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Title: The Arab conquests in Central Asia

Author: H. A. R. Gibb

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Transcriber’s Note: This text makes use of an uncommon system for
transcription of Arabic. Italics, sometimes on a _s_ingle le_t_ter,
are semantically meaningful; and you’ll need a font that can display
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THE ARAB CONQUESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA




                          JAMES G. FORLONG FUND
                                VOL. II.

                           THE ARAB CONQUESTS
                                   IN
                              CENTRAL ASIA

                           H. A. R. GIBB, M.A.
                            (EDIN. AND LOND.)
         Lecturer in Arabic, School of Oriental Studies, London.

                        THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY
                    74 GROSVENOR STREET, LONDON, W.1.
                                  1923




CONTENTS


                                                   PAGE

         PREFACE                                    vii

      I. THE OXUS BASIN
           Early History—Political Divisions—The
           Arabic Sources                             1

     II. THE EARLY RAIDS                             15

    III. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA                    29

     IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE                   59

      V. THE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA               88

         BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF WORKS CITED          100




PREFACE


The first draft of this work was presented to the University of London in
December 1921, under the title of “The Arab Conquest of Transoxania”, as
a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts, and was approved by the Senate
in January 1922, for publication as such. During the year my attention
was taken up in other directions and, except for the publication of two
studies on the subject in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies,
nothing further was done until by the generosity of the Trustees of the
Forlong Bequest Fund an opportunity of publication was offered. In its
present form the work has been largely rewritten and revised. It makes no
claim to present a complete historical account of the Arabs in Central
Asia, but is intended solely as a critical study of the authorities in
greater detail than has hitherto been made. Much is therefore omitted
because it has already been dealt with in the standard histories. In
order to keep down the cost of publication, the extensive references
which originally accompanied the text have been cut down to a few notes
at the end of each chapter. No references are given when, as in the great
majority of cases, the authority for the statements made can easily be
found in the appropriate place either in _T_abarī or Balādhurī.

I regret that several works which are indispensable for a thorough study
of the subject have, for linguistic reasons, been inaccessible to me.
Such are van Vloten’s _Opkomst der Abbasiden_, and almost the whole range
of Russian research work. Through the kindness of Sir Denison Ross,
however, I have been able to avail myself of a draft MS. translation of
the most important and valuable of them all, Professor W. Barthold’s
_Turkestan_, as well as of his as yet unpublished London lectures on
“The Nomads of Central Asia.” My sincere thanks are due to Sir Denison
Ross also for his continued interest and material assistance ever
since he first introduced me to the subject; to Sir Thomas Arnold for
much encouragement and helpful counsel; to Professor Barthold, who has
read the MS. through and made a number of valuable suggestions; to the
Trustees of the Forlong Bequest Fund for their kindness in undertaking
the publication; and in no small measure to my wife, who has given much
time and labour to preparing the MS. for publication.

                                                     London, April, 1923.




I. INTRODUCTION

THE OXUS BASIN


_Early History._

The Oxus is a boundary of tradition rather than of history. Lying
midway between the old frontier of Aryan civilisation formed by the
Jaxartes and the Pamīr and the natural strategic frontier offered by the
north-eastern escarpment of the plateau of Īrān, it has never proved a
barrier to imperial armies from either side. It was not on the Oxus but
on the Jaxartes that Alexander’s strategic insight fixed the position of
Alexander Eschate, and when the outposts of Persian dominion were thrust
back by the constant pressure of the Central Asian hordes, their retreat
was stayed not on the Oxus but on the Murghāb. Thus when the tide of
conquest turned and the Arabs won back her ancient heritage for Persia,
they, like Alexander, were compelled to carry their arms ever further to
the East and all unknowing re-establish the frontiers of the Achaemenid
Empire. It was from the legends of Sāsānian times, enshrined in the pages
of the historians and the national epic of Firdawsī, that the Oxus came
to be regarded as the boundary between Īrān and Tūrān.

Through all the centuries of invasion, however, the peoples of Sogdiana
and the Oxus basin remained Iranian at bottom, preserving an Iranian
speech and Iranian institutions. But the political conditions of the
country at the period of the Arab conquests were so complex that it is
necessary to trace briefly the course of their development.

The second century B.C. was a period of upheaval in Central Asia: the
powerful Hiung-Nu peoples were dispossessing weaker tribes of their
pasture lands and forcing them to migrate westwards. Between 150 and
125 B.C. a succession of nomadic tribes, the last and most powerful of
which were a branch of the Yueh-Chi, were driven down into Sogdiana. It
is now generally held that these tribes were of Aryan origin, though the
question is not perhaps settled with absolute certainty. Before long,
however, a second group, the K’ang, possessed themselves of Sogdiana,
driving the Yueh Chi on into Bactria and the Afghan mountains[1]. In
these districts they found, alongside the Iranian peasantry, a settled
population of Tukhari (in Chinese, Ta-Hia), already noted in the Chinese
annals for their commercial enterprise[2], and while at first the nomad
tribes introduced complete confusion, it would seem that they rapidly
absorbed, or were absorbed by, the native elements, and thus assimilated
the Hellenistic civilisation of Bactria. From this fusion arose, about
50 A.D., the powerful Kushan Empire which spread into India on the one
side and probably maintained some form of suzerainty over the K’ang
kingdoms of Sogdiana on the other. Under the new empire, Buddhism was
acclimatised in Turkestan, and Sogdiana developed into a great _entrepôt_
for Chinese trade with the West. Towards the close of the third century
the Kushan Empire, weakened by attacks from the new national dynasties
in India and Persia, reverted to its primitive form of small independent
principalities, which, however, retained sufficient cohesion to prevent
a Persian reconquest. It is practically certain that Sāsānian authority
never extended beyond Balkh and rarely as far. In the fourth and
fifth centuries references are made to a fresh horde of nomads in the
north-east, the Juan-Juan (Chionitae, Avars)[3], but it does not appear
that any new settlements were made in the Oxus countries.

In the middle of the fifth century, another people, the Ephthalites
(Arabic Hay_t_al, Chinese Ye-Tha), perhaps a branch of the Hiung-nu,
not only completely overran the former Kushan territories, but by
successive defeats of the Persian armies forced the Sāsānid Kings to pay
tribute. The Ephthalites appear to have been a nomadic people organised
as a military caste of the familiar Turkish type, and the existing
institutions and principalities, in large part at least, continued side
by side with them[4]. Their rule was too transitory to produce any
lasting effects, or to inflict any serious injury on the commerce and
prosperity of Sogdiana.

The rise of the Central Asian empire of the Turks proper (Tu-Kueh) dates
from their overthrow of the Juan-Juan in Mongolia in 552, under their
great Khan, Mokan. His brother Istämi (the Silzibul of the Byzantine
historians), the semi-independent jabghu of the ten tribes of Western
Turks, after consolidating his power in the Ili and Chu valleys, formed
an alliance with Khusrū Anūshīrwān, and in a joint attack between 563
and 568 the two powers completely overthrew the Ephthalite kingdom and
divided their territories. For a brief moment the Oxus was the actual
boundary between Īrān and Tūrān; under pressure from the silk traders of
Sogdiana, however, the alliance was broken and the weaker successors of
Anūshīrwān could scarcely do more than maintain their outpost garrisons
on the Murghāb. From this time the Ephthalites, like the Kushans, were
gradually assimilating to the Iranian population[5], though the change
was less rapid in the Cisoxine lands of Lower _T_ukhāristān, Bādghīs,
and Herāt, where Ephthalite principalities were re-constituted, probably
with Turkish support, and continued to give Persia much trouble on her
north-eastern frontiers[6]. On the other hand the Turks of the five
western tribes (Nu-she-pi), who became independent after the break up of
the Great Khanate about 582, maintained their suzerainty over Sogdiana
and the middle Oxus basin by frequent expeditions, in one case at least
as far as Balkh. There is no trace in our records of extensive Turkish
immigration into the conquered lands; at most, small groups of Turks
wandered south with their herds, especially, it would seem, south of the
Iron Gate[7]. In general, Turkish interference in the administration
of the subject principalities was at first limited to the appointment
of military governors and the collection of tribute. Thus, in the
semi-legendary account given by An-Naysābūrī of the Turkish conquest of
Bukhārā the Bukhār Khudāh is represented as the chief dihqān under the
Turkish governor. It is possible also that the native princes maintained
guards of Turkish mercenaries.

At this period, therefore, so far from the Oxus being a barrier, there
was considerable intercommunication between the peoples on either side,
and at least the elements of a racial and cultural unity, in spite of
political divisions. This is a factor of importance in the history of the
Arab conquests: the conquest of Transoxania is intimately linked with the
fortunes of Lower _T_ukhāristān, and only became possible when the latter
country was completely subdued. On the other hand, the Jaxartes formed
a natural racial and political frontier. “Shāsh and _S_ughd have seldom
run together” says Vámbéry, and in spite of nominal annexations on more
than one occasion Muslim rule was not effectively imposed on Shāsh and
Farghāna until some time after the final conquest of Transoxania. Their
chief importance for the history of Transoxania is that they formed the
jumping-off place for counter-invasions from the East. It is not without
significance that of the two battles which were decisive in establishing
Arab rule in Sogdiana one was fought to the west of Balkh and the other
on the Talas river, far into the Turkish lands beyond the Jaxartes (see
pp. 84 and 96).


_Political Divisions._

Researches into Chinese records have now made it possible to obtain
a more definite idea of the political conditions of these frontier
provinces in the seventh century. All the principalities acknowledged
the Khan of the Western Turks as overlord and paid tribute to him under
compulsion, though, as will appear, there is good cause for doubting
whether a Turkish army ever came in response to their appeals for support
until the rise of the Türgesh power in 716.

Geographically the cultivated lands to the west and south-west of the
middle Jaxartes are divided by the Hissar mountains into two well-defined
areas. The northern area includes the rich valley of the Zarafshān and
the lesser streams which descend the northern slope of the watershed,
the southern comprises the broad basin formed by the Oxus and its
tributaries between the mountains of the Pamīr and the steppelands. The
former, which as a whole is called Sogdiana in distinction from the
smaller principality of _S_ughd, was at this period divided between
a number of small states, each independent of the others but forming
together a loose confederacy in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the
Hellenic city-states. The strongest bond of union was formed by their
mutual interest in the Chinese silk trade, the chief stations of which
were at Samarqand, Paykand, and Kish. The premier city was Samarqand, the
pre-eminence of which and high culture of whose population is vouched
for by Yuan Chwang. Special emphasis is laid on their enterprise and
success in trade, and a number of early embassies, doubtless commercial
missions, are recorded from Samarqand and Bukhārā to the Chinese court.
The merchant families of Paykand, according to Tomaschek’s rendering of
Narshakhī[8], were Kushans, but Iranian elements, reinforced by emigrants
from the Sāsānid dominions, formed the majority in the cities. The
agricultural population was almost if not entirely Iranian.

A second link between the majority of the cities was formed by the ruling
house of the Shao-wu, if, as the Chinese records assert, these all
belonged to one royal family. The head of the clan governed Samarqand
and was allied by marriage to the Turkish Khan; cadet branches ruled in
Ushrūsana, Kish, Bukhārā, and the lesser principalities in the basin of
the Zarafshān. In the later lists the rulers of Shāsh and Farghāna as
well as the Khwārizm Shāh are shown as belonging to the clan also, though
with less probability[9]. Whether the family were of K’ang origin, or,
as the Chinese records state, belonged to the Yueh-Chi, they appear in
the Arabic histories with Persian territorial titles (Khudāh, Shāh, and
the general term dihqān). Some of the princes also possessed Turkish
titles, probably conferred on them as vassals of the Khan. The ruler
of Samarqand, as king of _S_ughd, is called the Ikhshīdh or Ikhshēdh,
which is easily recognised as the Persian _khshayathiya_. This title was
borne also, as is well known, by the king of Farghāna. It is certain
at least from both Chinese and Arabic accounts that these rulers were
not Turks. The Turkish names by which they are sometimes called were
given out of deference or compliment to their Turkish suzerains, just
as Arabic names begin to appear amongst them immediately after the
Arab conquests. Particularly misleading is the name _T_arkhūn which
appears more than once in the list of princes of Samarqand and has been
erroneously taken as the title Tarkhān, though it is in reality only the
Arabic transcription of a personal name spelt in the Chinese records
Tu-hoen. During the six or seven hundred years of their rule all these
princes had become fully identified with their Iranian subjects[10]. The
“kingship” moreover was not a real monarchy but rather the primacy in
an oligarchical system. Their authority was far from absolute, and the
landed aristocracy (dihqāns) and rich merchants possessed, as will be
seen later, not only a large measure of independence but also on occasion
the power to depose the ruling prince and elect his successor. As the
succession appears to have been largely hereditary it is probable that,
according to Iranian custom, eligibility was confined to a single royal
house. In some cases, it would seem, the succession was regulated during
the lifetime of the reigning prince by some such method as association in
the principate, probably combined with the appointment of the remaining
princes to other fiefs[11].

The “confederacy” of these states, however, was in no sense an alliance
and probably amounted to little more than a _modus vivendi_. Besides
the more important princes there existed an enormous number of petty
autocrats, some possibly Turkish, others probably descended from former
conquerors, whose authority may sometimes have scarcely extended beyond
the limits of their own villages. In lands subject to the Turks and
patrolled by nomadic tribes an effective centralised government was
hardly possible. Mutual antagonisms and wars cannot have been uncommon
though we have now no record of them, except that during the early Arab
period there was hostility between Bukhārā and Wardāna, but the latter
cannot be reckoned among the Shao-wu principalities since, according
to Narshakhī, it was founded by a Sāsānid prince about 300 A.D. Until
the profitable Chinese trade was threatened by the Arabs we find no
trustworthy record of combined resistance offered by the country to its
piecemeal reduction, and only long after the conquests of Qutayba is
there any hint of a concerted rising. At the same time, the strength of
the cities and warlike nature of their inhabitants may be gauged from the
way in which they not only preserved themselves from destruction at the
hands of their successive nomad invaders, but even gained their respect,
while this, in some respects perhaps the most highly civilised of all
the lands subdued by the Arabs[12], proved also the most difficult to
conquer, and most intractable to hold.

The same lack of unity is apparent in the districts south of the Iron
Gate, though nominally subject to a single authority. It is important
to bear in mind that the Zarafshān and Oxus valleys were completely
independent of one another—that the difference between them was not
merely one of government, but also of language, and even, to some extent,
of blood, owing to the greater mixture of races in the southern basin.
When, occasionally, as in the “Mūsā legend”, reference is made in the
Arabic histories to common action by _S_ughd and _T_ukhāristān, it is
due to a complete misunderstanding of the state of the country prior to
the conquest, and it is worthy of notice that no such reference is to
be found in any narrative otherwise reliable. On his outward journey in
630, Yuan Chwang found the country divided into twenty-seven petty states
under separate rulers, with the chief military authority vested in the
Turkish Shād, the eldest son of the Jabghu of the Western Turks, who
had his seat near the modern Qunduz. During the period of anarchy which
befell the Western Turks in the following years, the whole district was
formed into an independent kingdom under a son of the former Shād, who
founded the dynasty of Jabghus of _T_ukhāristān. Minor Turkish chiefs
and intendants probably seized similar authority in their own districts,
and though the Jabghu was recognised as suzerain of all the lands from
the Iron Gate to Zābulistān and Kapisa and from Herāt to Khuttal[13],
his authority was little more than nominal except within his immediate
district of Upper _T_ukhāristān. The lesser princes, in Shūmān, Khuttal,
&c., many of whom were Turkish, appear to have acted quite independently
and did not hesitate to defy their Suzerain on occasion. The name
_T_ukhāristān is used very loosely in the Arabic records, with misleading
effect[14]. How relatively unimportant to the Arabs _T_ukhāristān proper
was is shown by the fact that its annexation (see below p. 38) is passed
over in silence. The brunt of the resistance offered to the early Arab
conquests was borne by the princes of _Lower_ _T_ukhāristān, _i.e._,
the riverain districts south of the Iron Gate, including Chaghāniān and
Balkh, together with the Ephthalite principalities in Jūzjān, Bādghīs,
and Herāt, and possibly the mountainous fringe of Gharjistān. This
explains why the Arabs always regarded Balkh, the old religious capital
of the Kushan Empire and site of the famous Buddhist shrine of Nawbahār,
as the capital of the “Turks”; it was in fact the centre of what we
might almost term the “amphictyony” of Lower _T_ukhāristān, combining
strategic and commercial importance with religious veneration. Long after
the Nawbahār had been destroyed by Ibn ʿĀmir this sentiment continued to
exist in the country[15].

A chance narrative in _T_abarī (II. 1224 f.), which, though of Bāhilite
origin, can scarcely have been invented, indicates the situation in Lower
_T_ukhāristān in 710. In the presence of Qutayba, the Shād and as-Sabal
(King of Khuttal) do homage to the Jabghu, the former excusing himself
on the ground that though he has joined Qutayba against the Jabghu, yet
he is the Jabghu’s vassal. The Ephthalite prince of Bādghīs then does
homage to the Shād, who must consequently be regarded as the chief prince
in Lower _T_ukhāristān. His identification with the Jabghu himself in
another passage (_T_ab. II. 1206. 9) is obviously impossible. Though
certainty on the point is hardly to be expected, the description best
suits the king of Chaghāniān (Chāghān Khudāh), who consistently adopted
an attitude of co-operation with the Arabs. It would seem too that the
king of Chaghāniān commanded the armies of Lower _T_ukhāristān in 652 and
again in 737. Moreover, an embassy to China on behalf of _T_ukhāristān
in 719 was actually despatched by the king of Chaghāniān, which implies
that he held a status in the kingdom consonant with the high title of
Shād. The conclusion drawn by Marquart and Chavannes that the king of
Chaghāniān and the Jabghu were identical is disproved by the Chinese
records[16].

Such conditions of political disunion were naturally all in favour of the
Arabs. It might have seemed also that the general insecurity, together
with the burden of maintaining armies and courts and the ever-recurring
ravages of invasion, would move the mass of the population to welcome
the prospect of a strong and united government, more especially as so
large a proportion of the Muslim armies were composed of their Persian
kin. For the Arabic records in general are misleading on two important
points. By their use of the word “Turk” for all the non-Persian peoples
of the East, they give the impression (due perhaps to the circumstances
of the time in which the chief histories were composed) that the
opponents of the Arabs in Transoxania were the historical Turks. The
truth is that until 720 the Arab invaders were resisted only by the
local princes with armies composed almost entirely of Iranians, except
perhaps on one or two special occasions when Turkish forces may have
intervened. The other error is in interpreting the conquests as primarily
wars for the Faith. Rebellion, for instance, is expressed in terms of
apostasy. It is now well established that this conception is exaggerated;
religious questions did not, in fact, enter until much later and even
then chiefly as expressions of political relationships. To the Iranian
peasantry, themselves steadfastly attached to the national cults, the
advent of another faith in this meeting-place of all the cultures and
religions of Asia at first carried little significance. Two factors in
particular combined to provoke a resistance so stubborn that it took the
Arabs a century merely to reduce the country to sullen submission. The
first of these was the proud national spirit of the Iranians which was
eventually to break down the supremacy of the Arabs and give birth to
the first Persian dynasties in Islām. The few wise governors of Khurāsān
found in this their strongest support, but, outraged again and again by
an arrogant and rapacious administration, the subject peoples became
embittered and sought all means of escape from its tyranny. The second
was the interest of the commercial relations on which the wealth and
prosperity of the country depended. This again might have disposed the
cities to accept a rule which promised not only stability, but a wide
extension of opportunity. The Arab governors, as we shall see, were
not indeed blind to this, but the exactions of the treasury, and still
more the greed of local officials, combined with the unsettlement of
constant invasion to create an attitude of distrust, which deepened later
into despair. It must not be forgotten that the commercial ties of the
Sogdians were much stronger with the East than with the West, and that
this too prompted them to cultivate relations with the Turks and Chinese
rather than with the Arabs when the necessity of making a choice was
forced upon them.


_The Arabic Sources._

The early Arabic sources are remarkably rich in material for the
reconstruction of the conquests in Khurāsān and Transoxania. For the
earlier period the narratives of Yaʿqūbī and Balādhurī are nearly as full
as those of _T_abarī, but the special value of the latter lies in his
method of compilation which renders the traditions amenable to critical
study and thus provides a control for all the others. Moreover, while
the other historians, regarding the conquests of Qutayba as definitely
completing the reduction of Transoxania, provide only meagre notices for
the later period, _T_abarī more than compensates for their silence by
the enormous wealth of detail embodied in the accounts he quotes from
Al-Madāʾinī and others of the last thirty years of Umayyad rule. As a
general rule, these three historians rely on different authorities,
though all use the earlier histories of Al-Madāʾinī and Abū ʿUbayda
to some extent. The monograph of Narshakhī (d. 959 A.D.) based on
both Arabic and local sources, with some resemblance to Balādhurī, is
unfortunately preserved only in a Persian version of two centuries
later which has obviously been edited, to what extent is unknown, but
which probably represents the original as unsatisfactorily as Balʿamī’s
Persian version of _T_abarī. Even so it preserves to us some account of
the peoples against whom the Arab invaders were matched, and thus does a
little to remedy the defects of the other historians in this respect. It
may well be doubted, however, whether some of its narratives merit the
reliance placed upon them by van Vloten[17]. The much later historian Ibn
al-Athīr introduces very little new material, but confines himself for
the most part to abridging and re-editing the narratives in _T_abarī,
with a tendency to follow the more exaggerated accounts. The geographer
Ibn Khūrdādhbih gives a list of titles and names, which is, however, too
confused to supply any reliable evidence.

Reference has already been made to certain aspects of the conquests
in which the Arab historians are misleading. Their information on the
Turks and the principalities of Sogdiana can now, fortunately, be
supplemented and parts of their narratives controlled from Chinese
sources, chiefly through Chavannes’ valuable “Documents sur les Tou-Kiue
(Turcs) Occidentaux.” But there are two other facts which also demand
attention: one, that the Arabic authorities, as we possess them, and
even with all allowance made for their limitations, are by no means
exhaustive; _i.e._, reliance on omissions in the narratives is an unsafe
principle of criticism: the other, that by critical study it is possible
to distinguish at certain points several lines of tendentious tradition
or legend, directed to the interests of national feeling or of some
particular tribe or faction, and centred in some cases round specific
persons. These may most conveniently be summarised as follows:

    1. A Qaysite tradition, centred on the family of Ibn Khāzim:

    2. An Azd-Rabīʿa tradition, centred on Muhallab and hostile
    to _H_ajjāj. This became the most popular tradition among the
    Arabs, and is followed by Balādhurī, but opposed by Yaʿqūbī:

    3. A Bāhilite tradition, centred on the tribal hero, Qutayba b.
    Muslim. In general it found little favour but is occasionally
    quoted somewhat sarcastically by _T_abarī.

