of Drusus. It passed through
the small lake of Flevo before reaching the sea which became expanded
into what is now called the Zuyder Zee by increase of water through the
Yssel from the Rhine. The whole course of the Rhine is nine hundred
miles, of which six hundred and thirty are navigable from Basle to the
sea.--G. iv. 10, 16, 17; vi. 9, etc.; description of it, G. iv. 10

Rh[)o]d[)a]nus, the _Rhone_, one of the most celebrated rivers of
France, which rises from a double spring in Mont de la Fourche, a part
of the Alps, on the borders of Switzerland, near the springs of the
Rhine. It passes through the Lacus Lemanus, Lake of Geneva, and flows
with a swift and rapid current in a southern direction into the Sinus
Gallicus, or Gulf of Lyons. Its whole course is about four hundred miles

Rhod[)o]pe, a famous mountain of Thrace, now called _Valiza_

Rh[)o]dus, Rhodes, a celebrated island in the Mediterranean, upon the
coast of Asia Minor, over against Caria

Rhynd[)a]gus, a river of Mysia in Asia, which falls into the Propontis

R[)o]ma, _Rome_, once the seat of the Roman empire, and the capital of
the then known world, now the immediate capital of Camagna di Roma only,
on the river Tiber, and the papal seat; generally supposed to have been
built by Romulus, in the first year of the seventh Olympiad, B.C. 753

Roscillus and Aegus, brothers belonging to the Allobroges, revolt from
Caesar to Pompey, C. iii. 59

Roxol[-a]ni, a people of Scythia Europaea, bordering upon the Alani;
their country, anciently called Roxolonia, is now _Red Russia_

R[)u]t[-e]ni, an ancient people of Gaul, to the north-west of the Volcae
Arecomici, occupying the district now called Le Rauergne. Their capital
was Segodunum, afterwards Ruteni, now Rhodes, G. i. 45; vii. 7, etc.

S[=a]bis, _the Sambre_, a river of the Low Countries, which rises in
Picardy, and falls into the Meuse at Namur, G. ii. 16, 18; vi. 33

Sabura, general of king Juba, C. ii. 38; his stratagem against Curio, C.
ii. 40; his death, C. ii. 95

Sadales, the son of king Cotys, brings forces to Pompey, C. iii. 4

Salassii, an ancient city of Piedmont, whose chief town was where now
_Aosta_ is situate

Salluvii, _Sallyes_, a people of Gallia Narbonensis, about where _Aix_
now is

Sal[=o]na, an ancient city of Dalmatia, and a Roman colony; the place
where Dioclesian was born, and whither he retreated, after he had
resigned the imperial dignity

S[=a]lsus, a river of Hispania Baetica, _Rio Salado_, or _Guadajos_

S[)a]m[)a]r[:o]br[=i]va, _Amiens_, an ancient city of Gallia Belgica,
enlarged and beautified by the emperor Antoninus Pius, now Amicus, the
chief city of Picardy, on the river Somme; assembly of the, Gauls held
there, G. v. 24

S[=a]nt[)o]nes, the ancient inhabitants of _Guienne_, or _Xantoigne_, G.
i. 10

S[=a]rd[)i]n[)i]a, a large island in the Mediterranean, which in the
time of the Romans had forty-two cities, it now belongs to the Duke of
Savoy, with the title of king

S[=a]rm[=a]t[)i]a, a very large northern country, divided into Sarmatia
Asiatica, containing _Tartary, Petigora, Circassia_, and the country of
the _Morduitae_; and Sarmatia Europaea, containing _Russia_, part of
_Poland, Prussia_, and _Lithuania_

Savus, the _Save_, a large river which rises in Upper Carniola, and
falls into the Danube at Belgrade

Scaeva, one of Caesar's centurions, displays remarkable valour, C. iii.
5 3; his shield is pierced in two hundred and thirty places

Sc[=a]ldis, the _Scheld_, a noted river in the Low Countries, which
rises in Picardy, and washing several of the principal cities of
Flanders and Brabant in its course, falls into the German Ocean by two
mouths, one retaining its own name, and the other called the _Honte_.
Its whole course does not exceed a hundred and twenty miles. G. vi. 33

Scandinav[)i]a, anciently a vast northern peninsula, containing what is
yet called _Schonen_, anciently Scania, belonging to _Denmark_; and part
of _Sweden_, _Norway_, and _Lapland_

