Transcriber’s Note: This book has some very large tables. These should be viewed on a wide screen.

TRIALS
OF
WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10

NUERNBERG
OCTOBER 1946–APRIL 1949

VOLUME III

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1951

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. C.—Price $3.75 (Buckram)

In April 1949, judgment was rendered in the last of the series of 12 Nuernberg war crimes trials which had begun in October 1946, and were held pursuant to Allied Control Council Law No. 10. Far from being of concern solely to lawyers, these trials are of especial interest to soldiers, historians, students of international affairs, and others. The defendants in these proceedings, charged with war crimes and other offenses against international penal law, were prominent figures in Hitler’s Germany and included such outstanding diplomats and politicians as the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, von Weizsaecker, and cabinet ministers von Krosigk and Lammers; military leaders such as Field Marshals von Leeb, List, and von Kuechler; SS leaders such as Ohlendorf, Pohl, and Hildebrandt; industrialists such as Flick, Alfried Krupp, and the directors of I. G. Farben; and leading professional men such as the famous physician Gerhard Rose, and the jurist and Acting Minister of Justice, Schlegelberger.

In view of the weight of the accusations and the far-flung activities of the defendants, and the extraordinary amount of official contemporaneous German documents introduced in evidence, the records of these trials constitute a major source of historical material covering many events of the fateful years 1933 (and even earlier) to 1945, in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

The Nuernberg trials under Law No. 10 were carried out under the direct authority of the Allied Control Council, as manifested in that law, which authorized the establishment of the Tribunals. The judicial machinery for the trials, including the Military Tribunals and the Office, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, was prescribed by Military Government Ordinance No. 7 and was part of the occupation administration for the American zone, the Office of Military Government (OMGUS). Law No. 10, Ordinance No. 7, and other basic jurisdictional or administrative documents are printed in full hereinafter.

The proceedings in these trials were conducted throughout in the German and English languages, and were recorded in full by stenographic notes, and by electrical sound recording of all oral proceedings. The 12 cases required over 1,200 days of court proceedings and the transcript of these proceedings exceeds 330,000 pages, exclusive of hundreds of documents, books, briefs, etc. Publication of all of this material, accordingly, was quite unfeasible. This series, however, contains the indictments, judgments, and[IV] other important portions of the record of the 12 cases, and it is believed that these materials give a fair picture of the trials, and as full and illuminating a picture as is possible within the space available. Copies of the entire record of the trials are available in the Library of Congress, the National Archives, and elsewhere.

In some cases, due to time limitations, errors of one sort or another have crept into the translations which were available to the Tribunal. In other cases the same document appears in different trials, or even at different parts of the same trial, with variations in translation. For the most part these inconsistencies have been allowed to remain and only such errors as might cause misunderstanding have been corrected.

Volume III of this series is dedicated to the case United States of America vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al. (Case 3). This trial has become known as the Justice Case, because all of the defendants held positions in the Reich system of justice, as officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice or as judges or prosecutors of the Special Courts and the People’s Courts.

Arrangement by subject units for publication[1]

[Moscow Declaration]

Released November 1, 1943

THE UNITED KINGDOM, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-two [thirty-three] United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy.

Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.

[Signed]

[XI]

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson is hereby designated to act as the Representative of the United States and as its Chief of Counsel in preparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of the leaders of the European Axis powers and their principal agents and accessories as the United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an international military tribunal. He shall serve without additional compensation but shall receive such allowance for expenses as may be authorized by the President.

2. The Representative named herein is authorized to select and recommend to the President or to the head of any executive department, independent establishment, or other federal agency necessary personnel to assist in the performance of his duties hereunder. The head of each executive department, independent establishment, and other federal agency is hereby authorized to assist the Representative named herein in the performance of his duties hereunder and to employ such personnel and make such expenditures, within the limits of appropriations now or hereafter available for the purpose, as the Representative named herein may deem necessary to accomplish the purposes of this order, and may make available, assign, or detail for duty with the Representative named herein such members of the armed forces and other personnel as may be requested for such purposes.

3. The Representative named herein is authorized to cooperate with, and receive the assistance of, any foreign Government to the extent deemed necessary by him to accomplish the purposes of this order.

Harry S. Truman

The White House,

May 2, 1945

(F. R. Doc. 45-7256; Filed, May 3, 1945; 10:57 a. m.)

LONDON AGREEMENT OF 8 AUGUST 1945

Whereas the United Nations have from time to time made declarations of their intention that War Criminals shall be brought to justice;

And Whereas the Moscow Declaration of the 30th October 1943 on German atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German Officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free Governments that will be created therein;

And Whereas this Declaration was stated to be without prejudice to the case of major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies;

[XII]

Now therefore the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter called “the Signatories”) acting in the interests of all the United Nations and by their representatives duly authorized thereto have concluded this Agreement.

Article 1. There shall be established after consultation with the Control Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.

Article 2. The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement.

Article 3. Each of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps to make available for the investigation of the charges and trial the major war criminals detained by them who are to be tried by the International Military Tribunal. The Signatories shall also use their best endeavors to make available for investigation of the charges against and the trial before the International Military Tribunal such of the major war criminals as are not in the territories of any of the Signatories.

Article 4. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the provisions established by the Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war criminals to the countries where they committed their crimes.

Article 5. Any Government of the United Nations may adhere to this Agreement by notice given through the diplomatic channel to the Government of the United Kingdom, who shall inform the other signatory and adhering Governments of each such adherence.

Article 6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the powers of any national or occupation court established or to be established in any allied territory or in Germany for the trial of war criminals.