    4. A local Bukhārā tradition, followed by Yaʿqūbī, Balādhurī
    and Narshakhī. It presents the early conquests under the form
    of an historical romance, centred on the Queen Khātūn in the
    part of a national Boadicea. Other local traditions, which are
    frequently utilised by _T_abarī, seem to be much more free from
    serious exaggeration:

    5. The few notices in Dīnawarī follow an entirely divergent and
    extremely garbled tradition from unknown sources, which may for
    the most part be neglected:

    6. The quotations made by Balādhurī (_e.g._ 422. 10) from Abū
    ʿUbayda show the influence of a rewriting of episodes with an
    anti-Arab bias, directed to the interests of the Shuʿūbīya
    movement, in which Abū ʿUbayda was a prominent figure[18].

    7. In the later period, there appears also the fragments of a
    tradition of which Nasr b. Sayyār is the hero.

Some, if not all, of these traditions developed in some detail, and
where they are not balanced by other versions they present a distorted
narrative of events, verging in some cases on the fictitious. The most
noteworthy examples of this are the Khātūn legend (see below p. 18) and
the typical story of the exploits of Mūsā b. Khāzim in Transoxania in a
style not unworthy of Bedouin romance[19]. It is therefore most important
to disentangle these variant traditions and assign its proper value to
each. The Bāhilite accounts of Qutayba’s conquests, for instance, contain
wild exaggerations of fact, which, nevertheless, have sometimes been
utilised in all seriousness by modern historians, amongst other purposes
to establish synchronisms with the Turkish inscriptions[20].

With these precautions, it is possible to follow up and reconstruct, with
comparative certainty and completeness, that progress of the Arab arms
in Central Asia whose vicissitudes are outlined in the following pages.


NOTES

(Full Titles in Bibliography)

[1] Franke, Beiträge 41 ff., 67. Cordier, Chine I, 225.

[2] If Marquart’s identification (Ērānshahr, 201 f.) is correct.

[3] Cordier I. 229: Ērānshahr 50 ff.

[4] Yuan Chwang I. 103. Prof. Barthold suggests that the connection
between the Ephthalites and the Huns may have been political only, not
racial.

[5] Chavannes, Documents 155: Ērānshahr 89.

[6] _T_ab. I. 2885. 13 and 2886. 3: Yaʿqūbī, History, II, 193: Yāqūt
(ed. Wüstenfeld) I. 492: Balādhurī 403: Ērānshahr 65 f., 77 f., and
150. Bādghīs was still a nomad pasture-ground in the XIVth century: Ibn
Ba_tt_ū_t_a, III, 67 f.

[7] Yuan Chwang I. 105; II. 266; Chav. Doc. 161: Ērānshahr 250 ff.

[8] Tomaschek, Soghdiana, 170.

[9] See Marquart, Chronologie, 71: Shiratori in Keleti Szemle III (1902)
footnote to pp. 122-3.

[10] _Cf._ Narshakhī 29. 4. On the Iranisation of nomadic elements,
Blochet, Introduction à l’Histoire des Mongols, (Leyden, 1910) p. 211
note; Peisker, The Asiatic Background, pp. 353-6.

[11] Chavannes, Notes 91, and _cf._ below p. 80.

[12] _Cf._ Barthold, in Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) p. 262.

[13] Yuan Chwang I, 75 n. 2, 102 ff: II 270: Chav. Doc. 200 f.

[14] _E.g._ _T_ab. II, 1448, 7-10: _cf._ Ērānshahr 228.

[15] _Cf._ Yaʿqūbī, Geog. 287: _T_ab. II 1205. 12: Ērānshahr 66, 87 ff.

[16] Chavannes, Doc. 201, Note 37.

[17] Narshakhī’s unreliability is even more marked in his account of the
origins of the Sāmānid dynasty: _cf._ Barthold, Turkestan 215 n. 3.

[18] See Goldziher, Muhammadanische Studien, I, 195 ff.

[19] Prof. Barthold has drawn my attention to the fact that the story of
Mūsā also includes (twice over) an episode from the popular legend of
Zopyrus. See his article in Zapiski XVII (1906) 0141, and Wellhausen,
Arabische Reich, 257, 265.

[20] _E.g._ Marquart, Chronologie, p. 8.




II. THE EARLY RAIDS


_The Conquest of Lower _T_ukhāristān._

Arab legend relates that the Muslim forces, pursuing Yazdigird from the
field of Nihāwand in 21/642, had already come in contact with the “Turks”
of _T_ukhāristān before the death of ʿOmar. But the final destruction
of the Sāsānid power and first imposition of Arab rule on Khurāsān only
followed ten years later, by the troops of ʿAbdullah ibn ʿĀmir, ʿOthmān’s
governor in Ba_s_ra. The Ephthalites of Herāt and Bādghīs submitted
without a blow, and the first serious check to their advance was met in
the Murghāb valley, when al-A_h_naf b. Qays with an army of 4,000 Arabs
and 1,000 Persians found himself opposed by the organised forces of
Lower _T_ukhāristān and was compelled to retire on Merv-Rūdh. A second
expedition under al-Aqraʿ b. _H_ābis, however, defeated a weaker force in
Jūzjān, and subsequently occupied Jūzjān, Fāryāb, _T_ālaqān, and Balkh.
Small divisions made plundering raids into the neighbouring territories,
_e.g._, to Siminjān (a town within the frontiers of _T_ukhāristān proper,
governed by a Turkish prince, the Ruʿb Khān), and to Khwārizm, not always
with success; on the other hand, a successful raid was made on Māyamurgh
in Sogdiana in 33/654, which is mentioned by Abū ʿUbayda alone of the
Arabic authorities[21]. A general insurrection which broke out shortly
afterwards, headed by a certain Qārin, apparently a member of the noble
Persian family bearing that name, seems to have been instrumental in
causing the Arabs to evacuate Khurāsān for a time[22], though several
raids are recorded of ʿAlī’s governors between 35 and 38 A.H. These
earliest “conquests,” in fact, were little more than plundering raids on
a large scale, the effect of that movement of expansion whose momentum
was carrying forward the Arabs irresistibly. According to the Chinese
records, which, however, require to be used with caution at this
point, the retreat of the Arabs in 655 was followed up by the army of
_T_ukhāristān who reinstated Pērōz, the son of Yazdigird, as titular king
of Persia[23].

When peace was restored to Islām by the recognition of Muʿāwiya in
41/661, Ibn ʿĀmir was again entrusted with the conquest of Khurāsān. The
same rough and ready methods were adopted as before; there appears to
have been no definite plan of invasion, and even the order of governors
is uncertain. Not only are traditions relating to A.H. 32 and 42 confused
by the different authorities, but a vast amount of the whole is affected
by tribal legends. Hints of fierce resistance are given from time to
time. Qays b. al-Haytham, the governor’s first legate, was faced with a
fresh revolt in Bādghīs, Herāt, and Balkh. He recaptured the latter and
in retaliation destroyed the famous shrine of Nawbahār, but left the
Ephthalites to be dealt with by his successor, ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim.
It is clear that there was no ordered progress of the Arab arms until
Khurāsān was brought under the administration of Ziyād b. Abīhi. After
an experimental division of the province under tribal leaders, a policy
obviously dangerous and quickly abandoned, Ziyād, realising the danger of
allowing Persian nationalism a free hand in the East, backed up by the
resources of _T_ukhāristān, centralised the administration at Merv, and
organised a preventive campaign. In 47/667 his lieutenant, al-_H_akam b.
ʿAmr al-Ghifārī, opened a series of campaigns directed to the conquest of
Lower _T_ukhāristān and Gharjistān, in the course of which he crossed the
Oxus and carried his arms into Chaghāniān, and drove Pērōz back to China
in discomfiture. On his death, three years later, the conquered provinces
rose in revolt, but the new governor, Rabīʿ b. Ziyād al-_H_ārithī, the
first conqueror of Sijistān, after reducing Balkh, pursued the Ephthalite
army into Quhistān and dispersed it with great slaughter. Again an
expedition was sent across the Oxus into Chaghāniān (clearly indicating
the connection between Chaghāniān and Lower _T_ukhāristān), while another
directed down the left bank of the river secured Zamm and Āmul, the two
chief ferry points for Sogdiana. Mention is also made of a conquest of
Khwārizm. All these expeditions seem to point to a methodical plan of
conquest, arranged between Ziyād and his governors; the Arab power was
thus firmly established, for the moment at least, in the Cisoxanian
lands, and the way prepared for the invasion of Sogdiana. A further
important step was the colonisation of Khurāsān by fifty thousand
families from Ba_s_ra and Kūfa[24], settled according to Arab practice
in five garrison towns, for the double purpose of securing the conquests
already made, and providing the forces for their further extension.


_The First Invasion of Bukhārā and _S_ughd._

Although at this junction Ziyād himself died, his policy was carried on
by his sons, in particular by ʿUbaydullah. Scarcely any governor, not
even _H_ajjāj, has suffered so much at the hands of the traditionists
as the “Murderer of _H_usayn,” though his ability and devotion to the
Umayyads are beyond question. It is not surprising therefore that his
earlier military successes should be so briefly related, in spite of
their importance. Yet as he was no more than 25 years of age when
appointed by Muʿāwiya to the province of Khurāsān on probation, and only
two years later was selected to fill his father’s position in ʿIrāq, his
administration must have been markedly successful. The policy of Ziyād
had now firmly secured Khurāsān and made it feasible to use it as a base
for the extension of the conquests into the rich lands across the river.
On his arrival at Merv, therefore, in the autumn of 53/673, the new
governor began preparations for an invasion of Bukhārā.

The Shao-wu principality of Bukhārā was at this time second in importance
only to Samarqand. It included not only the greater part of the oasis
(“al-Bukhārīya”) then much more thickly populated than now, but also
the great emporium of Paykand, which controlled the trade route across
the Oxus at Āmul. Of its early history we have two accounts, both
confused, inaccurate in detail, and often conflicting. From these it
may be gathered that the prince, who held the high Turkish title of
Shād[25], resided at Paykand, the citadel of Bukhārā being either founded
or restored by the Bukhār Khudāh Bidūn, probably in consequence of the
Arab invasions. This prince at his death left a son only a few months
old on whose behalf the regency was exercised by the Queen-Mother. This
princess, known under the title of Khātūn (a Turkish form of the Sogdian
word for “lady”) became the central figure in the local traditions,
which represent the Arab invasions as occurring precisely during the
period of her regency. This version is the one accepted by Balādhurī,
Yaʿqūbī, and Narshakhī, but though not altogether devoid of historical
value, it is certainly misplaced, and the true account of the early
conquests must, for cogent reasons, be sought in the brief and widely
divergent narratives of _T_abarī. In the first place the Khātūn-legend,
like all such legends, has grown by natural elaboration of detail,
as in the account given by Narshakhī of Khātūn’s administration of
justice and by continual accretions from other streams of tradition, as
seen, on comparing the narratives of Balādhurī and Narshakhī, in the
introduction of episodes of Ibn Khāzim and Muhallab. Critical examination
also reveals alternative traditions and chronological inconsistencies,
as, for example, the birth of _T_ughshāda after the invasion of Saʿīd
b. ʿOthmān, Khātūn’s reign of 15 years, and others mentioned below.
There is clear evidence of the late compilation of the tradition in the
frequent references to “_T_arkhūn, King of _S_ughd,” though his reign
did not begin until considerably after 696[26]. It may be noticed that
in the variant account of the conquests prefixed to the Persian edition
of Narshakhī and ascribed to An-Naysābūrī there is no reference at all
to Khātūn. Moreover there are indications that _T_abarī was aware of the
local tradition and completely rejected it; this, at least, would account
for the unusual practice of specifying Qabaj-Khātūn as “the wife of the
king” in 54 A.H. Even Balādhurī rejects the more fantastic developments
of the legend. _T_abarī’s narratives, however, require to be collated
with the additional material in Balādhurī, who has not relied entirely
on the local tradition. The germ of the native version is probably to be
found in a confusion of the Arab conquests with the later war between
Bukhārā and Wardāna[27], whose echoes are heard in Qutayba’s invasions
thirty years after.

In the spring of 54/674 ʿUbaydullah b. Ziyād crossed the river and
marched directly on Paykand. After a partial success, he led his forces
forward towards Bukhārā and severely defeated the army of the Bukhār
Khudāh. From _T_abarī’s narrative, which relates only that two thousand
men of Bukhārā, skilful archers, were taken by ʿUbaydullah to Ba_s_ra,
where they formed his personal guard, it is left to be inferred that a
treaty was concluded under which the Bukhār Khudāh became tributary. The
local tradition magnifies the expedition by adding a siege of Bukhārā
(during the winter) and bringing in an army of Turks to assist Khātūn,
but confirms the success of the Arabs. ʿUbaydullah’s practice on this
occasion of forming a bodyguard or retinue of captives appears to have
been a common one. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Samura had previously brought
captives from Sijistān to Ba_s_ra, where they built him a mosque, and
later governors of Khurāsān continued the practice, as will be seen. In
this may be recognised perhaps the germ of the Turkish guards recruited
by the later ʿAbbāsid Caliphs.

ʿUbaydullah’s successor, Aslam b. Zurʿa, remained inactive, but in
56/676 Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān, who had obtained the governorship of Khurāsān
by importuning Muʿāwiya, carried the Arab arms more deeply into
Transoxania, defeated the _S_ughdians in the open field and reduced
their city. Taking fifty young nobles as hostages, he retired from
_S_ughd and subsequently occupied Tirmidh, an important fortress on the
Oxus controlling the main North and South trade route, having presumably
marched through the Iron Gate. The conquest of _S_ughd was thus
definitely co-ordinated with that of Chaghāniān. _T_abarī’s narrative is
strangely vague and abrupt; it contains no mention of Bukhārā nor any
definite reference to Samarqand, except for the statement that it was the
objective of Saʿīd’s expedition. Using this narrative alone, one would be
inclined to suspect that the city captured by Saʿīd was not Samarqand but
Kish (since it has been established by Marquart that Kish was formerly
called _S_ughd), and that the reference to Samarqand was due to a later
misunderstanding of the name[28]. On the other hand, both the local
tradition and Abū ʿUbayda speak of a siege of Samarqand by Saʿīd, though
their narratives are far from being in agreement in detail, and there
are other indications of confusion between Saʿīd and Salm b. Ziyād. All
accounts except Narshakhī’s, however, agree that the hostages who were
carried by Saʿīd to Madīna and there murdered him were _S_ughdians[29].
Balādhurī’s tradition of Saʿīd’s expedition is as follows. On his
crossing the river, Khātūn at first renewed her allegiance, only to
withdraw it again on the approach of an army of Turks, _S_ughdians,
and men of Kish and Nasaf, 120,000 strong. Saʿīd, however, completely
defeated the enemy and after a triumphal entry into Bukhārā, marched on
Samarqand, his forces swelled by Khātūn’s army, besieged it for three
days and made it tributary. On his return he captured Tirmidh and while
there received the tribute due from Khātūn and the allegiance of Khuttal.
Narshakhī’s account is the same in essentials, adding only a number of
imaginative details.

Saʿīd was unable to retain his position in Khurāsān, and for five
years the conquests were stayed (except for summer raids) under the
indolent Aslam b. Zurʿa and the avaricious ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Ziyād.
In 61/680-681 Yazīd I appointed Salm, another son of Ziyād, to Khurāsān
and Sijistān. Eager to emulate his brother, Salm, even before leaving
Ba_s_ra, announced his intention of renewing the expeditions into
Transoxania and enlisted a picked force on the spot, including such
tried leaders as Muhallab b. Abī _S_ufra and ʿAbdullah b. Khāzim. From
a poem preserved in the _H_amāsa of Abū Tammām[30] it would appear
that somewhat unwilling levies for this expedition were raised even in
Mesopotamia. Towards the close of the winter a surprise attack was made
on Khwārizm, with some success. _T_abarī gives two versions of this
expedition, the first of which is a highly embroidered one from the
Muhallabite tradition. During the same year, Salm marched into _S_ughd
and occupied Samarqand, where he appears to have made his headquarters
over the winter. Balādhurī mentions a subsidiary raid on Khujanda under
Aʿshā Hamdān, in which, however, the Muslims were defeated, and a
_S_ughdian revolt which was crushed with the loss of its leader, here
called Bandūn. The name is almost certainly to be read as that of the
Bukhār-Khudāh, Bīdūn[31], and in view of the silence of _T_abarī raises
rather a difficult problem. It may be conjectured that what Balādhurī
intended was a revolt of the Bukhariots, combined with _S_ughdian forces.
The origin of this statement may perhaps be sought for in the Bukhārā
tradition, which Balādhurī does not follow in his general account of the
expeditions of Salm, but which he may have tried to work in with the
other. On the other hand he nowhere refers to Bīdūn as the Bukhār Khudāh.
As related by Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī Salm’s expedition is directed solely
against Bukhārā. Khātūn, on promising her hand to _T_arkhūn, receives a
reinforcement of 120,000 men from _S_ughd, and Bīdūn (here still alive)
recruits an army in “Turkistān,” including the “Prince of Khotan.” After
severe fighting, the Muslim forces, numbering 6,000, kill Bīdūn and rout
the unbelievers, taking so much booty that the share of each horseman
amounts to 2,400 dirhems. Khātūn, thoroughly humbled by this decisive
proof of Arab invincibility, sues for peace and pays a heavy tribute.
Beyond the fantastic exaggerations and incoherencies of the legend, there
is nothing inherently improbable in a Bukhariot revolt. In support of
this view, it may be remarked that the death of Bīdūn at this point would
agree with the slender data we have for the internal wars which probably
formed the original basis of the Khātūn-legend, and would also provide
a foothold for the later developments of the tradition. Without fuller
evidence, however, we can get no further than reasonable conjecture.

After the conquests made by Salm, which probably occupied the years 682
and 683, it seemed as though the Arabs were on the verge of imposing
their rule on Transoxania when civil war broke out in the heart of the
Empire. Even allowing for the fact that these expeditions were little
more than raids, the comparative ease with which the Arabs held to ransom
the richest cities in the country is astonishing. The explanation can
lie only in their mutual exclusiveness. There is not a hint of united
action in the field in _T_abarī’s accounts[32]. A factor which may have
exercised some influence was that Sogdiana was completely isolated during
these years and unable to look for support from without. The power of
the Western Turks was broken by the Chinese armies between 645 and 658;
Chinese forces are said to have reached as far west as Kish, and the
Emperor Kao-Tsung had officially annexed all the territories formerly
included in the Turkish dominions. In the latter year the provinces of
Sogdiana and the Jaxartes were organized in sixteen districts, including
a “Government of Persia” under the Pērōz already mentioned, situated
apparently in Sijistān, possibly even in Eastern Khurāsān[33]. The
immediate practical effect of this change of status was of little moment,
but her nominal annexation gave China a prestige which was destined to
exercise immense influence in determining the attitude of the peoples
of Sogdiana to the Arabs. From 670 to 692, however, the new power of
Tibet held the Chinese armies in check in the Tarim basin and cut off
all possibility of Chinese intervention in the West. The Sogdian princes
were thus thrown on their own resources, and, ignorant as yet of the
danger behind the Arab raids, they seem to have bowed to the storm. It
must not be forgotten that the cities had never before met such an enemy
as the Arabs. They had been accustomed to plundering raids by Turks, who
disappeared as quickly as they came, and who, disliking to undertake
a lengthy siege, were easily appeased by a ransom. Familiar with such
nominal annexations, they would naturally adopt the same tactics against
the new invaders. Had the Arabs maintained their pressure, there was thus
every prospect that Transoxania would have been colonised with a tithe of
the expense and loss incurred in its reconquest and would have become as
integral a part of the Muslim dominions as Khurāsān. But the opportunity
was lost in the fratricidal struggles of the factions, and when the Arabs
recommenced their encroachments, the determined resistance offered to
their advance showed that the lessons of the first invasion had not been
lost on the native princes.


_The Withdrawal of the Arabs._

The tribal feuds which occupied the Arabs of Khurāsān left the princes of
Transoxania free to regain their independence. It would seem even that
Lower _T_ukhāristān was not only in part lost to the Arabs but that local
forces took the offensive and raided Khurāsān. On the gradual restoration
of order under Umayya, however, Lower _T_ukhāristān again recognised,
at least in name, the Arab suzerainty[34]. Meanwhile, a strange episode
had occurred in Chaghāniān. Mūsā, the son of ʿAbdullah ibn Khāzim, sent
by his father to secure a safe place of retreat, had captured the strong
fortress of Tirmidh, from which he continually raided the neighbouring
districts. His exploits were worked up in popular story into an epic
of adventure, in which legend has almost overlaid historical fact. The
most fantastic exaggerations were devised in order to provide a suitable
background for the incredible deeds of valour indulged in by the hero.
But in truth his actual exploits were sufficiently amazing, and all
the efforts of the forces of the local rulers (magnified in the legend
to huge armies of “Turks and Hay_t_al and Tibetans”), although aided
on one occasion by a force of Khuzāʿites, were unable to dislodge him.
For fifteen years he remained in secure possession of his stronghold, a
refuge for the disaffected from all sides, and a standing example of the
helplessness of the rulers across the river.

In 77/696 Umayya re-opened the campaigns into Transoxania. An expedition
to Khwārizm was successful[35], another across the Oxus narrowly escaped
destruction. Balādhurī mentions, with doubtful accuracy, a successful
raid on Khuttal, which may, however, only be a variant on this. An
expedition directed against Bukhārā, which is said to have had Tirmidh
as a second objective, was hurriedly abandoned on the fresh outbreak of
revolt under Bukayr b. Wishā_h_ in Khurāsān. Though the revolt failed
in its immediate object, a most serious situation had been created.
Bukayr had endeavoured to rally the Persians to his side by promising
all converts remission of Kharāj. The opportunity was undoubtedly seized
by large numbers, and the pacification occasioned some negotiations
between Umayya and Thābit b. Qu_t_ba, an influential noble who acted as
spokesman for the mawālī of Eastern Khurāsān. Umayya’s reimposition of
Kharāj, however, caused widespread unrest[36] and made prompt action
necessary. ʿAbdul-Malik at once recalled his hapless kinsman (in 78) and
made Khurāsān a dependency of ʿIrāq under the government of _H_ajjāj.
This far-sighted governor had already dealt with a desperate situation
of the same sort in ʿIrāq and reduced it to outward tranquillity. The
same extreme measures that had been adopted there were not necessary in
Khurāsān; its troubles were due less to insurgent mawālī than to the
factions of Qays. _H_ajjāj was himself a strong Qaysite, but he was
not the man to put party before the interests of the State. The first
necessity was to appoint a governor who could be trusted to repress both
forms of anarchy and in Muhallab such a man was available. His tribe of
Azd was not yet strong enough in Khurāsān to cause the risk of opening a
new channel for factional strife, and his military reputation fitted him
for carrying out _H_ajjāj’s policy of active campaigning as an antidote
to internal dissension. It is possible that _H_ajjāj had in mind from the
first a definite conquest of Transoxania, but for a few years nothing
more than sporadic raids took place.

Muhallab’s first care, however, was to encourage the settlement of Azd
in Khurāsān, until he was supported by a division equal in size to any
other. After securing the crossing at Zamm in 80/699 he marched into the
district of Kish and there established his headquarters for two years,
besieging the city and sending out minor expeditions under his sons
in various directions[37]. Yazīd was sent with a force into Khuttal,
nominally to co-operate with a pretender to the throne, but met with
little success; _H_abīb, sent against Rabinjān, found himself countered
by the forces of Bukhārā. Balādhurī’s account of Muhallab’s campaigns is
ludicrously exaggerated; _T_abarī quotes Muhallab himself as discouraging
any attempts at effecting a conquest. On the death of his son al-Mughīra
in Rajab 82, he came to terms with Kish and abandoned his expeditions,
but died in the following Dhuʾl-_H_ijja (Jan. 702) near Merv Rūdh, and
was succeeded by his son Yazīd.