Scipio, his opinion of Pompey and Caesar, C. i. 1, 21; his flight, C.
iii. 37

S[)e]d[=u]l[)i]us, general of the Lemovices; his death, G. vii. 38

S[=e]d[=u]ni, a people of Gaul, to the south-east of the Lake of Geneva,
occupying the upper part of the Valais. Their chief town was Civitus
Sedunorum, now _Sion_, G. iii. i

S[=e]d[=u]s[)i]i, an ancient people of Germany, on the borders of
Suabia, G. i. 51

S[=e]gni, an ancient German nation, neighbours of the Condrusi,
_Zulpich_

S[=e]g[=o]nt[)i][=a]ci, a people of ancient Britain, inhabiting about
Holshot, in Hampshire, G. v. 21

Segovia, a city of Hispania Baetica, _Sagovia la Menos_

S[)e]g[=u]s[)i][=a]ni, a people of Gallia Celtica, about where _Lionois
Forest_ is now situate

Sen[)o]nes, an ancient nation of the Celtae, inhabiting the country
about the _Senonois_, in Gaul

Sequ[)a]na, the _Seine_, one of the principal rivers of France, which
rising in the duchy of Burgundy, not far from a town of the same name,
and running through Paris, and by Rouen, forms at Candebec a great arm
of the sea

Sequ[)a]ni, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, inhabiting the country
now called the _Franche Comt['e]_, or the _Upper Burgundy_; they bring
the Germans into Gaul, G. vi. 12; lose the chief power, _ibid_.

Servilius the consul, C. iii. 21

S[=e]s[=u]v[)i]i, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about _Seez_;
they surrender to the Romans, G. ii. 34

Sextus Bibaculus, sick in the camp, G. vi. 38; fights bravely against
the enemy, _ibid_.

Sextus Caesar, C. ii. 20

Sextus, Quintilius Varus, qaestor, C. i. 23; C. ii. 28

Sib[=u]z[=a]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country
around the _Adour_; they surrender to the Romans, G. iii. 27

Sicil[)i]a, _Sicily_, a large island in the Tyrrhene Sea, at the
south-west point of Italy, formerly called the storehouse of the Roman
empire, it was the first province the Romans possessed out of Italy,
C. i. 30

S[)i]c[)o]ris, a river in Catalonia, the _Segre_

S[)i]g[)a]mbri, or S[)i]c[)a]mbri, an ancient people of Lower Germany,
between the Maese and the Rhine, where _Cuelderland_ is; though by some
placed on the banks of the Maine, G. iv. 18

Silicensis, a river of Hispania Baetica, _Rio de las Algamidas_. Others
think it a corruption from _Singuli_

Sinuessa, a city of Campania, not far from the Save, an ancient Roman
colony, now in a ruinous condition; _Rocca di Mondragon['e]_

Soldurii, G. iii. 22

S[)o]t[)i][=a]tes, or Sontiates, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting
the country about _Aire_; conquered by Caesar Aquillus, G. iii. 20, 21

Sp[=a]rta, a city of Peloponnesus, now called _Mucithra_, said to be as
ancient as the days of the patriarch Jacob

Spolet[)i]um, _Spoleto_, a city of great antiquity, of Umbria, in Italy,
the capital of a duchy of the same name, on the river Tesino, where are
yet some stately ruins of ancient Roman and Gothic edifices

Statius Marcus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, C. iii. i 5

S[)u][=e]ss[)i][=o]nes, an ancient people of Gaul, _les Soissanois_; a
kindred tribe with the Remi, G. ii. 3; surrender to Caesar, G. iii. 13

Su[=e]vi, an ancient, great, and warlike people of Germany, who
possessed the greatest part of it, from the Rhine to the Elbe, but
afterwards removed from the northern parts, and settled about the
Danube; and some marched into Spain, where they established a kingdom,
the greatest nation in Germany, G. i. 37, 51, 54; hold a levy against
the Romans, G. iv. 19; the Germans say that not even the gods are a
match for them, G. iii. 7; the Ubii pay them tribute, G. iv. 4

S[=u]lmo, an ancient city of Italy, _Sulmona_; its inhabitants declare
in favour of Caesar, C. i. 18

Sulpicius, one of Caesar's lieutenants, stationed among the Aedui, C. i.
74

Supplications decreed in favour of Caesar on several occasions, G. ii.
15; _ibid_. 35; iv. 38

