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Title: The British Campaign in France and Flanders—January to July, 1918

Author: Arthur Conan Doyle

Release date: April 9, 2021 [eBook #65046]

Language: English

Credits: Al Haines


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS—JANUARY TO JULY, 1918 ***




[Illustration: THE BRITISH FRONT IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS]



  THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN

  IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS

  JANUARY TO JULY

  1918



  BY

  ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE

  AUTHOR OF
  'THE GREAT BOER WAR,' ETC.



  HODDER AND STOUGHTON
  LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
  MCMXIX




  SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE'S
  HISTORY OF THE WAR

  Uniform with this Volume.

  THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE
  AND FLANDERS


  VOL. I--1914

  THE BREAKING OF THE PEACE.
  THE OPENING OF THE WAR.
  THE BATTLE OF MONS.
  THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU.
  THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE.
  THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE.
  THE LA BASSÉE-ARMENTIÈRES OPERATIONS.
  THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES.
  A RETROSPECT AND GENERAL SUMMARY.
  THE WINTER LULL OF 1914.


  VOL II.--1915

  THE OPENING MONTHS OF 1915.
  NEUVE CHAPELLE AND HILL 60.
  THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.
  THE BATTLE OF RICHEBOURG-FESTUBERT.
  THE TRENCHES OF HOOGE.
  THE BATTLE OF LOOS.


  VOL III.--1916

  JANUARY TO JULY 1916.
  THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
  THE GAINING OF THE THIEPVAL RIDGE.
  THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
  THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE.


  VOL IV.--1917

  THE BATTLE OF ARRAS.
  THE BATTLE OF MESSINES.
  THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.
  THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI.

  With Maps, Plans, and Diagrams

  HODDER AND STOUGHTON
  LONDON, NEW YORK, AND TORONTO




{v}

PREFACE

This fifth volume deals with one of the most tremendous episodes in
history, when the vigour of the German attack and the desperate
resistance of the British both on the Somme and in Flanders, held an
awestruck world in suspense.  A million men released from the Russian
front, rolled across Europe and, swelling that great tide which was
already banked up before the British breakwater, it washed over all
the front line barriers and threatened at one time to sweep down to
the sea.  The account of how the British Army, upon which
incomparably the greater pressure fell, rose to the occasion and
first slowed and then held the terrific flood is one of the most
wonderful of military epics.  At the same time every credit must be
given to the loyalty of the French commanders who, while guarding
their own extended lines, endeavoured to spare all possible help to
their hard-pressed Allies.  This volume carries the story of the
German attack to its close.  The next and final one will describe the
enormous counter-attack of the Allies leading up to their final
victory.

The Chronicler has been faced by many obstacles in endeavouring to
preserve both accuracy and historical proportion while writing
contemporary history.  He would gratefully acknowledge that his {vi}
critics in the press have shown a kindly indulgence, which arises, no
doubt, from an appreciation of these difficulties.  There has,
however, been one conspicuous exception to which he would desire to
call attention, since a large question of literary etiquette is
involved.  From the beginning a series of unflattering and anonymous
articles have appeared in _The Times_ Literary Supplement, commenting
adversely upon each volume in turn, and picking out the pettiest
details for animadversion.  Upon enquiry, these articles--in whole or
part--are admitted to have been written by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue,
who is himself the official historian of the War.  On being
remonstrated with, this gentleman could not be brought to see that it
is not fitting that he should make anonymous attacks, however _bonâ
fide_, upon a brother author who is working upon the same subject and
is therefore in the involuntary position of being a humble rival.

Having stated the facts they may be left to the judgment of the
public.

  ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE.

  CROWBOROUGH,
  _May_ 1, 1919.





{vii}

CONTENTS


CHAPTER I

EVENTS UPON THE BRITISH FRONT UP TO MARCH 21, 1918

The prospects of the Allies--Great dangers from the Russian
collapse--State of the British line--Huge German preparations--Eve of
the Great Offensive


CHAPTER II

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Attack on the Seventeenth and Sixth Corps

Disposal of the Third Army--Attack upon the Third Division--Upon the
Thirty-fourth Division--Upon the Fifty-ninth Division--Terrible
losses--Loss of Henin Hill--Arrival of Thirty-first Division--Hard
fighting of the Fortieth Division--The East Yorkshires at
Ervillers--The 15th West Yorks at Moyenneville--Recapture of
Ayette--Grand resistance of Third, Fifteenth, and Fourth Divisions
before Arras--Final German check in the north


CHAPTER III

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Attack on the Fourth and Fifth Corps

Attack on Sixth and Fifty-first Divisions--Engagement of the
Twenty-fifth and Forty-first Divisions--Attack on Forty-seventh,
Sixty-third, Second, and Nineteenth Divisions--The German
torrent--Serious situation--Arrival of Sixty-second
Division--Fighting before Albert--Gallant defence by Twelfth
Division--Arrival of the New Zealanders, of the Australians, of the
Thirty-fifth Division--Equilibrium

{viii}

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Attack on the Fifth Army.  March 21

The Fifth Army front--The story of a Redoubt--Attack upon Congreve's
Seventh Corps--Upon Watts' Nineteenth Corps--Upon Maxse's Eighteenth
Corps--Upon Butler's Third Corps--Terrific pressure--Beginning of the
Retreat--Losses of Guns


CHAPTER V

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Retreat of the Seventh and Nineteenth Corps

Problems before General Gough--His masterful action--Arrival of
Thirty-ninth, Twentieth, and Fiftieth Divisions--Retreat of Tudor's
Ninth Scottish Division--Destruction of the South Africans--Defence
of the Somme--Arrival of the Eighth Division--Desperate fighting--The
Carey line--Death of General Feetham--"Immer fest daran"--Advance,
Australia--Great achievement of General Watts


CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The Retreat of the Eighteenth Corps

Retreat of the Sixty-first Division--The Gloucesters at
Beauvais--Fall of Ham--Retreat of the Thirtieth and Thirty-sixth
Divisions--Great privations of the men--Fine feat at Le
Quesnoy--Summary of the experience of Maxse's Corps


CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The Retreat of the Third Corps

Movement across the Crozat Canal--Fight of the 173rd Brigade--Forcing
of the Canal Line--Arrival of the French--Fight of Frières
Wood--Splendid work of the Cavalry--Loss of Noyon--Final
equilibrium--General retrospect of the Battle


CHAPTER VIII

THE SOMME FRONT FROM APRIL 1 ONWARDS

The last waves of the storm--The Twelfth Division at Albert--The
Forty-seventh Division at Aveluy Wood--The Australians in the {ix}

south--Capture of Villers-Bretonneux by the Germans--Recapture by
Australians and Eighth Division--Fierce fighting--The first turn of
the tide


CHAPTER IX

THE BATTLE OF THE LYS

April 9-12

The Flanders front--Great German onslaught--Disaster of the
Portuguese--Splendid stand at Givenchy of the Fifty-fifth
Division--Hard fight of the Fortieth Division--Loss of the
Lys--Desperate resistance of the Fiftieth Division--Thirty-fourth
Division is drawn into the Battle--Attack in the north upon the
Ninth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fifth Divisions--British
retreat--General survey of the situation


CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF THE LYS

April 13 to May 8

Desperate situation--Sir Douglas Haig's "Win or Die" message--Epic of
the 4th Guards Brigade at Hazebrouck--Arrival of First Australian
Division--Splendid services of Thirty-third Division--Loss of
Armentières, Bailleul, and Neuve Eglise--The First Division at
Givenchy--Fall of Kemmel--Battle of Ridge Wood--Great loss of
ground--Equilibrium


CHAPTER XI

THE BATTLES OF THE CHEMIN DES DAMES AND OF THE ARDRES

May 27 to June 2

The rest cure of the Aisne--Attack upon the Fiftieth Division--Upon
the Twenty-first--Fifth Battery R.F.A.--Glorious Devons--Adventure of
General Rees--Retreat across the Aisne--Over the Vesle--Arrival of
Nineteenth Division--Desperate fighting--Success of 4th
Shropshires--General Pellé's tribute--General prospect of the Allies
midway through 1918


INDEX




{xi}

MAPS AND PLANS

British Battle Line, March 21

Position at the Close of the Great Retreat, March 30

Rough Sketch of the General Position of Troops at the Battle of
Villers-Bretonneux, April 24-25

Rough Sketch of Guards' Position, April 13

Defence of Givenchy by the First Division, April 18

Position of the Line in Flanders, April 9

British Line on Chemin des Dames

Map to illustrate the British Campaign in France and Flanders




{1}

CHAPTER I

EVENTS UPON THE BRITISH FRONT UP TO MARCH 21, 1918

The prospects of the Allies--Great dangers from the Russian
collapse--State of the British line--Huge German preparations--Eve of
the Great Offensive.

[Sidenote: Events upon the British Front to March 21]

The New Year of 1918, the fourth of the world war, opened with
chequered prospects for the Allies.  Upon all subsidiary fields of
action the developments were good.  In Palestine, General Allenby,
the victor of Arras, had shown himself to be a fine soldier upon the
larger scale, and had fought his way up the old highway of history
which leads from Egypt by Gaza to Jerusalem.  Homely crusaders in
tattered khaki stood where once Godfrey de Bouillon and his chivalry
had worshipped before the shrine of religion, and the cavalry of
Australia, the yeomen of the Shires, and the infantry of London won
once more the ground which Richard of the Lion Heart with his knights
and bowmen had contested in the long ago.  Surely in all the strange
permutations and combinations of the world war there could be none
more striking than that!  By April the British force covered all the
northern approaches to the city and extended its right wing to the
Jordan, where our Arab allies in the land of Moab were pushing {2}
the Turks back along the line of the Damascus railway.

On another road of world conquest, that from British Bagdad to
Nineveh, the British and Indian columns were also both active and
victorious.  The knightly Maude had perished from cholera contracted
by his own courtesy in drinking a proffered cup of village water.
His successor, General Marshall, formerly his Chief of Staff, and as
such conversant with his aims and his methods, carried on both one
and the other, moving his men north until the spectator who compared
their numbers with the immensity of the spaces around them, was
appalled at the apparent loneliness of their position.  By May his
raiding cavalry were not far from the Turkish supply depot of Mosul,
where the barren mounds, extending over leagues of desert, proclaim
both the greatness and the ruin of Nineveh.  Salonica continued in
its usual condition of uneasy and malarial somnolence, but gratifying
reports came of the belated rally of the Greeks, who, acting with the
French, won a smart little victory against their Bulgarian enemies
upon May 31.  German East Africa had at last been cleared of German
forces, but General Lettow Vorbeck, to whom we cannot deny remarkable
fortitude and leadership, wandered with his piebald commands in the
depths of the forests and marshes of Mozambique, still evading his
inevitable capture, and master only of the ground on which he camped.

But these distant campaigns had only a remote and indirect effect
upon the war in Europe.  Here the late winter and the early spring of
1918 saw the balance tilted against the British and their comrades in
the West, through causes over which they had no {3} control.  Russia
had completely broken down.  In her case, with a rapidity which made
it difficult to realise the situation, autocracy had changed to
liberty, liberty to license, and license to chaos.  The absolute
dissolution of all fighting power was partly due to national folly
and partly to deliberate treachery.  The leaders of the extreme party
had arrived from Switzerland with a free pass granted by the German
authorities.  Instantly they set to work to subvert the comparatively
sane government with which the name of Kerensky is chiefly
associated.  Lenin and his associates seized the reins of power and
guided their mad team up to and over the precipice.  It was clear to
any observer that such a frenzy of insanity must have its reaction,
and great pity was felt for those more honourable Russians who were
compelled to look on at the degradation of their country.  The new
super-democracy began its career by repudiating its debts of honour,
and by betraying all the other democracies of the world.  Such
conditions could not last; but meanwhile the Germans overran the
country at their pleasure, practically annexed both Finland and the
Ukraine, and helped themselves to harvests, warships, or anything
else they might desire.  Chivalrous little Roumania, with the foe in
front and the traitor in the rear, was compelled to make such hard
terms as she might--surely one of the most bitter tragedies of
history.

As a result of this huge defection the whole force of Germany and of
Austria, together with a good deal of captured Russian artillery, was
available for the Western war, and from November to March an endless
succession of troop trains were bearing the divisions which had
extended from the Baltic to {4} the southern frontiers of Russia, in
order to thicken the formidable array already marshalled across
France.  A great Austrian army assembled on the line of the Piave,
where the Italians had formed their new front, while a second force
in the mountains upon their flank seemed to hang suspended like an
avalanche, ready at any instant to crash down into the valleys.  In
spite of this imminent danger the situation was so threatening in
France that half of the British and French force in Italy had to be
recalled, while the gallant Italians actually sent some divisions of
their own best troops to aid the Allies in the more vital theatre of
war.  It was not only the vast concentration of infantry which formed
the immediate menace, but it was the addition to the German gun
power, in which the Austrians greatly assisted.  The enemy was acting
also upon internal lines and with excellent radiating communications,
so that by assembling large bodies in certain central points he could
hurl them against any portion of a long arc of the Allied line and
depend upon several days of battle before the reinforcements could
intervene.  This, as it proved, was a very great advantage.  He had
also used his Russian experiences to initiate and improve a new form
of attack by which he was confident, with a confidence which proved
to be well justified, that he could certainly make a deep impression
upon the Allied line, and turn the war, for a time, at least, into
one of open movement.  Such was the very favourable position of the
German army at the opening of the tremendous campaign of 1918, which
was enhanced by the fact that they had reduced to slavery the
population in their rear, and had thus gained a very {5} solid
present advantage at the cost of a universal hatred and execration of
which no man now living will see the end.  In the hope of being a
nation of victors they took steps which will brand them as a nation
of monsters so long as history is read--a nation with modern minds
but with worse than mediaeval souls.

The Allies were not without their consolations, though they lay
rather in the future than in the present.  Their veteran armies,
though somewhat outnumbered, had done so well in the offensive of the
year before that they had good reason to believe that, acting upon
the defensive, they would either hold the German onslaught, or at
worst inflict such losses that they would gradually bring them to an
equilibrium.  Neither France nor Britain had called upon its last
reserves to the same extent as Germany, and behind both was the
mighty power of America.  Up to date the American forces landed in
France had not been sufficiently trained or numerous to influence the
course of events, but from the spring onwards there was a steady
flow, and hardly a day elapsed without one or more transports laden
with troops arriving in the British or French ports.  The men were of
splendid spirit and physique, and the mere sight of them revived the
weary souls of those who had fought the hard fight so long.  It was
the knowledge of these reinforcements and the constant drafts from
Britain which stiffened men's courage and steeled their breasts in
the desperate days to come.

Turning our eyes now from the general prospect and concentrating our
attention upon the dispositions of the British army, it may be said
that the ranks had been filled once more after the very {6} expensive
fighting of the autumn.  Divisions were, however, weaker than before
for, following the German model, one battalion had been taken out of
each brigade, so that in future a division consisted of nine ordinary
units and one pioneer.  Of the six divisions lent to Italy three had
been brought back in view of the German menace.  The line still ran
from Houthulst Forest and Passchendaele in the north along the
familiar curve by La Bassée and Lens to the east of Vimy Ridge, and
thence along the first Hindenburg Line, with the one six-mile breach
in front of Cambrai.  The Third Army, under Sir Julian Byng, covered
the ground between Arras and Cambrai, whilst the Fifth, under Sir
Hubert Gough, carried it south from that point.  His junction with
the French was an indeterminate one and was twice moved to the south,
the second move on February 15 carrying his right wing across the
Oise as far south as Barisis, eight miles beyond La Fère.  There is
no doubt that in lengthening his line to this extent Sir Douglas Haig
took on more ground than his troops could be reasonably expected to
hold, and that General Gough was given a hard task.  It was done, as
was shown in a subsequent debate, against the better judgment of the
British at the urgent behest of M. Clemenceau.  We must remember,
however, that our Allies had frequently taken risks in order to help
us, and that it was for us to reciprocate even though it might
occasionally, as in this instance, lead to trouble.  There was a
tendency at the time for soldiers and politicians to put the blame
upon each other, whereas all were equally the victims of the real
cause, which was the crushing burden placed upon us by the defection
of our Ally.  It is {7} easy to be wise after the event, but it was
impossible to tell with any certainty where the impending blow might
fall, and M. Clemenceau was very naturally anxious about the French
line in Champagne, which was strengthened by this extension of the
British flank.  There is in truth no need for mutual reproach, as
every one acted for the best under the almost intolerable
circumstances imposed by the new conditions.

Before referring in detail to the tremendous storm which was visibly
banking up in the East, and which broke upon March 21 along the
British lines from the Scarpe to the Oise, some allusion should be
made to one or two sharp German attacks in the extreme north, by
which the enemy endeavoured to draw the attention of the Allies away
from the district in which their first real attack was planned.  In
the first of these, delivered upon March 8 to the south of Houthulst
Forest, in the area formerly occupied by the Second Army, the German
stormers, attacking on a mile of front, gained a footing in the
advanced trenches over a space of 500 yards, but were driven out
again and past their own front line by a spirited counter-attack.
The losses of the Thirty-sixth Reserve Division, who carried out the
operation, were considerable, and their gains were nil.  The second
attack was made upon the same evening in the neighbourhood of
Polderhoek Château, to the south of the Ypres front.  Here again some
trench elements were secured in the first rush, but were entirely
regained by the 10th K.R.R. and 13th Fusiliers of the 111th Brigade,
who restored the line.  Neither attempt was serious, but they were
operations on a considerably larger scale than any others during the
winter.  These attacks were delivered upon the front {8} of Jacob's
Second Corps, which belonged to Rawlinson's Fourth Army, but within a
few days Plumer had returned from Italy, and he, with the Second
Army, took over this sector once again.

We must now turn to the long stretch from Monchy in the north to La
Fère in the south, a front of fifty miles, upon which the great
German blow was about to fall.  It is said that after a tour of the
whole line General Ludendorff determined upon this as being the most
favourable region for a grand attack.  Granting that for general
motives of policy the assault should be on the British rather than on
the French army, it is clear that he could have come to no other
decision since Flanders at that time of year might have been a
morass, and the rest of the line was to a large extent upon
commanding ground.  On the other hand the desolate country which had
been already occupied and abandoned by the Germans was in front of
their new advance, and it was likely that this would act as a
shock-absorber and take the momentum off a victorious advance before
it could reach any point of vital strategic importance.  The German
Staff seems, however, to have placed great confidence upon their
secrecy, their numbers, and their new methods.  Their ambitious plan
was to break right through to Amiens, to seize the line of the Somme
so as to divide the Allied armies, and then to throw their weight to
right or to left as might seem best, the one movement threatening the
Channel ports and the other Paris.  Their actual success, though it
was considerable, fell so far short of their real intentions that
disappointment rather than triumph must have been their prevailing
emotion.  Looking first upon their side of the line one can {9}
appreciate in a general way the efficient methods which they took to
ensure success.  The troops had been exercised in the back areas
during the whole winter in the new arts of attack, which will be more
fully indicated when the battle opens.  They were then assembled at
various railway junctions, such as Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Wassigny,
and Vervins, sufficiently far from the front to escape direct
observation.  Then for seven nights in successive marches the troops
were brought forward, finally reaching the front lines on the night
before the attack, while the guns, the mine-throwers, and the
munition dumps had already been prepared.  The whole affair was upon
a gigantic scale, for sixty divisions, or half a million of infantry,
were thrown into the battle upon the first day, with half as many in
immediate reserve.  Secrecy was preserved by every possible
precaution, though the British aeroplanes, casting down their flare
lights upon crowded roads, gave few hopes that it could be sustained.
Three of the most famous generals in the German service were in
immediate charge of the operations.  General Otto von Below, the
victor of the Italian disaster, with the Seventeenth Army in the
north; General von Marwitz, who had distinguished himself at Cambrai,
with the Second Army in the centre; and General von Hutier, the
conqueror of Riga and the inventor of the new tactics, with the
Eighteenth Army in the south.  It was to the last, which was under
the nominal command of the Crown Prince, that the chief attack was
allotted.  Forty divisions, with large reserves, were placed under
his command for an assault upon General Gough's lines between Cambrai
and the Oise, while twenty divisions, with corresponding reserves,
{10} were thrown against the British Third Army, especially that
section of it opposite Croisilles and Bullecourt.  Never in the
history of the world had a more formidable force been concentrated
upon a fixed and limited objective.  The greatest possible
expectations were founded upon the battle, which had already been
named the "Kaiser Schlacht," while the day chosen had been called
Michael's day, or the day of Germany's revenge.

We shall now turn from the German preparations and examine that
British position upon which the attack was about to fall.  It was
divided into two sections, a point north of Gauche Wood upon the
Cambrai front being roughly the point of division between the Third
and the Fifth Armies.  These armies were of equal strength, each
having twelve divisions of infantry in the line or in immediate
support.  These divisions with their respective positions and varying
experiences will presently be enumerated.  For the moment it may be
stated that the Third Army consisted of four corps, the Seventeenth
(Fergusson) in the Arras-Monchy sector, the Sixth (Haldane) carrying
the line past Bullecourt, the Fourth (Harper) continuing it to near
the Cambrai district, and the Fifth (Fanshawe) covering that
important point where the gap in the Hindenburg Line seemed to make
an attack particularly likely.  The Fifth Army in turn consisted of
the Seventh Corps (Congreve) in the southern part of the Cambrai
district, the Nineteenth Corps (Watts) from south of Ronssoy to
Maissemy, the Eighteenth Corps (Maxse) in front of St. Quentin, and
the Third Corps (Butler) covering the great frontage of 30,000 yards
from Urvillers, across the Oise, down to Barisis, eight miles {11}
south of La Fère.  This long curve of fifty miles was strongly
fortified throughout its whole length, but the position was stronger
in the north where the British had been in their lines for a year or
more.  In the southern sector the new ground which had been taken
over was by no means so strongly organised as its defenders desired,
either in the portion formerly held by the British or in the French
sector, where only two lines existed.  In the north a system of
successive lines had been adopted, called respectively the forward
line, the corps line, and the army line.  In the south there was less
depth to the defence, but every possible effort was made to improve
it, the work proceeding night and day, and the soldiers being tied to
it to an extent which gave little time for military exercises.  In
this work the cavalry and special entrenching battalions gave
valuable help.  As a result, by the third week of March the south was
as well prepared as the number of men available would allow.  There
were not enough to man continuous lines of trenches over so great a
front.  A system was adopted, therefore, by which there was an
advanced zone, consisting of a thin line of infantry supported by
numerous small redoubts, each of which contained several machine-guns
and a company of infantry.  These were to take off the edge of the
assault, and it was hoped, as half a mile separated the two armies,
and the fields of fire were good, that before reaching the position
at all the enemy would suffer severely.  A thousand yards behind the
advance zone was the true battle zone, where the main body of the
infantry lay behind barbed wire with the support of isolated forts.
Beyond these again was a third zone, 2000 yards farther to the rear,
but this had not yet been {12} completed.  Behind the whole position
in the southern part of the line was the great bend of the River
Somme, which was also being organised as a reserve line, but was very
incomplete.  It should be emphasised that these deficiencies were in
no way due to the British command, which was so assiduous in its
preparations that it rather raised the ridicule of certain
unimaginative people upon the spot who cannot see a danger until it
actually materialises in front of them.  The fact that General Gough
had been a cavalry general, and that his actions in the war had been
aggressive rather than defensive, gave a false impression at the time
in certain quarters.  It is certain that nothing was neglected in the
way of defence which skill could devise or industry carry out.

The general situation then upon the night of March 20, when the
German preparations were complete, was that along the whole front the
Germans were crouching for their spring, and that their first line
consisted of sixty divisions, or more than half a million infantry,
against the twenty-four divisions, or about 200,000 infantry, who
awaited them.  The odds were greatly increased by the fact that the
Germans held some thirty divisions in immediate reserve, whereas the
British reserves, especially in the south of the line, were few and
distant.  The German concentration of gun power was more than twice
that of the British.  The published account of a German officer
claims it as fourfold, but this is probably an over-statement.  In
describing the results of this great attack we shall deal first with
the sequence of events in the sector of the Third Army in the north,
and then turn to those connected with the Fifth Army in the south.




{13}

CHAPTER II

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Attack upon the Seventeenth and Sixth Corps

Disposal of the Third Army--Attack upon the Third Division--Upon the
Thirty-fourth Division--Upon the Fifty-ninth Division--Terrible
losses--Loss of Henin Hill--Arrival of Thirty-first Division--Hard
fighting of the Fortieth Division--The East Yorkshires at
Ervillers--The 15th West Yorks at Moyenneville--Recapture of
Ayette--Grand resistance of Third, Fifteenth, and Fourth Divisions
before Arras--Final German check in the north.

[Sidenote: Third Army.  March 21.]

Taking the account of this great action upon March 21 from the north,
we shall begin with Sir Julian Byng's Third Army.  The left of this
force joined the Thirteenth Corps, which formed the flank of the
First Army, to the north of Fampoux, while the extreme right touched
the left of the Seventh Corps, the northern unit of the Fifth Army to
the east of Metz-en-Couture opposite to Cambrai.

The Seventeenth Corps consisted of the Fifteenth and Fourth Divisions
with the Guards Division in reserve.  They extended as far south as
the Sensée River, and were not seriously engaged upon March 21,
though exposed to heavy shelling.  We may for the time leave them out
of the narrative.  It was immediately to the south of them, upon the
Sixth Corps commanded by General Haldane, that the storm {14} burst
in its full fury.  Nothing can exaggerate the concentrated weight of
the blow which fell upon this and the next portion of the line.  The
divisions from the north were the old fighting Third upon the Sensée
section, the Thirty-fourth to the south of it, and the Fifty-ninth
North Midland Territorials on the right.  The Fortieth Division was
in close support.  These were the devoted units who upon that
terrible day had to bear the heavy end of the load in the northern
half of the line.  Let us turn first to the arduous experiences of
the Third Division.

This veteran division, still commanded by General Deverell, had all
three brigades in the line, the 76th upon the left, the 8th in the
centre, and the 9th upon the right, the battalions in the advanced
line being the 2nd Suffolks, 2nd Royal Scots, and 1st Northumberland
Fusiliers.  The front covered was 8000 yards from Croisilles to the
Arras-Cambrai Road in the north, both inclusive.  This front had been
strengthened by every device which experience could suggest, and was
organised, as already explained upon three lines, which may be called
the front, support, and reserve lines.  Its backing of artillery was
formidable, its moral high, and it offered a solid barrier to any
enemy, however numerous.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 21.]

The preliminary bombardment here as elsewhere broke out shortly after
five in the morning, and contained a large proportion of gas-shells
which searched the rear lines and battery positions as well as the
front defences.  So far as the 76th Brigade in the north was
concerned no serious infantry attack followed, and save for some
sporadic advances which were easily shot to pieces, there was no
organised attempt upon their sector.  The same applies, though {15}
in a less degree, to the central unit, the 8th Brigade.  Here there
were continual blasts of heavy fire during the day which decimated
but were unable to shake the Royal Scots in the front trenches.
Several times the enemy infantry made what was rather a menace than
an attack, but on each occasion it dissolved into nothing.  It is
clear that nothing serious was intended and that these demonstrations
were to hold the troops to their ground.  On the right, however, in
front of the 9th Brigade, the attempts were far more deadly and
earnest.  The first of these lasted from 7.30 till 10, and gained a
footing in the front trenches, but failed before a determined attack
by bombing parties of the Northumberland Fusiliers.  In the afternoon
the intermittent shelling became very severe, the trench mortar fire
upon the front lines being so heavy as to knock them to pieces and
stop all lateral communication.  It was a nerve-shattering ordeal to
the garrisons of these posts, crouching hour after hour in the midst
of these terrible explosions.  The bravest man on earth may find his
spirit wilt under such conditions.  Finally, about half-past three,
there came a forward surge of grey infantry from Fontaine Wood which
reached and occupied the front line, or the irregular hummocks where
the front line had been.  Every effort to extend this advantage was
crushed almost before it could get started.  There was complete
stability here, but it was known that things were not altogether well
with the Thirty-fourth Division upon the right, and masses of German
infantry were seen moving down the Cherisy valley in that direction,
a fair mark for the heavy guns.  The 4th Royal Fusiliers were brought
forward to reinforce their old comrades of {16} Northumberland, and
the line on the right was thrown back to get touch with the 11th
Suffolks of the 101st Brigade.  In this support position they were
solidly linked with the units to right and left, so that the close of
the day found the whole of this portion of the front absolutely
intact, save for the loss of the obliterated front line.

We shall now turn to the fortunes of the next unit upon the right,
the Thirty-fourth Division, a composite hard fighting body composed
of Northumbrians, Scots, and East Anglian troops.  General Nicholson,
commanding this division, had learned from a prisoner that the coming
German attack would begin at Bullecourt and then turn to the north.
Such incidents make one doubtful of the wisdom of that policy of
"teaching men to take an intelligent interest in the operations"
which is so often advocated.  In this case flank defences were
arranged and all due preparation was made.

The blow fell even as had been foretold, but the portion of the line
which was crushed in was on the front of the Fifty-ninth Division, to
the right of the Thirty-fourth.  The result was, however, that after
the capture of Bullecourt, which occurred about ten, the German
stormers began to work round the right rear of the 102nd Brigade, the
nearest unit of the Thirty-fourth Division.  The flanking line of
defence was manned by the 22nd Northumberland Fusiliers and
strengthened by many Lewis guns, so that it took heavy toll from the
masses of German infantry who were moving across.  This flanking line
was thickened by the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers and by the 1st
East Lancashires.  The heavy blow had forced back the Fifty-ninth
Division, and by one {17} o'clock Ecoust also was in the hands of the
enemy, bringing them considerably to the rear of the Thirty-fourth.
Up to 4.30 in the afternoon the Germans were attacking the 102nd
Brigade from the flank, but up to that hour they had not succeeded in
shifting the solid Tynesiders who held the improvised line.
Nevertheless the heavy and constant shelling reduced the strength of
the defenders, who in many cases were quite cut off, and had to hold
their positions with bombs and rifles as best they could.  Farther
south the Germans, passing Noreuil in their western advance, had
turned in considerable numbers to the north, well to the rear of the
flanking line, so that the British in reserve found themselves facing
south-west, but fought on none the less, the 22nd, 23rd, and 25th
Northumberland Fusiliers in a mixed line holding firmly to their
ground at the imminent risk of being cut off, while the 160th Brigade
R.F.A. were firing at ranges of 800 yards.  As the German flood
rolled on it engulfed these guns, but the gunners withdrew the blocks
and retired slowly, fighting in line with the infantry.  This
movement in turn affected the British garrisons of the more forward
trenches, who in any case were very severely pressed by the German
bombers, so that there was a general retirement towards the north in
the direction of Croisilles.  Outside this village the remains of the
101st and 102nd Brigades formed a line, and with the aid of the 10th
Lincolns and 9th Northumberland Fusiliers of the 103rd Brigade held
the enemy off from occupying it.  The Fortieth Division was, as will
be shown, coming up to fill the gap, and thus, although the
Thirty-fourth had been curled backwards as if a huge steel plough had
driven a furrow to the south {18} of them, there was still no
absolute fracture of the line.  Towards evening patrols of the enemy
had succeeded in filtering through into the village of Croisilles,
but General Haldane had already seen that his corps front needed
reorganisation in view of what had occurred to the south.  Orders
were given, therefore, to the 15th Royal Scots, who were still
holding on near Croisilles, to abandon the village and take up new
positions to the west of it.  With the help of the 119th Brigade of
the Fortieth Division these changes were made, and a line built up in
front of Henin Hill for the next day's battle.  The general result,
therefore, of the day's fighting was, so far as the Thirty-fourth
Division was concerned, that the left flank was still in touch with
the Third Division in the northern support line, but that the right
and centre had to hinge back upon it on account of the break through
to the south of them, and had been compelled to uncover Croisilles
and abandon it to the enemy.  The casualties had been high,
especially in the 102nd Brigade upon the defensive flank.  Of these,
about 1200 out of a total trench strength of 1800 were lost, some
being cut off but the greater number injured by the bombardment.
Three companies of the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers were engulfed in
the German tide and submerged, as were the field-guns already
mentioned, which were fought by their crews until the very last
instant.  The 11th Suffolks upon the left flank of the 101st Brigade
held absolutely fast all day, and by their fire gave great help to
the Third Division to their north.

The next unit upon the line was the Fifty-ninth North Midland
Division (Romer) which had a front {19} of over 5000 yards.  They
covered the important villages of Bullecourt, Ecoust, and Noreuil,
the former being in the very front line.  The 178th Brigade of
Sherwood foresters were upon the right and the 176th of Staffords
upon the left, with the 177th of Lincolns and Leicesters in reserve.
In the southern section of this position was the long shallow slope
of the Noreuil valley, the nearer half of which came within the
Fifty-ninth area, while the farther was held by the Sixth Division.
It was speedily apparent by the intensity of the bombardment and by
the rumoured concentration of the infantry that this was the centre
of danger.  About ten o'clock a demonstration was made against the
2/6 Sherwood Foresters upon the left, but the real attack came later
when on the right centre a heavy mass of the enemy surged through the
outpost line and established itself within the support line.  At
about the same hour the German infantry struck in great force up the
channel of the Noreuil valley, and having pushed their way as far as
the western edge of Noreuil turned to the north-west, working along a
hollow road between Noreuil and Longatte.  Two companies of the 2/5
Sherwoods, together with the 470th Field Company R.E., were caught
between the pincers of this double German attack, and were entirely
destroyed on the Noreuil-Ecoust Road, only one officer and six
sappers making their way safe to Vraucourt.  The 2/5 Lincolns of the
supporting brigade, moving up to the support of their comrades, were
themselves involved in the tragedy and three companies were
practically annihilated.  This rapid German advance, with the heavy
British losses, had all taken place by 11 A.M., and created the
situation which {20} reacted so unfavourably upon the Thirty-fourth
in the north.  The Germans having got so far forward in the south
were able to assail the flank of the 176th Brigade in the north,
which threw out a defensive line as far as Ecoust and defended itself
strongly.  Their position, however, was an almost impossible one, and
when later in the day the enemy took Ecoust and swung round to their
rear these battalions, already much reduced, were overwhelmed by the
attack, the survivors joining up with the Thirty-fourth Division in
their retreat.  The machine-guns, so long as they were in action,
caused heavy casualties to the enemy, but the latter were swarming on
all sides, and eventually the guns had either to withdraw or were
captured.

With the two front brigades destroyed and the whole position
occupied, the Germans may well have thought that a long advance was
within their power, but in this they were soon undeceived.  The
support brigade, the 177th, still barred their way, and it had been
strengthened by Headquarters staffs, bands, transport men and others,
and very especially by the pioneer battalion, the 6/7 Scots
Fusiliers.  These men occupied the third defence line, and from the
Hog's Back on which it was sited, they defied every effort of the
Germans to get forward from Ecoust.  This position was well covered
by artillery and supported by machine-guns.  So strong was the
defence that the enemy were beaten back three times, and on the last
occasion, late in the afternoon, fairly took to their heels.  Shortly
afterwards the 120th Brigade from the Fortieth Division came into
support, and the situation was saved for the day.  How terrific had
been the strain upon the Fifty-ninth {21} Division may be reckoned
from the fact that their losses were close upon 5000 out of a
ten-battalion unit.  It is true that they had been driven by vastly
superior numbers out of their two front lines with the attendant
villages, but evening found them still defiant, and, for the time,
victorious, with their right still linked up with the Sixth Division
and their left with the Thirty-fourth.  There could not have been a
finer recovery under more arduous circumstances.  It was the last of
the Fifty-ninth Division, however, for many a day to come, for the
Fortieth (Ponsonby) taking charge in this sector, gathered to itself
the fifteen field-guns still left of the artillery and the only
remaining brigade.  It was as well, for they would need every gun and
every rifle in the dark days to come.  Four German divisions, the
111th, 221st, 6th Bavarian, and 2nd Guards Reserve, had been engaged
in the attack.  Even admitting that some of these divisions were
concerned also with the attack upon the Thirty-fourth Division, the
latter had the 234th and some smaller units in front of it, so that
it is within the mark to say that five German had attacked two
British divisions, and by the aid of a vastly superior light and
heavy artillery equipment had pushed them back to their reserve line,
but had failed to break them.  It was not a fight of which either
nation need be ashamed.

This completes a superficial view of the experiences of the Sixth
Corps upon March 21.  In order to get the full picture one should
understand that the Sixth Division upon the right had also been
driven from their sector, including several important villages.  For
the sake of continuity of narrative it will be best {22} to merely
indicate this fact for the moment, and to continue to follow the
fortunes of Haldane's Corps during the fateful days which followed,
casting a glance also to the north where the Seventeenth Corps was
gradually involved in the fight.  We shall bear in mind, then, the
long slanting front from the old positions on the left to Henin Hill
and the Hog's Back upon the right, and we shall return to the Third
Division at the northern end of the line.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 22.]

The night had been quiet along the whole corps front, which seemed to
imply some exhaustion of the attack.  In the morning this lull still
continued in the region of the Third Division, which had up to now
been just outside the track of the storm.  During the morning and
afternoon of March 22 no serious attack was made upon this point, but
in the evening the enemy, having made a lodgment upon Henin Hill in
the south-west, was able to make a powerful onslaught from the flank
which met with very little success.  Its first onrush pushed back the
20th K.R.R., pioneer battalion of the division, in the trench called
Hind Avenue, but the ground was regained by the 13th King's
Liverpool, while the 4th Royal Fusiliers loosened the German grip of
another small corner of trench.  Up to nightfall the attempts
continued, alternating with bombardments, but no progress was made,
the 9th Brigade beating down every new advance.

About ten o'clock at night orders reached the division that as the
Seventeenth Corps were falling back for strategic reasons to the west
of Monchy on the north, while the Thirty-fourth were also retreating
upon the south, the Third Division must retire in conformity with
them.  It was no easy task under {23} a heavy shell fall and with an
elated enemy in close contact.  It was of importance that the
telephoned orders should not be tapped, and it is suggestive of the
world-wide services of the British soldier that they were sent over
the wires in Arabic and Hindustani.  Before morning the weary troops
had been quickly withdrawn without confusion or mishap, and all were
safely aligned in their new positions.  Their defence of their
battle-ground had been a splendid one, and though they had no huge
mass attack to contend with, such as had dashed the line of the
Fifty-ninth to pieces, still they had constant severe pressure and
had withstood it completely.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 21.]

We left the Thirty-fourth Division upon the evening of March 21 still
holding its reserve lines, with its three brigades in line, the 103rd
on the right in touch with the Fortieth Division, and the 101st on
the left where the Third Division joined it.  A spirited little body,
the J Special Company R.E., had joined the fighting line of the
Thirty-fourth, and did good work with it.  About 8 A.M. upon March
22nd the enemy attacked the 102nd Brigade in the Croisilles sector,
but two attempts had no result, though the general British line was
now 500 yards west of the village.  About ten o'clock a misfortune
occurred, for a heavy column of the enemy, moving up through a dense
mist, broke through the 101st Brigade and carried the greater part of
Henin Hill, a most important strategic point.  The possession of the
hill was, however, contested most strongly by the Fortieth Division
machine-gun company and by the 11th Suffolks, who by their valiant
resistance prevented the enemy from gaining the whole crest, though
they could not stop them from extending north and south, which {24}
turned the line of the troops at the flanks and caused them to fall
back.  The troops to the south, the 15th and 16th Royal Scots,
withdrew slowly to a new position west of Boyelles; the remains of
the 102nd Brigade (it was but 500 strong at the beginning of the
action) fell back upon the supports; while the valiant men of
Suffolk, aided by Colonel Roberts' machine-guns, still fought stoutly
upon the top of the incline, though entirely isolated upon the right
flank.  Finally the shattered remains of this staunch battalion
withdrew towards the north-west, their slow retreat being covered by
Lieutenant Woods, who met his death in the venture, and by a handful
of machine-gunners.

The chief evil result from the capture of Henin Hill was in the
south, where it enabled the enemy by a joint frontal and flank attack
at the junction of the Thirty-fourth and Fortieth Divisions, to push
back the 9th Northumberland Fusiliers and 13th Yorkshire, and to get
possession of the village of St. Leger.  The 103rd Brigade moved back
to Judas' Farm to the west of St. Leger, while the 119th Brigade
prolonged the line to the south.  A few machine-guns, with their feed
blocks removed, were lost on Henin Hill, but otherwise no booty was
obtained by the enemy.  On the evening of the 22nd the infantry of
the Thirty-first Division was rushed to the front, and the
Thirty-fourth Division after their two days of desperate and
honourable battle, were drawn back for a rest.  During March 22 the
103rd Brigade held on to St. Leger and St. Leger Wood, and so blocked
the valley of the Sensée.

To the south of the Thirty-fourth Division the Fifty-ninth Division
had now been entirely replaced {25} by the Fortieth, save for the
177th Brigade, the artillery, and machine-guns, some of which
rendered splendid service during the day.  There was little fighting
in the morning of March 22, but about mid-day it was found that some
hundreds of Germans with a profusion of machine-guns ("many bullets
but few men" was the key-note of the new advanced tactics) were close
to the divisional front in the region of St. Leger Wood.  These were
driven back, and fourteen of their guns taken, after some confused
but vigorous fighting, in which Lieutenant Beal captured four guns
himself before meeting a glorious death.  Several times the enemy
pushed strong patrols between the Sixth and Fortieth Divisions in the
Vaux-Vraumont sector, but these were always expelled or digested.
Shortly after mid-day, however, a very strong attack broke upon this
line, pushing back the left of the Sixth Division and causing heavy
losses to the Highlanders of the 120th Brigade upon the right of the
Fortieth Division.  The 14th Argyll and Sutherlands, with the 10/11
Highland Light Infantry, were the units concerned, and they restored
their line, which had been bent backwards.  Finding, however, that
they had lost touch with the Sixth Division to the south, they fell
back until communication was restored.  All day groups of German
machine-gunners could be seen rushing forward, their crouching
figures darting from cover to cover, while all day also the guns of
the division observed and shattered the various nests which were
constructed.  Major Nesham distinguished himself in this work.
Towards evening of the 22nd it was known that Vraumont to the south
was in German possession, and orders were given to withdraw to the
new general line which this change {26} and the capture of Henin Hill
must entail.  In the new position the Fortieth was still in close
touch with the Sixth in the neighbourhood of Beugnâtre, the general
line of the withdrawal being in a south-westerly direction.  The
losses had been heavy during the day, and included Colonel
Eardley-Wilmot of the 12th Suffolks.

The line of the Seventeenth and of the Sixth Corps, upon the morning
of March 23, stretched from the south of Fampoux, west of Heninel and
of St. Leger down to Mory.  The Seventeenth Corps had not yet been
seriously attacked.  We shall continue with the record of the Sixth
Corps, which now consisted of the Third Division in the north, part
of the Guards Division, which had formed up to their right, the
Thirty-first Division north of Mory, and the Fortieth Division to the
west of Mory, with outposts in the village.  We shall again trace the
events from the northern flank.  No serious movement occurred during
the day in front of the Third Division or of the Guards, but there
was a report of concentrations of infantry and other signs which
indicated that the storms of the south would soon spread upwards in
that direction.  The Thirty-first Division, the well-tried Yorkshire
unit, still retained two of its old brigades, but had an additional
4th Brigade of Guards, cut from the old Guards Division by the new
system of smaller units.  General Bridgford had taken over command
just before the battle and would be the first to admit that the
splendid efficiency of his troops was due to General Wanless O'Gowan,
who had been associated with them so long.  They carried a high
reputation into this great battle and an even higher one out of it.
On the morning of March 23 the division faced {27} the Germans to the
north of Mory Copse, having the 4th Guards Brigade upon the right and
the 93rd Brigade upon the left.  Two German divisions which had
already been engaged, the 111th and the 2nd Guards Reserve, tried to
break this fresh line and were each in turn broken themselves, as
were the German batteries which pushed to the front and found
themselves under the double fire of the Thirty-first and
Thirty-fourth divisional artillery.  Prisoners taken in this repulse
gave the information that the Germans were already a full day behind
their scheduled programme in this quarter.  All attacks upon the
Thirty-first met with the same fate during the day, but the enemy, as
will be shown, had got a grip of Mory for a time, and pushed back the
Fortieth in the south.  Instead of a retirement the 92nd Brigade was
brought from reserve and placed upon the exposed flank, while the
Guards and Yorkshiremen still stood firm.  In the evening the general
line extended from north of Ervillers, where the 92nd Brigade was on
watch, to the region of Hamelincourt, where the 93rd had their line.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 23.]

The heaviest work of the day had fallen upon the Fortieth Division,
which had dug itself in west of Mory and of Mory Copse, with strong
posts in the village itself.  The enemy attacked in the morning of
March 23 in great force and got complete possession of Mory.  A
splendid counter-attack, however, by the 13th East Surreys and 21st
Middlesex at 2.30 P.M. regained the village.  A deep cutting ran up
to Mory from Vraucourt in the south-east, and along this the Germans
sent their reinforcements, but the artillery of the British got the
range of it and caused heavy losses.  The village was held all day,
under the local {28} direction of Colonel Warden of the Surreys, and
was violently attacked by the enemy after dark, with the result that
desultory hand-to-hand fighting went on among the houses during the
whole night.  At one time the British had won to the eastern edge,
and then again they were forced back to the centre.  When one
remembers that these men had been fighting for three days, with
little food and less sleep, it was indeed a fine performance.  One
small post of the 18th Welsh under Sergeant O'Sullivan was isolated
for nearly two days and yet cut its way out, the gallant Irishman
receiving a well-deserved honour.  The morning of March 24 found
little change along the line of the corps.  If the Germans were
already a day behind they showed no signs of making up their time.
The 40th Machine-gun Battalion had done particularly fine work during
the day.  As an example of the gallantry which animated this unit it
may be recorded that two of the guns having been rushed by the
Germans near Ervillers, Lance-Corporal Cross volunteered to recover
them single-handed, which ne did in such fashion that seven German
prisoners appeared carrying them and marching at the point of his
revolver, an exploit for which he was decorated.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 24.]

March 24 was marked by considerable activity in the Mory district,
but no strong attack developed to the north of it.  On the front of
the Thirty-first and Fortieth Divisions, however, the battle raged
with great intensity.  The enemy had full possession of Mory by 9
A.M., and was attacking the depleted battalions opposed to them along
the whole divisional front so that they were compelled to fall slowly
back, by the late afternoon held a line about half a {29} mile east
of the Arras-Bapaume Road.  The situation to the south had been such
that the Fourth Corps had to arrange to withdraw to the west of
Bapaume, so that in any case the Sixth Corps would have been
compelled to throw back its right flank.  The Sixth Division on the
immediate right had been relieved by the Forty-first, but touch had
been lost and a gap formed, the enemy pushing on to Favreuil.  The
Forty-second Division was on the march up, however, in order to
relieve the Fortieth, and two brigades of this formed a defensive
line covering Gomiecourt.

These events had their reaction upon the Thirty-first Division to the
north.  When the enemy were seen in Mory at 9 A.M. they were upon the
flank of the 4th Guards Brigade, which at the same time could see
heavy columns massing to the east of St. Leger.  The Guards at once
dug in a new support switch line towards Ervillers and so kept touch
with the Fortieth in its new position.  The 93rd upon the left was in
the meanwhile heavily attacked in front, the enemy coming on again
and again with a powerful support from trench mortars.  These attacks
were all beaten back by the stout Yorkshire infantry, but nothing
could prevent the enemy from working round in the south and occupying
Behagnies and Sapignies.  The British artillery was particularly
masterful in this section, and no direct progress could be made by
the Germans.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 25.]

In the late afternoon of the 24th the Germans made a new and violent
attack upon the exhausted Fortieth Division and upon the 4th Guards
Brigade on the right of the Thirty-first.  In this attack the enemy
succeeded in forcing their way into Ervillers, while the Fortieth
reformed upon the west of it, so {30} as to cover Hamelincourt and
Moyenneville.  The situation in the morning of March 25 was
exceedingly critical for the two advanced brigades of the
Thirty-first, the Guards and the 93rd, who had not budged from their
position.  The enemy were now to the right rear, and if they advanced
farther northwards there was imminent danger that the defenders would
be cut off.  As usual the best defence of a dashing commander is an
attack, so the reserve brigade, the 92nd, was ordered to advance upon
Ervillers, which had already been consolidated by the 91st German
Infantry Regiment.  The 10th East Yorkshires led the attack and
seized the village once again, but the situation was still critical,
for the enemy were round the south-west, so that they enveloped the
whole right wing of the division, which was stretched to cracking
point with every man in the line.  Touch had for the moment been lost
with the troops on the right.  As the Germans poured past the right
wing of the Thirty-first they presented a menace for the future, but
a most tempting mark for the present, and ten machine-guns were kept
in continuous action for three hours upon ideal targets ranging from
300 to 1500 yards.  The enemy losses upon this occasion were
undoubtedly very heavy, but with fine persistency they kept upon
their way, as one-idea'd and undeviating as a swarm of ants in a
tropical forest.  A thick trail of their dead marked their westward
road.

There had been comparative quiet at the north of the line so that the
narrative may still concern itself with the situation which centred
round the Thirty-first Division.  The relief of the Fortieth upon the
right was now long overdue, and the men had been worked to the bone,
but the fact that Solly-Flood's {31} Forty-second Division had been
deflected to the south withheld their succours.  The Forty-first
(Lawford), however, was gradually coming into action and thickening
their shredded lines.  Sapignies in the extreme south of the corps
area had been taken by the Germans, but was recaptured in the morning
of March 25 by parts of the 120th Brigade working with the 127th
Brigade of the Forty-first Division.  Strong German reinforcements
came up, however, and the British line was pushed back in this
quarter to the north-west until it crossed the high ground east of
Gomiecourt.  This southern sector was handed over before noon from
the Sixth Corps to the Fourth, and in the evening the remains of the
Fortieth Division were finally drawn out, having finished a splendid
spell of service.  The strain upon General Ponsonby, and upon his
three Brigadiers, Crozier, Campbell, and Forbes, had been enormous,
but under the most extreme pressure their units had always maintained
the line.  Part of the 126th Brigade of the Forty-second Division was
now on the immediate right of the Thirty-first Division, the 10th
Manchesters connecting up with the 11th East Yorks and doing great
work in covering that flank.

It has already been recorded how the 92nd Brigade, all of East
Yorkshire, had beaten the 91st Prussian Regiment out of the village
of Ervillers.  A second regiment of the 2nd Guards Reserve Division,
the 77th, essayed the adventure of turning the Yorkshiremen out, but
met with a bloody repulse.  "It was a sight to see," says one who was
present.  "We were only a battalion, probably 800 strong, while he
had massed artillery and many thousands of infantry.  They came over
to us in columns, and they {32} kept coming.  They swarmed towards
us, but they made no progress, and we could not shoot fast enough.
For three and a half hours they came, and for three and a half hours
we knocked them out.  They were falling like ripe corn before the
reaper.  As fast as they fell others took their places, but they
could not move the East Yorks."  The 2nd Guards Reserve were worn out
by this experience, and it must be admitted that their service in the
battle had been long and arduous.  They were relieved by the 16th
Bavarians and the 239th Division, so that there was no surcease in
the endless pressure.

At 1.15 the 93rd West Yorkshires upon the left of the line were
attacked, but could no more be shifted than their brother Tykes in
the south.  The German stormers never reached the line, partly owing
to the excellent barrage and partly to the steady rifle-fire.  After
a long interval of following false gods, such as bombs and rifle
grenades, the British soldier was reasserting himself once more as
the best average shot of all the forces engaged, though it must be
admitted that the specialised German snipers with their weapons of
precision were of a high excellence.  All day the division stood its
ground and hit back hard at every attack, but by evening the salient
had become so extreme that it was necessary to readjust the line.
They fell back, therefore, the 92nd covering the operation, and took
up the line from Moyenneville to Ablainzeville, where they faced
round on the morning of March 26, the 92nd on the right of the line,
the 93rd upon the left, and the 4th Guards in reserve.  On their
north lay the division of Guards, on their south the Forty-second
Division.

It was on this morning that an incident occurred {33} leading to the
loss of a village, but also to a singular instance of military
virtue.  It is the episode of Moyenneville and of the 15th West
Yorkshire Battalion.  It appears that an officer in a state of
concussion from the explosion of a shell, sent an order to the left
of the line that they should retire.  The Guards and other observers
were surprised to see two British battalions walking back with sloped
arms under no pressure from the enemy.  By some chance the mistaken
order did not reach the 15th West Yorkshires, who remained isolated
in their position, and Colonel Twiss refused to follow the brigade
until a positive command should arrive.  In their loneliness they
extended each flank in search of a friend, and finally stretched
their left into Moyenneville village, which they found already
strongly occupied by the Germans.  To many minds this would have
appeared to be an excellent excuse for retirement, but its effect
upon the Yorkshire temperament was that they instantly attacked the
village and drove the intruders out.  One considerable body of
Germans was driven down into a hollow and pelted with bullets until
the survivors raised the white flag.  Very large numbers of German
wounded lay in and around the village, but it was not possible to
send them to the rear.  The enemy attacked Moyenneville again, but
the battalion covered the western exits and denied all egress.  For
the whole of that day, the whole night, and up to the afternoon of
March 27, this heroic body of infantry held their ground, though shot
at from every side and nearly surrounded.  Not one yard backwards
would they budge without a definite written order.  Not only did they
hold their own front but their machine-guns {34} played upon nine
successive waves of Germans advancing from Courcelles to Ayette, and
sorely hampered their movements to the south.  They covered 2000
yards for thirty-six hours and relieved the front of the Thirty-first
Division from pressure during that time.  When at last the survivors
made their way back only four officers and forty men represented that
gallant battalion.  Colonel Twiss was among the missing.  "This
battalion," says the official record, "by its brave action relieved
the pressure on our front throughout the whole day and gave the
division time to establish its position near Ayette."  It was as well
that this pressure should have been taken off, for both upon the 26th
and the 27th the ammunition question had become serious, and disaster
might have followed a more extended action.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 27.]

If we continue to follow the fortunes of the Thirty-first Division,
so as to bring them to their natural term, we find it now covering
the line from Ayette in the south to Ablainzeville.  The enemy were
driving up on the right of the division between Courcelles and
Ablainzeville, a space which was covered by the 92nd Brigade, who
were fighting as brilliantly as ever.  Touch had been lost with the
Forty-second upon March 27.  The East Yorkshires lost their outpost
line four times this morning and four times they cleared it with the
bayonet.  Colonel Rickman, the senior officer on the spot, fought for
every inch of ground as he retired before the ever-increasing
pressure.  Finally the 92nd, worn to rags, were ordered to reform
behind the 4th Guards Brigade at Ayette, but so high was their spirit
that when during the night there was word that the Guards {35} were
themselves hard pressed they eagerly sent help forward to them, while
the Guards, with equal chivalry of spirit, strictly limited the
number who should come.  About six in the evening the Guards threw
out a line to the south and joined up with the 10th Manchesters of
the Forty-second Division to the west of Ablainzeville, so that the
line was once more complete.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 28.]

March 28 found the battle still raging in front of the division,
which had now been engaged for four days without a break and had
beaten off the attacks of five separate German divisions.  Two
attacks were made, the one upon the 93rd Brigade, the other upon the
Guards.  Each attack got into the line and each was pitchforked out
again.  So broken was the enemy that they were seen retiring in
crowds towards the north-east under a canopy of shrapnel.  The
British barrage was particularly good that day, and many assaulting
units were beaten into pieces by it.  The division was terribly worn,
and the men could hardly stand for exhaustion, and yet it was a glad
thought that the last glimpse which their weary and bloodshot eyes
had of their enemy was his broken hordes as they streamed away from
the front which they had failed to break.  So thin were the ranks
that the pioneer battalion, the 12th Yorkshire Light Infantry, was
brought up to form the line.  The Guards had taken their position
somewhat to the west of Ayette, and some of the enemy from the south
filtered into the village, but they were shortly afterwards put out
again by Shute's Thirty-second Division, which had come up for the
relief.  There was no attack upon the 29th, and upon the 30th the
Thirty-first was able to withdraw, having established {36} a record
which may have been equalled but cannot have been surpassed by any
division in this great battle.  Five German divisions, the 111th, 2nd
Guards Reserve, 239th and 16th Bavarians, and 1st Guards Reserve, had
been wholly or partially engaged with the Thirty-first.  Both sides
had lost heavily and were exhausted.  It was here, near Ervillers,
that a German war correspondent has described how he saw the long
line of German and British wounded lying upon either side of the main
road.

It has been stated that the Thirty-second Division carried Ayette
after this unit had relieved the Thirty-first Division, and the
operation may be treated here to preserve continuity of narrative.
It was of more than local importance, as it was one of the earliest
indications that the British army was still full of fight and that in
spite of every disadvantage it meant to hit back at every
opportunity.  On taking over his section of the front, General Shute
found before him the village of Ayette, which was strongly held, but
was on the forward slope of a hill so that it could obtain little
help from the German guns.  He at once determined to attack.  The
15th Highland Light Infantry of the 14th Brigade were directed upon
the village on the night of April 2, while the 96th Brigade continued
the attack to the south.  The result was a very heartening little
success.  Three companies of the Highlanders, numbering under 300 in
all, carried the village, though it was held by a German battalion.
On the right, the 16th Lancashire Fusiliers made the attack, and in
spite of one check, which was set right by the personal intervention
of General Girdwood of the 96th Brigade, the objectives were reached.
The two attacks were {37} skilfully connected up by the 5/6th Royal
Scots, while a party of sappers of the 206th Field Company under
Lieutenant Cronin followed on the heels of the infantry and quickly
consolidated.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 24.]

Whilst these stirring events had been in progress in the south, the
north of the line had slowly drawn back in order to preserve
conformity.  The Seventeenth Corps, as already stated, were to the
west of Monchy, and the left of the Sixth Corps was on the line of
Henin, where the Third Division occupied a strong defensive position.
This was strongly attacked upon the forenoon of March 24; especially
on the 8th Brigade front, which was the right of the line, the
Germans swarming up from the south-east of Henin and trying hard to
work up the Henin-Neuville Vitasse Road.  This attack fell
particularly upon the 1st Scots Fusiliers, and it was completely
repulsed with heavy losses, though it was facilitated by the sunken
roads which converged upon Henin.  The Germans in their retirement
had to pass along a slope where once again they lost heavily.

Shortly after noon the left of the Third Division was also attacked,
and the enemy obtained a temporary footing between the 1st Gordons
and 8th Royal Lancasters of the 76th Brigade.  From this he was very
soon ejected, and though many bombing attacks were pushed with great
resolution they had no results.  March 25 was quiet upon the front of
the Third Division, though the right of the Guards Division to the
south near Boyelles was subjected to one heavy unsuccessful attack.
That evening both the Guards and the Third Division had to make some
retraction of their line in order to conform to the situation already
described in the south, but March 26 {38} passed without an attack,
the soldiers listening with anxious impatience to the roar of battle
on their right, unable to see the fight, and yet keenly conscious
that their own lives might depend upon its results.  The 27th was
also a day of anxious expectancy, culminating upon the 28th in a very
severe battle, which was the greater test coming after so long a
period of strain.  All three brigades were in the line, the 8th upon
the right, 9th in the centre, and 76th in the north.  Still farther
to the north was the 44th Highland Brigade of Reed's Fifteenth
Division upon which the storm first burst.

[Sidenote: Sixth and Seventeenth Corps.  March 28.]

This brigade at 6.45 was assailed by a bombardment of so severe a
character that its trenches were completely destroyed.  The German
infantry pushed home behind this shattering fire and drove back the
front line of the Highlanders.  This enabled them to get behind the
left flank of the 2nd Suffolks and nearly surround them, while at the
same time they pierced the front of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers
on their right.  The front line of the 8th Royal Lancasters had also
been penetrated, and the British infantry were pushed back and split
up into various small squads of men, intermingled in the north with
Highlanders of the 44th Brigade, and all fighting desperately with
the enemy swarming thickly upon them.  By 9.45 the whole front was in
German hands.  Enemy field-guns were lining Wancourt Ridge, and as
the shattered formations tried to form a new line they were heavily
shelled by them.  The loss in officers and men was very heavy,
Colonel James of the Royal Lancasters being among the dead.  The
withdrawal was made to the reserve line, which the 44th Brigade had
already occupied in the north.  {39} This included the village of
Neuville Vitasse which became untenable from shell-fire, and into the
northern portion of which the enemy was able to push, but in the main
the reserve system was occupied, the movement being covered by some
of the 1st Gordons.  At this point an equilibrium was attained and
the enemy held after as desperate a conflict as any troops could be
called upon to endure.

[Sidenote: Sixth Corps.  March 28.]

On the right of the 76th Brigade the 9th Brigade had also been
fighting very hard, and been compelled to yield some ground before
the overpowering weight of the attack, especially that of the
preliminary trench-mortar fire.  The first enemy advance in the
morning was completely beaten off with great loss.  A second attack
had driven in the 8th Brigade on the right, which enabled the Germans
to get behind the two companies of the 13th King's Liverpool who were
in the front line.  These men fought to the end and were last seen
standing on the parapet without a thought of surrender.  At the same
time a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers on their left shared
their fate, save for one officer and twelve men who survived.  The
front line of the 8th Brigade had now ceased to exist, but the
reserve line still held.  An attack upon the 7th Shropshires who,
with the remains of the other battalions, held on to it, was
successfully shattered, even the battalion headquarters being brought
into the desperate battle, while the guns on each side fought as hard
as the infantry, barrage and attack succeeding each other with
mechanical accuracy, and being answered by an equally efficient
barrage and defence, for the British guns were extraordinarily well
handled that day.  About mid-day the enemy got a lodgment {40} on the
right of the reserve line, but the Fusiliers, whose Colonel, Moulton
Barrett, had been hit, and the 13th King's still fought furiously for
what was left, and retained their ground until dusk, when they were
drawn back into the reserve line in order to conform with the 76th
Brigade.

The 8th Brigade upon the extreme right of the division had also
endured heavy losses in men and some loss in ground.  The front line
was held by companies of the 1st Scots Fusiliers and of the 7th
Shropshires.  The enemy, after an unsuccessful attempt, got into the
trenches of the latter and bombed their way along them, clearing that
section of the front.  It was bomb against rifle in the tortuous
ditches, and the bomb proved the more handy weapon.  The Scots
Fusiliers, who were the next to be assailed, made shift with
rifle-grenades, but these also ran short, and they were forced back,
so that the survivors of the two front companies were driven across
the Arras-Bapaume Road.  Finally, as in the case of the other
brigades, the reserve line was successfully maintained until evening.