The Muhallabite tradition which represents the appointment as distasteful
to _H_ajjāj but popular in Khurāsān is almost certainly influenced
by the later hostility between Yazīd and _H_ajjāj. It is probable,
however, that _H_ajjāj, whose policy was to keep his governors dependent
on himself, viewed with suspicion the concentration of authority in
the hands of the leader of a powerful hostile clan, but he was content
to wait for the meantime and give Yazīd sufficient rope to hang
himself. Except for an attempted raid on Khwārizm Yazīd carried out no
expeditions, while under his government the precarious internal balance
of Khurāsān was soon upset. The quarrels of Qays had been composed by
Muhallab, but they were in no mood to bear with the leadership of the
parvenu Azd; already before the death of Muhallab, in spite of the
Tamīmite eulogy quoted by _T_abarī, there was a moment when the feud
threatened to break out. The pronounced factional leanings of Yazīd
strained the situation still further. Even more serious was the attitude
of the mawālī. _H_urayth, the brother of Thābit ibn Qu_t_ba, had been
left behind at Kish by Muhallab to collect the tribute, but on his return
was scourged for disobedience. The disgrace cut _H_urayth deeply; too
late Muhallab realised the gravity of his act, but _H_urayth spurned his
overtures and with Thābit fled to Mūsā at Tirmidh. Yazīd retaliated with
foolish severity by maltreating their families, which only inflamed the
general resentment. _H_urayth and Thābit used their influence to stir
up an insurrection to act in concert with Mūsā; the king of Chaghāniān
and his Ephthalite confederates headed by Nēzak, prince of Bādghīs,
readily responded, while Persian interest was excited by the return to
_T_ukhāristān of the son of Pērōz, the heir of the Sāsānids. It seems
probable that even some of Qays were a party to the scheme[38]. Seizing
an opportunity when Yazīd was occupied with the rebel forces of Ibn
al-Ashath on the borders of Khurāsān the revolt broke out. Yazīd was
powerless to prevent the expulsion of his residents from Chaghāniān and
Lower _T_ukhāristān, and Mūsā is said to have refrained from invading
Khurāsān only from fear that it would fall into the hands of Thābit and
_H_urayth. Even the success claimed for Yazīd in Bādghīs can have been
of little effect[39]. Fortunately for the Arabs, Mūsā’s jealousy of
Thābit and _H_urayth caused a division in the ranks of their enemies, but
though the brothers both fell in battle, the danger remained acute. The
son of Pērōz still lingered in _T_ukhāristān, and even at Damascus there
was some uneasiness about the situation in Khurāsān[40].

To _H_ajjāj it was obvious that the first essential was to reunite
the Arabs and that so long as Yazīd was in power that was impossible.
The only difficulty was to find a governor acceptable to Qays and to
substitute him without risking a revolt of Azd. It was solved with
admirable ingenuity. By ordering Yazīd to transfer his authority to
his weaker brother Mufa_dd_al, _H_ajjāj at one stroke removed the man
from whom he had most to fear and prevented him from uniting Azd in
opposition, although Yazīd realised that the fall of his house was
imminent. At the same time the Caliph’s permission was sought for the
nomination of Qutayba ibn Muslim as governor of Khurāsān. Belonging to
the neutral tribe of Bāhila, Qutayba was reckoned as allied to Qays,
but might be trusted to hold the scales evenly between the factions; he
had already distinguished himself in ʿIrāq and in his governorship of
Rayy, and was the more devoted to _H_ajjāj in that he was protected by
no strong party of his own. The accepted belief that _H_ajjāj took no
steps to remove the family of Muhallab until Mūsā was put out of the way
is based on a remark attributed to Muhallab in the Mūsā-legend, which is
frequently contradicted elsewhere both expressly and by implication.

Mufa_dd_al, during his nine months of office in 85/704, seems to have
endeavoured to impress _H_ajjāj by a show of military activity against
the rebels in Bādghīs. At the same time, acting in concert with the local
princes (magnified in the legend to “_T_arkhūn and as-Sabal”), he sent
an expedition to Tirmidh under ʿOthmān b. Ma_s_ʿūd. Mūsā was cut off and
killed in a sortie and his nephew Sulaymān surrendered at discretion,
_H_ajjāj’s first exclamation on hearing the news is said to have been
one of anger at the insult to Qays, but the last hindrance to the
appointment of the new governor was now removed and towards the close of
the year Qutayba b. Muslim arrived in Merv.


NOTES

[21] Bal. 408. 5: Chav., Doc. 172, n. 1. There were two localities called
Māyamurgh in _S_ughd: one near Samarqand (I_st_akhrī 321. 6), and the
other one day’s march from Nasaf on the Bukhārā road (ibid. 337. 7).
According to the Chinese records the former is the one in question here.

[22] Yāqūt, ed. Wüstenfeld, II. 411. 21: _cf._ Caetani, “Annali” VIII. 4
ff. On Qārin, Nöldeke, Sasaniden 127, 437: Marquart, Ērānshahr 134.

[23] Chav., Doc. 172.

[24] _Cf._ Lammens, “Ziād b. Abīhi” (R.S.O. 1912) p. 664.

[25] _Cf._ with _T_ughshāda the name of the reigning prince in 658,
Chav., Doc. 137.

[26] Chav., Doc. 136.

[27] Narshakhī 8 and 30.

[28] Chronologie 57: Ērānshahr 303 f. This view is supported also by the
letter from the king of Samarqand to the Emperor of China in 718 (see p.
60), which puts the first Arab conquest some 35 years before, _i.e._ in
682 or 683.

[29] Accounts also in Kitāb al-Aghānī I. 18: Ibn Qutayba 101.

[30] _H_amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 363-4.

[31] _Cf._ Barthold, “Turkestan” 103 n. 1.

[32] The account given in _T_ab. II. 394 of the annual meeting of the
“Kings of Khurāsān” near Khwārizm for mutual counsel not only possesses
little intrinsic probability, but is obviously intended to magnify the
exploits of Muhallab. In this case, fortunately, the authorities quoted
by _T_ab. leave no doubt as to the Azdite origin of the narrative.
Madāʾinī’s version is given _ib._ ll. 19 sq.

[33] Wieger, Textes Historiques, 1608 f: Chav., Doc. 273 ff: Marquart,
Ēran. 68.

[34] _T_ab. II. 490, 860 ff.: Bal. 414 f.: I. Athīr, IV. 66: Anon. (ed.
Ahlwardt), 195.

[35] Abū ʿUbayda ap. Bal. 426. 10: _cf._ Lestrange, “Lands of the Eastern
Caliphate” p. 448, note.

[36] _T_ab. 1031: _cf._ Anon. 310 f.

[37] _T_ab. 1040 f., 1078. 5: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 330.

[38] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1152 with 1185. 5. For the son of Pērōz, Chav., Doc.
172.

[39] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1129 with 1144 and 1184.

[40] Anon. 337.




III. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA


The achievements of the Muslim armies in Central Asia during the reign of
Walīd I were due in the first place to the complete co-operation between
the directive genius of _H_ajjāj and the military capacity of Qutayba.
Qutayba’s strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, though the
Arabic texts are at no pains to conceal the fact that his gifts fell
something short of genius. On more than one occasion we are shown in what
constant touch the viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies,
and how large a part he took in drawing up the plan of campaign, though
the credit of carrying it through to a successful issue rightly belongs
to Qutayba. _H_ajjāj seems to have had the fullest confidence in his
lieutenant, and if he did not hesitate to utter reproof and warning
when occasion required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of
Qutayba’s success. The Arabs of all parties soon realised that behind
their general lay the authority of _H_ajjāj, the wholesome respect
inspired by whom prevented any open breach during his lifetime. The
second factor which materially assisted the conquests was that in their
prosecution Qutayba united all parties in Khurāsān, Persians and Arabs,
Qays and Yemen. It was no small matter to keep their enthusiasm unabated
in the face of campaigns so protracted and severe, nor can the enthusiasm
be explained only by the attraction of a rich booty. It is by no means
improbable that Qutayba’s success was really due more to his talent for
administration than to his generalship. He seems to have realised, as no
other Arab governor in the east had yet done, that in such a province
as Khurāsān the safety and security of the Arab government must depend
in the long run on the co-operation of the Persian populace, who formed
so great a majority in the country. The bitterness of factional strife
had shown how unsafe it was to rely on the support of the Arabs alone,
especially in the face of such a movement as Yazīd had provoked. By his
conciliatory attitude, therefore, Qutayba earned the confidence of the
Persians and repaid it with confidence; from his constant employment
of Persian agents and his growing preference for Persian governors, it
would seem even that he came to regard them as forming the “ʿAshīra”
he lacked among the Arabs. Although it earned him the ill-will of the
Arabs and played a great part in his fall, it may be that in this he was
instrumental in giving the first impulse to the recovery of a national
sentiment amongst the Persians of Khurāsān.

The situation in Central Asia was also favourable for a renewal of the
attempt to annex to the Arab dominions the rich lands of Transoxania,
though it is doubtful how much information the Arabs possessed on this
point. In 682, while China, weakened internally by the intrigues of the
Empress Wu, had her hands tied by the wars with Tibet, the Eastern or
Northern Turks had re-asserted their independence. The new Empire never
regained its authority over all the western territories of the former
Khans, but by constant campaigns had extended its rule over the Ten
Tribes of the Ili and Chu, who, we are told, were “almost annihilated.”
In 701 the Eastern Turks invaded Sogdiana, but there is no reason to
assume, though it has frequently been suggested, that Muhallab’s forces
at Kish were affected by this raid. As the necessity of securing hostages
for the safety even of the lines of communication shows, the hostility of
the local forces is sufficient to explain all the encounters narrated.
The devastation and loss that invariably accompanied these raids must
have still further weakened the resources of the subject princes, to
whom there was small consolation in the appointment of a son of the Khan
to command the Ten Tribes. In any case the unceasing warfare which the
Eastern Turks had to wage against the Türgesh from 699 to 711 effectually
prevented them from sending assistance in response to any appeals for
support which may have reached them from Sogdiana[41]. Equally if not
more impossible was it for the Türgesh to intervene in Sogdiana during
the same period[42]. By the “Turks,” as we have seen, the Arab historians
mean as a general rule the local inhabitants, amongst whom there may
quite possibly have been included at that time Turkish elements.
Occasional references to the Khāqān (unless they may be taken to refer
to local chiefs, which is improbable) are obvious _fakhr_-developments.
The narrative of 98 A.H. on which the theory of Türgesh intervention is
mainly based, is a pure Bāhilite invention. Finally, the experience of
the Arabs in later years shows us that, if the resistance of Sogdiana had
been backed by large forces of Turks, it would have been impossible for
Qutayba to achieve so large a measure of success.

The conquests of Qutayba fall naturally into four periods:

    1. 86/705: The recovery of Lower _T_ukhāristān;

    2. From 87/706 to 90/709: The conquest of Bukhārā;

    3. From 91/710 to 93/712: Consolidation of the Arab authority
    in the Oxus valley and its extension into _S_ughd;

    4. From 94/713 to 96/715: Expeditions into the Jaxartes
    provinces.


_The recovery of Lower _T_ukhāristān._

The first task before Qutayba was to crush the revolt of Lower
_T_ukhāristān. In the spring of 86/705 the army was assembled and marched
through Merv Rūdh and _T_ālaqān on Balkh. According to one of _T_abarī’s
narratives the city was surrendered without a blow. A second account,
which, though not explicitly given as Bāhilite, may be regarded as such,
since it centres on Qutayba’s brother and is intended to establish a
Bāhilite claim on the Barmakids, speaks of a revolt amongst some of the
inhabitants. This may perhaps be the more correct version, since we hear
of Balkh being in a ruinous condition four years later (_T_ab. 1206. 1).
The submission of Balkh was followed by that of Tīsh, king of Chaghāniān,
who had probably cooperated with Mufa_dd_al in the attack on Tirmidh the
year before. His action was, it seems, inspired by a feud with the king
of Shūmān and Ākharūn, in the upper valleys of the Surkhan and Penjab
rivers, against whom he hoped to use the Arab troops in return for his
assistance to them. Mufa_dd_al had actually projected an expedition
against Shūmān before his recall, and it was now carried out by Qutayba,
who was perhaps the more ready to undertake it since it assured the
safety of the southern approach to the Iron Gate. After the submission
of the King Ghīslashtān, who was of Turkish blood, according to Yuan
Chwang, Qutayba returned to Merv alone, leaving the army to follow under
his brother Sāli_h_, who carried out a number of minor raids on the way.
It is obvious that, in spite of Balādhurī’s imaginative account, these
raids must be located in the districts neighbouring on the Oxus. The
readings in _T_abarī’s narrative are, however, defective[43]. Having thus
isolated Nēzak in Bādghīs, the heart of the revolt, Qutayba spent the
winter months in negotiating with him through Sulaym “the Counsellor,”
an influential Persian whose skill in conducting the most difficult
negotiations proved more than once of the utmost value to Qutayba. Nēzak
was persuaded to surrender and was conducted to Merv, where peace was
concluded on condition that Qutayba would not enter Bādghīs in person. As
a precautionary measure however the governor arranged that Nēzak should
accompany him in all his expeditions. Thus for the moment at least, the
danger of an outbreak in Khurāsān was averted, in a manner honourable to
both parties, and the son of Pērōz took his way back to China to await a
more favourable opportunity[44].


_The Conquest of Bukhārā._

In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure of the crossings at
Āmul and Zamm, opened his campaigns in Bukhārā with an attack on Paykand.
From the expressions of Narshakhī, on whose history of this period we
may place more reliance since his details as a rule fit in with and
supplement the other histories, it can be gathered that the principality
of Bukhārā was weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority of
_T_ughshāda and the regency of Khātūn, the ambitious nobles had struggled
between themselves for the chief power; most of the territories,
including Bukhārā itself, had been seized by the prince of Wardāna
and the remaining districts seem to have been brought under the rule
of Khunuk Khudāh, a noble who assumed the title of Bukhār Khudāh[45].
Paykand was thus more or less isolated and, from Narshakhī’s account,
seems to have been left to its fate. The battle with the _S_ughdians
related in _T_abarī is an obvious anticipation from the events of the
following year. After a siege of some two months the city came to terms
with Qutayba, who left it under a small garrison and, according to
_T_abarī’s version, began the return march to Merv. An émeute in Paykand,
however, brought him back at once. It seems reasonable to assume that
the citizens, imagining Qutayba’s attack to have been no more than an
isolated raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as he retired. The
details given in Narshakhī, that on Qutayba’s advance towards Bukhārā a
certain citizen, enraged by the insulting conduct of the governor, Warqāʾ
b. Nasr al-Bāhili, attempted to murder him, are trivial and unconvincing.
Whatever the cause of the revolt may have been, however, Qutayba took a
terrible revenge. In accordance with mediaeval practice the renegade city
was sacked, its fighting men put to death, and its women and children
enslaved. The booty taken from this, the first of the great trading
cities of Central Asia to be forcibly captured by the Arabs, furnished
inexhaustible material for the exaggerated details of later tradition.
The most important part of the spoil was an arsenal of weapons and
armour, the excellence of which was such that the “forging of _S_ughd”
appears in contemporary verse alongside the traditional “forging of
David” for superlative craftsmanship[46]. With the consent of _H_ajjāj,
these weapons were not included in the division of the booty but used
to re-equip the army. The statement that there were only 350 suits of
armour in the whole army before this is, however, of Bāhilite provenance
and scarcely worthy of credence. The exemplary punishment thus meted
out by Qutayba to Paykand at the beginning of his career was a stern
warning to Nēzak and the Sogdians. Those who accepted Arab dominion would
be humanely treated, but any attempt at rebellion would be inexorably
crushed. Nevertheless the sentence on Paykand was somewhat mitigated in
the sequel, as Narshakhī adds that the captives were ransomed by the
merchants of Paykand on their return from the annual trading expedition
to China, and the city, after lying in ruins for many years, was
eventually rebuilt.

The disaster at Paykand roused the princes and merchants of Transoxania
to the danger of neglecting the invaders. The feud between Wardāna and
Bukhārā was patched up; round Wardān Khudāh, the central figure and
organiser of the struggle for independence, gathered the forces of all
the nearer principalities. Thus when Qutayba, on renewing his expedition
in 88/707, had taken the outlying town of Tūmushkath (not Nūmushkath,
which was the earlier name of Bukhārā) and Rāmīthana (or Rāmtīn), he
found his communications cut by the troops of Wardāna, Bukhārā, and
_S_ughd. It is not, perhaps, impossible that the prince of Farghāna
should have cooperated with the _S_ughdians, as stated in Madāʾinī’s
account. On the other hand the Arabic narratives are far from explicit,
and the _S_ughdians here referred to are much more probably those of
Kish than of Samarqand, a suspicion which is confirmed by the famous
punning order of _H_ajjāj: “Crush Kish, destroy Nasaf, and drive Wardān
back.” Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī give an account of the negotiations between
_H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, representing Qutayba, and _T_arkhūn king of
_S_ughd, which is certainly to be put, with _T_abarī, after the conquest
of Bukhārā two years later. Throughout all these campaigns there is
manifest a tendency, common to the early chronicles of all nations,
to exaggerate the numbers and composition of the opposing forces. As
usual the Bāhilite account carries this to the point of absurdity by
introducing a Türgesh force of no less than 200,000 men, an obvious
anachronism, influenced by the later Türgesh invasions. The connection
is made clear by the mention of Kūr Maghānūn, whom we find nearly thirty
years later (_T_ab. II. 1602. 2) as “one of the chiefs of the Türgesh.”
The true account would seem to be that Qutayba did not attempt to fight
a pitched battle, but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and
gave time for their natural inclination towards disunion to operate,
then evaded them by a rapid march through the Iron Gate and, except for
a rearguard skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry, got his army clear across
the river at Tirmidh. The appointment of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Muslim
to command the rearguard gives us the clue, as it was to this brother
that Qutayba regularly entrusted all the most difficult commands. In
the following year Qutayba was still unable to make headway against the
united forces of Wardān Khudāh, Kish and Nasaf, and after protracted
fighting (in spite of the double victory claimed by the Bāhilites)
returned to Merv. For this weakness he was severely reprimanded by
_H_ajjāj, who, with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The
invasion of 90/709 seems to have taken Wardān Khudāh by surprise, as the
Muslim army was able to advance at once to the siege of Bukhārā. There
is some ground for the conjecture, however, that the death of Wardān
Khudāh had occurred in the interval and that Qutayba was opposed only
by the local forces[47]. This may also explain the hesitation of the
forces of Samarqand to intervene. The battle before the walls of Bukhārā
is described by _T_abarī in a long Tamīmite tradition reminiscent of
the ancient “days,” but the actual capture of the city is left to be
inferred. This siege is transferred to Wardāna by Vámbéry (_cf._ _Heart
of Asia_ p. 52) probably on the authority of the Persian _T_abarī
(Zotenberg IV. 165), but Narshakhī, _T_abarī and all other authorities
quite definitely refer to Bukhārā. Abū ʿUbayda’s tradition (Bal. 420)
of capture by treachery is at best a confusion with the capture of
Samarqand. All the details given in Narshakhī relative to Qutayba’s
organisation of Bukhārā do not refer to this year; most probably the only
immediate measures taken were the imposition of a tribute of 200,000
dirhems and the occupation of the citadel by an Arab garrison.

A diplomatic success followed the victory at Bukhārā. _T_arkhūn, king
of Samarqand, opened negotiations with Qutayba, who was represented by
the commander of his Persian corps, _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and terms were
agreed upon, probably on the basis of the old treaty made by Salm ibn
Ziyād. _T_arkhūn gave hostages for the payment of tribute and Qutayba
began the march back to Merv.


_Consolidation and Advance._

If the Arabs returned in the autumn of 90/709 elated with their success,
they were soon given fresh cause for anxiety. Nēzak, finally realising
that all hope of recovering independence must be extinguished if Arab
rule was strengthened in Khurāsān, and perhaps putting down to weakness
Qutayba’s willingness to gain his ends if possible by diplomacy,
determined on a last effort to overthrow Muslim sovereignty in Lower
_T_ukhāristān, at the moment when it was least to be expected. Having
obtained permission to revisit his home, he left Qutayba at Āmul and made
for Balkh, but escaped to _T_ukhāristān in order to avoid re-arrest. From
here he corresponded with the rulers of Balkh, Merv Rūdh, _T_ālaqān,
Fāryāb, and Jūzjān, urging them to undertake a concerted rising in the
spring. The king of Chaghāniān seems to have refused to countenance the
conspiracy, but the weak Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān was induced, possibly by
force, to make common cause with Nēzak, who hoped doubtless by this means
to unite all the subject princes in defence of their suzerain.

Qutayba’s army was already disbanded and the winter was setting in.
All that he could do was to despatch the garrison at Merv, some 12,000
men, under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, with instructions to winter in Balkh,
where they could counter any immediate move by Nēzak, and advance into
_T_ukhāristān in the spring. This resolute action made Qutayba master
of the situation and so intimidated the rebels that when, in the early
spring, the Arabs marched through the disaffected districts, scarcely a
blow was struck and the princes either submitted or fled. The inhabitants
were granted a complete amnesty except at _T_alāqān, concerning which
the traditions are hopelessly confused. According to one account, a band
of robbers were there executed and crucified, but it is possible that
it was selected for special severity because there alone the revolt had
openly broken out[48]. There was probably also some reorganization of the
administration of Lower _T_ukhāristān, in the direction of conferring
fuller powers on the Arab governors installed in each district, though
the native princes continued to exercise a nominal authority. From
Balkh, Qutayba marched forward and rejoined ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān. With the
assistance of the lesser princes they pursued and captured Nēzak, who was
subsequently executed on direct orders from _H_ajjāj, in violation of
Qutayba’s promise of pardon[49]. How little this action was condemned by
the prevailing spirit of the age, however, is shown by the contemporary
poems quoted by _T_abarī, lauding the “defender of the precincts of
Islam” and comparing his action to the measures formerly adopted against
the Jewish tribes of Madīna. Yet even at this time we find traces of
the new spirit that was to make itself more felt in later years, and
hear voices raised, like Thābit Qu_t_na’s, against the “treachery that
calls itself resolution.” _T_abarī inserts at this point the narrative of
the putting to death of the hostages of Jūzjān, in retaliation for the
murder of the Arab hostage in Jūzjān, a much more excusable incident.
Balādhurī puts it at the beginning of Qutayba’s career, however, as
though it belonged to the first pacification of Lower _T_ukhāristān, so
that its position in _T_abarī may possibly be due to its superficial
similarity with the case of Nēzak. The results of this expedition were
of the greatest importance: not only was Nēzak’s scheme crushed and
Lower _T_ukhāristān henceforth incorporated in the Arab Empire, but also
for the first time Arab authority was extended over the Jabghu and his
immediate vassals in the Oxus basin. The former, exiled to Damascus,
formed a valuable hostage against any attempt to regain independence,
and it seems not improbable that the king of Chaghāniān was made regent
for the young Jabghu (see above, p. 9), ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was appointed
governor of Balkh, in order to supervise the administration of the new
province.