Suras, one of the Aeduan nobles, taken prisoner, G. viii. 45

Sylla, though a most merciless tyrant, left to the tribunes the right of
giving protection, C. i. 5, 73

Syrac[=u]sae, _Saragusa_, once one of the noblest cities of Sicily, said
to have been built by Archias, a Corinthian, about seven hundred years
before Christ. The Romans besieged and took it during the second Punic
war, on which occasion the great Archimedes was killed

S[=y]rtes, _the Deserts of Barbary_; also two dangerous sandy gulfs in
the Mediterranean, upon the coast of Barbary, in Africa, called the one
Syrtis Magna, now the _Gulf of Sidra_; the other Syrtis Parva, now the
_Gulf of Capes_

T[)a]m[)e]sis, the _Thames_, a celebrated and well-known river of Great
Britain; Caesar crosses it, G. v. 18

Tan[)a]is, the _Don_, a very large river in Scythia, dividing Asia from
Europe. It rises in the province of Resan, in Russia, and flowing
through Crim-Tartary, runs into the Maeotic Lake, near a city of the
same name, now in ruins

T[=a]rb[=e]lli, a people of ancient Gaul, near the Pyrenees, inhabiting
about _Ays_ and _Bayonne_, in the country of _Labourd_; they surrender
to Crassus, G. iii. 27

Tarcundarius Castor, assists Pompey with three hundred cavalry, C. iii.
4

Tarr[)a]c[=i]na, an ancient city of Italy, which still retains the same
name

T[=a]rr[)a]co, _Tarragona_, a city of Spain, which in ancient time gave
name to that part of it called Hispania Tarraconensis; by some said to
be built by the Scipios, though others say before the Roman conquest,
and that they only enlarged it. It stands on the mouth of the river
Tulcis, now _el Fracoli_, with a small haven on the Mediterranean; its
inhabitants desert to Caesar, C. i. 21, 60

Tar[=u]s[=a]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain; according to
some, _le Teursan_; they surrender to the Romans, G. iii. 13, 23, 27

Tasg[=e]t[)i]us, chief of the Carnutes, slain by his countrymen, G. v.
25

Taur[=o]is, a fortress of the inhabitants of Massilia

Taurus, an island in the Adriatic Sea, unknown

Taurus Mons, the largest mountain in all Asia, extending from the Indian
to the Aegean Seas, called by different names in different countries,
viz., Imaus, Caucasus, Caspius, Cerausius, and in Scripture, Ar[)a]rat.
Herbert says it is fifty English miles over, and 1500 long

Taximagulus, one of the four kings or princes that reigned over Kent, G.
v. 22

Tect[)o]s[)a]ges, a branch of the Volcae, G. vi. 24

Tegea, a city of Africa, unknown

Tenchth[)e]ri, a people of ancient Germany, bordering on the Rhine, near
_Overyssel_; they and the Usip[)e]tes arrive at the banks of the Rhine,
iv. 4; cross that river by a stratagem, _ibid_.; are defeated with great
slaughter, _ibid_. 15

Tergeste, a Roman colony, its inhabitants in the north of Italy cut off
by an incursion, G. viii. 24

Terni, an ancient Roman colony, on the river Nare, twelve miles from
Spol[=e]tum

Teutomatus, king of the Nitobriges, G. vii. 31

Teut[)o]nes, or Teutoni, an ancient people bordering on the Cimbri, the
common ancient name for all the Germans, whence they yet call themselves
_Teutsche_, and their country _Teutschland_; they are repelled from the
territories of the Belgae, G. ii. 4

Thebae, Thebes, a city of Boeotia, in Greece, said to have been built by
Cadmus, destroyed by Alexander the Great, but rebuilt, and now known by
the name of _Stives_; occupied by Kalenus, C. iii. 55

Therm[)o]pylae, a famous pass on the great mountain Oeta, leading into
Phocis, in Achaia, now called _Bocca di Lupa_

Thessaly, a country of Greece, formerly a great part of Macedonia, now
called _Janna_; in conjunction with Aetolia, sends ambassadors to
Caesar, C. iii. 34; reduced by Caesar, _ibid_. 81

Thessalon[=i]ca, a chief city of Macedonia, now called _Salonichi_

Thracia, a large country of Europe, eastward from Macedonia, commonly
called _Romania_, bounded by the Euxine and Aegean Seas