No soldiers could have fought with greater bravery and skill than did
the Third Division on March 28.  They were assailed by at least three
German divisions and by a crushing artillery, but they disputed every
inch of ground, and finally fought their formidable adversary to such
a complete standstill that he could not, with several hours of
daylight at his disposal, and disorganised ranks before him, continue
his attacks.  It is true that he secured Henin and Neuville Vitasse,
but he paid a rich price in blood.  So broken were the enemy that the
British wounded came back through their ranks without let or {41}
hindrance.  A strong counter would have swept them out of the ground
that they had gained, but neither the Third nor the Fifteenth, which
had endured an equal attack upon the left, was in a condition to
advance, while the Guards had been already withdrawn in accordance
with the situation on their right.  The blow which the Germans had
received was shown even more clearly by their failure to attack upon
the next day.  On March 30 the Third Division was relieved by the
Second Canadians.  Their record was a great one, and their losses,
139 officers and 3500 men, were a measure of their services.  In nine
days, before a vastly superior force, they had only gone back 7000
yards, most of which was strategic withdrawal.  Well might General
Byng say, "By their conduct they have established a standard of
endurance and determination that will be a model for all time."

[Sidenote: Seventeenth Corps.  March 28.]

This desperate German attack on March 28 to the north of the British
line had spread right across the face of the Fifteenth Scottish
Division through the line of Orange Hill and on to Telegraph Hill,
finally involving the Fourth Division on the other side of the
Scarpe, and the right-hand unit of the Thirteenth Corps on their
left, so that Horne's First Army was now drawn into the fray, which
reached as far north as Oppy and Gavrelle.  Along the whole of this
long front there was constant fighting, which in the case of the
Fifteenth Division was as desperate as that of the Third.  All three
brigades were in the line, each of them having two battalions in
front and one in reserve.  Never has the grand tough Scottish fibre
been more rudely tested than on this terrible day of battle, and
never has it stood the strain more splendidly.  General Reed's men
{42} undoubtedly saved Arras and held up at least six German
divisions which broke themselves on that rugged and impenetrable
line, formed in the first instance by the 7th Camerons upon the
right, the 13th Royal Scots in the centre, the 9th Black Watch and
7/8 Scots Borderers on the left.  As already told, the shattering
bombardment destroyed a large part of the right front, burying the
garrison amid the ruins of their trenches, near their junction with
the Third Division.  Some fifty Camerons, under Colonel MacLeod,
fought most desperately round their headquarters, and then fell back
slowly upon the 8/10 Gordons, who were holding the Neuville Vitasse
trench behind them.  This was about 6 A.M.  By 7.40 the whole front
line, shot to pieces and with their right flank gone, readjusted
their line to correspond, winding up near the Feuchy Road.  There was
no rest nor respite, however, for the whole German plan of campaign
depended upon their getting Arras, so they poured forward their waves
of attack regardless of losses.  It was a really desperate battle in
which the Scots, lying in little groups among the shell-holes and
ditches, mowed the Germans down as they swarmed up to them, but were
themselves occasionally cut off and overpowered as the stormers found
the gaps and poured through them.  The pressure was very great on the
front of the Black Watch, north of the Cambrai Road, and there
General Reed determined upon a counter-attack, for which he could
only spare a single company of the 10th Scottish Rifles.  In spite of
the small numbers it was carried out with such dash, under the
personal lead of Colonel Stanley Clarke, that the front was cleared
for a time, and the Germans thrown back east of Feuchy.

{43}

[Sidenote: Seventeenth Corps.]

Meanwhile the Germans had made some advance to the north of the
Scarpe, and the 7/8 Scots Borderers on the left wing had to fall back
to preserve the line.  At 11 A.M. the enemy were raging in the centre
of the line, and the 6th Camerons, north of the Cambrai Road, were
forced backwards, the enemy piercing their front.  Up to 1.45 the
weight of the attack was mostly in the north, and ended by all three
brigades moving back, with the enemy still striving with the utmost
fury and ever fresh relays of men to burst the line.  At 3 P.M. the
German stormers had won the Bois des Bœufs, but were driven out
again by the 9th Black Watch and by the 11th Argylls, who had lost
their C.O., Colonel Mitchell.  The division was worn to a shadow, and
yet the moment that the German attack seemed to ease both they and
the Fourth Division on their north advanced their front.  In this
single bloody day the Fifteenth Division lost 94 officers and 2223
men, but there can be no doubt that their action, with that of the
Third Division and the Fourth on either side of them, was the main
determining factor in the whole of this vast battle.  General Reed (a
V.C. of Colenso) with his Brigadiers, Hilliard, Allgood, and Lumsden,
might well be proud of the way they held the pass.

North of the Scarpe all three brigades of the Fourth Division were
exposed to a furious attack, and lost the village of Rœux, which
was defended literally to the death by the 2nd Seaforths of the 10th
Brigade, but the 1st Hants in the front line of the 11th Brigade and
the 2nd Essex of the 12th stood like iron, and in a long day's
fighting the enemy was never able to make any serious lodgment in the
position, though the rushes of his bombing parties {44} were said by
experienced British officers to have been extraordinarily determined
and clever.  Very little ground was gained by the Germans, and of
this a section upon the left flank near Gavrelle was regained by a
sudden counter-attack of the Fourth Division.

[Sidenote: Sixth and Seventeenth Corps.  March 28.]

Of the attack to the north of the Third Army in the Bailleul and Oppy
district, it should be noted that it fell upon the Fifty-sixth London
Territorial Division, who for once had the pleasant experience of
being at the right end of the machine-gun.  They took every advantage
of their opportunity, and there are few places where the Germans have
endured heavier losses with no gains to show in return.  The
Westminsters and L.R.B.'s of the 169th Brigade were particularly
heavily engaged, and a party of the former distinguished themselves
by a most desperate defence of an outlying post, named Towy Post,
near Gavrelle, which they held long after it was passed by the enemy,
but eventually fought their way to safety.  The attack lasted from
seven in the morning till six at night, and the Londoners had full
vengeance for their comrades of July 1916 or August 1917, who had
died before the German wire even as the Germans died that day.

It was a successful day for the British arms, so successful that it
marked the practical limit of the German advance in that quarter,
which was the vital section, covering the town of Arras.  There is no
doubt that the attempt was a very serious one, strongly urged by six
divisions of picked infantry in front and four in support, with a
very powerful concentration of artillery, which was expected to smash
a way through the three divisions chiefly {45} attacked.  The
onslaught was whole-hearted and skilful, but so was the defence.  The
German losses were exceedingly high, and save for a strip of
worthless ground there was really nothing to show for them.  It was
the final check to the German advance in this quarter of the field,
so that the chronicler may well bring his record to a pause while he
returns to the first day of the battle and endeavours to trace the
fortunes of the Fourth and Fifth Corps, who formed the right half of
the Third Army.  We have fixed the northern sector of the
battle-field from Bailleul in the north right across the Scarpe and
down to the Cojeul in its position, from which it was destined to
make no change for many months to come.  It was the first
solidification of the lines, for to the south all was still fluid and
confused.

[Sidenote: Sixth and Seventeenth Corps.]

A word should be said before one finally passes from this portion of
the great epic, as to the truly wonderful work of the Army Medical
Corps.  In spite of the constant fire the surgeons and bearers were
continually in the front line and conveying the wounded to the rear.
Many thousands were saved from the tortures of a German prison camp
by the devotion which kept them within the British lines.  It may be
invidious to mention examples where the same spirit of self-sacrifice
animated all, but one might take as typical the case of the Fortieth
Division, some details of which are available.  Colonel M'Cullagh and
his men conveyed to the rear during five days, always under heavy
fire, 2400 cases of their own or other divisions, the whole of the
casualties of the Fortieth being 2800.  M'Carter, a British, and
Berney, an American surgeon, both had dressing-posts right up to the
battle-line, the latter being {46} himself wounded twice.  Wannan, a
stretcher-bearer, carried thirty cases in one day, and ended by
conveying a wounded friend several miles upon his shoulders.  Private
M'Intosh, attacked by a German while binding an injured man, killed
the cowardly fellow with his own bayonet, and then completed his
task.  It is hard to work detail into so vast a picture, but such
deeds were infinitely multiplied along that great line of battle.
Nor can one omit mention of the untiring work of the artillery, which
was in action often for several days and nights on end.  Occasionally
in some soldier's letter one gets a glimpse of the spirit of the
gunners such as no formal account can convey: "Our battery fired two
days and nights without ceasing until spotted by the German
observers.  They then kept up a terrible fire until the British guns
were silenced in succession.  One officer was left standing when I
was wounded.  He shook my hand as they carried me away.  I went
leaving him with about seven men and two guns, still carrying on as
if nothing had happened.  This is only one battery among hundreds
which showed as great pluck and tenacity as we did."




{47}

CHAPTER III

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Attack on the Fourth and Fifth Corps

Attack on Sixth and Fifty-first Divisions--Engagement of the
Twenty-fifth and Forty-first Divisions--Attack on Forty-seventh,
Sixty-third, Second, and Nineteenth Divisions--The German
torrent--Serious situation--Arrival of Sixty-second
Division--Fighting before Albert--Gallant defence by Twelfth
Division--Arrival of the New Zealanders, of the Australians, of the
Thirty-fifth Division--Equilibrium.

[Sidenote: Fourth Corps.  March 21.]

To the immediate south of the Sixth Corps the front line upon March
21 was held by Harper's Fourth Corps, which consisted of the Sixth
Division (Harden) opposite to Lagnicourt with the Fifty-first
Highland Division to the right of them, which famous unit was now
under the command of General Carter-Campbell, whose name has been
recorded in a previous volume as the only officer left standing in
his battalion after the action of Neuve Chapelle.  To the south of
the Fourth Corps was the Fifth Corps (Fanshawe) with the Seventeenth
Division (Robertson) on the left, the Sixty-third (Lawrie) in the
centre, and the Forty-seventh (Gorringe) on the right covering the
whole Cambrai salient from Flesquières in the north to the point near
Gouzeaucourt Wood where the Third Army met the left flank of the
Fifth.  The line took a considerable bend at this point, marking the
{48} ground gained at the battle of Cambrai, and it was part of the
German scheme to break through to the north and south, so that
without attacking the Fifth Corps they would either cause it to fall
back or else isolate and capture it.  Had their advance been such as
they had hoped for, they would certainly have placed it in great
peril.  Even as it was, it was necessary to withdraw the line, but
without undue haste or confusion.  Great pressure was laid upon the
Fifth Corps in later stages of the battle, but beyond a considerable
shell-fall and demonstration there was no actual attack upon March
21.  It was by holding certain sections of the line in this fashion
that the Germans were able to pile up the odds at those places which
were actually attacked.

It will be possible to describe the sequence of events with
considerably less detail in this and other sectors of the line, since
the general conditions of attack and defence may be taken as similar
to that already described.  Here also the bombardment began with its
full shattering force of high explosive, blue cross invisible gas,
mustard gas, phosgene, and every other diabolical device which the
German chemist has learned to produce and the British to neutralise.
In the case of the British infantry, many of them had to wear their
gas masks for eight hours on end, and the gunners were in even worse
plight; but these appliances, which will no doubt find a place in the
museums of our children, were of a surprising efficiency, and
hampered the experienced soldier far less than would have been
thought.

The infantry advance was at 9.45, the Germans swarming in under the
cover of Nature's smoke barrage, for here, as in several other parts
of the line, {49} a thick morning mist greatly helped the attack and
screened the stormers until they were actually up to the wire, which
had usually been shattered in advance by the trench-mortars.  The
line from Flesquières to Dernicourt in the region of the Fifty-first
Division was less seriously attacked, and remained inviolate, but the
northern stretch from Dernicourt to Lagnicourt was struck with
terrific impact, and gave before the blow to very much the same
extent as the divisions to the immediate north.  The 71st Brigade in
the Lagnicourt sector was especially hard hit, and was very violently
assailed by a strong force of Germans, which included the 1st
Prussian Guard.  This famous regiment was at one time all round the
9th Norfolks, who succeeded at last in fighting themselves clear,
though their Colonel, Prior, and the great majority of the officers
and men in the battalion were killed or wounded.  Even these wounded,
however, were safely carried off, thanks to the devotion of Captain
Failes and a handful of brave men.  In this desperate struggle the
whole brigade was decimated.  The 16th and 18th Brigades had also
suffered severely, but the division, in spite of its losses, was
splendidly solid, and fell back slowly upon the support of the 75th
Brigade of the Twenty-fifth Division, which had hastened up to the
danger point.  By evening, the Germans, advancing in great numbers
and with fine resolution, had occupied the four villages of Doignies,
Boursies, Louverval, and Lagnicourt, their total penetration from
Boursies in the south to Ecoust in the north, a stretch of seven
miles, averaging about 3000 yards.  This advance had completely
turned the left wing of the Fifty-first, which was compelled to fall
back in consequence, {50} after stopping several attacks from across
the Canal du Nord.  All three brigades of the Fifty-first Division
were in line, and of the three the left and centre had been seriously
engaged, the enemy entering the front line of both before mid-day,
and finally reaching the second system between Louverval and
Lagnicourt, so that the defence lay along the Beaumetz-Morchies line.
The Nineteenth Division was in general support in this quarter, and
the 57th Brigade became practically the right of the Fifty-first
Division.  About 7 P.M. in the evening two battalions of it, the 8th
Gloucesters and 10th Worcesters of the 57th Brigade, tried to turn
the tide of fight by a counter-attack, with the aid of tanks, against
the village of Doignies.  This attack was successful in retaking half
the village, but in the course of the night it was found necessary to
withdraw before the increasing pressure of the enemy, who brought
many machine-guns into the village.  During the night it was arranged
that the Fifth Corps should fall back from its dangerous position in
the Cambrai salient, and by eleven next day the divisions which
composed it were ranged from Highland Ridge, through Havrincourt and
Hermies, in touch with the Fourth Corps in the north and with the
left of the Fifth Army in the south.  Whilst this very heavy attack
had been made upon the Fourth Corps, Bainbridge's Twenty-fifth
Division had been in close support of the two divisions in the front
line.  While the 75th Brigade, as already stated, was pushed up under
very heavy fire to strengthen the Sixth Division in their desperate
resistance, the 74th was allotted to the Fifty-first Division, which
was in less serious need of help during the day.  Griffin's 7th
Brigade {51} remained in reserve in front of Morchies, where upon the
following morning its presence was invaluable as a solid unshaken
nucleus of resistance.  Eight German divisions were identified that
day among those which attacked the two British divisions in the front
line of the Fourth Corps.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 22.]

There was no attack during the night, but the Germans thickened their
advanced line and were all ready for another strenuous day, while the
British, though hustled and overborne by the tremendous onslaught
which had pushed them back, were still within their battle positions
and as doggedly surly as British infantry usually are in hours of
stress and trial.  Three strong attacks were made in the morning and
early afternoon between Hermies and Beaumetz, all of which were
driven back.  There is no method of gauging the losses of the enemy
upon such occasions, but when one knows that the machine-guns fired
as many as 9000 rounds each, and that a single Lewis gun discharged
30,000 bullets, one can say with certainty that they were very heavy.
These attacks fell upon the Highlanders on the right, the 7th Brigade
in the centre, and the remains of the Sixth Division upon the left.
Unhappily, a chain of defence is no stronger than its weakest link,
which finds itself so often at points of juncture.  Upon this
occasion the Germans, continually filtering forward and testing every
possible orifice, found a weakness between the 120th Brigade of the
Fortieth Division in the north and the Sixth in the south.  This weak
point was to be mended by the Forty-first Division, which had been
hurried up from Favreuil, but the time was too short, or the rent was
too wide, so that the Germans pushed rapidly through and {52} seized
the village of Vaulx-Vraumont, separating the Fourth Corps from the
Sixth.  It was an anxious moment, and coupled with the German success
at Henin Hill in the north it might have meant the isolation of the
Sixth Corps; but the necessary changes were rapidly and steadily
effected, so that before evening the Highlanders of the 120th Brigade
feeling out upon their right and fearing all would be void, joined
hands suddenly with the 15th Hampshires of the Forty-first Division
in the neighbourhood of Beugnâtre.  Before night had fallen upon
March 22 the line had been restored and built up once more, though
some five thousand yards westward of where it had been in the
morning.  That evening the Sixth Division was drawn out, weak and
dishevelled, but still full of fight.  With all the hammering and
hustling that it had endured, it had saved its heavy guns and nearly
all its field batteries.  The Forty-first Division took its place,
and incorporated for the time the 7th Brigade, a unit which had
endured hard fortune, for it had held its ground splendidly with
little loss until, after the fashion of modern war, events upon the
other side of the horizon caused it to get the order to retire, an
order which could not be obeyed without complete exposure and very
heavy casualties, including Colonel Blackall of the 4th South
Staffords.  Each day of arduous battle was followed by a no less
arduous night, during which, under heavy fire and every conceivable
difficulty the various divisions were readjusted so that the morning
light should show no impossible salients, no outlying indefensible
positions, no naked flanks, and no yawning gaps.  How easy are such
exercises over a map upon a study table, and how difficult when
conducted by dazed, {53} over-wrought officers, pushing forward their
staggering, half-conscious men in the darkness of a wilderness of
woods and fields, where the gleam of a single electric torch may mean
disaster to all!  And yet, as every morning dawned, the haggard
staff-captain at the telephone could still report to his anxious
chief that all was well, and his battle-line still intact between the
Hun and his goal.

On the morning of the battle the general disposition of the Fifth
Corps had been that the Seventeenth Division (Robertson) was in the
line on the left, the Sixty-third Naval Division (Lawrie) in the
centre, and the Forty-seventh Division (Gorringe) on the right, being
the southern unit of the Third Army, in close liaison with the Ninth
Division, the northern unit of the Fifth Army.  Two divisions were in
close reserve, the Second (Pereira) on the right, and the Nineteenth
(Jeffreys) on the left.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 21.]

The Forty-seventh Division was in a particularly important position,
since it was the flank unit and the liaison between the two armies
depended upon it.  It had only come into line the day before the
battle, taking the place of the Second Division, which was now in
immediate support.  On March 21 the 140th Brigade covered the right
of the divisional front, and the 141st the left, the sector being
that of La Vacquerie.  In view of the menacing attitude of the enemy
both the 142nd Brigade and the 4th Welsh Fusiliers Pioneer Battalion
were brought nearer to the front line.  So heavy was the gas
bombardment in the morning that the front battalion of the 140th
Brigade, the 17th London, had to evacuate some advanced trenches and
to wear their gas masks for hours on end.  The front line trenches
were blown {54} to fragments, and so also were many of their
garrison.  The following infantry advance, however, though vigorously
conducted, had no great weight, and seems to have been the work of
two battalions carrying out a subsidiary attack.  By a counter-attack
of the 19th London they were driven out once more.

Whilst this partial attack had been made upon the Forty-seventh
Division, similar assaults had been made upon the Sixty-third in the
centre, and upon the Seventeenth in the northern sector of the Fifth
Corps.  None of them made more than petty gains, but in each case the
bombardment was formidable, chiefly with trench-mortar bombs and with
gas.  In the case of the Forty-seventh Division there was a
considerable interval between the front brigades, because a number
both of the 18th and 17th London had been absolutely destroyed,
together with their trench.  There were several other partial attacks
during the day, but the pressure was never extreme, and the
withdrawal to Highland Ridge after dusk was carried out on account of
the general tactical position.  All wounded men were carried back,
and no booty left to the enemy.

Meanwhile the left flank of the Fifth Corps had been covered by the
58th Brigade of the Nineteenth Division, the 9th Welsh Fusiliers
being heavily engaged.  During March 22, Havrincourt, Herrmies, and
the Beaumetz-Hermies line were held by the Seventeenth, Nineteenth,
and Fifty-first divisions against repeated German attacks, and in the
evening the Nineteenth was in touch with the Forty-first on its left
and with the Second on its right.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 22.]

On this night of March 22 the principal change was this movement
backwards of the whole Fifth {55} Corps.  The retirement of the Fifth
Corps continued during the day of March 23, and was caused by the
necessity of conforming with the Seventh Corps to the south of it
which, after valiant exertions, soon to be described, had lost Nurlu,
so placing the enemy upon the right rear of the divisions in the
north.  Fins had also been taken in the same neighbourhood, The Fifth
Corps was now heavily pressed in its retreat, all five divisions
enduring considerable losses and having the menace of the enemy
constantly upon their right flank.  At noon the general line was east
of Equancourt, and this line was held for a time, but the enemy was
still thundering on in the north, his fresh divisions rolling in like
waves from some inexhaustible sea.  At 1.30 they were pushing their
attack most desperately upon the weary fringes of riflemen and groups
of tired machine-gunners, who formed the front of the Forty-first
Division between Beugny and Lebucquière.  In all, this division, with
the Nineteenth and Fifty-first upon their right, sustained five
strong attacks in the afternoon of this day, most of them from
Vaulx-Vraumont.  Eventually Lebucquière was taken, the enemy breaking
their way at this point through the line of the exhausted Fifty-first
Division, who had fought with splendid resolution.  This German
success placed the Nineteenth Division south of Beaumetz and at
Beugny in a very serious position, as the enemy infantry got behind
the 9th Welsh Fusiliers and 6th Wiltshires, who were only saved from
total destruction by the staunch support of the 9th Welsh at Beugny,
who held on desperately until the remains of the 58th Brigade could
get back to them.  These remains when the three battalions {56} were
reunited were only a few hundred men.  The case of the 57th Brigade,
which was fighting a hard rearguard action all afternoon, was little
better, and both the 8th Gloucesters and 10th Worcesters were almost
overwhelmed by the swarms of Germans who poured up against their
front and flank.  A splendid stand was made by this brigade
north-east of Velu, in which the men of Gloucester especially
distinguished themselves, Captain Jones of A Company receiving the
V.C. for his heroic resistance.  Colonel Hoath of the 10th Warwicks
conducted this arduous retreat, and his own battalion shares in the
honours of a fight which was tragic in its losses, but essential for
its effect upon the fortunes of the army.  Captain Gribble of this
battalion also received the V.C., his D Company falling to the last
man after the best traditions of the British army.  The 5th Brigade
of the Second Division, upon the right of the Nineteenth Division,
shared in the honours of this desperate business, the 2nd Oxford and
Bucks being very heavily engaged.  After the prolonged action the
final line of the Nineteenth Division ran west of Bertincourt, the
movement of retreat being to the south-west.  So confused had been
the fighting of the last two days that the Nineteenth Division which
had been on the right of the Fifty-first was now upon their left.
Still keeping a closely-knit line and their faces to the foe, the
Third Army stretched that night from Sailly in the south to the west
of Henin and Monchy.  The Fourth Corps, which had been so badly
mauled, was strengthened that evening by the inclusion of the
Forty-second Division.  The towers of Bapaume in the rear showed how
far across the {57} ravaged and reconquered land the British line had
retreated.

The pressure here described had been upon the left of the Fifth
Corps, but the situation upon its right flank had also been very
awkward.  The terrific weight thrown upon the Ninth Division had, as
will be described, driven them farther westward than their left-hand
companions of the Forty-seventh Division.  The result was a most
dangerous gap which exposed the whole rear of the Third Army.  The
99th Brigade in the Equancourt district endeavoured after the fall of
Fins to fill this front, but they were not nearly numerous enough for
the purpose.  The result was that the Forty-seventh Division, which
moved back on the night of March 22 from Highland Ridge to the
Metz-Dessart Wood line, had to reach out more and more upon the right
in order to save the situation.  In this operation two battalions,
the 4th Welsh Fusiliers Pioneers and the 23rd London, sustained most
of the attack and suffered very heavily upon March 23, while in the
preliminary fighting upon March 22 the 18th London had many losses.
By the morning of March 24, the Forty-seventh, beating off all
attacks and keeping their position in the unbroken line, had fallen
back to a new position, the 142nd Brigade, which formed the
rearguard, fighting hard in its retreat, and having to brush aside
those groups of Germans who had slipped in at the rear.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 24.]

The morning of March 24 found the German torrent still roaring
forward in full spate, though less formidable than before, since the
heavier guns were far to the rear.  Their light artillery,
trench-mortars, and machine-guns were always up with the storming
{58} columns, and the latter were relieved in a manner which showed
the competence of their higher command.  It was a day of doubt and
difficulty for the British, for the pressure was everywhere severe,
and the line had frayed until it was very thin, while officers and
men had reached the last limits of human endurance.  At 8.30 in the
morning the enemy was pressing hard upon the Seventeenth and
Forty-seventh Divisions in the region of Bus and Le Mesnil, where
they were endeavouring to keep in touch with the worn remains of the
heroic Ninth Division on the left of the Seventh Corps.  Sailly
Saillisel was still clear of the enemy, but the tide was flowing
strongly towards it.  The 51st Brigade of the Seventeenth Division
occupied this village and threw out its left to the Londoners on the
north of them.  Bertincourt, which had become a dangerous salient,
was evacuated, and the line now ran east of Haplincourt and
Rocquigny, the three brigades of the Seventeenth Division occupying
this latter village, Barastre, and Villers-au-Flos.  On their north
were two brigades of the Forty-seventh, the remaining brigade being
south of Le Transloy.  North of the Forty-seventh Division the
Sixty-third Naval Division and the Second Division carried the line
on to the junction with the Fourth Corps, where the exhausted
Nineteenth Division lay across the Cambrai Road, with the even more
shattered Fifty-first Division at Riencourt to the north of them.
There was some very furious fighting in front of Rocquigny about
mid-day, in which the 12th Manchesters of the Seventeenth Division,
and the three battalions (18th, 19th, 20th London) of the 141st
Brigade made a very desperate resistance.  The fighting was continued
until the {59} defenders found themselves in danger of being
surrounded, when they were withdrawn.  The 140th Brigade, under
Colonel Dawes, also did great service that day in holding the Germans
from getting behind the line.  The enemy was so far round that there
was the greatest difficulty in clearing the transport, which was only
accomplished by the fine rearguard work of the 4th Welsh Fusiliers,
aided by the 11th Motor Machine-gun Battery, and 34th Brigade R.F.A.

It was, however, to the south, where the Third and Fifth Armies were
intermittently joined and vaguely interlocked, that the danger
chiefly lay.  About noon, the enemy, finding the weak spot between
the two armies, had forced his way into Sailly Saillisel in
considerable force, and pushed rapidly north and west from the
village.  So rapid was the German advance upon the right rear of the
Fifth Corps that Rancourt and even Combles were said to have fallen.
In vain the Seventeenth Division overstretched its wing to the south,
trying to link up with the Seventh Corps.  Early in the afternoon
Morval and Les Bœufs had gone, and the troops were back upon the
mud-and-blood areas of 1916.  For the moment it seemed that the
British line had gone, and it was hard to say what limit might be put
to this very serious advance.  By midnight the enemy were north of
Bapaume, and had reached Ervillers, while in the south they had taken
Longueval, the key village of Delville Wood.  It was indeed a sad
relapse to see all that the glorious dead had bought with their
hearts' blood reverting so swiftly to the enemy.  In the north,
however, as has already been shown in the story of the Sixth Corps,
the enemy's bolt was shot, {60} and in the south his swift career was
soon to be slowed and held.

In the Favreruil, Sapignies, and Gomiecourt district, north of
Bapaume, the advance was mainly accomplished through the pressure of
fresh German forces upon the exhausted and attenuated line of the
Forty-first Division, which still struggled bravely, and in the end
successfully, against overwhelming odds.  In the effort to hold a
line the divisions which had been drawn out as too weak for service
turned back once more into the fray like wounded men who totter
forward to strike a feeble blow for their comrades in distress.  The
Sixth Division was led in once more, and sustained fresh and terrible
losses.  Its left fell back to Favreuil, exposing the right wing of
the Fortieth Division.  The Twenty-fifth Division to the east of
Achiet found itself also once more overtaken by the battle.  By
evening the line had been built up again in this quarter, and the
dead-weary British infantry snatched a few hours of sleep before
another day of battle.  The Nineteenth Division, reduced to 2000
rifles, lay from Le Barque to Avesnes, with the Second upon their
right and the Forty-first upon their left, while the whole of this
difficult retreat had been covered by the weary but indomitable
Highlanders of the Fifty-first.

The really serious situation was to the south of Bapaume upon the old
Somme battle-field, where the Germans had made sudden and alarming
progress.  Their temporary success was due to the fact that the
losses in the British lines had contracted the ranks until it was
impossible to cover the whole space or to prevent the infiltration of
the enemy between the units.  The situation required some complete
and {61} vigorous regrouping and reorganisation if complete disaster
was to be avoided.  Up to this point the British Higher Command had
been unable to do much to help the two hard-pressed armies, save to
supply them with the scanty succours which were immediately
available.  Now, however, it interfered with decision at the vital
spot and in the vital moment.  To ensure solidity and unity,
Congreve's Seventh Corps, which had been the northern unit of the
Fifth Army, became from this time onwards the southern unit of the
Third Army, passing under the command of General Byng.  With them
went the First, Second, and Third Cavalry Divisions, which had been
doing really splendid service in the south.  Everything north of the
Somme was now Third Army.  At the same time the three fine and fresh
Australian Divisions, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth, were assembling
near Doullens in readiness to strike, while the Twelfth British
Division was also hurried towards the place of danger.  The future
was dark and dangerous, but there were also solid grounds for hope.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 21.]

On the morning of March 25 the line of the Third Army, which had
defined itself more clearly during the night, ran from Curlu near the
Somme, east of Bazentin, west of Longueval, east of Martinpuich,
through Ligny Thilloy, Sapignies, Ervillers, and hence as before.
The enemy, whose cavalry were well up and in force, at once began his
thrusting tactics in the southern section of the field, and may have
expected, after his advance of the day before, to find some signs of
weakening resistance.  In this he was disappointed, for both the 47th
Londoners in front of Contalmaison and the Second Division at Ligny
Thilloy beat off several attacks with {62} very great loss to the
assailants.  The units were much broken and mixed, but the spirit of
the individuals was excellent.  The pressure continued, however, to
be very great, and in the afternoon the line was once more pushed to
the westwards.  There was severe fighting between Bapaume and
Sapignies, where mixed and disorganised units still held the Germans
back, but in the late afternoon three distinct gaps had appeared in
the line, one between the Seventh and Fifth Corps, one in the Fifth
Corps itself in the Pozières area of the Sixty-third Division, and
one between the Fifth and the Fourth Corps.  Fortunately, the
resistance had been so desperate that by the time the Germans had
their opportunity they were always so bedraggled themselves that they
could not take full advantage of it.  The general order of divisions
in this area, counting from the south of Contalmaison, was
Seventeenth, Forty-seventh, Sixty-third, Second, upon the morning of
March 25.

The Seventh Corps, the previous adventures of which will be described
under the heading of the Fifth Army, had now become the right wing of
the Third Army.  It had been strengthened by the advent of the
Thirty-fifth Division, and this unit now covered from west of Curlu
to east of Maricourt, where it touched the right of the Ninth
Division--if the thin ranks of that gallant band can be dignified by
so imposing a title.  The Highlanders covered the front to Montauban,
where they touched the First Cavalry Division, but beyond that the
enemy were pouring round their flank at Bernafoy and Mametz Woods.
It was under these trying conditions that the Twelfth Division was
ordered up, about noon, to secure the {63} left of the Seventh Corps
and entirely stopped the dangerous gap.

Another had formed farther north.  The Seventeenth Division, who were
on the right of the Fifth Corps, held from Mametz to Contalmaison.
Thence to Pozières was held by the Forty-seventh.  A gap existed,
however, upon their left, between them and the Sixty-third Division,
who were gradually falling back upon Courcelette.  The left of the
Naval Division was also in the air, having lost touch with the right
of the Second Division who were covering Le Sars.  North of them the
Nineteenth Division extended from the west of Grevillers to the south
of Bihucourt.  The 57th Brigade in the north, under the local command
of Colonel Sole, fought a fine rearguard action as the enemy tried to
debouch from Grevillers.  Considering how terribly mauled this
brigade had been a few days before, this was a really splendid
performance of these brave Midlanders, and was repeated by them more
than once during the day.  From their left flank to the north
stretched a new division, Braithwaite's Sixty-second, which had
upheld the honour of Yorkshire so gloriously at Cambrai.  Their line
ran west of Sapignies and joined the Forty-second Division at the
point where they touched the Sixth Corps, east of Ervillers.

The front of the Sixty-second stretched from Bucquoy to Puisieux.
The enemy kept working round the right flank, and the situation there
was very dangerous, for everything to the immediate south was in a
state of flux, shreds and patches of units endeavouring to cover a
considerable stretch of all-important country.  South of Puisieux
there was a gap of four or five miles before one came to {64} British
troops.  Into this gap in the very nick of time came first the 4th
Brigade of the Second Australian Division, and later the New Zealand
Division in driblets, which gradually spanned the vacant space.  It
was a very close call for a break through without opposition.  Being
disappointed in this the Germans upon March 26 spent the whole
afternoon in fierce attacks upon the Sixty-second Division, but got
little but hard knocks from Braithwaite's Yorkshiremen.  The 186th
Brigade on the right threw back a flank to Rossignol Wood to cover
the weak side.

Meanwhile the enemy had made a spirited attempt to push through
between the Seventh Corps and the Fifth.  With this design he
attacked heavily, bending back the thin line of the Ninth Division,
who were supported by the Twenty-first Division, numbering at this
period 1500 men.  At four in the afternoon the German stormers got
into Maricourt, but they were thrust out again by the Thirty-fifth
Division.  They had better success farther north, where in the late
evening they got round the left flank of the Forty-seventh Division
and occupied Pozières.  The Londoners threw out a defensive line to
the north and awaited events, but the general position between the
Fifth and Fourth Corps was serious, as the tendency was for the gap
to increase, and for the Fourth Corps to swing north-west while the
other turned to the south-west.  The Twelfth Division was transferred
therefore from the Seventh to the Fifth Corps, and was given a line
on the west bank of the Ancre from Albert to Hamel.  This move proved
in the sequel to be a most effective one.  In the evening of this
day, March 25, the line from Bray to Albert exclusive was allotted to
the Seventh Corps, {65} which was directed to leave a covering party
as long as possible on a line from the River Somme to Montauban, in
order to safeguard the retirement of the Fifth Army.  Then came the
Twelfth Division covering Albert, then the remains of the
Forty-seventh and of the Second from Thiepval to Beaumont Hamel, all
moving across the Ancre.  It is said that during the retreat from
Moscow an officer having asked who were the occupants of a certain
sledge, was answered: "The Royal Regiment of Dutch Guards."  It is in
a somewhat similar sense that all mentions of battalions, brigades,
and divisions must be taken at this stage of the battle.  The right
of the Fourth Corps was threatened by an irruption of the enemy at
Pys and Irles, who threatened to get by this route round the flank of
the Sixty-second Division, but found the Twenty-fifth Division still
had vitality enough left to form a defensive flank looking south.  At
the same time the Forty-second Division had been driven back west of
Gomiecourt, and was out of touch with the right of the Sixth Corps.
Things were still serious and the future dark.  Where was the retreat
to be stayed?  Was it destined to roll back to Amiens or possibly to
Abbeville beyond it?  The sky had clouded, the days were mirk, the
hanging Madonna had fallen from the cathedral of Albert, the troops
were worn to shadows.  The twilight of the gods seemed to have come.

It was at that very moment that the first light of victory began to
dawn.  It is true that the old worn divisions could hardly be said
any longer to exist, but the new forces, the Yorkshiremen of the
Sixty-second in the north, the New Zealanders and the Twelfth in the
centre, and very particularly the {66} three splendid divisions of
Australians in the area just south of Albert, were the strong
buttresses of the dam which at last held up that raging tide.  Never
should our British Imperial troops forget the debt which they owed to
Australia at that supreme hour of destiny.  The very sight of those
lithe, rakish dare-devils with their reckless, aggressive bearing, or
their staider fresh-faced brethren with the red facings of New
Zealand, was good for tired eyes.  There was much still to be done
before an equilibrium should be reached, but the rough outline of the
permanent positions had even now, in those hours of darkness and
danger, been traced across the German path.  There was but one gap on
the morning of March 26, which lay between Auchonvillers and
Hebuterne, and into this the New Zealand Division and one brigade of
the Second Australians were, as already stated, hurriedly sent, the
New Zealanders supporting and eventually relieving the Second British
Division, while the Australians relieved the Nineteenth.  The line
was attacked, but stood firm, and the New Zealanders actually
recaptured Colincamps.

[Sidenote: March 26.]

The chief fighting both of this day and of the next fell upon Scott's
Twelfth Division, which lay before Albert, and was occupying the
western side of the railway line.  So vital was the part played by
the Twelfth in this quarter, and so strenuous their work, that a
connected and more detailed account of it would perhaps not be out of
place.  The 37th Brigade was in the north-east of Mesnil and Aveluy
Wood, the 36th in the centre, and the 35th on the west bank of the
Ancre, with outposts to cover the crossings at Albert and Aveluy.
{67} The men were fresh and eager, but had only their rifles to trust
to, for they had neither wire, bombs, rifle-grenades, Very lights, or
signals, having been despatched at the shortest notice to the
battle-field.  Their orders were to hold their ground at all costs,
and most valiantly they obeyed it.  It is only when one sees a map of
the German forces in this part of the field, with the divisions
marked upon it like flies upon fly-paper, that one understands the
odds against which these men had to contend.  Nor was the efficiency
of the enemy less than his numbers.  "The Germans scouted forward in
a very clever manner, making full use of the old chalk trenches,"
says an observer.  In the north upon the evening of March 26 the
enemy crept up to Mesnil, and after a long struggle with the 6th
Queen's forced their way into the village.  Shortly after midnight,
however, some of the 6th Buffs and 6th West Kents, together with part
of the Anson battalion from the Sixty-third Division, won back the
village once more, taking twelve machine-guns and a number of
prisoners.  The other two brigades had not been attacked upon the
26th, but a very severe battle awaited them all upon March 27.  It
began by a heavy shelling of Hamel in the morning, by which the
garrison was driven out.  The Germans then attacked southwards down
the railway from Hamel, but were held up by the 6th West Kents.  The
pressure extended, however, to the 9th Royal Fusiliers of the 36th
Brigade upon the right of the West Kents, who had a long, bitter
struggle in which they were assisted by the 247th Field Company of
the Royal Engineers and other elements of the 188th Brigade.  This
brigade, being already worn to a shadow, was {68} withdrawn, while
another shadow, the 5th Brigade, took its place, one of its
battalions, the 24th Royal Fusiliers, fighting stoutly by the side of
the West Kents.  There was a time when the pressure was so great that
all touch was lost between the two brigades; but the line was held
during the whole of the day and night of the 27th and on into the
28th.  At eleven o'clock in the morning of this day a new attack by
fresh troops was made upon the West Kents and the 7th Sussex, and the
men of Kent were at one time driven back, but with the aid of the
24th Royal Fusiliers the line was entirely re-established.  The whole
episode represented forty-eight hours of continual close combat
until, upon March 29, this front was relieved by the Second Division.
Apart from the heavy casualties endured by the enemy, this gain of
time was invaluable at a crisis when every day meant a thickening of
the British line of resistance.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 27.]

The fight upon the right wing of the 36th Brigade had been equally
violent and even more deadly.  In the fight upon March 27, when the
Royal West Kents and 9th Fusiliers were so hard pressed in the north,
their comrades of the 5th Berks and 7th Sussex had been very heavily
engaged in the south.  The Germans, by a most determined advance,
drove a wedge between the Berkshires and the Sussex, and another
between the Sussex and the Fusiliers, but in each case the isolated
bodies of men continued the desperate fight.  The battle raged for a
time round the battalion headquarters of the Sussex, where Colonel
Impey, revolver in hand, turned the tide of fight like some leader of
old.  The losses were terrible, but the line shook itself clear of
Germans, and though they attacked again upon the morning of March 28,
{69} they were again beaten off, and heavily shelled as they plodded
in their sullen retreat up the hillside to La Boisselle.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 26.]

Meanwhile, the 35th Brigade had also been fighting for its life to
the south.  Albert had fallen to the Germans, for it was no part of
the plan of defence to hold the town itself, but the exits from it
and the lines on each side of it were jealously guarded.  At 7 P.M.
on March 26 the Germans were in the town, but they had practically
reached their limit.  Parties had crossed the Ancre, and there were
attacked by the 7th Norfolks, who were supported in a long fight upon
the morning of the 27th by the 9th Essex and the 5th Northants
Pioneer Battalion.  The line was held, partly by the aid given by the
51st Brigade of the Seventeenth Division, who numbered just 600 men
and were led by Major Cubbon.  Whilst the line was held outside
Albert, the Germans in the town had a very deadly time, being fired
at at short ranges by the 78th and 79th Brigades Royal Field
Artillery.  The 7th Suffolks were drawn into the infantry fight,
which became a more and more desperate affair, involving every man
who could be thrown into it, including two battalions, the 1st
Artists and 10th Bedfords from the 190th Brigade of the Sixty-third
Division.  These latter units suffered very heavily from machine-gun
fire before ever they reached the firing-line.  At 8 A.M. upon March
28 the Germans were still pouring men through Albert, but were
utterly unable to debouch upon the other side under the murderous
fire of the British.  A single company of the 9th Essex fired 15,000
rounds, and the whole slope which faced them was dotted with the
German dead.  The town of {70} Albert formed a covered line of
approach, and though the British guns were still pounding the
buildings and the eastern approaches, the Germans were able to
assemble in it during darkness and to form up unseen in great numbers
for the attack.  At ten in the morning of the 28th another desperate
effort was made to get through and clear a path for all the hordes
waiting behind.  The British artillery smothered one attack, but a
second broke over the 7th Norfolks and nearly submerged them.  Both
flanks were turned, and in spite of great work done by Captain
Chalmers with his machine-guns the battalion was nearly surrounded.
The losses were terrible, but the survivors formed up again half a
mile to the west, where they were again attacked in the evening and
again exposed to heavy casualties, including their commanding
officer.  Few battalions have endured more.  Late that night the 10th
West Yorkshires of the Seventeenth Division came to their relief.
The whole of the Twelfth Division was now rested for a time, but they
withdrew from their line in glory, for it is no exaggeration to say
that they had fought the Germans to an absolute standstill.

We shall now return to March 26, a date which had been darkened by
the capture of Albert.  Apart from this success upon the German side,
which brought them into a town which they had not held for years, the
general line in this quarter began to assume the same outline as in
1916 before the Somme battle, so that Hebuterne and Auchonvillers
north of Albert were in British hands, while Serre and Puisieux were
once more German.  The existence of the old trenches had helped the
weary army to hold this definite line, and as already shown it had
received {71} reinforcements which greatly stiffened its resistance.
The dangerous gap which had yawned between the Fourth and Fifth Corps
was now successfully filled.  In the morning of March 27 all was
solid once more in this direction.  At eleven on that date, an
inspiriting order was sent along the line that the retreat was over
and that the army must fight out the issue where it stood.  It is the
decisive call which the British soldier loves and never fails to
obey.  The line was still very attenuated in parts, however, and it
was fated to swing and sway before it reached its final stability.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 27.]

The fighting upon the front of the Sixty-second Division at Bucquoy
upon March 27 was as heavy as on the front of the Twelfth to the
south, and cost the Germans as much, for the Lewis guns had wonderful
targets upon the endless grey waves which swept out of the east.  The
5th West Ridings, east of Rossignol Wood, were heavily engaged, the
Germans bombing their way very cleverly up the old trenches when they
could no longer face the rifle-fire in the open.  There were three
separate strong attacks on Bucquoy, which covered the slopes with
dead, but the persistent attempts to get round the right wing were
more dangerous.  These fell chiefly on the 2/4 Yorks Light Infantry
between Rossignol Wood and Hebuterne, driving this battalion in.  A
dangerous gap then developed between the British and the Australians,
but a strong counter-attack of the 5th Yorkshire Light Infantry after
dark, with the Australians and four tanks co-operating, recovered
nearly all the lost ground.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 28.]

On March 28 there was again a very heavy attack upon the 186th
Brigade.  The stormers surged right {72} up to the muzzles of the
rifles, but never beyond them.  Over 200 dead were found lying in
front of one company.  One isolated platoon of the 5th West Ridings
was cut off and was killed to the last man.  Farther to the right
there were several determined attacks upon the 187th Brigade and the
4th Australian Brigade, the latter being under the orders of the
Sixty-second Division.  These also were repulsed in the open, but the
bombing, in which the Germans had the advantage of a superiority of
bombs, was more difficult to meet, and the 5th Yorkshire Light
Infantry were driven from Rossignol Wood and the ground which they
had so splendidly captured the night before.

About 11 A.M. on this day the Forty-first Division had been ordered
up to man the east of Gommecourt.  A brigade of this division, the
124th, co-operated with the 8th West Yorkshires and some of the
Australians in a fresh attack upon Rossignol Wood, which failed at
first, but eventually, after dark, secured the north end of the wood,
and greatly eased the local pressure.  On March 29 and 30 the
positions were safely held, and the attacks less dangerous.  On the
evening of the latter date the Sixty-second Division was relieved by
the Thirty-seventh.

Whilst these events had occurred upon the front of the Sixty-second
Division, Russell's New Zealanders were holding the line to the south
in their usual workmanlike fashion.  From March 26 they held up the
Germans, whose main attacks, however, were north and south of them,
though March 27 saw several local advances against the Canterburys
and the Rifles.  On March 30 the New Zealanders hit {73} back again
at La Signy Farm, with good results, taking 295 prisoners.  It was a
smart little victory at a time when the smallest victory was indeed
precious.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 21.]

Reverting now to the general situation upon March 27, the weak point
was north and south of the Somme to the south of Albert.  Between the
river and Harbonnière the left wing of the Fifth Army had been
broken, as will be told when we come to consider the operations in
that area.  The German advance was pouring down the line of the river
with the same fierce rapidity with which it had recently thundered
forward over the old Somme battle-fields.  Having annihilated the
local resistance on the left bank of the river, where Colonel Horn
and 400 nondescripts did all that they could, they were pushing on
from Cerisy to Corbie.  General Watts of the Nineteenth Corps, whose
defence was one of the outstanding features of the whole operations,
was hard put to it to cover his left wing, so in loyal co-operation
the Third Army north of the river detached the hard-worked Cavalry
Corps, who were always called upon at moments of supreme crisis, and
who never failed to answer the call.  It was actually engaged to the
north of the river at the time, but disengaged itself in part, though
the enemy was holding Cerisy and Chipilly and had got a bridge across
the river which would enable them to get to the rear of General
Watts' Corps.  The means by which this very dangerous German move was
kept within bounds comes within the history of the Fifth Army.
Suffice it to say that the cavalry passed over the river and that the
Seventh Corps, north of the river, extended to cover the {74} wider
front, throwing out a defensive flank along the north bank from
Sailly-le-Sec to Aubigny.

Along the whole line to the north the pressure was great all day upon
March 27, but the attacks upon the Fourth Corps, which were
particularly severe, were repulsed with great loss at Beaumont Hamel,
Bucquoy, north of Puisieux, and at Ablainzeville.  Near Bucquoy the
Sixty-second Division in these two days repelled, as already
narrated, eight separate German attacks.  This fighting has to be
fitted in with that recounted in the previous chapter near Ayette, in
connection with the Thirty-first Division, in order to get a complete
view of the whole German effort and the unbroken British line.  Hamel
was the only fresh village to the north of Albert which was taken by
the Germans that day.

[Sidenote: Fourth and Fifth Corps.  March 21.]

March 28 was remarkable for the very desperate engagement upon the
front of the Sixth and Seventeenth Corps, which has been already
described, and which marked the limit of the whole German advance in
the northern area.  The Fourth Corps farther south had its own share
of the fighting, however, as already told in connection with the
defence of Bucquoy by the Sixty-second Division.  The line was held,
however, and save for a small strip of Rossignol Wood, no gain at all
came to solace the Germans for very heavy losses.

All through these operations it is worthy of note that an important
part was played by reorganised bodies of men, so mixed and broken
that no name can be assigned to them.  Officers stationed in the rear
collected these stragglers, and led them back into gaps of the line,
where their presence was sometimes of vital importance.  A divisional
general, {75} speaking of these curious and irregular formations,
says: "There was no panic of any kind.  The men of all divisions were
quite willing to halt and fight, but as the difficulty of orders
reaching them made them uncertain as to their correct action, they
came back slowly and in good order.  Once they received some definite
orders they fell into line and dug themselves in at once."  At one
point 4000 men were collected in this fashion.

In the Australian area the enemy occupied Dernancourt, but otherwise
the whole line was intact.  It was still necessary, however, to keep
a defensive line thrown back along the north bank of the Somme, as
the situation to the south, especially at Marcelcave, was very
dangerous.  Thus, the Seventh Corps covered this flank from Corbie to
Sailly, and then ran north to Treux on the Albert-Amiens Railway.
The arrival of the cavalry to the south of the river had spliced the
weak section, so that on the morning of March 29 the British
commanders from north to south had every cause to be easier in their
minds.  An inactive day was the best proof of the severity of the
rebuff which the Germans had sustained the day before, nor were
matters improved from their point of view when upon March 30 they
attacked the Australians near Dernancourt and lost some thousands of
men without a yard of gain, or when the New Zealanders countered
them, with the capture of 250 prisoners and many machine-guns.

This small chronicle of huge events has now brought the southern half
of the Third Army to the same date already reached in the previous
chapter by the northern half.  The narrative has by no means reached
the limit of the fighting carried on {76} by this portion of the
line, but equilibrium has roughly been attained, and if the story be
now continued it leaves too wide a gap for the reader to cross when
he has to return to the history of the Fifth Army upon the 21st of
March.  Therefore we shall leave the Third Army for the time and only
return to it when we have followed the resistance of the Fifth Army
up to the same date.

[Sidenote: Third Army.  March 28.]

Before starting upon this new epic, it would be well to remind the
reader of the general bearing of the events already described, as it
is very easy in attention to detail to lose sight of the larger
issues.  The experience of the Third Army then, put in its briefest
form, was that the attack upon March 21 fell with terrific violence
upon the two central corps, the Sixth and Fourth; that these, after a
most valiant resistance, were forced to retire; that the strategical
situation thus created caused the Seventeenth Corps in the north and
the Fifth Corps in the south to fall back, and that both of them were
then pressed by the enemy; that for six days the army fell slowly
back, fighting continual rearguard actions against superior numbers;
that this movement involved only a short retreat in the north, but a
longer one in the south, until in the Albert region it reached its
maximum; that finally the Germans made a determined effort upon March
28 to break the supple and resilient line which had always faced
them, and that this attempt, most gallantly urged, involved the Corps
in the north as well as the whole line of the Third Army.  The result
of this great battle was a bloody defeat for the Germans, especially
in the northern sector, where they made hardly any gain of ground and
lost such vast numbers of men that their whole {77} enterprise was
brought to a complete standstill and was never again resumed in that
quarter.

The losses of the Third Army during that week of desperate fighting
when, in spite of the heroic efforts of the Medical Corps, the
wounded had frequently to be abandoned, and when it was often
impossible to get the guns away intact, were very severe.  Many
divisions which numbered their 9000 infantry upon March 21 could not
put 1500 in the line upon March 28.  These losses were not, however,
so great as they might appear, since the constant movement of troops,
carried on very often in pitch darkness, made it impossible to keep
the men together.  An official estimate taken at the time and subject
to subsequent revision put the loss of guns at 206, only 23 of which
were above the 6-inch calibre.  Forty-three others were destroyed.
The casualties in the Third Army during the period under review might
be placed approximately at 70,000, divided into 10,000 killed, 25,000
missing, and 35,000 wounded.  The heaviest losses were in the
Fifty-ninth Division, which gave 5765 as its appalling total, but the
Sixth Division was little behind it, and the Forty-second,
Forty-seventh, and Fifty-first were all over 4000.  The Thirty-fifth
Division had also a most honourable record, enduring very heavy
losses in which the numbers of missing were comparatively small.  Its
work, however, was chiefly done at a later date than that which
closes this chapter.  In the estimate of losses there has to be
included practically the whole personnel of the devoted battalions
who held the forward line upon the first day of the German attack.
In connection with the large number of stragglers, who were
afterwards gathered together and showed {78} by their conduct that
they had no want of stomach for the fight, it is to be remembered
that the men had been accustomed to the narrow routine of trench
operations, that most of them had no idea of open warfare, and that
when they found themselves amidst swift evolutions over difficult
country, carried on frequently in darkness, it was very natural that
they should lose their units and join the throng who wandered down
the main roads and were eventually rounded up and formed into
formations at the river crossings or other places where they could be
headed off.  Among the casualties were many senior officers,
including General Bailey of the 142nd Brigade.




{79}

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Attack upon the Fifth Army.  March 21.

The Fifth Army front--The story of a Redoubt--Attack upon Congreve's
Seventh Corps--Upon Watts' Nineteenth Corps--Upon Maxse's Eighteenth
Corps--Upon Butler's Third Corps--Terrific pressure--Beginning of the
Retreat--Losses of Guns.

[Sidenote: Fifth Army.  March 21.]

In dealing with the German attack upon the Fifth Army, the first
point which should be emphasised is, that heavy as the fighting was
in the north, still it was this southern advance which was the main
one.  The official account of the disposition of the German forces
brings this fact out very clearly.  From the Sensée River to the
Bapaume-Cambrai Road they are stated to have had nine divisions in
line and eight in close reserve, covering a front of nine miles.  In
the eight miles from Cambrai Road to La Vacquerie they had four
divisions.  In the southern area from La Vacquerie down to La Fère
they had twenty-three divisions in the line and seventeen in reserve,
covering a front of over forty miles.  This front was defended by
eleven British divisions, with three divisions of infantry and three
of cavalry in reserve.  So far as infantry was concerned the odds
were 40 to 14, while the German guns numbered about 3500 to 1300 on
the British {80} line.  These odds were serious enough if directed
equally along the whole area, but when thrown in on special sectors
they became more crushing.  To add to the total picture of German
strength, it should be added that twenty-five fresh divisions were
thrown into the fight during the first week, nine upon the Scarpe
front, three between the Ancre and the Somme, seven between the Somme
and Montdidier, and six between Montdidier and the Oise.  Against
these have to be set British reinforcements, and the influx of French
from the south.  It was only on the first five days of battle that
the odds were so overpoweringly with the Germans.

In this chapter we shall endeavour to gain a superficial view of the
general course of events upon the whole front of the Fifth Army upon
the fateful March 21.  We shall then be in a position to appreciate
the situation as it was in the evening and to understand those
decisions on the part of General Gough and his subordinates which
influenced the subsequent operations.

The front of the Fifth Army extended from its junction with the Third
Army in the neighbourhood of La Vacquerie to Barisis, a village some
miles south of the Oise, the total frontage being nearly forty miles.
This was occupied by four corps.  The northern was the Seventh, under
General Congreve, a well-known soldier, whose V.C. and shattered arm
proclaimed his past services to the Empire.  This corps covered the
southern part of the dangerous Cambrai salient and extended to the
region of Ronssoy.  From this point to Maissemy the line was held by
General Watts with the Nineteenth Corps.  Upon his right, extending
as far as north of Essigny, {81} was General Maxse with the
Eighteenth Corps.  From thence to Barisis lay the Third Corps under
General Butler.  All four were soldiers of wide experience, their
leader, General Gough, had never failed in any task to which he had
laid his hand, and the troops in the line comprised some of the
flower of the British army, so that in spite of all disparity of
numbers there was a reasonable hope for success.  Arrangements had
been made by which the French or British could send lateral help to
each other; but it must be admitted that the liaison work proved to
be defective, and that the succours were slower in arriving, and less
equipped for immediate action, than had been expected.

The fortifications along the front of the Fifth Army were of various
degrees of strength, depending upon the nature of the ground and upon
the time that it had been in British possession, the north being
stronger than the south.  The Oise, which had been looked upon as an
obstacle, and the presence of which had seemed to justify the
extraordinarily long sector held by the Third Corps, had to some
extent dried up and had ceased to be a real protection.  In the main,
the defences consisted of a forward line, a chain of small redoubts,
each with four machine-guns and all connected by posts; a battle-line
which was strongly wired and lay about 3000 yards behind the forward
line; and a rear zone, the fortifications of which were not complete.
If anything were wanting in the depth of the defences it has to be
remembered that we are speaking of a vast tract of country, and that
to dig a serviceable trench from London, we will say, to Guildford,
furnishing it with sand-bags and wire, is a mighty {82} task.  There
were no enslaved populations who could be turned on to such work.
For months before the attack the troops, aided by the cavalry and by
several special entrenching battalions, were digging incessantly.
Indeed, the remark has been made that their military efficiency was
impaired by the constant navvy work upon which they were employed.
There is no room for criticism upon this point, for everything
possible was done, even in that southern sector which had only been a
few weeks in British possession.

Before beginning to follow the history of March 21, it would be well
to describe the position and number of the reserves, as the course of
events depended very much upon this factor.  Many experienced
soldiers were of opinion that if they had been appreciably more
numerous, and considerably nearer the line, the positions could have
been made good.  The three infantry divisions in question were the
Thirty-ninth, which was immediately behind the Seventh Corps, the
Twentieth, which was in the neighbourhood of Ham, and was allotted to
the Eighteenth Corps, and the Fiftieth, which was in general army
reserve, and about seven hours' march from the line.  The First
Cavalry Division was in the rear of the Nineteenth Corps, while the
Second Cavalry Division was on the right behind the Third Corps.  The
Third Cavalry Division was in billets upon the Somme, and it also was
sent to the help of the Third Corps.  Besides these troops the
nearest supports were at a distance of at least three days' journey,
and consisted of a single unit, the Eighth Division.

The German preparations for the attack had not been unobserved and it
was fully expected upon the {83} morning of the battle, but what was
not either expected or desired was the ground mist, which seems to
have been heavier in the southern than in the northern portion of the
line.  So dense was it that during the critical hours when the
Germans were pouring across No Man's Land it was not possible to see
for more than twenty yards, and the whole scheme of the forward
defence, depending as it did upon machine-guns, placed in depth and
sweeping every approach, was completely neutralised by this freak of
nature, which could not have been anticipated, for it was the first
time such a thing had occurred for two months.  Apart from the
machine-guns, a number of isolated field-guns had been sown here and
there along the front, where they had lurked in silence for many
weeks waiting for their time to come.  These also were rendered
useless by the weather, and had no protection from the German
advance, which overran and submerged them.

The devastating bombardment broke out along the line about five
o'clock, and shortly after ten it was known that the German infantry
had advanced and had invaded the whole of the forward zone, taking a
few of the redoubts, but in most cases simply passing them in the
fog, and pushing on to the main British line.  As it is impossible to
give the experiences of each redoubt in detail, the story of one may
be told as being fairly typical of the rest.  This particular one is
chosen because some facts are available, whereas in most of them a
deadly silence, more eloquent than words, covers their fate.  The
Enghien redoubt was held by Colonel Wetherall with a company of the
2/4 Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry {84} upon the front of the
Sixty-first Division.  The redoubt formed the battalion headquarters,
and was connected to brigade headquarters by a cable buried eight
feet deep.  In front were two companies of the battalion in the
outpost line; behind was the fourth company ready for counter-attack.
Early in the morning heavy trench-mortar fire was raining bombs upon
the redoubt, and the wire was flying in all directions.  At 6 the
redoubt was so full of gas that even the masks could not hold it out,
so the men were ordered below and put up gas blankets to fend it off.
This could be safely done, as when gas is so thick it is not possible
for the stormers to advance.  At 6.15, what with fog and gas and
blurred respirators, it was hardly possible to see anything at all.
At 7.30 the gas cleared and there was a shower of high explosive
shells with shattering effect.  At 9.30 the barrage lifted and the
garrison rushed up from their shelters and manned their posts, but
the fog rolled white and thick across their vision.  The cloud banked
right up to their wire, while from behind it came all the noises of
the pit.  So nerve-shaking was the effect that some of the outlying
men came creeping into the redoubt for human company.  At 9.40 the
whizzing of bullets all around showed that the infantry was on the
move.  The garrison fired back into the mist, whence came vague
shoutings and tramplings.  A request was cabled back for a protective
barrage, but the inadequate reply showed that the British guns had
suffered in the shelling.  Suddenly the mist darkened at one point;
it broke into running figures, and a wave of men rushed forward,
scrambled through the broken wire, and clambered into the redoubt.
The Oxfords {85} rushed across and bombed them back into the mist
again.  There was a pause, during which the attack was reorganised,
and then at 11 o'clock the German stormers poured suddenly in from
three sides at once.  The garrison stood to it stoutly and drove them
out, leaving many bodies on the broken wire.  The fort was now
entirely surrounded, and there was a fresh attack from the rear which
added fifty or sixty more to the German losses.  At 11.45 there was
some lifting of the fog, and Colonel Wetherall endeavoured to get
across to the village, 300 yards behind him, to see if help could be
obtained.  He found it deserted.  Stealing back to his fort he was
covered suddenly by German rifles, was dragged away as a prisoner,
but finally, late in the evening, escaped and rejoined the main body
of his own battalion.  Meanwhile, Lieutenant Cunningham had taken
over the defence of Enghien redoubt, assisted by Lieutenant Richards
with the machine-guns.  Hour after hour fresh attacks were repelled,
but showers of bombs fell in the confined space, and the garrison
were continually thinned out.  Despairing messages--"What shall we
do?  What shall we do?"--were sent back over the cable, but nothing
could be done, for these outliers are the _enfants perdus_ of the
army, marked from the first for destruction.  Finally, at 4.30, the
great deep all around them sent one heavy wave to submerge them, and
the cable was for ever silent.

Such is the typical history of a redoubt.  Some succumbed more
readily, some survived until the afternoon of the next day; but the
difference may sometimes have depended upon the various degrees of
severity of attack, which was by no means the {86} same upon all
sectors.  The total effect was the complete destruction of the eleven
gallant battalions which held the advanced line of the Fifth Army,
and the loss of all material therein.  One can but hope that the
enemy paid a full price.  Occasionally a sudden rise of the mist gave
the defence a splendid opening for their machine-guns.  On one
occasion such a chance exposed a German officer standing with a large
map in his hand within thirty yards of the fort, his company awaiting
his directions beside him.  Few of them escaped.

[Sidenote: Seventh Corps.  March 21.]