Qutayba had hardly returned to Merv before he was called to deal
with yet another revolt. The king of Shūmān, taking advantage of the
difficulties of the Arabs, or of their absence in the southern mountains,
had re-asserted his independence in spite of the conciliatory offers of
Sāli_h_ ibn Muslim. The full weight of Qutayba’s power was now employed
to crush him. His stronghold was attacked with siege artillery, the
king himself killed in a sortie and the garrison put to the sword.
From this point Shūmān and Ākharūn gradually drop out of the Arabic
narratives altogether. Qutayba then resumed his march through the Iron
Gate, reduced the districts of Kish and Nasaf, and revisited Bukhārā.
There seems to have been continual friction between the Arab garrison
and the population[50] and it was felt that a drastic re-organisation
was necessary. _T_ughshāda, though still a youth, was restored to the
position of Bukhār-Khudāh, and the leaders of the hostile party (more
probably that of Khunuk Khudāh than Wardān Khudāh) were put to death.
By this means, Qutayba no doubt hoped to secure compliance and docility
in the native administration. _T_ughshāda had been raised to the throne
by the Arabs and it might be expected that he would side with them in
consequence. A more solid guarantee for the permanence of the conquest,
however, was the establishment of a military colony in Bukhārā. Following
the precedent set in the colonization of Merv, Arabs were lodged in the
houses of the inhabitants, and it is said that the latter were encouraged
to attend the Friday prayer and behave as Muslims by the distribution
of a small gratuity. The Kushan merchants left their homes and property
rather than comply with these orders and founded a new city outside the
walls, but it is evident that the Islamization of the city was not yet so
thorough as the traditions assert[51]. The building of the Mosque and the
organization of the Friday services are dated by Narshakhī in 94 A.H.,
which points to a further organization of the city after the capture of
Samarqand. The organization of the new territories proceeded, in fact,
_pari passu_ with the extension and consolidation of the conquests.
So long as the Arab authority was insecure in Cisoxania, it was out
of the question to establish either military colonies or an elaborate
administration beyond the river. Consequently, it was only now that the
failure of Nēzak’s revolt had definitely secured the Arab dominion in the
former Ephthalite lands that it was possible to take the decisive step of
settling an Arab garrison in Bukhārā. The regularity with which each step
followed the last suggests that it was done according to a prearranged
plan, or at least that some attention had been devoted to the question
of the administration of the occupied territories in the event of the
success of the military operations.

Qutayba’s reorganization was not confined to the civil government,
however, but extended to the army as well. Hitherto the jealousy of
the Arabs for their exclusive rights as a warrior caste had strictly
limited the number of Persians in the armies, apart from the clients
and camp followers. Thus we are told (_T_ab. 1290. 20) that the armies
of Khurāsān at this period were composed as follows: from Ba_s_ra-Ahl
al-ʿĀliya, 9,000; Bakr, 7,000; Tamīm, 10,000; ʿAbd al Qays, 4,000; Azd,
10,000: from Kūfa, 7,000: and alongside these 47,000 Arabs only 7,000
Mawālī, commanded by _H_ayyān-an-Naba_t_ī, who is called variously a
Daylamite and a native of Khurāsān. Now, however, Qutayba imposed,
first on Bukhārā, and later on each successive conquest, the obligation
of providing an auxiliary corps of local troops, amounting usually to
some ten or twenty thousand men, to serve with the Arab armies. It is
possible, if the story be true, that this was suggested by the precedent
set by Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān in the conquest of Samarqand, but more probable
that it represents an entirely new departure in the East, though it had
long been a practice in other spheres of the Arab conquests.

We are given no hint of the motives which led to the adoption of the
new system, though it would seem that they must have been of some
force. Possibly it was no more than a desire to keep the native armies
occupied in the service of the Arabs rather than risk a revolt in their
rear. _H_ajjāj and Qutayba perhaps realised too that the Arab forces
by themselves, after taking four years to reduce Bukhārā alone, were
insufficient to ensure success in the greater task of subduing Samarqand.
Under the new system—which recalls Pan-chʿao’s famous aphorism “Use
barbarians to attack barbarians”—each conquest in turn made the next more
easy. The rapidity of Qutayba’s later conquests in contrast with the
early period is thus explained. It is just possible that in this plan
Qutayba had an ulterior motive as well: the formation of a Persian army,
trained on the same lines as the Arab forces, but more devoted to the
person of the governor and able to take his part against the Arabs. How
very nearly this plan succeeded, even in Qutayba’s own case, the sequel
was to show.

The practice of raising native levies, once started, appears to have
become general in Khurāsān. We have no information as to when the local
forces of Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān were incorporated in the army,
nor in what proportions, but we have frequent evidence of their presence
and increasing prestige in the wars of the next forty years[52]. On the
other hand, though contingents from the towns of Sogdiana were used by
later governors if they were available, as in 106 and 112 A.H., in view
of the weaker hold of the Arabs on Transoxania Sogdian troops never
formed a regular division of the Arab forces up to the end of the Umayyad
period. This distinction between the two subject Iranian groups became,
as will be seen, of some importance when the ʿAbbāsid propaganda began to
tamper with the loyalty of the armies of Khurāsān.

While Qutayba was occupied with the new organization of Bukhārā, a
detached force, sent under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān from Kish to Samarqand to
exact from _T_arkhūn the tribute agreed upon in the previous year,
successfully accomplished its mission. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, after restoring
the hostages to _T_arkhūn, rejoined his brother at Bukhārā, whence they
returned to Merv for the winter.

One important vassal of _T_ukhāristān, who had long been a thorn in the
side of _H_ajjāj, still remained unsubdued. This was Rutbīl or Zunbīl,
the Turkish ruler of Zābulistān[53]. In 91, the viceroy united Sijistān
to the province of Khurāsān, with instructions to Qutayba to undertake a
campaign in person against Rutbīl. In the following year, therefore, the
expeditions into Transoxania were interrupted, and the army again marched
southwards. To Qutayba’s great relief (for he disliked to undertake a
campaign against this formidable foe who had made Sijistān “an ill-omened
frontier”) Rutbīl hastened to tender his submission, and at the same
time sent an embassy to convey his homage to the Emperor of China[54].
Recognition of Arab suzerainty over Zābulistān involved of course only
the payment of a fixed tribute, and no attempt was made at a permanent
occupation.

Meanwhile a serious situation had arisen in _S_ughd. The merchants and
nobles of Samarqand had resented the weakness of their king and the
payment of tribute: in Qutayba’s absence the party for resistance _à
outrance_ gained the upper hand, and _T_arkhūn, deposed on the ground
of incapacity, committed suicide. The choice of the electors fell on
Ghūrak[55], a prince of whom we would gladly have known more. Under
the ever increasing difficulties with which he was confronted during
his twenty-seven years of rule, his consummate handling of the most
confused situations shows him to have been at once statesman and patriot,
and preserved his kingdom from repeated disaster. The action of the
_S_ughdian nobles, however, the Arabic account of which is confirmed by
the Chinese records, constituted a challenge to Arab pretensions which
Qutayba could not be slow in answering. These considerations clearly
disprove the partial tradition of Abū ʿUbayda (Bal. 422), to the effect
that Qutayba treacherously attacked Khwārizm and Samarqand in spite of
the treaties of Saʿīd ibn ʿOthmān, and the argument based upon it by van
Vloten in _La Domination Arabe_, must also, in consequence, be somewhat
modified.

The winter of 93/711, therefore, was spent in preparations for an
expedition against Samarqand, but before the opening of the campaigning
season, Qutayba received a secret mission from the Khwārizm Shāh, who
offered to become tributary if the Arabs would rid him of his rebellious
brother Khurrazādh. Qutayba agreed, and after publicly announcing his
intention of invading _S_ughd, suddenly appeared at Hazārasp. The
followers of the Khwārizm Shāh were persuaded to offer no resistance
for this year, at least, and accepted the terms, which included, in
accordance with the new scheme, the provision of a corps of 10,000
ablebodied men as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba remained at the
capital[56] until the army was collected, while ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was
employed, according to _T_abarī, in reducing the king of Khāmjird, who
from the parallel account in Balādhurī is to be identified either with
Khurrazādh, or at least with his party. The Persian _T_abarī adds a
long and doubtless legendary narrative of his surrender. Four thousand
prisoners were taken and butchered, probably by order of the Khwārizm
Shāh.

The later history of Khwārizm under Qutayba’s rule is an unhappy one.
His first governor Iyās b. ʿAbdullah, proved too weak for his post,
and on Qutayba’s withdrawal the Khwārizmians rose in revolt and put to
death the king who had betrayed them. Iyās was recalled in disgrace,
together with the Persian _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, who had been associated
with him, and Qutayba’s brother ʿAbdullah (in Balādhurī ʿUbaydullah) was
appointed as temporary regent until, after the capture of Samarqand, a
strong force under al-Mughīra b. ʿAbdullah could be sent to effect a
reconquest. Qutayba’s retribution on this occasion exceeded even the
terror of Paykand and Shūmān. We are told by Al-Bīrūnī that the educated
classes and more cultured elements in Khwārizm were slaughtered almost
to extinction. He refers this by implication to the second expedition of
Qutayba (though it does not appear that the governor led the expedition
in person), which is borne out by what we know of Qutayba’s methods in
similar cases, while there is no instance in his career of such an action
on a first conquest. It was in all probability the educated classes
(including no doubt the hierarchy) who led the revolt against the traitor
king and thus met with the severest punishment. The dynasty, however, was
maintained, and it is not improbable that the Arab colony of which we
hear shortly afterwards was settled in Khwārizm at the same time[57].

The booty from the first expedition into Khwārizm was enough to satisfy
Qutayba’s troops, who demanded to be allowed to return to their homes,
but a sudden thrust at Samarqand promised such success that Qutayba
and his leaders decided to make the attempt. The _S_ughdian army had
apparently been disbanded, and under cover of a false movement of the
advance guard, the Arabs marched directly on Samarqand. The advance guard
under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān numbered 20,000 men, while the main body included
the new Persian contingents from Khwārizm and Bukhārā. The march occupied
only a few days and the slight resistance encountered did not prevent
the Arabs from proceeding at once to invest the city. Ghūrak conducted
the defence with vigour, however, and appealed to Shāsh and Farghāna for
assistance, reminding them that Samarqand was the bulwark of the Jaxartes
valley. A strong force was despatched from Shāsh with the intention of
making a surprise attack on the Arab camp, but was ambushed at night by a
picked troop of Arabs and almost annihilated. This reverse, together with
the continuous bombardment to which they were subjected, disheartened
the _S_ughdians, but the wall had been breached and an entrance almost
effected by the Arabs, stoutly assisted by their new Iranian divisions,
before Ghūrak sued for peace. Qutayba’s demands were unexpectedly
light—an annual tribute, stated in widely varying amounts, and a strong
corps of _S_ughdians, together with a stipulation that the city should be
cleared of its fighting men while the Arabs built a mosque and celebrated
the ritual prayers. Once within the gates, however, Qutayba refused to
restore the city to Ghūrak: a strong garrison was established in the
citadel, under the command of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān (so Yaʿqūbī; in _T_abarī
ʿAbdullah) and drastic orders were issued excluding all unbelievers
except under strict surveillance, doubtless with the intention of
avoiding a repetition of the friction that had occurred at Bukhārā.
Ghūrak either could not or would not place himself in the humiliating
position of _T_ughshāda, and with his retinue, accompanied possibly by
the merchants, withdrew from Samarqand altogether and built a new city,
Farankath, some four farsakhs distant in the direction of Ishtīkhan[58].
Qutayba’s double-dealing on this occasion, however, tarnished his
reputation among both Persians and Arabs, far more than his severity to
Paykand and Khwārizm, and left a rankling memory in _S_ughd. In order
to avoid the stigma of treachery attaching to their hero the Bāhilite
tradition relates this expedition in an entirely different version[59].
Qutayba, we are told, after marching down the right bank of the Oxus
and collecting his army at Bukhārā, advanced to Rabinjān where he was
met by the _S_ughdians under Ghūrak, supported by the troops of Shāsh
and Farghāna and the Turks. The enemy retired on Samarqand but engaged
in constant rearguard actions, the city being finally entered by force
after a decisive battle in the suburbs. Though this account is at first
sight borne out to some extent by Ghūrak’s own narrative in his letter
to the Emperor of China, in which he claims an initial success against
the Arabs, but was unable to prevent their advance, both statements must
be regarded as exaggerations in opposite interests. At all events it is
quite certain that none but _S_ughdian troops were involved at first.

A further development of the Bāhilite tradition has given rise to some
controversy. According to this, Ghūrak appealed for help not only to
Shāsh but also to the Khāqān, and the squadron sent from Shāsh appears
as a force of Turks, commanded by a son of the Khāqān. This is, of
course, an obvious exaggeration on the former narrative. In the Turkish
Orkhon inscriptions, however, an expedition under the prince Kül-tegin
into Sogdiana “to organize the Sogdian people” is mentioned, following
on a successful campaign against the Türgesh in 710/711. Marquart
endeavours to prove that this expedition occurred in 712 and is, in
fact, corroborated by the Bāhilite tradition. Professor Houtsma has
raised several objections to this view, the most important being that
the chronology of the inscriptions has to be manipulated to allow of
this date, as the natural date to assume from the context is at latest
711. These, together with the considerations mentioned above, render
Marquart’s hypothesis absolutely untenable.

A second suggestion has been put forward by Professor Barthold, to which,
however, Professor Houtsma’s objections would apply with equal force[60].
In the narrative of the historian Yaʿqūbī (II. 344), there is a brief
notice as follows: “Qutayba appointed his brother ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn
Muslim governor of Samarqand, but the men of Samarqand treacherously
revolted against him, and Khāqān, king of the Turks, attacked him also.
He wrote to Qutayba, but Qutayba waited until the winter cleared, then
marched to join him and routed the army of the Turks.” Professor Barthold
takes the view, therefore, that this is the expedition referred to in the
inscriptions, and attributes the failure of the Turks to the disastrous
effects of a winter campaign in a devastated land, which so severely
disabled them that they could not face the formidable army that took the
field under Qutayba in the spring. It is questionable, however, how far
Yaʿqūbī’s narrative may be trusted. None of the other historians give the
slightest hint of this invasion, nor were the results such as we should
expect after a _S_ughdian revolt. There was no ruthless reconquest, no
stamping out of rebellion in blood. Neither does the general tenor of
Yaʿqūbī’s accounts of Qutayba inspire confidence. They are not only
confused in detail and chronology—the capture of Samarqand, for instance,
is dated 94 A.H.—but in some cases are taken from what we know to be the
Bāhilite tradition, and in others, such as the narrative under discussion
and the account of the conquest of Khwārizm, follow a tradition which
seems irreconcilable with our other information. While it cannot be said
definitely therefore, that Yaʿqūbī’s statements in this case contain no
truth, it is certainly preferable to regard them as a later development
of the narrative, on the lines of the Bāhilite tradition.

If the chronological objections raised by Professor Houtsma are sound,
there remains still a third possible solution, which, however, as there
is no corroborative evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources,
must remain nothing but a hypothesis. It is surely quite tenable that
Kül-tegin’s “organization of the Sogdian people” had something to do
with the deposition of _T_arkhūn and appointment of Ghūrak. With Sogdian
trade playing the most important part which we know in the Turkish lands,
it would be well worth while to try to prevent the Arabs from obtaining
control over it. The very unexpectedness of the description given to this
expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for “organization”
and it is difficult to see what other motive there could have been. These
circumstances would render it quite probable that Ghūrak did, in fact,
appeal to the Khāqān for assistance against the Arabs, but it seems that
the growing power of the Türgesh barred the way into Sogdiana against the
Northern Khanate for the remainder of its short existence.

By the conquest of Samarqand Qutayba finally established his position
in Transoxania. It must not be assumed, however, as many of the Arab
historians give the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand
meant the conquest of _S_ughd. All that had been done was to settle an
Arab garrison in a country as yet unfriendly. It was the duty of the
commanders at Samarqand gradually to extend their authority over the
whole district of _S_ughd by expeditions and razzias[61]. There was
thus a radical difference between the conquest of Bukhārā and that of
Samarqand. The former was the result of a series of campaigns in which
the resources of the country had been exhausted and the province annexed
piecemeal. The whole population had become subjects of the Arabs and
were under constant surveillance: _T_ughshāda himself held his rank on
sufferance and was compelled to maintain at least an outward show of
loyalty. But Samarqand had been captured in one swift thrust; _S_ughd
as a whole was still unsubdued and only from policy acknowledged the
suzerainty of the Arabs for the time being. “Ghūrak at Ishtīkhan was
free to turn either to the Arabs or to the Turks”[58]. Nevertheless
in the years that followed there is evidence that friendly relations
were formed between the Arab garrison and many of the local leaders and
inhabitants[62]. The whole country, however, had suffered terribly in the
constant invasions and counter invasions. A contemporary poet gives a
vivid picture of its dissipated wealth, its ruined and desolate lands:

    “Daily Qutayba gathers spoil, increasing our wealth with new
    wealth: A Bāhilite who has worn the crown till the hair that
    was black has whitened. _S_ughd is subdued by his squadrons,
    its people left sitting in nakedness.... As oft as he lights in
    a land, his horse leave it furrowed and scarred.”


_The Expeditions into the Jaxartes Provinces._

It might perhaps have been expected that Qutayba’s next object after the
capture of Samarqand would be to establish Arab authority in _S_ughd as
firmly as had been done in Bukhārā. It would probably have been better
in the end had he done so, but for the moment the attractions of the
“forward policy” which had already proved so successful were too strong.
Instead of concentrating on the reduction of _S_ughd, it was decided to
push the frontiers of the Empire further into Central Asia, and leave
the former to be carried out at leisure. Qutayba therefore crossed to
Bukhārā, where 20,000 levies from Khwārizm, Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf
had been summoned to meet him, and marched into _S_ughd. If there was
a Turkish army wintering in the country, it offered no considerable
resistance to the advance of the Arabs. In _S_ughd Qutayba divided his
forces into two corps. The Persian levies were sent in the direction
of Shāsh, while he himself with the Arabs marched on Khujanda and
Farghāna. Our information is brief and lacking in detail. Of the northern
expedition we are told only that they captured Shāsh and burnt the
greater part of it. Qutayba’s own force had to overcome some resistance
at Khujanda, but eventually reached Kāsān, where it was rejoined by the
other. The geographers refer also to a battle fought by Qutayba at Mīnak
in Ushrūsana, but against whom is not clear[63]. _T_abarī (1440. 7)
preserves a tradition that Qutayba appointed an Arab resident, ʿI_s_ām b.
ʿAbdullah al-Bāhilī, in Farghāna. If this is true, as seems not unlikely,
the appointment was probably made during this year. The details of the
tradition are quite unacceptable, however. No Arab governor would ever
have taken up his residence in a hill-pass in the remotest district
of Farghāna, completely cut off from his fellow-countrymen. One of
Balādhurī’s authorities carries this or a similar tradition further by
crediting Qutayba with the establishment of Arab colonies as far as Shāsh
and Farghāna. Here again at most only temporary military outposts can be
in question. On the other hand, the extraordinary success achieved by the
Arabs on this expedition is apt to be overlooked, and Qutayba might well
have imagined, as he returned to Merv, that the latest conquests were as
permanently annexed to Khurāsān as Samarqand and Khwārizm.

The helplessness of their Turkish suzerain in face of the victorious
Arabs, however, caused a revival in Transoxania of the tradition of
Chinese overlordship. Appeals to the Khāqān were of no avail, and in the
minds of the Sogdian princes, seeking for some counterpoise to the rapid
extension of the Arab conquests, the idea of appealing directly to the
Emperor was slowly maturing. Though no definite steps in this direction
had as yet been taken, some inkling of it may have reached Qutayba. The
Arabs were now familiar with China through the sea-borne trade of the
Persian Gulf and at least after, if not before, their conquest of the
cities which were already becoming the headquarters of Central Asian
commerce, must have become aware of the close commercial relations
which these cities maintained with China. Under these circumstances,
Qutayba (or possibly _H_ajjāj) decided to send a mission overland to
the Chinese court, possibly to prevent their intervention in the West,
but more probably with the intention of promoting trade relations. As
the princes of Sogdiana and _T_ukhāristān were much more alive to the
advantages of preserving their commerce and to the dangers which might
befall it under the new government than the Arabs could have been, it was
probably on their suggestion that the embassy was sent. They would, of
course, have no difficulty in persuading governors of the character of
_H_ajjāj and Qutayba that their own interests also lay in safeguarding
and encouraging the trade which brought such wealth to Transoxania.
If the intervention of the Turks had been caused by their concern for
Sogdian trade, it became doubly important for the Arabs to show their
practical interest in its welfare. Apart from the immediate gain to the
treasury which would accrue, such an action might reasonably be expected
to secure the acquiescence of the Sogdians in Arab rule. The date of the
mission is fixed as 713 by the Chinese records, which add also that in
spite of the refusal of the envoys to perform the customary kow-tow it
was favourably received by the Emperor. Both statements are confirmed by
_T_abarī’s remark that the leader was sent to Walīd on his return, which
must therefore be dated between the death of _H_ajjāj and the end of
714[64]. Unfortunately the Arab records of the mission have been confused
with the legendary exploits of Qutayba two years later, becoming so
disfigured in the process as to be almost worthless. The wisdom of this
step must have been justified by its results, though there are no effects
apparent in our histories and the relentless march of Chinese policy was
not affected. This embassy is mentioned by the Arabic historians as if it
were an isolated incident, but it was, as I have shown elsewhere[65],
only the first of many such sent by the governors of Khurāsān to maintain
friendly relations with the Chinese court. It cannot be doubted that
in the majority of cases at least the object of these missions was
commercial, particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or
other of the Sogdian principalities.

In the following year 95/714 the raids on the Jaxartes provinces were
renewed. It would seem on comparing Balādhurī’s account with _T_abarī
that Qutayba made Shāsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far
as Isbījāb. The prince of Shāsh appealed to China for assistance, but
without effect[66]. Qutayba’s plan therefore was to follow up the
important trade-route which led from Turfan down the Ili valley, along
the northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through Tokmak and Tarāz
into Shāsh and Samarqand. Though the economic importance of controlling
this trade-route may have had its part in this decision, especially in
view of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable that this
was less in the mind of the Arabs than its strategic value as the road
by which the Central Asian Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the
end of the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted by the news
of the death of _H_ajjāj, which had occurred in Shawwāl (June). Deeply
affected by the loss of his patron and not a little uncertain of the
effect on his own fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons
to Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv. Walīd, however,
allayed his fears by an encouraging letter, and made his province
independent of ʿIrāq. But the death of _H_ajjāj had affected Khurāsān too
deeply for such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in their
expeditions, they were weary of the constant campaigns and anxious to
enjoy the comforts of peace. Factional feeling was merely slumbering,
and a new element of unrest had been added by a Kūfan corps under Jahm
b. Za_h_r, which had been transferred to Khurāsān from India by _H_ajjāj
in his last year. All parties among the Arabs were alienated from
Qutayba; even Qays had been estranged by his highhanded action in the
first place with the house of Al-Ahtam and again by his feud with Wakīʿ
b. Abī Sūd, the chief of Tamīm[67]; moreover, they were suspicious of his
medizing tendencies. Amongst the Persians he was popular, but _H_ayyān
an-Naba_t_ī, though restored to his position in command of the Persian
troops, had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace at Khwārizm. It seems
extraordinary that the general himself should have been blind to any
internal danger and was entirely confident in the loyalty of his army.