Article 7. This agreement shall come into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for the period of one year and shall continue thereafter, subject to the right of any Signatory to give, through the diplomatic channel, one month’s notice of intention to terminate it. Such termination shall not prejudice any proceedings already taken or any findings already made in pursuance of this Agreement.

In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed the present Agreement.

Done in quadruplicate in London this 8th day of August 1945 each in English, French and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity.

For the Government of the United States of America

Robert H. Jackson

For the Provisional Government of the French Republic

Robert Falco

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Jowitt, C.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

I. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

Article 1. In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be established an International Military Tribunal (hereinafter called “the Tribunal”) for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.

Article 2. The Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with an alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed by each of the Signatories. The alternates shall, so far as they are able, be present at all sessions of the Tribunal. In case of illness of any member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other reason to fulfill his functions, his alternate shall take his place.

Article 3. Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their Counsel. Each Signatory may replace its member of the Tribunal or his alternate for reasons of health or for other good reasons, except that no replacement may take place during a Trial, other than by an alternate.

Article 4.

(a) The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the alternate for any absent member shall be necessary to constitute the quorum.

(b) The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial begins, agree among themselves upon the selection from their number of a President, and the President shall hold office during that trial, or as may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three members. The principle of rotation of presidency for successive trials is agreed. If, however, a session of the Tribunal takes place on the territory of one of the four Signatories, the representative of that Signatory on the Tribunal shall preside.

(c) Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by a majority vote and in case the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the President shall be decisive: provided always that convictions and sentences shall only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least three members of the Tribunal.

Article 5. In case of need and depending on the number of the matters to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; and the establishment, functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be identical, and shall be governed by this Charter.

II. JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:

Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.

Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.

Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

Article 9. At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization.

After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard.

Article 10. In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.

Article 11. Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before a national, military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such court may, after convicting him, impose upon him punishment independent of and additional to the punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such group or organization.

Article 12. The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence.

[XV]

Article 13. The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. These rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter.

III. COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

Article 14. Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of major war criminals.

The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following purposes:

The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority vote and shall appoint a Chairman as may be convenient and in accordance with the principle of rotation: provided that if there is an equal division of vote concerning the designation of a Defendant to be tried by the Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall be charged, that proposal will be adopted which was made by the party which proposed that the particular Defendant be tried, or the particular charges be preferred against him.

Article 15. The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting in collaboration with one another, also undertake the following duties:

It is understood that no witness or Defendant detained by any Signatory shall be taken out of the possession of that Signatory without its assent.

IV. FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS

Article 16. In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the following procedure shall be followed:

V. POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL AND CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL

Article 17. The Tribunal shall have the power

Article 18. The Tribunal shall

Article 19. The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.

Article 20. The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature of any evidence before it is offered so that it may rule upon the relevance thereof.

Article 21. The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of the United Nations, including the acts and documents of the committees set up in the various allied countries for the investigation of war crimes, and the records and findings of military or other Tribunals of any of the United Nations.

Article 22. The permanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin. The first meetings of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a place to be designated by the Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held at Nuremberg, and any subsequent trials shall be held at such places as the Tribunal may decide.

Article 23. One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part in the prosecution at each Trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor may be discharged by him personally, or by any person or persons authorized by him.

The function of Counsel for a Defendant may be discharged at the Defendant’s request by any Counsel professionally qualified to conduct cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any other person who may be specially authorized thereto by the Tribunal.

[XVII]

Article 24. The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following course:

Article 25. All official documents shall be produced, and all court proceedings conducted, in English, French and Russian, and in the language of the Defendant. So much of the record and of the proceedings may also be translated into the language of any country in which the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable in the interests of justice and public opinion.

VI. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

Article 26. The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any Defendant shall give the reasons on which it is based, and shall be final and not subject to review.

Article 27. The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a Defendant, on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just.

Article 28. In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tribunal shall have the right to deprive the convicted person of any stolen property and order its delivery to the Control Council for Germany.

Article 29. In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in accordance with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, which may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may not increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council for Germany, after any Defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers fresh evidence which, in its opinion, would found a fresh charge against him, the Council shall report accordingly to the Committee established under Article 14 hereof, for such action as they may consider proper, having regard to the interests of justice.

VII. EXPENSES

Article 30. The expenses of the Tribunal and of the Trials, shall be charged by the Signatories against the funds allotted for maintenance of the Control Council for Germany.

[XVIII]

PROTOCOL

Whereas an Agreement and Charter regarding the Prosecution of War Criminals was signed in London on the 8th August 1945, in the English, French, and Russian languages.

And whereas a discrepancy has been found to exist between the originals of Article 6, paragraph (c), of the Charter in the Russian language, on the one hand, and the originals in the English and French languages, on the other, to wit, the semi-colon in Article 6, paragraph (c), of the Charter between the words “war” and “or”, as carried in the English and French texts, is a comma in the Russian text,

And whereas it is desired to rectify this discrepancy:

Now, therefore, the undersigned, signatories of the said Agreement on behalf of their respective Governments, duly authorized thereto, have agreed that Article 6, paragraph (c), of the Charter in the Russian text is correct, and that the meaning and intention of the Agreement and Charter require that the said semi-colon in the English text should be changed to a comma, and that the French text should be amended to read as follows:

In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed the present Protocol.

Done in quadruplicate in Berlin this 6th day of October, 1945, each in English, French, and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity.