We shall now follow the line of the Fifth Army from the north.  The
Seventh Corps upon the left consisted of the Ninth (Tudor), the
Twenty-first (Campbell), and the Sixteenth (Hull) Divisions in the
order named, and it carried the line down as far as Ronssoy, where it
joined on to Watts' Nineteenth Corps.  The Ninth Division had two
brigades in the line, and all the battalions both of the Twenty-sixth
and of the South Africans were in the forward zone and exposed to the
usual devastating losses.  Their front joined that of the
Forty-seventh Division at Fifteen Ravine in the north, and the
Twenty-first at Chapel Hill in the south.  About eleven o'clock the
main advance of the Germans struck up against this front.  There was
no action upon the left between Gauche Wood and the canal, though the
bombardment was exceedingly heavy.  On the right in the neighbourhood
of Gauche Wood the fighting was very severe all day, and the stormers
were able to make little progress, although they attacked again and
again with the utmost resolution.  This attack fell mainly upon the
South African Brigade, who held on with the same firm courage which
they had shown {87} at Delville Wood, and proved once more that there
are no better soldiers in all the vast army of the Empire.  It was
only at this point, however, near the junction with the Twenty-first
Division that the Ninth Division was attacked, for the German
infantry was crushed by the artillery fire upon the left in front of
Gonnelieu, so that the total losses of the Ninth upon this murderous
day were probably less than those of other divisions in the Fifth
Army.  Gauche Wood was continually attacked, but the Quentin redoubt
to the immediate north of it was left alone during the whole day.  It
was the 2nd or Natal South African regiment which held the extreme
front, and after a very fine resistance they were driven through the
wood, until at 11.30 the Germans held it all, but the Africans still
clung to the system of Chapel trenches to the immediate west and
south of it.  To this they held all day, being much helped by a local
rise in the mist about eleven, which enabled the guns in Quentin
redoubt to see their targets in the south.  Finally, the Germans were
compelled to dig in in Gauche Wood, and give up the attempt to get
farther.  No other point was gained upon the Ninth Divisional front.
Meanwhile, the enemy had pressed their attack with great violence
upon the immediate right, where it fell with special strength upon
the 2nd Lincolns of the Twenty-first Division.  At 12 they were well
behind the right rear of the Africans, who were compelled to throw
back a flank.  The Lincolns held on splendidly, however, and the
danger was arrested.  At 3.30 a new concentration of the enemy
developed in front of Vaucelette Farm, and was heavily shelled by the
British guns.  At 5 o'clock the fight was very desperate upon Chapel
{88} Hill on the southern limit of the South African area, where the
Lincolns were still holding out but were being gradually pressed
back.  The 4th South African Regiment (South African Scots) was
therefore ordered to counter-attack in this direction, which was done
with great dash, the position upon Chapel Hill being re-established.
Such was the general situation when at 8.15 orders were issued for
the withdrawal of all units to the rear zone.  This was done during
the night, the general line of retirement being towards Sorel and
Heudicourt, while the Scottish Brigade kept position upon the left.
The order to retire came as a complete surprise, as all was well upon
the immediate front, but the reason given was the penetration of the
line at other points.

Upon the right of the Scots and South Africans of the Ninth Division
the line was held by Campbell's Twenty-first Division, consisting of
the Leicester Brigade and two brigades of North Country troops, all
of them the veterans of many battles.  They covered the ground from
south of Gauche Wood in the north to Epehy in the south.  Two
brigades were in the line, the 62nd in the north and the 110th in the
south, and were exposed all day to a very severe attack which they
held up with great steadiness and resolution.  Heudicourt, Peizière,
and Epehy were the scenes of particularly severe fighting.  In the
evening these places, and the whole line through Quentin Ridge and
east of Gouzeaucourt, were still firmly held by the defenders.  It
may truly be said that along the whole fifty-mile front of battle
there was no point where the enemy met with a more unyielding
resistance than in the area of the Twenty-first Division.  During the
long day three {89} German divisions essayed the task of forcing
Epehy and overcoming the defence of Chapel Hill, but as the night
drew in all three lay exhausted in front of their objectives, and
there would certainly have been no British retirement had it not been
for the movements in the other sections of the line.  Only at one
post had the enemy made any lodgment, namely at Vaucelette Farm, and
here he could have been thrown out by a counter-attack had the
general situation permitted it.  The Leicesters and the
Northumberland Fusiliers upheld the fame of their historic regiments
on this day of battle, but two of the outstanding exploits in the
fight lie to the credit of the Lincolns, who kept an iron grip upon
Chapel Hill, and to the 15th Durhams, who made a dashing
counter-attack which swept back the German advance when it tried to
penetrate between Epehy and Chapel Hill.  The village of Peizière was
held by the 7th Leicesters of the 110th Brigade, who fought as this
brigade has always fought and held the Germans out.  Once with the
help of flame-throwers they gained a lodgment among the houses, but
the brave Midlanders came back to it and threw them out once more.
It was a party of this same Leicester regiment which held the farm of
Vaucelette, and fought it out to the very last man before they
suffered it to pass from their keeping.

The fighting upon Chapel Hill was particularly severe, and was the
more important as this eminence, lying almost upon the divisional
boundary, enfiladed the Ninth Division to the north.  There was a
trench in front of the hill, called Cavalry Trench, and a farm behind
called Revelon Farm, and the battle swung and swayed all day,
sometimes the British holding {90} all the ground, and sometimes
being pushed back as far as the farm.  The 1st Lincolns gained great
honour that day, but they could not have held the hill were it not
for the co-operation of the South Africans, who twice helped to
retake it when it had been temporarily lost.  The 11th Royal Scots
from the Ninth Division Reserve Brigade struck in also with effect
when the enemy filtered round the north edge of the hill and worked
to the rear of it.  They had got as far as Genin Copse when the Royal
Scots attacked and hunted them back once more.  The weak point of the
Twenty-first Division lay upon their right where they had to throw
out a defensive flank 3000 yards deep.  They had not troops enough to
cover this ground, and it was only the splendid work of the batteries
of the 94th Brigade R.F.A. which prevented a disaster.

The Sixteenth Irish Division (Hull) lay upon the right of the
Twenty-first Division, carrying the line to the south of Ronssoy.
This division had two brigades in the line, the 48th to the left and
the 49th to the right, and it appears to have sustained an attack
which was of a peculiarly crushing nature.  It cannot be denied that
the wretched parochial politics which tear Ireland in two, and which
are urged with such Celtic extravagance of language, cannot have a
steadying effect upon national troops, but none the less every
soldier will admit that the men who carried Guillemont and breasted
the slope of the Messines Ridge have proved themselves to be capable
of rising to the highest exercise of military virtue.  If, therefore,
they gave way upon this occasion while others stood, the reason is to
be sought rather in the extra severity of the attack, which had {91}
the same crushing effect upon other divisions both in the north and
in the south of the line.  All these brigades were desperately
engaged during the day, as was the 116th Brigade of the Thirty-ninth
Division which came to the help of the Irish, while the other two
brigades of this supporting division endeavoured to strengthen the
line of defence in the rear zone with a switch line from Saulcourt to
Tincourt Wood.  On the right the attack was too severe to be
withstood, and not only the advance line but the battle position also
was deeply penetrated, the Germans pouring in a torrent down the
Catelet valley and occupying Ronssoy and Lempire, by which they
turned the flanks both of the Twenty-first in the north and of the
Sixty-sixth Division in the south.  Especially fierce was the
resistance offered by the 48th Brigade in the north, some units of
which were swung round until they found themselves sharing with the
Twenty-first Division in the defence of Epehy.  The 2nd Munsters
lived up to their high reputation during a long day of hard fighting,
and were for the third or fourth time in the war practically
destroyed.  Colonel Ireland was hit about 10.30 in the morning, and
one company, which counter-attacked near Malassise Farm, was
annihilated in the effort; but the survivors of the battalion were
undismayed, and under Major Hartigan they continued to oppose every
effort of the stormers.  One of the features of the battle in this
area was the fight maintained all day by C Company scattered in
little parties over Ridge Reserve and Tetard Wood.  Lieutenant Whelan
was the soul of this fine defence, contesting every bay of his
trench, and continuing to rally and lead his dwindling band until
noon of {92} the next day.  A road ran past this position, and it was
all-important for the enemy to move their artillery down it in order
to press the retreat; but the Irishmen shot down the horse teams as
they came until the passage was blocked with their bodies.  Finally,
all the scattered bands rallied near Epehy village, where, under
Captain Chandler, who was killed in the contest, they fought to the
last, until in the late evening their cartridges gave out, and the
gallant Hartigan, with the headquarter staff of the battalion, was
overwhelmed.  Lieutenant Whelan, meanwhile, held his post near Epehy
until noon of March 22, when he and his men fired their last round
and threw their last bomb before surrender.  The defence of Malassise
Farm by Lieutenant Kidd and his men was also a glorious bit of
fighting to the last man and the last cartridge.

The general situation upon the front of the Seventh Corps on the
night of March 21 was that the Sixteenth Division, reinforced by the
116th Brigade, held the main battle positions, save on the extreme
right, as far north as St. Emilie.  Thence the line followed
approximately the railway round and east of Epehy, in the region of
the Twenty-first Division.  East of Chapel Hill and Chapel Crossing
it entered the holding of the Ninth Division, and passed west of
Gauche Wood, through Quentin redoubt and so to the original line.
Behind this indented position the 118th and 117th Brigades with the
Sappers and Pioneers of the Thirty-ninth Division were hard at work
upon the switch line, which should form a cover for retreat or a
basis for reorganisation.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 21.]

Upon the right of the Seventh Corps lay Watts' Nineteenth Corps,
which had two divisions in the {93} line, the Sixty-sixth Lancashire
Territorial Division (Malcolm) in the north, and the Twenty-fourth
Division (Daly) in the south.  They covered a front from south of
Ronssoy to south of Maissemy.  The Lancashire Division, the same
which behaved so splendidly in the mud battle of Broodseinde, had all
three brigades in the front, covering 4000 yards, and were exposed
all day to a most terrific assault.  From the north they were in the
order 197th, 199th, 198th.  To the south of them an even more
strenuous attack was launched upon the Twenty-fourth Division, which
had two brigades in the line.  These were the 17th upon the left and
the 72nd upon the right, with the 1st North Staffords, 8th West
Kents, 1st Rifle Brigade, and 8th Queen's in front.  About 11 o'clock
the news came that the enemy was pushing through at the point of
junction with the Eighteenth Corps upon the right, where there seems
to have been a gap of some hundreds of yards between divisions, and
later that they had penetrated into the village of Hargicourt in the
rear of the Sixty-sixth Division.  There was heavy fighting all day,
and by evening the whole forward zone held by the 2/3 Lancs
Fusiliers, East Lancashires, and Manchesters had passed into the
hands of the enemy, Colonel Stokes-Roberts of the former battalion
being among the casualties.  The twelve redoubts which constituted
the main defences of the battle zone held out stoutly all day, all
three brigades fighting with great valour.  The Germans were
continually pushing in, however, upon the right of the Twenty-fourth
Division and enlarging their gains in that direction, so that the
First Cavalry Division was called up, and the Pioneer Battalion of
the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was thrown in on the {94} right of the
Sixty-sixth Division near Roisel to form a defensive flank.  By 1
o'clock the battle zone of the Twenty-fourth Division was seriously
compromised.  The 72nd Brigade upon the right had been turned and the
village of Maissemy had been taken by the Germans.  Stone's 17th
Brigade kept a tight grip, however, upon the hamlet of Le Verguier,
and though many assaults were made upon it the place remained untaken
in the evening.  In the area of the Sixty-sixth Division the enemy
was still gaining ground, however, and they had pushed on from
Hargicourt to Templeux, where a counter-attack by the 6th Lancashire
Fusiliers held them for a time.  The fighting continued to be very
bitter until late in the evening, for though the Germans had
infiltrated all the ground between the redoubts, they were unable to
overcome their resistance, or to take possession of their gains.  At
10.15 the order from General Watts was that there should be no
retreat, and that however great the odds against them--and it was
manifest that they were indeed very great--the two divisions should
prepare for a fight to a finish.  Meanwhile, the Fiftieth Division
(Stockley) in army reserve had been ordered, after a march of seven
hours, to support the line of the Nineteenth Corps, taking up a
position in the rear from the Omignon River to the Cologne River,
upon a front which had been partly wired.  With the early morning of
March 22 there came a renewed German attack which forced back the
left of the Sixty-sixth, who were always much handicapped by the deep
incursion the enemy had made into the area of the Sixteenth Division
to the north, which continually endangered their flank and even their
rear.  {95} The battle was soon general along the whole front, and
everywhere the resistance was most desperate, though the troops were
gradually pressed back by the ever-increasing weight of the attack as
Hindenburg's legions came rolling in from the east.  Many a bitter
curse went up that day from overwrought men against the perjured
traitors on the Russian front, who to ease their own burden had
thrown a double weight upon those who had helped and trusted them.
At 11.30 in the morning the post of Le Verguier, which had been held
so long and so gallantly by the 8th West Surreys, was at last carried
by storm and its brave garrison destroyed or taken, though Colonel
Peirs, who had been the soul of this defence, dashed out, revolver in
hand, at this last moment, and got away in the mist.  The whole line
of the Twenty-fourth Division was shaken by the gap thus created.
The pressure was very great also at Roisel, and the 151st Brigade
from the Fiftieth Division had to be hurried up in order to hold back
the advance down the valley of the Cologne, which would have turned
the right flank of the Lancashire men to the north.  The 9th Sussex
was heavily engaged in this quarter and suffered severely.  About
noon a valiant attempt was also made by some tanks and dismounted
troopers to turn the tide by recapturing the village of Hervilly,
which had some temporary success.  The German penetration had been
too deep, however, and there was very pressing danger of isolation
unless the corps fell back.  This they did in the late afternoon and
evening, passing through the ranks of the Fiftieth Division behind
them.  "They were nearly all gassed and dead weary," said one who
observed them as {96} they passed.  The 11th Hussars and 19th
Entrenching Battalion most gallantly covered the retreat.  The enemy
were close at their heels, however, in great force and most
aggressive mood, as the Fiftieth Division soon discovered.  This unit
will be remembered as the famous Yorkshire Territorial division who
helped to turn the tide at the second battle of Ypres, and have shown
their worth upon many fields; but on this occasion the odds were too
heavy, though they held the enemy for the rest of the day.  The lower
half of the line between the Omignon and the Cologne rivers was held
by Riddell's 149th Brigade of Northumberland Fusiliers, while the
northern half was held by Rees' 150th Brigade, of Yorkshiremen.
Against this thin wall dashed the full tide of the German advance as
it swept on in the wake of the Nineteenth Corps.  It was a long and
hard fight in which the enemy had heavy losses, especially in front
of Pœuilly, where considerable sheets of wire lay in front of the
position of the 6th Northumberland Fusiliers.  It was a most gallant
affair--gallant on both sides.  Their Colonel, Robinson, laid out his
machine-guns in the long grass upon each side of this wire and
enfiladed the German line with most murderous results.  In the south
the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers were attacked in front and on the
right flank, and the pressure was so great that they had to abandon
Caulaincourt, which was then recaptured and again abandoned by the
6th Northumberland Fusiliers from the supporting line.  The enemy,
with his usual wile, telephoned from the mausoleum, a central
building, that reinforcements be sent to that point.  Upon asking the
name of the officer and getting no reply, General Riddell, in local
command, {97} turned on five batteries of 18-pounders and blew the
mausoleum to pieces.  At Poeuilly also there had been two successful
counter-attacks, but the enemy was swarming round the southern flank
in great numbers, and the river, which is not more formidable than an
average South of England trout stream, was of little use as a
protection.  An important point named Nobescourt Farm, lying near the
junction of brigades, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and the
village of Poeuilly was also taken.  By evening the Fiftieth Division
had done its work, however, as it had held up the pursuit and enabled
the Nineteenth Corps to reach the line of the Somme without severe
pressure.  That night they received orders to withdraw, which were
carried out in the morning of March 23, Martin's 149th Brigade in the
south making a show of fighting in order to cover the movements of
their companions in the north who were moving over a perfectly flat
plain from Mons to Brie.  Finally, General Riddell destroyed Tertry
bridge and dropped back to St. Christ.  During all these operations
the German infantry were moving slowly forward in successive lines of
skirmishers, about a thousand yards from the British, who retired in
leisurely fashion, continually turning and holding them up, so that
the whole spectacle was exactly that of a well-ordered field-day.
When the main body had reached the bridges, a single company of the
5th Northumberland Fusiliers lay out in the higher ground, under the
leadership of Captain Proctor, who received the D.S.O. for his able
conduct of the operation.  This company held up a brigade for two
hours, and then, their comrades being safely across, they withdrew in
their turn, leaving half their number behind {98} them.  Every one
being across, both the St. Christ and Brie bridges were blown up.
The latter was a brand-new construction and was in charge of an
American officer of engineers who distinguished himself by his cool
courage, starting out alone, and bringing across the river a train
full of ammunition which lay upon the farther side.  The
Twenty-fourth Division had crossed at Falvy, the rearguard action
being fought by the depleted battalions of the 72nd Brigade.  Colonel
Pope of the 1st North Staffords, Colonel Charlton of the 4th Yorks,
and Colonel Le Fleming of the 9th East Surreys were among those who
had fallen.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 23.]

The Nineteenth Corps was now covering a total front of 20,000 yards
along the western bank of the stream, which is shallow and marshy in
these reaches.  Their line was from Rouy-le-Crane in the south to
near Peronne, with some small outposts to the east of the river.  The
Eighth Division (Heneker) had come up on the morning of March 23, and
occupied the southern end of the line, with the remains of the
Twenty-fourth, the Sixty-sixth, and the Fiftieth extending to the
north.  There we shall leave them while we return to the history of
the front line upon March 21.

[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps.  March 21.]

On the right of the Nineteenth Corps was Maxse's Eighteenth Corps
covering the ground from the Omignon valley to a point just west of
St. Quentin, with three divisions in the line.  These were the
Sixty-first on the left, the Thirtieth in the centre, and the
Thirty-sixth in the south.  The Sixty-first Division, under General
Colin Mackenzie, was one of those fine second-line Territorial units
which have done so well in the later stages of the war.  All {99}
three brigades were in the line, the 183rd Brigade of Scottish troops
in the north, the 184th in the centre, and the 182nd in the south,
both of the last being from the South Midlands.  The 2/4th Oxfords,
2/5th Gordons, and 2/8th Worcesters were the devoted battalions which
held the forward line, and so fierce was their defence that the
battle-line was able to maintain itself along the whole divisional
front, in spite of very valiant efforts upon the part of the German
stormers, who showed absolute contempt of death in their efforts to
cut the wire at those points where their artillery had failed to do
so.  The story of the Enghien redoubt and its devoted defence has
already been told, but belongs to the record of this division.  The
battle zone ran in the main along the eastern edge of the Bois
d'Holnon, and this was desperately defended from morning to night.
In the afternoon the high ground south of Maissemy, in the left rear
of the division and outside their area, had been captured, and the
2/4th Berkshires endeavoured to help the Twenty-fourth Division in
their counter-attack.  The Berkshires lost heavily in this venture,
and their gallant Colonel, Dimmer, who had won the V.C. in the early
days of the war, was shot through the head leading his men on
horseback to the very lip of a trench full of Germans.  Horse and
groom fell before the same volley.  The Sixty-first resumed its line
after this action in the north, and it maintained it intact until
evening, the three divisions of the German attack being practically
held up by the three heroic battalions in the front line, so that the
full weight of attack never reached the main line.  It was as solidly
established in the evening as in the morning.  The position of the
enemy on their left {100} rear had become more and more menacing, as
after taking Maissemy they had pressed on to Villescholes.  This led
to dangerous attacks from the north on the early morning of March 22,
in the course of which the 183rd Brigade had to fight desperately to
preserve the flank of the division.  The weight of this fighting fell
chiefly upon the 8th Argyll and Sutherlands, who counter-attacked
most valiantly, aided by the remains of the gallant 2/4 Berkshire's,
who had suffered so severely the day before.  Colonel M'Alpine Downie
of the Argylls was wounded, and died next day.  Even when the enemy
had got as far westward as Vermand, the Sixty-first Division was
still rooted to its ground, and the Highlanders on the left flank
recovered by a spirited advance nine guns which had been overrun by
the German advance between Maissemy and Villescholes.  The 9th Royal
Scots extended their line to the westward, and facing north presented
an unbroken front to the constant hordes of Germans who were moving
down the northern slopes of the Omignon valley in the direction of
Caulaincourt.  It was not until late in the afternoon of March 22
that the Sixty-first Division retired, still fighting, to a prepared
position north of Vaux.

[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps.  March 22.]

Next to the Sixty-first Division was the Thirtieth under General
Williams.  This division had two brigades--the 21st (Goodman) and the
90th (Poyntz)--in the line, the latter officer being known to all
sportsmen as the famous Somerset batsman.  The front of 4000 yards
was from the immediate west of St. Quentin to the Somme, and included
two notable strong points, Manchester Hill and the Epine du Dullon.
The 89th Brigade under General Stanley was in the immediate rear.  It
was {101} not used as a unit during the day, but the three fine
battalions of the King's Liverpool Regiment, the 17th, 18th, and
19th, were dispersed in the evening to reinforce three separate units.

The fighting along the front of the Thirtieth Division was of a very
desperate character.  The forward battalions were the 2nd Wilts and
the 16th Manchesters.  Rushing through the gaps in their line of
defence, the Germans flung themselves upon the battle zone, where
after long fighting which lasted into the afternoon they gained
possession of the two posts already mentioned, and worked into the
main battle-line at Savy.  Both brigades lost very heavily during
these attacks, but the addition of the 18th and 19th King's from
Stanley's brigade helped them to carry on under most trying
conditions.  Both these reinforcing battalions came in for severe
fighting in the evening, and the 18th King's, which joined in a
counter-attack by the 21st Brigade, was particularly hard hit, while
the 19th had hardly an officer left, the colonel falling at the head
of his  men.  As a final result of the day's battle both the brigades
were somewhat driven in upon the front, but each held its line and
was ready to renew the battle next morning.  The 2nd Bedfords
particularly distinguished themselves during this day of incessant
fighting, making no less than six successful counter-attacks in order
to clear their sector when it was partly occupied by the Germans.  Up
to 4 o'clock in the afternoon of March 22 the Thirtieth were still
firm in their positions, and it was only the general situation of the
Army which finally compelled them to abandon them.  They dropped back
upon the general line of Ham, where the three scattered {102}
battalions of the 89th Brigade had been ordered to form one unit once
more.  Of the Manchester men in the front rank upon the day of battle
hardly a man ever got away, and their splendid Colonel Elstob lay
dead with the greater part of his battalion around him.  He had said:
"The Manchesters will defend Manchester Hill to the last," and he
lived and died true to his word.  A superior officer reporting upon
this episode said: "At about 11 o'clock Colonel Elstob informed me
that the Germans had broken through and were swarming round the
redoubt.  At about 2 P.M. he said that most of his men were killed or
wounded, including himself; that they were all getting dead beat,
that the Germans had got into the redoubt and hand-to-hand fighting
was going on.  He was still quite cheery.  At 3.30 he was spoken to
on the telephone and said very few were left and that the end was
nearly come.  After that no further answer could be got."

On the right of the Thirtieth Lancashire Division was the
Thirty-sixth Ulster Division under the command of General Nugent, one
of the many good soldiers who were trained by South Africa for this
greater ordeal.  That scrambling and difficult campaign has, though
its lessons were most imperfectly apprehended, proved to be an
invaluable preparation for the leaders in the world's war of the
future.  The Ulster division had all three brigades in the line, the
109th (Ricardo) to the north, the 107th (Witteycombe) in the centre,
and the 108th (Griffiths) in the south.  The three outlying
battalions were the 12th and 15th Irish Rifles and the 2nd
Inniskilling Fusiliers, which suffered the common fate of all who
held that post of danger.  Not a man returned, save a few of {103}
the Irish Rifles, who swam down the canal that night.

[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps.  March 21.]

The front held by the Ulstermen was from the Somme on the left to the
neighbourhood of Urvillers on the right, a distance of 6000 yards.
Three German divisions attacked upon this frontage, but the edge of
their onslaught was blunted by the splendid resistance of the three
doomed battalions in the van.  None the less, it surged with great
violence all along the edge of the battle zone, but it was everywhere
held save only at the hamlet of Contescourt, where the Germans
obtained a lodgment.  The whole defence of the division was
imperilled, however, by the fact that the Germans had bitten deeply
into the British line to the south of the 108th Brigade, getting as
far as Essigny on their right rear, with the effect that a deep
defensive flank had to be thrown back in this direction, which used
up all the reserves of the division.  Thus, when the Germans late
that day and in the following morning pressed their advantage at
Contescourt, and were stopped by the magnificent resistance of the
1st Inniskilling Fusiliers at the neighbouring village of
Fontairie-les-Clercs, they should have been permanently held, as they
were driven back in twelve successive attacks.  As there were no
reserves available for a counter-attack, however, the defence was
gradually worn down by a great disparity of numbers, so that by March
22 the Germans had advanced into the sector of the line which ran
down the course of the rivulet which is dignified by the name of the
Somme.

[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps.  March 22.]

Such, in brief, was the experience of the three divisions which held
the line of the Eighteenth Corps on March 21.  The Twentieth Division
in {104} reserve was not employed during the day, nor were its
services needed, for Maxse's Corps, though attacked by eight German
divisions, was able to hold its ground, thanks largely to the
splendid resistance of the shock-absorbing battalions in the front
line.  Up to 4 P.M. of March 22 the enemy had made no permanent
advance into the battle zone, but at that hour both flanks of the
Corps had been turned at Maissemy in the north and at Essigny in the
south, and the alternative was retirement or absolute isolation and
destruction.  It may then briefly be said that, thanks to the
resolute resistance of the battalions in the forward zone, and to the
solidity of those in the battle zone, the Eighteenth Corps was able
to maintain its ground until it was ordered to leave it, and that
save for some indentation of its front, especially at Contescourt,
its main positions remained inviolate.

[Sidenote: Third Corps.  March 21.]

Upon the right of the Eighteenth Corps lay the Third Corps, which
covered the enormous front of 30,000 yards.  Of the nine brigades in
the corps, eight were in the line and only one in reserve, so that
between the tenuity of the line and its want of support it was an
extremely tempting mark for the German assault, especially as by
ignoring the two brigades south of the Oise they could concentrate
their whole force upon the six brigades in line in the north.  It is
true that the wide marshes of the Oise offered an impediment which
covered part of the British line, but as already remarked, the waters
were exceedingly low for the time of year, and the Germans very
cleverly overcame whatever obstacle was left.

The three divisions which formed Butler's Third Corps were the
Fourteenth Light Division (Cowper), which extended as far south as
Moy, the Eighteenth {105} Division (Lee) covering the ground between
Moy and Travecy, and finally the Fifty-eighth Division (Cator)
extending to Barisis, five or six miles south of the Oise.  As usual,
we will take them from the north, confining the narrative to the
point at which the fighting in the front line came to an end.

The Fourteenth Division had all three brigades in the line, their
order being 41st, 42nd, and 43rd from the north.  This division,
composed entirely of light infantry battalions, has had more than its
share of desperate adventures during its service in France.  Again
and again, notably in the fire-attack before Ypres in 1915, in the
third battle of Ypres, and upon the present occasion, they have been
exposed to ordeals of the most tremendous kind.  Their frontage was
5500 yards, which was not excessive as compared with that of other
divisions, and it contained some high ground north of Essigny which
should have been valuable for observation and defence, but none the
less the attack was so severe and so concentrated that it rapidly
made an impression upon the defence, which became more serious as the
day wore on.  The three outlying battalions were the 8th and 9th
King's Royal Rifles and the 6th Somerset Light Infantry, and these,
as usual, were sacrificed almost to a man.  The enemy then stormed in
upon the line, making his advance here, as elsewhere, with a
systematic skill which showed how thoroughly he had been drilled and
exercised behind the line.  This process of infiltration by which
small bodies here, there, and everywhere extend their advance where
they find a cranny into which to push and establish machine-gun posts
which, unless they be instantly rooted out, soon grow into formidable
{106} positions, shows the remarkable adaptability of the German
soldier--a quality with which, it must be admitted, the world had not
credited him in the past.  It may also be admitted that we yielded
too easily to such tactics, and that there was a tendency, as was
pointed out in a memorandum from the Higher Command, to consider a
position as untenable because it was outflanked, instead of closing
in upon the intruders and pressing each side of the nut-crackers
against the intrusive nut.  In many cases this was done, but in
others small bodies of daring men with a few machine-guns were able
to dislodge whole lines which they had managed to enfilade.  On this
occasion the Germans pushed in upon both flanks of the Fourteenth
Division, but their most serious gains occurred about mid-day, when
they captured Manufacture Farm north of Essigny, and, shortly
afterwards the weighbridge west of that village.  The 41st Brigade on
the left were driven out of their headquarters, while the 43rd on the
right were pushed back to the Gibercourt Road.  A very weak point was
evidently developing, so General Butler hurried up part of the Second
Cavalry Division (Greenly), and also his only spare infantry brigade,
the 54th (Sadleir-Jackson) in order to make a line of resistance at
the switch line between Camas and Lizerolles.  About 1.30 the Germans
had got in between Essigny and Benay and taken Lambay Wood.  In view
of their accelerating advance and the ominous reports which were also
coming in from the 173rd Brigade on the right, General Butler
continued to build up his rear line, putting into it not only all
three brigades of the Second Cavalry and the 54th Infantry Brigades,
but also the 12th and {107} 13th Entrenching Battalions, thus
covering the whole rear zone of the corps.  Isolated parties of the
41st Brigade were holding out in the main position upon the left, but
Hinacourt had also fallen and the line was slowly rolling westward,
so that by evening the Fourteenth Division had practically lost its
hold of the whole of its battle position.

Things were going better, however, with the Eighteenth Division,
which held 9000 yards of front in the centre of the Third Corps.  As
this great frontage was maintained by only two brigades, the 53rd
(Higginson) in the north and the 55th (Wood) in the south, it must
have been very thinly held, and even admitting that the pressure was
less than on either of the wing divisions, it was none the less a
fine achievement to keep a grip on so wide an area.  Three battalions
were in the forward zone, the 8th Berks on the left, the 7th West
Kents in the centre, and the 7th Buffs on the right, all of whom did
splendidly, so that the defence of Fort Vendeuil, Cork, Cardiff,
Durham, and other redoubts upon this point form a whole series of
epics.  Besides the infantry, the 79th Company Royal Engineers shared
in the peril and the glory of this defence.  The wires connecting up
these forward garrisons were speedily cut, and no news came back all
day, save the rattle of their rifle-fire.  The first definite tidings
of the German advance came back through the fog about 12 o'clock,
when some gunners emerged from its folds and announced that the
advanced guns had been overrun by the enemy.  Soon after came a
runner with a message from Colonel Crosthwaite of the West Kents to
say that his headquarters was surrounded, and asking for a barrage on
one side {108} of it.  A second message arrived from him: "Still
holding, 12.30 P.M.  Boche all round within fifty yards except rear.
Can only see forty yards, so it is difficult to kill the blighters."
It was the last word from the post.  At 1.30 the enemy had closed in
on the battle zone, and the high ground at Cerisy in the area of the
53rd Brigade had been lost.  On the front of the 55th Brigade at the
same hour strong parties of the enemy who had pushed between the
redoubts in the fog had occupied Vendeuil, while a section of guns in
Ronquenet Wood had been rushed by them.  The reserve company of the
Buffs in front of the battle zone fought desperately against these
intruders, while near the Dublin redoubt Captain Dennis fought his
guns till 5 P.M., inflicting heavy losses upon the Germans, who
collected in masses in front of the wire at this point.  Eventually
his gun-pits were rushed, all the gunners being killed or taken.  The
main weight of the attack fell upon the 53rd Brigade upon the left,
and by the middle of the afternoon all the redoubts upon this front
had gone, while the 55th was still well covered.  The battle zone,
however, was still intact, though the enemy massed heavily in front
of Moulin Farm and opposite the switch line from Vendeuil to
Ly-Fontaine.  They came forward several times, but the mist had risen
and the rifle-fire was accurate so that they made no progress.  At
Caponne Farm there was also a brisk attack, but the 10th Essex, the
only battalion left in the brigade, held firmly to its position,
though much plagued by low-flying aeroplanes who skimmed their very
heads, while the British Headquarters was equally disturbed by a
captured anti-tank gun with which the Germans kept up a point-blank
fire.  To {109} ease the pressure upon this wing, General Lee put in
the 8th East Surreys from divisional reserve to thicken the line in
the neighbourhood of Remigny.

At 3.30 the covering forts upon the front of the 55th Brigade were
still holding out.  Fort Vendeuil had made a particularly fine
defence and broke up a heavy attack.  There was lamp signalling from
this fort till 6 P.M., when the lamp went out for ever.  The 7th
Buffs, who had charge of all this portion of the battle front, did a
magnificent day's work, and the famous regiment to which this
battalion belongs has won no prouder laurels in all the centuries.
Little is known of their fate save the pregnant facts that the front
was screened all day, that repeated messages for help were received
up to 8.30 in the evening, and that rifle-fire was heard from their
posts till midnight.  Bald words--and yet to him who can see they
convey a sure picture of fading light, dwindling cartridges, and
desperate men, baited from all sides and dying with clenched teeth
amid the ever-flowing German hordes.

About 4 o'clock the Germans had not only penetrated deeply into the
battle zone of the Fourteenth Division to the north, but had also
dented that of the Fifty-eighth in the south, so that both wings of
the Eighteenth were in a perilous state.  The East Surreys were
pushed forward, therefore, into the switch line from Gibercourt to
Ly-Fontaine.  Two regiments of dismounted cavalry from the Second
Division were sent also to form a defensive flank upon the right of
the 55th Brigade.  At 6 P.M. the attack upon the battle zone of the
Eighteenth had ceased, but it was being pushed hard upon the two wing
divisions, and the Fifty-eighth had lost both Quessy {110} and
Fargniers.  Orders were then issued to get behind the Crozat Canal
after dark, this having always been chosen as the second line of
defence.  The 54th Brigade, which behaved with great steadiness, was
directed to cover the retirement of the Fourteenth Division, and the
guns were withdrawn first, so as to cover the infantry at the canal
crossings.  A few of the outlying posts were gathered up and brought
back in safety.  The East Surreys covered the withdrawal of the poor
remains of the 53rd Brigade, while the 3rd Hussars covered the 55th
Brigade on the right.  It was a most difficult and delicate operation
with a victorious and elated enemy swarming upon the rear, but it was
successfully carried out, and by 6 A.M. the Third Corps were all
across the canal, and the bridges in that sector had been destroyed.

The performance of the Eighteenth Division had been a very fine one,
and it was one of the units which could boast that on the evening of
that terrible day they still held the main position which they had
covered in the morning.  The main German attack seems to have been
conducted by four divisions, the Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, One
hundred and third, and Two hundred and eleventh, while four more were
identified as either partly engaged or in immediate reserve.  The
direction of the attack was mainly from the north and came upon the
front and flank of the 53rd Brigade, which could hardly call itself a
battalion in the evening.  The gunners had to fire by guess until the
mist lifted, after which time they did great execution, and stuck to
their pieces to the last moment.  A particularly notable performance
was that of Captain Haybittle of C Battery, 83rd Brigade Royal Field
Artillery, whose guns, just {111} south of Benay, were rushed in the
mist at noon.  He and his crews removed the blocks and held a
neighbouring position with their rifles, directing at the same time
the fire of two guns in the rear which played upon the German masses
as they debouched from Lambay Wood.  Afterwards he and his men fell
back upon these guns and fought them until late in the evening, when
both of them were knocked out.  Nineteen hundred rounds were fired,
and this stubborn defence did much to hold the northern flank of the
battle zone.

It only remains now to give some account of the events upon the front
of the 173rd Brigade (Worgan) of the Fifty-eighth London Division
(Cator) upon the extreme right, in order to complete this rapid
bird's-eye view of the events of March 21 upon the front of the Fifth
Army.  This brigade, which filled the space between Travecy on the
left and the Oise upon the right, had the 2/1 Londons in the forward
zone, the 2/4 Londons in the battle zone opposite La Fère, and the
2/3 Londons in the rear zone upon the Crozat Canal.[1]  The single
battalion in front was attacked by the impossible odds of three
German divisions, but held out for a long time with great constancy.
Their brave Colonel, Richardson, was last seen surrounded by the
enemy, but still fighting with his headquarters troops around him.
The Germans stormed forward to the battle zone, but there on the high
ground across the Oise they also met with a very vigorous resistance
from the 4th Londons, aided by some sappers and a company of
pioneers.  It was indeed {112} a great achievement of Colonel Dann
and his men to hold up the attack with such disparity of numbers, for
according to the official German account several divisions took part
in the attack.  Finally, as the afternoon wore on the enemy obtained
a lodgment in the left of the position, and before evening they had
occupied Travecy and part of Fargniers, winding up by the capture of
Quessy.  The 2/3 Londons had been drawn into the fight, and now the
2/8 Londons from the 174th Brigade were brought north and placed in
reserve along the line of the Crozat Canal, across which the troops
were now ordered to fall back.  This battalion with the 18th
Entrenching Battalion guarded the whole canal line from Condren
Crossing on the right to the junction with the Eighteenth Division on
the left.  By 5 A.M. all troops were across and the bridges had been
destroyed.  The 2/4th Londons succeeded in removing all their stores
and munitions, and their remarkable achievement in holding the high
ground of La Fère against ten times their numbers for as many hours,
during which they inflicted very heavy losses upon their assailants
and repulsed six separate attacks, was among the outstanding military
feats of that difficult day.


[1] When two numbers are given to a Territorial battalion, for
instance 2/4 Londons, it means that the 4th Londons have two
battalions and that this is the second of them.


It is needless to say that the losses in men were very heavy on March
21, though it is difficult to separate them from the general losses
of the retreat, which will be recorded later.  Among senior officers
of note who died for their country that day, besides those already
mentioned, were Colonels Acklom of the Northumberland Fusiliers,
Thorne of the North Staffords, Wrenford of the East Lancashires, and
Stewart of the Leicesters.

[Illustration: General line of Army on March 21st.]




{113}

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Retreat of the Seventh and Nineteenth Corps

Problem before General Gough--His masterful action--Arrival of
Thirty-ninth, Twentieth, and Fiftieth Divisions--Retreat of Tudor's
Ninth Scottish Division--Destruction of the South Africans--Defence
of the Somme--Arrival of the Eighth Division--Desperate fighting--The
Carey line--Death of General Feetham--"Immer fest daran"--Advance
Australia--Great achievement of General Watts.

[Sidenote: Fifth Army.  March 22.]

The reader is now in a position to form some conception of the
situation of the Fifth Army upon the evening of March 21, and to
understand the problems which confronted its commander.  He was of
opinion, and the opinion was shared by some at least of his corps
commanders, that had he had four or five divisions of reserves within
easy call, he could unquestionably have held the line.  He had,
however, to deal with the situation as it stood, and no man could
have had a more difficult and responsible task.  His own reserves
were already practically engaged.  On the other hand, both his air
service and the reports of prisoners assured him that those of the
enemy were numerous and near.  His line had been deeply dented in
four places: in the sector of the Sixteenth Division at Ronssoy, in
that of the {114} Twenty-fourth Division at Maissemy, in that of the
Fourteenth Division at Essigny, and in that of the Fifty-eighth
Division opposite La Fère.  These various points are, it will be
observed, almost equidistant along the line, which tends to show that
the German attack was conducted upon a plan which threw such forces
upon limited areas that the result was almost a certainty, whatever
troops might be holding them.  It was the misfortune and not the
fault of these gallant divisions that their thin ranks were in the
very places which huge hordes of the enemy had marked in advance as
their objectives.

It must have been clear to General Gough and to his corps commanders
that a second day of battle, with the German reserves pouring up,
would certainly mean a penetration of the line at these various weak
points, and that the enemy would then be in a position to cut off
large portions of the force.  These units, be they divisions or
corps, would no doubt fight to the last, but the end must surely be
annihilation.  In that case the general situation would have been an
appalling one.  It might indeed have been decisive for the whole war.
There was nothing between the Germans and Amiens.  Pouring westwards
they would have destroyed all reserves almost before they could have
alighted from their trains or their motors, and within a few days
would have entirely cut off the British from the French, with the
estuary of the Somme between the two armies.  Any hesitation would
have been fatal.  An immediate decision was imperative.  That
decision could only be that the British Army should retard the German
advance by an obstinate rearguard action, that it should endeavour to
preserve its line, and allow no unit to be cut off, {115} that it
should fall back in an orderly fashion upon its reserves, and that
when it met them it should turn at bay and prevent the enemy from
reaching his objective.  This was the plan which General Gough
instantly formed, and which he proceeded with firmness and moral
courage to carry out.  Orders were at once given that the weaker
portions of the line should drop back behind the obstacles which had
already been marked out as the best defensive lines.  At the same
time with great foresight he gave orders that the old French Somme
trenches, from the river southwards, should be set in order as a last
line of defence.  He despatched his chief army engineer, General
Grant, to carry out this order, and it was eventually a very vital
one in ensuring the safety of the army in the last stages of its
retreat.

The orders to each corps commander were given in the form of general
indications, the details being left to his own judgment, for the
position of each corps and the pressure upon it formed a number of
independent problems.  We shall turn to the north therefore, where,
upon the whole, the situation was least critical, and we shall follow
first the Seventh and then the Nineteenth Corps in their various
movements until a condition of equilibrium was at last safely
established.  Let it be at once stated that the design was duly
carried out along the whole line, and that the operation, which at
the time was designated as a disaster, was really a remarkable
example of how by the coolness of commanders and the discipline of
their men, the most desperate situation may be saved and the most
powerful and aggressive foe foiled in his attempts.  What complicated
the military problem of the Fifth Army was that the {116} German
threat was really aimed at Paris as much as at Amiens, and that if
they could have got through at Essigny and cut off the Fifty-eighth
Division there were hardly any reserves between them and the
all-important metropolis.

[Sidenote: Seventh Corps.  March 22.]

The morning of March 22 again presented those conditions of fog and
low visibility which are favourable to the attack.  There was no
advance in the early hours upon the new positions of the Ninth
Division, but the enemy directed his attention entirely to the Chapel
Hill front of the Twenty-first Division upon the right, which was
still held by the Lincolns.  An attempt was made to relieve them by
the Scots battalion of the South Africans, who took over some of the
northern line.  The defence was a splendid one, but by 4 o'clock in
the afternoon the Germans had gained most of this high ground by
outflanking it, and the South Africans at Revelon Farm, who had been
reinforced by the 11th Royal Scots Battalion from the 27th Brigade,
were badly enfiladed in consequence by rifle and machine-gun fire
from the south.  Colonel M'Leod of the South African Scots, and many
officers and men, were among the casualties.  There was a withdrawal
therefore of the right of the Ninth Division, and about 6.30 P.M. the
Germans had got as far as Heudicourt, and the brigade staff at Sorel
had to line up in order to resist his turning movement to the north.
So far round had the Germans penetrated that the Africans were
compelled to fall back due north for some distance until their rear
was clear, when they retreated with the rest of the division
westwards towards Nurlu.  By two in the morning of March 23 the new
positions had been reached, and the attenuated {117} South African
Brigade, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, was taken into
divisional reserve.  This difficult retreat was rendered possible by
the desperate resistance offered by the 6th Scots Borderers, who
formed a defensive flank south of Sorel and gave the troops to the
north time to gain the new position.  One company of the 11th Royal
Scots was cut off in Revelon Farm, but managed to fight their way
back, bringing with them an officer and eighteen other prisoners.  No
guns were lost by the Ninth Division save ten, which were without
teams and were therefore destroyed.

[Sidenote: Seventh Corps.  March 23.]

At this period there was some dislocation between the left of the
Ninth Division and the right of the Forty-seventh, as is likely to
occur where each belongs to a different corps and army.  For a time
there was a gap between them.  This was partly overcome, however, on
the evening of the 22nd by means of the Second Division, which lay in
reserve behind the Forty-seventh and put its 99th Brigade under the
orders of the Ninth Division so as to ensure unity of command in this
position of danger.

Turning to the right wing of the Seventh Corps allusion has been made
in the last chapter to the severe pressure upon the Sixteenth
Division and its determined resistance.  It will be remembered that
it was reinforced by the 116th Brigade of the Thirty-ninth Division,
and all three brigades were involved in the same heavy fighting on
the morning of March 22, the German attack being relentless in its
vigour.  In the course of this severe action the village of St.
Emilie was lost, and was afterwards retaken in a very gallant fashion
by the 1st Hertfords, a battalion which had greatly distinguished
itself {118} already at St. Julien and elsewhere.  The orders were to
retreat, however, and in this movement the switch line from Saulcourt
dug and manned by the 117th and 118th Brigades proved invaluable.
The army policy was to fight rearguards and delay the enemy, and this
was most efficiently done during the evening of March 22, the flank
of the Twenty-first Division being covered in its retirement, and the
line held against vigorous attacks.  Many of the guns of the
Thirty-ninth Divisional artillery were lost through their extreme
devotion in covering the retreat of the Sixteenth Division, for they
frequently carried on until the infantry were behind them.  The enemy
was pressing his attacks with great vigour, and every withdrawal was
followed up by strong bodies of troops and of field artillery.

[Sidenote: Seventh Corps.  March 22.]

During these operations General Hornby had been in command of the
division, but on March 23 General Feetham returned from leave and
took over the duties.  All day the Thirty-ninth Division was fighting
rearguard actions as it fell back upon the Somme.  In the course of
them General Hornby, now in command of the 116th Brigade, was
severely wounded.  The roads running westwards to Peronne and Clery
were crowded with traffic, but the Thirty-ninth Division turned at
bay again and again, giving them time to get clear.  By evening the
remains of the Sixteenth Division had been practically squeezed out
of the line, and the Thirty-ninth had the Sixty-sixth Division on its
right and the Twenty-first on its left.  At night it held a line from
La Maisonnette along the canal to south of Ommiecourt.  The enemy
appeared to be much exalted by the capture of Peronne, and the 118th
Brigade {119} on the right heard them singing lustily during the
night.

[Sidenote: Seventh Corps.  March 23.]

On March 23 the German attack continued to be very heavy upon the
front of the two Scottish brigades of the Ninth Division, which were
in touch with the Fifth Corps in the north and with the Twenty-first
Division in the south.  So close and violent was the fighting that
the 6th Scots Borderers were only extricated with difficulty.  At 2
P.M. the line was east of Bouchavesnes, but by 4 P.M. the
Twenty-first Division on the right had lost ground, and the flank and
even the rear of the Ninth was for a time exposed until the Natal
Regiment was thrown out south of Bouchavesnes to cover it.  The three
brigades of the Twenty-first Division were engaged all day as they
slowly retreated before the swarming enemy.

March 23 was a most arduous day for both the Highland and the Lowland
brigades, for each of them was attacked again and again with the
utmost violence.  Though the attacks were repulsed each of them had
the effect of weakening still further these units which were already
much exhausted by hard fighting and incessant exertion.  Gradually
they were pushed to the westward until they found themselves lining
the eastern edge of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, and manning the ridge
which extended from that forest to the ruins of Saillisel.  Their
left at this period seems to have been in the air, as the 99th
Brigade had been returned to its division, and they had failed to
make contact with the Seventeenth Division, who were at the time just
west of Saillisel.  At this period the front of the Ninth Division
seems to have covered 11,000 yards, and to have extended for at least
two miles into the area of the Third Army, {120} showing how
desperate were the exertions needed to cover the ground and to
prevent a break through.

[Sidenote: Seventh Corps.  March 24.]

In the morning of March 24 the Scots could see the German infantry
streaming forward over the open ground which had been evacuated upon
the evening before.  It was clear that a great attack was imminent,
and at 9 o'clock, after a very heavy cannonade, it developed along
the whole line.  For three hours the Germans made repeated efforts to
force their way through the Ninth Division, but on each occasion they
were repulsed, and their losses at this point were exceedingly heavy.
About mid-day, however, they had gained so much ground upon the
flanks that the South Africans were almost surrounded, and shot into
from north and south.  The general British line had fallen back to
the ridge east of Combles, 1000 yards behind, but General Dawson
found it impossible to withdraw in daylight, so that his brigade was
compelled to defend itself in its isolated position at Marrières Wood
as best it could.  The result was a disaster, but one of a most
glorious kind, for the men fought until their last cartridges had
been expended, and a large proportion of the survivors were wounded
men.  General Dawson was among the prisoners.  It was reported
afterwards from German sources that he was taken while working a
machine-gun with his brigade-major lying dead beside him.  The whole
defence was said by the Germans to have been one of the finest things
in the war.  From that time forward the South African Brigade had
practically ceased to exist until it was reorganised in Flanders.
The supporting parties alone were left, and these were formed at once
into a composite battalion under Colonel Young, for no rifle {121}
could be spared from the fighting line at such a time.  Whilst the
South Africans had been engaged in this death struggle the 27th
Lowland Brigade had been in a similar plight.  All these battalions,
the 6th Scots Borderers and the 11th and 12th Royal Scots, were very
hard pressed, particularly the former.  The Lowlanders extricated
themselves from an almost desperate situation and fell back from St.
Pierre Vaast to the position covering Combles.  So great was the
general dislocation of troops that one portion of the 5th Camerons
found themselves that evening fighting with the Forty-seventh
Division, while another was with the Seventeenth.

The main effort of the enemy upon March 24 was directed against the
Fifth and Seventh Corps in the centre of the British line, though his
energy at other points was sufficient to engage the full attention of
all the other units.  Heavy and fresh masses were poured in at the
centre and the pressure was great.  For the Seventh Corps it was the
fourth day of incessant and desperate fighting.  There were few men
left, and these were very exhausted.  Towards evening the left of the
Seventh had been turned, and had been compromised by the occupation
of Sailly Saillisel.  All attempts at counter-attack, however
gallant, were destined to failure, or at the best evanescent success,
for there was not the weight to carry them through.  At 4.15 the
report was: "The enemy is through on the right flank and has occupied
Combles, Morval, and Lesbœufs."  The Seventh Corps then fell back
to the line Hem-Maurepas and threw out every stray unit it could get
together--troops of cavalry, Canadian motor-guns, crews and
machine-guns of tanks, and all the powdered débris {122} of broken
formations, in the direction of Bernafoy Wood to cover the exposed
flank.  It was still out of touch with the Fifth Corps.  This
movement gave the line an awkward angle from Peronne and made it
almost impossible to hold the stretch of river.  For the time the
right of the Third Army was a good five miles behind the left of the
Fifth Army--the result, as Sir Douglas Haig has stated, of an
unauthorised local withdrawal due to misunderstanding of orders.  The
line near Peronne was still held by the Thirty-ninth Division.
Throughout the morning of the 24th strong enemy forces were seen by
them pushing forwards between Clery and Rancourt, where they were
harassed by the British fire in enfilade, particularly on the roads,
where the artillery of the Sixteenth and Thirty-ninth Divisions
caused much havoc and confusion, doing great work at short range over
open sights.  Many excellent targets were missed, however, owing to
that difficulty in liaison between the infantry and the guns, which
was one of the greatest problems of the operations.  During the day
the average number of rounds fired per battery was 3000, most of
which were observed fire.

As March 24 wore on the position of the Thirty-ninth Division became
untenable, as they heard upon one side of the loss of Saillisel, and
on the other of the forcing of the Somme at Brie, Pagny, and
Bethencourt.  They moved back, therefore, at night with orders to
hold the line from Buscourt to Feuilleres.  The average strength of
brigades at this time was not more than 20 officers and 600 men.
From the morning of March 25 the Thirty-ninth Division passed to the
command of the Nineteenth Corps, and its {123} further arduous work
will be found under that heading.  During all this day Campbell's
Twenty-first Division, still fighting hard in a succession of
defensive positions, had its right upon the Somme, while its left was
in intermittent touch with the Ninth Division.

The Ninth Division had fallen back, the two Scottish brigades being
continually in action until they reached the Maricourt-Montauban
line, where they supported the First Cavalry Division who were in
front of Bernafoy Wood.  The general line at this period from
Montauban southwards was held by the Ninth Division, the First
Cavalry, the newly-arrived and most welcome Thirty-fifth Division
(Franks), the Twenty-first Division, now reduced to a single
composite brigade under General Headlam, and then some oddments under
Colonel Hunt.  This brought the line to the Somme, on the south side
of which were the remains of the Sixteenth and Thirty-ninth
Divisions.  This might sound an imposing force upon so short a front,
but save for the Thirty-fifth each division was _nominis magni
umbra_, none of them stronger than brigades.  The Forty-seventh
Division was retiring at this time upon Contalmaison, and a gap of
several miles was appearing between the Fifth and Seventh Corps.
During the movements upon March 24 the guns of the 65th and 150th
R.F.A. did great work and earned the warm gratitude of the weary
infantry.  The enemy targets round Combles were all that a gunner
could wish.

All troops north of the Somme were upon March 25 transferred to the
Fifth Corps, and became part of the Third Army.  The 27th Brigade was
drawn out of the line, and the 26th was under the orders of the {124}
Thirty-fifth Division which took over the defence of this sector,
relieving the exhausted Twenty-first Division.  March 25 saw heavy
attacks on Bernafoy which was lost once, but regained by the 106th
Brigade.  There was still a gap to the north, and no touch had been
made with the Seventeenth Division, though the cavalry had built up a
defensive flank in that direction.  At 2 P.M. the Germans attacked
from Ginchy towards Trones Wood, names which we hoped had passed for
ever from our war maps.  In the first onset they pressed back the
12th and 18th Highland Light Infantry of the 106th Brigade, but there
was a strong counter-attack headed by the 9th Durhams which retook
Favière Wood and restored the situation.  A second attack about 3
P.M. upon the Thirty-fifth Division was also repulsed.  The German
pressure was so great, however, that the line of defence was taken
back during the night to the Bray-Albert position.  The enemy
followed closely at the heels of the rearguards, though the guns were
active to the last so as to conceal the retreat as long as possible.
Early in the morning of March 26 the Lowland Brigade was again
attacked with great violence, but the 12th Royal Scots, upon whom the
main assault fell, drove it back with loss.  Changes in other parts
of the line, however, necessitated a withdrawal across the Ancre, so
as to keep in touch with the Twelfth Division which had now come up
on the left.  The Ninth Division upon this date numbered 1540 rifles
with 20 machine-guns.  It was shortly afterwards drawn from the line
after as severe a spell of service as troops could possibly endure.
The story of the retreat of the Seventh Corps has been indicated
mainly from the point of view of this {125} northern unit, but it
will be understood that the Twenty-first, as tried and as worn as its
Scottish neighbour, was keeping its relative position to the south,
while the Sixteenth was conforming in the same way until the time
when it passed into the Nineteenth Corps.

The Thirty-fifth Division, newly arrived from Flanders, did great and
indeed vital work in upholding the weakening line at the moment of
its greatest strain.  A consecutive account of its work may make this
clear.  Pushing through the remains of the Twenty-first Division on
March 24, Franks threw his men instantly into the thick of the fight,
attacking the Germans in front of Clery.  Marindin's 105th Brigade
did great work that day, the 15th Cheshires on the right and 15th
Sherwood Foresters on the left, attacking and, for a time, carrying
the ridge of Clery, though it was impossible in view of the general
retreat to hold it for long.  The Germans were staggered by the
sudden, unexpected blow, and they poured troops against their new
antagonist, losing very heavily in their reconquest of the ridge.
Finally the front line of the Sherwoods was practically annihilated,
and the Cheshires were in almost as bad a way, but with the help of
some Sussex men who were formed into an emergency unit, together with
some signallers, they were able to draw off, and a line of defence
was organised under General Marindin, but general orders arrived for
a withdrawal to the front Curlu-Maurepas, which was safely carried
out, the 17th Royal Scots covering the rear.  It was a most ticklish
business, as touch had been lost with the Ninth Division, but the
wounded were safely evacuated, and all withdrew in good order, the
12th {126} Highland Light Infantry finally bridging the gap upon the
left.  This battalion had lost in these operations its splendid
Colonel, Anderson, whose work has earned a posthumous V.C.  The enemy
followed closely, and attacked again before dusk, but was driven off.
The attack was renewed on the morning of March 25, but still without
success, the 4th North Staffords bearing the brunt.  The weary troops
of the Scottish division, who had been engaged for four long days,
were rallied here and formed into provisional fighting units, which
did good service by relieving the 106th Brigade at Maricourt, when it
was forced back.  The pressure upon the division was desperately
severe, but was slightly eased by the arrival of a Northumberland
Fusilier battalion from the Twenty-first Division.  That night the
order was to withdraw to the line Bray-Albert.

[Sidenote: Seventh Corps.  March 25.  March 30.]

The general command of the retiring line in this section, including
the Ninth, Twenty-first, and Thirty-fifth Divisions had for the time
fallen to General Franks, who handed his own division over to General
Pollard.  The position was exceedingly critical, as not only were the
units weak, but ammunition had run low.  The line was still falling
back, and the enemy was pressing on behind it with mounted scouts in
the van.  In this retreat tanks were found of the greatest service in
holding the German advance.  The route was through Morlancourt and
Ville-sur-Ancre to a defensive position upon the right bank of the
Ancre in the Dernancourt area, the orders being to hold the line
between that village and Buire.  Both villages were attacked that
evening, but the Thirty-fifth Division on the right and the 26th
{127} Brigade on the left, drove back the enemy.  By the morning of
March 28 the line seemed to have reached equilibrium in this part,
and the welcome sight was seen of large bodies of troops moving up
from the rear.  This was the head of the Australian reinforcements.
During the day the enemy got into Dernancourt, but was thrown out
again by the 19th Northumberland Fusiliers Pioneer Battalion.  The
104th Brigade also drove back an attack in front of Treux Wood.  It
was clear that the moving hordes were losing impetus and momentum.
That same evening the Australians were engaged upon the right and
inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.  On the night of March 30 the
Thirty-fifth Division, which had lost nearly half its numbers, was
relieved by the Third Australians.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 23.]

We shall now follow the Nineteenth Corps in its perilous retreat.  It
will be remembered that on the evening of the first day of the battle
it had been badly outflanked to the north, where the Sixty-sixth
Division had made so stout a resistance, and had also lost a great
deal of the battle zone in the south, which was made more disastrous
by the fall of Le Verguier at nine on the morning of March 22.  The
supporting line formed by the Fiftieth Division had also been pushed
in at Pœuilly and other points, and it was with no little
difficulty that the depleted and exhausted corps was able to get
across the Somme on the morning of March 23, where they were ordered
to hold the whole front of the river, including the important
crossings at Brie.  This, as a glance at the map will show, was a
very considerable retreat, amounting to no less than ten miles in two
days, but it was of the first importance to get a line {128} of
defence, and also to lessen the distance between the sorely tried
army and its reserves.  It was hard indeed to give up ground and to
be back on the line of Peronne, but there was at least the small
solace that this was the ravaged ground which the Germans had
themselves turned into a waste land, and that there was no town of
any consequence nor any military point of importance in its whole
extent.

By the late afternoon of March 23 the bulk of the Nineteenth Corps
was across the Somme.  The Germans had followed closely, and there
was rearguard fighting all the way in which the Fiftieth Division
slowed down the pursuit of the enemy.  The officers who were
entrusted with the defence of the line of river soon realised that
they had a difficult task, for the dry weather had shrunk it into
insignificance in this section, and owing to trees and thick
undergrowth the fields of fire were very limited, while the thin line
of defenders scattered over some twelve miles of front offered, even
after the advent of the Eighth Division, an ineffective screen
against the heavy advance from the east.  Heneker's Eighth Division,
a particularly fine unit consisting entirely of Regular battalions,
had made heroic exertions to reach the field of battle, and fitted
itself at once into its correct position in that very complicated
operation in a way which seemed marvellous to soldiers on the spot.

In the evening of March 23 a number of Germans, some of them cavalry,
were observed upon the farther side of the Somme and were heavily
punished by artillery fire.  None got across before dark, but during
the night numerous bodies established themselves upon the western
side.  Local reserves had {129} been placed near the probable
crossings, and these in several cases hunted the enemy across again;
but the fact was that the river could be forded anywhere, and that a
German concentration on a given point could always overpower the thin
local defence.  The line of resistance was further weakened by the
First Cavalry Division, which had linked up the Nineteenth Corps with
the Eighteenth Corps on the south, being now ordered to join the
Seventh Corps in the north.  The general order of the troops at this
moment was, that the newly arrived Eighth Division was on the extreme
right touching elements of the Eighteenth Corps at Bethencourt and
extending with the aid of one brigade of the Fiftieth as far as
Eterpigny, nearly eight miles.  From Eterpigny to Biaches, south of
Peronne, were the remains of the Sixty-sixth Division, covering about
four miles, and joining the Thirty-ninth Division on the right of the
Seventh Corps near that point.  The Twenty-fourth was lining up
between Hattencourt and Chaulnes.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 24.  March 25.]

It was on the front of the Eighth Division, at Bethencourt, at
Pargny, and at St. Christ, that the Germans made their chief
lodgments upon the western banks of the river on the morning of March
24.  The Bethencourt attack was particularly formidable, both for its
energy and because it aimed at the junction of the two corps.  By two
in the afternoon the German infantry were across in considerable
numbers, and had forced back the right flank of the Eighth Division,
which fell back hinging upon the river farther north, so as to oppose
the repeated efforts which were made to enfilade the whole line.
General Watts' responsibilities were added to next morning, March 25,
for the two much exhausted {130} divisions of the Seventh Corps which
were holding the northern bend of the river from Biaches to beyond
Frise were handed over to him when the rest of Congreve's Corps was
incorporated in the Third Army.  These two divisions were the
Thirty-ninth and the Sixteenth, the former holding as far as Frise
and the latter the Somme crossings to the west of that point.  March
25 was a day of great anxiety tor General Watts, as the enemy were
pressing hard, many of his own units were utterly exhausted, and the
possibilities of grave disaster were very evident.  A real fracture
of the line at either end might have led to a most desperate
situation.  The French were now at the south end of the river
position, but their presence was not yet strongly felt, and with
every hour the pressure was heavier upon the bent line of the Eighth
Division, on which the whole weight of the central battle had fallen.
By 10 o'clock on the morning of March 25, the defensive flank of the
Eighth Division had been pushed back to Licourt, and had been broken
there, but had been mended once more by counter-attack, and was still
holding with the aid of the Fiftieth.  The cyclists of the Nineteenth
Corps, the armoured-car batteries, and other small units were thrust
in to stiffen the yielding line, which was still rolled up, until
after one o'clock it lay back roughly from Cizancourt to Marchelepot
and the railway line west of that place.  Later in the day came the
news of fresh crossings to the north at St. Christ and Eterpigny
where the Sixty-sixth Division had been pushed back to Maisonette.
It was evident that the line was doomed.  To stay in it was to risk
destruction.  At 4.15 the order was given to withdraw to a second
position which had been prepared farther westward, {131} but to
retain the line of the Somme as the left flank.  During these
operations the Eighth Division had performed the remarkable feat of
holding back and defeating fourteen separate German divisions during
thirty-six hours on a nine-mile front, and finally withdrew in
perfect order.  Every unit was needed to cover the ground, and the
general disposition of divisions was roughly as drawn:

      Hattencourt.     Estrees.       Herbecourt.
                Chantres.    Assevillers.      Frise.
  _R._     24       8     50      66      39    16    _L._


It will be seen that General Watts' command had increased from two
divisions to six, but it is doubtful whether the whole six had the
normal strength of two.  The new line had not yet been completed and
was essentially unstable, but none the less it formed a rallying
point for the retreating troops.  It should be noted that from the
morning of March 25 General Fayolle took over the command south of
the Somme.