Th[=u]r[=i]i, or T[=u]r[=i]i, an ancient people of Italy, _Torre
Brodogneto_

Tigur[=i]nus Pagus, one of the four districts into which the Helvetii
were divided according to Caesar, the ancient inhabitants of the canton
of _Zurich_ in Switzerland, cut to pieces by Caesar, G. i. 12

Titus Ampius attempts sacrilege, but is prevented, C. iii. 105

Tol[=o]sa, _Thoulouse_, a city of Aquitaine, of great antiquity, the
capital of Languedoc, on the Garonne

Toxandri, an ancient people of the Low Countries, about _Breda_, and
_Gertruydenburgh_; but according to some, of the diocese of _Liege_

Tralles, an ancient city of Lydia in, Asia Minor, _Chara_, C. iii. 105

Trebonius, one of Caesar's lieutenants, C. i. 36; torn down from the
tribunal, C. iii. 21; shows remarkable industry in repairing the works,
C. ii. 14; and humanity, C. iii. 20

Trev[)i]ri, the people of _Treves_, or _Triers_, a very ancient city of
Lower Germany, on the Moselle, said to have been built by Trebetas, the
brother of Ninus. It was made a Roman colony in the time of Augustus,
and became afterwards the most famous city of Gallia Belgica. It was for
some time the seat of the western empire, but it is now only the seat of
the ecclesiastical elector named from it, G. i. 37; surpass the rest of
the Gauls in cavalry, G. ii. 24; solicit the Germans to assist them
against the Romans, G. v. 2, 55; their bravery, G. viii. 25; their
defeat, G. vi. 8, vii. 63

Tr[)i]b[)o]ci, or Tr[)i]b[)o]ces, a people of ancient Germany,
inhabiting the country of _Alsace_, G. i. 51

Tribunes of the soldiers and centurions desert to Caesar, C. i. 5

Tribunes (of the people) flee to Caesar, C. i. 5

Trin[)o]bantes, a people of ancient Britain, inhabitants of the counties
of _Middlesex_ and _Hertfordshire_, G. v. 20

Troja, _Troy_, a city of Phrygia, in Asia Minor, near Mount _Ida_,
destroyed by the Greeks, after a ten years' siege

Tubero is prevented by Attius Varus from landing on the African coast,
G. i. 31

Tulingi, an ancient people of Germany, who inhabited about where now
_Stulingen_ in Switzerland is; border on the Helvetii, G. i. 5

Tungri, an ancient people inhabiting about where Tongres, in Liege, now
is

Tur[=o]nes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about _Tours_

Tusc[)i], or Hetrusci, the inhabitants of _Tuscany_, a very large and
considerable region of Italy, anciently called Tyrrh[=e]nia, and Etruria

Ubii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, who inhabited about where
_Cologne_ and the duchy of _Juliers_ now are. They seek protection from
the Romans against the Suevi, G. iv. 3; tributary to the Suevi, _ibid_.;
declare in favour of Caesar, G. iv. 9, 14

Ulcilles Hirrus, one of Pompey's officers, C. i. 15

Ulla, or Ulia, a town in Hispania Baetica, in regard to whose situation
geographers are not agreed; some making it _Monte Major_, others
_Vaena_, others _Vilia_

Umbria, a large country of Italy, on both sides of the Apennines

Unelli, an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain, G. ii. 34

Urbigenus, one of the cantons of the Helvetii, G. i. 27

Usip[)e]tes, an ancient people of Germany, who frequently changed their
habitation

Usita, a town unknown

Uxellod[=u]num, a town in Gaul, whose situation is not known; according
to some, _Ussoldun_ besieged and stormed, G. viii. 32

Vah[)a]lis, the _Waal_, the middle branch of the Rhine, which, passing
by Nim[)e]guen, falls into the Meuse, above Gorcum, G. iv. 10

Valerius Flaccus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, C. i. 30; his death, C.
iii. 5 3

Val[=e]t[)i][)a]cus, the brother of Cotus, G. vii. 32

Vangi[)o]nes, an ancient people of Germany, about the city of _Worms_,
G. i. 51

V[=a]r[=e]nus, a centurion, his bravery, G. v. 44

Varro, one of Pompey's lieutenants, C. i. 38; his feelings towards
Caesar, C. ii. 17; his cohorts driven out by the inhabitants of Carmona,
C. ii. 19; his surrender, C. ii. 20

V[=a]rus, the _Var_, a river of Italy, that flows into the Mediterranean
Sea, C. i. 87