For the Government of the United States of America

Robert H. Jackson

For the Provisional Government of the French Republic

François de Menthon

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Hartley Shawcross

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

R. Rudenko

CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

In order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto and in order to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal, the Control Council enacts as follows:

[XIX]

Article I

The Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 “Concerning Responsibility of Hitlerites for Committed Atrocities” and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 “Concerning Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis” are made integral parts of this Law. Adherence to the provisions of the London Agreement by any of the United Nations, as provided for in Article V of that Agreement, shall not entitle such Nation to participate or interfere in the operation of this Law within the Control Council area of authority in Germany.

Article II

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

(b) War Crimes. Atrocities or offences against persons or property constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose, of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

(c) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.

(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.

2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a), if he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country.

3. Any person found guilty of any of the Crimes above mentioned may upon conviction be punished as shall be determined by the tribunal to be just. Such punishment may consist of one or more of the following:

[XX]

Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of which is ordered by the Tribunal shall be delivered to the Control Council for Germany, which shall decide on its disposal.

4. (a) The official position of any person, whether as Head of State or as a responsible official in a Government Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or entitle him to mitigation of punishment.

(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation.

5. In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to, the accused shall not be entitled to the benefits of any statute of limitation in respect of the period from 30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945, nor shall any immunity, pardon or amnesty granted under the Nazi regime be admitted as a bar to trial or punishment.

Article III

1. Each occupying authority, within its Zone of occupation,

(a) shall have the right to cause persons within such Zone suspected of having committed a crime, including those charged with crime by one of the United Nations, to be arrested and shall take under control the property, real and personal, owned or controlled by the said persons, pending decisions as to its eventual disposition.

(b) shall report to the Legal Directorate the names of all suspected criminals, the reasons for and the places of their detention, if they are detained, and the names and locations of witnesses.

(c) shall take appropriate measures to see that witnesses and evidence will be available when required.

(d) shall have the right to cause all persons so arrested and charged, and not delivered to another authority as herein provided, or released, to be brought to trial before an appropriate tribunal. Such tribunal may, in the case of crimes committed by persons of German citizenship or nationality against other persons of German citizenship or nationality, or stateless persons, be a German Court, if authorized by the occupying authorities.

2. The tribunal by which persons charged with offenses hereunder shall be tried and the rules and procedure thereof shall be determined or designated by each Zone Commander for his respective Zone. Nothing herein is intended to, or shall impair or limit the jurisdiction or power of any court or tribunal now or hereafter established in any Zone by the Commander thereof, or of the International Military Tribunal established by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945.

3. Persons wanted for trial by an International Military Tribunal will not be tried without the consent of the Committee of Chief Prosecutors. Each Zone Commander will deliver such persons who are within his Zone to that committee upon request and will make witnesses and evidence available to it.

4. Persons known to be wanted for trial in another Zone or outside Germany will not be tried prior to decision under Article IV unless the fact of their apprehension has been reported in accordance with Section 1 (b) of this Article, three months have elapsed thereafter, and no request for delivery of the type contemplated by Article IV has been received by the Zone Commander concerned.

5. The execution of death sentences may be deferred by not to exceed one month after the sentence has become final when the Zone Commander concerned has reason to believe that the testimony of those under sentence[XXI] would be of value in the investigation and trial of crimes within or without his Zone.

6. Each Zone Commander will cause such effect to be given to the judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction, with respect to the property taken under his control pursuant hereto, as he may deem proper in the interest of justice.

Article IV

1. When any person in a Zone in Germany is alleged to have committed a crime, as defined in Article II, in a country other than Germany or in another Zone, the government of that nation or the Commander of the latter Zone, as the case may be, may request the Commander of the Zone in which the person is located for his arrest and delivery for trial to the country or Zone in which the crime was committed. Such request for delivery shall be granted by the Commander receiving it unless he believes such person is wanted for trial or as a witness by an International Military Tribunal, or in Germany, or in a nation other than the one making the request, or the Commander is not satisfied that delivery should be made, in any of which cases he shall have the right to forward the said request to the Legal Directorate of the Allied Control Authority. A similar procedure shall apply to witnesses, material exhibits and other forms of evidence.

2. The Legal Directorate shall consider all requests referred to it, and shall determine the same in accordance with the following principles, its determination to be communicated to the Zone Commander.

(a) A person wanted for trial or as a witness by an International Military Tribunal shall not be delivered for trial or required to give evidence outside Germany, as the case may be, except upon approval of the Committee of Chief Prosecutors acting under the London Agreement of 8 August 1945.

(b) A person wanted for trial by several authorities (other than an International Military Tribunal) shall be disposed of in accordance with the following priorities:

(1) If wanted for trial in the Zone in which he is, he should not be delivered unless arrangements are made for his return after trial elsewhere;

(2) If wanted for trial in a Zone other than that in which he is, he should be delivered to that Zone in preference to delivery outside Germany unless arrangements are made for his return to that Zone after trial elsewhere;

(3) If wanted for trial outside Germany by two or more of the United Nations, of one of which he is a citizen, that one should have priority;

(4) If wanted for trial outside Germany by several countries, not all of which are United Nations, United Nations should have priority;

(5) If wanted for trial outside Germany by two or more of the United Nations, then, subject to Article IV 2 (b) (3) above, that which has the most serious charges against him, which are moreover supported by evidence, should have priority.

Article V

The delivery, under Article IV of this Law, of persons for trial shall be made on demands of the Governments or Zone Commanders in such a manner that the delivery of criminals to one jurisdiction will not become the means of defeating or unnecessarily delaying the carrying out of justice in another place. If within six months the delivered person has not been convicted by the Court of the zone or country to which he has been delivered, then such[XXII] person shall be returned upon demand of the Commander of the Zone where the person was located prior to delivery.