The Twenty-fourth Division, which had suffered so severely in the
first two days of the action, was again heavily engaged during this
arduous day.  In the morning it had been directed to counter-attack
in the direction of Dreslincourt in co-operation with the French
Twenty-second Division.  In the meantime, however, the whole
situation had been changed by the right flank of the Eighth Division
being turned, so that General Daly's men as they went up for the
attack were themselves heavily attacked near Curchy, while the
junction with the French could not be made.  They fell back therefore
upon their original position where hard fighting ensued all day, and
a most anxious situation developed upon the southern flank, where a
wide gap existed and the enemy was mustering {132} in force.  Colonel
Walker, C.R.E. of this division, was killed that day.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 26.]

On the morning of March 26 the new line had been occupied.  The
Seventeenth Corps had retired in the night to the Bray-Albert line,
which left a considerable gap in the north, to the west of Frise, but
this was filled up by an impromptu line made up of stragglers and
various odds and ends from the rear of the army.  It was in the
south, however, that the attack was most severe, and here it soon
became evident that the line was too long and the defenders too weak,
so that it could not be maintained against a determined assault.
Before the sun had risen high above the horizon it had been shaken
from end to end, the Twenty-fourth Division being hard put to it to
hold Fonches, while the Sixty-sixth were driven out of Herbecourt.
At 9.30 the order was given to withdraw, and with their brave
rearguards freely sacrificing themselves to hold back the swarming
enemy, the troops--some of them in the last stage of exhaustion--fell
back upon a second position.  It was at this period of the battle
that Major Whitworth, the gallant commander of the 2/6 Manchester's,
stood at bay with his battalion, which numbered exactly 34 men.  He
and 17 of his men were dead or wounded after this last stand, and 17
survivors were all that could be mustered that evening.

Before the right wing fell back to Vrely there had been a good deal
of fighting.  The Twenty-fourth Division, which was now a mere
skeleton, was strongly attacked in the morning of March 27, and
Dugan's 73rd Brigade was pushed back towards Caix, the 8th Sussex
having very heavy losses, including Colonel Hill, and Banham, the
second-in-command.

{133}

The situation upon the other flank of the Twenty-fourth Division was
also particularly desperate, and the 9th East Surrey, under Major
Clark, sacrificed itself to cover the withdrawal of the 72nd Brigade.
There were few more gallant actions in the war.  Major Clark, writing
from a German prison, gave a small account which enables us to get a
glimpse of the actual detail of such a combat.  The enemy's infantry
were in force, he says, within 100 yards of his scattered line.  "We
managed to get back some hundred yards when I saw that our position
was really desperate.  The enemy were sweeping up from the south, and
several lines of them were in between us and our next defensive
line....  We were seen and the enemy began to surround us, so I
decided to fight it out.  We took up position in a communication
trench, and used our rifles with great effect.  Grant was doing good
work till shot through the head, and Warre-Dymond behaved admirably.
It was a fine fight, and we held them until ammunition gave out.
They then charged and mopped up the remainder.  They were infuriated
with us.  My clothing had been riddled with shrapnel, my nose
fractured, and my face and clothing smothered with blood.  There are
3 officers and 59 men unwounded.  The rest of the battalion are
casualties.  It was a great fight, and the men were simply splendid.
I have the greatest admiration for them.  It was a glorious end."
Such were the class of men whom the East End of London sent into the
New Army.

The new position on March 26 may be depicted as follows:

             Rosières.       Framerville.    Froissy.
       Rouvroy.     Vauvillers.       Proyart.
  _R._    24     8      50       66      39     16   _L._


{134}

The Germans followed up closely all along the line, the pressure
being great everywhere, but greatest on the left, where the
Thirty-ninth and Sixty-sixth disengaged themselves with difficulty,
both of them being heavily attacked, and the Cambridgeshires fighting
a fine rearguard action in Biaches.  About two in the afternoon the
troops were solidly established in their new positions, but the
extreme north of the line was in a very unstable condition, as the
Sixteenth were fired upon from the north of the river and their left
was in no condition to meet an attack.  On the right, however, there
was earlier in the day some very spirited fighting, for the Eighth
and Fiftieth Divisions, though very worn, were in far better shape
than their comrades who had endured the gassings and the losses of
the first day.

The Fiftieth Division fought particularly hard to stop the enemy's
advance, turning at every rise, and hitting back with all the
strength that was left it.  A very fine little delaying action was
fought by its rearguard this day upon the line
Lihons-Vermandovillers--Foucaucourt.  The 5th and 8th Durhams, with a
few of the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers and a couple of batteries,
held up the advance for several hours and stood their ground with
such resolution that two platoons of the Northumberlands were never
seen again, for they held on to Foucaucourt until both they and the
village were submerged.  As the day wore on and the pressure
increased, the Sixty-sixth Division was forced to let go of
Framerville, for these men had fought without sleep for five days and
nights.  They staggered back through the rear ranks of the Fiftieth
Division, consisting of the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers, who at
once, under the {135} personal leading of General Riddell and Colonel
Anstey, both of them on horseback and in red-banded caps, rushed the
village once again.  It was a fine advance which was much helped by
the way in which Captain Thompson in Vauvillers brought his
machine-guns to bear upon the flank of the Germans advancing to the
south of him.  Brigade-Major Paget, a very rising officer, was killed
in this spirited affair.

No gains could ever be held, as the general line was receding, but
all such successful blows were of use as slowing down the German
advance, teaching him caution, and gaining time--for time was the
very essence of the matter.  If there were time the line could be
built up behind.  If there were no time Amiens must fall.  "I will
fight before Amiens, in Amiens, or behind Amiens!" cried Foch.  Brave
words, but if Amiens went, the future was dark indeed.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 27.]

At eight on the morning of March 27 the Germans were raging once more
along the whole line of the British breakwater.  The gallant weary
Eighth Division was heavily attacked near Rosières and the stormers
reached the village, but Heneker's men counter-attacked in most
heroic fashion, and cleared them out again, taking a number of
prisoners.  The 2nd Devons, 1st Sherwoods, and 22nd Durham Light
Infantry were the units engaged in this fine action.

News was bad from the north end of the line, and it was understood
that the Germans were in Proyart, so both the Eighth and Fiftieth
Divisions, out of their scanty ranks, sent reinforcements (R.E.
details and the 2nd Devons) to help the Thirty-ninth Division.  At 3
P.M. on March 27 the Germans were in Framerville, and an hour later
were on the top of the {136} Eighth and Fiftieth once more, in front
of Harbonnière.  The rearguard of the latter were the 4th and 6th
Northumberland Fusiliers.  The German guns were in full blast that
morning, and the infantry full of ginger, but they could not break
that protective line, thin, disciplined, and flexible.  The two
battalions could not cover the ground, and the Germans streamed past
their flank.  In order to support the advanced line every available
man was assembled on the reverse slope of a rise, just out of sight
of the Germans.  In front of them they could hear the roar of the
battle, ever growing nearer as the British line was rolled back.  "We
were a mixed crowd," says one who was among them.  "Staff officers in
red caps, clerks in spectacles, signalling officers, cooks, sappers,
and that extraordinary never-beaten infantry."  It was indeed one of
the crises of the war, for the situation was desperate just south of
the Somme, and if the enemy was through at this point also the line
would be in fragments.  The whole array waited over the curve of the
hill, and as the enemy, in eight or ten waves, poured over the brow
they fired at close range in the traditional Busaco fashion of the
peninsula.  A bayonet charge as of old completed the transaction, and
the enemy broke and fled, with a barrage beating down upon his
supports.  The British infantry from the top of the rise was treated
to the welcome, and, as it must be confessed, unusual sight of a
large force of Germans all shredded out and hurrying for the nearest
shelter, "like a football crowd caught in the rain."  It is an
instance of the incurable levity of British troops that they broke
into the refrain of "Goodbyee!  Goodbyee!  There's a silver lining in
the skyee!"

{137}

In spite of their cheerfulness, however, the losses had been heavy,
both Colonel Robinson of the 6th and Colonel Wright of the 5th
Northumberland Fusiliers being among the casualties.  Each of the
battalions now numbered little more than a hundred men.

This brisk counter-attack was a healthy little reminder to the
Germans upon this section of the line that the British infantry might
be overborne by numbers or by strategy, but that they were still the
men who had in the previous year chased them again and again from the
most formidable positions which they could construct.  But these
points of aggressive resistance were now rare and the men were worn
out.  It does indeed seem to be an extreme example of the weakness of
the reserves at this period in France, that in spite of the fact that
the battle broke out upon March 21, no help save the one division had
in the course of a week reached the overmatched and exhausted troops.
It is true that the Higher Command may well have reckoned upon the
French as reserves, and this would have been perfectly true had they
been able to take over the ground in the south and contract the
British line.  They did take over the ground, but they took over most
of the two British Corps as well, so that the Nineteenth Corps was
little the better for their presence.  Unaided by either their own
people or by the French, the Nineteenth Corps still held on
desperately with dwindling numbers to a line which was far beyond
their strength.

Bad as was the position of the Nineteenth Corps, it was made worse by
the ever-changing position in the north.  When the Seventh Corps fell
back to the line of Bray it was behind the left flank of the
Nineteenth Corps.  But now it was compelled to make {138} a further
move to the line Chipilly-Morlancourt, while all bridges were ordered
to be destroyed up to Cherisy.  This disposition was absolutely
necessary in view of what was happening in the Third Army area; but
it made the position more and more difficult for the men in the
south, who had either to fall back or to see the gap of undefended
river upon their left rear grow wider and wider.  General Watts is a
stubborn fighter with no idea of going back if it can be in any way
avoided, so he held on in the south and fought a brisk, successful
action there, while he sent such poor reinforcements as he could to
the Sixteenth Division in the north, stopping the dangerous rent with
any odds and ends upon which he could lay his hands.  Three hundred
improvised infantry, six Lewis guns, and a battery in armoured cars
were the best that he could do, and these troops actually did hold
the river line in the north from the early morning of March 27 until
nightfall, against an ever-growing menace.  But they could not cover
all the ground, and the enemy, as was foreseen, was coming over the
river and getting behind the British line.  The Sixteenth Division
was practically destroyed, and the Thirty-ninth was in little better
case, though General Feetham showed great energy in re-organising all
the débris of units upon the road, so that the line of resistance was
very weak.  In the afternoon a considerable party of Germans with
machine-guns had got across the river at Cherisy, west of Morcourt,
held by seventy men of the Sixteenth Division, and pushed on in the
most daring way south-west to Lamotte and Bayonvillers.  They were
right across the rear of the Nineteenth Corps, and a great disaster
seemed inevitable, but weary as the {139} men were, and tired as were
their leaders, they were still capable of clear decision and swift
action.  The river was for the moment abandoned, the left of the line
was swung south, and early upon March 28 they faced north in this
sector, along the track of the Amiens-La Fère railway.  Roughly, the
new position may be traced as follows:

              Vrely.    Gillancourt.
     Warvillers.    Caix.        Wiencourt.  Marcelcave.
                                 +---------------------+
  _R._   24     8    60     66             39            _L._


[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 28.]

This very difficult and remarkable disengagement was particularly
trying for the Thirty-ninth Division since it had farthest to go and
was in close contact with the enemy.  It was carried out in broad
daylight in the morning of March 28, and with such skill that there
was no great loss in the 118th Brigade which covered it, but so close
was the enemy that both General Bellingham and his brigade-major,
Major F. Gunner, were captured while personally supervising the
withdrawal.  After this operation the remains of the Thirty-ninth
Division were occupying the line from Marcelcave to Wiencourt
inclusive, along the railway track.  Germans were found in Wiencourt,
and the two brigades, now reduced to two composite battalions under
Colonel Saint, attacked them with success, but eventually occupied a
line to the west.  All the guns had been saved and were in action
once more.

On the occasion of the reforming of the line as already described on
March 28, the Fiftieth Division had fallen back upon Caix, where it
held fast to the important bridge across the River Luce upon which a
number of troops from various units were converging.  Many of these
were disorganised, and some, {140} to use the expression of a
spectator, "stone-cold"; but the same witness has recorded the
splendid moral effect produced by one battalion which, marching in
fours and with everything in most precise order, came swinging down
the road, with no change after its seven days of purgatory save that
two-thirds of its personnel had disappeared.  This was Colonel
Hancock's 1st Battalion of Royal Fusiliers from the Twenty-fourth
Division--an object-lesson to all who saw it as to how discipline can
outlast the most terrific tests which a soldier can be asked to
endure.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 28.]

The enemy, still working down from the north, had threatened the new
defensive flank at a point between Caix and Cayeux, but were held by
a very spirited attack made by the men of the 22nd Entrenching
Battalion.  With considerable loss both to themselves and to the
Germans, they held the line of the river until reinforcements
arrived.  The Thirty-ninth from the north and the Eighth and
Twenty-fourth from the south were all converging upon the one point
to take up their new positions.  A Brigadier in command of the
infantry, with 800 men and 3 batteries, held the bridge; but the
Germans might have rushed it had it not been for a charge by the
151st Brigade, when the 5th and 7th Durhams drove back their
advancing line.  This spirited attack was led by General Jackson in
person, who encouraged his men by blasts upon his hunting-horn.
Speaking of one of their military heroes, a French historian has
said: "Il avait la graine de folie dans sa bravoure que les Français
aiment."  All soldiers love it, and it is a wise leader who knows how
to employ it.  It was a time when every possible device was needed to
hold the men, for the enemy was close upon the bridge, {141} and the
safety of the remains of several divisions depended upon the bridge
being held.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 27.]

Returning to the general survey of the line of the Nineteenth Corps
the Sixteenth Division was now rather a crowd of warlike particles
than an organised unit.  It was ordered, however, that every
individual particle should be reassembled at Hamel so that the
nucleus of a division should exist once more.  Hard marching and hard
fighting had reduced the Twenty-fourth Division to almost the same
condition, though, thanks to a miraculous survival of most of the
senior officers, the unit was still efficient.  On the other hand,
the Sixty-first Division from the Eighteenth Corps, numbering at this
period 2400 men, was given to General Watts to help to form his new
line.  It was at first intended with the aid of these new troops to
endeavour to clear the left flank, and for this purpose a
counter-attack upon Lamotte was ordered.  The newly-arrived men from
the south, the 183rd and 184th Brigades, who could hardly stagger a
mile, did actually carry the twin village of Warfusee and hold the
edge of it for a time under very heavy fire--an operation in which
Major Bennett of the Oxfords did conspicuously fine work.  Several
grand soldiers fell in this attack, including Captain Willick who had
commanded the 2/4 Berkshires after the fall of the heroic Dimmer.
His last speech to his men is worth recording.  It was, "I know how
you feel, boys, tired and worn out, but we have to stop them from
breaking through."  The support to this brave attack is said to have
been "one gun, firing wildly."

The line sloped back now from Demuin in the south to the Somme at a
point opposite Sailly-le-Sec, the Sixty-first occupying the general
sector {142} just south of the Lamotte-Amiens Road.  From there to
the river had been a gap which it was absolutely vital to fill.  An
old line of trench existed here, extending from the river to Demuin,
and early in the battle General Gough, amid all his preoccupations,
had realised that it might be of great importance to have it ready as
a rallying place.  He had therefore deputed General Grant, his own
chief of engineers, together with Colonel Harvey, his chief of staff,
to organise it and to endeavour to man it, with any spare troops that
they could find.  This had been done, and after three days of
feverish work, Grant had prepared a line and had thrust into it a
most curious assortment of all sorts of details, made up of
entrenching troops, American sappers, the staffs of various army
schools, reinforcing units, and stragglers.  On the third day General
Grant was recalled to his official duties, but General Carey happened
to be passing from the front to take over a divisional command, and
he was deflected and placed in charge of this assembly of military
samples, which included 500 cases out of hospital.  There was a
sprinkling of machine-guns with trained instructors to use them, but
the line was thin and there was a want of cohesion in the elements
which formed it.  The great thing, however, was that the gulf was
spanned between Watts in the south and Congreve in the north.  There
was still a trench and a line of British soldiers between the Germans
and the open country that led to Amiens.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 28.]

March 28 was a day of destiny along the line, for upon that date were
the first definite signs that the assault had failed so far as its
ultimate objective was concerned, and that the Germans were not
destined to overcome the British resistance.  In the north, {143}
this was clearly indicated by the victory in front of Arras.  In the
south, the situation was still obscure and dangerous; but the mere
fact that the day was got over without a catastrophe was in itself a
success, for on March 27 the prospects were very ominous.  The line
now ran from Demuin to Marcelcave, and thence the improvised trench
garrison carried it on to the river.  The First Cavalry Division,
which had come across from the north bank, formed a link between the
Sixty-first in the north of Watts' line, and what we will now call
the Carey line.  The cavalry men were still full of fight, but they
had done wonderful work since the first day of the battle, cementing
every weak seam, and they were terribly reduced in numbers if not in
spirit.  Nothing can exaggerate the debt which the infantry owed to
all three divisions of cavalry for their tireless support during that
awful week.  They now tried to advance towards Lamotte, but they came
upon the right flank of a very strong German force moving south-west
from Cherisy, and though they endeavoured to harass it they were
unable to make much impression.  The 61st was also terribly worn.
Upon this day the 184th Brigade lost Colonel Belton, its fifth
commander, and was taken over by Colonel Pagan of the Gloucesters.

The southern end of the British line had troubles enough before, but
they were now accentuated by the fact that the Germans had made a
very rapid advance in the Montdidier sector which placed them in the
right rear of the Nineteenth Corps.  On this right flank there was
much confused fighting, and a mixture of units which reached such a
point before the morning of March 29 that the Twenty-fourth, or what
remained of it, found that it had unwittingly {144} changed from the
right to the left flank of the Eighth Division.  There could perhaps
be no clearer illustration of the dimensions to which the division
had shrunk.  These confused movements caused loss of touch, and there
was a time when Corps Headquarters had completely lost the right of
the line, which was badly disorganised.  It was a time of great
danger.  Yet another division, however, the Twentieth, was given to
Watts, and though it was already worn to the bone, and could not
reckon a thousand men in all three brigades, it was still
battleworthy and formed an invaluable asset at such a time.  They
were lined up, or perhaps dotted along would be a fitter term, upon
the front of Mezières-Demuin, and formed a frail barrier behind which
the hard-pressed men could have a brief breathing space while they
endeavoured to reform.  By the late afternoon of March 28 this
operation was in progress, and before 11 P.M. the new positions were
actually occupied.  The line, which was partly wired, now ran from
Mezières, through Demuin, Marcelcave, and Hamel to the Somme, but it
would be hard to add the exact alignment of the units, as in many
places they were inextricably mixed.  The Sixty-first and the Cavalry
had been placed behind Carey's line, in order to support it should it
weaken.  South of this was the Twentieth Division, reinforced by
fragments of other divisions, which among them had the strength and
spirit to beat off a strong German attack delivered by the force
which had been engaged by the cavalry in the morning.  The country
here was seamed by the old French trenches, which were woefully out
of repair but none the less were of great value to the defence.
Carey's force was involved in this German {145} attack on March 28,
but with the help of the First Cavalry Division they managed to hold
their line.  Upon that date the exhausted troops received the
following well-timed message from the Fifth Army commander: "By the
grand and stubborn way you are holding out and delaying the advance
of the enemy, the British and French reserves are being given the
necessary time to come up and assume the offensive.  Your great
exertions and sacrifices are not being thrown away: they are of
immense importance, and your resistance and your deeds in this great
battle will live for all time, and will save our country."

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 29.]

March 29 was another eventful and critical day for the Nineteenth
Corps, and began badly for them, since the remains of the Eighth and
Twenty-fourth Divisions had, as already explained, been thrust out of
their positions and were mostly on the west side of the Avre and out
of the line.  The Fiftieth Division was only partly in position, the
fighting strength of the Sixty-sixth was reckoned at 750 bayonets,
and that of the Thirty-ninth at 500 bayonets.  The Nineteenth Corps
at this moment was nominally composed of eight infantry
divisions--Eighth, Twentieth, Twenty-fourth, Sixteenth, Thirty-ninth,
Fiftieth, Sixty-first, and Sixty-sixth; but it is questionable
whether their united strength greatly exceeded that of a single full
division, to such a point had the army been reduced.  On the other
hand, there was no direct evidence of excessive wastage upon the part
of the Germans, who could be seen in large well-organised bodies
moving in front of the British lines.  The one consolation lay in the
fact that their heavy guns, and even a good many of their field-guns,
had been {146} left behind.  The machine-guns, however, and their
newly-developed light field artillery were as energetic as ever.  The
British artillery had been weakened by capture and destruction, but
it was greatly supplemented by several armoured-car batteries,
Canadian and British, which did splendid service during these
all-important days.

About mid-day on March 29 the French, and the remains of the
Thirtieth Division under the French Higher Command, had abandoned
Mezières upon the right flank of the Nineteenth Corps, and by so
doing they exposed the right of the steadfast Twentieth Division.
The fighting extended from the River Avre to Demuin.  The 59th
Brigade, which was in the south of the line, was forced to fall back,
but two battalions of the 60th Brigade were thrown out to cover the
flank and hold the German advance from getting behind the British
line.  At 2 o'clock these two brigades gathered their thin ranks
together for a counter-attack, aided by the Fiftieth Division, which
had now been telescoped into a single weak brigade.  It was a
remarkable attack, for most of the men were stumbling with utter
fatigue, and could hardly totter forward with their rifles at the
port.  It was the Riflemen and Shropshires who made the advance upon
Mezières while their comrades stormed the surrounding woods.  The 5th
Durhams, 6th Northumberland Fusiliers, and 22nd Entrenching Battalion
of the Fiftieth Division also did great things.  There is evidence
from the prisoners that the Germans at that particular point had lost
very heavily and were much distressed, so that the combat was like
those closing rounds of a hard-fought boxing contest, where the two
exhausted combatants can {147} but push and paw as they lurch against
each other.  The village was actually carried by the British, and a
temporary easement secured, together with a handful of the 352nd
Regiment, who stated that they had lost three entire companies in
their first advance upon Mezières.  This spirited counter-attack was
covered by the guns of the Fiftieth Division which, under Major
Johnson, had worked very hard during those last trying days.

About 2 o'clock on March 29 Watts' Corps was reinforced by another
skeleton division, the Eighteenth--2000 bayonets, in all.  It was
merged with the Sixty-first and placed in the Berteaucourt-Bois de
Blangy line.  The thin ranks of the Twenty-fourth were still able to
muster at the south end of the position, but only one brigade of the
Eighth Division, the Twenty-fifth, was in a condition for service.
This unit moved to the edge of Moreuil Wood, and co-operated with the
French One hundred and thirty-third Division which was holding the
line at that point.  From this time onwards the
Moreuil-Ailly-sur-Noye Road and everything south of it was French.
As the British force dwindled its front also contracted, otherwise
the situation would have indeed been impossible.

As it was, it continued to be desperately critical, for beyond the
telescoping of units and the contraction of front there was no help
for the British line, while the assailants were still very numerous
and aggressive.  About noon on this day, March 29, the Thirty-ninth
Division, and indeed the whole army, sustained a severe loss in the
person of General Feetham, a leader of great valour and experience,
who was killed by a shell while walking with Colonel {148} Gosset,
his chief of staff, in the village of Demuin.  His death was to some
extent revenged at once by his devoted troops, for a German attack
which followed at once down the valley of the Luce was driven back
with heavy loss by the rifles of the infantry.  General Feetham was
replaced next day by General Blacklock.  It is a remarkable fact that
Feetham was the second commander of the Thirty-ninth Division killed
within a fortnight, for General Cape, his _locum tenens_, fell upon
the 13th of March.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 30.]

On the morning of March 30 the 61st Brigade of the Twentieth Division
was on the south end of the line covering the bridge over the Luce at
Hangard, while the 59th covered that at Dornart, the 60th lining up
from Dornart to Berteaucourt.  The Fiftieth Division had been now
incorporated in the Twentieth.  All the bridges had been prepared for
demolition.  The enemy were slowly pushing the French out of the
Moreuil Wood upon the extreme right, small bodies of infantry
gradually infiltrating the whole position.  The Germans soon
developed activity also in the Luce valley, and finally along the
whole corps front.  The Second Cavalry Division was sent into Moreuil
Wood to help the French, but the whole right of the line began
gradually to crumble in face of the repeated assaults.  The remains
of the Sixty-sixth and Twentieth Divisions were bent back, though the
latter continued for a long time to hold the Demuin-Marcelcave line
of road, but about 8 A.M. the Sixty-sixth Division was pushed out of
Aubercourt.  There was some weakness farther north also, between
Villers and Marcelcave, but the never-failing First Cavalry Division
stiffened the yielding line.  At 10 {149} o'clock the situation had
improved in Moreuil Wood, where Seely's Canadian cavalry, with the
3rd Cavalry Brigade in support, were making their presence felt.
They held the line along the edge of the wood from east of Moreuil,
but had lost touch with the Twentieth upon their left.  Later in the
morning there was a strong German counter in this quarter which drove
the cavalry back into the wood.  Here at a later hour they were
reinforced by the Eighth Division, if such a sonorous name can be
given to a handful of dazed and exhausted men.  The line at mid-day
ran roughly as follows:

  Moreuil Wood.  Demuin.  W. of Aubercourt.  W. of Marcelcave.
    2nd Cav.   20th.  66th.     Carey.        61st.  1st Cav.

The great bulk of the British force lay to the north of the Luce
River, and the Germans were making every effort to push the flank
backwards or aside and to ford the stream.  A wood named Little Wood
lay in such a position as to help or hinder, such an attempt, and it
was the scene of some fierce fighting.  It was first occupied by one
of the enemy's advanced parties.  It was then retaken by some of the
West Yorkshires of the 60th Brigade.  These in turn were pushed out
by the enemy.  Finally, in the evening the 12th Rifles and 12th Rifle
Brigade, with some French and scattered units of the Fiftieth
Division, charged forward through the twilight, recaptured the wood,
and re-established the whole line in this quarter.  Nine machine-guns
and fifty-three prisoners were taken.  Well might General Watts
telegraph: "Well done, the Twentieth!  Such a counter-attack after
all your hard work is splendid."

Now at last there were signs of some relaxation {150} in the dreadful
strain.  On this, the ninth day of the battle, the first British
reserves, save only the Eighth Division, began to appear in the line.
They were the 9th Australian Brigade, who came into the fight between
Demuin and Aubercourt with their usual brisk gallantry.  Their attack
made some progress, and the 12th Lancers who advanced with them
shared something of the glory.  Although the final objectives were
not attained, the line north of the Luce was stayed by their presence
and made firm for the morrow.  On this evening several of those
heroic units which had fought themselves to the last point of human
endurance from the beginning of the battle were taken from that stage
where they had played so glorious and tragic a part.  The remains of
the Thirty-ninth, the Fiftieth, the Sixteenth, and the Sixty-sixth
were all drawn back for re-organisation.  It was theirs to take part
in what was a defeat and a retreat, but their losses are the measure
of their endurance, and the ultimate verdict of history upon their
performance lies in the one single undeniable fact that the Germans
could never get past them.  Speaking of these troops an observer
remarked: "They had been fighting for nine days, but were very
cheerful and still full of vigour."  The losses of some units and the
exertions of the individuals who composed them can seldom have been
matched in warfare.  The 2/6th Lancashire Fusiliers, for example, had
fought in the rearguard of the Sixty-sixth Division for the whole
retreat under Captain Porter, the only officer left standing.  They
were now reduced to about a hundred men.  Many battalions were in no
better condition.  Carey's nondescript force was also broken up on
the evening of March 30.  They had {151} served a most useful purpose
at a critical moment of the battle, and their formation may have
prevented a disaster, but it should be emphasised that their
existence was not some impromptu effort, but had been pre-arranged by
the wise foresight of General Gough.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  March 31.]

On March 31 there were signs that the German flood was reaching full
tide.  They had acted to a wonderful degree up to their own saying:
"Immer fest daran!" but they had now far outstripped their artillery
support and the tenacious elastic British defence had worn them down.
There was no attack on the morning of this day, but about noon the
fighting broke out once more in the Moreuil Woods, the enemy pushing
their way through them and slowly driving back the line of the Eighth
and the Twentieth, while the French were again driven out of the
village of Moreuil.  North of Marcelcave there was a day of quiet and
re-organisation.  The Sixty-first was still holding the
Berteaucourt-Gentilles line, while the Eighteenth was holding the
line of the Luce.  In the evening the Eighth and Twentieth were again
reinforced by the cavalry, and by the superior and heroic exertions
of every one concerned the position on the right flank was
maintained.  The 2nd Berkshires distinguished themselves in this
fighting.  There is something more than a name even in this stage of
the war in the old Regular battalions, for the chronicler finds that
they stand out amidst the other units out of all proportion to their
numbers.  The 2nd Bedfords, 1st Royal Fusiliers, 2nd Scots Fusiliers,
and many others upheld the honour of the grand old force.

The right wing had been considerably hustled in {152} the Moreuil
quarter on March 31, but on April 1 the Second Cavalry Division,
which included the Canadian Brigade, made a sudden fierce
counter-attack which threw the enemy back.  Fifty prisoners and
thirteen machine-guns were the fruits of this action.  The British
guns had played upon the wood during the whole night, and the enemy
had suffered severely, for the assailants found the brushwood to be
full of dead Germans.  There was no other movement of importance on
this day.  The reformed Fourteenth Division was brought back into the
battle and took the place of the Twentieth, the Fiftieth, and of the
cavalry upon the front to the south of the Luce.  Speaking of the
latter troops after their nine days of martyrdom, a senior officer
who saw them at this stage said: "In the last attack they were driven
back about a mile towards Amiens, but after the first Bosch onrush
they stood like rocks, repelling attack after attack,
counter-attacking and regaining ground in such a manner that every
day I marvelled at the doing of it, and at the men who did it."

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  April 4.]

April 2 and 3 were quiet days, but on the 4th there was a very
violent and general attack along the line of the Nineteenth Corps,
and of the Thirty-sixth French Corps (General Nollet) which lay to
the immediate south.  The main weight of the battle fell upon the
Fourteenth Division in their new positions, and by nine o'clock in
the morning the Germans had gained some success to the north of the
main Amiens Road.  The Australian 9th Brigade, which was south of the
road, held their line, but had to fall back 500 yards in order to
conform with the general position.  At 11.30 the enemy was still
making progress, mostly {153} on the front of the Fourteenth
Division, and had reached the east edge of Hamel and of Bois de
Vaire.  The Third Cavalry Division, those indomitable troops, were
thrown in to thicken the line of the Fourteenth, and the Canadian
motor guns from Villers-Bretonneux were also brought into the battle.
Later two battalions of the invaluable Australian infantry came up at
the double from the 15th Australian Brigade.  If ever the arrival of
strong loyal men in a time of darkness brought joy and comfort with
it, it was when the Australians relieved the British line in these
later days of the second battle of the Somme.  "God bless them!" was
the silent prayer that went down the weary line.  Ground had been
lost south of Villers-Bretonneux, and the line was bent, but the
whole of the Third and Fifth Australian Divisions were streaming down
to their places in the defence.  The end of the retreat was at hand.

[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps.  April.]

Upon the evening of April 4, the line which was to be permanent for
many months to come began to define itself, and order gradually
evolved out of ever-shifting chaos.  Lee's Eighteenth Division was
now in touch with the Thirty-sixth French Corps at Hangard.  Then at
the Bois l'Abbé lay the 9th Australian Brigade.  North of this, at
the Bois de Gentilles, was the Third Cavalry Division.  Thence in
succession came the 15th Australian Brigade, the 43rd Brigade, the
remains of the Twenty-fourth Division, the 8th Australian Brigade,
the other elements of the Fourteenth Division, the Fifth Australian
Division near Aubigny, and the Fifty-eighth Division in the north.
This summary will show how Australia had braced the line.  Upon the
next day, April 5, Butler's Third Corps took over {154} the whole
area of the Nineteenth Corps, and the episode was at an end.

The retreat of General Watts across the ravaged country, his attempt
to hold the long front of the Somme, his successive short retreats,
his continual stands, and his eventual success, will always remain
one of the most remarkable incidents in the war.  This officer, who
at the beginning of hostilities was a "dug-out," hardly rescued from
a premature ending of his military career, showed in the highest
degree those qualities of never despairing, and of rapidly adapting
means to an end, which mark the competent soldier.  He began with two
units under his control, and he ended with fifteen, but no general
ever had to handle more weary troops, or had more need of a clear
head and a high heart.  The strain upon him had been
extraordinary--though indeed that is true of every corps and
divisional commander in the line.  As to the special features of this
operation, it may be said to be remarkable for the improvisations of
troops, for the continual use of entrenching battalions as
combatants, for the work of the dismounted cavalry, for the
self-sacrifice and energy of the motor batteries, and very specially
for the degree of mobility attained by the heavy artillery and the
rapidity with which it came into action in successive positions.
Military critics will draw many deeper lessons from these operations,
but these at least are sufficiently obvious to catch the eye of the
least experienced student.

The total losses of the Nineteenth Corps during this fourteen days of
battle came to from 35,000 to 40,000, killed, wounded, and missing.
The losses in guns were 41 heavy pieces and 73 field-guns, twelve
{155} of which were anti-tank guns in the forward line.  The pressure
sustained by some of the divisions would be incredible if the facts
were not fully authenticated.  Thus the Eighth English Division was
attacked from first to last by eighteen different German divisions,
including three of the Guards.  Prisoners were taken from each so
that their identity could not be disputed.  Yet this same Eighth
Division was engaged within three weeks in the victorious advance at
Villers-Bretonneux.  The German oracle Clausewitz has said that a
retreating army should go back not like a hunted deer but like a
wounded lion.  His commentators would hardly find a better example
than the British armies in the second battle of the Somme.




{156}

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The Retreat of the Eighteenth Corps, March 21-29.

Retreat of the Sixty-first Division--The Gloucesters at
Beauvais--Fall of Ham--Retreat of the Thirtieth and Thirty-sixth
Divisions--Great privations of the men--Fine feat at Le
Quesnoy--Summary of the experience of Maxse's Corps.

[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps.  March 22.]

It has been shown that Maxse's Eighteenth Corps, covering the St.
Quentin front, maintained its whole position on March 21, thanks to
the splendid conduct of the three battalions in the forward line, and
to the stout resistance in the zone of battle.  It has also been told
how the Sixty-first Division, the most northern unit, withdrew on the
afternoon of March 22, very attenuated but still full of fight, to a
prepared position between Vaux and Villévêque.  At 4 P.M. that day
the three brigades, or what was left of them, were in line 1500 yards
east of Beauvais, the 184th being in the centre, with the 182nd on
its right, and the 183rd on its left.  As they faced their pursuers
they could plainly see the Germans pouring in successive waves from
Atilly.  The central brigade was commanded by General the Hon. Robert
White, one of two gallant brothers who sowed their military wild oats
in the Jameson Raid, and this unit, reduced now to a mere handful of
{157} Gloucesters, Berkshires, and Oxfords, was exposed to a
scourging fire of shrapnel, which further thinned their ranks, their
General being one of the casualties.  No field ambulances were
available at the moment, and as General White was led away badly
wounded he saw the German cavalry breaking into the south side of
Beauvais, while a large artillery dump west of the village was
exploded by the enemy fire.  The whole situation was chaotic, but the
British infantry still hung together, retreating slowly and turning
continually upon their pursuers.  Some twenty German aeroplanes were
quartering the district like so many fierce hawks, and diving with
great daring from time to time into the very streets of the village,
while the British falling back into cover fired up at them with their
rifles and light machine-guns.  Two of them came crashing down upon
the roofs of the houses.  It was rumoured that the enemy had already
got close to Ham upon the right rear of the division, and they were
round the left flank in the region of Holnon Wood.  There was little
artillery support available, for sixty per cent of the forward guns
had been taken or destroyed in Holnon Wood, and the remaining
batteries were getting away with their reduced teams, so that the
retreat of the infantry was correspondingly slow in order to cover
the withdrawal.  In the north the Scotsmen of the 183rd Brigade were
moving back near Villescholles in touch with the 72nd Brigade of the
Twenty-fourth Division, both of them being much helped in their
retirement by the 11th Hussars.  All along the line the Germans were
pressing very closely, but the Sixty-first kept wonderfully steady,
though at Beauvais, where Colonel Wetherall had taken over the
command when {158} General White was wounded, the two parties were
continually intermingled, so ardent was the pursuit and so leisurely
the retreat.  So mixed were the combatants that Major Howitt,
brigade-major of the 184th, was dragged out from among his men, and
was in the hands of the Germans for some exciting and instructive
hours.  "I must say the officers treated me well, though the escorts
were very rough," says he.  "For all my hatred I could not help
admiring them intensely, for their deployment, discipline, and
preparation were an eye-opener.  They extended into battle order with
hardly a sound and lay down preparatory for the next assault,
bringing up mules dragging light trench-mortars, machine-guns, and
ammunition."  Major Howitt finally broke away from his escort, and by
keeping so near to a burning ammunition dump that no one dared to
follow him, he succeeded in regaining his own lines.

The defence of the line in front of Beauvais was kept up with
remarkable tenacity and ended by 150 men of the 2/5th Gloucester
battalion performing what was an extraordinary feat, even in this war
of miracles, for they held on to a line 2000 yards in length until
3.30 in the morning of March 23, holding up the whole German advance.
All night the enemy tried to rush or to bomb this thin line of
determined men, but it was not until the cartridges ran low that the
British made their retreat, sneaking round the outskirts of the
village which blazed behind them, and making their way to
Longuevoisin where they joined their comrades, who had already given
them up as lost, for they had been five miles behind the army.
Colonel Lawson was in command during this heroic episode, and was
ably supported by his {159} two lieutenants, Rickerby and Dudbridge.
Of the latter, it is recorded that in a later stage of the retreat he
was in such a condition of absolute exhaustion that he was wounded
three times in the course of a single day without ever observing it
until evening.  Utter nerve fatigue has its compensations as well as
its terrors.

The Thirtieth Division had held on to its ground until four in the
afternoon of March 22.  Some units lingered to cover the retreat, the
2nd Yorkshires and the 17th Manchesters holding on to their redoubts
until six o'clock, when they were in danger of isolation.

During their withdrawal both the Sixty-first Division and the
Thirtieth Division to the south of it were covered by the 59th and
60th Brigades of the Twentieth Division.  These two fine brigades,
still intact and full of fight, allowed the weary soldiers to pass
through their ranks, while they opposed a tenacious resistance to the
pursuing Germans.  When the Sixty-first and Thirtieth were across the
canal of the Somme the covering division fell back in orderly
fashion, and itself crossed the canal between Canizy and Bethencourt,
the 60th Brigade being on the right and the 59th on the left.  The
60th Brigade was compelled to fight hard to make good its retirement,
and it struck back again and again at the German vanguard.  In this
fighting the 12th Rifle Brigade particularly distinguished itself,
but its losses were heavy, and included its gallant Colonel,
Maclachlan.

Early in the morning of March 23 it was known that the enemy had
crossed the line of the Somme at Ham.  The Thirtieth Division had
retreated upon {160} this important little town, which had been
thrown into a state of defence by General Stanley of the 89th
Brigade, but his garrison was so utterly inadequate to cover the
ground that his dispositions were useless, as the Germans could get
round him on either side.  He had with him in the first instance two
entrenching battalions, the 21st and 23rd, two companies of gas
engineers, the corps cyclists, and a mere handful of infantry.  Late
on March 22 he was joined, however, by his own three attenuated
battalions of the King's, each of which had been heavily engaged in
different parts of the battle.  At the same time the 90th Brigade
dropped back to the left of Ham and the 21st to the right.  The
division was bare on both flanks, however, and it was determined to
continue the retreat.  The bridges were blown up and such rolling
stock as was possible was destroyed, but there were very many stores
in the town which had to be abandoned to the enemy.  It was a very
great disaster, for it supplied him with much, and indeed served him
as an advanced base, all ready-made for his operations in this part
of the field.  As to the loss of the river line, it has already been
explained that in these higher reaches it is a very slight barrier.

[Sidenote: March 23.]

When the enemy had taken Ham he pushed along swiftly towards
Esmery-Hallon on the heels of the retiring Thirtieth Division.  The
Thirty-sixth Division, which had been assisted in its retreat by the
61st Brigade of the Twentieth, had crossed the Somme to the east of
Ham, and was now to the right of the Thirtieth (right and left being
used all through these operations on the supposition that the unit is
turning and facing the enemy).  The Thirty-sixth {161} Division
crossed the Somme Canal at St. Simon, closely pressed by the enemy,
and the 121st Field Company Royal Engineers and other sapper units
performed great work under heavy fire, destroying no less than
twenty-seven bridges.  After the passing of the river by the Germans
there were constant rearguard actions, one of the most spirited of
which was at Villeselve, where the 9th Irish Fusiliers and the Royal
Dragoons fought together and drove in the German vanguard.  The
general situation of Maxse's Corps upon the forenoon of March 23 was
that the Thirty-sixth Division was over the Somme and near Golancourt
and Bronchy, that the Thirtieth Division was dropping back upon
Esmery-Hallon, and that the Sixty-first Division, retreating in the
direction of Nesle had crossed the Somme at Voyennes and Offoy,
continuing its retreat to the Nesle Canal.  Between the Thirtieth and
Sixty-first Divisions were the 60th Brigade on the right and the 59th
on the left, who were also covering the Nesle Canal, but were quite
ready to counter-attack should an opening present itself.

A British corps does not allow itself to be driven without hitting
back, however great the odds may seem.  A series of brisk skirmishes
was going on all along the line.  In one of these, just south of Ham,
Colonel Watson with the 17th King's Liverpools came back on his
pursuers and held them up for a time.  More serious was the
counter-attack organised by the main body north of Esmery-Hallon.
This attack struck southwards from Canizy and hit upon the right
flank of the Germans, staggering them for the instant.  It was
carried out by the 60th Brigade and the 182nd Brigade, all under
General Duncan of the {162} former unit.  This spirited advance was
led upon the field by Colonel Bilton of the Sixty-first Division, and
was delivered with such force that this small British detachment
drove back for some distance the great army which was rolling
westwards.  It was impossible, of course, to recover ground
permanently, but it gained invaluable time and eased the pressure
upon the south end of the line for the whole of a critical evening.
It was clear, however, that the capture of Ham and the crossing of
the stream had turned the flank of the Twentieth and Sixty-first
Divisions, who were defending the higher reaches of the same river.
They were not to be frightened prematurely out of their positions,
however, and at Bethencourt the 11th Rifle Brigade drove back a
German attempt at crossing, while at Offoy the 12th Rifles also
inflicted a sharp repulse upon the pursuers.  That evening, March 23,
the Sixty-first Division was practically amalgamated with the
Twentieth, and both were concentrated near Nesle.  They received at
this time a most useful reinforcement in the shape of two batteries
(16 guns) of Canadian motor machine-guns under Captain Meerling.
There is not an officer or man of these much-tried battalions who
would not admit a deep debt of gratitude to these splendidly
efficient and energetic guns, which had such mobility that they were
always where they were most wanted.

[Sidenote: March 24.]

The troops had on the morning of March 24 got behind the Somme Canal,
which runs beside the river, all bridges had been broken, and patrols
were pushed across where practicable so as to keep in touch with the
enemy.  It was not in this southern area, however, but at Bethencourt
that the Germans did actually get across in force, by which they
turned {163} the flank of the 25th Brigade of the Eighth Division in
the north and of the 59th Brigade in the south.  An attack was
instantly organised by the 11th Rifle Brigade, who had lost their
Colonel, Cotton, the day before, and were now led by Major Bertie.
They succeeded by a fine effort in driving the Germans for the time
across the canal and gaining touch with the Eighth Division.  The
Germans pushed across once more at Pargny, upon the other flank of
the Eighth Division, and also renewed their attempt in greater force
at Bethencourt, getting possession of the higher ground there.  This
time it was the Highlanders and Royal Scots of the 183rd Brigade who
counter-attacked, acting as part of the Twentieth Division, and by
half-past two in the afternoon the position had once more been
re-established.  The Canadian motor-guns were invaluable in this
operation.

Upon the morning of March 24 the Sixty-first Division was barring the
road from Ham to Nesle.  The German progress had been checked in this
direction by a spirited counter-attack carried out by the 5th
Cornwalls, the pioneer battalion of that division, together with a
mixed array of police, bandsmen, and other details, who advanced from
Offoy to a depth of five miles, under Major Bennett.  This little
improvised force held on all night, and seems eventually to have
joined up with the French in the neighbourhood of Esmery-Hallon.

The British were still holding the crossings at Voyennes and Offoy,
but very hard fighting had broken out to the south, and the Germans,
who had poured over in the neighbourhood of Ham, were now thrusting
hard for Canizy.  The road bridges had all been destroyed, but there
was a railway bridge {164} at Ham which had been taken out of the
hands of the army authorities and left in charge of the railway
department.  This was either uninjured or at any rate inadequately
destroyed, and was of immediate use to the enemy, enabling him to
keep uninterrupted pressure upon the retiring troops.  Canizy was now
taken, but the 12th Rifles made an immediate counter-attack and
forced the Germans back from the village.  In this spirited operation
they lost their gallant Colonel, Moore, who had led them with the
utmost fearlessness.

Whilst the Germans were pushing forward at Canizy they had also
maintained strong and continuous pressure upon the Thirtieth Division
near Moyencourt, and upon the Thirty-sixth Division at Golancourt,
causing the Ulster men, whose left wing was entirely in the air, to
fall back westwards.  The next line of defence, after the Somme had
been forced, lies along what is called the Libermont Canal between
Nesle and Libermont.  It was necessary to fall back, fighting as best
they could, and to place this obstacle, narrow as it was, between the
weary soldiers and their pursuers.  It was the third day since the
men had had a decent meal or an uninterrupted rest, and they were
very disorganised and broken.  "Hundreds of men were streaming back,"
says one observer.  "They had been without food for days and were
done in completely.  They were stopped and reformed at the bridges,
where as many as 2000 were collected."  It is such plain sobering
sentences which help one to realise that war is not, as large scale
descriptions might seem to imply, a question of the moving of pieces
upon a board, but that underneath the strategy lie the countless
human tragedies, the {165} tortured frames, the broken nerves, the
prayers of brave men that they may still be brave, the torturing
anxiety of officers, the ever-pressing burden which sometimes breaks
the weary back which tries to hold it.  Strategy reckons nothing of
these things, but their accumulation makes up the terrible human
tragedy of war, which brings humility to the most proud and fear to
the most valiant.  All equally feel the weakness of nature, but he is
blessed who has the strength of spirit to cover and to combat it.

By mid-day on March 24 the Thirtieth Division was over the Libermont
Canal, holding from Buverchy to Libermont, with the village and
bridge of Raincourt as a joining point between the 90th Brigade to
the north and the 89th to the south.  It may be recorded, to descend
suddenly from divisions to individuals, that the first sign of the
new German advance was a single scout who appeared in the open in
front of the canal, and was engaged in a prolonged and deliberate
rifle duel by Lieutenant Harrop, with the result that he was finally
brought in as a wounded prisoner.  The Twentieth Division had also
fallen back, the orders of brigades from the south being the 60th
with its flank on Buverchy, the 59th resting on Quiquery, and the
183rd to link up with the Eighth Division near Mesnil St. Nicaise.
The Thirty-sixth Division prolonged the line to the south of
Libermont.  The French reinforcements from the south were beginning
by the afternoon of this day to get as far north as this section, and
if not very weighty at the moment they were of great moral use as a
promise for the future.

From the new positions of the British line the German infantry could
now be seen advancing in {166} platoon columns in three lines on each
side of the Voyenne Road and heading for the Libermont Canal.
Several parties of horsemen could be seen also, who were conjectured
to be battery staffs, keeping up with the fight.  The weak point was
still near Bethencourt, between the Twentieth and the Eighth
Divisions, where the gap tended to be wider as the enemy got more
troops across and endeavoured to push the 25th Brigade north as has
been described in dealing with the experiences of the Nineteenth
Corps.  They were reported before evening as having got as far as
Morchain.  The flank brigade of the Eighteenth Corps, the 183rd, was
ordered to extend as far to the north-west as Potte in the hope of
regaining touch, but though they reached that village they were still
unable to bridge the gap.  During the night there were heavy attacks
upon Mesnil St. Nicaise in this region, which fell chiefly upon the
Rifle battalions of the 59th Brigade, which had been reinforced by
the 20th Entrenching Battalion and the 11th Durhams, the divisional
pioneer battalion.  The general result was to force the British line
some little distance to the westward.  At Buverchy in the evening the
German infantry also advanced in great numbers, but came under the
very efficient guns of the Thirtieth Division, and lost very heavily.
The enemy artillery was also very active so that both the Thirtieth
near Buverchy and the Thirty-sixth farther south had many casualties.
The French relief was making itself more felt, however, in this
southern section, where they were already outnumbering the British.
The latter were greatly worn--so much so that the 21st Brigade of the
Thirtieth Division could hardly be said to exist, only about 100 of
the Yorkshires {167} being left in the line.  By evening the centre
of the position was near Moyencourt, some little distance to the west.

[Sidenote: March 25.]

In spite of the French reinforcements, which were not accompanied
with artillery, the attack was still markedly stronger than the
defence, so that March 25 was a most dangerous and critical day in
this quarter of the field.  To trace the developments from the north
the enemy continued to press through the gap between the two corps,
the Nineteenth and the Eighteenth, making a series of heavy attacks
towards Mesnil-le-Petit and Nesle from the direction of Potte.  This
movement, powerfully followed up, pushed back the left flank from
Quiquery to a point on the high ground 1000 yards west of Nesle.  The
183rd Brigade, which was now a mere handful of Scottish infantry,
superb in quality but reduced to the last stage of exhaustion,
together with the thin ranks of the 59th Brigade of Rifles, could
not, even with the aid of the Canadian motor-guns, hold the heavy
masses who pressed down upon them.  The French One hundred and
thirty-third Division moving up in support had dug a line between
Billancourt and Herly, but Nesle was abandoned to the enemy, the
Twenty-second French Division retiring from this sector and falling
back towards Roye.  The 60th Brigade of the Twentieth Division, much
helped by the 23rd Entrenching Battalion--these valiant diggers made
their presence felt all along the line--still held stoutly to their
positions from Quiquery to Buverchy, but their left and left rear
were so compromised that it was clear they could not hold out longer.
To the south the French, who had relieved the Thirty-sixth Division
at Libermont, had been pushed back, and the British {168} position
was turned in their direction also.  By the afternoon the French had
taken over the line as far north as Buverchy, and the Thirtieth
Division was ordered to fall back, but the Germans had advanced so
rapidly from Libermont and got so far to their right rear that it was
no easy matter either for the British or the French to get past them.
Many had to swim the canals which striate this part of the country,
and the 2nd Bedfords were especially hard-pressed before they were
able to get away.  The Twenty-second French Division was doing all it
could to cover the approaches to Nesle upon the south, and the 184th
Brigade cheered them loudly as they passed through their ranks.
"They looked very fine men and seemed very much for it."  General
Wetherall of this brigade was badly wounded by a shell splinter in
this period of the battle.  And we have a vivid pen-picture drawn by
a spectator of Brigade-Major Hewitt, some of whose adventures have
already been recorded, holding Wetherall's wounded artery with one
hand, while he wrote brigade orders with the other, for more than two
hours on end.  The 184th lost five commanders during the retreat.

Even if the local pressure had not caused a rapid withdrawal at this
portion of the line, it would have been enforced by the general
strategic position, for the German advance in the south had been so
masterful that on this night of March 25 Roye was taken, which is far
to the south-west of Nesle.  The 61st Brigade had been sharing the
hard fortunes of the Thirty-sixth Division, but now, as the latter
had been drawn out, it was restored to the Twentieth Division.  So
severe had been the strain upon it that it only numbered about 500
bayonets, and some battalions, {169} such as the 2/6th Royal
Warwicks, had not a single combatant officer left standing.  None the
less, it was at once sent to man a supporting line stretching through
Gruny, Cremery, and Liancourt, and had hardly reached it before the
Germans were also at Liancourt.  The brigade held them, however, and
so enabled the front line to fall back upon an organised position
whence, on the next morning, a swift retreat became necessary.

After dark on March 25 the One hundred and thirty-third French
Division had come up to relieve the Twentieth and Sixty-first, but
the situation was such along the line of the Nesle Canal that no
fixed line could be formed, and the three divisions were finally
greatly mixed up in the darkness and there was a good deal of
confusion in their councils, since the general directions of the
French were to fall back to the south, while the line of retreat of
the British lay rather to the west.  There was little time for
deliberation, for word had come in that the Germans were closing in
upon Liancourt, pressing south and west, in a way which threatened to
cut off the whole forward line.  At midnight, the British, many of
them hardly able to move for fatigue, staggered off in such
formations as they could assemble, with orders to concentrate north
and east of Roye.  Thanks largely to the presence of the remnants of
the 61st Brigade near Liancourt, this most hazardous march was
successfully accomplished, but as Roye was within the grasp of the
enemy the movement was continued so as to reach a line between
Hangest and Le Quesnel.  The Germans were close upon them in the
north, so the 61st Brigade, now down to 400 men, acted as flankguard,
fending off their constant attacks.  {170} The war has shown few
finer instances of disciplined and tenacious valour than in the case
of the three handfuls of men who represented what had once been the
12th King's, 7th Somersets, and 7th Cornwalls.  The enemy were in
Liancourt, and their patrols were in actual hand-to-hand fighting
with a French detachment aided by some of the Somersets.  Other
German troops pouring down from the north and using to the utmost the
gap which had opened between the corps, endeavoured to cut in and to
seize Le Quesnoy (not to be confused with Le Quesnel towards which
the troops were marching).  It was, however, upon their line of
retreat, and about halfway to their destination, so that a German
occupation would have been serious.  The post was most desperately
defended by Captain Combe, the brigade-major of the 61st Brigade,
with two Lewis guns and 100 men.  Only eleven were left standing at
the end of this defence, but the village was held for the necessary
time, and the survivors only withdrew upon receipt of a positive
order.  Thus the flank march of the British from Roye to Le Quesnel
upon the morning of March 26 was successfully accomplished, owing to
the devotion of their covering party to the north.  "It was very much
of a rabble," says an officer, "and there was great difficulty in
sorting out the men and arranging the units."  None the less the
future was to show that the force was no more beaten than were the
old contemptibles after Mons.

[Sidenote: March 26.]

The Thirtieth Division had been drawn out of the line on the arrival
of the French, but they were hardly started on their movement towards
the rest which they had earned so well, when this great pressure
arose, and every man who could still carry a {171} rifle was needed
once more in the line.  On the morning of March 26 they were back
then, between Bouchoir and Rouvroy.  The 21st Brigade had now
entirely disappeared, but the remains of the 2nd Yorks and the South
Lancashire Pioneer Battalion were added to the 89th Brigade which was
in the north at Rouvroy, while the 90th, under General Poyntz, filled
the gap to Bouchoir.  The Thirtieth Division had got considerably to
the west of this line before they were recalled, and it was only by
some splendid marching that they were able at last to throw
themselves down upon the coveted ground before the German armies,
which were streaming along the Roye-Amiens road, were able to reach
it.  As they faced the Germans the Twenty-fourth, now the mere shadow
of a division, was on their left at Warvillers, while the Sixty-first
and Twentieth were in support at Beaufort and Le Quesnel.  Near
Erches the Thirty-sixth Ulster men, whose relief, like that of the
Thirtieth, had proved to be impossible, were still battling bravely,
retaking the village of Erches after it had fallen to the enemy.  The
109th Brigade also distinguished itself greatly in this area, the
Irish Fusiliers Battalions of which it is composed holding on most
desperately to the village of Guerbigny, at the extreme south of the
corps front, and continuing a heroic defence during March 26, and
long after it was isolated upon March 27.  The artillery of the
Ulster Division was particularly good in its covering fire during
these operations, gaining the very grateful acknowledgments of the
French troops and generals who were more and more concerned with this
southern sector of the line.  Speaking generally the troops had now
reached the region of the old French trenches, {172} which
grid-ironed a considerable area of country, so that it was certain
that if men could be found to man them, the pursuit would no longer
continue at the pace of the last two days.

Great work was done at this period by four of the Canadian motor-guns
at the cross-roads, north-west of Rouvroy, where they not only
inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy but delayed his advance while
the exhausted troops were settling down into this new position.
Every hour was of importance as giving reinforcements time to come up
from the rear, and the general orders to the divisional generals were
to hold on at all costs wherever defence was possible.  A small body
of corps cyclists under Lieutenant Quartermain co-operated splendidly
with the motor-guns and did good service at this critical period of
the retreat, during which there was very little artillery support
behind the thin line of infantry.

[Sidenote: March 27.]

The German pressure on March 27 fell chiefly, as already shown, upon
the Twenty-fourth Division and the other units on the extreme south
of the Nineteenth Corps, which were forced back for some distance,
and so threatened the stability of the line in the south.  The 17th
King's Liverpool, which was the flank battalion, held fast, however,
and flung back their left to form a defensive line to the north.  A
small body of German cavalry performed a brilliant piece of audacious
work in the darkness of the early morning of this date, pushing
through the outposts of the Thirty-sixth Division in the south near
Guerbigny, and capturing the Brigade Headquarters of the 109th
Brigade, and also the chief staff officer of the division.

The future was full of menace, for the Germans {173} were pressing on
in great numbers.  An observer near Bouchoir that evening (March 27)
says: "I have never seen so many Germans in all my life--one huge
dark mass about a mile away.  With glasses one could see howitzers,
machine-guns, trench-mortars, and field batteries, as well as
infantry.  It was a most wonderful sight.  They seemed to be coming
down the Roye Road, then moving off to the south, and some stopping
in a mass."

The main German attack upon the extreme south of the corps line on
March 27 fell upon the Thirty-sixth Division in the direction of
Erches, with the result that the Ulster men fell slowly back upon
Arvillers, the 60th Brigade throwing back a defensive flank to
correspond.  By 12.30 Bouchoir, held by the 90th Brigade, was gained
by the Germans, but the British formed a new line to the immediate
westward of the village.  An attack upon Folies was thrown back by
the 59th Brigade.  Towards evening some order came out of a rather
tangled position, which may well be obscure both to writer and
reader, since soldiers upon the spot found the greatest difficulty in
separating the various confused elements.  As night fell upon March
27 after much desultory and inconclusive local fighting, there was no
great change in the British line which ran from Warvillers, still
held by the Twenty-fourth Division, to the west of Bouchoir, where
the Thirtieth held the line, and down to Arvillers held by the 60th
Brigade of the Twentieth Division, which was temporarily out of touch
with the Thirty-sixth Division.  Hangest was held by the Sixty-first
Division, and Le Quesnel by the Sixty-first and the French.  That
night the Twentieth Division was ordered to join the Nineteenth {174}
Corps, and their record under this new command will be found in the
preceding chapter.  One would have thought that they had reached the
limits of human endurance, and their total numbers were not more than
a thousand, and yet they were but at the beginning of a new chapter
in their glorious history.  The same words apply to their comrades of
the Sixty-first Division, who were also ordered north.  They were
relieved by the French at Arvillers, and this portion of the line was
on March 28 pressed back to the west of Hangest.

[Sidenote: March 28.]

The removal of the Twentieth Division at so critical a time could
only be justified by the extreme and pressing need of the Nineteenth
Corps, for it had the effect of producing an almost impossible
position for the line in the south.  Had it been possible to replace
it at once with a solid French division, it would have mattered less,
but as matters stood the One hundred and thirty-third French Division
had itself been involved in the retreat and was greatly worn.  There
was so little time also to get it into its new positions that there
was never any solid bastion upon that corner of the line.  The result
was speedily seen in the morning of March 28, when the Thirtieth
Division were first subjected to a very heavy bombardment, and then
looking south saw a general retreat going on from Arvillers, while
their left flank at Warvillers was also very weak, since the
Twenty-fourth Division was hardly strong enough to maintain itself.
By 2 P.M. both flanks were bare, and the enemy were well round them
in the north and in the south at Hangest.  At one time it seemed
impossible for the division to get clear, and even now their
extrication seems miraculous to {175} the officers who effected it.
A rapid retreat was made through Mezières and on to Moreuil, which
only just avoided the closing pincers of the German advance.  The
French, who were in the act of relieving the Thirtieth Division, came
away with them and had the same narrow escape.  The block upon the
road which formed the only egress is described as having been
appalling, fugitives, refugees, and small disciplined columns of
troops being crowded together from one end of it to the other.  "The
men were excellent," says an officer of the Thirtieth Division.
"Their discipline was not a bit shaken."  Such words could not
truthfully be said of every unit, and yet soldiers can have seldom
been more highly tried in any operation in history.  Even the
Imperial Guard may reach its breaking point, as the retreat from
Moscow has shown.  At Moreuil there is only one bridge, and had the
German artillery been able to find it the result would have been a
Beresina.  As it was, the troops got across and speedily reformed
upon the farther side of the river Avre.

This may be taken as the limit of the retreat of the Eighteenth
Corps, since the stand in the north of the line and the thickening
French resistance in the south brought the momentum of the German
advance to a halt.  How terrible the ordeal had been may be gathered
from the fact that the Twentieth Division, as already mentioned, was
not more than 1000 strong, the Thirtieth Division about 2000 strong,
the Sixty-first Division 2100 strong, and the Thirty-sixth Division
only a little stronger at the end of it.  Again and again it had been
on the brink of absolute disaster, but always by the wise
dispositions of General Maxse and his divisional generals, seconded
{176} by the splendid tenacity of his men, the worst consequences had
been avoided.  Rapid readjustments had been needed, but a fatal break
was always averted.  The troops were handicapped in every possible
way, for not only was their artillery far below strength, but for
some reason the British Air Service during these days of stress was
very weak in this southern area, while the German machines were very
numerous and aggressive.  The artillery officers were splendidly cool
and efficient all through, and in the case of the 92nd Brigade Royal
Field Artillery near Esmery-Hallon, it is said that the last gun was
just 25 yards from the Germans when it limbered up.  For two days the
whole corps artillery was with the French, and did fine work with
them, but to the great detriment of their own infantry.  Some of the
batteries remained for a long time with the French, and one French
general has left it upon record that the failure of the Germans to
capture Moreuil on April 4 was almost entirely due to the splendid
shooting of the 306th Brigade Royal Field Artillery.  After the first
two days of the retreat no guns were abandoned by the Eighteenth
Corps.  The total losses of guns might be put at about 90 field
pieces and 4.5 howitzers, with about 50 heavier pieces.