Varus, one of Pompey's lieutenants, is afraid to oppose Juba. C. ii. 44;
his flight, C. ii. 34

Vatinius, one of Caesar's followers, C. iii. 100

V[)e]launi, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about _Velai_

Vellaunod[=u]num, a town in Gaul, about which geographers are much
divided; some making it _Auxerre_, others _Chasteau Landon_, others
_Villeneuve_ in Lorraine, others _Veron_. It surrenders, G. vii. 11

Velocasses, an ancient people of Normandy, about _Rouen_, G. ii. 4

V[)e]n[)e]ti, this name was anciently given as well to the _Venetians_
as to the people of _Vannes_, in Bretagne, in Gaul, for which last it
stands in Caesar. They were powerful by sea, G. iii. 1; their senate is
put to death by Caesar, G. iii. 16; they are completely defeated,
_ibid_. 15; and surrender, _ibid_. 16

Veragri, a people of Gallia Lugdunensls, whose chief town was Aguanum,
now _St. Maurice_, G. iii. 1

Verb[)i]g[)e]nus, or Urb[)i]g[)e]nus Pagus, a nation or canton of the
Helvetians, inhabiting the country in the neighbourhood of _Orbe_

Vercelli Campi, the _Plains of Vercellae_, famous for a victory the
Romans obtained there over the Cimbri. The city of that name is in
Piedmont on the river Sesia, on the borders of the duchy of Milan

Vercingetorix, the son of Celtillus, receives the title of king from his
followers, G. vii. 4; his plans, G. vii. 8; is accused of treachery, G.
vii. 20; his acts, G. vii. 8; surrenders to Caesar, G. vii. 82

Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, one of the Gallic leaders, G. vii. 76;
taken prisoner, G. vii. 88

Vergobr[)e]tus, the name given to the chief magistrate among the Aedui,
G. i. 16

V[)e]r[)u]doct[)i]us, one of the Helvetian embassy who request
permission from Caesar to pass through the province, G. i. 7

Veromand[)u]i, a people of Gallia Belgica, whose country, now a part of
Picardy, is still called _Vermandois_

Ver[=o]na, a city of Lombardy, the capital of a province of the same
name, on the river Adige, said to have been built by the Gauls two
hundred and eighty-two years before Christ. It has yet several remains
of antiquity

Vertico, one of the Nervii. He was in Cicero's camp when it was attacked
by the Eburones, and prevailed on a slave to carry a letter to Caesar
communicating that information, G. v. 49

Vertiscus, general of the Remi, G. viii. 12

Vesontio, _Besan[,c]on_, the capital of the Sequani, now the chief city
of Burgundy, G. i. 38

Vett[=o]nes, a people of Spain, inhabiting the province of
_Estremadura_, C. i. 38

Vibo, a town in Italy, not far from the Sicilian Straits, _Bibona_

Vibullius Rufus, one of Pompey's followers, C. i. 15

Vienna, a city of Narbonese Gaul, _Vienne in Dauphiny_, G. vii. 9

Vindel[)i]ci, an ancient people of Germany, inhabitants of the country
of Vindelicia, otherwise called Raetia secunda

Viridomarus, a nobleman among the Aedui, G. vii. 38

Viridorix, king of the Unelli, G. iii. 17

Vist[)u]la, the _Weichsel_, a famous river of Poland, which rises in the
Carpathian mountains, in Upper Silesia, and falls into the Baltic, not
far from Dantzic, by three mouths

Visurgis, the _Weser_, a river of Lower Germany, which rises in
Franconia, and, among other places of note, passing by Bremen, falls
into the German Ocean, not far from the mouth of the Elbe, between that
and the Ems

V[)o]c[=a]tes, a people of Gaul, on the confines of the Lapurdenses, G.
iii. 23

Vocis, the king of the Norici, G. i. 58

V[)o]contii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about _Die_, in
Dauphiny, and _Vaison_ in the county of Venisse

Vog[)e]sus Mons, the mountain of _Vauge_ in Lorrain, or, according to
others, _de Faucilles_, G. iv. 10

Volcae Arecom[)i]ci, and Tectosages, an ancient people of Gaul,
inhabiting the _Upper_ and _Lower Languedoc_

Volcae, a powerful Gallic tribe, divided into two branches, the
Tectosages and Arecomici, G. vii. 7

Volcatius Tullus, one of Caesar's partisans, C. iii. 52







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