Done at Berlin, 20 December 1945.

Joseph T. McNarney

General

B. L. Montgomery

Field Marshal

L. Koeltz

Général de Corps d’Armée

for P. Koenig

Général d’Armée

G. Zhukov

Marshal of the Soviet Union

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9679

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. In addition to the authority vested in the Representative of the United States and its Chief of Counsel by Paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, to prepare and prosecute charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of the leaders of the European Axis powers and their accessories as the United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an international military tribunal, such Representative and Chief of Counsel shall have the authority to proceed before United States military or occupation tribunals, in proper cases, against other Axis adherents, including but not limited to cases against members of groups and organizations declared criminal by the said international military tribunal.

2. The present Representative and Chief of Counsel is authorized to designate a Deputy Chief of Counsel, to whom he may assign responsibility for organizing and planning the prosecution of charges of atrocities and war crimes, other than those now being prosecuted as Case No. 1 in the international military tribunal, and, as he may be directed by the Chief of Counsel, for conducting the prosecution of such charges of atrocities and war crimes.

3. Upon vacation of office by the present Representative and Chief of Counsel, the functions, duties, and powers of the Representative of the United States and its Chief of Counsel, as specified in the said Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, as amended by this order, shall be vested in a Chief of Counsel for War Crimes to be appointed by the United States Military Governor for Germany or by his successor.

[XXIII]

4. The said Executive Order No. 9547 of May 2, 1945, is amended accordingly.

Harry S. Truman

The White House,

January 16, 1946.

(F. R. Doc. 46-893; Filed, Jan. 17, 1946; 11:08 a. m.)

HEADQUARTERS
US FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

General Orders

No. 301

24 October 1946

I....OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES. Effective this date, the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes is transferred to the Office of Military Government for Germany (US). The Chief of Counsel for War Crimes will report directly to the Deputy Military Governor and will work in close liaison with the Legal Adviser of the Office of Military Government for Germany and with the Theater Judge Advocate.

II....CHIEF PROSECUTOR. Effective this date, the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes will also serve as Chief Prosecutor under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, established by the Agreement of 8 August 1945.

III....ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS. Effective this date, Brigadier General Telford Taylor, USA, is announced as Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, in which capacity he will also serve as Chief Prosecutor for the United States under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, established by the Agreement of 8 August 1945.

By command of GENERAL McNARNEY:

Official:

GEORGE F. HERBERT

Colonel, AGD

Adjutant General

Distribution: D

MILITARY GOVERNMENT—GERMANY UNITED STATES ZONE ORDINANCE NO. 7

ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF CERTAIN MILITARY TRIBUNALS

Article I

The purpose of this Ordinance is to provide for the establishment of military tribunals which shall have power to try and punish persons charged with[XXIV] offenses recognized as crimes in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, including conspiracies to commit any such crimes. Nothing herein shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the powers of other courts established or which may be established for the trial of any such offenses.

Article II

(a) Pursuant to the powers of the Military Governor for the United States Zone of Occupation within Germany and further pursuant to the powers conferred upon the Zone Commander by Control Council Law No. 10 and Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 certain tribunals to be known as “Military Tribunals” shall be established hereunder.

(b) Each such tribunal shall consist of three or more members to be designated by the Military Governor. One alternate member may be designated to any tribunal if deemed advisable by the Military Governor. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Article, all members and alternates shall be lawyers who have been admitted to practice, for at least five years, in the highest courts of one of the United States or its territories or of the District of Columbia, or who have been admitted to practice in the United States Supreme Court.

(c) The Military Governor may in his discretion enter into an agreement with one or more other zone commanders of the member nations of the Allied Control Authority providing for the joint trial of any case or cases. In such cases the tribunals shall consist of three or more members as may be provided in the agreement. In such cases the tribunals may include properly qualified lawyers designated by the other member nations.

(d) The Military Governor shall designate one of the members of the tribunal to serve as the presiding judge.

(e) Neither the tribunals nor the members of the tribunals or the alternates may be challenged by the prosecution or by the defendants or their counsel.

(f) In case of illness of any member of a tribunal or his incapacity for some other reason, the alternate, if one has been designated, shall take his place as a member in the pending trial. Members may be replaced for reasons of health or for other good reasons, except that no replacement of a member may take place, during a trial, other than by the alternate. If no alternate has been designated, the trial shall be continued to conclusion by the remaining members.

(g) The presence of three members of the tribunal or of two members when authorized pursuant to subsection (f) supra shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. In the case of tribunals designated under (c) above the agreement shall determine the requirements for a quorum.

(h) Decisions and judgments, including convictions and sentences, shall be by majority vote of the members. If the votes of the members are equally divided, the presiding member shall declare a mistrial.

Article III

(a) Charges against persons to be tried in the tribunals established hereunder shall originate in the Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, appointed by the Military Governor pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Executive Order Numbered 9679 of the President of the United States dated 16 January 1946. The Chief of Counsel for War Crimes shall determine the persons to be tried by the tribunals and he or his designated representative shall file the[XXV] indictments with the Secretary General of the tribunals (see Article XIV, infra) and shall conduct the prosecution.

(b) The Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, when in his judgment it is advisable, may invite one or more United Nations to designate representatives to participate in the prosecution of any case.

Article IV

In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the following procedure shall be followed:

(a) A defendant shall be furnished, at a reasonable time before his trial, a copy of the indictment and of all documents lodged with the indictment, translated into a language which he understands. The indictment shall state the charges plainly, concisely and with sufficient particulars to inform defendant of the offenses charged.