{177}

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The Retreat of the Third Corps

Movement across the Crozat Canal--Fight of the 173rd Brigade--Forcing
of the Canal Line--Arrival of the French--Fight of Frières
Wood--Splendid work of the Cavalry--Loss of Noyon--Final
equilibrium--General retrospect of the Battle.

[Sidenote: March 22.]

We shall now complete this slight survey of a vast subject by
following the fortunes of Butler's Third Corps upon the extreme right
of the whole British Army.  It has already been shown that the
condition of this corps at the end of the first day of battle was
most perilous, as its left flank in the region of Essigny, where the
battle zone of the Fourteenth Division had been deeply pierced, was
completely turned.  The Eighteenth Division in the centre had, it is
true, retained its ground, but the left brigade of the Fifty-eighth
Division upon the right, the only brigade of that unit which was
engaged, had also after a very desperate resistance lost their front
positions at Quessy opposite to La Fère.  Therefore orders had been
given to draw off the troops during the night of March 21 across the
Crozat Canal, and a covering line had been built up from the 54th
Brigade, the Second Cavalry Division, and the 12th and 18th
Entrenching Battalions in order to hold the German pursuit and {178}
to give the somewhat dishevelled troops time to re-organise their
ranks.  By 5 A.M. on March 22 they were over the canal and the
bridges had been destroyed.  The artillery had been got over first to
cover the crossings, and the 54th Brigade, which had covered the rear
of the Fourteenth Division, was lined up from Jussy to Mennessis.
The Eighteenth Division (less the 54th Brigade) fell back in the line
of Frières Wood, behind the canal.  Many guns had been lost but the
cavalry had thrown the 3rd and 5th Brigades of the R.H.A. into the
firing-line to support the infantry, and two new batteries of the
96th R.F.A., only arrived the day before from England, came in at the
nick of time.

It was of the first importance to destroy the bridges along the
canal, but this was found to be no easy matter.  They had all been
mined and prepared for destruction some time before by the French,
but either the lapse of time or faulty material had caused such
deterioration that the charges failed to explode, and had to be
renewed and discharged under circumstances of great difficulty and
danger.  It was carried out none the less with great tenacity by the
British sappers, but several weak points remained, notably a canal
lock which had been so injured that the bed of the canal was exposed
for some distance.  The railway bridges here, as elsewhere, were also
a source of weakness.

As the corps turned to face the enemy upon the south side of the
canal the general line of battle showed the 41st Brigade just south
of St. Simon, connected up on the left by the only surviving
battalion of the 42nd Brigade with the 61st Brigade of the Twentieth
Division who were in support of {179} the Thirty-sixth Ulsters at
that place.  Then came the 43rd and 54th Brigades, facing Jussy and
Mennessis with the 3rd and 5th Dismounted Cavalry Brigades in
support.  South of this point were the 4th Cavalry Brigade, the 55th
Brigade, and the 53rd Brigade, all in the Frières area.  Then came
the 173rd Brigade in the Vouel neighbourhood with the 18th
Entrenching Battalion and the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade.  This
force had already lost heavily, and many of the men were suffering
from gas, but they were sustained by the certainty that French
reinforcements would speedily reach them from the south, as a system
of mutual lateral support had been agreed upon between the commanders.

A line of trenches had been begun in this neighbourhood by the French
some time before, and it had been carried on by Italian labour, but
it was still very unfinished, with many gaps, so that the tired
soldiers had to lay down their rifles and take to their trenching
tools to get some cover.  It was already clear that they would need
it, for with early daybreak on March 22 the Germans showed that they
had reached the north bank of the canal at Jussy.  It was again very
misty, and they were able to bring up their machine-guns and small
artillery with perfect impunity and place them under cover.  It was
not until between 10 and 11 A.M. that the mist began to lift, and the
British outposts peering through it could see the flash of the guns
among the plantations on the farther side.  At an earlier hour the
Germans had tried to cross at Jussy, but had been driven back.  It
was already evident, however, that they were in a position to repair
the bridges in such a way as to find a passage wherever they desired.
The general {180} situation might be described as a curious
reproduction of the first action of the war when the two armies lay
upon either side of the Mons Canal.

The French Sixth Army on the right had acted with loyal promptitude,
and the One hundred and twenty-fifth Division, under General Diebold,
was already moving up from the south.  One would have imagined that
the most efficient relief would have been to replace the two British
brigades in the south of the Oise, and so re-unite the Fifty-eighth
Division.  For some reason this was not done, and General Worgan's
173rd Brigade continued to be a lone unit.  A very welcome
reinforcement consisted of nine batteries of French 75's.  It was
understood also that the whole Fifth French Corps, under General
Pellé, was due at Noyon that evening, and that the Third British
Corps would be relieved by it as soon as possible, but further help
was slow in materialising.

At about 1 P.M. on March 22 the enemy made their first crossing of
the canal in the region of the 173rd Brigade.  They advanced from
Fargniers in the direction of Tergnier village.  The range of vision
in this water-sodden region was not more than fifty yards, which
greatly handicapped Colonel Dervicke-Jones of the 8th London, who was
in local command of this sector, as it put his machine-gun defence
out of action.  The troops were spread over a front of 3000 yards, so
that the various companies were widely separated.  The first German
advance was made across a lock gate by a number of men dressed in the
uniforms of some of the 1st London, taken the day before--a ruse
which was the more successful as a number of genuine stragglers had
actually been in in this fashion during the morning.  An {181} attack
followed during which C Company of the 8th Londons, while holding the
enemy in front, were attacked by these pretended comrades upon the
right rear, so that they were almost entirely destroyed.  A road was
thus opened across the canal, and the enemy opened out both north and
south of the Quessy-Tergnier Road, cutting off those of the 3rd and
8th London who were on the farther side.  These men fought to a
finish, and only a few of them ever got back.  Colonel Dervicke-Jones
had taken up a position in an old French reserve line called the Butt
line, with two companies of his battalion and some machine-guns, and
was able to hold up the enemy all day in his immediate front, and to
prevent several battalions from deploying out of Tergnier.  The
artillery also got on to the German infantry in this part of the
field with good results.  This Butt position was maintained until the
morning of March 23.  Farther up the line, in the region of the
Fourteenth Division, other troubles had developed, and the pressure
of the enemy was great.  At 4.30 P.M. the defenders were reinforced,
but the enemy were already across at several points and were
advancing upon Cugny.  There was desultory fighting along the whole
corps front, and though there was promise of immediate French relief,
no French troops seem to have been actually engaged upon March 22.
About 6 o'clock in the evening the enemy was across at Jussy Bridge
and also at Montagne, but a fine counter-attack was made at this
point by the 7th Bedfords and 6th Northamptons of the 54th Brigade,
aided by the 16th Lancers, which drove the German infantry across
once more and caused considerable losses.  In spite of this success
the general situation upon {182} the evening of March 22 was not
cheering, and the task of the Third Corps which had been ordered to
stand fast and form the southern hinge upon which the whole retreat
should turn, was clearly a very difficult one.  It was the more
alarming, as the rapid progress of the enemy at Beauvais and Vaux at
the centre of the army led to a demand for cavalry which could not be
complied with without denuding the line to a dangerous and almost
impossible extent.

[Sidenote: March 23.]

It was soon clear on the morning of March 23 that the Butt position
on the right could not be maintained.  The French had taken it over,
but they were unable to hold it.  A line was built up near Noreuil,
where the remains of the 8th and 3rd Londons, aided by some French
details, endeavoured all day to check the German advance.  The main
attacks were driving down from the north, and were heralded by a very
severe machine-gun barrage, which rained bullets over the British
position.  The defence was much aided by a French armoured car upon
the Quessy-Rouez road, and by a battery of 75's.  The 4th London were
to the south of the village and less exposed to the force of the
advance.  About six, after an hour of intense shelling, the Germans
closed in upon Noreuil, the defenders, after a stout resistance which
occasionally came to hand-to-hand fighting, being driven westwards.
Colonel Burt, commanding the 6th Cavalry Brigade, barricaded his
headquarters in the village and held the Germans off a long time by
his deadly fire.  It was not until long after the lines had been
withdrawn that this brave officer had to be specially summoned to
leave his post and fall back on Chauny.  Finally, the retreat became
general, but was rallied at the end of the Noreuil valley, where
{183} some 200 men collected, and with a good field of fire to help
them, remained for some time on the defence.  Late at night this
small force was ordered to fall back to a new line at Chauny.

It has already been stated that two companies (C and D) of the 8th
London (Post Office Rifles) had been cut off when the Germans got
across the lock gate on the afternoon of March 22.  These men, under
Captain Gunning, had made a remarkable defence, crawling out with
Lewis guns on to the lock gates in order to enfilade the advancing
Germans.  In the afternoon of March 23 they found themselves with the
Germans on three sides of them and the canal on the fourth.  Captain
Gunning and Captain Kelly with the survivors then fought their way
through to Condren, where they still continued their resistance.
These soldiers, who made so admirable a resistance, were largely men
who had been combed from the Army Service Corps.

Whilst the 23rd of March had brought this heavy fighting to the 173rd
Brigade, it had been a day of severe trial to all the other units of
the corps front.  The 54th Brigade was still covering the crossing at
Jussy and Montagne, but the pressure was rapidly increasing as fresh
German divisions made their presence felt.  The situation was the
more serious as General Butler already knew that the enemy were
across the canal at Ham and had turned his left flank, but it was
still hoped that a counter-attack in this quarter might throw him
back, and so it was determined to hold on to the line.  An emergency
force of odds and ends, dismounted troopers, labour men, and returned
leave men were gathered together at Crisolles and placed under the
command of General {184} Harman to co-operate with General Greenly
who now led the remains of the Fourteenth Division, in guarding the
left wing.  Meanwhile there was very brisk fighting at Jussy, where
the German infantry had once again, under the cover of many guns, got
a footing upon the south side of the canal.  They were at once
vigorously attacked by a small body of the 11th Royal Fusiliers and
of the Scots Greys and penned up in the village of Jussy.  At 11 A.M.
the Germans had also got across at Mennessis, but came under the fire
of four machine-guns of the Canadian Mounted Brigade which inflicted
heavy losses upon them.  None the less at a second effort the Germans
were across once more, driving back by the weight of their attack the
worn ranks of the 7th Bedfords and of the 9th Scottish Rifles.  At
11.30 they were half a mile south of Jussy, and might have got round
the flank of the Bedfords but for the interposition of 200 Canadian
dragoons.  "These grim, square-faced men, with their parchment skins
and their granite features, were a glad sight to our weary eyes,"
says one who was fighting beside them.  There was a time when it was
doubtful whether in this quarter there was anything but a line of
dismounted troops between the enemy and Paris.

Every man who could be spared was hurried up to hold the weak points
of the line, including the 8th Sussex, the pioneer battalion of the
Eighteenth Division, the rest of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, and
the 7th Cavalry Brigade, but the mischief had gone too far, and the
situation upon the right of the line was even worse than at Jussy.
The counter-attack of the French One hundred and twenty-fifth
Division in the direction of Tergnier had not been a {185} success,
which is not to be wondered at, for the French infantry had come fast
and far, their ammunition was not plentiful, and they were working
over strange ground against an aggressive and victorious enemy.  Next
to the French on that front was the 7th Queen's.  Colonel Bushell
found himself at one period in command of the left of the French as
well as of his own Surrey men, and he led on this mixed following
under an intense fire, being himself severely wounded and yet
rallying them again and again.  Little progress could be made, but at
least he held the line firm for a time.  This gallant colonel, after
having his wound dressed, returned to the field of battle, fell
insensible, and had at last to be carried off.  Next to the 7th
Queen's was the 8th East Surreys (both of 55th Brigade), which was
also in the thick of the battle, as was the neighbouring 12th
Entrenching Battalion.  This line made a very fine resistance, but
was slowly pressed back by weight of numbers until at 4 P.M. they
were on the line Noreuil-Frières-Faillouel, to the left of the spot
where the 173rd Brigade was still holding its ground.  The remains of
the 7th Buffs fell back also with the rest of the 55th Brigade,
fighting hard, through Frières Wood, where to the south-west of the
wood they found some old French trenches, in which, with the aid of
the survivors of the Queen's, they, under Colonel Ransome, organised
a line for the rest of that arduous day.  This resistance held up
some strong drives of the enemy which were evidently intended, in
conjunction with the attack from Jussy in the north, to cut off all
the troops in the woody country round Frières, and it acted as a most
efficient screen during the withdrawal of the rest of the line.

{186}

The whole eastern limit of the British area was spotted at this
period by small bodies of men who were working desperately to keep
the German infantry from sweeping in from that side.  At Noreuil, as
has been shown, were the remains of the 173rd Brigade.  At Frières
Wood were the decimated 55th Brigade.  Opposite Jussy were the 54th
Brigade and the dismounted cavalry, slowly retiring before the
ever-increasing pressure.  In between these organised bodies were
many smaller units all striving hard for the same end.  Among these
may be mentioned two companies of sappers, 80th and 92nd Field
Companies R.E., who were extended upon the road north of Noreuil in
touch with the 173rd Brigade on one side.  These valiant men not only
held their position all day, but actually made a counter-attack under
Lieutenant Richardson in the evening, when they advanced until they
were nearly surrounded.  Finally they fought their way back to the
Caillouel area.

As evening drew in the situation had become more and more difficult.
The enemy had been driving in from every quarter all day without a
respite, and the troops, many of whom had been engaged for more than
two days without a moment for rest or re-organisation, were in a
great state of exhaustion.  Only a handful of several battalions
remained as a fighting force.  The confusion was made worse by the
fact that the light blue uniforms of the French were mistaken for the
grey of the Germans, so that misleading and alarming reports were
continually brought in to the commanders.  All reserves were in the
fight, and the need of relief was urgent.  About 4 o'clock the
Faillouel position was found to be no longer tenable, and the troops
fell {187} back through the village, which was immediately occupied
by the enemy who were pushing up their troops in motor-lorries in
this quarter.  By 5 o'clock the right wing had come back 500 yards,
and by evening the main position was at Caillouel, when the 54th
assembled, numbering 650 bayonets all told, the three battalions of
Bedfords, Northamptons, and Royal Fusiliers being each a little over
200 strong.  Detachments of the Scots Greys and 20th Hussars joined
them at that village.

The 53rd Brigade, fighting upon the left of the 55th Brigade, was as
heavily engaged on March 23 as the other units of the Third Corps on
the south side of the canal.  At noon they had lent the 10th Essex to
support their neighbours, and they consisted henceforth of only two
weary battalions, the 6th Berks and 7th West Kents.  At 3 o'clock in
the afternoon they were heavily attacked and were pushed slowly back,
struggling hard to keep the line.  Major Tween led a counter-attack
of his battalion headquarters, and checked the German advance at a
critical moment, but was mortally wounded in the gallant endeavour.
The two battalions were so weak that they had been telescoped into
one, but good steel remains tough be it ever so thin, and the line
still held.  At 5.30 the 9th French Cuirassiers, long-booted giants,
came up to help them, as did the 79th Field Company and various small
details.  At 7 the remains of the 55th Brigade were falling back
through their ranks.  When they had passed, the 53rd was also
withdrawn as far as Commenchon, while the 55th reassembled at
Bethencourt to the north.  Three gallant Cuirassier regiments of the
1st French Cavalry Division covered the rear.  All {188} the troops
that night were worn to rags, for it is to be remembered always that
the great local disparity of force enabled the Germans to bring up
perpetually lines of perfectly fresh men with a new impetus and
inspiration, against men, many of whom had been gassed on the first
day, and who were now weary to death and hardly able either to stand
or to think, to order or to understand an order.  On the whole long,
tormented, struggling line there was no time or place where the
pressure was greater than here.  In spite of all the ardour of the
attack the stubborn constancy of the defence may be measured by the
fact that, save for one battery which was destroyed by shell-fire
upon the afternoon of the 23rd, no guns were lost in this corps
either upon March 22 or 23.  On the other hand, so great had been the
destruction of machine-guns, especially upon the first day, that only
two were left out of forty-eight in the Eighteenth Division, though
these were augmented by six new ones on March 24.

The Sixth French Army, on the right of the British, was doing all it
could to send up help, but it seems certain that none of this force
was actually engaged before March 23, though it is stated upon good
authority that in the liaison plans of the army the aid from the
south was promised for the very first day.  Any delay was not due to
want of energy or loyalty of officers and men upon the spot.  By the
evening of March 23 the French units in the fighting-line were the
One hundred and twenty-fifth Division, which made the unsuccessful
counter-attack towards Tergnier, the First French Dismounted Cavalry
Division, who fought side by side with the Eighteenth British
Division, the Ninth and the Tenth French {189} Divisions, both of
which were on the extreme left of the Third Corps, and can hardly be
said to have been engaged.  As the French troops were now
predominating in this sector, the command passed on the evening of
March 23 to General Humbert, a dark, wiry little French veteran,
commanding the Third Army.  General Butler continued, of course, to
command his own corps.

[Sidenote: March 24.]

On the morning of March 24 the situation to the south of the Crozat
Canal was as follows.  The Fifty-eighth Division still held its
original line from Barisis to the Buttes de Rouy, with a party
holding the bridgehead at Condren.  Then on the general line north
and north-east of Chauny were the broken but indomitable remains of
the Londoners of the 173rd Brigade, mixed up with fragments of the
French One hundred and twenty-fifth Division, the 18th Entrenching
Battalion, and troopers of the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade,
together with the dust of smaller broken units.  Up to La Neuville
was covered by the worn brigades of the Eighteenth Division
supporting the French Cuirassiers.  North of that was the 326th
Regiment of the Ninth French Division, and north of that what was
left of the British Fourteenth Division up to a point within a mile
of Cugny, which was in German hands.  On the extreme left flank on
this sector the Thirty-sixth Division and the 61st Brigade were in
Ollezy and Eaucourt.  There had been some fighting on the front of
the Fifty-eighth Division during the night, but otherwise it was
quiet, and the soldiers were able to snatch a few hours of sleep.

Once again there was a thick morning fog, under cover of which the
German infantry broke suddenly {190} upon the One hundred and
twenty-fifth French Division, north-east of Chauny, driving them back
towards Abbecourt.  This placed the British troops at Condren in a
perilous position, but it was essential to hold the line of the Oise,
and any abandonment of the bridge would have been fatal.  The
Fifty-eighth Division was ordered to stand fast therefore, and the
173rd Brigade was reinforced by the 16th and 18th Entrenching
Battalions.  These entrenching battalions are, it may be remarked,
entirely apart from the Labour Corps, and were soldiers, well
officered and organised, formed from those units which remained over
after the re-organisation of the three-battalion brigades.  Apart
from these were the labour battalions who also in those hard days
were occasionally the final weight which tilts the balance where the
fate of armies and finally of empires was in the scale.  Manfully
they rose to the occasion, and the Empire owes them a very special
word of thanks.  During the afternoon all the British and French
troops in this quarter passed over the Oise, mostly in the Abbecourt
district, blowing up the bridges behind them and passing under the
command of General Duchesne of the Sixth French Army.  This left a
blank upon the right of the Eighteenth Division upon the north of the
river, but General Seely brought up his cavalry and endeavoured to
cover it, while the Second Dismounted Cavalry Division was pushed out
upon the left of the Fourteenth Division in the north, to preserve
the connection between the Third and Eighteenth Corps.  The Third
Cavalry Division under General Harman was thrown in also at this
point, and about 2.30, having mounted their horses, they charged most
gallantly in order to re-establish {191} the line north of Villeselve
on the front of the Ulster Division.  The Royal Dragoons were
prominent in this fine charge in which they sabred many of the enemy,
took over 100 prisoners, and relieved the pressure upon the Irish
Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade at a time when it was very heavy.

The whole corps front was slowly falling back during the day, partly
on account of the steady pressure of the German attack and partly in
order to conform with the line to the north.  The Fourteenth
Division, moving south-west through Crisolles, found itself in the
evening on the west side of the Noyon Canal, covering the two
crossings at Haudival and Beaurains.  A vamped-up detachment of
stragglers and nondescripts under Colonel Curling were placed to fill
up the gap between the Fourteenth Division and Noyon.  The left of
the Fourteenth Division at Guiscard was covered by General Harman's
detachment, and it is characteristic of the adaptability of the
British soldier that seventy Northumberland Hussars who had become
cyclists were suddenly whipped off their machines, put upon horses
and sent up to reinforce the thin ranks of the cavalry.

The centre of the line covering Caillouel was held all day by the
Eighteenth Division, with the First French Cavalry Division still
acting as a breakwater before the advancing flood.  In spite of the
gallant Cuirassiers the pressure was very great from the 54th Brigade
who were in the north, through the 55th and down to the 53rd, which
covered the north of Noyon.  Some of the edge was taken from the
German attack by the efficient work of the 82nd Brigade Royal Field
Artillery and the 3rd and 5th Royal Horse Artillery, who were hard at
it from {192} morning to night.  The French infantry on the left of
the Eighteenth Division lost Guivry towards evening, but they held
fast to Beaugies until after nightfall.  About ten o'clock, however,
the German infantry was into Beaugies, and the situation became
dangerous as they were getting round the left flank of the Eighteenth
Division, so that there was a general retreat to the rearward
position called the Crepigny Ridge, which was not fully reached and
occupied until 3 A.M. on March 25.  That evening the Fifty-eighth
Division reported that early in the day they had blown up all bridges
and also the Royal Engineer dump at Chauny.  So intersected is the
whole country at the back of the line of the Fifth Army by
watercourses, that the total number of bridges blown up during the
retreat amounted to about 250; and only in two cases, that of the Ham
Road bridge and that at Chipilly, was the result unsatisfactory.

[Sidenote: March 25.]

In the early morning of March 25 the Germans, who were still marching
rapidly and fighting hard, were close to Guiscard, pushing on so
swiftly that special troops had to be detailed to cover the heavy
guns.  General Butler had so far as possible pulled his dismounted
troopers out of the fight and had restored them to their proper role,
so that now he possessed a force of about 2000 horsemen, who were
ready to execute the all-important functions of mounted infantry, so
invaluable in a retreat.  Under Generals Greenly and Pitman these
horsemen did great work during the remainder of the operations.

Since the German pressure was still very heavy and the enemy were
sweeping onwards in the north, it was necessary to continue the
withdrawal of {193} the line north of the Oise, while holding fast to
the southern bank along its whole length.  The first movement in this
withdrawal was to the line Mondescourt-Grandru, and the second to the
line Appilly-Babœuf-Mont de Béthéricourt.  By 8.30 the Eighteenth
Division in the middle of the line was effecting this retirement, the
northern flank, which was the post of danger, being covered by the
11th Royal Fusiliers of the 54th Brigade.  It was a most difficult
and delicate business with the enemy pressing down continually
through the woods and villages with which the country is studded.  On
the south the 53rd Brigade and the French Cuirassiers were
withdrawing through Mondescourt in some disorder.  When the troops
were rallied and rearranged, there were no French troops upon the
right.  At 10 A.M. the 54th Brigade had reached the Grandru position,
but were out of touch both with the French on their left and with the
55th Brigade on their right.  They therefore continued to fall back
upon Béthéricourt.  At 1 o'clock a strong German infantry attack, in
many lines, developed upon the right near Appilly and a heavy
machine-gun barrage burst out over the 53rd Brigade and their
immediate comrades upon the right, the 289th French Regiment.  Up to
3 o'clock the Allies in this quarter were retiring under a very heavy
fire, much helped by four valiant cars of the French Cavalry's
Mitrailleuses Automobiles, who did splendid service in covering the
exhausted infantry.  The German infantry, pressing eagerly forward in
expectation of that general débacle which never occurred, was riddled
by the fire of these motor-guns and left swathes of dead behind them.
The attack had the effect, however, of driving back {194} the Allied
line to such a point that a French force which was defending Mont
Béthéricourt was entirely isolated and in great peril of destruction.
Under these circumstances the French officer in command appealed to
General Sadleir-Jackson of the 54th Brigade to make a great effort to
rescue his imperilled men.  Sadleir-Jackson without hesitation led
back his men into the village of Babœuf, cleared it of the
Germans, captured ten machine-guns with nearly 300 prisoners, and
regained touch with the French, who were enabled to withdraw.  The
7th Bedfords and 11th Royal Fusiliers were the heroes of this
chivalrous exploit, where we were able to repay the loyalty which the
French have so often shown to us.  It should be added that a company
of the 12th Entrenching Battalion, which like all the other
entrenching units had gone through this severe infantry fighting
without light artillery, signals, or any of the ordinary adjuncts of
well-equipped infantry, was still so full of military spirit that
without orders it joined in this victorious charge.

On March 25 the Germans were within shelling distance of Noyon, and
the British evacuated successfully nearly 2000 wounded from that
town.  The counter-attack of the 54th Brigade had stopped the German
advance for a time, and the Eighteenth Division was able to get
across the river Oise, the guns and transport passing in the
afternoon while the infantry got across that night and in the morning
of March 26, without serious molestation, being covered by their
sappers and pioneers, who blew up the bridges as soon as the troops
were safely across.  At two in the morning of March 26 the French
abandoned Noyon.  At this time there were no {195} British troops
upon the north of the river save the remains of the Fourteenth
Division which were finally relieved upon this date, and the Second
and Third Cavalry Divisions, now under Generals Pitman and Portal,
who harassed the German advance at every opportunity, and rendered
constant help to the French rearguards.  The Second Cavalry Division
secured the high ground immediately west of Noyon, and held it until
it could be handed over to the French infantry.  The general line of
the cavalry was facing north-east from west of Noyon, through Suzoy
to Lagny, where they were in touch with the Tenth French Division.
The left of the Second Cavalry Division had been prolonged by the
addition of the Canadian Dismounted Brigade.  These men soon found
themselves involved in some hard fighting, for the Germans attacked
the French at Lagny and drove them out.  On one occasion this day, at
the Bois des Essarts, the troopers of the Second British Cavalry
Division galloped through the French infantry to hold off the
attacking Germans, an episode in which Lieutenant Cotton and other
officers gained the honour of mention in the French order of the day.
The left of the cavalry was compelled to fall back finally to Dives,
and the Canadians after a determined struggle were driven out of the
woods which they occupied.  Finally, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade
(Bell-Smyth), consisting of the 5th and 16th Lancers with the 4th
Hussars were nearly surrounded, and had the greatest difficulty in
fighting their way out.  Before night they were in touch once more
both with the French and with their comrades of the 4th Brigade.  On
the morning of March 27 word came that the British cavalry was
imperatively {196} needed at the junction between the French and
British armies.  It was despatched forthwith to do splendid service
in the north after having played a glorious part in the south.

[Sidenote: March 28.]

From now onwards the fighting upon the Roye and Montdidier front
(both towns passed soon into German possession) was no longer
connected with the Third Corps.  The position to the south of the
Oise showed that the Fifty-eighth British Division held from Barisis
to Manicamp.  Thence to Bretigny was the One hundred and twenty-fifth
French Division.  Thence to the east of Varennes were the Fifty-fifth
French Division, with cavalry, and the First French Division up to
Sempigny.  Thence the line ran in an irregular curve through Lassigny
to Canny, the enemy being well past that line on the north, and the
direction of attack being rather from the north-west.  On the morning
of March 28 orders were issued that the remains of the Third Corps
should be transferred to the north, where they should join their
comrades of the Fifth Army, from whom they were now separated by a
considerable distance.  Within the next two days, after some
difficulties and delays in extricating the artillery, these orders
were carried out, though it was not till some days later that the
Fifty-eighth London Division could be relieved.  This unit had not,
save for the 173rd Brigade, been engaged in the recent fighting, but
it had held a line of over ten miles of river, along the whole of
which it was within touch with the enemy.  One effort of the Germans
to get across at Chauny on March 31 was met and repelled by the 16th
Entrenching Battalion, who killed many of the assailants and captured
nearly 100 prisoners.

{197}

So ended the vicissitudes of the Third Corps, which had the strange
experience of being swept entirely away from the army to which it
belonged, and finding itself under French command, and with French
troops fighting upon either wing.  Its losses were exceedingly heavy,
including 20 heavy and 100 field-guns, with about 15,000 killed,
wounded, or missing.  The Fourteenth Division was the chief sufferer
with 5880 casualties, 4500 of which came under the head of "Missing,"
and represent the considerable detachments which were cut off in the
first day of the battle.  The losses of some of the battalions
approached annihilation.  In spite of all pressure and all
misfortunes there was never a time when there was a break, and the
whole episode was remarkable for the iron endurance of officers and
men in the most trying of all experiences--an enforced retirement in
the face of an enemy vastly superior both in numbers and in artillery
support.  When we realise how great was the disparity it is amazing
how the line could have held, and one wonders at that official
reticence which allowed such glorious epics to be regarded as part of
a great military disaster.  Against the two and a half British
divisions which were in the line on March 21 there were arrayed seven
German divisions, namely, the Fifth Guards, First Bavarians,
Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, One hundred and third, Forty-seventh,
and Third Jaeger.  There came to the Third Corps as reinforcements up
to March 26 two British cavalry divisions, one French cavalry
division, and three French infantry divisions, making eight and a
half divisions in all, while seven more German divisions, the Tenth,
Two hundred and eleventh, Two hundred and twenty-third, Eleventh
{198} Reserve, Two hundred and forty-first, Thirty-third, and
Thirty-sixth, came into line, making fourteen in all.  When one
considers that these were specially trained troops who represented
the last word in military science and efficiency, one can estimate
that an unbroken retreat may be a greater glory than a victorious
advance.

Every arm--cavalry, infantry, and artillery--emerged from this
terrible long-drawn ordeal with an addition to their fame.  The
episode was rather a fresh standard up to which they and others had
to live than a fault which had to be atoned.  They fought impossible
odds, and they kept on fighting, day and night, ever holding a fresh
line, until the enemy desisted from their attacks in despair of ever
breaking a resistance which could only end with the annihilation of
its opponents.  Nor should the organisation and supply services be
forgotten in any summing up of the battle.  The medical arrangements,
with their self-sacrifice and valour, have been already dealt with,
but of the others a high General says: "A great strain was also cast
upon the administrative staffs of the army, of corps and of
divisions, in evacuating a great mass of stores, of hospitals, of
rolling stock, of more than 60,000 non-combatants and labour units,
while at the same time supplying the troops with food and ammunition.
With ever varying bases and depots, and eternal rapid shifting of
units, there was hardly a moment when gun or rifle lacked a
cartridge.  It was a truly splendid performance."

We have now traced the movements and the final positions of the eight
corps which were involved in this terrible battle from the foggy
morning which {199} witnessed the German attack, up to those rainy
days of early April which showed a stable line--a line which in spite
of occasional oscillations continued from that date until the great
British victory in August, to mark the point of equilibrium of the
giant forces which leaned from east and from west.  In this account
we have seen the Seventeenth and Sixth Corps in the north fall back
upon Arras and the Vimy Ridge, where they turned and dealt their
pursuers such a blow that the battle in that sector was at an end.
We have seen the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Corps struggling hard to
make a line from Arras to Albert and down to the Somme; we have seen
the Nineteenth Corps covering a huge front and finally holding firm
near Villers-Bretonneux, and we have seen the Eighteenth and Third
Corps intermixed with our French Allies helping to determine the line
in the southern area of the great field of battle.  That line running
just to the west of Montdidier, Moreuil, and Albert was destined for
four months to be a fixed one, though it was advanced during that
time by the splendid audacity of the Australians, who gave their
opponents no rest, and finally, with the help of the British Eighth
Division, entirely re-won the town of Villers-Bretonneux when it was
temporarily lost, and extended our outposts a mile or more to the
east of it, as will be presently described.  Save for this action
there was no movement of importance during that time, though the
general set of the tide was rather eastwards than westwards.

One cannot leave so vast a theme as the second battle of the Somme
without a few words as to the general impression left upon the mind
of the writer by the many documents bearing upon the subject {200}
which he has had to peruse.  In the first place, we cannot possibly
deny that it was a great German victory, and one which was well
earned, since it depended upon clever and new dispositions entailing
laborious preparation with the intelligent and valiant co-operation
of officers and men.  The overpowering force of the blow, while it
removed all reproach from those who had staggered back from it,
depended upon the able way in which it was delivered.  Having said so
much, we must remind the German commentator that he cannot have it
both ways, and that if a gain of guns, prisoners, and ground which
fails to break the line is, as we admit, a victory to the Germans,
then a similar result is a victory to the British also.  He cannot
claim the second battle of the Somme to be a victory, and yet deny
the term to such battles as Arras, Messines, and Passchendaele.  The
only difference is that the Germans really did try to break the line
upon March 21, and failed to do so, while no such design was in
General Haig's mind during the battles of 1917, save perhaps in the
last series of operations.

[Illustration: Position at the Close of the Great Retreat, March 30]

There was a regrettable tendency after the battle to recriminations
in the Press, and General Gough, who had been the head of the Fifth
Army, was sacrificed without any enquiry as to the dominant force
which he had to face, or as to the methods by which he mitigated what
might have been a really crushing disaster.  It can be safely stated
that in the opinion of many of those who are in the best position to
know and to judge, there was absolutely nothing upon the military
side which could have been bettered, nor has any suggestion ever been
made of anything which was left undone.  {201} The entrenching had
been carried out for several months with an energy which raised
protests from the men who had to do it.  There might almost be room
for the opposite criticism that in the constant work of the navvy the
training of the soldier had been unduly neglected; but that was the
result of the unavoidable scarcity of non-military labour.  The
extension of the front was undoubtedly too long for the number of men
who had to cover it; but this was done at the express request of the
French, who had strong military reasons for drawing out and training
a number of their divisions.  It was taking a risk undoubtedly, but
the risk was forced upon the soldiers, and in any case the French
have taken risks before now for us.  The blowing up of the bridges
was well done, and the only exception seems to have been in the case
of railway bridges which, for some reason, were taken out of the
hands of the army commander.  The reserves were insufficient and were
perhaps too far back, but the first item at least depended upon the
general weakness of manpower.  Nowhere can one lay one's hand upon
any solid ground for complaint, save against the rogues and fools of
Brest-Litovsk, who by their selfish and perjured peace enabled the
Germans to roll a tidal wave of a million men from east to west, with
the certainty that they would wash away the first dam against which
they struck.  If there is any military criticism to be made, it lies
rather in the fact that the French help from the south was nearly
sixty hours before it made itself felt at the nearest part of the
British line, and also in the surprising number of draft reserves
kept in England at that date.  Within a month of the battle 350,000
had been sent to the {202} front--a very remarkable feat, but a sign,
surely, of an equally remarkable omission.  Had ten emergency
divisions of infantry been made out of the more forward of these
drafts, had they been held ready in the rear zones, and had the
actual existing reserves been pushed up to the front, it is safe to
say that the German advance would have been stopped earlier and would
probably not have got beyond the Peronne-Noyon line.  If, as was
stated in Parliament, it was confidently expected that the German
attack would strike exactly where it did, then it does seem
deplorable that the nearest reserve to the Fifth Army, a single
division, had, through our weak man-power, to be kept at a three
days' journey from the point of danger.  If, instead of searching the
record of the General for some trace of weakness, our critics had
realised the rapidity of his decision, with the moral courage and
grasp of actuality which he showed by abandoning his positions--no
easy thing for one of his blood and record--and falling back unbroken
upon a new line of defence beyond the German heavy artillery, they
could not have failed to admit that the country owes a deep debt of
gratitude to General Gough.  Had he hesitated and his army been
isolated and destroyed, the whole war might well have taken a most
sinister turn for the worse.

Granting, however, that the disaster was minimised by the prompt
appreciation of the situation by the General in command, by the
splendid work of his four corps-commanders, and by the co-operation
of every one concerned, it is still undeniable that the losses were
very heavy, and the result, even after making every allowance for
German wastage, a considerable military disaster.  In killed, {203}
wounded, and missing in the Fifth Army alone the figures could not be
less than 50,000, including Feetham and Malcolm, army divisional
generals, with Dawson, Bailey, White, Bellingham, and numerous other
brigadiers and senior officers.  In field-guns 235 were so lost or
destroyed out of 600, in medium heavies 108 out of 494, in 8-inch or
over pieces 19 out of 98.  Great quantities of stores, especially at
Ham, fell into the hands of the enemy, but so far as possible they
were burned or made useless.  Bad as the episode seemed at the time,
it is clear now to any one who looks back upon it that it had no evil
effect upon the result of the war.  The Germans were exposed to very
heavy losses which they could ill afford.  They have admitted to
180,000 in documents published since the armistice but this may be an
understatement.  They were drawn away from their famous lines to
which they did not return until they were so reduced that they could
not hold them.  Finally, it led to that concentration of power in the
hands of Marshal Foch which was worth many sacrifices to attain.  Sir
Douglas Haig, from his many services and long experience, might well
have put forward claims to the supreme place, and it is
characteristic of the nobility of this great soldier that it was in
response to a telegram from him to the Prime Minister, in which he
named General Foch for the position, that the change was eventually
carried through.




{204}

CHAPTER VIII

THE SOMME FRONT FROM APRIL 1 ONWARDS

The last waves of the storm--The Twelfth Division at Albert--The
Forty-seventh Division at Aveluy Wood--The Australians in the
south--Capture of Villers-Bretonneux by the Germans--Recapture by
Australians and Eighth Division--Fierce fighting--The first turn of
the tide.

[Sidenote: April 1918.]

The limit and results of the second battle of the Somme had been
defined when the Australians, New Zealanders, Second Canadians, and
fresh British divisions took the place of their exhausted comrades
towards the end of March.  The German reserves, great as they were,
were nearly exhausted, and they had no more men to put into the
fight.  The final line began to clearly define itself, running from a
few miles east of Arras where the Seventh and Sixth Corps had struck
back so heavily at the German pursuit, through Neuville Vitasse,
Boyelles, Ayette, Bucquoy, Hebuterne, Auchonvillers, Aveluy, just
west of Albert, Denancourt, Warfusee, and Marcelcave.  The worst
storm was over, but even as the sinking sea will still send up one
great wave which sweeps the deck, so the German battle front would
break from time to time into a spasm of energy, which could effect no
great purpose and yet would lead to a considerable local engagement.
These episodes must at least be indicated in the order of their
occurrence.

{205}

One great centre of activity was the ruined town of Albert, for the
Germans were able to use it as a covered approach, and thus mass
their troops and attempt to break through to the westward.  The order
of divisions in this sector showed that the Sixty-third and
Forty-seventh, still fighting in spite of their wounds, were to the
immediate north-west.  The Twelfth Division was due west.  South-west
was the Third Division of Australians and south of these the Fourth.
On each of these, and sometimes upon all of them, the strain was very
great, as the Germans struggled convulsively to burst the bonds of
Albert.  It should be noted that the Fifth Army had for the time
passed out of being, and that all the southern end of the line was
now held by the Fourth Army under General Rawlinson.

[Sidenote: April 4.]

The main attack upon the Albert sector was on April 4, when the
Germans made a violent effort, and the affair reached the proportions
of a considerable battle.  About eight in the morning the action
began by a severe and sudden attack upon the Australian Division 1000
yards south of Albert, and also on the railway near Denancourt.  The
Australians fought as Australians have always fought in this war, but
the onset was very heavy, supported by a shattering fire, and they
were forced to yield some ground.

[Sidenote: April 5.]

North of the Australians was the Twelfth Division with the 35th and
36th Brigades in the line, in that order from the south.  The
temporary recoil of the Australians rendered the 35th Brigade
vulnerable, and the Germans with their usual quick military
perception at once dashed at it.  About 1 o'clock they rushed forward
in two waves, having built up {206} their formation under cover of
the ruined houses of Albert.  The attack struck in between the 7th
Suffolks and 9th Essex, but the East Anglians stood fast and blew it
back with their rifle-fire, much helped by the machine-guns of the
5th Berks.  Farther north the attack beat up against the left of the
Forty-seventh and the right of the Sixty-third Divisions, but neither
the Londoners nor the naval men weakened.  The pressure was
particularly heavy upon the Forty-seventh, and some details of the
fighting will presently be given.  The next morning, April 5, saw the
battle still raging along the face of these four divisions.  The
Germans attempted to establish their indispensable machine-guns upon
the ridge which they had taken on the south, but they were driven off
by the Australians.  The 36th Brigade in the north of the Albert
sector had lost some ground at Aveluy, but about noon on April 5 the
9th Royal Fusiliers with the help of the 7th Sussex re-established
the front, though the latter battalion endured very heavy losses from
an enfilade fire from a brickfield.  The 5th Berks also lost heavily
on this day.  So weighty was the German attack that at one time the
4th Australians had been pushed from the high ground, just west of
the Amiens-Albert railway, and the 35th Brigade had to throw back a
defensive wing.  The position was soon re-established, however,
though at all points the British losses were considerable, while
those of the Germans must have been very heavy indeed.

It has been stated that to the north of the Twelfth Division,
covering Bouzincourt and partly occupying Aveluy Wood, was the
Forty-seventh Division (Gorringe), which had been drawn out of the
line, {207} much exhausted by its prolonged efforts, some days
before, but was now brought back into the battle.  It stood with the
15th and 20th London of the 140th Brigade on the right, while the
23rd and 24th of the 142nd Brigade were on the left.  Units were
depleted and the men very weary, but they rose to the crisis, and
their efforts were essential at a time of such stress, for it was
felt that this was probably the last convulsive heave of the dying
German offensive.  It was on April 5 that the German attack from the
direction of Albert spread to the front of the Forty-seventh
Division.  The bombardment about 8 A.M. reached a terrific pitch of
intensity and was followed by an infantry advance through clouds of
gas and smoke.  The main attack fell upon the left of the divisional
line, and was met by a sustained rifle, Lewis gun, and artillery
fire, which could not be faced by the stormers.  At one time the left
of the 23rd London was penetrated, but a rally re-established the
position.  The enemy were rushing forward in mass formations, and
their desperate tactics offered targets which ensured very heavy
losses.

About 9 o'clock the right brigade was also involved in the fighting,
the enemy advancing in force towards Aveluy Wood.  Here also the
assault was very desperate and the defence equally determined.  The
15th (Civil Service Rifles) was heavily attacked, and shortly
afterwards the Blackheath and Woolwich men of the 20th Battalion saw
the enemy in great numbers upon their front.  The whole line of the
division was now strongly engaged.  About 10 A.M. a company of the
24th London was driven from its position by concentrated
rifle-grenade {208} fire, but a support company sprang to the front
and the line was unbroken.  At 10.30, however, things took a grave
turn, for a sudden rush brought the assailants into the line between
the two left flank battalions, outflanking and destroying the
outlying company of the 23rd London.  These men fought bravely to the
end and took heavy toll of the enemy.  At the same time the 20th
London came under a shattering shell-fire which put every Lewis gun
out of action.  It was also enfiladed by machine-guns from the corner
of Aveluy Wood, where the Germans had penetrated the line.  The 20th
threw out a defensive flank and held on.  The 15th on their right
were still in their original positions.

At 11.40 the 23rd London, which had suffered from the German
penetration of its left company, was exposed all along its line to
machine-gun fire from its left rear, where the enemy had established
three posts.  The result was that the position in Aveluy Wood had to
be abandoned.  The 22nd London from the reserve brigade was now
pushed up into the firing-line where the pressure was very great.
The weight of the attack was now mainly upon the 20th, who held their
posts with grim determination in spite of very heavy losses, chiefly
from trench mortars and heavy machine-guns.  It was a bitter ordeal,
but the enemy was never able to get nearer than 300 yards to the line
of the 20th, and if they caused heavy losses they endured as much
from the British fire.  About 12.40 the enemy seemed to be mustering
at the south end of the wood for a grand final attack, but the
gathering was dispersed by the machine-guns of the Londoners.

At four in the afternoon, after a truly terrible day, the
Forty-seventh Division determined to counter-attack, {209} and the
22nd Battalion was used for this purpose.  They had already endured
heavy losses and had not sufficient weight for the purpose, though
eight officers and many men had fallen before they were forced to
recognise their own inability.  The failure of this attack led to a
further contraction of the line of defence.  The Sixty-third Division
on the left had endured a similar day of hard hammering, and it was
now very exhausted and holding its line with difficulty.  For a time
there was a dangerous gap, but the exhausted Germans did not exploit
their success, and reserves were hurried up from the Marines on the
one side and from the 142nd Brigade on the other to fill the vacant
position.

When night fell after this day of incessant and desperate fighting
the line was unbroken, but it had receded in the area of Aveluy Wood
and was bent and twisted along the whole front.  General Gorringe,
with true British tenacity, determined that it should be
re-established next morning if his reserves could possibly do it.
Only one battalion, however, was available, the pioneer 4th Welsh
Fusiliers, who had already done conspicuous service more than once
during the retreat.  An official document referring to this attack
states that "no troops could have deployed better or advanced more
steadily under such intense fire, and the leadership of the officers
could not have been excelled."  The casualties, however, were so
heavy from the blasts of machine-gun fire that the front of the
advance was continually blown away and no progress could be made.
Two platoons upon the left made some permanent gain of ground, but as
a whole this very gallant counter-attack was unavailing.

{210}

This attack near Albert on April 4 and 5 was the main German effort,
but it synchronised with several other considerable attacks at
different points of the line.  One was just north of Warfusee in the
southern sector, where once again the Australians were heavily
engaged and prevented what at one time seemed likely to be a local
break-through.  As it was the line came back from Warfusee to Vaire,
where the Australian supports held it fast.  Farther north the Fourth
Australian Division was sharply attacked opposite Denancourt, and had
a very brisk fight in which the 13th Brigade, and more particularly
the 52nd Regiment, greatly distinguished itself.  The object of the
fight was to hold the railway line and the position of the Ancre.
The tenacity of the Australian infantry in the face of incessant
attacks was most admirable, and their artillery, ranging upon the
enemy at 1500 yards, as they came over the higher ground behind
Denancourt, inflicted very heavy losses.  One gun fired 1250 rounds
without a stop.

The village of Hangard and Hangard Wood were at that time the points
of junction between the French and British armies.  The extreme right
unit of the British was Smith's 5th Brigade of the Second Australian
Division (Rosenthal).  The 20th Battalion on the southern flank was
involved on this and the following days in a very severe and
fluctuating fight in which Hangard Wood was taken and lost several
times.  Colonel Bennett, an Australian veteran whose imperial
services go back as far as the Suakin expedition, had to cover 3500
yards with 600 men, knowing well that there were no reserves behind
him and that the point was vital.  With heavy losses he managed, with
the 19th Battalion beside him, to {211} dam the German flood until
help could arrive.  So fierce was the fighting that 750 dead Germans
were picked up in the Hangard Wood.  On April 7 the wood was
abandoned, but under no compulsion and in accordance with the general
movement of the line.

[Sidenote: April 5 and 6.]

About 10 A.M. on April 6 the enemy renewed his attack upon the
junction between the Forty-seventh and Sixty-third Divisions, but it
was the British turn to mow down advancing lines with machine-gun
fire.  No progress was made, and there were such signs of German
weakening that the British made a sudden local advance, capturing two
machine-guns and some prisoners.  In this affair it is characteristic
of the spirit which still remained in the weary British troops, that
Corporal March of the 24th London went forward and shot the opposing
German officer, bringing back his maps and papers.

The German commanders were well aware that if the line was to be
broken it must be soon, and all these operations were in the hope of
finding a fatal flaw.  Hence it was that the attacks which began and
failed upon April 4 extended all along the northern line on April 5.
Thus the New Zealand Division on the left of the points already
mentioned was involved in the fighting, the right brigade, consisting
of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, being fiercely attacked by some
2000 storm troops who advanced with great hardihood, and at the
second attempt recaptured the farm of La Signy.  The German officers
seem upon this occasion to have given an example to their men which
has often been conspicuously lacking.  "A tall Wurtemburger," says
the New Zealand recorder, "ran towards our line with nine of his men.
In one hand he carried a cane and over his arm a {212} light
waterproof coat.  He was a fine big fellow over six feet high....
Just at the critical moment some Lewis-gunners took a hand in the
business, the officer was shot dead, and most of the others were
killed or wounded."

On the left of the New Zealanders the attack was extended to the road
between Ayette and Bucquoy.  Here a brigade of the Thirty-seventh
Division in the south and of the Forty-second in the north were
heavily attacked and Bucquoy was taken, but before the evening the
defenders returned and most of the lost ground was regained.  The
right of the Thirty-seventh Division had advanced in the morning upon
Rossignol Wood, that old bone of contention, and had in a long day's
struggle got possession of most of it.  Three machine-guns and 130
men were the spoils.

[Sidenote: April 21, 22.]

From this time onwards there were no very notable events for some
weeks in the Somme line, save for some sharp fighting in the Aveluy
Wood sector on April 21 and 22, in which the Seventeenth,
Thirty-fifth, and Thirty-eighth Divisions were all involved.  The
enemy tried hard to improve his position and did succeed in gaining
some ground.  The attacks were costly to both sides but the results
were futile.  The British outposts, and particularly those of the
Australians, maintained an aggressive attitude throughout, and it was
more and more impressed upon the German mind that in spite of his
considerable advance and large captures, it was an unbeaten army
which lay before him.

[Sidenote: April 24.]

On the morning of April 24 a very determined attack was made by the
Germans upon the front of Butler's Third Corps in the area of
Villers-Bretonneux.  {213} This small town is of great importance, as
it stands on a curve of the rolling downs from which a very
commanding view of Amiens is obtained, the cathedral especially
standing out with great clearness.  Already the city had suffered
great damage, but the permanent loss of Villers-Bretonneux would mean
its certain destruction.  The attack was urged by four German
divisions and was supported by tanks which did good service to the
enemy and broke in the British line, held mainly at this point by
Heneker's Eighth Division which had hardly recovered from its heroic
services upon the Somme.

It is suggestive of the value of the tanks whether in German or in
British hands that where the attack was unsupported by these machines
it broke down under the British fire, as on the right of Cator's
Fifty-eighth Division to the south and on the left of the Eighth
Division.  There were fifteen German tanks in all, so their array was
a formidable one, the more so in a mist which was impenetrable at
fifty yards.  It was for the British now to experience the thrill of
helpless horror which these things can cause even in brave hearts
when they loom up out of the haze in all their hideous power.  The
2/4th Londons on the south of the village were driven back to the
line Cachy-Hangard Wood, so that their neighbours of the 2/2nd London
had to conform.  The 2/10th London counter-attacked at once, however,
and penetrated Hangard Wood, doing something to ease the situation.
The 2nd Middlesex and 2nd West Yorks were overrun by the tanks, much
as the Roman legionaries were by the elephants of Pyrrhus, and even
the historical and self-immolating stab in the belly was useless
against these monsters.  The 2nd Rifle {214} Brigade were also
dislodged from their position and had to close up on the 2nd
Berkshires on their left.  The 2nd East Lancashires had also to fall
back, but coming in touch with a section of the 20th Battery of
divisional artillery they were able to rally and hold their ground
all day with the backing of the guns.

The 2nd Devons in reserve upon the right were also attacked by tanks,
the first of which appeared suddenly before Battalion Headquarters
and blew away the parapet.  Others attacked the battalion, which was
forced to move into the Bois d'Aquenne.  There chanced to be three
heavy British tanks in this quarter, and they were at once ordered
forward to restore the situation.  Seven light whippet tanks were
also given to the Fifty-eighth Division.  These tanks then engaged
the enemy's fleet, and though two of the heavier and four of the
light were put out of action they silenced the Germans and drove them
back.  With these powerful allies the infantry began to move forward
again, and the 1st Sherwood Foresters carried out a particularly
valuable advance.

Shortly after noon the 173rd Brigade of the Fifty-eighth Division saw
the Germans massing behind tanks about 500 yards east of Cachy, with
a view to attacking.  There were three whippets still available, and
they rushed out and did great work, catching two German battalions as
they deployed.

The Fifty-eighth had good neighbours upon their right in the shape of
the Moroccan corps, a unit which is second to none in the French Army
for attack.  These were not engaged, but under the orders of General
Debeney they closed up on the left so as to shorten the front of
General Cator's division, a great assistance with ranks so depleted.
His {215} troops were largely lads of eighteen sent out to fill the
gaps made in the great battle, but nothing could exceed their spirit,
though their endurance was not equal to their courage.

On the evening of April 24 General Butler could say with Desaix, "The
battle is lost.  There is time to win another one."  The Germans not
only held Villers-Bretonneux, but they had taken Hangard from the
French, and held all but the western edge of Hangard Wood.  The
farthest western point ever reached by the Germans on the Somme was
on this day when they occupied for a time the Bois l'Abbé, from which
they were driven in the afternoon by the 1st Sherwoods and 2nd West
Yorks.  They had not attained Cachy, which was their final objective,
but none the less it was very necessary that Villers-Bretonneux and
the ground around it should be regained instantly before the Germans
took root.

For this purpose a night attack was planned on the evening of April
24, and was carried out with great success.  The operation was
important in itself, but even more so as the first sign of the turn
of the tide which had run so long from east to west, and was soon to
return with such resistless force from west to east.

For the purposes of the attack the fresh 13th Australian Brigade
(Glasgow) was placed under the General of the Eighth Division, and
was ordered to attack to the south of Villers, while the 15th
Australian Brigade made a similar advance upon the north.  Each of
these was directed to pass beyond the little town, which was to be
cleared by an independent force.  On the right of the Australians was
the {216} balance of the Eighth Division, which had to clear up the
Bois d'Aquenne.

[Illustration: Rough Sketch of the General Position of Troops at the
Battle of Villers-Bretonneux, April 24-25]

The attack was carried out at 10 P.M., the infantry having white
arm-bands for identification in the darkness.  There was no artillery
preparation, and the advance was across unknown country, so that it
may be placed among the most hazardous operations in the war.  In the
case of the 13th Australian Brigade, the 52nd Battalion was on the
right in touch with the British, while the 51st was on the left, with
the 50th in support.  From the onset the machine-gun fire was very
severe, especially against the 51st Regiment, but the admirable
individuality of the Australian soldiers was of great service to
them, every man getting forward through the darkness as best he
could.  The weather was ideal, for there was sufficient moon to give
direction, but not enough to expose the troops to distant fire.  The
German flares were rather a help to the attack by defining the
position.  The Australian front got as far forward as Monument Wood,
level with the village, but the 173rd Brigade on their right was in
some difficulty, and they themselves were badly enfiladed from the
town, so they could not maintain their more advanced position.  The
2nd Northamptons, attached to the 13th Australian Brigade, had been
told off to take the town itself, but both their colonel and their
adjutant were killed during the assembly, and some confusion of
orders caused the plans to miscarry.  On the north of the town the
15th Australian Brigade, with the 22nd Durhams attached, had been an
hour late in starting, but the 60th and 59th Regiments got up, after
some confused fighting, to a point north of the town, which was
entered after dawn and {218} cleared up by the 2nd Berkshires, aided
by a company of the Australian 58th Battalion.

The German tanks had done good work in the attack, and some of the
British tanks were very useful in the counter-attacks, especially
three which operated in the Bois d'Aquenne and broke down the
obstinate German resistance in front of the Eighth Division.
Daylight on April 25 found the British and Australian lines well up
to the village on both sides, and a good deal of hard fighting, in
which the troops got considerably mixed, took place.  One unusual
incident occurred as two blindfolded Germans under a flag of truce
appeared in the British line, and were brought to Colonel Whitham of
the 52nd Australian Regiment.  They carried a note which ran: "My
Commanding Officer has sent me to tell you that you are confronted by
superior forces and surrounded on three sides.  He desires to know
whether you will surrender and avoid loss of life.  If you do not he
will blow you to pieces by turning his heavy artillery on to your
trenches."  No answer was returned to this barefaced bluff, but the
messengers were detained, as there was considerable doubt as to the
efficiency of the bandages which covered their eyes.

By 4 P.M. on April 25 the village had been cleared, and the troops
were approximately in the old front line.  The 22nd Durham Light
Infantry had mopped up the south side of the village.  About a
thousand prisoners had been secured.  The 54th Brigade of Lee's
Eighteenth Division, which had been in support, joined in the
fighting during the day, and helped to push the line forward, winning
their way almost to their final objective south of the village and
then having to yield 200 yards to a counter-attack.  {219} The fast
whippet tanks were used during this action, and justified themselves
well, though, as in the case of all tanks, the value of the
instrument depends mainly upon the courage of the crew who handle it.
One British tank, under the command of a leader named Craig, seems to
have been all over the field wherever it was most needed, so that
some weeks after the fight the present chronicler in visiting the
field of battle still heard the legend of his prowess.  As to the
German resistance a skilled observer remarks: "The enemy handled his
machine-guns with great boldness.  The manner in which he pushes
forward numbers of guns, relying upon the daring and initiative of
the crews to use them to best advantage, may lead to a greater number
being lost, but he certainly inflicts enormous casualties in this
way."

[Sidenote: April 26.]

There was an aftermath of the battle on April 26 which led to some
very barren and sanguinary fighting in which the losses were mainly
incurred by our gallant Allies upon the right.  There was a position
called The Monument, immediately south of Villers, which had not yet
been made good.  The Moroccan Division had been slipped in on the
British right, and their task was to assault the German line from
this point to the north edge of Hangard Wood.  Part of the
Fifty-eighth Division was to attack the wood itself, while on the
left the Eighth Division was to complete the clearance of Villers and
to join up with the left of the Moroccans.  The Eighth Division had
already broken up three strong counter-attacks on the evening of
April 25, and by the morning of April 26 their part of the programme
was complete.  The only six tanks available were given to the {220}
Moroccans.  At 5.15 on the morning of April 26 the attack opened.  It
progressed well near the town, but on the right the Foreign Legion,
the very cream of the fighting men of the French Army, were held by
the murderous fire from the north edge of Hangard Wood.  The 10th
Essex and 7th West Kents, who had been lent to the Fifty-eighth
Division by the 53rd Brigade, were held by the same fire, and were
all mixed up with the adventurers of the Legion, the losses of both
battalions, especially the West Kents, being terribly heavy.  The
Moroccan Tirailleurs in the centre were driven back by a German
counter-attack, but were reinforced and came on again.  Hangard
village, however, held up the flank of the French.  In the evening
about half the wood was in the hands of the Allies, but it was an
inconclusive and very expensive day.

The battle of Villers-Bretonneux was a very important engagement, as
it clearly defined the _ne plus ultra_ of the German advance in the
Somme valley, and marked a stable equilibrium which was soon to turn
into an eastward movement.  It was in itself a most interesting
fight, as the numbers were not very unequal.  The Germans had five
divisions engaged, the Fourth Guards, Two hundred and twenty-eighth,
Two hundred and forty-third, Seventy-seventh Reserve, and Two hundred
and eighth.  The British had the Eighth, Fifty-eighth, Eighteenth,
and Fifth Australian, all of them very worn, but the Germans may also
have been below strength.  The tanks were equally divided.  The
result was not a decided success for any one, since the line ended
much as it had begun, but it showed the Germans that, putting out all
their effort, they could get no {221} farther.  How desperate was the
fight may be judged by the losses which, apart from the Australians,
amounted to more than 9000 men in the three British divisions, the
Fifty-eighth and Eighth being the chief sufferers.

As this was the first occasion upon which the Germans seem to have
brought their tanks into the line of battle, some remarks as to the
progress of this British innovation may not be out of place--the more
so as it became more and more one of the deciding factors in the war.
On this particular date the German tanks were found to be slow and
cumbrous, but were heavily armed and seemed to possess novel
features, as one of them advanced in the original attack upon April
24 squirting out jets of lachrymatory gas on each side.  The result
of the fighting next day was that two weak (female) British tanks
were knocked out by the Germans while one German tank was destroyed
and three scattered by a male British tank.  The swift British
whippet tanks were used for the first time upon April 24, and seem to
have acted much like Boadicea's chariots, cutting a swathe in the
enemy ranks and returning crimson with blood.

Treating the subject more generally, it may be said that the limited
success attained by tanks in the shell-pocked ground of the Somme and
the mud of Flanders had caused the Germans and also some of our own
high authorities to underrate their power and their possibilities of
development.  All this was suddenly changed by the battle of Cambrai,
when the Germans were terrified at the easy conquest of the
Hindenburg Line.  They then began to build.  It may be said, however,
that they never really gauged {222} the value of the idea, being
obsessed by the thought that no good military thing could come out of
England.  Thus when in the great final advance the tanks began to
play an absolutely vital part they paid the usual price of blindness
and arrogance, finding a weapon turned upon them for which they had
no adequate shield.  If any particular set of men can be said more
than another to have ruined the German Empire and changed the history
of the world, it is those who perfected the tank in England, and also
those at the German headquarters who lacked the imagination to see
its possibilities.  So terrified were the Germans of tanks at the end
of the war that their whole artillery was directed to knocking them
out, to the very great relief of the long-suffering infantry.

From this time onwards this front was the scene of continuous
aggressive action on the part of the Australians, which gradually
nibbled away portions of the German line, until the day came for the
grand advance of August 8.  One of the most successful of these was
on May 19, when the village of Ville-sur-Ancre was taken by a sudden
assault with 20 machine-guns and 360 prisoners.  A second very sharp
fight, which may be mentioned here, though it is just beyond the
scope of this volume, was on July 1 and following days in the Aveluy
sector, near the Ancre, where the Twelfth and Eighteenth Divisions
had three bouts of attack and counter-attack, in which the 37th and
54th Brigades were heavily engaged, the honours of the action being
about equally divided between the British and the Germans.




{223}

CHAPTER IX

THE BATTLE OF THE LYS

April 9-12

The Flanders front--Great German onslaught--Disaster of the
Portuguese--Splendid stand at Givenchy of the Fifty-fifth
Division--Hard fight of the Fortieth Division--Loss of the
Lys--Desperate resistance of the Fiftieth Division--Thirty-fourth
Division is drawn into the Battle--Attack in the north upon the
Ninth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fifth Divisions--British
retreat--General survey of the situation.


Nearly a hundred German divisions had been used against the British
alone in the great offensive which began on March 21 and ended in the
first week of April.  At this time the British forces in France,
including Portuguese and Overseas divisions, numbered sixty in all.
Of these no less than forty-four had been engaged in the great
battle, and all of these were either still in the line, tied to the
Amiens front, or else had been drawn out in a shattered and
disorganised condition, having lost on an average not less than from
4000 to 5000 men each.  It will be seen that there was only a very
small margin over, and that if the Germans by a supreme effort had
burst the line and reached the estuary of the Somme, it would have
been possible to have caused a great military disaster.  Especially
would this have been the case if the northern flank {224} of the
British could have been driven in as well as the southern, for then
the mutilated and shaken army would have been hurled in upon itself
and would have found itself crowded down upon a sea-coast which would
have given few facilities for embarkation.  In the hopes of a débacle
in the south the Germans had prepared out of their huge reserves a
considerable force in the north which would have formed the second
claw of their deadly embrace.  When the first claw missed its grip
and could get no farther it was determined that the other should at
least go forward and endeavour to reach the Channel ports.  Although
the Somme estuary had not been attained, none the less the Germans
knew well that three-quarters of the whole British force had been
engaged, and that most of it was not fit to take its place in a
renewed battle.  Therefore they had reason to hope for great results
from their new offensive in Flanders, and they entered upon it with a
good heart.