On re-opening the campaign in 96/715, therefore, his only precautions
consisted in the removal of his family and personal property from Merv to
Samarqand and the posting of a guard on the Oxus, in view of a possible
restoration to favour of Yazīd b. Muhallab. It is unlikely that Qutayba
could have had in mind the possibility of Walīd’s death; what he feared
was more probably a _rapprochement_ between the Caliph and his heir
Sulaymān, who was his bitter enemy.

The object of this last campaign was probably the complete subjugation
of Farghāna. Having established his authority over the important section
of the Middle Jaxartes and its trade route, it remained now to round off
his conquests by extending it also over the central trade route between
Farghāna and Kashgaria. The account which _T_abarī intends to convey,
however, is that Qutayba marched first into Farghāna and from there led
an expedition against Kashgar, with complete success. In an article
of mine published in the _Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies_
(II. 467 ff.), all our evidence for this expedition has been critically
discussed, and shown to be against the authenticity of the tradition. It
is unnecessary, therefore, to do more than summarise very briefly the
arguments there put forward. (1) None of the historians earlier than or
contemporary with _T_abarī contain any reference to a raid on Kashgar,
and even _T_abarī’s own statement is not borne out by the authorities
on which it professedly rests. Only one of these relates an expedition
to Kashgar, and that under the command of an unknown leader. (2) The
interval between the opening of the campaign and the death of Qutayba
in Farghāna in August or September does not allow time for such an
expedition, especially in view of the mutinous attitude of the army after
the death of the Caliph. (3) The Chinese account of Arab interference
in Farghāna cannot refer, for chronological reasons, to Qutayba’s
expedition, and in any case is silent on any attack on Kashgaria.

That an expedition of this sort should have been attributed to Qutayba
is not surprising, in view of the tradition of the embassy to China, and
of the great renown which attached to his memory. Later tradition[68]
recounted that _H_ajjāj pledged the governorship of China to the first
to reach it of his two governors in the East, Mu_h_ammad b. Qāsim and
Qutayba. “_S_īn” was, of course, not the sharply defined country of
our days, but rather a loose term for the Far East, including even the
Turkish lands in the North-East. Qutayba had probably done little more
than make preparations for his campaign, perhaps to the extent of sending
out minor raiding expeditions, when the news of the death of Walīd
brought everything to a standstill.

The historians give the most contradictory accounts of the events that
followed; according to Balādhurī the new Caliph Sulaymān confirmed
Qutayba in his command but gave permission to the army to disband.
_T_abarī’s narrative, with which Yaʿqūbī’s in general agrees, is fully
discussed by Wellhausen (274 ff.), together with a valuable analysis
of Qutayba’s position. The story of his highhanded negotiations with
Sulaymān is too well known to need repetition. Finding the army
disinclined to follow him, he completely lost his head and roused the
mutiny in which he was killed. The Persian levies, who were inclined to
side with him, were dissuaded by _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and at the last
only his own family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained faithful.

The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of the Arab conquests in
Central Asia for a quarter of a century, but the beginning of a period
of retrogression. Under Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, his successor[69], the armies
melted away. Mukhallad, the son of Yazīd b. Muhallab and his lieutenant
in Transoxania, carried out summer raids on the villages of _S_ughd,
but an isolated attempt on the Jaxartes provinces by ʿOmar’s governor,
Al-Jarrā_h_ b. ʿAbdullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly
to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold (_Turkestan_ 160),
of the disaster met with by a Muslim army refers. On the other hand an
embassy was sent in the name of the Caliph to renew relations with the
Chinese court, and a third in concert with the kingdoms of _T_ukhāristān
and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of ʿOmar[65]. There is mention also
of an expedition into Khuttal which regained some territory. But it was
Qutayba, with _H_ajjāj at his back, who had held his conquests together,
and when he disappeared there was neither leader nor organisation to take
his place. The history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and
unstable was the authority of the Arabs. It was force that had made the
conquests, and only a settled policy of force or conciliation could hold
them. The first was absent. “Qutayba in chains at the world’s end is more
terrible to us than Yazīd as governor in our very midst” is the graphic
summary put into the mouths of the conquered, while of Rutbīl, king of
Zābulistān, we are told expressly that after the death of _H_ajjāj “he
paid not a cent of tribute to any of the governors of Sijistān on behalf
of the Umayyads nor on behalf of Abū Muslim.”[70].

Nor was ʿOmar’s policy a true policy of conciliation, based as it was not
on the maintenance of the Arab conquests but on the complete evacuation
of Transoxania. His orders to that effect were of course indignantly
rejected by the Arab colonists in Bukhārā and Samarqand, but together
with his appointment of the feeble and ineffective ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b.
Nuʿaym al-Qushayrī as governor, such a policy was naturally construed
by the Sogdians as mere weakness, and an invitation to regain their
independence. In addition to the embassies to China, to be related in
the next chapter, and possibly also some negotiations with the Türgesh,
Ghūrak sought to win back his capital by playing on ʿOmar’s piety.
The Caliph sent envoys to the princes of Sogdiana calling on them to
accept Islām, and Ghūrak, outwardly professing his adherence, sent a
deputation to ʿOmar urging that as “Qutayba dealt with us treacherously
and tyrannically, but God has now caused justice and equity to reign” the
city should be restored to the _S_ughdians. The commonsense of the judge
appointed to try the case on ʿOmar’s instructions by the governor of
Samarqand, Sulaymān b. Abiʾs-Sarī (himself a mawlā), solved the problem
in an eminently practical manner, and we are told that his decision, so
far from being “malicious,” was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the
_S_ughdians, if not perhaps to Ghūrak. Beyond the remission of kharāj, it
is doubtful whether ʿOmar’s administration benefited the subject peoples
in the slightest, and the reaction which followed his brief reign only
aggravated the situation. Already before its close the _S_ughdians had
withdrawn their allegiance[71].

Thus within six years from the death of Qutayba, much of his work was
undone. He had laid the foundations on which the later rule of Islām
was built, and laid them well, though his own superstructure was too
flimsy to withstand the tempests of the years ahead. But the fault was
not entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault of the builder. He was
snatched away before his work was done, even if in his latter years he
tended to neglect everything else for military glory. As we shall see,
there was no peace in Transoxania until other men arose, great and strong
enough to adopt and carry out the best of his plans. The ruthlessness
and ferocity of his conquests, however, have been much exaggerated.
He was always ready to use diplomacy rather than force if it offered
any hope of success, so much so that his lenience was misconstrued on
occasion by both friends and foes. Only in cases of treachery and revolt
his punishment came swift and terrible. That he did not hesitate to take
vengeance on his private enemies is to say no more than that he was an
Arab. It was not without reason that in later days the Muslims of Central
Asia added Qutayba’s name to the roll of martyrs and that his tomb in
Farghāna became a favourite place of pilgrimage[72].

To sum up the position in Central Asia in the years immediately following
Qutayba’s conquests:—

    (1) Lower _T_ukhāristān and Chaghāniān formed an integral part
    of the Arab Empire.

    (2) _T_ukhāristān, now in the decay of its power, was held
    as a vassal state, together with the Transoxine provinces of
    Khuttal, Kumādh, etc., where, however, the Arab authority was
    much weaker.

    (3) In Sogdiana, Bukhārā was regarded as a permanent conquest
    and gradually colonized; _S_ughd was still hostile territory
    held by strong outpost garrisons in Samarqand and Kish,
    connected to Bukhārā by minor posts.

    (4) Khwārizm as a military power was negligible and was
    permanently colonized.

    (5) The kingdoms beyond the Jaxartes remained independent,
    hostile, and relatively strong, supported by the Turkish power
    to the North East and also by the intervention of China.

    (6) Ushrūsana, though unsubdued, does not seem to have offered
    any obstacle to the passage of Arab armies.

    (7) The existing dynastic houses were everywhere maintained, as
    the representatives of the conquered peoples and vehicle of the
    civil administration. The actual administrative and financial
    authority in their territories, however, passed to the Wāli,
    or agent of the Arab governor of Khurāsān[73].


NOTES

[41] Chav. Doc. 42, 282 f.: Marquart Chronologie 15: _T_abarī II. 1078,
1080.

[42] As was suggested by Prof. Houtsma, Gotting. Gelehrt. Anz., 1899,
386-7.

[43] Suggested readings in Barthold, Turkestan, p. 71 n. 5, and p. 76.

[44] _T_ab. 1184 f., 1195: Chav. Doc. 172: Hamadhānī, Kitāb al-Buldān
(Bibl. Geog. Arab. V) 209. 7: _cf._ _T_ab. 1874.

[45] Narshakhī 8, 15, 30, 37, 44: _T_ab. 1199. 1: Yaʿqūbī Hist. II. 342.
9. _Cf._ Marquart, Chronologie 63 and Barthold, Arab. Quellen 7.

[46] _H_amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 349.

[47] Narshakhī 8. 15.

[48] _T_ab. 1207. 16: _cf._ Yaʿqūbī loc. cit. On the Arab method of
crucifixion, Nöldeke Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902) 433; _cf._ _T_ab. 1691 and
Dīnawarī 336. 18.

[49] Detailed accounts of this are readily accessible in “The Heart of
Asia”, and “The Caliph’s Last Heritage” by Sir Mark Sykes, the latter
in a richly imaginative vein. Very full geographical data are given by
Marquart, Ērānshahr 219 f.

[50] Narsh. 46. 12, 50. 15.

[51] _E.g._ Narsh. 58. 5. On the new city, Barthold Turkestan 110 f.

[52] _E.g._ _T_ab. 1544. 9, 1600 ff.

[53] On this dynasty see Ērānshahr 37 f., 248 ff. and de Goeje in
W.Z.K.M. XVI (1902) 192-195.

[54] Yaʿqūbī Geog. 283: Chav. Doc. 161.

[55] The pronunciation of this name, usually pointed Ghūzak, is fixed by
the Chinese transcription U-le-kia (Chav. Doc. 136).

[56] On the city of Khwārizm (Fīl, Kath) see Sachau “Zur Geschichte usw.
von Khwārizm” pp. 23-25.

[57] _T_ab. 1252 f., 1525: Bal. 421: Al-Bīrūnī, “Chronology of Ancient
Nations” (trans. Sachau, London 1879) pp. 41 f. Prof. Barthold is
inclined to regard Al-Bīrūnī’s narrative as fictitious (perhaps intended
to account for the absence of written records of Khwārizm dating from
pre-Muslim times?) _cf._ “Turkestan” p. 1.

[58] Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21 f.

[59] _T_ab. 1247 f., 1249. For Ghūrak’s latter, Chav. Doc. 204 f.

[60] Marquart, Chronologie 5 ff.: Barthold, Arab. Quell. 11 f.: Houtsma
as note 2 above.

[61] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1418: Bal. 425.

[62] _T_ab. 1365. 8, 1518, 1542. 1.

[63] Ibn Hawqal 383; I_st_akhrī 328. 4. The latter’s statement that
Qutayba here beleaguered the Afshīn of Ushrūsana is almost certainly due
to the omission of some words or perversion of the text. On the other
hand, there could not be, as in Ibn Hawqal’s account, any question of
Musawwida (“Black Robes”) in the ordinary sense of the term as early as
94 A.H. and above all in Ushrūsana.

The absence of any reference to levies from _S_ughd in this expedition
would seem to favour Prof. Barthold’s theory of a _S_ughdian rising in
co-operation with the Turks. The evidence in favour of an accidental
omission is, however, very strong. At this point _T_abarī’s narratives,
in contrast to the preceding period, become extremely brief. The levies
from the four states mentioned met Qutayba at Bukhārā and marched with
him into _S_ughd. Naturally the _S_ughdian levies would have awaited his
arrival there. Had the omission been intentional it would be difficult
to explain why _T_abarī did not include some account of the reasons why
_S_ughdian troops were not summoned. In any case it is certain that
Qutayba would not have left a hostile _S_ughdian army in his rear, and
they must therefore have taken part in the march to the Jaxartes.

[64] Cordier, Hist. gen. de la Chine, I. 460: Wieger 1642: _T_ab. 1280. 3.

[65] Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, II. 619 ff. For another
view of these embassies see Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches (1910),
II. 247 f.

[66] Hirth, Nachworte 81.

[67] Bal. 425 f.: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 354: Wellhausen, Arab. Reich 275.

[68] Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 346. 7.

[69] See his character-sketch in Wellhausen 277.

[70] Bal. 401. 5: _T_ab. 1353.

[71] _T_ab. 1364 f., 1356. 13, 1364. 13, 1421. 7, 1418. 13: Bal. 422, 426.

[72] Narsh. 57. 4: Fa_z_āʾil Balkh, ap. Schefer, Chrest. Persane, I. 71.
2.

[73] Sachau, Khwārizm I, 29: Barthold, Turkestan 189.




IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE.[74]


The princes of Transoxania had so long been accustomed to regard the
Arabs as mere marauders that it was some time before they could realise
the loss of their independence. Though necessity forced them at first
to adopt a conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance
of Islām under ʿOmar II), they were dismayed to find all the machinery
of permanent occupation set in motion, and their authority flouted
by tactless and greedy Arab officials. Such a state of affairs was
tolerable only in the absence of any countering force. The situation
was not stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba’s death
other and disturbing factors had begun to enter. Our best clue to the
complications in Transoxania during this period is the attitude of
Ghūrak, king of _S_ughd, of whose movements, fortunately, sufficient
indications have been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance
between the Türgesh and the Arabs, his true statesman’s instinct seldom
misled him in judging how and when to act to advantage throughout his
troubled reign. In addition to this we have the evidence, unreliable
in detail but confirmatory in the mass, of the embassies sent by the
subject principalities to the Chinese court. Doubtless they were
despatched in the guise of commercial missions and in many cases were
truly so, but that they frequently possessed a political character
can hardly be denied. The dates of these embassies as given in the
authorities translated by Chavannes fall naturally into four periods. In
the following list all embassies have been omitted in which the Arabs
are known to have participated or whose object is known to have had no
connection with the Arab conquests, as well as those which appear to be
duplicated, and those from the minor states:

NUMBER OF EMBASSIES FROM:—

  1. 717-731 _S_ughd 11, _T_ukhāristān 5, Bukhārā 2, Arabs 4.
  2. 732-740   ”    none       ”       2     ”  none   ”   1 (733).
  3. 741-747   ”      4        ”       3     ”    1    ”   4
  4. 750-755   ”      4        ”       2     ”    3    ”   6

These four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond to the
fluctuations of Arab authority in Transoxania.

In the same year, 713, that Qutayba first led his army across the
Jaxartes, a new era of westward expansion opened in China with the
accession of Hiuen-Tsong. In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs
of the Ten Tribes and obtained their immediate submission, while in the
following year they restored the deposed king of Farghāna. In 716, on
the death of Me-chuʾo, Khan of the Northern Turks, the powerful tribes
of the Türgesh asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu
established, with Chinese assistance, a new kingdom in the Ili basin. The
princes of Transoxania eagerly sought to profit by these developments
to free themselves from the Arab yoke. In 718 a joint embassy was sent
to China by _T_ughshāda, Ghūrak, Narayāna king of Kumādh, and the king
of Chaghāniān. The first three presented petitions for aid against the
Arabs, which are given in full in Chavannes’ _Documents_. _T_ughshāda
asked that the Türgesh might be ordered to attack the Arabs, Ghūrak
related the capture of Samarqand and asked for Chinese troops, Narayāna
complained of the seizure of all his treasures by the Arabs and asked
that representations might be made to induce them to remit their crushing
taxation. It is significant that the king of Chaghāniān, acting for his
suzerain, the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, did not compromise himself by
joining in these requests. But beyond “fair words” the son of Heaven took
no action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxartes, in spite
of the repeated entreaties addressed by the princes to their self-elected
suzerain.

The Türgesh, however, were not long in intervening on their own account.
Whatever opportunity the Arab government had to pacify the _S_ughdians
was lost by a succession of incompetent governors. Already in the reign
of ʿOmar II, as has been seen, they had withdrawn their allegiance from
the weak ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym. For a moment the situation seemed
to improve at the beginning of the governorship of Saʿīd “Khudhayna”
(102/720) owing to the firm handling of Samarqand by his lieutenant
Shuʿba b. _Z_uhayr. But disturbances broke out and Shuʿba was recalled,
perhaps in a vain attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seem that
the _S_ughdians appealed to the new Turkish power in the East and Su-Lu,
unable to make headway against the growing influence of China, willingly
seized the opportunity of diverting his armies into Transoxania. A small
Türgesh force was sent under Köl-chur (called by _T_abarī Kūr_s_ūl)[75]
to make common cause with the _S_ughdian rebels in the following
spring (end of 102). Saʿīd awoke to find the whole country in arms, a
Turkish force marching on Samarqand, and the local princes, with few
exceptions, aiding the invaders. The Arab commanders could not rely on
their levies and a small garrison at Qa_s_r al-Bāhilī was evacuated only
with the utmost difficulty. The tale of their relief by a small force
of volunteers is one of the most spirited narratives of adventure in
_T_abarī. But such episodes did not affect the general success of the
Turkish forces. Kūr_s_ūl continued his advance through _S_ughd without
opposition, avoiding Samarqand, until at last Saʿīd was roused by public
reproach to march against the Turks. After a small initial success, which
he refused to follow up, he was severely defeated and confined to the
neighbourhood of Samarqand. The Turks were not strong enough to undertake
a siege of the city, as the whole operation seems to have been little
more than a reconnaissance in force combined with a raiding expedition.
As the Türgesh retired, the Arab cavalry followed them up as far as
Waraghsar, the head of the canal system of _S_ughd. Ghūrak appears to
have refrained from committing himself by openly aiding the rebels, and
doubtless recognised that the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged.
From the fact that Saʿīd’s camp was pitched at Ishtīkhan, in close
proximity to him, it may even be conjectured that he outwardly supported
the Arabs.

But the new governor of ʿIrāq, ʿOmar b. Hubayra, was not the man to stand
idly by in face of the danger that threatened Khurāsān. The weakness
shown by Khudhayna and the complaints of oppression from his subjects,
were sufficient reason for his recall, and Saʿīd b. ʿAmr al-_H_arashī,
a man of very different stamp, was installed in his place. The transfer
may be placed in the late autumn of 103/721. The new governor’s first
act was to summon the rebels to submit, but a large number of nobles and
merchants, with their retainers, either fearing that they could expect
no mercy, or anxious to free themselves altogether from the Arab yoke,
prepared to emigrate to Farghāna. Ghūrak did his utmost to persuade
them to remain, but without effect; their absence would no doubt affect
the revenues, and a certain emphasis is laid on the point in _T_abarī’s
account. Leaving hostages behind, the malcontents marched towards
Farghāna and opened negotiations with the king for the occupation of
ʿI_s_ām. The majority settled in the interval at Khujanda, but other
parties actually entered Farghāna, and one body at least occupied a
fortified position on the Zarafshān. Al-_H_arashī followed up his demands
by marching into _S_ughd and encamped near Dabūsia, where he was with
difficulty persuaded to stay until sufficient contingents arrived. On
advancing, he was met by a messenger from the king of Farghāna, who,
outwardly professing to assist the _S_ughdians, had secretly decided to
rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs against them. Al-_H_arashī
eagerly seized the opportunity and pressed forward, receiving the
allegiance of Ushrūsana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged by
their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or to submit, decided
to risk a siege in Khujanda, trusting to the protection of the king
of Farghāna. But when Saʿīd set about the siege in earnest, and they
realised that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on unexpectedly
easy terms. Saʿīd divided them, placing the nobles and merchants in a
camp apart from the soldiers. By the execution of Thābit, a noble from
Ishtīkhan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which he massacred the
nobles and the troops, sparing the merchants, who numbered four hundred,
only in order to squeeze them of their wealth. _T_abarī’s account very
thinly veils al-_H_arashī’s responsibility for this wanton act of
atrocious cruelty, which could not fail to embitter the feelings of the
whole population of Transoxania. It is curious that the Persian _T_abarī
(Zotenberg IV. 268) has an entirely different story, which is found in
none of the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped eventually took
refuge with the Khāqān of the Türgesh, where they formed a regiment
(no doubt continually recruited from new emigrants) which particularly
distinguished itself in the war against the Arabs[76].

The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the spring and summer of
722 (end of 103, beginning of 104), though the chronology here, and
indeed for all this period, is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of
the fortresses in _S_ughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series
of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the effect of
the news from Khujanda in stiffening the resistance to the Arabs. The
first fortress to be attacked was that of Abghar, in which a band of
the emigrants had settled. The attack was entrusted to Sulaymān b.
Abiʾs-Sarī, with an army composed largely of native levies from Bukhārā,
Khwārizm, and Shūmān, accompanied by their princes. Sulaymān persuaded
the dihqān to surrender, and sent him to al-_H_arashī, who at first
treated him well in order to counteract the effect of the massacre of
Khujanda, but put him to death after recapturing Kish and Rabinjān. The
most inaccessible fortress and the crowning example of Al-_H_arashī’s
perfidy were left to the last. The dihqān Subuqrī still held out in the
fortress of Khuzar, to the south of Nasaf; unable to take it by force,
Al-_H_arashī sent Musarbal b. Al-Khirrīt, a personal friend of Subuqrī,
to offer him a pardon. On his surrender, he was sent to Merv and put to
death, although the amnesty, it is said, had been confirmed by ʿOmar b.
Hubayra.