(b) The trial shall be conducted in, or translated into, a language which the defendant understands.

(c) A defendant shall have the right to be represented by counsel of his own selection, provided such counsel shall be a person qualified under existing regulations to conduct cases before the courts of defendant’s country, or any other person who may be specially authorized by the tribunal. The tribunal shall appoint qualified counsel to represent a defendant who is not represented by counsel of his own selection.

(d) Every defendant shall be entitled to be present at his trial except that a defendant may be proceeded against during temporary absences if in the opinion of the tribunal defendant’s interests will not thereby be impaired, and except further as provided in Article VI (c). The tribunal may also proceed in the absence of any defendant who has applied for and has been granted permission to be absent.

(e) A defendant shall have the right through his counsel to present evidence at the trial in support of his defense, and to cross-examine any witness called by the prosecution.

(f) A defendant may apply in writing to the tribunal for the production of witnesses or of documents. The application shall state where the witness or document is thought to be located and shall also state the facts to be proved by the witness or the document and the relevancy of such facts to the defense. If the tribunal grants the application, the defendant shall be given such aid in obtaining production of evidence as the tribunal may order.

Article V

The tribunals shall have the power

(a) to summon witnesses to the trial, to require their attendance and testimony and to put questions to them;

(b) to interrogate any defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, or who is called to testify regarding any other defendant;

(c) to require the production of documents and other evidentiary material;

(d) to administer oaths;

(e) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by the tribunals including the taking of evidence on commission;

(f) to adopt rules of procedure not inconsistent with this Ordinance. Such rules shall be adopted, and from time to time as necessary, revised by the members of the tribunal or by the committee of presiding judges as provided in Article XIII.

[XXVI]

Article VI

The tribunals shall

(a) confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges;

(b) take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever;

(c) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including the exclusion of any defendant or his counsel from some or all further proceedings, but without prejudice to the determination of the charges.

Article VII

The tribunals shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. They shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which they deem to have probative value. Without limiting the foregoing general rules, the following shall be deemed admissible if they appear to the tribunal to contain information of probative value relating to the charges: affidavits, depositions, interrogations, and other statements, diaries, letters, the records, findings, statements and judgments of the military tribunals and the reviewing and confirming authorities of any of the United Nations, and copies of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents of any document, if the original is not readily available or cannot be produced without delay. The tribunal shall afford the opposing party such opportunity to question the authenticity or probative value of such evidence as in the opinion of the tribunal the ends of justice require.

Article VIII

The tribunals may require that they be informed of the nature of any evidence before it is offered so that they may rule upon the relevance thereof.

Article IX

The tribunals shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. They shall also take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of any of the United Nations, including the acts and documents of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for the investigation of war crimes, and the records and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United Nations.

Article X

The determinations of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment in Case No. 1 that invasions, aggressive acts, aggressive wars, crimes, atrocities or inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall be binding on the tribunals established hereunder and shall not be questioned except insofar as the participation therein or knowledge thereof by any particular person may be concerned. Statements of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment in Case No. 1 constitute proof of the facts stated, in the absence of substantial new evidence to the contrary.

Article XI

The proceedings at the trial shall take the following course:

(a) The tribunal shall inquire of each defendant whether he has received[XXVII] and had an opportunity to read the indictment against him and whether he pleads “guilty” or “not guilty.”

(b) The prosecution may make an opening statement.

(c) The prosecution shall produce its evidence subject to the cross examination of its witnesses.

(d) The defense may make an opening statement.

(e) The defense shall produce its evidence subject to the cross examination of its witnesses.

(f) Such rebutting evidence as may be held by the tribunal to be material may be produced by either the prosecution or the defense.

(g) The defense shall address the court.

(h) The prosecution shall address the court.

(i) Each defendant may make a statement to the tribunal.

(j) The tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence.

Article XII

A Central Secretariat to assist the tribunals to be appointed hereunder shall be established as soon as practicable. The main office of the Secretariat shall be located in Nurnberg. The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary General and such assistant secretaries, military officers, clerks, interpreters and other personnel as may be necessary.

Article XIII

The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Military Governor and shall organize and direct the work of the Secretariat. He shall be subject to the supervision of the members of the tribunals, except that when at least three tribunals shall be functioning, the presiding judges of the several tribunals may form the supervisory committee.

Article XIV

The Secretariat shall:

(a) Be responsible for the administrative and supply needs of the Secretariat and of the several tribunals.

(b) Receive all documents addressed to tribunals.

(c) Prepare and recommend uniform rules of procedure, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance.

(d) Secure such information for the tribunals as may be needed for the approval or appointment of defense counsel.

(e) Serve as liaison between the prosecution and defense counsel.

(f) Arrange for aid to be given defendants and the prosecution in obtaining production of witnesses or evidence as authorized by the tribunals.

(g) Be responsible for the preparation of the records of the proceedings before the tribunals.

(h) Provide the necessary clerical, reporting and interpretative services to the tribunals and its members, and perform such other duties as may be required for the efficient conduct of the proceedings before the tribunals, or as may be requested by any of the tribunals.

Article XV

The judgments of the tribunals as to the guilt or the innocence of any defendant shall give the reasons on which they are based and shall be final and not subject to review. The sentences imposed may be subject to review as provided in Article XVII, infra.

[XXVIII]

Article XVI

The tribunal shall have the right to impose upon the defendant, upon conviction, such punishment as shall be determined by the tribunal to be just, which may consist of one or more of the penalties provided in Article II, Section 3 of Control Council Law No. 10.