The omens were certainly propitious, but there were two factors which
were in favour of the British--factors which could not yet have been
adequately appreciated by the Germans.  The first was the new unity
of command under General Foch, a soldier famous for his writings in
peace and for his deeds in war.  This great leader, who had
distinguished himself again and again since the first month of the
war, when he had played a vital part in checking the German rush for
Paris, was selected with the cordial consent of every one concerned,
and especially of Sir Douglas Haig, as Generalissimo of the Allied
forces.  Therefore a common control and a common policy were ensured,
so that the German chiefs could not {225} turn their whole force upon
half of the Allies with the assurance that the other half would find
the operations outside their war map.  Hence the British in Flanders,
though they would have to fight their own battle for a week or two,
could count confidently upon receiving help at the end of that time.

The second and more immediate factor, was that by a fine national
effort a splendid stream of efficient drafts had been despatched from
England during the great battle--young soldiers it is true, but full
of spirit and most eager to meet the Germans and to emulate the great
deeds of their elders.  Their training had been short, but it had
been intense and practical, with so excellent a result that one could
but marvel at the old pre-war pundits who insisted that no soldier
could be made under two years.  These high-spirited lads flocked into
the depleted battalions, which had often to be reformed from the
beginning, with a skeleton framework of officers and N.C.O.'s upon
which to build.  It was of course impossible to assimilate these
drafts in the few days at the disposal of the divisional generals,
but at least they had adequate numbers once more, and they must be
taught to be battle-worthy by being thrown into the battle, as
Spartan fathers have taught their boys to swim.

One more sign of the times was the quick appreciation by the American
authorities of the desperate nature of the crisis all along the
Allied line.  With magnanimous public spirit they at once gave
directions that such American troops as were available and had not
yet been formed into special American divisions should be placed
under British or French command and fitted temporarily into their
organisation.  The few complete organised American divisions {226} in
France had been on the Alsace line, but some of these were now
brought round to thicken the French army on the Oise.  But most
important of all was the effect upon the shipment of American troops,
which had averaged about 50,000 a month and now rose at a bound to
250,000, a number which was sustained or increased for several months
in succession.  This result was helped by the whole-hearted
co-operation of the British mercantile marine, which was deflected
from its other very pressing tasks, including the feeding of the
country, in order to carry these troops, and actually handled about
two-thirds of them whilst the British Navy helped to find the
escorts.  So efficiently were the transport arrangements carried out
both by British and Americans; that when a million men had been
conveyed they were still able to announce that the losses upon the
voyage were practically nil.  Even the lie-fed bemused German public
began to realise in the face of this fact that their much boomed
submarines were only one more of their colossal failures.

The German attack upon the British lines by the army of General von
Quast in Flanders broke on the morning of April 9.  There had been
considerable shelling on the day before along the whole line, but as
the hour approached this concentrated with most extreme violence on
the nine-mile stretch from the village of Givenchy in the south to
Fleurbaix, which is just south of Armentières in the north.  This
proved to be the area of the actual attack, and against this front
some eight German divisions advanced about 6 o'clock of a misty
morning.  So shattering had been their bombardment and so active
their wire-cutters, who were covered {227} by the fog, that the
advanced positions could hardly be said to exist, and they were able
to storm their way at once into the main defences.

The point upon which this attack fell was held the by four divisions,
all of which formed part of Horne's First Army.  The general
distribution of the troops at that time was that the Second Army
stretched from the junction with the Belgians near Houthulst Forest
down to the Messines district where it joined the First Army.  The
First Army had weakened itself by an extension to the south, and
Plumer's force was about to extend also, and take over the Laventie
district, when the storm suddenly burst upon the very point which was
to be changed.

Two corps were involved in the attack, the Fifteenth (De Lisle) in
the Armentières region, and the Eleventh (Haking) in the region of
Givenchy.  The latter had two divisions in the line, Jeudwine's
Fifty-fifth West Lancashire Territorials defending the village and
adjacent lines, while the Portuguese Second Division (Da Costa)
covered the sector upon their left.  The depleted Fiftieth Division
(Jackson) was in immediate reserve.  On the left of the Portuguese
was Ponsonby's Fortieth Division which had lost five thousand men in
the Somme battle only a fortnight before, and now found itself
plunged once more into one of the fiercest engagements of the war,
where it was exposed again to very heavy losses.

The main force of the German attack fell upon the Portuguese line,
and it was of such strength that no blame can be attached to
inexperienced troops who gave way before so terrific a blow, which
would have been formidable to any soldiers in the world.  The
division held the line from 2000 yards south of {228} Richebourg
l'Avoué to the east of Picantin, a frontage of 9350 yards, or more
than half of the total front of the assault.  The division had all
three brigades in the line, and even so was very extended to meet a
serious assault.  The 3rd Brigade from the First Portuguese Division
was in immediate support.  The 5th Brigade was on the right, covering
Le Touret, the 6th in the middle, and the 4th on the left, covering
Laventie.  Behind the whole position lay the curve of the River Lys,
a sluggish stream which moves slowly through this desolate plain, the
Golgotha where so many men have died, Indians, French, British, and
German, since the first months of the war.  In all that huge flat
canalised space it was only at Givenchy that some small ridge showed
above the dreary expanse.

The Portuguese had been in the line for some months, but had never
experienced anything to approach the severity of the shattering
bombardment which poured upon them from four in the morning.  When an
hour or two later the storming columns of the German infantry loomed
through the thick curtain of mist, the survivors were in no condition
to stand such an attack.  All telephone and telegraph wires had been
cut within the first half-hour, and it was impossible to direct any
protective barrage.  The artillery in the rear, both British and
Portuguese, had been much weakened by a concentration of gas-shells
extending as far as Merville, so that the infantry were left with
insufficient support.  The gunners stood to their work like men, and
groups of them continued to fire their guns after the infantry had
left them exposed.  These brave men were killed or captured by the
enemy, and their batteries were taken.  In the rear the roads had
been so {229} shattered by the German fire that it was impossible to
get a tractor or lorry up to the heavy guns, and there was no way of
removing them.  All observers agree that the crews of the heavy guns
did excellently well.  The whole front had fallen in, however, and in
spite of scattered groups of infantry who showed the traditional
Portuguese courage--that courage which had caused the great Duke to
place them amongst his best soldiers--the position was in the hands
of the enemy.  By mid-day they were at Le Touret upon the right, and
the guns there were blown up and abandoned.  About the same time they
had reached Estaires upon the left and Bout Deville in the centre.
Before evening the German line was four miles from its
starting-point, and had reached the River Lawe, a small affluent of
the Lys.  From this time onwards the Fiftieth Division, coming up
from the rear, had taken over the front, and the Portuguese were out
of the battle.  The Germans in their day's work had taken 6000
prisoners and 100 guns, many of them in ruins.  It should be
mentioned that the Portuguese ordeal was the more severe, as
breast-works had taken the place of trenches in this sector.  All
were agreed that General da Costa did what was possible.  "He is a
fine man, who does not know what fear is," said a British officer who
was with him on the day of the battle.

The caving in of the front of the line had a most serious effect upon
the two British divisions, the Fifty-fifth and the Fortieth, who were
respectively upon the right and the left of the Portuguese.  Each was
attacked in front, and each was turned upon the flank and rear.  We
shall first consider the case of the Fifty-fifth Division which
defended the lines of {230} Givenchy with an energy and success which
makes this feat one of the outstanding incidents of the campaign.
This fine division of West Lancashire Territorials, containing
several battalions from Liverpool, had some scores to settle with the
Germans, by whom they had been overrun in the surprise at Cambrai at
the end of the last November.  At Givenchy they had their glorious
revenge.

The position of the Fifty-fifth Division was a strong one, extending
for some thousands of yards from the hamlet of Le Plantin in the
south to Cailloux in the north, with a section of the old British
line a thousand yards in front, a deserted trench half full of water
and festooned with rusty wire.  There were outpost companies along
the scattered line of ruined houses, and a few posts were thrown far
out near the old trench.  The village line consisted of a series of
well-concealed breast-works and loopholed walls without any
continuous trench, the whole so cunningly arranged that it was
difficult to get the plan of it from in front.  Each post or small
fort had its own independent scheme of defence, with good enfilade
fire, concrete emplacements, belts of wire, and deep ditches.

Very early in the day the left flank of the position had been
entirely exposed by the retirement of the Portuguese, so that during
the whole long and desperate struggle the general formation of the
division was in the shape of an L, the shorter arm being their proper
front, and the longer one facing north and holding up the German
attack from inside the old lines.  The northern defensive flank does
not seem to have been entirely improvised, as some precautions of
this nature had already been taken.  The new front extended from the
hamlet of Loisne upon the {231} stream of that name, through a second
hamlet called Le Plantin, and so down to the canal.  The first strain
of the fighting fell chiefly upon the 165th Brigade (Boyd-Moss),
consisting of three battalions of the famous King's Liverpool
Regiment.  The 6th and 7th Battalions were in the line with the 5th
in support at Gorre, but as the day wore on and the pressure
increased, units from both the other brigades were drawn into the
fight, so that all participated in the glory of the victory.  By 8.30
the flank was entirely naked, and the Germans in small but audacious
bodies, with a constant rattle of rifle and machine-gun fire, were
pushing in between the outer posts of the British division,
overwhelming and obliterating some of them by a concentrated fire of
trench mortars.  Some of these isolated garrisons held out in the
most desperate fashion, and helped to take the pressure off the main
village line.  One particularly brilliant example was that of Captain
Armstrong of the 1/4th South Lancashires, who with A Company of that
battalion defended a moated farm, literally to the death, having been
warned that it was a key position.

About mid-day the German attack was still creeping in, and had gained
one important outpost called Princes' Island.  The 10th Liverpool
Scots from the 166th Brigade, a battalion which has a great record
for the war, had come up to thicken the line of defenders.  Amid the
crash and roar of constant shells, and a storm of bullets which beat
like hail upon every wall and buzzed through every crevice, the
stubborn infantry endured their losses with stoic patience, firing
steadily through their shattered loopholes at any mark they could
see.  At 1 o'clock some audacious stormers had got so far forward on
{232} the left that they were in the rear of the Brigade
Headquarters, and were only held there by spare men from the
transport lines who chanced to be available.  The attack was drifting
down more and more from the new ground, so about this hour the 5th
South Lancashires, also of the 166th Brigade, were sent across to the
north of Loisne to hold the stream.  Each flank was attempted in turn
by the wily assailants, so that when the left proved impervious they
charged in upon the right, and captured Windy Corner, which is near
the canal upon that side, continuing their advance by attacking Le
Plantin South from the rear and the flank, so that the defenders were
in an impossible position.  Having taken this point it seemed as if
the Germans would roll up the whole long thin line from the end, and
they actually did so, as far as Le Plantin North.  Here the British
rallied, and the survivors of the 6th and 7th King's made a furious
advance, pushed the Germans back, retook Le Plantin South, and
captured a number of prisoners.  The position was still serious,
however, as the Germans held Windy Corner, and had penetrated between
the British right and the canal, so as to get into the rear of the
position.  A great effort was called for, and the men responded like
heroes.  The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers from the 164th Brigade
(Stockwell) had come up, and these fine soldiers, with the weary
remains of the two King's Liverpool battalions, rushed the whole
German position, dragging them out from the pockets and ruins amid
which they lurked.  In this splendid counter-attack more than 700
prisoners were taken in all, with a number of machine-guns.  At the
end of it the British right was absolutely intact.

{233}

Whilst these stirring events had taken place on the right flank,
there had been heavy fighting also on the left.  Here the British
defence had been based upon two small but strong forts, called
Cailloux North and Route A Keep.  The latter fell early in the
action, the German infantry coming upon it so unexpectedly in the fog
that the machine-guns were at the moment mounted upon the parapet and
elevated for indirect fire.  They were put out of action, and the
place was surrounded and taken.  This greatly weakened the left wing
of the defence.  Farther still to the left the Germans were pushing
through Loisne, and the fort called Loisne Central was heavily
engaged.  This portion of the line was held by the 166th Brigade.
Once the German wave actually lapped over into the little fort, but
the place was not taken, and its machine-guns still clattered and
flashed.  All day the Germans were held at this point though the
pressure was great.  During the night the 13th King's Liverpools from
the 9th Brigade were sent as a reserve to the weary line.  At 7.40 on
the morning of April 10 the enemy, under cover of a murderous
barrage, attacked Loisne once more, striving hard to break in the
left of the British defence.  The garrison suffered terribly, but
none the less the stormers were shot back into their shell-holes and
lurking-places.  Two successive attacks on the forts of Cailloux and
Festubert had no better success and were less strongly urged.  At
seven in the evening they again, with a sudden rush, got a footing in
the fort of Loisnes, and again were driven out, save for twenty-one
who remained as prisoners.  Another day had passed, and still
Lancashire stood fast and the lines were safe.  On April 11 the whole
position {234} was swept by a heavy shell-storm, and the German
infantry clustered thickly in front of the crumbling barricades.  The
guns both of the Fifty-fifth and of the Eleventh Division played
havoc with them as they assembled, so that the attack was paralysed
on the right, but on the left the two little forts of Festubert East
and Cailloux were both overwhelmed.  The former, however, was at once
retaken by a mixed storming party from the 5th and 13th King's
Liverpools.  Late in the evening Cailloux Keep was also stormed, and
once more the position was intact.

There was now only Route A Keep in possession of the enemy, and it
was determined to regain it.  The guns had quickly registered upon it
during the day, and at midnight they all burst into a concentrated
bombardment which was followed by a rush of two companies, one drawn
from the Liverpool Scots and the other from the 13th King's
Liverpools.  The place was carried by assault, and the garrison held
it strongly on the 12th and 13th against a series of attacks.  It was
a most murderous business, and the brave little garrisons were sadly
cut about, but they held on with the utmost determination, having
vowed to die rather than give the fort up.  The survivors were still
there, crouching among the ruins and exposed to constant heavy
shelling, when on April 15 the old epic was ended and a new one was
begun by the relief of the Fifty-fifth Division by Strickland's First
Division.  The episode will live in history, and may match in
tenacity and heroism the famous defence of Ovillers by the German
Guards.  The casualties were heavy, but it may be safely said that
they were small compared with those of the attacking battalions.

{235}

The story has been carried forward in this quarter for the sake of
connected narrative, but we must now return to the events of April 9,
and especially to the effect produced upon the Fortieth Division by
the exposure of their southern flank.  This fine unit, with its
terrible wounds only half healed, was exposed all day to a desperate
attack coming mainly from the south, but involving the whole of their
line from Laventie to Armentières.  The division, which is
predominantly English, but contains one brigade of Highland troops,
fought most valiantly through the long and trying day, enduring heavy
losses, and only yielding ground in the evening, when they were
attacked in the rear as well as in front and flank.

In the morning the Fortieth Division had the 119th Brigade (18th
Welsh, 21st Middlesex, and 13th East Surrey) on the right, while the
121st Brigade (20th Middlesex, 12th Suffolks, and 13th Yorks) was on
the left, joining up with Nicholson's Thirty-fourth Division which
held the Armentières front.  The right of the Fortieth was involved
in the heavy initial bombardment and also in the subsequent infantry
advance, which established a footing in the front trenches of the
119th Brigade.  Whilst a counter-attack was being organised to drive
the stormers out, it was found that the right and the rear of the
position were threatened by the advance through the Portuguese.  The
120th Scottish Brigade in reserve was ordered to form a defensive
flank, but the 10/11th Highland Light Infantry, the nearest unit,
found itself almost overlapped, and the brigade had to fall back upon
the bridges at Nouveau Monde in order to protect the river crossings.
The 2nd Scots Fusiliers covered the bridge-head, while the {236}
whole of the 119th Brigade fell back to the line of the Lys, save
only the garrison of Fleurbaix.  The 121st Brigade was still holding
its line in the Bois Grenier sector.  By 1 o'clock the bulk of the
Fortieth Division was across the Lys, the bridges being destroyed one
by one as the day advanced.  The destruction was not in all cases
complete, and in that of the Pont Levis at Estaires was absolutely
checked by a chance shell which destroyed the leads, and prevented
the explosion.  The enemy, under cover of machine-guns mounted in the
houses of Bac St. Maur, were able to cross the river here and get a
footing upon the northern bank.  The 74th Brigade from the
Twenty-fifth Division and the 150th from the Fiftieth were coming up,
however, and it was still hoped that the German advance might be
checked.  So severe had the fighting been that the 18th Welsh had
only 5 officers and 120 men standing in the evening.

The 121st Brigade were in the meanwhile endeavouring to hold the
Fleurbaix defences on the left of the line.  At 11.30 A.M. the
Germans were in the east of the village, but the 12th Suffolks, who
formed the garrison, put up a most determined resistance, in which
they were aided by a company of the 12th Yorkshires Pioneer
Battalion.  It was not till 5.30 that the village was nearly
enveloped, and the troops had to make their way as best they could to
the north bank of the Lys.  The 20th Middlesex and 13th Yorkshires,
with their flank badly compromised, still held on to the Bois Grenier
sector.  These battalions on the left were taken over by the
Thirty-fourth Division, with whom they were now in close liaison.

{237}

On the morning of April 10 the two brigades which had crossed the
river were in very evil case, having sustained heavy losses.  They
were concentrated about Le Mortier.  The 74th Brigade was in position
south of Croix du Bac in touch on the right with the 150th Yorkshire
Territorials.  All day the enemy were pushing west and north, but
meeting a strong resistance from the British who had an excellent
trench, the Steenwerck switch, to help them.  Some ground was lost,
but much of it was regained in the evening by a spirited
counter-attack of the 14th and 10/11th Highland Light Infantry, the
2nd Scots Fusiliers, and the 21st Middlesex, which advanced over 600
yards.  The pressure was great and unceasing, however, so that the
morning of April 11 found the line farther back again.  The two
brigades were reduced to about 1000 men, who were concentrated at
Strazeele, while the 92nd and 93rd Brigades of the Thirty-first
Division came up in their place.  A brave counter-attack by the 93rd
Brigade at Le Verrier gained its objective, but created a dangerous
gap between it and the 92nd Brigade on its right, which was filled,
however, by the 11th East Yorkshires.  On the 12th the remains of all
three brigades were strung out to cover Strazeele and Hazebrouck from
the east and south-east, but next day they were relieved by the
welcome appearance of the First Australian Division, whose advent
will afterwards be explained.  It had been a very desperate term of
service, in which for three days the sappers of the 224th, 229th, and
231st Field Companies Royal Engineers had to fight as hard as the
infantry.  The Fortieth, like the other divisions described, were
driven back, but only as the buffer is driven back, {238} with the
ultimate result of stopping the force which drove it.  They were much
aided by the guns of the Fifty-seventh Division under General Wray.
The losses of the division were 185 officers and 4307 other ranks.
When one reflects that the losses on the Somme three weeks before had
been equally heavy, one can but marvel.

We shall now follow the fortunes of the Thirty-fourth Division
(Nicholson), which was on the immediate left of the Fortieth,
covering a sector of 8000 yards, including the town of Armentières.
On the north, near Frelinghien, it joined the right of the
Twenty-fifth Division.  On the night of April 7 the enemy fired an
enormous number, 30,000 or 40,000, gas-shells into Armentières, and
soaked it to such an extent with mephitic vapours that it became
uninhabitable.  Otherwise there was no warning of an impending
attack, which came indeed as a surprise to all the forces engaged.

On April 9 the division lay with the 103rd Brigade upon the right
section and the 102nd upon the left, with the guns of the
Thirty-eighth Division behind them.  The main attack on this day was
entirely upon the two divisions, the Portuguese and the Fortieth, to
the south.  There was heavy shelling, however, of the back areas,
especially Armentières and Erquinghem.  When as the day advanced
everything on the right had given way or weakened, the 103rd Brigade
threw back a long thin defensive line, facing south, which ended in
the direction of Fleurbaix.  At the same time the reserve 101st
Brigade was ordered up to cover Bac St. Maur Bridge.  One battalion
of the Reserve Brigade, the 11th Suffolks, got into Fleurbaix, when
by a happy chance {239} they were able to reinforce their own
comrades of the 12th Battalion.  These two sturdy East Anglian units
held the village in a very desperate fight for many hours.  The 15th
and 16th Royal Scots of the the same brigade had some hard fighting
also as they continued the defensive line formed by the 103rd
Brigade, and tried to prevent the victorious Germans from swarming
round and behind the Thirty-fourth Division.  Some idea of the danger
may be gathered from the fact that of two brigades of artillery
engaged one was firing south-west and the other due east.  The
original front was never in danger, but it was a desperate conflict
upon the refused flank.

During the afternoon the Germans crossed the Lys at Sailly and Bac
St. Maur, though the bridge at the latter place had been destroyed.
Their progress, however, had slowed down and become uncertain.  The
74th Brigade of the Twenty-fifth Division had come under the orders
of General Nicholson, and was at once directed against the village of
Croix du Bac, with the ultimate design of recovering the Bac St. Maur
crossing.  The 74th Brigade succeeded in clearing Croix du Bac of the
enemy, but night fell before they could get farther.  The morning
found this brigade sandwiched in between the Fortieth and
Thirty-fourth Divisions, while the 147th Brigade had also moved up in
support.  It was soon found, however, that the enemy had got so far
west in the south that they outflanked the 74th Brigade, who had to
retire on April 10 through Croix du Bac and Steenwerck.  On the same
morning the Twenty-fifth Division had been attacked near Frelinghien,
and the Germans penetrated as far as the northern bend of the Lys,
north of Armentières.  {240} The left of the Thirty-fourth Division
was now entirely in the air.  It was clear, therefore, that a
retirement north of the Lys was necessary, and about 3 P.M. in a
sedate and orderly fashion it was started and carried through,
covered by the fire of the 147th Brigade.  The Thirty-fourth drew off
in fine order, the rearguards stopping from time to time, especially
in the streets of Armentières, for the purpose of beating back the
advancing German patrols.  All bridges were destroyed, and no
unwounded prisoners were left.  The men of the Thirty-fourth were
loud in praise of the way in which the Yorkshire Territorials of the
147th Brigade covered their right flank during this difficult and
dangerous extrication.  We will now, having traced the effects upon
the Fifty-fifth to the south, and upon the Fortieth and Thirty-fourth
Divisions to the north, return to the situation created on April 9 by
the breaking of the Portuguese.

Jackson's Fiftieth Division, without its artillery, had only arrived
from the Somme on April 8, having lost half its old soldiers, so that
50 per cent of the personnel were drafts.  It had also suffered
severely in officers, and was very battle-weary and exhausted.  It
was placed in billets at Merville, with two battalions of the 151st
Brigade holding redoubts at Lestrem south of the Lys close to
Estaires.

As soon as it was seen that the situation was serious, about 8
o'clock in the morning, the division was put in motion.  The 151st
Brigade was ordered to extend its left into Estaires, while the 150th
prolonged the line north of Estaires.  The 149th was held in reserve,
though one of its battalions, the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers, was
sent in to {241} strengthen the right.  The intention was that the
Fiftieth Division should hold the line until the reserves could be
brought to the point of danger.

By two in the afternoon the Germans could be seen all along the
front, and some of the Portuguese had made their way through and
between the ranks.  A very heavy fire was opened by both lines of
infantry, and the Germans advancing by short rushes made continuous
progress towards the eastern bank of the stream.  Yorkshire and
Durham stood solid upon the farther side, however, and 5000 recruits
endured a long and terrible baptism of fire from the afternoon to the
evening of that spring day.  It was on the right at Lestrem, where
the British were to the east of the Lys, that the pressure was most
severe, and eventually the 151st Brigade found it impossible to hold
this point, while farther to the north, upon the left of the
Yorkshire men, the German infantry of the 370th Regiment had won a
footing upon the western bank of the Lys at Sailly and Bac St. Maur.
The British guns were beginning to concentrate, however, and
invaluable time had been gained by the resistance of the Fiftieth
Division.  As night fell the 5th Durhams were still holding Estaires,
while the 5th and 6th Northumberland Fusiliers from the reserve were
standing firm along the stretch north and east of Estaires.  Farther
north still were the 4th East Yorks, 4th Yorks, and 5th Yorks in that
order from the south, all very weary, but all holding tenaciously to
their appointed line.  During the night the Fifty-first Highland
Division (Carter-Campbell) came up on the right of the 151st Brigade
to cover the weak point at Lestrem and all the line to the south of
it.  A brigade of the Twenty-fifth Division also came up {242} to
Steenwerck north of where the river line had been broken, but it was
too late for an effective counter-attack, as considerable forces were
already across, which were spreading out north and south on the
western bank.

The fall of night made no change in the battle, and the darkness was
lit up by the red glare of the incessant fire.  For many hours the
line was held, though the Germans had brought up fresh divisions for
their attack.  Early in the morning of April 10, however, they won a
footing in Estaires, which was desperately defended by the 5th
Durhams.  By 8.45, after long-continued street fighting, the Germans
held the whole town, with the exception of the south-western
extremity.  The fight raged all day backwards and forwards through
this little straggling place, the infantry upon either side showing
the most determined valour.  About 9.30 the 6th Northumberland
Fusiliers, under Colonel Temperley, made a brilliant counter-attack,
crossing 1500 yards of open country with only three batteries to
cover the movement.  Before 10 o'clock they were into Estaires and
had cleared the main street, rushing house after house and driving
the Germans down to the river edge, where they rallied and remained.
The 149th Brigade had promptly sent forward its machine-guns, and
these were mounted on the highest houses at the south end of the
town, to fire on any enemy reserves coming up south of the Lys.  They
raked the Germans on the farther bank and caused heavy losses.  All
day the remains of the 5th Durhams and 6th Northumberlands fought
desperately in Estaires, and held nearly all of it in the evening,
which was in a way a misfortune, since it allowed the Germans to
{243} concentrate their heavies upon it during the night in a
whole-hearted fashion which rendered it absolutely untenable.  The
morning of April 11 found Estaires a No Man's Land between the lines
of infantry.  In spite of a fresh advance by the 4th and 5th
Northumberland Fusiliers, it was found impossible to regain the
place, while the Germans gradually extended their line from the river
crossings which they had retained all through.  By mid-day on April
11, the British line was 500 yards west of the town.

In the southern portion of the line the 151st Brigade of Durhams had
been slowly forced back from the Lestrem sector until they were on
the line of the Lys, which they reached in the evening of April 10.
At that date the 150th Yorkshire Brigade was still firm upon the
river, but the left-hand battalion, the 5th Yorks, had thrown back
its flank, since the enemy, brushing aside the right wing of the
Fortieth Division, had crossed the stream and turned the Fiftieth
from the north.  The Fortieth was still fighting hard, as already
described, and endeavouring to hold back the attack, so that the
German advance was slow.  Early in the morning of April 11 the attack
became very severe, and broke through to the west of Estaires--the
river at this point runs from west to east--driving back the Durham
Brigade, which was absolutely exhausted after forty-eight hours of
ceaseless fighting without assistance.  Their resistance had been an
extraordinarily fine one, but there comes a limit to human powers.
The whole division was at the last extremity, but fortunately at 12
o'clock on the 11th, two brigades of the Twenty-ninth Division
(Cayley) came up in relief.  {244} So close was the fighting,
however, and so desperate the situation, that General Riddell of the
149th Northumberland Fusiliers Brigade refused to disengage his men
from the battle, since the confusion of a relief might have led to
disaster.  He was at the time holding the line astride the Meteren
Becque, north of Estaires, covering about 1000 yards of vital ground.
Here the Germans attacked all day, making prodigious efforts to push
the 4th and 5th Northumberland Fusiliers out of Trou Bayard.  The
ground between this point and Pont Levis, the bridge at the east end
of Estaires, was dead flat, and afforded no particle of cover.
Fifteen British machine-guns stationed beside the infantry swept all
this expanse, and cut down each wave of attack.  Four times the place
was supposed to have fallen, and four times the Germans fell back,
leaving long grey swathes of their dead.  It was not until 3 P.M.
that the stubborn Northumbrians found that their right was completely
exposed, and were forced to retire from a position which they had
sold at a terrible price.

Instead of dying down the German advance was attaining a greater
proportion with every day that passed, for it seemed to their
commanders that with so favourable an opening some very great success
lay within their power.  In spite of the arrival of the Fifty-first
and Twenty-ninth Divisions the battle raged most furiously, and the
weight of the attack was more than the thin line could sustain.  The
Germans had rapidly followed up the 151st Brigade as it drew out, and
there was a fierce action round Merville and Robermetz in the early
afternoon of April 11.  The exhausted Durhams turned furiously upon
their pursuers, and there was fierce hand-to-hand {245} work in which
even General Martin and his Headquarters Staff found themselves
handling rifles and revolvers.  The Thirty-first Division (Bridgford)
had come up and taken position in the rear of the Twenty-ninth, with
their left flank facing east to hold off the enemy, who were now
close to Steenwerck in the north.  By nightfall Merville had gone,
and so had Neuf Berquin, which lay between the 151st and the 149th
Brigade, rather in the rear of the latter's right.  At this period
the Twenty-ninth Division, with the Thirty-first behind it, was on
the left or north of the 149th Brigade, covering the ground between
Neuf Berquin and Steenwerck.  The enemy had turned the right of this
line as already described, and now through the events in the north,
which will soon be narrated, the left of the Twenty-ninth Division
was also turned, and the situation became most dangerous, for the
enemy was in great force in front.  A consultation was held by the
various general officers affected, and it was decided to make a side
slip under the cover of darkness to the line of Vierhouck-Meteren
Becque.  The British had to fight, however, to gain this position, so
far had the enemy outflanked them, and when the 149th Brigade, with
their indomitable Northumbrians, now reduced to a few hundred men,
had cut their way through to Vierhouck it was only to find it empty
and the British line about 1000 yards to the west of it, where the
4th Guards Brigade of the Thirty-first Division had just begun to
arrive.  The Northumbrians held on to Vierhouck none the less on the
morning of April 12, and the Guards Brigade came forward.

Whilst this stern fighting had been in progress, and while the
Fifty-fifth kept its iron grip upon {246} Givenchy and Festubert, the
Fifty-first Highland Division to its north, along the line of the
Lawe Canal, had been very hard pressed.  All three brigades had been
engaged in most desperate defence and counter-attack, the fighting
being so close that two at least of the Brigadiers had been compelled
to drop maps and binoculars, while they seized rifles from their
orderlies.  The canal was half dry and offered a poor front, but it
was sustained until the Germans got across in the north where the
left flank of the 153rd Brigade was turned and had to fall back.  The
Gordons and Black Watch of this unit fought most fiercely in the
neighbourhood of Vieille Chapelle, and the Germans will long remember
their meeting with the clansmen.  Finally their line swung back west
of Lestrem, keeping in touch with the right flank of the Fiftieth
Division.

At this period the 184th Brigade was the only one in the Highland
Division which was still capable of service, for the others had lost
so heavily and were so wearied that rest was absolutely necessary.
The Sixty-first Division (Colin Mackenzie), still very weak after its
service on the Somme, came up in the Robecq sector, and, with the aid
of the surviving Highland Brigade, formed a barrier to the terrific
German pressure, the whole coming under General Mackenzie.  This line
was held by these troops up to the 23rd of April.

Meanwhile, to revert to the early days of the battle, the German
attack was raging with great fury upon the centre and left of this
line, and finding a gap between the Twenty-ninth Division and the
149th Brigade it poured through it with most menacing results, but
the 4th Guards Brigade counter-attacked {247} and retrieved the
situation west of the Vieux Berquin-Neuf Berquin Road, as will be
told in detail in the next chapter.  Farther north, however, the
German attack made more progress and rolled forward to the south of
the village of Merris.  The 6th Northumbrians with only two officers
left standing--one of them their gallant Colonel, Temperley,--still
held on to their old stance at Vierhouck, though reduced to the
strength of a company, and in such a state of physical exhaustion
that the men fell to the ground fast asleep between the attacks.  One
young soldier woke up during his nap to find the Germans among them,
on which he sprang up, shot the German officer, and organised a
charge which re-established the line.  As darkness fell on the
evening of April 12 the survivors of the Fiftieth Division were drawn
from the line, though some were so entangled with other units that
they stayed and shared in the severe fighting of April 13.

As already shown the Givenchy bastion was held firm, which meant that
the Fifty-first Division was also to some extent helped to resist
attack, since an enfilade fire from the Fifty-fifth would beat upon
any advance against them.  Such advances were repeatedly made upon
April 11 and were splendidly countered.  North of this point the
Fiftieth, Twenty-ninth, and Thirty-first Divisions had all suffered
heavily, while the line had been bent back in a curve from the La
Bassée Canal to a maximum depth of ten miles, ending on the night of
April 12 in a position from west of Merville through the two Berquins
to Merris.  The Twenty-ninth Division, which is a particularly good
comrade in a tight place, had been very hard pressed, with its
brigades sent {248} hither and thither wherever a leak was to be
stopped.  It was in this action that Colonel Forbes Robertson, one of
the heroes of Cambrai, earned the coveted Cross by fighting on
horseback at the head of his men like some knight of old, and
repeatedly restoring the line when it was broken.  In spite of all
valour, however, the general movement was westwards.  Whilst these
misfortunes had occurred in the southern sector, others not less
serious had occurred in the north, owing to the great extension of
the German attack.  It is to these that we must now turn.

The enemy had achieved a considerable success upon April 9 when they
succeeded in establishing themselves across the Lys at Sailly and Bac
St. Maur, because by doing so they had got to the south-west of
Armentières.  They had prepared another attack in the north, and it
was evident that if it had any success the Armentières position would
be impossible.  Early in the morning of April 10 the usual shattering
and pulverising bombardment which preceded a full-dress German attack
broke out upon the right of the Second Army, involving the front from
the Ypres-Comines Canal in the north down to the Lys River at
Armentières, thus joining up with the battle of yesterday, and
turning the ten-mile front into one of twenty.  The chief points in
this line are Hollebeke in the north, Wytschaete in the centre, and
Messines in the south, with Ploegsteert Wood and village and Nieppe
as the final connecting links with Armentières.  It was all classic
and sacred ground drenched with the blood of our bravest.  There can
be few regiments in the British Army which have not at one time or
another left their dead upon this shell-pitted slope, or upon the
levels which face it.

{249}

The order of the Second Army from the north at this time was
Twenty-second, Eighth, Second, and Ninth Corps.  It was the Ninth
Corps (Hamilton-Gordon) which was now attacked.  The order of
divisions upon this front was Campbell's Twenty-first Division
astride the Ypres-Menin Road, the Ninth (Tudor) in the Hollebeke
district, the Nineteenth (Jeffreys) covering 6000 yards east of
Messines and Wytschaete from Ravine Wood in the north to the Douve in
the south, and finally the Twenty-fifth Division (Bainbridge) on the
right, which was already in a most unfavourable position, as its
right flank was menaced by the driving in of the Fortieth and threat
to the Thirty-fourth on the preceding day, while one of its brigades,
the 74th, had been taken away to cover Steenwerck from the German
advance at Bac St. Maur.  It was upon these divisions, and, in the
first instance, upon the two southern ones that the new German attack
from the Fourth Army of our old enemy General von Armin broke on
April 10.  It should be remembered that, like so many of their
fellow-units, both of these divisions had been very heavily engaged
in the south, and that their losses within the last two weeks had
been very great.  Verily we have travelled far from the day when it
was laid down as an axiom that a corps which had lost a quarter of
its numbers would not stand to its work until time had effaced the
shock.

Since the main assault on April 10 fell upon the Nineteenth Division
the story can be most plainly told from their central point of view.
The left of their line was held by the 58th Brigade (Glasgow),
consisting of the 6th Welsh and 9th Welsh Fusiliers.  The right was
held by the 57th Brigade (Cubitt) {250} which contained the 10th
Warwick, 8th Gloucester, and 10th Worcesters.  The 56th (Heath) was
in reserve.  It was upon these troops that there fell the strain of
an attack which can seldom have been exceeded in severity.  The total
German force on the corps front was eleven divisions, and of these no
less than five were directed on the morning of April 10 upon the
depleted ranks of General Jeffreys' unit.

A very thick mist prevailed, and through this protective screen the
German infantry advanced about 6 o'clock, driving swiftly through all
the forward posts, and putting them out of action in exactly the same
fashion as on March 21.  The enemy were in great numbers, and their
advance was swift and resolute.  Within half an hour of the first
alarm they had made a lodgment in the main position of the 57th
Brigade, and had also broken in the face of the left wing of the
Twenty-fifth Division to the south.  The garrisons of the outlying
posts were never seen again, and it was observed that they were
greatly hampered by their camouflage screens which they had no time
to tear away in the face of so rapid and overwhelming an attack.  At
6.40 the enemy were deep in the position of the 57th Brigade,
especially near Gapard Spur, which marked the centre of that unit.
At 7.30 the whole brigade was in difficulties, which was more marked
in the centre than on either flank, but was serious at every point of
the line.  The 8th North Staffords of the Reserve Brigade were
brought up at this hour to help in the defence of this weakening
sector.  Before they could arrive upon the scene the enemy had made
such progress that he had reached the crest of the ridge and had
occupied the village of Messines.  The 68th Brigade in the north
{251} had not yet been attacked, but General Glasgow seeing his right
flank entirely exposed had thrown back a defensive line.  Close to
this line was a post named Pick House, and upon this the mixed
elements of the left of the 57th Brigade, chiefly men of the 10th
Warwicks, now rallied and formed a strong centre of resistance.  The
Twenty-fifth Division to the south had been also very hard pressed,
and was in immediate danger of losing the important knoll, Hill 63,
so that the reserve brigade of the Nineteenth Division had to send
the two remaining battalions, the 4th Shropshires and 9th Cheshires,
to strengthen their defence.  There was thus no longer any support
for the Nineteenth Divisional fighting line in their great need, save
for the 5th South Wales Borderers, their pioneer battalion, and the
81st Field Company R.E., both of whom were thrown into the battle,
the pioneers pushing bravely forward and connecting up with the 10th
Warwicks at Pick House.  Meanwhile the 8th North Staffords had made a
fine attempt to retake Messines, and had actually reached the western
edge of the village, but were unable to gain a permanent footing.
Their right was in touch with the 8th Gloucesters, and some sort of
stable line began to build itself up before the Germans.  They had
been unable to occupy Messines in force, owing to the rifle-fire
which became more deadly with the rising of the mist.  The scattered
groups of infantry lying upon the ridge on either side of Messines
were greatly heartened by the splendid work of A Battery, 88th
R.F.A., under Captain Dougall, which remained among them, firing over
open sights at the advancing Germans.  "So long as you stick it I
will keep my guns here!" he shouted, and the crouching men {252}
cheered him in return.  He was as good as his word, and only withdrew
what was left of his battery, man-handling it across almost
impossible ground, when he had not a shell in his limbers.  This
brave officer received the Victoria Cross, but unhappily never lived
to wear it.

The 8th North Staffords, still lying opposite Messines, extended
their left down the Messines-Wytschaete Road in an endeavour to join
up with the men at Pick House.  Thus a frail curtain of defence was
raised in this direction also.  Shortly after mid-day things began to
look better, for the gallant South African Brigade (Tanner) of the
Ninth Division was despatched to the rescue.  So severe had been its
losses, however, that it numbered only 1600 bayonets, and had hardly
been re-organised into battalions.  Late in the afternoon it
advanced, the 1st Battalion on the left, 2nd on the right, and though
it had not the weight to make any definite impression upon the German
front it entirely re-established the line of the road from Messines
to Wytschaete, and reinforced the thin fragments of battalions who
were holding this precarious front.  The South Africans incurred
heavy losses from machine-gun fire in this very gallant attack.

The Ninth Division had hardly relinquished its Reserve Brigade when
it found that it was itself in urgent need of support, for about 2
o'clock on August 10 the attack spread suddenly to the northern end
of the line, involving the 25th, 26th, and 58th Brigades, all under
General Tudor, who was now responsible for the Wytschaete front.  So
infernal was the barrage which preceded the attack, that the right of
the Ninth Division in the vicinity of Charity {253} Farm was driven
in, and the 58th Brigade, with both flanks in the air and smothered
under a rain of shells, was compelled also to fall back upon its
support line.  About 4 P.M. the 58th Brigade was broken near Torreken
Farm, and the 6th Wiltshires, who were the flank battalion on the
right, were cut off and lost heavily.  The enemy were driving hard at
this period towards Wytschaete, but the 9th Welsh stood fast in a
cutting to the south of the village, and held the Germans off with
their rifle-fire.  So ended a most trying and unfortunate day, where
the overborne troops had done all that men could do to hold their
ground, fighting often against five times their own number.  The
prospects for the morrow looked very black, and the only gleam of
light came with the advent, about midnight, of the 108th Brigade
(Griffiths) from the Ulster Division, with orders to fight alongside
the exhausted 57th, whose commander, General Cubitt, was now
directing the local operations to the west of Messines.  The
Wytschaete front was also strengthened by the inclusion in the Ninth
Division of the 62nd and later of the 64th Brigade of the
Twenty-first Division.  Farther south the 75th Brigade north of
Armentières had been driven back by the enemy's attack, and the 7th
Brigade on its left, finding its flank uncovered, had hinged back
upon Ploegsteert Wood, where it held its line as best it might.  Thus
on the left, the centre, and the right there had been the same story
of unavailing resistance and loss of valuable, dearly-bought ground.
Even more serious, however, than the local loss was the strategical
situation which had been created by the German advance in the lower
sector, by their crossing the Lys, and by the fact that on the night
of {254} April 10 they were closing in upon Steenwerck and La Crêche
far to the right rear of the defenders of the Messines line.  It was
a situation which called for the highest qualities of generals as of
soldiers.

By the morning of April 11 General Plumer, dealing out his reserves
grudgingly from his fast diminishing supply, placed the 147th Brigade
of the Forty-ninth Yorkshire Territorial Division (Cameron) behind
the Twenty-fifth Division in the Ploegsteert region, and a brigade of
the Twenty-ninth Division to the north of it.  Such succours were
small indeed in the face of what was evidently a very great and
well-prepared attack which had already shaken the whole northern
front to its foundations.  The Higher Command had, however, some
points of consolation.  If the vital sectors could be held there was
the certainty that strong reinforcements would arrive within a few
days from the south.  The Amiens line was now certainly stabilised,
and if once again an equilibrium could be secured then the last
convulsive efforts of this titanic angel of darkness would have been
held.  With no illusions, but with a dour determination to do or die,
the British line faced to the east.

The immediate danger was that a gap had opened between Messines and
Wytschaete, while another was threatened farther south between
Ploegsteert and the Nieppe-Armentières Road.  The pressure upon the
Damstrasse was also very great in the region of the Ninth Division.
The first disposition in the Messines area was to strengthen the line
of resistance by pushing up the three battalions of the 108th
Brigade, the 1st Irish Fusiliers on the left near Pick House, the 9th
Irish Fusiliers west of Messines, and the 12th Irish Rifles in the
Wulverghem line.  The {255} attack on the morning of April 11 was not
heavy in this direction, but was rather directed against the
Twenty-fifth Division in the Ploegsteert district, where it came
ominously close to Hill 63, a commanding point from which the
Messines position of the British would be taken in reverse.  General
Jeffreys of the Nineteenth Division determined none the less to stand
his ground, but he threw out a defensive flank along the
Messines-Wulverghem Road, and mounted machine-guns to hold any attack
from the south.  Meanwhile the 57th, South African, and 108th
Brigades, in spite of this menace to their right rear continued to
hold the Messines front.  There was severe fighting on this sector
during the afternoon in which the remains of the 2nd and 4th
(Transvaal Scots) Battalions were pushed back for some distance, but
counter-attacked under the lead of Captain Green, regaining most of
the ground that they had lost, and connecting up with the 5th South
Wales Borderers, who were still holding fast near Pick House.  This
line was maintained until the general withdrawal.  It was further
strengthened by the 146th Brigade, one of the three units of the
Forty-ninth Division, which were all engaged at different points.
One battalion, the 7th West Yorkshires, called on suddenly to fill a
gap, made a very fine advance under heavy fire, and restored the
situation.  It remained in the line until, on April 16, it was almost
annihilated by a terrific German attack upon it.

But the situation on the right rear was getting worse and worse.  In
the evening it was definitely known that Hill 63 had at last fallen
after a long and obstinate struggle.  The Twenty-fifth, and later
{256} the Thirty-fourth Divisions had held up against great odds, but
the main force of the enemy was now striking upon that line, and the
British were forced to withdraw from Le Bizet towards Nieppe.  These
German gains enforced a completely new re-arrangement of the forces
in the north if they were to avoid being taken in the rear.  This
change of a wide and far-reaching character was quickly and safely
effected during the night of April 11 and 12.  It involved moving
back the three northern corps into their battle zones, leaving only
outposts in advance.  They still covered Ypres, but the retirement
meant that all that had been won in the mud-and-blood struggle of
1917 had passed into German keeping, and coupled with the loss of
Messines it seemed to threaten that the old salient might be renewed
in as disastrous a fashion as ever.  This retirement was rather in
the nature of a precaution against the possibilities of the future.
What was of most immediate importance was the withdrawal of the lines
which were at such close grips with the enemy to the west of
Messines.  By the morning of April 12 the general line of the
Nineteenth Corps was Steenwerck Station, Pont-d'Achelles, Neuve
Eglise, Wulverghem, Wytschaete.  No immediate German attack followed
on the withdrawal.  This abstention on the part of the enemy was due
in part to the wonderful work done by a small nest of four
machine-guns on the Messines-Wulverghem Road under the command of
Lieutenant Hodgson.  This small unit had already fought for
forty-eight hours, but on this third day of the battle their services
were invaluable, for they shot down hundreds of Germans as they
endeavoured to debouch from Messines and descend the slope.  Save for
two {257} wounded men none of this band of heroes ever returned.
Among other detachments who behaved with great heroism were a few men
of the 5th South Wales Borderers, B Company, under Captain Evans, who
maintained themselves at Pick House, north and east of Messines, for
three days, until they were at last rescued by the 58th Brigade from
the north.

Whilst these fresh dispositions and general retrogressions had been
made on this front the Thirty-fourth Division to the south had also
been compelled to rearrange its positions.  It has already been
described how, under cover of the 147th Brigade, they withdrew in
absolute order across the Lys.  April 11 saw such continued pressure,
however on the right of the Twenty-fifth and the whole of the
Thirty-fourth Divisions that it became clear early in the afternoon
of April 11 that further retirement was imperative.  This began at
dusk, the three brigades retiring by the Armentières-Bailleul Road,
while the 147th still acted as rearguard.  They retired through the
74th and 88th Brigades near Bailleul Station, fighting back all the
way and considerably harassed by the German guns.  On the morning of
the 12th the general line was Steam-mill-Bailleul Station-southern
border of La Crêche to a point about 500 yards north-east of Pont
d'Achelles on the Bailleul Road.  Along this line the order of battle
from the south was the 147th, 75th, 101st, 74th, 102nd, and 88th
Brigades.  Nieppe, which had been evacuated, was occupied by the
enemy later in the day, and on the evening of April 12 the line was
pushed a little farther back to De Seule.

There was no fighting on the new line opposite {258} Messines on
April 12, but the battle was, as has been shown, raging furiously
elsewhere, and the situation in the south, where the enemy was making
progress, must deeply affect that in the north.  Had an aviator taken
a swift flight from Hollebeke to Givenchy on this day, following the
deep curve which had formed in the British line, his observations
would have been roughly as follows: in the Hollebeke district he
would have found no extreme pressure, and that the Ninth Division,
reinforced by the 58th Brigade, was holding the line not far westward
of their original position.  From there onwards he would have skirted
the new line of the Ninth Corps, as already indicated, and would have
seen the remains of the Nineteenth Division covering the north of it,
the Twenty-fifth Division, also in fragments, about Neuve Eglise, and
the Thirty-fourth Division near Steenwerck.  He would next observe
with consternation or joy according to his colours, that there was a
considerable gap before Bailleul.  At the other side of this gap he
would come upon elements of the Thirty-first and Twenty-ninth
Divisions, hard-pressed and worried by the advance which the enemy
had made through Merville on their right.  He would catch a glimpse
also of some thin lines of resistance, still farther south, which
represented all that was left of the Fiftieth Division.  Finally, he
would see the Fifty-first and the Fifty-fifth on the extreme south,
both of them standing firm in their positions.  Looking eastwards he
would see pouring across the Lys the legions of Prince Rupprecht of
Bavaria, hurrying to improve their blow, while behind the British
lines he would see new divisions, the Fifty-ninth Midlanders at
Wulverghem, the Thirty-third {259} near Bailleul, the Sixty-first
near Robecq, the 4th Guards Brigade followed by the First Australians
near Hazebrouck, all hastening with heavy hearts but the most grim
determination to throw themselves across the path of this German
invasion which already threatened the most vital points in Flanders.
Far to the south also our aviator would perhaps have seen the smoke
of many trains, and out at sea might have made out the little dots
which marked in the one case French, in the other British,
reinforcements.  Such was the general panorama upon the Flanders
front on the evening of April 12.




{260}

CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF THE LYS

April 13-May 8

Desperate situation--Sir Douglas Haig's "win or die" message--Epic of
the 4th Guards Brigade at Hazebrouck--Arrival of First Australian
Division--Splendid services of Thirty-third Division--Loss of
Armentières, Bailleul, and Neuve Eglise--The First Division at
Givenchy--Fall of Kemmel--Battle of Ridge Wood--Great loss of
ground--Equilibrium.


Up to April 13 twenty-eight German divisions had been traced in the
battle of Flanders.  Since the whole British Army consisted of sixty
divisions, and only thirteen had been engaged in Flanders, one can
gather how terrible had been their task.

By the fourth day of the battle the purpose of the enemy became more
clear.  It was evident now that his attack consisted really of three
movements.  The northern of these, consisting of about six divisions,
had for its task to drive through Wytschaete and Messines to
Bailleul.  At present it was held up in the north by the Ninth
Division, but had made its way in the south until Neuve Eglise was
the only village which intervened between it and Bailleul.  The
central attack, consisting of the main force, had taken Armentières
and penetrated ten miles deep, capturing Merville, reaching the
Clarence River, touching Robecq, and threatening St. Venant.  This
{261} deep penetration reacted upon the British flanks to north and
south of it.  Finally, there was an advance by seven or eight
divisions in the south, which had been held at Givenchy, but had bent
the line back the from that point, Bethune being the immediate
objective.  The hammering of the Germans was remorseless and
terrific.  All that the British needed was a little time, but it
seemed as if it would be denied them.  Help was coming, but it did
not arrive so quickly as the new divisions which Von Armin and Von
Quast were pouring over the Messines Ridge and across the plain of
the Lys.

The position was very menacing, as was shown by an order of the day
from the British Commander-in-Chief which is unique perhaps in our
military annals--a stern call to duty and to death, pitched on the
very note which would arouse the historic tenacity of the British
soldier.  Documents have been avoided in this chronicle, but this one
at least must be quoted in full.  It was addressed to all ranks of
the British Army under his command.

"Three weeks ago to-day," said Sir Douglas Haig, "the enemy began his
terrific attacks against us on a fifty-mile front.  His objects are
to separate us from the French, to take the Channel ports, and
destroy the British Army.

"In spite of throwing already 106 divisions into the battle, and
enduring the most reckless sacrifice of human life, he has, as yet,
made little progress towards his goals.  We owe this to the
determined fighting and self-sacrifice of our troops.

"Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the
splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our army under the most
trying circumstances.

{262}

"Many amongst us now are tired.  To these I would say that victory
will belong to the side which holds out the longest.

"The French Army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support.

"There is no other course open to us but to fight it out.  Every
position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement.
With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our
cause, each one of us must fight to the end.

"The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon
the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment."

No words can describe the danger of the crisis more clearly than this
clear call from a leader remarkable for his judgment and restraint,
exhorting his men to fight to the death with their faces to the
raging German line, and their backs to those all-important harbours
on which the fate of the world was now depending.  The German
vanguard was forty miles from Calais on the day that the appeal was
made, and there was no strong line to be forced, save that strongest
of all lines which was formed by Sir Herbert Plumer and his men.

A new unit had come into line on April 13.  This was the Thirty-third
Division under General Pinney.  It was at once thrust in to fill the
gap in front of Bailleul, where it found itself involved from that
date onwards in most desperate fighting, in which it was associated
with the Thirty-first Division.  The narrative of the services and
trials, both of them very great, which were rendered and endured by
these divisions may be best told in consecutive form, as a too strict
adhesion to the order of dates produces an {263} effect which makes
it difficult to follow the actual happenings.  We shall first
consider the operations at Hazebrouck and Meteren, where these two
divisions and the First Australian Division were chiefly concerned,
and we shall afterwards return to the north and follow the fortunes
of the Nineteenth, Twenty-fifth, Forty-ninth, Thirty-fourth, and
other divisions which were holding the northern curve.

[Sidenote: Central Area.  April 12.]

The line was very weak on April 12 in front of central Hazebrouck,
and yet it was absolutely vital that this important railway junction
should not fall into German hands.  The need was pressing and
desperate, for the German attack was furious and unremitting, while
the British line was so thin, and composed of such weary units, that
it seemed impossible that it could hold.  The exhausted remains of
the Fiftieth Division, who had been at it continually ever since the
breaking of the Portuguese front, were hardly capable now of covering
or defending any serious front.  Yet if the ground could be held, the
First Australian Division, brought hurriedly back from the Somme and
in the act of detraining, would be in the line within twenty-four
hours.  There have been few moments more heavy with fate during the
whole of the campaign.  Everything depended for the moment upon
Pinney's Thirty-third Division, upon the worn remnants of the
Twenty-ninth Division, upon the 92nd and 93rd Brigades, and upon the
4th Guards Brigade of the Thirty-first Division who were brought up
from Pradelles, and thrown hurriedly across the path of the advancing
Germans.

Of the Thirty-first Division the 92nd and 93rd Brigades had already
been heavily engaged on April 11 as already recorded.  The Guards
Brigade {264} had been delayed in its journey and was still fresh.
General Reedman of the 92nd Brigade was in local command, and the
situation was a particularly difficult one.  At all costs Hazebrouck
must be covered until reinforcements could arrive, for if the line
were cut there was no end to the possible evils.  When Merris fell
General Reedman still held the heights west of Merris with the 10th
East Yorkshires, while the 11th East Lancashires were to the south,
and the remnants of the 86th and 87th Brigades of the Twenty-ninth
Division held on to Vieux Berquin.  This line held until 5 P.M. on
April 13 in spite of very stormy attacks and very little help from
the guns.  About that hour the right of the line gave way under
severe pressure, and Vieux Berquin was taken, but the Germans were
bottled up in it and were unable to get forward.  There they remained
until the great turn of the tide.  We must now, however, turn our
gaze to the immediate south and follow the phases of the wonderful
stand made by the remaining brigade of the Thirty-first Division, the
4th Guards Brigade, who found themselves involved in a desperate
battle in front of Hazebrouck.

Without enumerating a number of obscure hamlets which are rather
confusing than helpful, it may be said that the brigade under General
Leslie Butler covered the north of the main road from Merville to
Hazebrouck, with their right resting upon the Bourre, a small
sluggish stream.  Vierhouck represented roughly the centre of their
line.  It was a country of flat cultivated fields, with many roads
and watercourses lined with willows, which cut the view.  There were
untouched farms with their human and animal on every side.  To the
west lay the great {265} forest of Nieppe.  On the right were the 3rd
Coldstream, on the left the 4th Grenadiers, with the 2nd Irish in
close support.  They were in position on the morning of April 12, and
at once found the enemy in front of them, who after a strong
preliminary bombardment advanced in great numbers along the whole
line.  The rifle-fire of the Guardsmen was too deadly, however, and
the attack dissolved before it.  The German machine-gunners were
exceedingly aggressive, "not to say impudent" as a Guards officer
explained it, and many losses were sustained from their fashion of
pushing forward upon the flanks, and worming their way into every
unoccupied crevice.  Nothing could exceed both the gallantry and the
intelligence of these men.  Having cleared their front the Guards
endeavoured to advance, but the Coldstream on the right met with
murderous fire from the village of Pures Becques, and the movement
could get no farther, nor were the Grenadiers much more fortunate on
the left, though Captain Pryce with his company broke into some
outlying houses, killing a number of Germans, seven of whom fell to
that officer's own automatic.  This whole gallant episode occurred
under the very muzzles of a German battery, firing with open sights
at a range of 300 yards.

At this period the brigade seems to have got ahead of the general
British line, and to have had both flanks entirely exposed to every
sort of enfilade fire.  About four in the afternoon the right company
of the Coldstream, numbering only forty men, had to turn south to
face the enemy.  The Germans had thrust into the centre of the
Coldstream also, but No. 2 Company of the supporting Irish, acting
without {266} orders upon the impulse of the moment, and aided by the
surviving Coldstream, completely re-established the line.  The Irish,
who were led by Captain Bambridge, were almost annihilated in their
dashing effort to ease the pressure upon their English comrades.
Their leader was wounded, Lieutenant Dent was killed, and only eleven
men of the company were left standing.  On the left the Germans were
500 yards in the rear, and here a rearrangement was called for and
steadily carried out.  An hour later another violent attack was made
at the junction of the two battalions, but it also was driven back in
disorder.  The Germans had brought their guns well forward and into
the open, but they met their match in Lieutenant Lewis of the 152nd
Brigade Royal Field Artillery, who directed the scanty British
artillery, and handled his pieces in a way which was much appreciated
by the weary Guardsmen.

The readjustment of the line enabled the 4th Guards Brigade to link
up with the 12th Yorkshire Light Infantry, pioneer battalion of their
own division, which was holding the line at La Couronne, and fought
that day with the utmost tenacity and resolution.  On the left flank
of the Yorkshiremen, near Vieux Berquin, were the worn remains of the
Twenty-ninth Division.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

{267}

[Illustration: Rough Sketch of Guards' Position, April 13]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Night fell upon a sorely-tried but unconquered line.  The two front
battalions had lost at least a third of their effectives.  Under the
screen of darkness the position was re-organised, and it was hoped
that the Fifth Division, drawn back from Italy, would be able to
effect a relief.  This could not be fully accomplished, however, and
at best only a small contraction of the front could be effected, so
that the morning {268} of April 13 found the exhausted Coldstream and
Grenadiers still facing the German attack.  Their line had been
strengthened by the 210th Field Co. of the Royal Engineers.  The
front to be held was still very wide for so weakened a force.

It had been a hard day, but it was only the prelude of a harder one.
On April 13 the morning began with thick mist, of which the Germans
took advantage to rush their machine-guns to very close quarters.  At
early dawn the Coldstream found themselves once more heavily
attacked, while an armoured car came down the road and machine-gunned
the outposts at a range of ten yards.  After severe mixed fighting
the attack was driven back.  At 9.15 it was renewed with greater
strength, but again it made no progress.  It is typical of the truly
desperate spirit of the men, that when every man save one in an
outpost had been killed or wounded, the survivor, Private Jacotin of
the Coldstream, carried on the fight alone for twenty minutes before
he was blown to pieces with a grenade.

The left flank of this battalion had also been heavily attacked, the
enemy, with their usual diabolical ingenuity, shouting as they
advanced through the fog that they were the King's Company of the
Grenadier Guards.  They were blown back none the less into the mist
from which they had emerged.  The 12th Yorkshire Light Infantry was
also four separate times attacked, but held to its appointed line.
This gallant unit fairly earned the title of the "Yorkshire Guards"
that day, for they were the peers of their comrades.  Meanwhile,
however, outside the area of this grim fight the Germans had taken
Vieux Berquin, pushing back the scanty line of defence at that point,
so that they were able to bring up trench-mortars and guns {269} to
blast the Yorkshire battalion at La Couronne out of its shallow
trenches.  Captain Pryce, on the extreme left of the Guards, found
the Germans all round him, and his Grenadiers were standing back to
back and firing east and west.  The company was doomed, and in spite
of the gallant effort of a party of Irish Guards, who lost very
heavily in the venture, the whole of them perished, save for Sergeant
Weedon and six men who reported the manner in which their comrades
had met their end.  Captain Pryce had led two bayonet charges, first
with eighteen men, which was entirely successful, and later with
fourteen men, who buried themselves in the grey of the German ranks,
and there remained.  Such was the end of No. 2 Company of the 4th
Grenadiers, and of its commander.  This brave man received a
posthumous V.C. in the record of which it is stated that with forty
men he had held up a German battalion for ten hours and so saved a
break through.

Apart from this flank company the centre company of the Grenadiers at
this period consisted of six unwounded men, while the right company
was twenty strong.  All the officers were down.  They were hemmed in
on two sides by the enemy, but they were still resisting as the
shades of night fell upon them.  By dawn the Grenadier battalion had
ceased to exist.

The 3rd Coldstream on the right were hardly in better case.  The
right company was surrounded, and fought until there was only a
handful left.  A few survivors fell back upon the Fifth Division and
the Australians who were now well up to the line.  The orders to the
Guards had been to keep the Germans out until the Australians could
arrive.  They had {270} been faithfully obeyed.  The total casualties
had been 39 officers and 1244 rank and file, the greater part from
two weak battalions; 17 per cent of the brigade mustered after the
action.  Soldiers will appreciate the last words of the official
report which are: "No stragglers were reported by the A.P.M."  It is
an episode which needs no comment.  Its grandeur lies in the bare
facts.  Well might General de Lisle say: "The history of the British
Army can record nothing finer than the story of the action of the 4th
Guards Brigade on April 12 and 13."

Whilst the Guards had made their fine stand to the east of
Hazebrouck, the rest of the Thirty-first Division, covering a front
of 9000 yards, had a most desperate battle with the German stormers.
The fine north country material which makes up the 92nd and 93rd
Brigades had never been more highly tried, for they were little more
than a long line of skirmishers with an occasional post.  In some
parts of the line they were absolutely exterminated, but like their
comrades of the Guards, they managed somehow or other to retain the
positions and prevent a penetration until reinforcements arrived.
The remains of the Twenty-ninth Division on the left had also fought
with the utmost devotion and held the line at the price of a heavy
drain upon their weakened ranks.  It has been calculated that the
line held by the 31st Division upon these days was 5½ miles long, and
that it was attacked by the 35th and 42nd German divisions, the 1st
Bavarian Reserve, and 10th, 11th, and 81st Reserve divisions.