The whole of _S_ughd was thus once more in the hands of the Arabs. The
nearer districts, Khwārizm and Bukhārā, had remained loyal and the Oxus
basin seems to have been unaffected. But to make a solitude and call it
peace did not suit the aims of the Arab government and Al-_H_arashī found
that his “policy of thorough” only provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse
for superseding him. During the winter, therefore, he was replaced by
Muslim b. Saʿīd al-Kilābī, who, as the grandson of Aslam b. Zurʿa, came
of a house long familiar with Khurāsān. The danger of the movement of
revolt spreading to the Iranians of Khurāsān seems to have preoccupied
the Arab government during all this period. Saʿīd Khudhayna had poisoned
the too-influential _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī on suspicion of rousing the
Persians against the government and that it was felt even in Ba_s_ra
may be seen from Ibn Hubayra’s advice to his new governor, “Let your
chamberlain be one who can make peace with your mawālī.” Muslim, in fact,
favoured the Persians and did all in his power to appoint officials
acceptable to them, the Mazdean Bahrām Sīs, for example, being appointed
Marzubān of Merv[77]. But all such measures were merely palliatives
and could not materially affect the growing discontent in _S_ughd and
_T_ukhāristān. During his first year of office it is recorded (if the
narrative is not, as Wellhausen thinks, a duplicate of the raid on
Farghāna in the following year) that Muslim marched across the river
but was met and pushed back into Khurāsān by a Turkish army, narrowly
escaping disaster. It is not improbable that the local forces were again
assisted by Türgesh on this occasion. In the following year, however,
before the close of 105, a second expedition gained some success at
Afshīna, near Samarqand. Meanwhile Hishām had succeeded Yazīd II as
Caliph, and ʿOmar b. Hubayra, whose Qaysite leanings were too pronounced,
was recalled in favour of Khālid b. ʿAbdullah al-Qasrī of Bajīla. The
transfer took place most probably in March (724), though another account
places it some months later. Muslim was now preparing an expedition into
Farghāna, but the Yemenite troops at Balkh held back partly through
dislike of the campaign and doubtless expecting the governor’s recall.
Na_s_r b. Sayyār was sent with a Mu_d_arite force to use compulsion;
the mutinous Yemenites were defeated at Barūqān and unwillingly joined
the army. It is noteworthy that troops from Chaghāniān fought alongside
Na_s_r in this engagement. Before leaving Bukhārā Muslim learned that
he was to be superseded, at the same time receiving orders to continue
his expedition. Four thousand Azdites, however, took the opportunity of
withdrawing. The remainder, accompanied by _S_ughdian levies, marched
into Farghāna, crossed the Jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting
down the fruit trees and devastating the land. Here news was brought
that Khāqān was advancing against them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a
retreat. The Arabic accounts graphically describe the headlong flight of
the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages, the next day they
crossed the Wādī Sabū_h_, closely pursued by the Türgesh; a detachment,
largely composed of mawālī, which encamped separately, was attacked and
suffered heavy losses, the brother of Ghūrak being amongst the killed.
After a further eight days’ march, continually harassed by the light
Turkish horse, they were reduced to burning all the baggage, to the
value of a million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes the following day,
they found the way barred by the forces of Shāsh and Farghāna, together
with the _S_ughdians who had escaped from Saʿīd al-_H_arashī, but the
desperate and thirsty troops, hemmed in by the Türgesh from behind, cut
their way through. The rearguard made a stand, but lost its commander. At
length the remnants of the army reached Khujanda, where ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān
b. Nuʿaym took command on behalf of Asad b. ʿAbdullah, and made good his
retreat to Samarqand.

This disaster, which is known as the “Day of Thirst,” marks a period in
the history of the Arab conquests. It was practically the last aggressive
expedition of the Arabs into Transoxania for fifteen years, but of
much greater importance was the blow which it struck at Arab prestige.
The rôles were reversed; from now onwards the Arabs found themselves
on the defensive and were gradually ousted from almost every district
across the Oxus. No wonder, therefore, that the memory of the “Day of
Thirst” rankled even long after it had been avenged[78]. According to
the Arab tradition, the Türgesh armies were led on this occasion not by
Su-Lu himself, but by one of his sons. Unfortunately the accounts of
Su-Lu in such Chinese works as have been translated are silent on his
Western expeditions, and the Arab historians are our only authorities.
The immediate result of the Arab defeat, not only in _S_ughd but in
_T_ukhāristān and the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude
of passive resistance to the Arabs to the point at which it only needed
active support to break into a general conflagration. From this time,
if not before, the subject princes regarded the Türgesh as the agents
of their deliverance, commissioned by China in response to the urgent
entreaties they had addressed to the Emperor for aid in their struggle.
We find this actually expressed in a letter sent three years later by
the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, which is, in Chavannes’ words “but one long
cry of distress”[79]. “I am loaded with heavy taxation by the Arabs;
in truth, their oppression and our misery are extreme. If I do not
obtain the help of the (Chinese) Kagan ... my kingdom will certainly be
destroyed and dismembered.... I have been told that the Celestial Kagan
has given this order to the Kagan of the Türgesh: To you I delegate the
affairs of the Far West; you must at once send soldiers to drive out
the Arabs.” The point of view here expressed is of course that of the
ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of their authority is
understandable. Besides making allowance for some natural exaggeration,
it would be dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by the
people. In all probability, if we may judge from historical analogies,
there was also a pro-Arab party in Sogdiana, who felt that the best
interests of the country lay, not in an opposition whose final issue
could scarcely be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters as
far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab administration was that by
alternately giving and refusing co-operation on its side, it drove its
supporters in the end to make common cause with its opponents.

But though the situation was steadily deteriorating the decisive moment
had not yet come. The new governor, Asad b. ʿAbdullah, seems to have
seen something of the danger though factional feeling was running so
high that the administration was almost helpless in face of it. He
tried to continue Muslim’s policy of conciliation by appointing agents
of known probity. Tawba b. Abī Usayd, a mawlā who had been intendant
for Muslim, and who “treated the people fairly, made himself easily
accessible, dealt uprightly with the army and maintained their supplies,”
he persuaded to remain in office under him. Hāniʾ b. Hāniʾ, the financial
intendant at Samarqand, was unpopular; he was recalled and Al-_H_asan
b. Abiʾl-ʿAmarra_t_a of Kinda, who was in sympathy with the mawālī,
appointed in his place. With him was associated Thābit Qu_t_na, who had
been a leader of some repute under Saʿīd Khudhayna, “gallant warrior,
distinguished poet, confidant of Yazīd b. Muhallab, and universally
popular”[80]. Still more significant is the fact that one of Asad’s
earliest actions was to renew the practice, neglected since the days
of ʿOmar II, of sending an embassy to the Chinese court. As before,
however, the Arabs resented the favour shown to the Persians, and the
military weakness of Ibn Abiʾl-ʿAmarra_t_a roused them to open anger.
Strong Turkish forces, probably guerilla bands swollen by refugees
and malcontents from the wasted districts, spread over the country
and appeared even before Samarqand. The governor made some show of
opposition, but avoided coming to grips with them, thus intensifying his
unpopularity.

Samarqand indeed was gradually becoming more and more isolated, but no
assistance could be given from Khurāsān. During his three years of office
Asad’s attention was wholly engaged with the situation in _T_ukhāristān
and the South. Even here his constant expeditions, to Gharjistān,
Khuttal, and elsewhere, met with no success. Worse still, in 108/726 he
found his forces in Khuttal opposed by the Khāqān with his Türgesh. The
princes of _T_ukhāristān had taken to heart the lessons of the “Day of
Thirst”, and the powerful chief who had already all but driven the Arabs
out of Sogdiana was now called in to expel them from the Oxus basin as
well. Asad visited his failure on the Mu_d_arites, whom he may have
suspected of treachery, but the indignation called out by his treatment
of such men as Na_s_r b. Sayyār, ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym, Sawra b.
Al-_H_urr, and Al-Bakhtarī, made his recall inevitable. Nor had his
measures removed the distrust and hatred of the subject peoples. The land
was wasted and desolate[81], the crushing taxation was not lightened, and
all Persian governors were not of the stamp of Tawba; many of them were
but too ready to rival their Arab rulers in greed and cruelty. Asad may
have gained the friendship of many dihqāns[82], but that was an easier
matter than to placate the population. In such an atmosphere it was only
to be expected that Shīʿite and ʿAbbāsid propaganda, though actively
combated by the administration, found a fertile field among the Muslim
converts in Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān, and was already beginning
to undermine the whole fabric of Arab government.

For a moment the hopes of a radical change of policy entertained by the
mawālī and the clearer-sighted Arabs were raised to the highest pitch by
the appointment (in 109) of Ashras b. ʿAbdullah as-Sulami, accompanied by
the separation of Khurāsān from Khālid al-Qasrī’s province of ʿIrāq. It
is unnecessary to recapitulate here the far-reaching concessions by which
he hoped to secure, and actually did for a time secure the allegiance of
the _S_ughdians, or the methods by which the local princes, especially
Ghūrak, succeeded in checking the movement[83]. It is generally assumed
that the hostility of Ghūrak was due to the serious fall in revenue
which would result. Though this was doubtless the plea put forward and
accepted by Ashras it can scarcely have been the true issue. Ghūrak’s
aim was not to maintain himself on good terms with the Arab governors
but to recover his independence. If once the people became “Arabs” all
hope of success must have been lost. It was a game with high stakes and
Ghūrak won. It must not be overlooked, however, that the account as we
have it is traditional and may often be mistaken on the sequence of
cause and effect. The astonishing reversal of the measures adopted by
Ashras is more probably to be explained by pressure from above, not from
below, and our tradition may really present only the popular view of
the Caliph Hishām’s reorganization of the financial administration[84].
The Arabs resorted to brutal methods to wring the taxes from the new
converts, and with incredible blindness selected the dihqāns for
special indignities. It is not unlikely that Narshakhī’s story of the
martyrdom of native Muslims in Bukhārā is connected with this event,
though there are many other possible explanations, such as, for example,
an attempted _H_ārithite movement (see below, p. 76 f.) The reaction
swung the whole population of Transoxania, dihqāns and peasantry alike,
into open rebellion. The first small party of emigrants who quitted
Samarqand, although supported by a few Arabs, were induced to surrender
and return[85], but within a few months the dreaded Khāqān with his
Türgesh had joined forces with the rebels and swept the Arabs across the
Oxus. Even Bukhārā was lost[86] and only Samarqand with two minor posts
on the Zarafshān, Kamarja and Dabūsia, held out. Ghūrak, however, still
supported the Arabs, as Samarqand, although besieged, seems to have been
in no danger, while his son Mukhtār, doubtless to keep a footing in the
opposite camp, joined with the Türgesh.

The pressing danger sobered the Arabs and temporarily united all parties
and factions. The army was concentrated at Āmul but for three months was
unable to cross the river in the face of the combined native and Türgesh
armies. A small body under Qa_t_an b. Qutayba which had already crossed
and fortified itself before the arrival of the Turks was beleaguered. The
Turkish cavalry even made raids on Khurāsān with an excess of boldness
which was punished by a mounted force under Thābit Qu_t_na. At length
Ashras got his forces across and, joining with Qa_t_an b. Qutayba,
advanced on Paykand. The enemy cut off the water supply, and had it not
been for the gallantry and self-sacrifice of _H_ārith b. Surayj, Thābit
Qu_t_na, and their companions, an even greater and more irretrievable
“Day of Thirst” had resulted. In spite of their weakness, Qa_t_an and the
cavalry of Qays and Tamīm charged the enemy and forced them back, so that
Ashras was able to continue his advance towards Bukhārā. In the heavy
fighting the Muslim forces were divided, Ashras and Qa_t_an gave each
other up for lost, and Ghūrak judged that the time had come to throw in
his lot with the Turks. Two days later, however, the armies were reunited
and on the retiral of the Turks encamped at Bawādara outside the walls of
Bukhārā, whence they prepared to besiege the city. Ghūrak also retrieved
his error and rejoined Ashras. The Khāqān withdrew towards Samarqand,
but sat down before Kamarja, expecting to take it by storm in a few
days at the most. The Arabic narratives of these events are confused in
several places, which has given rise to many incorrect statements, such
as that Ghūrak was beleaguered with the Arabs in Kamarja and that the
garrison consisted of Qa_t_an and his forces. Kamarja was not in the
neighbourhood of Paykand, as Wellhausen states, but a few farsakhs west
of Samarqand[87]. When the garrison would not yield to assault Khāqān
tried other methods. Accompanying his expedition was Khusrū the son of
Pērōz and grandson of Yazdigird, heir of the Sāsānid kings. This prince
was sent to parley with the garrison, but when he claimed the restoration
of his kingdom and promised them an amnesty, it is not surprising that
the Arabs indignantly refused to hear him. Nor would the appearance of a
Sāsānid prince evoke much enthusiasm amongst the Iranians of Transoxania.
As the Sāsānid house had taken refuge in China, however, the presence of
Khusrū might be taken as an indication that the rebels were receiving
encouragement from China also, though the Chinese records are silent on
this expedition. Khāqān’s second proposal, that he should hire the Arabs
as mercenaries, was rejected as derisively as the first. The siege was
then pressed with renewed vigour, both sides putting their prisoners and
hostages to death, but after fifty-eight days Khāqān, on the advice of
the son of Ghūrak and the other _S_ughdian princes, allowed the garrison
to transfer either to Samarqand or Dabūsia. On their choosing the latter,
the terms were faithfully carried out after an exchange of hostages.

The fame of the defence of Kamarja spread far and wide, but it brought
little relief to the pressure on the Arabs in Transoxania. Even Khwārizm
was affected by the movement of revolt, but at the first symptoms of open
rebellion it was crushed by the local Muslims, probably Arabs settled
in the district, with the aid of a small force despatched by Ashras.
The reference made in _T_abarī to assistance given to the rebels by the
Turks is probably to be discounted, as is done by Ibn al-Athīr. It is of
course quite possible that the movement was instigated by the Türgesh,
though no such explanation is necessary, but if any Turks were engaged
they were probably local nomadic tribes. Ashras seems to have remained
before Bukhārā during the winter, possibly in Paykand; the Türgesh
probably withdrew towards Shāsh and Farghāna.

In the following year, 730/111-112[88], the attacks on the army of
Ashras were renewed. The course of events can only be gathered from the
accounts given of the difficulties experienced by the new governor,
Junayd b. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān al-Murrī, in joining the army before Bukhārā.
His guide advised him to levy a force from Zamm and the neighbouring
districts before crossing the Oxus but Junayd refused, only to find
himself after crossing put to the necessity of calling on Ashras for a
bodyguard of cavalry. This force narrowly escaped disaster on its way to
meet Junayd and fought a second severe engagement on the return journey
before reaching Paykand. The enemy are variously described as “men of
Bukhārā and _S_ughd” and “Turks and _S_ughdians”; it may therefore be
assumed that they were the same forces against whom Ashras had fought the
previous year. Wellhausen is probably correct in supposing that Ashras
was practically beleaguered, though not in Bukhārā. The recapture of this
city and the retiral of Khāqān took place shortly after Junayd’s arrival,
in circumstances which are not described[89]. The attitude of Tugshāda
during this episode is not recorded. It is practically certain, however,
that he remained in Bukhārā, and after the reconquest was able to make
his peace with the Arabs, probably on the excuse of _force majeure_. At
all events he retained his position, possibly because Junayd thought it
impolitic in the face of the situation to victimise the nobles in the
reconquered territories and thus provoke a more stubborn resistance in
the rest of the country. The Arabs seem to have followed up the Turks
towards Samarqand, probably to relieve the garrison; the two armies met
again at Zarmān, seven farsakhs from Samarqand, where the Arabs claimed
a success, one of their prisoners being a nephew of Khāqān. From _S_ughd
the army marched to Tirmidh where Junayd halted for two months in the
friendly atmosphere of Chaghāniān before returning to Merv. His intention
was no doubt to make arrangements for the pacification or reconquest of
_T_ukhāristān and Khuttal; in the following year his troops were actually
engaged in this direction when the Türgesh invasion of _S_ughd forced him
to change his plans. Balādhurī quotes Abū ʿUbayda for the statement that
Junayd reconquered certain districts in _T_ukhāristān which had revolted.

How lightly even yet factional feeling was slumbering was shown after the
return of the army, when the Bāhilites of Balkh had a chance to retaliate
on Na_s_r b. Sayyār for their discomfiture at Barūqān. Though Junayd was
prompt to punish the offending governor, the incident throws a strong
light on one cause of the weakness of the Arabs in these campaigns.

Early in 731/112-113, the Türgesh and _S_ughdians gathered their forces
for the investment of Samarqand. Ghūrak now openly joined the Khāqān.
Sawra b. Al-_H_urr, the governor of Samarqand, unable to face the enemy
in the field, sent an urgent message to Junayd for assistance. The
governor hastily recalled his troops, but crossed the river without
waiting for them against the advice of his generals. “No governor of
Khurāsān,” said al-Mujashshar b. Muzā_h_im, one of the ablest of the Arab
commanders, “should cross the river with less than fifty thousand men.”
Accompanied only by a small force, Junayd reached Kish, where he raised
some local levies and prepared to march on Samarqand. The enemy in the
meantime, after blocking up the water supplies on his road, interposed
their forces between Samarqand and the army of relief. Junayd thereupon
decided to follow the direct route across the Shāwdār mountains in
the hope of avoiding an engagement, but when only four farsakhs from
Samarqand was surprised in the defiles by Khāqān. The advance-guard
was driven in and the main body engaged in a furious struggle in which
both sides fought to a standstill. The Arabs, hemmed in on all sides,
were forced to entrench; stragglers, refugees, and baggage, collected
near Kish, were attacked by a detachment of Turks and severely handled.
Khāqān renewed his attacks on the camp the next day, all but overwhelming
Junayd, and settled down thereafter to beleaguer him. In this predicament
there was only one course open to Junayd. Had his force perished,
Samarqand would certainly have fallen in the end and two disasters taken
the place of one. He therefore adopted the more prudent, if unheroic,
course of ordering Sawra to leave a skeleton garrison in Samarqand and
march out to join him by way of the river: Sawra, however, took the short
cut across the mountains, and was actually within four miles of Junayd,
when the Turkish forces bore down on him. The battle lasted into the heat
of the day, when the Turks, on Ghūrak’s advice it is said, having first
set the grass on fire, drew up so as to shut Sawra off from the water.
Maddened by heat and thirst, the Arabs charged the enemy and broke their
ranks, only to perish miserably in the fire, Turks and Muslims together.
The scattered remnants were pursued by the Turkish cavalry and of twelve
thousand men scarcely a thousand escaped. While the enemy were engaged
with Sawra, Junayd freed himself from his perilous position in the
defiles, though not without severe fighting, and completed his march to
Samarqand. _T_abarī gives also a variant account of the “Battle of the
Pass,” the main difference in which is the inclusion of the Jabghu on the
side of the Turks. In view of the Arab expeditions into _T_ukhāristān, it
is improbable that the Jabghu, even if he was present personally, which
is doubtful, was accompanied by any of his troops. The Persian _T_abarī
also contains an entirely different version of the Battle of the Pass and
the fate of Sawra. The original version is amply attested by contemporary
poets, who show no mercy to Junayd. Whatever credit the Arabs gained
in this battle is reflected on Na_s_r b. Sayyār and the mawālī. Junayd
remained at Samarqand for some time, recuperating his forces, while
couriers were sent to Hishām with the news of the disaster. The Caliph
immediately ordered twenty thousand reinforcements from Ba_s_ra and Kūfa
to be sent to Khurāsān, together with a large number of weapons and a
draft on the treasury, at the same time giving Junayd a free hand in
enlistment.

The Turks, disappointed in their attack on Samarqand, withdrew to
Bukhārā, where they laid siege to Qa_t_an b. Qutayba. Here they were also
on the natural lines of communication between Samarqand and Khurāsān.
Junayd held a council, and of three alternatives, either to remain in
Samarqand and await reinforcements, or to retire on Khurāsān _via_ Kish
and Zamm, or to attack the enemy, chose the last. But the morale of the
Arabs was sadly shaken; a garrison of eight hundred men for Samarqand
was scraped together only by granting a considerable increase in their
pay, while the troops openly regarded the decision to face Khāqān and
the Turkish hordes as equivalent to courting destruction. Junayd now
marched with the utmost circumspection, however, and easily defeated a
small body of the enemy in a skirmish near Karmīnīa. The following day
Khāqān attacked his rearguard near _T_awāwīs (on the edge of the oasis
of Bukhārā), but the attack had been foreseen and was beaten off. As it
was now well into November, the Türgesh were compelled to withdraw from
Sogdiana, while Junayd entered Bukhārā in triumph on the festival of
Mihrjān. In Chaghāniān he was joined by the reinforcements, whom he sent
on to Samarqand, the remainder of the troops returning to their winter
quarters.

Junayd seems to have been content with saving Samarqand and Bukhārā. As
no further expeditions are recorded of his two remaining years of office
it must be assumed that the situation in _S_ughd remained unchanged and
that the Türgesh irruptions also were suspended. Though the Arabs still
held Samarqand and the territories of Bukhārā and Kish, they were in
all probability confined to these, while in the southern basin their
authority hardly extended beyond Balkh and Chaghāniān. Both sides may
have awaited the first move by the other, but were surprised by the
appearance of a new factor, which threatened the existence of Arab
sovereignty in the Far East more seriously than any external danger. It
is noteworthy that in his last year of office (115/733) Junayd resumed
relations with the Chinese court. The Turkish title of the leader of the
embassy, Mo-se-lan Tarkan, suggests that none of the ambassadors were
actually Arabs, but that the governor had commissioned some dignitaries
from the subject states to represent the Arab government. The only
embassy recorded in this year from a native state, however, came from
Khuttal. In the same year Khurāsān was visited by a severe drought
and famine, and to provide for the needs of Merv, Junayd commandeered
supplies from all the surrounding districts. This, added to the military
disasters of the last few years and the insinuations of Shīʿite
propaganda, provoked open discontent in the district which had hitherto
been outwardly faithful to Merv, namely the principalities of Lower
_T_ukhāristān. The leader of the malcontents was Al-_H_ārith b. Surayj,
who was flogged in consequence by the governor of Balkh. The discontent
flared into open revolt on the death of Junayd in Mu_h_arram 716 (Feb.
734). _H_ārith, assisted by the princes and people of Jūzjān, Fāryāb, and
_T_ālaqān, marched on Balkh and captured it from Na_s_r b. Sayyār. The
versions leave it uncertain whether _H_ārith defeated Na_s_r and then
captured the city or whether he entered the city first and beat off an
attempt at recapture by Na_s_r. (Wellhausen’s reference to the Oxus is
due to his so misunderstanding the “river of Balkh” in _T_ab. 1560. 2.
That it refers here, as frequently, to the Dehas river is clear from the
distance to the city (2 farsakhs, whereas the Oxus lay twelve farsakhs
from Balkh) as well as from the mention of the bridge of ʿA_t_ā.) From
Balkh he moved against the new governor ʿĀ_s_im b. ʿAbdullah al-Hilālī,
at Merv, capturing Merv-Rūdh on the way. ʿĀ_s_im found a large section
of the inhabitants in league with _H_ārith, but on his threatening to
evacuate Merv and to call for Syrian troops, the local forces rallied
round him. At the first reverse, the princes of Lower _T_ukhāristān
deserted _H_ārith, whose army fell from sixty thousand to three thousand.
He was thus reduced to making terms with ʿĀsim, but early in the
following year renewed his revolt. ʿĀsim, hearing that Asad b. ʿAbdullah
was on the way as his successor, began to intrigue with _H_ārith against
him. The plan miscarried, however; _H_ārith seized the governor and held
him to ransom, so that Asad on his arrival found the rebels in possession
of all Eastern Khurāsān, and Merv threatened both from the East and from
the South. Sending a force under ʿAbdur Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym towards Merv
Rūdh to keep _H_ārith’s main body in check, he marched himself against
the rebel forces at Āmul and Zamm. These took refuge in the citadel of
Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the insurgents in this quarter,
continued his march on Balkh. Meanwhile _H_ārith seems to have retreated
before ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān towards Balkh and thence across the Oxus, where he
laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower _T_ukhāristān returned to its allegiance;
on the other hand _H_ārith was now supported not only by the kings of
Khuttal and Nasaf, but also, as appears from later events, by the Jabghu
of _T_ukhāristān. The government troops were unable to cross the Oxus
in the face of _H_ārith’s army; finding, however, that the garrison was
well able to defend itself, they returned to Balkh, while _H_ārith,
after falling out with the king of Khuttal, seems to have retired into
_T_ukhāristān. Here, following the example of Mūsā b. Khāzim at Tirmidh,
he made a safe retreat for himself in Badakhshān.