Article XVII

(a) Except as provided in (b) infra, the record of each case shall be forwarded to the Military Governor who shall have the power to mitigate, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed by the tribunal, but may not increase the severity thereof.

(b) In cases tried before tribunals authorized by Article II (c), the sentence shall be reviewed jointly by the zone commanders of the nations involved, who may mitigate, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence by majority vote, but may not increase the severity thereof. If only two nations are represented, the sentence may be altered only by the consent of both zone commanders.

Article XVIII

No sentence of death shall be carried into execution unless and until confirmed in writing by the Military Governor. In accordance with Article III, Section 5 of Law No. 10, execution of the death sentence may be deferred by not to exceed one month after such confirmation if there is reason to believe that the testimony of the convicted person may be of value in the investigation and trial of other crimes.

Article XIX

Upon the pronouncement of a death sentence by a tribunal established thereunder and pending confirmation thereof, the condemned will be remanded to the prison or place where he was confined and there be segregated from the other inmates, or be transferred to a more appropriate place of confinement.

Article XX

Upon the confirmation of a sentence of death the Military Governor will issue the necessary orders for carrying out the execution.

Article XXI

Where sentence of confinement for a term of years has been imposed the condemned shall be confined in the manner directed by the tribunal imposing sentence. The place of confinement may be changed from time to time by the Military Governor.

Article XXII

Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of which is ordered by a tribunal shall be delivered to the Military Governor, for disposal in accordance with Control Council Law No. 10, Article II (3).

Article XXIII

Any of the duties and functions of the Military Governor provided for herein may be delegated to the Deputy Military Governor. Any of the duties and functions of the Zone Commander provided for herein may be exercised[XXIX] by and in the name of the Military Governor and may be delegated to the Deputy Military Governor.

This Ordinance becomes effective 18 October 1946.

By order of Military Government:

MILITARY GOVERNMENT—GERMANY
ORDINANCE NO. 11

Article I

Article V of Ordinance No. 7 is amended by adding thereto a new subdivision to be designated “(g)”, reading as follows:

“(g) The presiding judges, and, when established, the supervisory committee of presiding judges provided in Article XIII shall assign the cases brought by the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes to the various Military Tribunals for trial.”

Article II

Ordinance No. 7 is amended by adding thereto a new article following Article V to be designated Article V-B, reading as follows:

“(a) A joint session of the Military Tribunals may be called by any of the presiding judges thereof or upon motion, addressed to each of the Tribunals, of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes or of counsel for any defendant whose interests are affected, to hear argument upon and to review any interlocutory ruling by any of the Military Tribunals on a fundamental or important legal question either substantive or procedural, which ruling is in conflict with or is inconsistent with a prior ruling of another of the Military Tribunals.

“(b) A joint session of the Military Tribunals may be called in the same manner as provided in subsection (a) of this Article to hear argument upon and to review conflicting or inconsistent final rulings contained in the decisions or judgments of any of the Military Tribunals on a fundamental or important legal question, either substantive or procedural. Any motion with respect to such final ruling shall be filed within ten (10) days following the issuance of decision or judgment.

“(c) Decisions by joint sessions of the Military Tribunals, unless thereafter altered in another joint session, shall be binding upon all the Military Tribunals. In the case of the review of final rulings by joint sessions, the judgments reviewed may be confirmed or remanded for action consistent with the joint decision.

“(d) The presence of a majority of the members of each Military Tribunal then constituted is required to constitute a quorum.

“(e) The members of the Military Tribunals shall, before any joint session begins, agree among themselves upon the selection from their number of a member to preside over the joint session.

“(f) Decisions shall be by majority vote of the members. If the votes of the members are equally divided, the vote of the member presiding over the session shall be decisive.”

[XXX]

Article III

Subdivisions (g) and (h) of Article XI of Ordinance No. 7 are deleted; subdivision (i) is relettered “(h)”; subdivision (j) is relettered “(i)”; and a new subdivision, to be designated “(g)”, is added, reading as follows:

“(g) The prosecution and defense shall address the court in such order as the Tribunal may determine.”

This Ordinance becomes effective 17 February 1947.

By order of the Military Government:

Military Tribunal III

Case 3

The United States of America

—against—

The “Justice Case” was officially designated United States of America vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al. (Case 3). Of the sixteen defendants indicted, nine were officials in the Reich Ministry of Justice. The two persons who held the position of Reich Minister of Justice during the Hitler regime, Franz Guertner and Georg Thierack, were both dead before the indictment was filed. Between Guertner’s death in January 1941 and Thierack’s appointment in August 1942, the defendant Schlegelberger served as Acting Reich Minister of Justice. The defendants Schlegelberger, Rothenberger, and Klemm each had held the position of Under Secretary (“Staatssekretaer”, also translated as State Secretary) in the Reich Ministry of Justice. Two other officials of this Ministry were indicted but not tried: the defendant Westphal committed suicide in Nuernberg jail after indictment and before the opening of the trial; a mistrial was declared as to the defendant Engert, whose physical condition prevented his presence in court for most of the trial. The defendants who were not officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice included the chief public prosecutor of the People’s Court and several prosecutors and judges of both the Special Courts and the People’s Courts. Both the Special and the People’s Courts were established as important parts of the administration of justice during the Nazi regime.