It would be well to continue the action upon the Hazebrouck front by
giving at once an account of the operations of the First Australian
Division under {271} General Sir Harold Walker, which had the
remarkable experience of being sent from Flanders to the Amiens
front, being engaged there, and now being back in the Flanders front
once more, all in little over a week.  They detrained on April 12,
and on the 13th their 2nd Brigade (Heane) found themselves in front
of Hazebrouck with the remains of the 92nd British Brigade on their
left and with the hard-pressed 4th Guards Brigade in front of them.
In the evening the remains of the Guards were withdrawn through their
line, and they were facing the pursuing Germans.  On their left the
Australians were in touch with the 1st Cameronians of the 19th
Brigade in the Meteren area.

This fierce fighting was going on in a country which was new to war,
with unbroken soil, whole cottages, and numerous refugees, who by
their flight before the German vanguard complicated a situation which
was already so chaotic that it was very difficult for the generals on
the spot to grasp the relative positions of the attack and the
defence.

[Sidenote: Central Area.  April 14 onward.]

On April 14 the Germans, advancing behind a deadly barrage, came
forward through Merris and Vieux Berquin.  They soon found, however,
that they had before them fresh and steady troops who were not to be
driven.  The immediate German objective was the high ground from Mont
de Merris to Strazeele.  The 2nd Australian Brigade was on the right
and the 1st (Leslie) on the left.  Both were equally attacked, and
both met their assailants with a shattering fire which piled the
level plain with their bodies.  Three lines swept forward, but none
reached the shallow trenches of the "digger" infantry.  The 3rd and
4th Battalions held the line {272} to the north where the pressure
was greatest.  The One hundred and twenty-third French Division was
in support, but there was never any need to call for their
co-operation.  Strazeele, however, was blown to pieces by the German
guns.

April 15 and 16 were comparatively quiet, and the Australians busily
strengthened their lines.  On the 17th a sharp attack was made upon
the 1st and 4th Battalions on the left and centre of the 1st
Australian Brigade, the advance coming up the valley between Merris
and Meter en.  This also was cut to pieces by rifle and gun-fire, so
that it made no progress whatever.

The 3rd Australian Brigade (Bennett) had been in reserve, but it was
destined for severe service after Meteren had passed out of the hands
of the Thirty-third Division in the manner elsewhere described.  They
had actually relieved some of the worn elements of the British
Thirty-third and of the French One hundred and thirty-third Divisions
to the west of Meteren, and on April 22 and 23 they endeavoured by
two separate movements upon either flank to fight their way back into
the little town.  The first operations carried out by the 11th and
12th Battalions were successful, but the final push into the town by
the 9th and 10th met with heavy opposition, and the casualties were
so great that the attempt had to be abandoned.  The three Australian
brigades were shortly relieved, after their very valuable spell in
the line.  They were destined soon to find themselves with their
comrades on the Somme once again.

Whilst the 1st Brigade had won a complete defensive victory in the
north of the line, the 2nd {273} Brigade had done equally well in the
south.  The 7th and 8th Battalions were in the line, and both were
heavily engaged, especially the latter, which faced Vieux Berquin.
The German attack was once again a complete failure, and it was clear
that the Australians had the historical honour in Flanders as well as
on the Somme, of saying, "Thus far and no farther," upon the sector
which they manned.

We pass on to the movements of the Thirty-third Division, which
arrived upon the scene of action on April 11, and from that time
onwards played an ever increasing part in this great world crisis.
General Pinney had the experience of first being denuded of large
part of his own proper force, which was given away, brigade by
brigade, to points of danger, and afterwards of not only seeing them
reunited under his hand, but of having the remains of four divisions
and a great number of details under him, and so being in actual
command of the whole operations to the south and west of Bailleul.
To his coolness, firmness, and well-tried fortitude, the nation owed
much during those few desperate days.

The 100th Brigade (Baird) was moved forward at once to come under the
orders of General Bainbridge, who, with his Twenty-fifth Division,
had endured so much in the Ploegsteert district and was in urgent
need of help.  We shall follow them from the date of their detachment
to that of their return to their own unit.  On April 11, after dusk,
they took their position, covering Neuve Eglise, the 16th King's
Royal Rifles on the right of the line, the 2nd Worcesters in the
centre, and the 9th Highland Light Infantry in reserve, the 148th
Brigade being on the left, and the 75th Brigade on their right, the
{274} latter much exhausted by two days of battle.  Immediately to
the north lay the much enduring battle line of the Nineteenth
Division, which has already been fully described.  Two points can
hardly be described simultaneously, but these facts are to be read in
conjunction with those already given in the last chapter, and it is
to be understood that the whole situation at Neuve Eglise reacted
from hour to hour upon that farther north, since a German capture of
the town would place the enemy in the rear of General Jeffreys and
his men.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 13.]

On April 12 there was no direct attack upon this area, but about 4
P.M. the 75th Brigade on the right, which was much worn, was driven
back and a gap created, which was filled in by such reserves as could
be got together at the shortest notice.  In the morning of April 13
it was found that this flank was still very open, the nearest
organised unit being the 88th Brigade of the Twenty-ninth Division,
which was also stretching out its left in the hope of making
connection.  The enemy, however, pushed through early on April 13,
getting to the rear of the 100th Brigade, and swinging north into
Neuve Eglise which they captured.  The Glasgow Highlanders, the only
battalion of the Highland Light Infantry which wears Highland
costume, attacked at once with all the vigour of fresh troops, and
cleared the Germans out of the town at the point of the bayonet.  The
enemy had filtered into the brigade line, however, and parties of
them were in the rear of the Worcesters.  The hardest part of all was
borne by the 16th King's Royal Rifles, who, being the flank
battalion, bore all the weight of an advance which had enveloped them
upon three sides, front, flank, {275} and rear.  Of this gallant
battalion there were hardly any survivors.  The Worcesters threw back
their right flank, therefore, in order to cover Neuve Eglise upon the
south and south-east, while the Twenty-fifth Division were on the
north and north-east.

The mishaps of a dark day were still not over, for the enemy about
4.30 made a determined attack and again punctured the over-stretched
line.  Some of them drove their way once more into Neuve Eglise,
brushing aside or scattering the thin line of defence.  Another
strong force broke into the front of the 100th Brigade and drove a
wedge between the Glasgow Highlanders and the Worcesters.  The
headquarters of the latter battalion was in the Municipal Building of
Neuve Eglise, and put up a desperate, isolated resistance for many
hours, Colonel Stoney and his staff finally making their way back to
their comrades.  In this defence the Chaplain, the Rev. Tanner,
greatly distinguished himself.  The survivors of the 2nd Worcesters
had also maintained themselves in Neuve Eglise as house neighbours to
the German stormers, but after mid-day on April 14, finding
themselves entirely cut off, they fought their way out, leaving the
Square round the Church and Mairie piled with corpses.  The town was
now entirely German, with results already described upon the northern
section of the outflanked line.  Once more the Worcesters, the heroes
of the old Gheluvelt battle, had placed fresh laurels upon their
faded and battle-stained colours.  The remains of the 100th Brigade
were now reassembled on the Ravelsberg ridge, west of Neuve Eglise,
where they faced their enemy once more.  So worn was it that the
survivors of the Rifles {276} and of the Highlanders were clubbed
together to form one very weak composite battalion.  On their right
now was a collection of odds-and-ends under General Wyatt about a
thousand strong, while on their left was the 103rd Brigade of the
Thirty-fourth Division, with the 148th in support.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 14 onwards.]

This latter brigade had aided in the defence of Neuve Eglise, and
done very severe service, two of the battalions, the 4th Yorkshire
Light Infantry and the 4th York and Lancasters, having sustained
heavy losses.  During the two days in which the fate of the village
hung in the balance these battalions were engaged in constant defence
and counter-attack, especially on April 13, when in one desperate
sally they captured a German colonel and nearly a hundred of his men.
When the village fell on April 14 the gallant Yorkshiremen still held
on close to it and gave no ground until they were ordered that night
into reserve.  The other battalion of the brigade, the 5th York and
Lancaster, had been ordered to Steenwerck, where also it had borne a
distinguished part in the fight.

The Germans were now nursing their wounds and also digesting their
gains, so that there was a very welcome pause which was mainly in
favour of the defence, who had good hope of reinforcement.  A number
of French batteries appeared as the forerunners of relief, and helped
to break up an advance upon the Ravelsberg on the morning of April
16.  A second attack had no better luck.  Some posts were taken but
were won back again with the help of the 9th Northumberland Fusiliers
of the 103rd Brigade.

April 17 saw a fresh attack which was preceded by {277} a barrage
which tore gaps in the thin line of the Highlanders.  It developed
into an infantry attack, which gave the enemy possession of an
orchard near the line.  The Highlanders, aided by some of the 6/7th
Scots Fusiliers of the 177th Brigade, tried hard to win it back, but
could at best only block the exits.  After dark that night the
brigade was relieved by the 148th Brigade, and staggered out of the
line with only 800 men unscathed.  General Baird's infantry had
endured an ordeal which exceeded what the most disciplined troops
could be expected to survive: 58 officers and 1424 men had fallen in
their splendid defence of Neuve Eglise.

The other brigades of the Thirty-third Division had meanwhile been
involved in situations hardly less critical than those which had
faced Baird's Brigade at Neuve Eglise.  Maitland's 98th Brigade,
which found itself on April 12 in the Ravelsberg area, was placed to
the north of Bailleul as a support to that place, and the narrative
of its doings will be found in the subsequent account of the defence
of Meteren.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 12.]

The 19th Brigade (Mayne) of the Thirty-third Division had been
detailed to cover Meteren to the west of Bailleul against the
northward sweep of the Germans.  At 9.40 on April 12 it was known
that the enemy had got through at Merville, that their cavalry had
been seen at Neuf Berquin, and by noon that this swiftly advancing
tide was submerging Merris only three miles south of Meteren.
General Pinney, deprived of two of his brigades, had only under his
hand the 19th Brigade, with the 18th Middlesex Pioneers, 11th and
222nd Field Companies Royal Engineers, and the 33rd British
Machine-gun {278} Corps under Colonel Hutchinson, an officer who
until he was gassed, was a tower of strength to the defence.  At
mid-day the place was under heavy shell-fire.  There is a windmill in
a prominent position south of the town overlooking the dead flats of
Flanders.  In and around this was stationed the 1st Queen's West
Surrey.  East of the town, facing Bailleul, was the 5th Scottish
Rifles, while the 1st Scottish Rifles (The Cameronians) were in
reserve.  The whole situation was under the direct control of General
Pinney, and he was reinforced in the course of the day by several
very welcome units--9th Corps Cyclists, 22nd New Zealand Entrenching
Battalion, and others.  Strazeele was included in the line of
defence, which joined up in the night with the hard-worked
Twenty-ninth Division.

The situation on April 12 in this quarter of the field was most
alarming.  Everything in the south seemed to be in a state of chaos,
and the line was for the moment absolutely fluid.  The fall of
Merville and of Estaires had been exploited with extraordinary energy
by the Germans, who were rushing on at the very heels of the retiring
and often disorganised troops, who were dead-beat after two days and
nights of constant exertion.  It was all important to build up some
sort of line south of Meteren, but events were moving so fast that it
was doubtful if it could be done.  It was here that the value of the
new machine-gun organisation, perfected during the winter, was
brilliantly exemplified.  Colonel Hutchinson was able to throw
forward the whole of his guns to make up for the local weakness of
the infantry, and he ran great risks in doing so, since he had only
broken men and stragglers to man the gaps between his gun {279}
positions.  The crisis was such, however, that any risk had to be
taken, and the 33rd Battalion of the Machine-gun Corps saved the
situation.  On the other hand it is not too much to say that a humble
hero, Driver Sharples, whose motor-lorry was handy, saved the 33rd
Battalion, for he not only rushed up eight guns under heavy fire,
with their crews, but he brought up afterwards on his own initiative
the wire and other essentials which enabled them to hold their
position.  It was a supreme example of what can be done by one brave,
clear-headed man.  The German tide was flowing at a rate which was
measured as 1½ miles in forty minutes, but now it was to reach its
limit, when it came under the fire of these eight guns upon Windmill
Hill.  The advance was not only from Merris in the south but even
more along the Bailleul-Meteren Road, which was crowded with their
troops.  By dusk the infantry of the 19th Brigade had taken the place
of the weary fragments who lined the front, and the immediate danger
of a complete rupture of the line was over.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 13.]

At 5.30 A.M. on April 13 the attack upon Meteren commenced with a
strong advance against the 1st Queen's at the Windmill, and gained
some ground in the centre.  The usual tactics of rushing up
machine-guns was tried, but in spite of the mist they had very
limited success.  The 98th Brigade was now in support, and the 2nd
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were ordered forward to cover Meule
Houck Hill on that side.  At 10.30 the Queen's were again fiercely
attacked, and after changing hands three times the windmill in their
position remained with the stormers.  At noon a well-knit line had
been formed in front of Meteren, with the Yorkshiremen {280} of the
92nd Brigade in touch on the right, while their brother Yorkshiremen
of the 147th Brigade were on the left, drawn respectively from the
Thirty-first and the Forty-ninth Divisions.  There were cheering
rumours that the First Australians and the hundred and thirty-third
French were both speeding upon their way, but the need of the present
was very great, for the German guns were many, while there was hardly
one to aid in the defence.

At 4 P.M. the Germans were beating once more along the whole front of
the division, but by 5.30 were back in their own line, what was left
of them, much the worse for the venture.  News came, however, that
Vieux Berquin had fallen, and that Meteren was to be taken next day
at all costs.  Meanwhile, in spite of the severe fighting, the losses
had not been heavy, save in the 1st Queen's, which had borne all the
brunt of three separate attacks.  Colonel Kemp-Welch and his men had
a very severe ordeal that day.  Cavalry appeared more than once in
front of the position, and one body, 200 strong, were cut to pieces
by a sudden concentration of machine-guns.  The splendid machine-guns
still played a prominent part in the battle.  One of them having been
submerged by a rush of the enemy, Corporal Hurd returned
single-handed, advancing 200 yards beyond the line, and brought it
back upon his shoulder.  At one time the supplies of belts ran short,
but they were brought up in most dashing fashion.  "At noon," says an
officer, "the fighting limbers with belt-boxes, barrels, and S.A.A.
were galloped through a hail of shell to our gun positions in a style
reminiscent of the Royal Horse Artillery upon an Aldershot
field-day."  The result was great.  {281} "Gunners and gun-commanders
report having piled the dead enemy before their guns."

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 14]

Shortly after dawn on April 14 the 1st Queen's was in the wars once
more, and from six to eight there were constant attacks along the
whole line from Strazeele on the right to Bailleul Station on the
left, the latter forming the front of the Thirty-fourth Division.
The 1st Cameronians, those stern descendants of the Covenanters, beat
the enemy away from Strazeele about noon.  At one time there were
renewed attacks upon both the Queen's and the Cameronians.  It is
difficult to know which was the more admirable, the perseverance of
the attacks or the tenacity of the defence.  About five in the
evening another fierce wave of storm-troops swept up from the south;
and for one critical moment found a gap in the line.  Two companies
of the stalwart labourers of the 2nd New Zealand Entrenching
Battalion threw themselves into the breach, and the position was
restored.  When night fell, the whole line, though shaken, was still
intact, and the assault had been a complete and a costly failure.
Such operations, which littered the fields of Flanders with their
dead, go far to explain the German weakness in the latter part of
this campaign of 1918.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 15.]

April 15 was quiet in the morning on the front of Meteren, but the
afternoon proved to be disastrous at Bailleul, since Ravelsberg and
Mont de Lille were stormed by the Germans, with the result that the
town had to be vacated.  The Thirty-fourth Division had been
withdrawn from this position, and the Fifty-ninth North Midlanders
(Romer) had taken their place, but this division had, as already
described, suffered extraordinary losses on the Somme front, {282}
and was in no condition to undertake another considerable operation.
It had already been partly engaged in Flanders, and its losses had
been increased.  Under these conditions it is not surprising that the
determined assault of the Germans should have forced the line.  It
would appear upon the map that this German success entirely
outflanked the position of the Thirty-third Division, but fortunately
a switch line had been constructed which was now manned by the
remains of the Thirty-fourth Division, while the Fifty-ninth passed
through it and concentrated in the rear.  In this way an extension of
the German success was prevented, in spite of great energy upon the
part of the enemy, who had his patrols a kilometre to the west of the
town before night.  The 98th Brigade had now taken the place of the
19th in the line, the 4th King's Liverpools relieving the Queen's at
the Windmill, while the 5th Scottish Rifles relieved the Cameronians
near Strazeele.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 15 onwards.]

In the efforts to stop the German advance from Bailleul the 147th
Brigade of Cameron's Forty-ninth Yorkshire Division played an
important part.  This unit, containing the 4th, 6th, and 7th
Battalions of the West Riding Regiment found themselves in the front
line on the evening of April 15, and held hard to a defensive
position north-west of Bailleul.  For two more days, April 16 and 17,
they maintained the fight, inflicting and receiving heavy losses, but
with the balance well in their favour.  The dour Yorkshiremen made it
clear at last to their equally dour assailants, that there was no
road through their ranks, however they might thin them.

In the early morning of April 16 the enemy by a very sudden and
violent attack broke through the {283} switch line and made a
lodgment in the eastern outskirts of Meteren.  In spite of determined
counter-attacks made during the morning by the 1st Middlesex, the 4th
King's, and the gallant New Zealand Trench Battalion, it was not
possible to clear these houses to which the enemy's machine-gun
parties clung with great bravery.  Evening found them still in
possession, but all efforts to debouch to the north and west had been
stopped.  The Australians were coming up on the right, so that the
Thirty-third were able to shorten their line.

One farm west of Meteren was penetrated by a pushful party of
Germans, but they were beaten out of it and destroyed by the 11th
Field Company of sappers, who took a number of prisoners.

On April 17 the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had come into
the line, relieving the 18th Middlesex Pioneers.  About 10 A.M. this
battalion was violently attacked, but drove back its assailants, as
did the Thirty-fourth Division on the left at about the same hour.
At six in the evening another very severe attack developed upon the
front of the 4th King's.  For a time the line appeared to be
penetrated, but the 1st Middlesex and units of the One hundred and
thirty-third French Division, which had newly arrived, made a brisk
counter-attack, and the situation was completely restored.  It must
indeed have been discomposing to the enemy to find that each success
which he won, whether it was the taking of Neuve Eglise, of Bailleul,
or later of Mount Kemmel, instead of being an opening which led to
victory, was only a passage to further trials and further losses in
an unending vista.  The edge of the attack had now been completely
blunted in this quarter.  April 18 {284} was quiet, and on the 19th,
as the Australians and French were up, arrangements were made for
drawing the Thirty-third out of the line which they had so splendidly
made good.  Their losses in the six days amounted to 145 officers and
3302 men.  A few days later Monsieur Clemenceau arrived to convey to
General Pinney and his battle-worn men the thanks of the French
Republic for their iron defence of an essential line.

The Thirty-fourth Division was last mentioned in this narrative when
it fell back from Nieppe on April 12, and was afterwards compelled to
take position on the right of the Twenty-fifth Division in the De
Seule neighbourhood.  Among other losses during the retreat was a
tried soldier, General Gore of the 101st Brigade.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 13 onwards.]

On the 13th the enemy made several tentative attacks, but had no
success.  Late in the afternoon, however, he had succeeded in
penetrating the line of the Twenty-fifth Division between Neuve
Eglise and De Seule.  This success left the left flank of the
Thirty-fourth in the air.  The 103rd Brigade had moved to the
Ravelsberg Ridge, however, and so gave a definite line upon which to
withdraw, extending from Bailleul Station to Crucifix Corner, which
was a very important position.  The 103rd Brigade was now on the left
of the line, and the 102nd on the right.  There followed, on April
15, a day of very severe fighting, the enemy making continual and
very fiery attacks along the whole line, especially upon the three
points, Steam Mill, Mont de Lille, and Crucifix Corner.  The latter
was carried by the enemy and then was retaken by the 9th
Northumberland Fusiliers.  Mont de Lille was held by the 74th {285}
Brigade, and Steam Mill by the 147th, each the centre of a very
deadly combat.  Steam Mill was lost and yet again retaken by the
Yorkshire Territorials who were aided by the 1st Middlesex from the
Thirty-third Division.  It was a long and arduous day of battle,
inexpressibly trying to the wearied troops engaged.  General
Nicholson had under his hand six brigades that day, and senior
officers upon the spot have testified to the masterly use which he
made of them.  That night the Fifty-ninth came up into the front line
and relieved the exhausted infantry.  The relief, however, was but a
momentary one, for on the afternoon of April 15 the Germans delivered
yet another strong attack upon the Ravelsberg line, now held by the
Forty-ninth, Fifty-ninth, and Thirty-third Divisions.  The
Fifty-ninth, as already described, fell back through the
Thirty-fourth Division, which again found itself in the front line.
The two flank divisions both fell back to conform, and lined up with
the remains of the Thirty-fourth on the new line near St. Jans
Cappel, which held firm from April 16.

On April 17 there was yet another day of heavy fighting upon this
line, both flanks and the Meule Hook being strongly attacked, but the
position was successfully held, and one more limit seemed to have
been reached in the advance.  The same six brigades under General
Nicholson, reduced now to the strength of battalions, were still
throwing an iron bar across the German path.  From the right the
147th, 74th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, and 88th, all of them with set
teeth, held on to the appointed line which receded under pressure and
was yet again re-established.  The 88th, under that remarkable young
soldier, {286} General Freyberg, had some especially hard work to do.

Late on April 20 this goodly fellowship in arms was dissolved, the
three separate brigades returned to their divisions, and the
Thirty-fourth was relieved by the French.  The artillery of the
Thirty-eighth Welsh Division fought throughout these awful days at
the back of the infantry, who could not say too much for these guns
or for General Topping who commanded them.  Save two howitzers hit on
April 9, no gun of this division was lost during all this close and
severe fighting.  South of the Lys many of the Royal Army Medical
Corps remained with their wounded, and were taken prisoners, sharing
with their charges the wretched treatment which was still meted out
to British captives, especially behind the lines and before reaching
the camps in Germany.

It should be added that the sappers of the 207th, 208th, 209th Field
Companies and the 18th Northumberland Fusiliers Pioneers fought like
ordinary infantry, and did splendid and essential service in holding
the line.

We shall now turn to Jeffreys' Nineteenth Division which we left on
the 12th of April, holding on to the Wulverghem-Wytschaete front,
with formidable enemies in front of them, but an even more formidable
menace upon their right flank, whence came constant rumours that the
enemy had at last penetrated the hard-pressed Twenty-fifth Division,
had occupied Neuve Eglise, and was pushing up along the lines of the
northward roads which would turn the whole of the position.  Late at
night on April 12 it had been ascertained that these reports were
premature.  {287} The units of the 108th Ulster Brigade on the right
of the line and connecting with the Twenty-fifth Division had been
penetrated and driven back, but were strengthened and stayed by the
advent of the 8th Gloucesters.  The situation was obscure on the
right, and there was a dangerous gap which was filled early in the
morning of April 13 by the energy and initiative of Captain Macintosh
of the 94th Field Company Royal Engineers, who with a handful of the
10th Worcester's pushed his way in, and showed a bold front to the
enemy.

The 2/5th Sherwood Foresters from the 178th Brigade (Stansfeld) of
the Fifty-ninth North Midland Division had also been ordered to face
south and with the help of some machine-guns to hold off the turning
movement from that quarter.  All these movements were carried out in
pitch darkness and amid a situation so confused that it was
impossible to define which was the attacking line and which the line
of defence.  The general scheme of the battle in this area on the
morning of April 13 was that the Twenty-fifth Division, with the help
of the 148th Brigade of Yorkshire Territorials, was fighting
desperately in and around Neuve Eglise to the north of those units of
the 100th Brigade, whose defence of the town has already been
described.  Next to them on the north lay the remains of the 108th
Brigade, then the battalion of Sherwood Foresters, and then the 57th
Brigade with the 8th Gloucesters on the southern flank.  All the
morning the roar of battle rose from Neuve Eglise where the German
stormers fought hand to hand with the British infantry, who had been
strengthened by the addition of that fine battalion, the 4th
Shropshires from the Nineteenth {288} Division.  The contest swung
and swayed as fresh German troops were thrown into the struggle, but
at last about half-past ten in the morning the attack was defeated,
the German infantry fell back in sullen groups under the constant
fire of the defenders, and the British line was pushed forward to the
south of the village.

During the day, which was spent under heavy fire of artillery and the
imminent menace of attack from the grey clouds seen gathering upon
the Messines Ridge, the remaining battalions of the 178th Brigade,
the 2/6th and the 7th Sherwood Foresters, were pushed into the line
to relieve the exhausted 108th Brigade.  It was clear that great
German concentrations were being made upon Neuve Eglise, and that the
village was in danger, so every arrangement was made to accommodate
the line to the situation which would arise if that important point
were taken, and the Wulverghem position became in consequence
untenable.  This new line would run from Meteren through Kemmel and
Spy Farm to Spanbrockmolen.  The night of April 13 would have been
quiet upon the front of the Nineteenth Division had it not been for
the constant pre-occupation and alarm caused by the varying fortunes
of the fighting at Neuve Eglise, in which they were well aware that
their own fate was concerned.  The attack had been renewed with fresh
forces, and the Twenty-fifth Division was extremely exhausted and
could only be helped by other units which were in no better case.
Again and again the Germans were deep in the village.  Again and
again they were evicted.  It seemed to be the beginning of the end,
however, when it was announced towards morning that the Twenty-fifth
Division was {289} out of touch with the British troops upon its
south flank, and that the Germans filtering through this gap had got
to Nordhoek, west of Neuve Eglise, and were pushing to the north in
the rear of the British position, By morning of April 14 Neuve Eglise
had been abandoned, though it does not appear to have been solidly
occupied by the enemy until mid-day, and snipers of both armies
infested the ruins.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 14.]

The loss of the village and of the low ridge which adjoined it had a
most sinister effect upon the general strategic position to the
north, and it was indeed fortunate that measures had been taken in
advance to deal with the new situation.  The Nineteenth Division on
April 14 found itself shelled heavily all day, while it was
machine-gunned and trench-mortared from the right where its flank was
now in the air.  The position of the right-hand unit, the 4th
Shropshires, south of the Neuve Eglise-Wulverghem Road, became
impossible, as the Germans were in the rear, and indeed upon three
sides of them.

Major Wingrove stuck to his position till mid-day, and no battalion
could have given a more cogent example of steadiness and fortitude in
adversity.  About 2 P.M. the Germans began to emerge in force from
the villages, beating up against the gallant Shropshires, who retired
slowly and steadily, taking toll of their assailants, while the
Sherwood Foresters of the 178th Brigade helped them to hold the enemy
at arm's length.

As the day wore on the pressure became more insistent, until about
seven in the evening Major Wingrove, of whom it has been stated by
his General that "his tenacity, gallantry, and determination had held
the much-tried and isolated line up to this {290} time," was severely
wounded.  When his inspiring presence was removed there was a break
to the north of Neuve Eglise and the Twenty-fifth Division, now
reduced to a handful, were retreating westwards, while the Nineteenth
was being rolled up from the south.

General Jeffreys' force was now in so dangerous a position that it
had actually to form a front to the west as well as to the east, a
difficult manoeuvre which was carried out with great coolness and
skill by Colonel Sole of the 10th Worcesters, who was in charge of
the new line, aided by Major Parkes of the 8th Gloucesters.  The men
were rallied, led into their new positions, and a dangerous
penetration was narrowly averted.  Later a new line was built up with
the Forty-ninth Yorkshire Territorial Division in the place of the
Twenty-fifth Division on the right, reinforced by the 71st Brigade
from the Sixth Division.  Next to them on the left was the 178th
Sherwood Foresters Brigade, then the 108th Brigade, and finally the
58th Brigade, standing just in their old positions.  The changes in
the British line were such that whereas it used to face east, it now
faced almost south from near Meteren to Kemmel and Spanbrockmolen.
The latter marked the point of junction upon the left with the right
of the Ninth Division.  This line was not fully occupied till April
16.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 15.]

On April 15 the intermediate positions were attacked, the 9th Welsh
Fusiliers, on the extreme left of the line, and the remains of the
6th Wiltshires being heavily engaged.  No impression was made.  At a
different point the Germans had better results to show with the 108th
Brigade, and made some {291} progress, but the Sherwood Foresters
once more mended the line.  In the evening it was reported that the
enemy had taken Crucifix Corner and were moving westwards.  The
strength of all battalions had now fallen to such a point, owing to
constant shelling and incessant attacks, that it was very difficult
to form more than a line of outposts.  By evening of April 15 all the
troops concerned, the remains of the Twenty-fifth, the Forty-ninth,
and the Nineteenth Divisions were on the general line Meteren-Kemmel,
facing south to the German advance, but also threatening the German
right flank if they should press too far to the west.  The remnant of
the 108th Ulsters was relieved that night.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 15.]

A heavy attack was made at 6 A.M. on the morning of April 16 upon the
front of the Ninth Division, which had withdrawn in conformity with
the new northern line.  The 62nd Brigade of the Twenty-first Division
had, as already stated, been put under the orders of General Tudor of
the Ninth Division, for his unit had been greatly weakened by the
terrible losses of the South Africans.  The North Countrymen of the
62nd fought desperately against great odds, but they were pushed out
of Spanbrockmolen, and later out of Wytschaete.

They found a new line to the north, however, and the Germans tried in
vain to bend it.  The 58th Brigade had thrown back its own line to
correspond, and joined up with the 62nd at Lacache Farm.  Late that
evening the worn and weary troops were deeply comforted by the sight
of a small group of blue-clad men with classical helmets surveying
the German lines through their glasses.  It was the vanguard and the
observers of the Twenty-eighth and One {292} hundred and thirty-third
French Divisions which were coming up to the aid of the Ninth.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 17.]

It was clear that the commanding position of Kemmel, a hill which
overlooks a wide range of country, was the immediate objective of the
enemy in this quarter.  About 10 A.M. on April 17 they put down a
heavy barrage, and then pushed on in force with the intention of
breaking in the British line and capturing the hill.  The battalions
attacked were the three Sherwood Foresters units, with the 8th North
Staffords and 10th Warwicks of the 57th Brigade.  This attack was a
complete failure.  Weary as they were the sturdy Englishmen stood
fast to their lines, and beat their assailants back in blood and
ruin.  Machine-gun fire from the crest of the hill contributed to the
result, and the guns also did their share.  The only German gain was
a post called Donegal Farm between the Nineteenth and the Forty-ninth
Divisions.  A fresh attack was made upon the 10th Warwicks in the
evening, but this also was thrown back with heavy loss.

Meanwhile, on the northern sector, the Ninth Division endeavoured to
regain the ground which they had lost the day before, but their
efforts had no great success, save that the 7th Seaforths of the 26th
Brigade in a very brilliant advance fought their way into Wytschaete
once more, and took possession of the village which they held until
the following day, when the general position forced them to abandon
it.  On April 18 the fighting died down upon this front, and in the
evening the gallant Nineteenth Division, after most glorious service,
was relieved by the French Twenty-eighth Division, which took over
the defence of Kemmel Hill.  The total losses {293} of this division
had been nearly 4000 men, which, coming on the top of the heavy
losses on the Somme in the previous fortnight, formed such a record
as had seldom been equalled.  Nor was their ordeal yet at an end, and
many a stout battle was still to be fought before a rest should come.

All these stirring episodes, including the glorious destruction of
the 4th Brigade of Guards, the formation of a permanent line by the
Australians, the defence of Meteren and Bailleul by the Thirty-third
and other divisions, the fighting at Neuve Eglise, and the defence of
the Wytschaete and Messines fronts by the Nineteenth and Ninth
Divisions with odd brigades to help them, all came within the area of
Plumer's Second Army, which still consisted of the Ninth and
Fifteenth Corps in the line.  It should be mentioned that of fourteen
divisions contained in this army on March 21 no less than twelve had
been sent down to the Somme, while the remaining two, the Forty-ninth
and Twenty-ninth, were under orders to go at the moment when the
great battle in Flanders broke out.

[Sidenote: Southern Area.  April 14.]

We shall now for a moment turn to the left flank of the First Army in
the south which had so far, in spite of heavy attacks, lost very
little ground.  It has already been described how the Fifty-fifth
Lancashire Division stood like a rock at Givenchy and Festubert,
while the Fifty-first and afterwards the Fourth Division struggled
desperately to hold back the attack on their left.  The former had
been relieved on April 16 by Strickland's First Division, while the
Highlanders and Fourth Division also had been drawn out, and gave
place to Deverell's Third Division, which had done so splendidly and
lost so heavily upon the Somme.

{294}

After the repulse from the Fifty-fifth Division, the Germans had
contented themselves with shelling Givenchy, but they had pushed on,
as already narrated, to the north of the position, and had got as far
as Locon.  The result was that the First Division had a long frontage
which faced due north and a shorter frontage to the east.

[Sidenote: Southern Area.  April 16.]

The Fourth Division held the front at this period to the east of
Robecq, being on the right of the Sixty-first, with the 184th Brigade
between them.  It was used on April 14 for a counter-attack which was
carried out at night, and which achieved a local success by the
recapture of the village of Riez, with 150 prisoners.  This operation
was carried out by the 11th Brigade, with the 1st Hants and 1st
Somersets in the lead, and was a very workmanlike little action which
was the more valuable when coming at a period of general recoil.

[Sidenote: Southern Area.  April 18.]

On April 18 the new German attack upon the First Division at Givenchy
began with a bombardment of great violence.  Their plan upon this day
was to carry Givenchy and Festubert by storm, and to win the line of
the canal as far west as Gorre.  They would then capture the high
ground at Hinges, and so command the canal right up to Robecq.  No
doubt they calculated, and with justice, that if they could overcome
the men on the spot they would find that the reserves had all been
drawn away to the north.  Their plan was wrecked, however, by the
fact that the men on the spot were not to be overcome.  Eighteen
German battalions moved forward to the attack, and all of them
suffered heavily without gaining any appreciable advantage.  So heavy
was the slaughter that many German companies were {295} reduced
before evening to twenty or thirty effectives, while the three
battalions of one regiment were left under the respective command of
one lieutenant and two sub-lieutenants.  There have been few more
costly failures, considering the scale of the operations, in the
whole campaign.

The infantry attack was on the two flanks of the British line which
looked northwards, the one attack being in front of Hinges and the
other covering the space from Loisne to the south of Givenchy,
including Festubert.  Three German regiments, the 98th, 361st, and
202nd Reserve, advanced in this quarter.  They had constructed two
bridges during the night to cross a broad ditch in front of the
British line, but machine-guns were trained upon them, and the troops
which tried to cross were exposed to heavy losses, which left both
the bridges and the banks heaped with bodies.  The mist, the smoke,
and the dust from the shells were so thick, however, that a hundred
yards was the limit of visibility.  The German shell-storm continued
to be very heavy, but the British were snugly ensconced in trenches
with a parapet and parados, both of which were several feet thick, so
that no very great harm was done.  The worst losses were at the
advanced keep at Festubert, which was blown to bits, only eight men
of the garrison surviving.

The First Division had two brigades in the line, the 1st on the right
holding from Givenchy to Le Plantin, and the 3rd to the left from Le
Plantin to Festubert.  The fighting was particularly severe in the
latter sector of the line.  As the garrison looked north they saw
through the rising mist about 8.15 in the morning the enemy advancing
in small groups {296} of light machine-guns, coming over a slight
rise some 900 yards east of Festubert.  These troops pushed bravely
on, though they had no cover but shell-holes, and they suffered very
severely.  The 1st Gloucester, under Colonel Tweedie, on the right
and the 1st {297} South Wales Borderers on the left, battalions with
the halo of the first Ypres battle round their heads, held the line
and littered the open ground with their steady rifle-fire.  There was
a gap in the defences at a point called Willow Road, and into this
the enemy poured more quickly than they could be shot down.  Their
rush carried them through, and into the houses and gardens of Le
Plantin.  A company of the Gloucesters under Captain Handford was cut
in two, but both sections stood fast, Lieutenant Hall on one side,
and the company commander on the other, closing in on the centre and
preventing reinforcement, while Lieutenant Gosling attacked with the
reserve company.  The Germans ran field-guns right up, but the crews
were shot down.  So matters remained until the afternoon, the
stormers being in the British position, but so pinned down by
rifle-fire that they could not raise their heads.  On the other hand,
German snipers in the houses and trees were very deadly to any
runners or other exposed defenders.  Whilst matters were in this
stage in the Le Plantin area, they were even more critical at
Festubert.  The enemy, moving up behind a good barrage, overran a
part of the South Wales Borderers and forced their way into an
orchard just south of the keep known as Route A.  Thence they tried
to get into the rear of the defence.  About eleven Sergeant-Major
Biddle of D Company ran the gauntlet to Brigade Headquarters to
explain the situation and ask for help.  Captain Smith got together a
party of odds and ends, under twenty in number, who made their way up
the west side of Festubert and prevented the extension of this
dangerous German movement.

[Illustration: DEFENCE OF GIVENCHY BY THE FIRST DIVISION, APRIL 18,
1918.*]

* This rough plan was drawn by an officer engaged in the action.


By two o'clock the attack was definitely defeated, {298} and by three
the Germans were retiring along the whole line.  They found it,
however, very difficult to disengage themselves from their advance
positions.  They tried to crawl back from shell-hole to shell-hole,
while the British stood up all along the parapets and shot them in
scores.  Absolutely demoralised, many of the Germans threw away their
arms.  Their retirement probably cost as much as their advance.
Those who had got into Le Plantin had to run the gauntlet between two
halves of the Gloucesters in getting out, and few of them escaped.
The performance of the 1st Gloucesters was remarkable, for they were
at one time attacked front, flank, and rear by a force estimated at
four battalions.  It is recorded that the barrels of their new Lewis
guns were worn smooth by the intensity of one day of battle.  The 1st
Brigade on the right of the defence from the canal to Le Plantin was
also heavily attacked, though their ordeal was not so long or severe
as that of their comrades on the left.  The 1st Black Watch, the
flank battalion next to the Gloucesters, had some especially heavy
fighting, but kept their ground intact, and did their full share
towards the victorious result.  The whole affair was a fine feat of
arms, for the German gun power had greatly increased since April 9,
while the repulse was even more decisive.  It proved to be a final
one, as the Germans made no further attempt to force their passage to
Bethune.  During all this long fight the Third Division beyond Loisne
on the left was holding the line firmly against all German pressure.
So ended April 18.  Before the evening of the 20th all outlying posts
had been cleared of the Germans.  On this same date, April 18, there
was a sharp {299} action to the immediate left of this Givenchy
fighting, when the Fourth Division held up a German attack, and
afterwards countered, capturing the Bois Paquan in the Kobecq sector.
Two hundred prisoners were the fruits of this action, but they were
dearly bought, for many officers and men were killed or wounded.
Among the former were two grand soldiers, Colonel Armitage of the 1st
Hants and Brigade-Major Harston of the 11th Brigade.  This forward
movement was continued later by the Sixty-first Division, who did
very good work on April 23, General Pagan of the 184th Brigade being
a leader in the advance, which was notable for a fine attack by the
2/5th Gloucesters under Colonel Lawson.  Shortly afterwards General
Colin Mackenzie of this division, who had done splendid work from the
first days of the war, was wounded while reconnoitring in front of
his line and had to return to England.

There now followed a short pause in the German attack, and we may
look around and follow the general line of the defence at this period
before the action was renewed.  On the extreme north of the Second
Army the Belgians had relieved the Thirtieth Division, and thus
shortened the British line.  Then came the Ninth and Twenty-first
British Divisions near Wytschaete.  South and west of this point the
front line had been taken over by General de Mitry with the
Thirty-sixth French Corps, which now succeeded the Ninth British
Corps in this sector.  The Thirty-fourth and One hundred and
thirty-third French Divisions were in the line, with the Second
French Cavalry Corps in co-operation.  This most welcome and indeed
vital reinforcement had taken over Kemmel, Mont Rouge, Mont Noir,
Mont Vidaigne, {300} and Mont des Cats, the range of kopjes which
screen the Ypres plain from the south.  On the right of the French
was the weary Fifteenth Corps, with the First Australian Division as
the flank unit near Meteren.  The British divisions in the north were
in close support to the French, the Nineteenth and Thirty-fourth
being near Poperinghe, and the Twenty-fifth behind Kemmel.  Such was
the general position in that northern sector, to which the battle was
now more and more confined.  Before following the further events it
should be mentioned that on April 17 the Belgians in the
neighbourhood of Bixschoote had been exposed to a very severe attack
from four German divisions, which would have shaken the whole line of
defence had it succeeded.  It was met, however, with very great
courage, and the Belgians proved themselves to be valiant soldiers,
well worthy to be admitted upon entirely equal terms into the
battle-line of the larger nations.  They fought the action with
heroic gallantry, and gave the Germans a severe check, killing some
2000 of them, and taking 700 prisoners with several guns.  It was a
notable performance, and the more welcome in a period of such stress.

[Illustration: Position of the Line in Flanders, April 9]

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 25.]

On April 25, at an early hour of the morning, the Germans made an
attack upon the northern line from a point north of Bailleul to the
east of Wytschaete, a distance of about ten miles.  The whole of this
front, save the extreme eastern portion, was held by the French, who
made a very gallant resistance to as fierce an assault as the war has
seen.  The main German objective was the very important height of
Mount Kemmel, a bluff five hundred feet high, wooded upon the sides.
This was held by the Twenty-eighth {301} French Division, who fought
most gallantly, but were finally overpowered by the four German
divisions which were brought against it, including a division of
Alpine troops, especially trained for hill fighting.  The Allied line
was pushed back along its whole front, Dranoutre and St. Eloi falling
into the hands of the Germans, together with 6000 prisoners.  It was
the darkest hour of the Flemish battle, and was the more depressing
as it came after a week of equilibrium in which the tide of invasion
seemed to have been finally dammed.  The German infantry had
penetrated through the joining point of the French and British near
Wytschaete, and at the same time through the French at Dranoutre, so
that they were able to assail Kemmel Hill from both sides.  It had
fallen by nine o'clock.  The Ninth Division in the north was forced
to fall back upon the line of La Clytte, after enduring heavy losses
in a combat lasting nine hours, during which they fought with their
usual tenacity, as did the 64th and 146th Brigades, who fought beside
them.

The Germans, having got through the French upon the right flank, had
got round to the rear of the 27th Brigade, with the result that the
12th Royal Scots were almost entirely destroyed, and the Scottish
Borderers were also very hard hit.  None the less, with the enemy in
front and rear, the Lowland infantry held out, finally making their
way back in orderly fashion during the night.  Farther north the line
of the 64th and the 146th Brigades was broken and the remnants
reformed in Cheapside, where their reserve battalions thickened their
array.  The 26th Highland Brigade threw back all attacks in front,
and formed a defensive flank to the south, withdrawing at leisure and
in order after dark.

{302}

Even the Ninth Division has seldom had a harder day, or a more
honourable one.  On the 26th General Cameron of the Forty-ninth
Division took over this sector, and the Ninth went out of the line
with very special messages of thanks from both the British and the
French marshals.

Some small British units were involved in the disaster of Mount
Kemmel as they were on the hill helping in the defence.  Among these
were the 19th Lancashire Fusiliers (Pioneers), the 456th Field
Company R.E., and part of the 49th Battalion Machine-gun Corps, all
drawn from the Forty-ninth Division.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 26.]

A determined effort was at once made to retrieve the situation, and a
counter-attack upon the new German line was ordered for 3 A.M. on
April 26.  It was carried out by the Thirty-ninth French Division on
the right, and by the Twenty-fifth Division (Bainbridge) on the left.
The French advance was held by severe machine-gun fire on the line of
the Kemmel Brook.  The British advancing from La Clytte had more
success, but were unable to maintain the ground which they had won.
They went forward with Griffin's 7th Brigade on the left and
Bethell's 74th on the right.  The water was up to the men's waists as
in the cold of the early morning they splashed their way across the
Kemmel Brook.  It was dismal and desperate work, but the spirit of
the men, in spite of all that this division had endured, was still
high, and they beat down all obstacles until they had forced their
way into the village of Kemmel, where they secured 200 prisoners.
Their own losses were heavy, however, including Colonel Cade of the
1st Wilts, Colonel {303} Stewart of the 4th South Staffords, Colonel
Reade of the 10th Chesters, and several other senior officers.  It
was now found that the flanks of both brigades were in the air, and
as the losses were increasing through the enfilade fire, they were
ordered to withdraw.  It was still early, and the morning mist
screened what would otherwise have been a very murderous operation.
The final line held by the Twenty-fifth Division was about 1000 yards
in advance of the starting-point.

It should be remembered that in this difficult and gallant night
attack against a victorious enemy the young 19-year-old recruits, who
now made up a considerable proportion of the decimated division,
showed a very fine spirit and kept up with the veterans beside them.

Having repulsed the counter-attack of the French and of the
Twenty-fifth Division, the enemy tried with great energy to improve
his advantage, and Von Armin thundered during the whole of April 26
against the Allied line, trying especially to drive in the northern
sector at Wytschaete and Eloi.  The fighting on this line was very
desperate during the day, and in spite of every effort the troops
were pushed back from their forward positions.  The strain fell
chiefly upon the remains of the 26th Brigade of the Ninth Division,
the Twenty-first Division, the 21st Brigade of the Thirtieth
Division, and the Thirty-ninth Division.  The 21st Brigade defended
the northern portion of the line, and one of the outstanding feats of
the day was the defence of the Old Bluff from morning to dusk by that
grand battalion, the 2nd Bedfords.  Farther south the two points
called the Brasserie and the Spoil-Bank were eventually {304} won by
the Germans, but they were defended with great determination by units
of the Thirty-ninth Division, the 1st Herts, the Cambridgeshires, and
the Sussex battalions.  It was a day of struggle, and the most that
the Allies could say was that they had prevented a break in their
line.  That night there was another general withdrawal along the
front which brought the Allied position into very much the same
trenches as had been occupied in the autumn of 1914.  Such a result
of four years' fighting might well have caused depression, and yet
these brave hearts never for one instant relinquished their high
hopes of the victory to come.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 26 onwards.]

The enemy had gained a spectacular advantage at Kemmel, and high
hopes were raised in Germany that some great ulterior result would
come of it, but in spite of strong efforts it was not destined that
there should be any particular consequences from their victory.
Observation can be obtained from a balloon as easily as from a hill,
and the space upon the summit was so limited that the Allied guns
could make it almost untenable.  Strong efforts were at once made to
push on upon the line Locre-La Clytte, which was held by the French.
They repulsed three strong attacks on April 27, and though in the
evening the Germans got into Locre, they were thrown out again by our
tenacious Allies.  Again on the morning of April 29 the enemy
attacked along the whole line from Mont Vidaigne to Zillebeke Lake.
This attack was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy, and must have
gone far to convince him that he was not destined to develop his
Kemmel success.  The battle involved not only the front of the
Thirty-sixth French Corps, but also that of the Twenty-fifth,
Forty-ninth, and {305} Twenty-first Divisions, all of which stood
like a wall and beat off every assault.  These attacks extended from
north of Kemmel to Voormezeele.  The Twenty-fifth Division was next
to the French on the right of the line, in the British centre was the
Forty-ninth, while on the left the Twenty-first Division connected up
with the Ninth, which was out of the direct line of attack.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  April 29.]

The 75th Brigade formed the fighting line of the Twenty-fifth
Division on this day of battle.  They found themselves on the western
side of the Kemmel Brook, while the 3rd Prussian Guards lay on the
farther side and advanced to the attack.  To do this they had to pass
over the smooth slope which led down to the stream, and they fell in
heaps in the attempt.  They huddled for shelter behind a group of
huts, but the guns got on to them and blew them to pieces.  Four
distinct attacks were all equally murderous and unsuccessful.  The
8th Border Battalion was particularly conspicuous in the defence.
Next to them, near Ridge Wood, were the well-tried Yorkshiremen of
the Forty-ninth.  For some reason the Germans at this point advanced
in close formation with bayonets fixed.  Such tactics received the
slating which they deserved.  Both the West Riding Battalions of the
147th Brigade and the York and Lancasters of the 148th were in the
firing-line, and they amply repaid themselves for many a distressful
hour.  Once for three minutes the Germans made a lodgment, but at the
end of that time a rush of bayonet-men pitchforked them out of their
only gain.  The Twenty-first Division held the line above Ridge Wood
and on towards Voormezeele.  Upon them came the heaviest attack of
all, and the slaughter {306} of the Germans, coming on at a range of
400 yards under machine-gun and rifle-fire, was very murderous.  The
Leicester Brigade did particularly well this day, and so did the worn
89th Brigade of the Thirtieth Division, which had come under the
orders of General Campbell of the Twenty-first Division.  The German
attack struck very hard against the front of this unit near the
Brasserie on the Vierstraat-Ypres Road, and all three battalions, the
17th, 18th, 19th King's Liverpools, had desperate fighting, the 17th
coming in for particularly rough treatment.  It had each flank
penetrated and one company surrounded, but still managed to shake
itself clear.

The Belgians were also involved in this wide-spread attack, and both
their lines in the north and those of the French round the
Sharpenberg and Mont Rouge were held intact.  This severe check,
inflicted upon a force which was not less than twelve divisions,
marked the beginning of the collapse of the great German offensive in
Flanders, which had now lasted for twenty days of constant battle.

Early in May the Franco-British line still lay from Kemmel village in
the south to Ypres in the north, taking Voormezeele upon the way.  If
the Germans could succeed in bursting through here they would partly
encircle Ypres, and would probably cause an evacuation, an event
which might be of no great military importance, but could not fail to
have a moral and political repercussion.  Ypres stood like an
oriflamme of war amid the ranks of the British Army.  Here it was
that in October 1914 they had said to the Germans, "Thus far and no
farther!"  Now in the fourth year the words still held good.  If
after all the efforts, all the self-sacrifice, all {307} good blood
so cheerfully shed, it was now to pass from their hands, no consoling
lectures upon strategy could soften the heavy blow which it would be
to those who relaxed the grip which their comrades had the held so
firmly.  Yet it was this and no less which was at stake in these
early days of May.  A crushing German victory with the capture of the
coast was no longer to be feared.  But an important local success,
which would reverberate through the world, was still well within
their hopes and their power.

At the moment of this important attack the southern sector of this
line was held by the One hundred and twenty-ninth and Thirty-second
French Divisions, the latter being next to the British just to the
south of Vierstraat.  To the north of the French lay the 30th
Composite Brigade (Currie), which had been formed by telescoping the
remains of the Thirtieth Division into a single unit.  It had two
splendid though attenuated Regular battalions, the 2nd Bedfords and
2nd Yorkshires in the line with the 17th King's Liverpools in
immediate support.  Still farther to the north lay Pinney's
well-tried Thirty-third Division with the 98th Brigade (Maitland) in
front.  Their battle line consisted of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, the 4th King's Liverpools, and the 1st Middlesex, from
south to north.  Farther north still from the Voormezeele region to
the southern suburbs of ruined Ypres lay Marden's Sixth Division
which was not involved to any great degree in the fighting.

[Sidenote: Northern Area.  May 8.]

In the centre of the position was a well-marked line of trees forming
the edge of Ridge Wood.  Behind the British line was the village of
Dickebush with the Dickebush Lake.  These two points were the first
{308} objectives of the German attack, which broke with great
violence at 7.30 in the morning of May 8.  It was preceded by a
lavish use of mustard gas shells, a hellish device which was used
more and more from this time forward.  This poison may be kept out of
the lungs by a mask, but cannot be kept from the body, where it
raises such blisters and irritation as may prove fatal in the same
fashion as a bad burn.  When enough has been poured into any position
it can be made untenable by troops, since in heavy weather it hangs
about for days, and has the unpleasant property of appearing to have
vanished and yet becoming active again when exposed to moisture.
Many a battalion which has crossed a dew-moistened field within the
battle area has had reason afterwards to regret it.

Coming after so deadly a preparation the first rush of the Germans
met with success, and they penetrated the line, both of the
Thirty-second French Division and of the 30th Composite Brigade.
Their advance brought them roughly to the south end of Dickebush
Lake, whereupon the 98th Brigade threw back a flank from Ridge Wood
to the lake, so as to cover themselves from a southern attack.

At seven in the evening a strong attempt was made to re-establish the
line, the 19th Brigade (Mayne) being thrown into the battle.  The
counter-attack was made by the 1st Cameronians, advancing across the
Hallebast-La Clytte Road, but they were in full view of the enemy
whose machine-gun fire was sweeping the very grass from the ground in
front of their feet.  They could not get forward, and many of them
never got back.  A fine advance was made, however, by the composite
King's Liverpools with the {309} help of some of the Bedfords.  It
actually reached the old front line, but had lost so heavily that it
was unable to retain it in the face of a renewed German assault, but
stuck on as near as it could.

It should be explained that this King's Liverpool unit was really the
old 89th Brigade which had been worn down to such an extent that the
17th, 18th, and 19th King's were now compressed into one battalion,
750 strong.  Their heavy losses upon the Somme had been greatly
increased in Flanders, and included Colonel Watson, the gallant and
veteran leader of the 17th Battalion.  Now under Colonel Rollo their
sentiment was that of one of their officers who wrote, "We are still
the 89th Brigade, call us what they like and put us in what division
they please.  The old spirit remains as ever."  This was the unit
whose swan song is here recorded.  Next day the survivors made good
their line, and handed it over intact to their relief.

To the north of this composite battalion (which was independent of
the 30th Divisional Brigade already mentioned) the counter-attack was
made by the 5th Scottish Rifles near Dickebush Lake, and by the 2nd
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at Ridge Wood.  Both of these
battalions won home and gained their full objectives.  The great
German local effort, urged by four strong divisions, the Fifty-second
and Fifty-sixth in front, the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first in
support, had been held.  Each of these convulsive efforts of Von
Armin's tired army brought the final equilibrium and ultimate
retirement more close.

The fighting died down entirely in this quarter, and the Fourteenth
French Division took it over {310} from the British.  Indeed this day
of strenuous battle may be said to have marked the end of the great
Battle of the Lys, which had raged ever since April 9.  The Germans
had been fought to a standstill.  They had in the course of a month's
fighting won ground, prisoners, and guns, but it is possible in
winning a battle to lose a war, and this is exactly what they had
accomplished.  An expensive and barren success had been achieved by a
lavish use of their reserves, and on the day when those reserves were
vitally needed, they had been wastefully strewn over the plains of
the Somme and of Flanders.  Never had the British Army been more
severely tried than at this time when their General issued his famous
"back to the wall" appeal, and never had the individual soldier risen
to a greater height.  "The British Army," says an Italian observer
who was present throughout the crisis, "impresses one with its
inherent moral soundness.  The German," he adds, "uses almost
exclusively machine-guns and bombs, but the Englishman loves his
rifle, and knows much better how to use it.  He is a better marksman,
he is more contemptuous of danger, and he is calmer, steadier, and
feels himself individually superior to his enemy.  The cheerfulness
of the men is due in great measure to the noble, dignified, serene
example of their officers, so simple in their gentlemanly bearing, so
conscious of the reasons and the end of the war, so proud of their
country and of its unshakeable prestige."  It is a noble tribute, but
none who know the men could say that it was a strained one.

No account of the battle of the Lys can close without a word as to
the splendid work done by General Plumer, never wearied, never
flurried, during {311} those fateful days.  Hardly less arduous was
the experience of General Horne in the southern sector.  The three
corps commanders, too, who bore the brunt, and very especially
General de Lisle, who only took over his command on the second day of
the battle, will always be associated with one of the most desperate
incidents of the war.  But above and behind all is the commanding and
heroic figure of Douglas Haig, impassive, serene, still working as he
had worked four years before, at the mending of broken lines and the
bracing of weak ones, until the hour should strike for his tremendous
revenge.




{312}

CHAPTER XI

  THE BATTLES OF THE CHEMIN DES DAMES AND
  OF THE ARDRES

May 27-June 2

The rest cure of the Aisne--Attack upon the Fiftieth Division--Upon
the Eighth--Upon the Twenty-first--5th Battery R.F.A.--Glorious
Devons--Adventure of General Rees--Retreat across the Aisne--Over the
Vesle--Arrival of Nineteenth Division--Desperate fighting--Success of
4th Shropshires--General Pellé's tribute--General prospect of the
Allies midway through 1918.


It had been determined to rest four of the crippled British divisions
which had been heavily engaged first on the Somme and then in the
battle of the Lys.  These divisions were the Twenty-fifth
(Bainbridge), Twenty-first (Campbell), Eighth (Heneker), and Fiftieth
(Jackson), all forming the Ninth Corps (Hamilton-Gordon).  Each of
them had been cut to pieces twice in the course of little more than a
month, and should by every pre-war precept have been incapable of
exertion for a long time to come.  They were reconstituted with
numbers of recruits under fresh officers, both leaders and men with
slight experience of actual warfare.  They were then sent, via the
outskirts of Paris, the direct route being under fire from the German
guns in front of Amiens, and they were thrust into the French line
just north {313} of the Aisne in the region of the Chemin des Dames.
The intention was to give them repose, but the change was looked upon
with misgiving by the divisional generals, one of whom wrote to the
present chronicler at the time saying, "They think it will be a rest
cure, but to my mind it is more likely to be a fresh centre of storm."

As a matter of fact the Germans, who had now made two colossal
thrusts, the one on March 21 on the Somme, the other at the Lys on
April 9, were planning a third desperate attack at this very point.
The competent military historian of the future with all the records
before him will no doubt be able to pronounce how far it was wise for
the German high command to leave two unfinished tasks in order to
undertake a third one.  On the face of it, it seemed an unlikely
thing to do, and that perhaps is why they did it.  The line at this
position had few natural advantages and was not strongly held.  In
the opinion of British generals it would have been wise if it could
have been drawn south of the Aisne, since a broad river is a good
friend in one's front, but a treacherous enemy in one's rear.  There
were reasons, however, why it was not easy for the French to abandon
the north bank, for they had spent much time, labour, and human life
in capturing Craonne, the California Plateau, and other positions
within that area, and it was a dreadful thing to give them up unless
they were beaten out of them.  They held on, therefore--and the
British divisions, now acting as part of the French army, were
compelled to hold on as well.  The Fiftieth Northern Territorial
Division had a frontage of 7000 yards from near Craonne to
Ville-aux-Bois, including the famous California {314} Plateau; on
their immediate right was the Regular Eighth Division, and to the
right of that in the Berry-au-Bac sector, where the lines cross the
Aisne, was the Twenty-first Division, this British contingent forming
the Ninth Corps, and having French troops upon either side of them.
The Twenty-fifth Division was in reserve at Fismes to the south of
the river.  The total attack from Crecy-au-Mont to Berry was about
thirty miles, a quarter of which--the eastern quarter--was held by
the British.

Confining our attention to the experience of the British troops,
which is the theme of these volumes, we shall take the northern unit
and follow its fortunes on the first day with some detail, remarking
in advance that the difficulties and the results were much the same
in the case of each of the three front divisions, so that a fuller
account of one may justify a more condensed one of the others.  The
position along the whole line consisted of rolling grass plains where
the white gashes in the chalk showed out the systems of defence.  The
Germans, on the other hand, were shrouded to some extent in woodland,
which aided them in the concentration of their troops.  The defences
of the British were of course inherited, not made, but possessed some
elements of strength, especially in the profusion of the barbed wire.
On the other hand, there were more trenches than could possibly be
occupied, which is a serious danger when the enemy comes to close
grips.  The main position ran about 5000 yards north of the Aisne,
and was divided into an outpost line, a main line of battle, and a
weak system of supports.  The artillery was not strong, consisting of
the divisional guns with some backing of French 75's and heavies.

{315}

The Fiftieth Division, like the others, had all three brigades in the
line.  To the north the 150th Brigade (Rees) defended Craonne and the
slab-sided California Plateau.  On their right, stretching across a
flat treeless plain, lay the 151st Brigade (Martin).  To the right of
them again was the 149th Brigade (Riddell), which joined on near
Ville-aux-Bois to the 24th Brigade (Grogan) of the Eighth Division.
It may give some idea of the severity with which the storm broke upon
the Fiftieth Division, when it is stated that of the three brigadiers
mentioned one was killed, one was desperately wounded, and a third
was taken before ten o'clock on the first morning of the attack.

The German onslaught, though very cleverly carried out, was not a
complete surprise, for the experienced soldiers in the British lines,
having already had two experiences of the new methods, saw many
danger signals in the week before the battle.  There was abnormal
aircraft activity, abnormal efforts also to blind our own air
service, occasional registering of guns upon wire, and suspicious
movements on the roads.  Finally with the capture of prisoners in a
raid the suspicions became certainties, especially when on the
evening of May 26 the Germans were seen pouring down to their front
lines.  No help arrived, however, for none seems to have been
immediately available.  The thin line faced its doom with a courage
which was already tinged with despair.  Each British brigade brought
its reserve battalion to the north bank of the Aisne, and each front
division had the call upon one brigade of the Twenty-fifth Division.
Otherwise no help was in sight.

The bombardment began early in the morning of {316} May 27, and was
said by the British veterans to be the heaviest of the war.  Such an
opinion meant something, coming from such men.  The whole area from
Soissons to Rheims was soaked with gas and shattered with high
explosives, so that masks had to be worn ten kilometres behind the
lines.  A German officer declared that 6000 guns were employed.  Life
was absolutely impossible in large areas.  The wire was blown to
shreds, and the trenches levelled.  The men stuck it, however, with
great fortitude, and the counter-barrage was sufficiently good to
hold up the early attempts at an infantry advance.  The experiences
of the 149th Infantry Brigade may be taken as typical.  The front
battalion was the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers under Colonel Gibson.
Twice the enemy was driven back in his attempt to cross the shattered
wire.  At 4 A.M. he won his way into the line of outposts, and by
4.30 was heavily pressing the battle line.  His tactics were good,
his courage high, and his numbers great.  The 6th Northumberland
Fusiliers, under Colonel Temperley, held the main line, and with the
remains of the 4th made a heroic resistance.  At this hour the
Germans had reached the main lines both of the 151st Brigade on the
left and of the 24th on the right.  About five o'clock the German
tanks were reported to have got through on the front of the Eighth
Division and to be working round the rear of the 149th Brigade.  Once
again we were destined to suffer from the terror which we had
ourselves evolved.  The main line was now in great confusion and
breaking fast.  The 5th Northumberland Fusiliers were pushed up as
the last reserve.  There was deep shadow everywhere save on the
California Plateau, where General Rees, with his {317} three
Yorkshire battalions, had repulsed repeated assaults.  The French
line had gone upon his left, however, and the tanks, with German
infantry behind them, had swarmed round to his rear, so that in the
end he and his men were all either casualties or captives.