The motives of _H_ārith’s rebellion have been most variously estimated.
In spite of the unctuous sentiments which he is represented as uttering
on all occasions, it is hard to find in him the “pious Muslim, ascetic
and reformer” whom van Vloten too sharply contrasts with the government
officials[90]. In spite too of the prominent position given to him in
the Arabic chronicles, it may even be questioned whether he and his
small personal following were not rather the tools than the leaders of
the elements making for the overthrow of the Umayyad administration in
Khurāsān. At all events the weakness of his hold over his temporary
followers is much more striking than his transient success. Further
evidence of this is given in a most important narrative prefaced by
_T_abarī to his account of Asad’s expedition into _S_ughd. Except for the
scantiest notices, the Arabic historians have nothing to say regarding
the effects of the war in Khurāsān on the situation in Transoxania.
Wellhausen’s conclusion (based apparently on _T_abarī 1890. 6) that
“_H_ārith first unfurled the black flag in Transoxania in the last
year of Junayd” is scarcely tenable. There is further no evidence at
all for his assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands of the
_H_ārithites, especially as Bukhārā remained loyal to the administration.
That Asad’s expedition was not, in fact, directed against _H_ārith
follows in the clearest possible manner from the narrative referred to
(_T_ab. 1585. 6-16).

    “Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm, and when
    he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-Shaybānī, one of
    _H_ārith’s followers, who was in Bādhkar (the citadel of Zamm),
    saying “That which you have disowned in your own people is only
    their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women ...
    _nor to the conquest by the unbelievers of such as Samarqand_.
    Now I am on my way to Samarqand and I take an oath before God
    that no harm shall befall you on my initiative, but you shall
    have friendly and honourable treatment and pardon, you and
    those with you....” So Al-Haytham came out to join him on the
    condition of pardon which he had given him, and Asad pardoned
    him, and Al-Haytham marched with him to Samarqand and Asad gave
    them double pay.”

The expedition therefore was obviously against unbelievers. That the
whole of _S_ughd was lost to the Arabs is clear from the fact that Asad
found it necessary to take provisions for the army with him from Bukhārā.
He was not successful in recapturing the city, however, and attempted no
more than the damming of the canal sluices at Waraghsar.

The fate of the garrison of Samarqand has thus been passed over in
silence, unless, perhaps, it is hinted at in Asad’s reference to the
capture of Muslim women. Whether Ghūrak recaptured it with his own troops
or with the aid of the Türgesh, it can scarcely be doubted that he had
taken advantage of the dissensions in Khurāsān to realise his ambition
and at last drive the Arabs out of his capital. Of all the conquests
of Qutayba beyond the Oxus, Bukhārā, Chaghāniān, and perhaps Kish
alone remained to the Arabs. A confirmatory detail is the cessation of
_S_ughdian embassies to China between 731 and 740: now that independence
(even if under Türgesh suzerainty) had been won again, there was no need
to invoke Chinese support. Negative evidence of the same kind is afforded
by the absence of any Arab embassy during the same period. Had the Arabs
been in possession of _S_ughd, it is practically certain that Asad,
as he had done before, would have renewed relations with the Chinese
court. Against this view may be set the statement in _T_ab. 1613. 5 that
Khāqān was preparing an army to invest Samarqand at the time of his
assassination. This report is, however, from its nature untrustworthy,
and is contradicted by the presence of the king of _S_ughd with
_S_ughdian troops in the Türgesh army in 119/737 as well as by Na_s_r b.
Sayyār’s expedition to Samarqand two years later. _S_ughd thus enjoyed
once more a brief period of independence. In 737 or 738 Ghūrak died and
his kingdom was divided amongst his heirs. He was succeeded at Samarqand
by his son Tu-ho (? _T_arkhūn), formerly prince of Kabudhān. Another son
Me-chuʾo (? Mukhtār) was already king of Māyamurgh, while the king of
Ishtīkhan in 742 was a certain Ko-lo-pu-lo who may perhaps be identified
with Ghūrak’s brother Afarūn[91].

The year after the campaigns against _H_ārith, 118/736, was devoted by
Asad to the re-organisation of his province, including a measure which,
it seems, he had already projected in his first term of office. This was
the removal of the provincial capital from Merv to Balkh[92]. Since no
other governor of Khurāsān followed his example we must seek the motive
for the innovation either in the contemporary situation in Khurāsān
and Transoxania or in Asad’s personal views. Explanations based on the
former are not hard to find. Asad, on taking office, had been faced with
a serious situation both in Lower _T_ukhāristān and across the river. He
had obviously to establish a strong point _d’appui_. The loyalty of the
garrison at Merv was not above suspicion but the garrison at Balkh was
composed of Syrian troops, who could be trusted to the uttermost[93].
Merv was also less convenient for reaching _T_ukhāristān, which was at
the moment the main area of operations. More important still, perhaps,
Balkh was the centre from which all disturbances spread in Eastern
Khurāsān, as in the revolt of Nēzak and the recent attempt of _H_ārith.
As the holding of Balkh had enabled Qutayba to forestall Nēzak, it is
possible that Asad felt that in Balkh he would be in a position to check
all similar movements at the beginning. Other considerations may also
have disposed him to take this view. Balkh was the traditional capital
and on it, as we have seen, was focussed the local sentiment of Eastern
Khurāsān. Merv, on the other hand, had always been the capital of the
foreigners, of the Sāsānians before the Arabs. Asad’s personal friendship
with the dihqāns may have given him some insight into the moral effect
which would follow from the transference of the administration to the
centre of the national life. Still greater would this effect be when the
rebuilding was carried out not by the Arabs themselves but by their own
people under the supervision of the Barmak, the hereditary priest-ruler
of the ancient shrine. Quite apart from this, however, the rebuilding
of Balkh was an event of the greatest significance, and once restored
it soon equalled, if it did not eclipse, its rival Merv in size and
importance. While the new city was being built, the army was employed in
expeditions into _T_ukhāristān, for the most part under the command of
Judayʿ al-Karmānī, who achieved some successes against the followers of
_H_ārith and even succeeded in capturing their fortress in Badakhshān.
Other raids were undertaken by the governor himself, but without results
of military importance.

Asad now planned a more ambitious expedition against Khuttal, partly in
retaliation for the assistance given to _H_ārith, partly, it may be, to
wipe off an old score. The chronology presents some difficulties at this
point. _T_abarī relates two expeditions into Khuttal in the same year
119/737, both from the same source, but that which is undoubtedly the
earlier is dated towards the close of the year (Rama_d_ān = September).
Wellhausen avoids the difficulty by referring this expedition to 118,
reckoning back from the appointment of Na_s_r b. Sayyār, the data
for which are full and unimpeachable. This would seem the obvious
solution were it not that the date given in the Chinese records for
the assassination of Su-Lu, 738[94], agrees perfectly with _T_abarī’s
dating of the Battle of Kharīstān in Dec. 737. The presence of Asad
on the second expedition would then hang together with the “somewhat
legendary” narrative of the Mihrjān feast. There seems reason, therefore,
for dating this expedition in 120/738 and regarding it as having been
despatched by Asad, though not actually accompanied by him. _T_abarī
fortunately preserves also a short notice of the situation in Khuttal.
The heir of as-Sabal, whose name is to be read as Al-Hanash, from the
Chinese transcription Lo-kin-tsie[95], had fled to China, possibly on
account of factional disturbances. On his deathbed as-Sabal appointed a
regent, Ibn As-Sāʿijī, to govern the country until Al-Hanash could be
restored. The moment was certainly opportune for making an expedition and
Asad at first carried all before him. On his first appearance, however,
Ibn As-Sāʿijī had appealed for aid to Su-Lu, who was at his capital
Nawākath (on the Chu). The Khāqān, with a small mounted force including
the _S_ughdian refugees, marched from Sūyāb (near Tokmak, on the Chu)
to Khuttal in seventeen days, only to find Asad, warned of his approach
by the regent, who was endeavouring to play both sides off against each
other, in precipitate retreat. The baggage train had been despatched in
advance under Ibrāhīm b. ʿĀ_s_im with a guard of Arabs and native troops
from Chaghāniān but the main body was overtaken by the Turks as it was
crossing the river and suffered severe losses. Asad, considering himself
safe with the river between his army and the enemy, encamped and sent
orders to Ibrāhīm to halt and entrench his position. The Turks, however,
were able to effect a crossing; after an unsuccessful assault on Asad’s
camp, they hastened to overtake the richer prize while the governor’s
troops were too worn out to protect it. By sending a party under cover
to fall on the troops of Chaghāniān from the rear while he himself
attacked in front, the Khāqān forced an entrance into Ibrāhīm’s camp.
Chāghān Khudāh, faithful to the last, himself fell with the greater part
of his forces but the remainder of the garrison were saved by the timely
arrival of Asad. According to the main account, the Arabs were allowed
to withdraw to Balkh without further serious fighting. A variant account
given by _T_abarī relates an unsuccessful assault by the Türgesh on
Asad’s camp on the morning following the “Battle of the Baggage,” which
happened to be the feast of Fi_t_r (1st October 737). On the retiral of
the Arabs, the Khāqān, instead of returning to his capital with the
honours of the day, remained in _T_ukhāristān.

Here he was joined by _H_ārith, who advised him to undertake a winter
raid into Lower _T_ukhāristān while the Arab troops were disbanded,
undoubtedly in the expectation that the local princes would again unite
with him against Asad. The governor retained his army at Balkh until
the winter had set in, and in the meantime the Khāqān summoned forces
to join him from _S_ughd and the territories subject to _T_ukhāristān.
The enumeration which _T_abarī gives of the troops accompanying the
Khāqān on this expedition shows very clearly how completely Arab rule in
Transoxania and the Oxus basin had been supplanted by that of the Turks.
We are told that besides the Khāqān’s own Turkish troops and _H_ārith
with his followers there were present the Jabghu, the king of _S_ughd,
the prince of Usrūshana, and the rulers of Shāsh and Khuttal. It is
fairly certain, of course, that the list is exaggerated in so far as the
actual presence of the princes is concerned (it is in fact partially
contradicted in other parts of the narrative), but it can scarcely be
doubted that forces from some, if not all, of these principalities
were engaged. On the evening of the 9th Dhuʾl-_H_ijja (7th Dec.) news
reached Balkh that the Türgesh with their auxiliaries, numbering some
30,000, were at Jazza. Asad ordered signal fires to be lit and with the
Syrian garrison of Balkh and what other troops he could muster from
the district marched out against them. The governor of Khulm sent in a
second report that the Khāqān, having been repulsed in an attack on the
town, had marched on towards Pērōz Nakhshēr, in the neighbourhood of
Balkh. From this point the enemy, avoiding Balkh, moved on Jūzjān and
occupied the capital[96]. Instead of continuing his advance immediately,
the Khāqān halted here and sent out raiding parties of cavalry in all
directions, an action which put it beyond doubt that the immediate object
of the expedition was not the capture of Merv but the rousing of Lower
_T_ukhāristān against the Arabs. Contrary to _H_ārith’s expectations,
however, the king of Jūzjān joined with the Arabs, who marched towards
Shubūrqān by way of Sidra and Kharīstān. From the conflicting narratives
in _T_abarī, it seems that Asad surprised the Khāqān in the neighbourhood
of Kharīstān (or Sān) at a moment when his available forces amounted only
to 4,000. A furious struggle ensued, which was decided in favour of the
Arabs by an assault on the Khāqān from the rear, on the initiative of the
king of Jūzjān. It is in connection with the battle, which he describes
as if it were a set engagement in which the whole of the opposing forces
were engaged, that _T_abarī gives his list of the combatants. But as only
4,000 out of the total of 30,000 troops with the Khāqān were involved,
the list is obviously out of place and the whole narrative shows the
marks of rehandling. The Muslims gained an overwhelming success: the
Khāqān and _H_ārith, having narrowly escaped capture in the confusion,
were closely followed by Asad as far as Jazza, when a storm of rain and
snow prevented further pursuit. They were thus able to regain the Jabghu
in _T_ukhāristān, with happier fortune than the raiding parties, whose
retreat was cut off by the vigilance of Al-Karmānī, and of whom only a
single band of _S_ughdians made good their escape.

On this skirmish at Kharīstān, for it was little more, hung the fate of
Arab rule, not only in Transoxania, but possibly even in Khurāsān, at
least for the immediate future. Though the princes of Lower _T_ukhāristān
fought for Asad in the first place, there can be little doubt that a
victory for Su-Lu would have swung them back to the side of _H_ārith
and the Turks, who would then have been in a position to follow up
their attacks with the advantage of a base at Balkh, solidly supported
by the Oxus provinces. From such a danger the Arabs were saved only by
Asad’s resolution and fortunate selection of Balkh as his residence. The
account given of Hishām’s incredulity on hearing the report shows how
very serious the outlook had been and the extent to which the name of
the Khāqān had become an omen of disaster. Kharīstān was not only the
turning point in the fortunes of the Arabs in Central Asia, but gave the
signal for the downfall of the Türgesh power, which was bound up with the
personal prestige of Su-Lu. The princes of _T_ukhāristān and Transoxania
found it expedient to treat him with respect as he was returning to
Nawākath, but in his own country the dissensions long fomented in secret
by the Chinese broke out. Su-Lu was assassinated by the Baga Tarkhan
(Kūr_s_ūl); the kingdom fell to pieces. “The Turks split up and began to
raid one another,” and the _coup de grâce_ of the Khanate was delivered
at Sūyāb in 739 by the faction of Kūr_s_ūl, supported by the Chinese
and with the assistance of Al-Ishkand and contingents from Shāsh and
Farghāna[97][98]. With the collapse of the Türgesh kingdom disappeared
the last great Turkish confederation in Western Asia for more than two
centuries to come. The battle of Kharīstān assured the supremacy of
the Muslim civilisation in Sogdiana, but it could not have attained
the richness of its full development there unless all danger from the
steppes had been removed. That this security was attained was due not
to the Arabs, but to the Chinese diplomacy, which, by breaking down the
greatest external obstacle to the Muhammadan penetration of Central Asia,
brought itself face to face with the Arabs. This could scarcely have been
realised at once, however, by the Arab government, whose immediate task
was to restore its lost authority in Transoxania.


NOTES

[74] As the history of this and the following period has been given
in considerable detail by Wellhausen (Arab. Reich 280 ff.) from the
Arab point of view, it is intended in these chapters to follow only
the situation in Transoxania and the course of the Türgesh conquests,
avoiding as far as possible a simple recapitulation of familiar matter.
Thus little reference is made to the factional strife among the Arabs,
though it naturally played a very important part in limiting their power
to deal with the insurgents.

[75] See Chavannes, Documents 285, n. 3.

[76] _Cf._ _T_ab. II. 1718. 3 ff.

[77] _T_ab. 1462. 11; _cf._ 1688. 10, 1481 f.

[78] _T_ab. 1690. 16.

[79] Chav. Doc. 206 f., 293 f.

[80] Van Vloten, La Domination Arabe 28.

[81] _T_ab. 1533. 15.

[82] _T_ab. 1501. 2.

[83] Wellhausen 284 f.: van Vloten 22 f.: _T_ab. 1507 f.: Bal. 428 f.

[84] See Wellhausen 218.

[85] The variant readings in _T_ab. 1509. 11. (_cf._ Ibn al-Athīr) make
it doubtful whether the taxes were reimposed on them or not.

[86] _T_ab. 1514. 11.

[87] See Yāqūt s.v.: Barthold, Turkestan 127: and _cf._ _T_ab. 1523. 3.
The chief difficulty in _T_abarī’s text is the abrupt change at the last
word of l. 14 on p. 1516: thumma ta_h_awwala (ashrashu) ilā marjin yuqālu
lahu bawādaratun _faʿatāhum_ sabābatun ... wahum nuzūlun bikamarjata.
The context shows that it was not to Ashras that Sabāba came but to the
garrison of Kamarja with the news that the Khāqān was retiring past them
(mārrun bikum).

[88] The chronological difficulties are explained by Wellhausen 285 ff.
They are of small importance however, and it seems preferable to follow
his dates for these campaigns.

[89] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1528. 9. with 1529. 5 f. 14 f.

[90] Van Vloten, _op. cit._ 29 ff.: Wellhausen 289 ff. (_cf._ 302 f.).
Another account of _H_ārith is given by Gardīzī ap. Barthold Turkestan,
Texts pp. 1-2.

[91] Chav. Doc. 210, 136, 140; Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21. n. 8.

[92] _T_ab. 1490, 1591. 18: Wellhausen 292 and 284 n.: Barthold in
Zeitschrift für Assyriologie XXVI (1911) 261.

[93] _T_ab. 1590. 5. There does not seem to be any record of when these
Syrians were settled at Balkh.

[94] Wieger 1643: Chav. Doc. 284 f.

[95] Chav. Doc. 168.

[96] As Jūzjān is distinguished from Shubūrqān in _T_ab. 1608. 17, it
is probable that this was the town Kundurm or Qurzumān mentioned in
Yaʿqūbī’s Geog. 287.

[97] _T_ab. 1613: Chav. Doc. 83 f., 122 n. As regards the adjective
Kharlukhī applied to the Jabghu in 1612. 16, the most satisfactory
explanation is that given by Marquart, Hist. Glossen 183 f.

[98] The frequent references in the Chinese annals to the association of
Se-kin-tʾi, king of Kish, with the Türgesh raise an interesting problem.
There can be no doubt that he is the same prince as Al-Ishkand, ruler
of Nasaf, in the Arabic records. The name is Iranian and personal,
not dynastic. (See Justi’s Iranisches Namenbuch.) Al-Ishkand is first
mentioned in the account of the Battle of the Pass, (_T_ab. 1542. 8)
where he appears in command of a cavalry force on the side of the Khāqān,
though Kish and Nasaf were both in the hands of the Arabs (1545. 1). The
forces which he commanded were therefore not the ordinary local troops.
During _H_ārith’s siege of Tirmidh he received reinforcements from
Al-Ishkand, but no statement is made on the composition of his forces.
He is mentioned again as accompanying the Khāqān and the _S_ughdians in
the attack on Asad before the “Battle of the Baggage” (1597. 17-18,)
where the reading ‘I_s_pahbadh of Nasā’ is probably an error in the
tradition. Again there can be no question here of local troops from Nasaf
or Kish. In the Chinese records Se-kin-tʾi appears as the commander of an
independent force, not merely a detachment of Turks or levies from Shāsh
or Farghāna. The most reasonable conclusion is that Al-Ishkand was the
commander of the corps of _S_ughdian refugees. This would explain the
title “King of the Warriors” by which he is sometimes mentioned in the
Chinese records (Chav. Doc. 147 n. 1 and 313). The actual term (Chākar)
from which the title was derived does not appear in the Arabic histories
in this connection, but it is perhaps possible that a variant of the name
(derived from _razm_) is to be read in _T_ab. 1614. 2 for the meaningless
“razābin al-Kissī.” In 1609. 15 a force of “Bābīya” is mentioned along
with the _S_ughdians, and the name, though unrecognisable, probably
refers to some forces connected with _S_ughd. Wellhausen’s conclusion
that the _S_ughdians and “Bābīya” formed part of the personal following
of _H_ārith b. Surayj seems to force the connection in the text too far
(_h_amala ʾl-_h_ārithu waman maʿahu min ahliʾs-sughdi wal-bābīyati). On
the other hand, since al-Ishkand appears as the ally of _H_ārith, we
may conclude that some understanding existed between the latter and the
_S_ughdians (and therefore the Turks) at the time of his revolt. It is
probable that the _S_ughdian corps assisted in the recovery of Samarqand
from the Arabs.




V. THE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA.


The reaction produced by the downfall of the Türgesh power was manifested
in Transoxania in the first place by an increased regard for China. The
princes had found the Türgesh yoke no less galling in the end than that
of the Arabs[99]; the country was as wasted and impoverished by their
continual raids as it had been under the latter. The profitable native
and transit trade, the source of the entire wealth of the cities, must
have shrunk to negligible proportions if it had not wholly ceased. All
classes of the people therefore were weary of war and sought only a
peace consonant with their self-respect. For the attainment of these
aims it was vain to look to China; the granting of bombastic titles
to a few princes brought neither comfort nor aid. A final opportunity
was thus offered to wise statesmanship to swing the whole country
round to the Arabs almost without a blow. For two years, however, the
situation seemed to remain much as it was, except for an expedition into
Khuttal, probably on the pretext of assisting the ruling house against
a usurper from Bamiyān. Nevertheless some progress had been made by the
administration in regaining the prestige it had lost. This was due not
merely to the effect of the victories over _H_ārith and the Türgesh, but
even more to Asad’s personal relations with the dihqāns. He had, as we
have seen, gratified the national pride of the people of _T_ukhāristān by
transferring the seat of power from Merv, the capital of the foreigners,
to Balkh, the centre of their national life. As had been the case even
in his first term of office, he was able to attract to his side many of
the more influential elements in Lower _T_ukhāristān and the Ephthalite
lands—to this, in fact, was largely due his success in the struggle with
the Turks. More striking evidence still is afforded by the conversion of
the dihqāns at this period, amongst them the minor chief Sāmān-Khudāh and
probably also the Barmak. By this means Asad laid the foundations for a
true reconciliation and Narshakhī’s work amply attests the honour which
later generations attached to his name. His work was of course incomplete
in that it was practically confined to the ruling classes and naturally
did not extend to the now independent dihqāns of _S_ughd.

Early in 120/738 Asad died, and after a lapse of some months the
governorship was conferred by Hishām on Na_s_r b. Sayyār. For the subject
peoples no choice could have been more opportunely made. Na_s_r was
one of the few men who had come with honour and reputation through the
external and internal conflicts of the last thirty years. Belonging
to the small and almost neutral tribe of Kināna, his position bore a
strong similarity to that of Qutayba in that both were more dependent on
the support of a powerful patron than on their tribal connexions, and
therefore, though favouring Qays, less frantically partisan. In contrast
to Qutayba, however, Na_s_r, after thirty years of active leadership,
knew the situation in Khurāsān, Transoxania, and Central Asia as no
Arab governor had ever done. He had seen the futility of trying to hold
the country by mere brute force, and the equal futility of trying to
dispense with force. While he held the support of Hishām, therefore, he
set himself to restore Arab authority in Transoxania. The appointment
of Qa_t_an b. Qutayba, who had inherited much of his father’s ability,
to command the forces beyond the river gave earnest of an aggressive
policy. The appointment was not to Samarqand, as Wellhausen says, but
“over _S_ughd,” _i.e._, the garrisons in Bukhārā and probably Kish, who
were responsible in the first place for keeping the surrounding districts
in subjection. The governor himself then carried out a brief expedition,
intended apparently to punish some rebels in the neighbourhood of the
Iron Gate, possibly in Shūmān. Having thus vindicated the authority of
the administration, Na_s_r returned to Merv and delivered the famous
Khu_t_ba in which the system of taxation and conditions of amnesty were
at last laid down in a form satisfactory to the mawālī and the subject
peoples[100]. The results were as he had foreseen. The princes and people
of Transoxania submitted, as far as we can judge, without opposition when
Na_s_r with his army marched through _S_ughd to re-establish the Arab
garrison and administration in Samarqand.