All sixteen defendants named in the indictment were charged with criminal responsibility under the first three counts of the indictment. Count one charged participation in a conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity; count two alleged the commission of war crimes against civilians of territories occupied by Germany and against members of the armed forces of nations at war with Germany after September 1939; count three charged the commission of crimes against humanity, including offenses against both German civilians and the nationals of occupied countries, after the outbreak of World War II. The specific offenses charged included murder, persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds, deportation and enslavement, plunder of private property, torture and other atrocities. Count four charged seven of the defendants with membership in the SS, the SD, or the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, all organizations declared to be criminal by the International Military Tribunal.

[4]

During the course of the trial the Tribunal ruled with respect to count one “that neither the Charter of the International Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law No. 10 has defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against humanity as a separate substantive crime; therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any defendant upon a charge of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense.” However, the Tribunal ruled further that count one “also alleges unlawful participation in the formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity which actually involved the commission of such crimes. We therefore cannot properly strike the whole of count one from the indictment, but, insofar as count one charges the commission of the alleged crime of conspiracy as a separate substantive offense, distinct from any war crime or crime against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that charge.” Judge Blair, in a separate opinion filed at the time of judgment, dissented from this ruling, declaring that the Tribunal should have declared that the military tribunals created under Ordinance No. 7 had jurisdiction over “conspiracy to commit” any and all crimes defined in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10.

Of the 14 defendants who stood trial to the end, ten were convicted on one or more counts, and four were acquitted on all counts.

The Justice Case was tried at the Palace of Justice in Nuernberg before Military Tribunal III. Early in June 1947, the presiding judge became ill, and for this reason the sessions of the Tribunal had to be temporarily suspended. Thereupon the Tribunal designated the other two members and the alternate member as commissioners of the Tribunal to hear the testimony of a number of available witnesses whose affidavits had been introduced in evidence by the prosecution and who had been requested for cross-examination by the defense. Accordingly, the commissioners held hearings to take the further testimony of 13 prosecution affiants on 3, 4, and 5 June 1947. The presiding judge still remained incapacitated due to severe illness. Consequently, on 19 June 1947, shortly before the beginning of the defense case, the Tribunal was reconstituted pursuant to Article II of Military Government Ordinance No. 7, and the alternate judge, who had been present throughout the sessions of the trial, replaced the incapacitated member. Hearings before the Tribunal or the commissioners of the Tribunal were held on 129 separate days. The trial, from indictment to judgment, lasted 11 months. The course of the trial and subsequent related proceedings is shown in the following table:

[5]

The English transcript of the Court proceedings, including the judgment, the separate opinion of Judge Blair, and the sentences, runs to 10,964 mimeographed pages. The prosecution introduced into evidence 641 written exhibits (some of which contained several documents), and the defense 1,452 written exhibits. The exhibits offered by the prosecution and the defense contained documents, photographs, affidavits, interrogatories, letters, charts, and other written evidence. Approximately 600 of these written exhibits were affidavits, more than 500 of which were introduced by the defense. The Tribunal and the members thereof sitting as commissioners heard the testimony of approximately 140 witnesses, including that of twelve of the defendants who elected to testify. Each of the defendants who testified was subject to examination on behalf of the other defendants. Many of the witnesses heard by the Tribunal itself, and all of the witnesses whose testimony was taken in the commission, were prosecution affiants who were called for cross-examination by the defense.

The case-in-chief of the prosecution began on 5 March 1947 and ended on 5 June 1947, subject to the understanding that several prosecution affiants requested for cross-examination by the defense and not immediately available for cross-examination, could be cross-examined by the defense during the defense case. The Tribunal was in recess between 28 May 1947 and 23 June 1947, during which period the commissioners of the Tribunals held hearings on three successive days. The defense case began on 23 June 1947 and ended on 26 September 1947. The Tribunal was in recess between 26 September 1947 and 13 October 1947, to give both the prosecution and the defense additional time to prepare the closing statements.

[6]

The members of the Tribunal and prosecution and defense counsel are listed on the ensuing pages. Prosecution counsel were assisted in preparing the case by Walter Rapp (Chief of the Evidence Division), Fred Niebergall (Chief of the Document Branch), Peter Beauvais, interrogator, and Arnold Buchtal and Henry Einstein, research and documentary analysts.

Selection and arrangement of the Justice Case material published herein was accomplished principally by Robert D. King, working under the general supervision of Drexel A. Sprecher, Deputy Chief Counsel and Director of Publications, Office U.S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes. Arnold Buchtal, Paul H. Gantt, Gertrude Ferencz, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Julia Kerr, and Walter Schonfeld assisted in selecting, compiling, editing, and indexing the numerous papers.

John H. E. Fried, Special Legal Consultant to the Tribunals, reviewed and approved the selection and arrangement of the material as the designated representative of the Nuernberg Tribunals.

Final compilation and editing of the manuscript for printing was administered by the War Crimes Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, under the supervision of Richard A. Olbeter, Chief, Special Projects Branch, with Evelyn A. Goldblatt and Robert F. Phelps as editors and Harry Jacobs and John W. Mosenthal as research analysts.

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
APO 472

General Orders

No. 11

14 February 1947

Pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 7

1. Effective as of 13 February 1947, pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 7, 24 October 1946, entitled “Organization and Powers of Certain Military Tribunals,” there is hereby constituted, Military Tribunal III.

2. The following are designated as members of Military Tribunal III:

3. The Tribunal shall convene at Nurnberg, Germany, to hear such cases as may be filed by the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes or by his duly designated representative.