Colonel Gibson meanwhile had held on most tenaciously with a nucleus
of his Fusiliers at a post called Centre Marceau.  The telephone was
still intact, and he notified at 5.45 that he was surrounded.  He
beat off a succession of attacks with heavy loss to the stormers,
while Temperley was also putting up a hopeless but desperate fight.
Every man available was pushed up to their help, and they were
ordered to hold on.  A senior officer reporting from Brigade
Headquarters says: "I could hear Gibson's brave, firm voice say in
reply to my injunctions to fight it out, 'Very good, sir.
Good-bye!'"  Shortly afterwards this gallant man was shot through the
head while cheering his men to a final effort.

The experience of the Durhams of the 151st had been exactly the same
as that of the Northumberlands of the 149th.  Now the enemy were
almost up to the last line.  The two brigadiers, Generals Martin and
Riddell, together with Major Tweedy of the reserve battalion, rushed
out to organise a local defence, drawing in a few scattered platoons
for the purpose.  As they did so they could see the grey figures of
the Germans all round them.  It was now past six o'clock, and a
clear, sunny morning.  As these officers ran forward, a shell burst
over them, and General Martin fell dead, while Riddell received a
terrible wound in the face.  In spite of this, he most heroically
continued to rally the men and form a centre of resistance {318} so
as to cover Pontavert as long as possible.  The 5th Northumberland
Fusiliers with a splendid counter-attack had regained the position of
Centre d'Evreux, and for the moment the pressure was relieved.  It
was clear, however, both to General Jackson and to General Heneker
that both flanks were exposed, and that their general position was an
acute salient far ahead of the Allied line.  The Twenty-first
Division was less affected, since it already lay astride of the
river, but the French line on the left was back before mid-day as far
as Fismes, so that it was absolutely necessary if a man were to be
saved to get the remains of the two British divisions across the
Aisne at once.

Pontavert, with its bridges over river and canal, was in the hands of
the Germans about 7 A.M., but the bridge-heads at Concevreux and
other places were firmly held, and as the men got across, sometimes
as small organised units, sometimes as a drove of stragglers, they
were rallied and lined up on the south bank.  The field-guns had all
been lost but the heavies and machine-guns were still available to
hold the new line.  Some of the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers were
entirely cut off, but fought their way through the Germans, and
eventually under Major Leatheart reported themselves at the bridges.
So rapid had been the hostile advance that the dressing-stations were
captured, and many of our doctors and wounded fell into the hands of
the Germans to endure the hard fate which these savages so often
reserved for the brave but helpless men who fell into their power.
It is a terrible fact which should not be forgotten, that among these
torturers the nurses and the doctors held in many cases a prominent
position.

The 150th Brigade, under General Rees, which {319} was defending the
Craonne position, had endured an even heavier ordeal than the others.
It was on the extreme left of the British line, on the right of the
French 118th Regiment.  This latter seems to have been entirely
destroyed or taken early in the attack.  The British brigade lay in
front of Craonne upon the edge of the California Plateau, with the
5th Yorks on the right and the 4th East Yorks on the left.  The 4th
Yorks were in brigade reserve in Craonelle, immediately behind the
fighting line.  The Germans got through the French on the left, also
through a gap down the Corbeny railroad on the right of the 150th and
left of the 151st Brigade.  Colonel Thomson of the 5th Yorks, a very
brave and experienced soldier who was said by those who knew him best
to be worth half a battalion in his own person upon the day of
battle, was in charge on the right, and hung on with tooth and claw
to every inch of ground, but his little force, already greatly
weakened by the cannonade, was unable to resist the terrible
onslaught of the German infantry.  Two counter-attacks were attempted
by reserve companies, but each was swept away.  The Germans were on
the flank in Craonne and enfiladed the line with a machine-gun.
Colonel Thomson's last words over the telephone to Headquarters were,
"Good-bye, General, I'm afraid I shall not see you again."  He was
killed shortly afterwards.  Major Haslett of the East Yorks made an
equally desperate resistance on the other flank, and finally he and a
wounded sergeant-major were captured with their empty pistols in
their hands.  Meanwhile the Brigade Headquarters at La Hutte were
practically surrounded and under a terrible fire.  General Rees
endeavoured to get into touch with his only {320} remaining
battalion, the 4th Yorks, but they had already been overrun by the
enemy.  Colonel Kent, with sixteen men, had thrown himself into a
house in Craonelle, and had fought until the whole party were killed
or wounded.  The enemy was now several miles to the rear of the few
survivors of the 150th Brigade, who endeavoured to make their way
back as best they might.  It gives some idea of how completely they
were cut off that General Rees, after many adventures and escapes,
was finally stopped and taken by encountering the main line of the
German traffic coming down the road which he had to cross.  This was
late in the day of May 27, when the enemy was well across the Aisne.
It may be of interest to add that General Rees was taken before the
Kaiser next morning, whom he found upon the California Plateau.  The
emperor behaved with courtesy to his prisoner, though he could not
refrain from delivering a monologue of the usual type upon the causes
of the war and the iniquity of Great Britain in fulfilling her treaty
obligations.

Some account must now be given of the experiences of Heneker's Eighth
Division which occupied the centre of the British line.  This
division, like the others, had been sent to the Aisne for a rest cure
after its terrific exertions upon the Somme.  Full of raw soldiers
and inexperienced officers it would have seemed to be entirely unfit
for battle, but it had the two solid assets of experienced leading in
the senior officers and great regimental traditions, that ever
present stand-by of the British Army.  Young as were the troops they
took General Heneker's orders literally when he issued the command
that the posts were to be held at all costs, and, as a consequence,
{321} hardly a single battalion existed as a fighting unit after the
engagement.

The British field-batteries were mostly to the north of the river,
and were greatly damaged by the preliminary German fire.  They were
accurately located by the enemy, and were smothered in poison and
steel.  So were the Gernicourt defences, which formed an important
tactical position with a permanent garrison on the right of the
division.  All three brigades were in the line, the 25th on the
right, the 24th in the centre, and the 23rd on the left.  The outpost
line was utterly overwhelmed in the first rush, the experience being
much the same as on March 21, for each small body of men found itself
isolated, and could only do its best to hold its own patch of ground.
Thus at 5.15 A.M. a pigeon message was sent, "H.Q. 2nd Berks,
consisting of Colonel Griffin, Captain Clare, and staff, are
surrounded.  Germans threw bombs down dug-out and passed on.
Appeared to approach from right rear in considerable strength.  No
idea what has happened elsewhere.  Holding on in hopes of relief."
Their position was typical of many similar groups along the front,
marooned in the fog, and soon buried in the heart of the advancing
German army.  The right of the 25th Brigade had been thrust back, but
on the left the 2nd Berkshires made a desperate resistance.  The
whole front was intersected by a maze of abandoned trenches, and it
was along these that the enemy, shrouded in the mist, first gained
their fatal footing upon the flank.  The 2nd East Lancashires were
brought up in support, and a determined resistance was made by the
whole brigade within the main zone of battle.  The German tanks were
up, however, and {322} they proved as formidable in their hands as
they have often done in our own.  Their construction was cumbrous and
their pace slow, but they were heavily armed and very dangerous when
once in action.  Eight of them, however, were destroyed by the French
anti-tank artillery.  At 6.30 the 25th Brigade, in shattered
remnants, was back on the river at Gernicourt.

The attack on this front was developing from the right, so that it
came upon the 24th Brigade an hour later than upon its eastern
neighbour.  The 2nd Northamptons were in front, and they were driven
in, but rallied on the battle zone and made a very fine fight, until
the German turning movement from the south-east, which crossed the
Miette south of the battle zone, took the line in flank and rear.  In
the end hardly a man of the two battalions engaged got away, and
Haig, the brigadier, with his staff, had to cut their way out at the
muzzle of their revolvers, shooting many Germans who tried to
intercept them.  The 23rd Brigade was attacked at about the same
time, and the 2nd West Yorkshires managed to hold even the outpost
line for a time.  Then falling back on the battle position this
battalion, with the 2nd Devons and 2nd Middlesex near the Bois des
Buttes, beat off every attack for a long time.  The fatal turning
movement threatened to cut them off entirely, but about 7.30 General
Grogan, who had set his men a grand example of valour, threw out a
defensive flank.  He fell back eventually across the Aisne south of
Pontavert, while the enemy, following closely upon his heels,
occupied that place.

Many outstanding deeds of valour are recorded in all the British
divisions during this truly terrible {323} experience, but two have
been immortalised by their inclusion in the orders of the day of
General Berthelot, the French general in command.  The first
concerned the magnificent conduct of the 5th Battery R.F.A., which,
under its commander, Captain Massey, stuck to its work while piece
after piece was knocked out by an overwhelming shower of German
shells.  When all the guns were gone Captain Massey, with Lieutenants
Large and Bution and a handful of survivors, fought literally to the
death with Lewis guns and rifles.  One man with a rifle, who fought
his way back, and three unarmed gunners who were ordered to retire,
were all who escaped to tell the heroic tale.  The other record was
that of the 2nd Devons, who went on fighting when all resistance
round them was over, and were only anxious, under their gallant
Colonel Anderson-Morshead, to sell their lives at the price of
covering the retreat of their comrades.  Their final stand was on a
small hill which covered the river crossing, and while they remained
and died themselves they entreated their retiring comrades to hurry
through their ranks.  Machine-guns ringed them round and shot them to
pieces, but they fought while a cartridge was left, and then went
down stabbing to the last.  They were well avenged, however, by one
post of the Devons which was south of the river and included many
Lewis guns under Major Cope.  These men killed great numbers of
Germans crossing the stream, and eventually made good their own
retreat.  The main body of the battalion was destroyed, however, and
the episode was heroic.  In the words of the French document: "The
whole battalion, Colonel, 38 officers, and 552 in the ranks, offered
their lives in ungrudging sacrifice to the sacred cause of the {324}
Allies."  A word as to the valour of the enemy would also seem to be
called for.  They came on with great fire and ardour.  "The Germans
seemed mad," says one spectator, "they came rushing over the ground
with leaps and bounds.  The slaughter was frightful.  We could not
help shooting them down."

Whilst this smashing attack had been delivered upon the Fiftieth and
Eighth Divisions, Campbell's Twenty-first Division on the extreme
right of the British line had also endured a hard day of battle.
They covered a position from Loivre to Berry-au-Bac, and had all
three brigades in action, six battalions in the line, and three in
reserve.  Their experience was much the same as that of the other
divisions, save that they were on the edge of the storm and escaped
its full fury.  The greatest pressure in the morning was upon the
62nd Brigade on the left, which was in close liaison with the 25th
Brigade of the Eighth Division.  By eight o'clock the posts at Moscou
and the Massif de la Marine had been overrun by the overpowering
advance of the enemy.  About nine o'clock the 7th Brigade from the
Twenty-fifth Division came up to the St. Aubœf Wood within the
divisional area and supported the weakening line, which had lost some
of the outer posts and was holding on staunchly to others.  The
Germans were driving down upon the west and getting behind the
position of the Twenty-first Division, for by one o'clock they had
pushed the 1st Sherwood Foresters of the Eighth Division, still
fighting most manfully, out of the Gernicourt Wood, so that the
remains of this division with the 75th Brigade were on a line west of
Bouffignereux.  This involved the whole left of the Twenty-first
Division, which had to swing back the 62nd {325} Brigade from a point
south of Cormicy, keeping in touch with the 7th Brigade which formed
the connecting link.  At 3.20 Cormicy had been almost surrounded and
the garrison driven out, while the 64th Brigade on the extreme right
was closely pressed at Cauroy.  At six in the evening the 7th Brigade
had been driven in at Bouffignereux, and the German infantry, beneath
a line of balloons and aeroplanes, was swarming up the valley between
Guyencourt and Chalons le Vergeur, which latter village they reached
about eight, thus placing themselves on the left rear of the
Twenty-first Division.  Night fell upon as anxious a situation as
ever a harassed general and weary troops were called upon to face.
The Twenty-first had lost few prisoners and only six guns during the
long day of battle, but its left had been continually turned, its
position was strategically impossible, and its losses in casualties
were very heavy.  It was idle to deny that the army of General von
Boehm had made a very brilliant attack and gained a complete victory
with, in the end, such solid trophies as 45,000 Allied prisoners and
at least 400 guns.  It was the third great blow of the kind within
nine weeks, and Foch showed himself to be a man of iron in being able
to face it, and not disclose those hidden resources which could not
yet be used to the full advantage.

The capture of Pontavert might have been a shattering blow to the
retreating force, but it would seem that the Germans who had pushed
through so rapidly were strong enough to hold it but not, in the
first instance, strong enough to extend their operations.  By the
afternoon of May 27 they were over at Maizy also, and the force at
Concevreux, which {326} consisted of the remains of the Fiftieth and
part of the Eighth and Twenty-fifty Divisions, was in danger of
capture.  At 2 P.M. the Germans had Muscourt.  The mixed and
disorganised British force then fell back to near Ventelay, where
they fought back once more at the German advance, the Fiftieth
Division being in the centre, with the 75th and 7th Brigades on its
right.  This latter brigade had been under the orders of the
Twenty-first Division and had helped to hold the extreme right of the
position, but was now involved in the general retreat.  Already,
however, news came from the west that the Germans had not got merely
to the Aisne but to the Vesle, and the left flank and rear of the
Ninth Corps was hopelessly compromised.  Under continuous pressure,
turning ever to hold up their pursuers, the remains of the three
divisions, with hardly any artillery support, fell back to the south.
On the western wing of the battle Soissons had fallen, and Rheims was
in a most perilous position, though by some miracle she succeeded in
preserving her shattered streets and desecrated cathedral from the
presence of the invaders.

The Eighth Division had withdrawn during the night to Montigny, and,
in consequence, the Twenty-first Division took the general line,
Hermonville-Montigny Ridge, the 64th Brigade on the right, with the
62nd and 7th in succession on the left.  Every position was
outflanked, however, touch was lost with the Eighth on the left, and
the attack increased continually in its fury.  Prouilly fell, and the
orders arrived that the next line would be the River Vesle, Jonchery
marking the left of the Eighth Division.  On the right the
Twenty-first continued {327} to be in close touch with the French
Forty-fifth Division.  All units were by this time very intermingled,
tired, and disorganised.  The 15th Durhams, who had fought a
desperate rearguard action all the morning upon the ridge north of
Hervelon Château, had almost ceased to exist.  The one gleam of light
was the rumoured approach of the One hundred and thirty-fourth French
Division from the south.  It had been hoped to hold the line of the
River Vesle, but by the evening of May 28 it was known that the
Germans had forced a passage at Jonchery, where the bridge would have
been destroyed but for the wounding of the sapper officer and the
explosion of the wagon containing the charges.  On the other hand,
the Forty-fifth French Division on the right was fighting splendidly,
and completely repulsed a heavy German attack.  When night fell the
British were still for the most part along the line of the Vesle, but
it was clear that it was already turned upon the west.  Some idea of
the truly frightful losses incurred by the troops in these operations
may be formed from the fact that the Eighth Division alone had lost
7000 men out of a total force of about 9000 infantry.

About eight in the morning of May 29 the enemy renewed his attack,
pushing in here and there along the line in search of a gap.  One
attempt was made upon the Twenty-first Division, from Branscourt to
Sapicourt, which was met and defeated by the 1st Lincolns and 6th
Leicesters.  Great activity and movement could be seen among the
German troops north of the river, but the country is wooded and
hilly, so that observation is difficult.  Towards evening, the right
flank of the fighting line was greatly comforted by the arrival of
the French Division already {328} mentioned, and the hearts of the
British were warmed by the news that one of their own divisions had
come within the zone of battle, as will now be described.

When the Ninth Corps was sent to the Aisne, another very weary
British division, the Nineteenth (Jeffreys), had also been told off
for the French front with the same object of rest, and the same
actual result of desperate service.  So strenuous had the work of
this division been upon the Somme and in Flanders, that the ranks
were almost entirely composed of new drafts from England and Wales.
Their destination was the Chalons front, where they remained for
exactly twelve days before the urgent summons arrived from the
breaking line on the Aisne, and they were hurried westwards to
endeavour to retrieve or at least to minimise the disaster.  They
arrived on the morning of May 29, and found things in a most critical
condition.  The Germans had pushed far south of the Aisne, despite
the continued resistance of the survivors of the Eighth,
Twenty-fifth, and Fiftieth British Divisions, and of several French
divisions, these débris of units being mixed up and confused, with a
good deal of mutual recrimination, as is natural enough when men in
overwrought conditions meet with misfortunes, the origin of which
they cannot understand.  When troops are actually mixed in this
fashion, the difference in language becomes a very serious matter.
Already the Allied line had been pushed far south of Fismes, and the
position of the units engaged was very obscure to the Higher Command,
but the British line, such as it was, was north of Savigny on the
evening of May 28.  Soissons had fallen, Rheims was in danger, and it
was doubtful whether even the line of the Marne could {329} be held.
Amid much chaos it must, indeed, have been with a sense of relief
that the Allied generals found a disciplined and complete division
come into the front, however young the material of which it was
composed.

A gap had opened in the line between the Thirteenth French Division
at Lhery and the One hundred and fifty-fourth near Faverolles, and
into this the 57th and 58th Brigades were thrust.  The artillery had
not yet come up, and the rest of the Allied artillery was already
either lost or destroyed, so there was little support from the guns.
It was a tough ordeal for boys fresh from the English and Welsh
training camps.  On the left were the 10th Worcesters and 8th
Gloucesters.  On the right the 9th Welsh Fusiliers and 9th Welsh.  It
was hoped to occupy Savigny and Brouillet, but both villages were
found to be swarming with the enemy.  Remains of the Eighth and
Twenty-fifth Divisions were still, after three days of battle, with
their faces to the foe on the right of the Nineteenth Division.  They
were very weary, however, and the 2nd Wiltshires were brought up to
thicken the line and cover the divisional flank north of Bouleuse.
This was the situation at 2 P.M. of May 29.

The tide of battle was still rolling to the south, and first Savigny
and then Faverolles were announced as being in German hands.  A mixed
force of odd units had been formed and placed under General
Craigie-Hackett, but this now came back through the ranks of the
Nineteenth Division.  On the right also the hard-pressed and
exhausted troops in front, both French and British, passed through
the 2nd Wiltshires, and endeavoured to reform behind them.  The
Nineteenth Division from flank to flank became the {330} fighting
front, and the Germans were seen pouring down in extended order from
the high ground north of Lhery and of Treslon.  On the right the
remains of the Eighth Division had rallied, and it was now reinforced
by the 2nd Wilts, the 4th Shropshire Light Infantry, and the 8th
Staffords, the latter battalions from the 56th Brigade.  With this
welcome addition General Heneker, who had fought such a long uphill
fight, was able in the evening of May 29 to form a stable line on the
Bouleuse Ridge.  By this time the guns of the Nineteenth Division,
the 87th and 88th Brigades Royal Field Artillery, had roared into
action--a welcome sound to the hard-pressed infantry in front.  There
was a solid British line now from Lhery on the left to the eastern
end of the Bouleuse Ridge, save that one battalion of Senegal
Tirailleurs was sandwiched in near Faverolles.  Liaison had been
established with the Thirteenth and One hundred and fifty-fourth
French Divisions to left and right.

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[Illustration: British Line on Chemin des Dames]

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The early morning of May 30 witnessed a very violent attack along all
this portion of the line.  By 6 A.M. the enemy had worked round the
left flank of the 10th Worcesters at Lhery, driving before them some
of the troops, French and British, who were exhausted from the long
battle.  It is difficult for either writer or reader to imagine the
condition of men who have fought a losing battle for three days
without cessation.  If Foch saved up his reserves during these weeks
of agony, it was surely at a precious cost to the men who bore the
weight.  The left company of the 10th Worcesters lost all its
officers and 60 per cent of its men, and Lhery had to be left to the
enemy.  Meanwhile, the Senegalese, who, like all tropical troops, are
more formidable in attack than in defence, were {331} driven in near
Faverolles, the Germans making a frontal attack in eight lines.  They
pushed through the gap, outflanked the 9th Welsh Fusiliers on the
left and the 2nd Wiltshires on the right, cutting off a platoon of
the former battalion.  Both these battalions suffered very heavily,
the Welsh Fusiliers especially being cut to pieces.  At both ends of
the line the remains of the front battalions had to fall back upon
their supports.  The 74th Composite Brigade, already referred to as
being under General Craigie-Hackett, fought on the left of the
Nineteenth Division, and was ordered to hold the Lhery-Rohigny Road.
The pressure, however, upon these tired troops and upon the remains
of the 10th Worcesters continued to be very great, and by 11 A.M. the
situation was critical on the left of the line, the flank having been
driven in, and the 8th Gloucesters enfiladed so that the D'Aulnay
Wood could no longer be held.  These changes enabled the Germans to
close in upon the 9th Welsh and the remains of the 9th Welsh
Fusiliers, attacking them in front and flank.  The troops on their
right gave way, and the assailants were then able to get round the
other flank of these two devoted battalions, and practically to
surround them, so that very few won their way back.  The whole front
line had gone with the exception of the 10th Warwicks on the left.
For a time it seemed as if there was nothing to limit this powerful
thrust of the enemy, but in the usual miraculous fashion a composite
party of odds and ends, drawn from stragglers and details, hastily
swept together by General Jeffreys, were hurried up to the high
ground south of Ville-en-Tardenois.  With the aid of four
machine-guns from the Nineteenth Division this force {332} held the
victorious enemy from coming further, covered the left flank of the
10th Warwicks, and formed a bastion from which a new wall could be
built.  A second bastion had been made by the 5th South Wales
Borderers, pioneers of the Nineteenth Division, who had dug in south
of Rohigny and absolutely refused to shift.  Up to 2 P.M. the 2nd
Wilts also held their ground north of Bouleuse.  Between these fixed
points the 57th and 58th Brigades were able to reorganise, the 15th
Warwicks and 9th Cheshires covering the respective fronts.  On the
right the Twenty-eighth French Division had relieved the One hundred
and fifty-fourth, while the 4th Shropshires and 8th North Staffords,
both still intact, formed a link between the two Allies.  Touch had
been lost on the left, and patrols were sent out to endeavour to
bridge the gap.  At this period General Jeffreys of the Nineteenth
Division commanded the whole British line.  A serious loss had been
caused by the wounding of General Glasgow, the experienced leader of
the 58th Brigade.  General Heath of the 56th Brigade took over the
command of both units.

The Germans had reached their limit for the day, though some attempt
at an attack was made in the afternoon from the wood of Aulnay, which
was beaten back by the British fire.  It was rumoured, however, that
on the left, outside the British area, he was making progress south
of Rohigny, which made General Jeffreys uneasy for his left wing.  Up
to now the British had been under the general command of the Ninth
British Corps, but this was now withdrawn from the line, and the
Nineteenth Division passed to the Fifth French Corps under General
Pellé, an who left a most pleasant impression upon the {333} minds of
all who had to deal with him.  On May 31 the front consisted of the
French Fortieth on the left, the French Twenty-eighth on the right,
and the British Nineteenth between them, the latter covering 12,000
yards.  The weary men of the original divisions were drawn out into
reserve after as severe an ordeal as any have endured during the
whole war.  The 74th Composite Brigade was also relieved.  Some idea
of the losses on the day before may be gathered from the fact that
the two Welsh battalions were now formed into a single composite
company, which was added to the 9th Cheshires.

The morning of the 31st was occupied in a severe duel of artillery,
in which serious losses were sustained from the German fire, but upon
the other hand a threatened attack to the south-west of
Ville-en-Tardenois was dispersed by the British guns.  About two
o'clock the enemy closed once more upon the left, striking hard at
the 6th Cheshires, who had been left behind in this quarter when the
rest of the 74th Composite Brigade had been relieved.  The 10th
Warwicks were also attacked, and the whole wing was pushed back, the
enemy entering the village of Ville-en-Tardenois.  The Warwicks
formed up again on high ground south-east of the village, the line
being continued by the remains of the 10th Worcesters and 8th
Gloucesters.  Whilst the left wing was driven in, the right was also
fiercely attacked, the enemy swarming down in great numbers upon the
French, and the 9th Cheshires.  The former were driven off the
Aubilly Ridge, and the latter had to give ground before the rush.

General Jeffreys, who was on the spot, ordered an immediate
counter-attack of the 2nd Wilts to retrieve {334} the situation.
Before it could develop, however, the French were again advancing on
the right, together with the 4th Shropshires.  A local counter-attack
had also been delivered by the 9th Cheshires, led on horseback with
extreme gallantry by Colonel Cunninghame.  His horse was shot under
him, but he continued to lead the troops on foot, and his Cheshire
infantry followed him with grim determination into their old
positions.  The ground was regained though the losses were heavy,
Colonel Cunninghame being among the wounded.

The attack of the 2nd Wiltshires had meanwhile been developed, and
was launched under heavy fire about seven in the evening, moving up
to the north of Chambrecy.  The position was gained, the Wiltshires
connecting up with the Cheshires on their right and the Gloucesters
on their left.  Meanwhile, advances of the enemy on the flank were
broken up by artillery fire, the 87th and 88th Brigades of guns doing
splendid work, and sweeping the heads of every advance from the
Tardenois-Chambrecy Road.  So ended another very severe day of
battle.  The buffer was acting and the advance was slowing.  Already
its limit seemed to be marked.

On the morning of May 31 the British position extended from a line on
the left connecting Ville-en-Tardenois and Champlat.  Thence the 57th
Brigade covered the ground up to the stream which runs from Sarcy to
Chambrecy.  Then the 56th Brigade began, and carried on to 1000 yards
east of the river Ardres.  The line of battalions (pitiful remnants
for the most part) was from the left, 10th Warwicks, 10th Worcesters,
8th Gloucesters, 2nd Wilts, 9th Cheshires, 8th Staffords, and 4th
Shropshires.  {335} Neither brigade could muster 1000 rifles, while
the 58th Brigade in reserve was reduced to 350.  The three sapper
field companies, the personnel of the trench-mortar batteries, and
every straggler who could be scraped up was thrust forward to thicken
the line.

The German attack was launched once more at 4 P.M. on June 1,
striking up against the Fortieth French Division and the left of the
British line.  Under the weight of the assault the French were pushed
back, and the enemy penetrated the Bonval Wood, crossed the
Tardenois-Jonchery Road, and thrust their way into the woods of
Courmont and La Cohette.  Here, however, the attack was held, and the
junction between the French and the Warwicks remained firm.  The
front of the 57th Brigade was attacked at the same time, the 8th
Gloucesters and the 2nd Wilts on their right being very hard pressed.
The enemy had got Sarcy village, which enabled them to get on the
flank of the Gloucesters, and to penetrate between them and the
Wiltshires.  It was a very critical situation.  The right company of
the Gloucesters was enfiladed and rolled up, while the centre was in
deadly danger.  The left flank and the Worcesters held tight, but the
rest of the line was being driven down the hill towards Chambrecy.  A
splendid rally was effected, however, by Captain Pope of B Company,
who led his west countrymen up the hill once more, driving the enemy
back to his original line.  For this feat he received the D.S.O.  At
this most critical period of the action, great help was given to the
British by the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd French Regiment, led in
person by Commandant de Lasbourde, which joined in Pope's
counter-attack, {336} afterwards relieving the remains of the
Gloucester's.  Lasbourde also received the D.S.O.  The success of the
attack was due partly to the steadiness of the 10th Worcesters on the
left, who faced right and poured a cross-fire into the German
stormers.  It was a complete, dramatic little victory, by which the
high ground north of Chambrecy was completely regained.

A withdrawal of the whole line was, however, necessary on account of
the German penetration into the left, which had brought them complete
possession of the Wood of Courmont on the British left rear.  The
movement was commenced at seven in the evening, and was completed in
most excellent order before midnight.  This new line, stretching from
Quisles to Eligny, included one very important position, the hill of
Bligny, which was a prominence from which the enemy could gain
observation and command over the whole valley of the Ardres, making
all communications and battery positions precarious.

The general order of units in the line on June 2 was much the same as
before, the 5th South Wales Borderers being held in reserve on the
left, and the 2/22nd French on the right of the Nineteenth Division.
These positions were held unbroken from this date for a fortnight,
when the division was eventually relieved after its most glorious
term of service.  The British Ninth Corps was busily engaged during
this time in reorganising into composite battalions the worn and
mixed fragments of the Eighth, Twenty-fifth, and Fiftieth Divisions,
which were dribbled up as occasion served to the new battle-line.  A
composite machine-gun company was also organised and sent up.

Several days of comparative quiet followed, during {337} which the
sappers were strengthening the new positions, and the Germans were
gathering fresh forces for a renewed attack.  Congratulatory messages
from General Franchet d'Esperey, the French Army Commander, and from
their own Corps General put fresh heart into the overtaxed men.
There was no fresh attack until June 6.  On that date the line of
defence from the left consisted of the Fortieth French Division, the
Eighth Division Composite Battalion (could a phrase mean more than
that?), the 10th Warwicks, 10th Worcesters, 8th Gloucesters, 58th
Brigade Composite Battalion, 9th Cheshires, 8th North Staffords, 4th
Shropshires, and Twenty-eighth French Division.  At 3 A.M. there
began a tremendous bombardment, mostly of gas-shell, which gave way
to the infantry advance at 4 A.M., the attack striking the right and
centre of the British line, in the section of the all-important
Bligny Hill.  As the enemy advanced upon the front of the 58th
Composite Battalion, the men who were the survivors of the 2nd Wilts,
9th Welsh Fusiliers, and 9th Welsh, fired a volley, and then, in a
fashion which would have delighted the old Duke, sprang from their
cover and charged with the bayonet, hurling the Germans down the
slope.  It was a complete repulse, as was a second attack upon the
front of the Gloucesters and Worcesters who, with a similar
suggestion of the legendary Peninsula tactics, waited till they could
see their foemen's eyes before firing, with the result that the
storming column simply vanished, flinging itself down in the long
grass and hiding there till nightfall.  There was no attack on the
left of the line, but the 9th Cheshires and the North Staffords both
had their share in the victory.  The Twenty-eighth French {338}
Division on the right had given a little before the storm, and the
British line was bent back to keep touch.  Otherwise it was
absolutely intact, and the whole terrain in front of it was covered
with German dead.

The German is a determined fighter, however, and his generals well
knew that without the command of Bligny Hill no further progress was
possible for him in the general advance.  Therefore they drew
together all their strength and renewed the attack at 11 A.M. with
such energy and determination that they gained the summit.  An
immediate counter by the 9th Cheshires, though most gallantly urged,
was unable to restore the situation, but fortunately a battalion was
at hand which had not lost so grievously in the previous fighting.
This was the 4th Shropshires, which now charged up the hill,
accompanied by the remains of the undefeated 9th Cheshires.  The
attack was delivered with magnificent dash and spirit, and it ended
by the complete reconquest of the hill.  For this feat the 4th
Shropshires received as a battalion the rare and coveted distinction
of the Croix de Guerre with the palm.  This local success
strengthened the hands of the French on the right, who were able in
the late afternoon to come forward and to retake the village of
Bligny.  June 6 was a most successful day, and gave fresh assurance
that the German advance was spent.

There was no further close fighting in this neighbourhood up to June
19, when the young soldiers of the Nineteenth and other divisions
were withdrawn after a sustained effort which no veterans could have
beaten.  In the official report of General Pellé to his own Higher
Command, there occurs the generous {339} sentence: "L'impression
produite sur le moral des troupes françaises par la belle attitude de
leurs alliés a ét très bonne."  Both Allies experienced the
difficulty of harmonising troops who act under different traditions
and by different methods.  At first these hindrances were very great,
but with fuller knowledge they tended to disappear, and ended in
complete mutual confidence, founded upon a long experience of loyalty
and devotion to the common end.

From this date until the end of June no event of importance affecting
the British forces occurred upon the Western front.  The German
attack extended gradually in the Aisne district, until it had reached
Montdidier, and it penetrated upon the front as far south as the
forest of Villers-Cotteret, where it threatened the town of
Compiègne.  In the middle of June the German front was within forty
miles of Paris, and a great gun specially constructed for the
diabolical work was tossing huge shells at regular intervals into the
crowded city.  The bursting of one of these projectiles amidst the
congregation of a church on a Sunday, with an appalling result in
killed and wounded, was one of those incidents which Germans of the
future will, we hope, regard with the same horror as the rest of the
world did at the time.

The cause of the Allies seemed at this hour to be at the very lowest.
They had received severe if glorious defeats on the Somme, in
Flanders, and on the Aisne.  Their only success lay in putting limits
to German victories.  And yet with that deep prophetic instinct which
is latent in the human mind, there was never a moment when they felt
more assured of the ultimate victory, nor when the language of {340}
their leaders was prouder and more firm.  This general confidence was
all the stranger, since we can see as we look back that the situation
was on the face of it most desperate, and that those factors which
were to alter it--the genius of Foch, the strength of his reserves,
and the numbers and power of the American Army--were largely
concealed from the public.  In the midst of the gloom the one bright
light shone from Italy, where, on June 17, a strong attack of the
Austrians across the Piave was first held and then thrown back to the
other bank.  In this most timely victory Lord Cavan's force, which
now consisted of three British Divisions, the Seventh, Twenty-third,
and Forty-eighth, played a glorious part.  So, at the close of the
half year Fate's curtain rang down, to rise again upon the most
dramatic change in history.




{341}

INDEX


Ablainzeville, 32, 34, 35

Acklom, Colonel, 112

Aisne, British on the, 312-338

Albert, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 73, 76, 199, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210

Allenby, General Sir Edmund, 1

Allgood, Brigadier-General, 43

America, preparations by, 5

Amiens, 65, 114, 135, 152, 213, 312

Anderson, Colonel, V.C., 126

Anderson-Morshead, Colonel, 323

Anstey, Colonel, 135

Armentières, 226, 227, 235, 238, 240, 248, 260

Armin, General von, 249, 261, 303, 309

Armitage, Colonel, 299

Armstrong, Captain, 231

Arras, 6, 42, 44, 199, 204

Aveluy Wood, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 212

Ayette, 34, 35, 36



Bac St. Maur, 236, 238, 239, 241, 248, 249

Bailey, Brigadier-General, 78, 203

Bailleul, 44, 45, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 273, 278, 281, 282, 283,
293

Bainbridge, General Sir E., 50, 249, 273, 302, 312

Baird, Brigadier-General, 273, 277

Bambridge, Captain, 266

Banham, Major, 132

Bapaume, 56, 59, 60, 62

Barisis, 80, 81, 105

Barrett, Colonel Moulton, 40

Beal, Lieutenant, 25

Beaumetz, 50, 51, 55

Beaumont Hamel, 64, 65, 67, 74, 141, 144, 153

Beauvais, 156, 157, 158

Bellingham, Brigadier-General, 139, 203

Bell-Smyth, General, 195

Below, General Otto von, 9

Belton, Colonel, 143

Bennett, Brigadier-General, 210, 272

Bennett, Major (Cornwalls), 163

Bennett, Major (Oxfords), 141

Bernafoy Wood, 62, 122, 123, 124

Berney, Dr., 45

Berthelot, General, 323

Bertie, Major, 163

Bertincourt, 56, 58

Bethell, Brigadier-General, 302

Bethencourt, 122, 129, 159, 162, 163, 166, 187

Biddle, Sergeant-Major, 297

Bilton, Colonel, 162

Blackall, Colonel, 52

Blacklock, General, 148

Bligny, 336, 337, 338

Boehm, General von, 325

Bois d'Aquenne, 214, 216, 218

Boyd-Moss, Brigadier-General, 231

Boyelles, 24, 37

Braithwaite, General, 63, 64

Bridgford, General, 26, 245

British Armies, general disposition of, in March 1918, 5-7

Buchoir, 171, 173

Bucquoy, 63, 71, 74, 204, 212

Bullecourt, 10, 16, 19

Burt, Colonel, 182

Bushell, Colonel, 185

Bution, Lieutenant, 323

Butler, General, 10, 81, 104, 106, 153, 177, 183, 189, 192, 212, 215

Butler, Brigadier-General Leslie, 264

Buverchy, 165, 166, 167, 168

Byng, General Sir Julian, 6, 13, 41, 61



Cachy, 213, 214, 215

Cade, Colonel, 302

Cailloux, 230, 233, 234

California Plateau, 313, 315, 316, 319, 320

Cambrai, 6, 10, 47, 48, 63, 80, 221

Cameron, General, 254, 282, 302

Campbell, General, 86, 88, 123, 249, 306, 312, 324

Campbell, Brigadier-General, 31

Canizy, 159, 161, 163, 164

Cape, General, 148

Carey, General, 142, 143, 144, 150

Carter-Campbell, General, 47, 241

Cator, General, 105, 111, 213, 214

Cavan, General Lord, 340

Cayley, General, 243

Chalmers, Captain, 70

Chambrecy, 334, 336

Chandler, Captain, 92

Chapel Hill, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 116

Charlton, Colonel, 98

Chauny, 182, 183, 188, 190, 192, 196

Chemin des Dames, battle of, 312-338

Clare, Captain, 321

Clark, Major, 133

Clarke, Colonel Stanley, 42

Clemenceau, M., 6, 7, 284

Clery, 118, 125

Combe, Captain, 170

Combles, 59, 120, 121

Congreve, General, V.C., 10, 61, 80, 130, 142

Contalmaison, 61, 62, 63, 123

Contescourt, 103, 104

Cope, Major, 323

Cotton, Colonel, 163

Cotton, Lieutenant, 195

Cowper, General, 104

Craig, ----, 219

Craigie-Hackett, General, 329, 331

Craonelle, 319, 320

Craonne, 313, 315, 319

Croisilles, 17, 18, 23

Croix du Bac, 237, 239

Cronin, Lieutenant, 37

Cross, Lance-Corporal, 28

Crossthwaite, Colonel, 107

Crown Prince, the, 9

Crozat Canal, 110, 111, 112, 177, 189

Crozier, Brigadier-General, 31

Cubbon, Major, 69

Cubitt, Brigadier-General, 249, 253

Cunningham, Lieutenant, 85

Cunninghame, Colonel, 334

Curling, Colonel, 191

Currie, Brigadier-General, 307



Da Costa, General, 227, 229

Daly, General, 93, 131

Dann, Colonel, 112

Dawes, Colonel, 59

Dawson, General, 120, 203

Debeney, General, 214

De Lisle, General, 227, 270, 311

De Mitry, General, 299

Demuin, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 150

Dennis, Captain, 108

Dent, Lieutenant, 266

Dernacourt, 75, 126, 204, 205, 210

Dervicke-Jones, Colonel, 180, 181

Deverell, General, 14, 293

Diebold, General, 180

Dimmer, Colonel, V.C., 99, 141

Doignies, 49, 50

Dougall, Captain, V.C., 251

Downie, Colonel M'Alpine, 100

Duchesne, General, 190

Dudbridge, Lieutenant, 159

Dugan, Brigadier-General, 132

Duncan, Brigadier-General, 161



Eardley-Wilmot, Colonel, 26

Ecoust, 17, 19, 20

Elstob, Colonel, 102

Epehy, 88, 92

Ervillers, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 59, 63

Esmery-Hallon, 160, 161, 176

Esperey, General Franchet d', 337

Essigny, 80, 103, 104, 105, 106, 114, 116, 177

Estaires, 229, 236, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 278

Evans, Captain, 257



Failes, Captain, 49

Fanshawe, General Sir E. A., 10, 47

Fayolle, General, 131

Feetham, General, 118, 138, 147, 148, 203

Fergusson, General Sir Charles, 10

Festubert, 233, 234, 246, 293, 294, 296, 299

Fins, 55, 57

Fismes, 314, 318, 328

Flesquières, 47, 49

Fleurbaix, 226, 236, 238

Foch, Marshal, 135, 203, 224, 325, 330, 340

Forbes, Brigadier-General, 31

Franks, General, 123, 125, 126

Frelinghien, 238, 239

Freyberg, Brigadier-General, 286

Frières Wood, 178, 185, 186

Frise, 130; 132



Gauche Wood, 86, 87, 88

Gavrelle, 41, 44

German East Africa, operations in, 2

Gibson, Colonel, 316, 317

Girdwood, Brigadier-General, 36

Givenchy, 226, 227, 228, 230, 246, 247, 258, 293, 294, 295

Glasgow, Brigadier-General, 215, 249, 251, 332

Goodman, Brigadier-General, 100

Gore, Brigadier-General, 284

Gorringe, General, 47, 53, 206, 209

Gosling, Lieutenant, 297

Gosset, Colonel, 148

Gough, General Sir Hubert, 6, 9, 12, 80, 81, 114, 115, 142, 151, 200,
202

Grant, General, 115, 142

Grant, ----, 133

Green, Captain, 255

Greenly, General, 106, 184, 192

Gribble, Captain, V.C., 56

Griffin, Brigadier-General, 50, 302

Griffin, Colonel, 321

Griffiths, Brigadier-General, 102, 253

Grogan, Brigadier-General, 315, 322

Gunner, Major F., 139

Gunning, Captain, 183



Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 6, 122, 200, 203, 224, 261, 310, 311

Haig, Brigadier-General, 322

Haking, General, 227

Haldane, General Sir Aylmer, 10, 13, 18, 22

Hall, Lieutenant, 297

Ham, 82, 101, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 183, 203

Hamilton-Gordon, General, 249, 312

Hancock, Colonel, 140

Handford, Captain, 297

Hangard Wood, 210, 211, 213, 215, 219, 220

Hangest, 173, 174

Hargicourt, 93, 94

Harman, General, 184, 190, 191

Harper, General, 10, 47

Harrop, Lieutenant, 165

Harston, Brigade-Major, 299

Hartigan, Major, 91, 92

Harvey, Colonel, 142

Haslett, Major, 319

Havrincourt, 50, 54

Haybittle, Captain, 110

Hazebrouck, 237, 258, 263, 264, 270, 271

Headlam, General, 123

Heane, Brigadier-General, 271

Heath, Brigadier-General, 250, 332

Heneker, General, 98, 128, 135, 213, 312, 318, 320, 330

Henin, 37, 40

Henin Hill, 18, 22, 23, 24, 26, 52

Hermies, 50, 51, 54

Heudicourt, 88, 116

Higginson, Brigadier-General, 107

Hill, Colonel, 132

Hilliard, Brigadier-General, 43

Hindenburg Line, the, 6, 10

Hoath, Colonel, 56

Hodgson, Lieutenant, 256

Hollebeke, 248, 249, 250

Holnon Wood, 157

Horn, Colonel, 73

Hornby, General, 118

Horne, General Sir H., 41, 227, 311

Houthulst Forest, 6, 7, 227

Howitt, Major, 158, 168

Hull, General, 86, 90

Humbert, General, 189

Hunt, Colonel, 123

Hurd, Corporal, 280

Hutchinson, Colonel, 278

Hutier, General von, 9



Impey, Colonel, 68

Ireland, Colonel, 91

Italy, operations in, 4, 340



Jackson, General, 227, 240, 312, 318

Jackson, Brigadier-General, 140

Jacob, General Sir C., 8

Jacotin, Private, 268

James, Colonel, 38

Jeffreys, General, 53, 249, 250, 255, 274, 286, 290, 328, 331, 332,
333

Jeudwine, General Sir Hugh, 227

Johnson, Major, 147

Jones, Captain, V.C., 56

Jussy, 178, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185



Kelly, Captain, 183

Kemmel, Mount, 283, 292, 299, 300, 301, 302, 304, 305

Kemmel, village, 302, 306

Kemp-Welch, Colonel, 280

Kent, Colonel, 320

Kerensky, 3

Kidd, Lieutenant, 92



La Bassée, 6

La Fère, 8, 79, 111, 112, 114, 177

Lagnicourt, 47, 49, 50

Lamotte, 138, 141

Large, Lieutenant, 323

Lasbourde, Commandant de, D.S.O., 335, 336

La Vacquerie, 79, 80

Laventie, 227, 228, 235

Lawford, General, 31

Lawrie, General, 47, 53

Lawson, Colonel, 158, 299

Leatheart, Major, 318

Lee, General, 105, 109, 153, 218

Le Fleming, Colonel, 98

Lenin, 3

Lens, 6

Le Plantin, 230, 231, 232, 295, 297, 298

Le Quesnel, 169, 170, 173

Le Quesnoy, 170

Leslie, Brigadier-General, 271

Lestrem, 240, 241, 243, 246

Lettow Vorbeck, General, 2

Le Verguier, 94, 95, 127

Lewis, Lieutenant, 266

Liancourt, 169, 170

Libermont, 164, 165, 167, 168

Loisne, 230, 232, 233, 295, 298

Longueval, 69, 61

Louverval, 49, 50

Ludendorff, General, 8

Lumsdon, Brigadier-General, 43

Lys, battle of the: the Flanders front, 223-224; German hopes, 224;
factors in favour of the Allies, 224-226; disaster to and retirement
of Portuguese, 227-229; Fifty-fifth Division at Givenchy, 230-234;
loss of the Lys, 235-246; German attack in the north, 249-256;
British retreat, 256-257; general review of the situation, 258-259;
loss of Armentières, 260; Sir Douglas Haig's "Win or Die" message to
his armies, 261-262; 4th Guards Brigade at Hazebrouck, 263-270;
arrival of First Australian Division, 270-273; loss of Neuve Eglise,
275, 287-289; Nineteenth Division, 286-287, 289-293; enemy attack on
First Division at Givenchy, 294-298; attack on and fall of Kemmel,
300-304; battle of Ridge Wood, 306-309; review of month's fighting on
Flanders front, 310-311



M'Carter, Dr., 45

M'Cullagh, Colonel, 45

Macintosh, Captain, 287

M'Intosh, Private, 46

Mackenzie, General Colin, 98, 246, 299

Maclachlan, Colonel, 159

MacLeod, Colonel, 42

M'Leod, Colonel, 116

Maissemy, 80, 93, 94, 99, 100, 104, 114

Maitland, Brigadier-General, 277, 307

Malassise Farm, 91, 92

Malcolm, General, 93, 203

Mametz, 62, 63

Marcelcave, 139, 143, 144, 148, 151, 204

March, Corporal, 211

Marden, General, 47, 307

Maricourt, 62, 64, 123

Marindin, Brigadier-General, 125

Marshall, General, 2

Martin, Brigadier-General, 97, 245, 315, 317

Marwitz, General von, 9

Massey, Captain, 323

Maude, General Sir F. S., 2

Maxse, General Sir Ivor, 10, 81, 98, 104, 156, 161, 175

Mayne, Brigadier-General, 277, 308

Meerling, Captain, 162

Mezières, 146, 147, 175

Mennessis, 178, 179

Merris, 247, 264, 277

Merville, 228, 240, 244, 245, 247, 258, 260, 277, 278

Mesopotamia, operations in, 2

Messines, 227, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 260,
293

Meteren, 263, 272, 277, 278, 280, 281, 283, 293, 300

Mitchell, Colonel, 43

Monchy, 8, 10, 37

Montauban, 62, 65, 123

Montdidier, 196, 199, 339

Moore, Colonel, 164

Moreuil, 147, 148, 149, 151, 175, 199

Mory, 26, 27, 28, 29

Moyencourt, 164, 167

Moyenneville, 30, 32, 33, 34



Nesham, Major, 25

Nesle, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 169

Neuf Berquin, 245, 247, 277

Neuve Eglise, 260, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 283, 286, 287, 288, 289,
290

Neuville Vitasse, 37, 39, 40, 42

Nicholson, General, 16, 235, 238, 239, 285

Nieppe, 248, 256, 257, 265, 284

Nollet, General, 152

Noreuil, 182, 186

Noreuille, 17, 19

Noyon, 180, 191, 194, 195

Nugent, General, 102



Offoy, 162, 163

O'Gowan, General Wanless, 26

Oppy, 41, 44

O'Sullivan, Sergeant, 28



Pagan, Brigadier-General, 143, 299

Paget, Brigade-Major, 135

Palestine, operations in, 1, 2

Parkes, Major, 290

Passchendaele, 6

Peirs, Colonel, 95

Peizière, 88, 89

Pellé, General, 180, 332, 338

Pereira, General, 53

Peronne, 98, 118, 122, 128

Piave, Italian victory on the, 340

Pinney, General, 262, 263, 273, 277, 278, 284, 307

Pitman, General, 192, 195

Ploegsteert, 253, 254, 255

Plumer, General Sir Herbert, 8, 227, 254, 262, 293, 310

Pœuilly, 96, 97, 127

Polderhoek Château, 7

Pollard, General, 126

Ponsonby, General, 21, 31, 227

Pope, Colonel, 98

Pope, Captain, D.S.O., 335

Portal, General, 195

Porter, Captain, 150

Poyntz, Brigadier-General, 100, 171

Pozières, 62, 63, 64

Prior, Colonel, 49

Proctor, Captain, D.S.O., 97

Pryce, Captain, V.C., 265, 269



Quartermain, Lieutenant, 172

Quast, General von, 226, 261



Ransome, Colonel, 185

Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, 8, 205

Reade, Colonel, 303

Reed, General, V.C., 38, 41, 42, 43

Reedman, Brigadier-General, 264

Rees, Brigadier-General, 96, 315, 316, 318, 319, 320

Regiments:

_Artillery_--

Royal Field Artillery, 17, 59, 69, 90, 110, 123, 176, 178, 191, 251,
266, 323, 330

Royal Horse Artillery, 178, 191

_Cavalry_--

Royal Dragoons, 161, 191

Scots Greys, 184, 187

6th Lancers, 195

12th Lancers, 160

16th Lancers, 181, 195

3rd Hussars, 110

4th Hussars, 195

11th Hussars, 96, 157

20th Hussars, 187

Northumberland Hussars, 191

_Guards_--

Coldstream, 265, 266, 268, 269

Grenadier, 265, 268, 269

Irish, 265, 266, 269

_Infantry_--

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 25, 43, 100, 279, 283, 307, 309

Bedford, 69, 101, 151, 168, 181, 184, 187, 194, 303, 307, 309

Berkshire, 68, 99, 100, 107, 141, 151, 157, 187, 206, 214, 218, 321

Black Watch, 42, 43, 246, 298

Border, 305

Buffs (East Kent), 67, 107, 108, 109, 185

Cambridge, 134, 304

Cameron Highlanders, 42, 43, 121

Cheshire, 125, 251, 303, 332, 333, 334, 337, 338

Devons, 135, 214, 322, 323

Duke of Cornwall's, 163, 170

Durham Light Infantry, 89, 124, 134, 135, 140, 146, 166, 216, 218,
241, 242, 243, 244, 317, 327

East Lancashire, 16, 93, 112, 214, 264, 321

East Surrey, 27, 28, 98, 109, 110, 133, 185, 235

East Yorkshire, 30, 31, 32, 34, 237, 264, 319

Essex, 43, 69, 108, 187, 206, 220

Gloucester, 50, 56, 143, 250, 251, 287, 290, 296, 297, 298, 299, 329,
331, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337

Gordon Highlanders, 37, 39, 42, 99, 157, 158, 246

Hampshire, 43, 52, 294, 299

Hertford, 117, 304

Highland Light Infantry, 25, 36, 124, 126, 235, 237, 273, 274, 275,
276, 277

Inniskilling Fusiliers, 102, 103

King's Liverpool, 22, 39, 40, 101, 160, 161, 170, 172, 231, 232, 233,
234, 282, 283, 306, 307, 308, 309

King's Own Royal Lancaster, 37, 38

King's Own Scottish Borderers, 42, 43, 117, 119, 121, 301

King's Royal Rifles, 7, 22, 105, 146, 149, 162, 164, 166, 167, 273,
274, 275

Lancashire Fusiliers, 36, 93, 94, 150, 232, 302

Leicester, 19, 88, 89, 112, 306, 327

Lincoln, 17, 19, 87, 88, 89, 90, 116, 327

Liverpool Scottish, 231, 234

1st Artists, 69

London Rifle Brigade, 44

1st London, 111, 180

2nd London, 213

3rd London, 111, 112, 181, 182

4th London, 111, 112, 182, 213

8th London (Post Office Rifles), 112, 180, 181, 182, 183

10th London, 213

15th London (Civil Service), 207, 208

15th London (Queen's Westminsters), 44

17th London, 53, 54

18th London, 54, 57, 58

19th London, 54, 58

20th London, 58, 207, 208

22nd London, 208, 209

23rd London, 57, 207, 208

24th London, 207, 211

Manchester, 31, 35, 58, 93, 101, 102, 132, 159

Middlesex, 27, 213, 235, 236, 237, 277, 283, 285, 307, 322

Munster Fusiliers, 91

Norfolk, 49, 69, 70

Northampton, 69, 181, 187, 216, 322

North Staffordshire, 19, 93, 98, 112, 126, 250, 251, 252, 292, 330,
332, 334, 337

Northumberland Fusiliers, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 38, 39, 40, 89, 96,
97, 112, 126, 127, 134, 136, 137, 146, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245,
247, 276, 284, 286, 316, 317, 318

Oxford and Bucks, 56, 83, 84, 99, 141, 157

Queen's (West Surrey), 67, 93, 95, 185, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282

Rifle Brigade, 93, 149, 159, 162, 163, 166, 167, 214

Royal Fusiliers, 7, 15, 22, 67, 68, 140, 151, 184, 187, 193, 194, 206

Royal Irish Fusiliers, 161, 171, 191, 254

Royal Irish Rifles, 102, 103, 254

Royal Scots, 14, 15, 18, 24, 37, 42, 90, 100, 116, 117, 121, 124,
125, 163, 239, 301

Royal Scots Fusiliers, 20, 37, 40, 151, 235, 237, 277

Royal West Kent, 67, 68, 93, 107, 187, 220

Seaforth Highlanders, 43, 292

Sherwood Foresters, 19, 125, 135, 214, 215, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291,
292, 324

Scottish Rifles, 42, 184, 271, 278, 281, 282, 308, 309

Shropshire, 39, 40, 146, 251, 287, 289, 330, 332, 334, 337, 338

Somerset Light Infantry, 105, 170, 294

South Lancashire, 171, 231, 232

South Staffordshire, 19, 52, 303

South Wales Borderers, 251, 255, 257, 297, 332, 336

Suffolk, 14, 16, 18, 23, 24, 26, 38, 69, 206, 235, 236, 238, 239

Sussex, 68, 95, 125, 132, 184, 206, 304

Warwick, 56, 169, 250, 251, 292, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 337

Welsh, 28, 235, 236, 249, 253, 329, 331, 333, 337

Welsh Fusiliers, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 209, 249, 290, 329, 331, 337

West Lancashire, 227, 230

West Riding, 71, 72, 282, 305

West Yorkshire, 32, 33, 70, 72, 149, 213, 215, 255, 322

Wiltshire, 55, 101, 253, 290, 302, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335,
337

Worcester, 50, 56, 99, 250, 273, 274, 275, 287, 290, 329, 330, 331,
333, 334, 335, 336, 337

York and Lancaster, 276, 305

Yorkshire, 24, 98, 159, 166, 171, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 243, 307,
317, 319, 320

Yorkshire Light Infantry, 35, 71, 72, 266, 268, 269, 276

--------

Entrenching Battalions, 96, 106, 107, 112, 140, 146, 166, 167, 177,
179, 185, 189, 190, 194, 190

Royal Army Medical Corps, 45, 77, 286

Royal Engineers, 19, 23, 37, 67, 107, 135, 161, 186, 187, 237, 251,
268, 277, 283, 286, 287, 302

Royal Naval Division, 53, 58, 62, 63, 67, 206, 209

_Overseas Forces_--

Australians, 61, 64, 66, 71, 72, 75, 127, 150, 152, 153, 204, 205,
206, 210, 212, 215, 216, 218, 220, 221, 222, 237, 259, 283, 269, 270,
271, 272, 273, 280, 283, 284, 293, 300

Canadians, 41, 121, 146, 149, 152, 153, 162, 167, 172, 184, 195, 204

New Zealanders, 64, 65, 66, 72, 75, 204, 211, 212, 278, 281, 283

South Africans, 86, 87, 88, 90, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 252, 255, 291



Rheims, 316, 326, 328

Ricardo, Brigadier-General, 102

Richards, Lieutenant, 85

Richardson, Colonel, 111

Richardson, Lieutenant, 186

Rickerby, Lieutenant, 159

Rickman, Colonel, 34

Riddell, Brigadier-General, 96, 97, 135, 244, 315, 317

Ridge Wood, 305, 307, 308, 309

Robecq, 246, 259, 260, 294

Roberts, Colonel, 24

Robertson, General, 47, 53

Robertson, Colonel Forbes, V.C., 248

Robinson, Colonel, 96, 137

Rœux, 43

Roisel, 94, 95

Rollo, Colonel, 309

Romer, General, 18, 281

Ronssoy, 80, 90, 91, 93, 113

Rosenthal, General, 210

Rossignol Wood, 64, 71, 72, 74, 212

Roumania, 3

Rouvroy, 171, 172

Roye, 167, 168, 170, 196

Russell, General Sir A., 72

Russia, events in, 3



St. Emilie, 92, 117

St. Leger, 24, 26, 29

St. Pierre Vaast, 119, 121

St. Quentin, 10, 98, 100, 156

Sadleir-Jackson, Brigadier-General, 106, 194

Sailly Saillisel, 58, 59, 119, 121, 122

Saint, Colonel, 139

Salonica, 2

Scarpe River, 41, 43, 45

Scott, General, 66

Seely, General, 190

Sensée River, 13, 14, 24

Sharples, Driver, 279

Shute, General, 35, 36

Smith, Brigadier-General, 210

Smith, Captain, 297

Soissons, 316, 326, 328

Sole, Colonel, 63, 290

Solly-Flood, General, 31

Somme, the second battle of the: effects of German and Austrian
successes in Russia, 3; in Roumania, 3; in Italy, 4; disposition of
the British Armies, 5-7; enemy preparations for the Great Offensive
of March 21, 1918, 8-10; the German plan, 8; examination of the
British positions, 10-12; general situation on 20th March, 12; attack
on the Sixth Army Corps, 14; loss of Bullecourt, 16; Croisilles
abandoned, 18; losses of the Fifty-ninth Division, 21; capture of
Henin Hill by the enemy, 23; hard fighting by Fortieth Division, 25,
27-31; East Yorkshires at Ervillers, 30-32; West Yorkshires at
Moyenneville, 33-34; recapture of Ayette, 36; successful resistance
before Arras, 37-43; German advance checked in the north, 44-45; work
of the R.A.M.C., 45; of the Artillery, 46; attack on Sixth and
Fifty-first Divisions, 48-53; attack on and retirement of the Fifth
Corps, 53-57; continued German pressure, 57-63; fighting before
Albert, 64-70; defence of Twelfth Division, 66-70; enemy advance
stayed in this sector, 70; results of first week's fighting on Third
Army front summarised, 76-77; losses of Third Army, 77-78; Fifth Army
front on 21st March, 80; its fortifications, 81; position and number
of reserves, 82; story of a redoubt, 83-85; attack upon the Seventh
Corps, 86-92; on the Nineteenth Corps, 92-98; on the Eighteenth
Corps, 98-104; on the Third Corps, 104-112; retreat of the Fifth
Army, 113; the problem before General Gough, 113-115; his plans,
115-116; the Seventh Corps, 116-127; destruction of the South African
Brigade, 120; the Nineteenth Corps, 127-155; defence of the Somme,
127-131; the East Surreys, 133; the Carey line, 142-145; General
Feetham killed, 147; advance of Australians, 152-153; General Watts'
achievement, 154; losses of Nineteenth Corps in the retreat, 154; the
Eighteenth Corps, 156-176; defence of Beauvais by the Gloucesters,
158-159; enemy capture Ham, 160; defence of Le Quesnoy, 170;
experiences of Maxse's Eighteenth Corps summarised, 175-176; Third
Corps, 177-203; Germans force the Crozat Canal line, 178-182; arrival
of the French, 180; fight at Frières Wood, 186; loss of Noyon,
194-195; losses of the Third Corps, 197; end of the retreat, 199;
general observations and criticism, 199-203; losses of Fifth Army,
21st to 28th March, 203; attack upon Albert, 205-209; fighting at
Aveluy Wood, 207-209; Germans capture Villers-Bretonneux, 212-215;
recapture by Australians and Eighth Division, 215-219; turn of the
tide, 220

Sorel, 88, 116, 117

Stanley, Brigadier-General, 100, 101, 160

Stansfeld, Brigadier-General, 287

Steenwerck, 237, 239, 242, 245, 249, 254

Stewart, Colonel (Leicester), 112

Stewart, Colonel (South Staffs), 303

Stockley, General, 94

Stockwell, Brigadier-General, 232

Stokes-Roberts, Colonel, 93

Stone, Brigadier-General, 94

Stoney, Colonel, 275

Strazeele, 237, 272, 278, 281

Strickland, General, 234, 293



Tanner, Brigadier-General, 252

Tanner, Rev. --, 275

Temperley, Colonel, 242, 247, 316, 317

Thompson, Captain, 135

Thomson, Colonel, 319

Thorne, Colonel, 112

Topping, General, 286

Tudor, General, 86, 249, 252, 291

Tweedie, Colonel, 296

Tweedy, Major, 317

Tween, Major, 187

Twiss, Colonel, 33, 34



Vierhouck, 245, 247, 264

Vieux Berquin, 247, 264, 266, 268, 271, 272, 280

Ville-en-Tardenois, 331, 333, 334

Villers-Bretonneux, 153, 155, 199, 212, 213, 215, 219, 220

Vimy Ridge, 6



Walker, General Sir Harold, 271

Walker, Colonel, 132

Wannan, Private, 46

Warden, Colonel, D.S.O., 28

Warre-Dymond, --, 133

Watson, Colonel, 161, 309

Watts, General Sir H., 10, 73, 80, 86, 92, 94, 129, 130, 131, 138,
141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 149, 154

Weedon, Sergeant, 269

Wetherall, Brigadier-General, 83, 85, 157, 168

Whelan, Lieutenant, 91, 92

White, Brigadier-General Hon. R., 156, 157, 158, 203

Whitham, Colonel, 218

Whitworth, Major, 132

Williams, General, 100

Willock, Captain, 141

Wingrove, Major, 289

Witteycombe, Brigadier-General, 102

Wood, Brigadier-General, 107

Woods, Lieutenant, 24

Worgan, Brigadier-General, 111, 180

Wray, General, 238

Wrenford, Colonel, 112

Wright, Colonel, 137

Wulverghem, 254, 256, 258

Wyatt, General, 276

Wytschaete, 248, 249, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 260, 291, 292, 293,
299, 301, 303



Young, Colonel, 120

Ypres, 256, 306



THE END



_Printed in Great Britain by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.




[Illustration: Map to illustrate the British Campaign in France and
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