This expedition may in all probability be dated in 121/739. A year or
two later, Na_s_r collected his forces, which included levies from
Transoxania, for an attack on Shāsh. Wellhausen considers that the first
two expeditions were only stages of the third, but the expedition to
Shāsh can hardly have taken place earlier than 122/740, in view of the
fact that the armies of Shāsh and Farghāna were engaged with the Türgesh
in 739, and of Narshakhī’s statement[101], which there is no reason to
dispute, that _T_ughshāda was assassinated in the thirty-second year of
his reign. Reckoning in lunar years this gives 122 (91-122), in solar
years 123 (710-741), as the date. This is confirmed by the Chinese
record of an embassy from Shāsh in 741 complaining that “Now that the
Turks have become subject to China, it is only the Arabs that are a
curse to the Kingdoms”[102]. 123 is also the date given for the return
of the _S_ughdians[103]. It is most unlikely that the intervening year
or years passed without expeditions altogether, and the most reasonable
supposition is that they were occupied in the pacification of _S_ughd.
The expedition marched eastward through Ushrūsana, whose prince, as
usual, paid his allegiance to the victor on his passage, but on reaching
the Jaxartes Na_s_r found his crossing opposed by the army of Shāsh,
together with _H_ārith b. Surayj and some Turkish troops. It would seem
that he was unable to come to blows with the main body of the enemy,
but made a treaty with the king by which the latter agreed to accept an
Arab resident and to expel _H_ārith, who was accordingly deported to
Fārāb. As usual, later tradition magnified the exploits of the Arabs by
crediting Na_s_r with the capture and execution of Kūr_s_ūl, the Türgesh
leader who had been scarcely less redoubtable than the Khāqān himself.
If the story has any foundation it is probably a legendary development
from the capture of a Turkish chief Al-Akhram, related by _T_abarī in a
variant account. The presence of Kūr_s_ūl with a Türgesh force on this
occasion is not in itself impossible, but if his identification with
Baga Tarkhan is sound, we know that he was executed by the Chinese in
744/126[104]. The expulsion of _H_ārith was probably the object for which
the expedition had been undertaken; before returning, however, the Arabs
entered Farghāna and pursued its king as far as Qubā before bringing him
to terms. The negotiations were carried out between Sulaymān b. _S_ūl,
one of the princes of Jūrjān, and the Queen-Mother. This invasion of
Farghāna is related in three (or four) different versions, some of which
may possibly refer to a second expedition mentioned by _T_abarī later.
In the same year, on returning from the expedition to Shāsh, Na_s_r was
met at Samarqand by the Bukhār Khudāh _T_ughshāda and two of his dihqāns.
The nobles laid a complaint against the prince, but as Na_s_r seemed
indisposed to redress their grievance, they attempted to assassinate both
the Bukhār Khudāh and the Arab intendant at Bukhārā, Wā_s_il b. ʿAmr. The
former was mortally wounded, and succeeded by his son Qutayba, so named
in honour of the conqueror. The incident is related also by Narshakhī
with some additional details which profess to explain the assassination.
The two narratives present such a remarkable similarity of phrase,
however, even though they are in different languages, that it is rather
more likely that the Persian version has elaborated the story than that
_T_abarī deliberately suppressed any offensive statements, as argued by
van Vloten[105].

Except for a possible second expedition to Farghāna, no other campaigns
into Transoxania are recorded of Na_s_r, unless Balādhurī’s tradition
(from Abū ʿUbayda) of an unsuccessful attack on Ushrūsana refers to a
separate expedition. This is unlikely, and the account conflicts with
that given in _T_abarī. Ushrūsana, however, was never really subdued
until nearly a century later. _T_ukhāristān, if it had not already been
recovered by Asad, may have made submission of its own accord. Since the
defeat of the Türgesh and the flight of _H_ārith it had ceased to hold
any menace to the Arabs, and Na_s_r had accordingly retransferred the
capital to Merv on his appointment.

The governor now turned his attention to restoring the prosperity of the
country and developing a policy of co-operation with the subject peoples.
Na_s_r was the first Arab ruler of Transoxania to realise that the
government depended for support in the last resort on the middle classes
and agriculturalists. Both these classes were of greater political
importance perhaps in Transoxania, with its centuries of mercantile
tradition, than any other were in the Empire. It was in the same way
that in later years the _T_āhirids and Sāmānids established their
ascendancy[106]. He was thus able not only to complete the work begun by
Asad b. ʿAbdullah, but to settle it on more stable foundations. Shortly
after his recapture of Samarqand he had sent an embassy to China. This
was followed up in 126/744 by a much more elaborate embassy, obviously
intended to regulate commercial relations in the most complete manner
possible, in which the Arabs were accompanied by ambassadors not only
from the Sogdian cities and _T_ukhāristān, but even from Zābulistān,
Shāsh, and the Türgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded in
745 and 747. There can be no doubt that it was not so much the justice
of Na_s_r’s rule as his personal influence and honesty that reconciled
the peoples of Transoxania. Even the _S_ughdian refugees, stranded after
the dissolution of the Türgesh confederacy, trusted him to honour the
conditions upon which they had agreed to return, and were not deceived
although his concessions raised a storm of protest, and the Caliph
himself was brought to confirm them only for the sake of restoring peace.

It is not surprising, however, that the princes were dissatisfied with
the success which had attended the pacification of Transoxania. The
people were “becoming Arabs” too rapidly and their own authority was
menaced in consequence. They were still hopeful of regaining their
independence, especially when Na_s_r’s position became less secure after
the death of Hishām. We hear therefore of sporadic embassies to China,
such as that sent from Ishtīkhan in 745 asking for annexation to China
“like a little circumscription.” That the governor was aware of this
undercurrent may be judged from the fact that he felt it necessary to
have _H_ārith b. Surayj pardoned, in case he should again bring in the
Turks to attack the government[107]. But the people as a whole held
for Na_s_r. The respect and even affection which he inspired held all
Transoxania true to him during the last troubled years. No tribute could
be more eloquent than the facts that not a single city in Transoxania
took advantage of the revolutionary movements in Khurāsān to withdraw
its allegiance, that Abū Muslim’s missionaries went no further than
the Arab colonies at Āmul, Bukhārā, and Khwārizm, and that the loyal
garrison of Balkh found first support and then refuge in Chaghāniān and
_T_ukhāristān. On these facts the various authorities whose narratives
are related by _T_abarī completely agree, and by their agreement
disprove the exaggerated account given by Dīnawarī (359 f.) that “Abū
Muslim sent his envoys (duʿāt) to all quarters of Khurāsān, and the
people rallied _en masse_ to Abū Muslim from Herāt, Būshanj, Merv-Rūdh,
_T_ālaqān, Merv, Nasā, Abīward, _T_ūs, Naysābūr, Sarakhs, Balkh,
Chaghāniān, _T_ukhāristān, Khuttalān, Kish, and Nasaf.” Dīnawarī himself
states a little later that Samarqand joined Abū Muslim only after the
death of Na_s_r. Abū Muslim’s main strength, in fact, was drawn from
Lower _T_ukhāristān and the neighbourhood of Merv-Rūdh, several of the
princes of which, including the ruler of Būshanj and Khālid b. Barmak,
declared for him. But even here the people were not solidly against
the administration. We are told that a camp was established at Jīranj
(south of Merv) “to cut off the reinforcements of Na_s_r b. Sayyār from
Merv-Rūdh, Balkh, and the districts of (Lower) _T_ukhāristān.” Herāt fell
to Abū Muslim by force of arms. The Syrian garrison of Balkh, together
with the Mu_d_arite party, were supported by the rulers of both Upper and
Lower _T_ukhāristān, and twice recaptured the city from their stronghold
at Tirmidh. An example of Abū Muslim’s efforts to gain over the Iranians
is afforded by an incident when, having taken 300 Khwārizmian prisoners
in an engagement, he treated them well and set them free[108].

The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for Abū Muslim is true
only of the period after his success. In our most authentic records there
is no trace of a mass movement such as has so often been portrayed. His
following was at first comparatively so small that had the Arabs been
more willing to support Na_s_r at the outset, it is practically certain
that it would have melted away as rapidly as the following of _H_ārith
b. Surayj at the first reverse. “Nothing succeeds like success,” and
Abū Muslim, once victorious on so imposing a scale, and that with the
aid of Iranians, became a heroic figure among the peoples of Eastern
Khurāsān. The legend penetrated but slowly into Transoxania. When by
130/748, however, the whole of Eastern Khurāsān had fallen to Abū Muslim
and Na_s_r no longer held authority, his governors in Transoxania were
replaced by the nominees of Abū Muslim without outward disturbance. But
the recrudescence of embassies to China shows that under the surface
currents were stirring. Shāsh had already thrown off its allegiance
and the Sogdian princes had by no means lost all hope of regaining
independence in spite of the tranquillity of the last few years. As it
happened, however, the first revolt was not on their part but by the Arab
garrison of Bukhārā under Sharīk b. Shaykh in 133/750-751. The rising,
which was due to their resentment at the seizure of the Caliphate by the
ʿAbbāsids and the passing over of the ʿAlid house, was suppressed with
some difficulty by Abū Muslim’s lieutenant Ziyād b. Sāli_h_ assisted by
the Bukhār Khudāh. The fact that the Bukhār-Khudāh assisted the troops
of Abū Muslim against Sharīk might be regarded as an indication that
he belonged to the party of the former. This inference is more than
doubtful, however. Of the 30,000 men, who, we are told, joined the
rebels, probably the greater part were the townsmen, or “popular party,”
of Bukhārā. The revolt thus assumed the domestic character of a movement
against the aristocratic party, who, led by the Bukhār-Khudāh, naturally
cooperated with the Government in its suppression. The events of the
following year are sufficient evidence against any other explanation.
According to Narshakhī, who gives by far the fullest account of this
revolt, Ziyād had also to suppress a similar movement in Samarqand. In
the same year an expedition was sent into Khuttal by Abū Dāwud, the
governor of Balkh. Al-_H_anash at first offered no opposition; later in
the campaign he attempted to hold out against the Arabs but was forced
to fly to the Turks and thence to China where he was given the title of
Jabghu in recompense for his resistance[109]. By this expedition Khuttal
was effectively annexed to the Arab government for the first time.

Of much greater, and indeed decisive, importance were the results of
an expedition under Ziyād b. Sāli_h_ into the Turkish lands beyond
the Jaxartes. It is surprising to find no reference to this either in
_T_abarī or any other of the early historians. A short notice is given
by Ibn al-Athīr, drawn from some source which is now apparently lost.
The earliest reference which we find in the Arabic histories seems to
be a passing mention of Ziyād b. Sāli_h_’s expedition “into _S_īn”
in a monograph on Baghdād by Ibn _T_ayfūr (d. 250/983)[110]. For a
detailed account of the battle we are therefore dependent on the Chinese
sources[111]. In 747 and 749 the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān had appealed
to China for aid against certain petty chiefs who were giving trouble
in the Gilghit and Chitral valleys. The governor of Kucha despatched on
this duty a Corean officer, Kao-hsien-shih, who punished the offenders
in a series of amazing campaigns over the high passes of the Karakorum.
Before returning to Kucha after the last campaign he was called in by the
King of Farghāna to assist him against the king of Shāsh. Kao-hsien-shih
at first came to terms with the king of Shāsh but when on some pretext
he broke his word and seized the city, the heir to the kingdom fled to
_S_ughd for assistance and persuaded Abū Muslim to intervene. A strong
force was accordingly despatched under Ziyād b. Sāli_h_. The Chinese,
with the army of Farghāna and the Karluks (who had succeeded the Türgesh
in the hegemony of the Western Turks), gave battle at Athlakh, near
_T_arāz, in July 751 (Dhuʾl-_h_ijja 133). During the engagement the
Karluks deserted and Kao-hsien-shih, caught between them and the Arabs,
suffered a crushing defeat. Though this battle marks the end of Chinese
power in the West, it was in consequence of internal disruption rather
than external pressure. Nothing was further at first from the minds of
the princes of _S_ughd than the passing of the long tradition of Chinese
sovereignty, indeed it blazed up more strongly than ever. For had not
a Chinese army actually visited Shāsh on their very borders; even if
the Arabs had won the first battle, would they not return to avenge the
defeat? For the last time the Shao-wu princes planned a concerted rising
in Bukhārā, Kish, _S_ughd, and Ushrūsana. But China gave neither aid
nor encouragement; the presence of Abū Muslim at Samarqand overawed the
_S_ughdians, and only at Kish did the revolt assume serious proportions.
Abū Dāwud’s army easily crushed the insurgents in a pitched battle at
Kandak, near Kish, killing the king Al-Ikhrīd and many of the other
dihqāns. Amongst the treasures of the royal palace which were sent to
Samarqand were “many articles of rare Chinese workmanship, vessels inlaid
with gold, saddles, brocades, and other objects d’art.” The Bukhār-Khudāh
Qutayba and the dihqāns of _S_ughd also paid for their complicity with
their lives[112].

So ended the last attempt at restoring an independent Sogdiana under
the old régime. For some years yet the princes of _S_ughd, Khwārizm,
and _T_ukhāristān continued to send appeals to China. The Emperor,
however, “preoccupied with maintaining peace, praised them all and gave
them consolation, then having warned them sent them back to assure
tranquillity in the Western lands.” Abū Muslim had also, it would seem,
realised the importance of maintaining relations with the Chinese court,
for a succession of embassies from “the Arabs with black garments” is
reported, beginning in the year following the battle of the Talas.
As many as three are mentioned in a single year. It is possible that
these embassies were in part intended to keep the government informed
on the progress of the civil wars in China, though the active interest
of the new administration in their commerce would, as before, tend to
reconcile the influential mercantile communities to ʿAbbāsid rule. The
actual deathblow to the tradition of Chinese overlordship in Western
Central Asia was given, not by any such isolated incident as the battle
of the Talas, but by the participation of Central Asian contingents in
the restoration of the Emperor to his capital in 757[113]. Men from the
distant lands to whom China had seemed an immeasurably powerful and
unconquerable Empire now saw with their own eyes the fatal weaknesses
that Chinese diplomacy had so skilfully concealed. From this blow Chinese
prestige never recovered.

The complete shattering of the Western Turkish empires by the Chinese
policy had also put an end to all possibility of intervention from that
side. Transoxania, therefore, was unable to look for outside support,
while the reorganization of the Muslim Empire by the early ʿAbbāsid
Caliphs prevented, not indeed sporadic though sometimes serious risings,
but any repetition of the concerted efforts at national independence.
The Shao-wu princes and the more important dihqāns continued to exercise
a nominal rule until the advent of the Sāmānids, but many of them
found that the new policy of the Empire offered them an opportunity of
honourable and lucrative service in its behalf and were quick to take
advantage of it. On the other hand the frequent revolts in Eastern
Khurāsān under the guise of religious movements show that the mass of the
people remained unalterably hostile to their conquerors[114]. In none of
these, however, was the whole of Transoxania involved until the rising
organized by Rāfiʿ b. Layth three years after the fall of the Barmakids.
The extraordinary success of his movement may partly be ascribed to
resentment at their disgrace, but it perhaps counted for something that
he was the grandson of Na_s_r b. Sayyār. Though the revolt failed it led
directly to the only solution by which Transoxania could ever become
reconciled to inclusion in the Empire of the ʿAbbāsids. Whether by wise
judgment or happy chance, to Maʿmūn belongs the credit of laying the
foundations of the brilliant Muhammadan civilisation which the Iranian
peoples of Central Asia were to enjoy under the rule of a dynasty of
their own race.


NOTES

[99] _Cf._ _T_abarī 1594. 14: 1613. 3: Chavannes, Documents 142.

[100] The details of this measure are discussed by Wellhausen, Das
Arabische Reich 297 ff., and van Vloten, Domination Arabe 71 f. Note that
_T_ab. 1689. 5 expressly refers to them as “conditions of peace.”

[101] Narshakhī 8. 19.

[102] Chav., Doc. 142.

[103] _T_ab. 1717 f.

[104] Chav., Doc. 286.

[105] Van Vloten, _op. cit._ 20. _Cf._ _e.g._ _T_ab. 1694. 1 with Narsh.
60. 3-5.

[106] Barthold, Turkestan 219.

[107] _T_ab. 1867.

[108] _T_ab. 1956. 17; 1966.10; 1997 ff. (this passage is unfortunately
defective and has been supplemented by the editor from Ibn al-Athīr);
1970. 9. The popularity of Na_s_r is demonstrated also by the growth of a
tradition round his name. This appears in _T_abarī somewhat unobtrusively
in isolated passages, unfortunately without quotation of Madāʾinī’s
authorities. According to the “Fihrist” (103. 12) Madāʾinī wrote two
books on the administrations of Asad b. ʿAbdullah and Na_s_r b. Sayyār, a
fact which confirms the special importance of these two governors in the
history of Khurāsān. Probably Asad was more popular with the dihqāns and
Na_s_r with the people.

[109] Chav., Doc. 168: _cf._ Marquart, Ērānshahr 303.

[110] Kitāb Baghdād, Band VI ed. H. Keller, p. 8. 12.

[111] Chav., Doc. 297 f.; Wieger, Textes Historiques 1647.

[112] _T_ab. III. 79 f.: Narsh. 8 fin.: Chav., Doc. 140, Notes Addit. 86
and 91.

[113] Wieger 1684 ff.: Chav., Doc. 158 n. 4 and 298 f. _Cf._ my article
“Chinese records of the Arabs in Central Asia” in the Bulletin of the
School of Oriental Studies, II. 618 f.

[114] A full account of these risings is given by Prof. E. G. Browne in
“Literary History of Persia” vol. I, 308 ff.




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Al-Balādhurī: (1) (_Kitāb al-Ansāb_) _Anonyme Arabische Chronik_, Band
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—— (2) _Kitāb Futū_h_ al Buldān_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1865.

Ad-Dīnawarī: _Kitāb al-Akhbār a_t_-_T_iwāl_, ed. V. Guirgass, Leyden,
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_Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum_, vol. I, from Kitāb al-ʿUyūn, ed. M.
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Ibn Khūrdādhbih: _Kitāb al-Masālik wal-Mamālik_, ed. M. J. de Goeje,
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Ibn Qutayba: _Kitāb al-Maʿārif_, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1850.

Al-I_st_akhrī: _Kitāb Masālik al-Mamālik_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, (Bibl.
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An-Narshakhī: _Description Topographique et Historique de Boukhara par
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A_t_-_T_abarī: (1) _Annales quos scripsit Abū Jaʿfar ... a_t_-_T_abarī_,
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—— (2) _Chronique de Tabari traduite sur la version persane de ...
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Al-Yaʿqūbī: (1) _Kitāb al-Buldān_, ed. M. J. de Goeje, (Bibl. Geog. Arab.
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—— (2) _Ibn Wadhih qui dicitur Al-Jaʿkubi Historiae_, ed. M. Th. Houtsma,
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W. Barthold: (1) _Turkyestan v’Epokhu Mongolskavo Nashyestviya_, St.
Petersburg, 1898.

—— (2) _Zur Geschichte des Christenthums in Mittel-Asien bis zur
Mongolischen Eroberungen_, German trans. by R. Stübe, Tubingen and
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—— (3) See under Radloff.

—— (4) Articles in _Encyclopaedia of Islām_.

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E. Chavannes: (1) _Documents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux_, St.
Petersburg, 1903.

—— (2) _Notes Additionnelles sur les Tou-Kiue Occidentaux, T’oung Pao_,
vol. V (1904).

H. Cordier: _Histoire Générale de la Chine_, tome I, Paris, 1920.

M. A. Czaplicka: _The Turks of Central Asia_, Oxford U.P., 1918 (contains
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_Encyclopaedia Britannica_, Eleventh Edition, 1910-1911.

_Encyclopaedia of Islām_, Leyden and London, 1913-(proceeding).

O. Franke: _Beiträge aus Chinesischen Quellen zur Kenntnis der Türkvölker
und Skythen Zentralasiens_, Berlin, 1904.

I. Goldziher: _Muhammandanische Studien_, Band I, Halle, 1888.

A. von Kremer: _Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen_, 2
vols., Vienna, 1875-1877.

G. Le Strange: _The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate_, Cambridge, 1905.

J. Marquart: (1) _Die Chronologie der Alttürkischen Inschriften_,
Leipzig, 1898.

—— (2) _Historische Glossen zu den Alttürkischen Inschriften_, W.Z.K.M.,
vol. XII (1898) pp. 157-200.

—— (3) _Ērānshahr ..._, Berlin, 1901, with notices by:—

    W. Bang, in Keleti Szemle III (1902).

    E. Chavannes in J.A. Ser. IX t. XVIII (1901).

    M. J. de Goeje, in W.Z.K.M. XVI (1902).

    Th. Nöldeke, in Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902).

Sir W. Muir: _The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline, and Fall_: New edition,
ed. T. H. Weir, Edinburgh, 1915.

Th. Nöldeke: _Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden
..._, Leyden, 1879.

_Pauly’s Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Neue
Bearbeitung_, Stuttgart, 1895-(proceeding).

T. Peisker: “The Asiatic Background,” _Cambridge Mediaeval History_, vol.
I (1911).

W. Radloff: (1) _Die Alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Neue Folge_,
St. Petersburg, 1897: with appendix by—

    W. Barthold: _Die Historische Bedeutung der Alttürk. Inschr._

—— (2) _Die Alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei, Zweite Folge_, St.
Petersburg, 1899: with appendices by—

    W. Barthold: _Die Alttürk. Insch. und die Arabischen Quellen_.

    Fr. Hirth: _Nachworte zur Inschrift des Tonjukuk_.

E. Sachau: _Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwārizm_, 2 parts,
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K. Shiratori: _Über den Wu-sun-stamm in Centralasien, Keleti Szemle_ III
(1902), pp. 103-140.

F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross: _The Heart of Asia_: A History of Russian
Turkestan, etc., from the Earliest Times. London, 1899.

M. A. Stein: (1) _Ancient Khotan_, Oxford, 1907.

—— (2) _Serindia_, vol. I, Oxford, 1921.

E. Thomas: _Contributions to the Numismatic History of the Early
Mohammedan Arabs in Persia_, J.R.A.S. First Series, vol. XII (1850), pp.
253-347.

W. Tomaschek: _Centralasiatische Studien_: I. _Soghdiana_, Vienna, 1877
(S.B.W.A.).

A. Vámbéry: _History of Bokhara from the Earliest Period down to the
Present_, London, 1873.

G. van Vloten: _Recherches sur la Domination Arabe, etc., sous le
Khalifat des Omayades_, Amsterdam, 1894.

J. Wellhausen: _Das Arabische Reich und Sein Sturz_, Berlin, 1902.

L. Wieger, S.J.: _Tomes Historiques_, ? 1903-1905.

Yüan Chwang: _On Yüan Chwang’s travels in India_, T. Watters, 2 vols.,
London, 1904 (Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, vols. XIV and XV).

              Printed in Great Britain by FOX, JONES & CO.,
             Kemp Hall Press, High Street, Oxford, England.







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