By Command of Lieutenant General Clay:

Official:

A. D. Van Orsdel

Lieutenant Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

Seal:

Office of Military Government for Germany (US)

Official

DISTRIBUTION: “B” plus

2—AG MRU, USFET

[8]

General Orders

No. 69

27 June 1947

Pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 7

1. Confirming verbal order Commander-in-Chief, European Command, 19 June 1947, and pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 7, 24 October 1946, entitled “Organization and Powers of Certain Military Tribunals”, James T. Brand is appointed Presiding Judge of Military Tribunal III vice Carrington T. Marshall, relieved because of illness.

2. Confirming verbal order Commander-in-Chief, European Command, 19 June 1947, Justin William Harding,[4] Alternate Judge, is appointed Judge for Military Tribunal III.

By Command of General Clay:

Official:

George E. Norton, Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel, AGD

Asst. Adjutant General

Seal: Official Headquarters

European Command

DISTRIBUTION: “B” plus

2—AG, MRU, EUCOM

2—The Adjutant General

War Department

Attn: Operations Branch AG AO-I

1—OPO Reports Section

800—Hq EUCOM

[9]

TRIBUNAL III—CASE THREE

James T. Brand; Carrington T. Marshall, presiding; Mallory P. Blair; Justin W. Harding, alternate. [Presiding Judge Marshall was obliged to retire because of illness at which time Judge Brand became presiding judge and Alternate Judge Harding became a member judge.

[10]

The defendants in the dock. Left to right: front row, Franz Schlegelberger, Herbert Klemm, Curt Rothenberger, Ernst Lautz, Wolfgang Mettgenberg, Wilhelm Von Ammon, Guenther Joel, Oswald Rothaug, Paul Barnickel, Hans Petersen, Guenther Nebelung. Back row, Hermann Cuhorst, Rudolf Oeschey, and Joseph Altstoetter. In front of defendants’ dock are defense counsel. Interpreters are behind glass partition at upper right.

[11]

Charles M. LaFollette, Deputy Chief Counsel at the reading of the indictment.

[12]

Defendant Hermann Cuhorst, on the witness stand, conferring with defense counsel.

Judge Carrington T. Marshall, Presiding Judge (to 19 June 1947).

Formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.

Judge James T. Brand, Member (to 19 June 1947), and Presiding Judge (from 19 June 1947).

Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.

Judge Mallory B. Blair, Member.

Associate Justice of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third District of the State of Texas.

Judge Justin W. Harding, Alternate Member (to 19 June 1947), and Member (from 19 June 1947).

Formerly Assistant Attorney General of the State of Ohio and District Judge of the First Division of the Territory of Alaska.

ASSISTANT SECRETARIES GENERAL

Chief of Counsel:

Brigadier General Telford Taylor

Deputy Chief Counsel:

Charles M. LaFollette

Associate Counsel:

Robert D. King

Alfred M. Wooleyhan

Assistant Counsel:

Sadie B. Arbuthnot

DEFENDANTS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL

The United States of America, by the undersigned Telford Taylor, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, duly appointed to represent said Government in the prosecution of war criminals, charges that the defendants herein participated in a common design or conspiracy to commit and did commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, duly enacted by the Allied Control Council on 20 December 1945. These crimes included murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, plunder of private property, and other inhumane acts, as set forth in counts one, two, and three of this indictment. Certain defendants are further charged with membership in criminal organizations, as set forth in count four of this indictment.

The persons accused as guilty of these crimes and accordingly named as defendants in this case are:

Josef Altstoetter—Chief (Ministerialdirektor) of the Civil Law and Procedure Division (Abteilung VI) of the Reich Ministry of Justice; and Oberfuehrer in the SS.

Wilhelm von Ammon—Ministerial Counsellor (Ministerialrat) of the Criminal Legislation and Administration Division (Abteilung IV) of the Reich Ministry of Justice and coordinator of proceedings against foreigners for offenses against Reich occupational forces abroad.

Paul Barnickel—Senior Public Prosecutor (Reichsanwalt) of the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof); Sturmfuehrer in the SA.

Hermann Cuhorst—Chief Justice (Senatspraesident) of the Special Court (Sondergericht) in Stuttgart; Chief Justice of the First Criminal Senate of the District Court (Landgericht) in Stuttgart; member of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party at Gau executive level; sponsoring member (Foerderndes Mitglied) of the SS.

Karl Engert—Chief (Ministerialdirektor) of the Penal Administration Division (Abteilung V) and of the secret Prison Inmate Transfer Division (Abteilung XV) of the Reich Ministry of Justice; Oberfuehrer in the SS; Vice President of the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof); Ortsgruppenleiter in the NSDAP Leadership Corps.

Guenther Joel—Legal Adviser (Referent) to the Reich Minister of Justice concerning criminal prosecutions; Chief Public[16] Prosecutor (Generalstaatsanwalt) of Westphalia at Hamm; Obersturmbannfuehrer in the SS; Untersturmbannfeuhrer [sic] in the SD.

Herbert Klemm—State Secretary (Staatssekretaer)[6] of the Reich Ministry of Justice; Director (Ministerialdirektor) of the Legal Education and Training Division (Abteilung II) in the Ministry of Justice; Deputy Director of the National Socialist Lawyers League (NS Rechtswahrerbund); Obergruppenfuehrer in the SA.

Ernst Lautz—Chief Public Prosecutor (Oberreichsanwalt) of the People’s Court.

Wolfgang Mettgenberg—Representative of the Chief (Ministerialdirigent) of the Criminal Legislation and Administration Division (Abteilung IV) of the Reich Ministry of Justice, particularly supervising criminal offenses against German occupational forces in occupied territories.

Guenther Nebelung—Chief Justice of the Fourth Senate of the People’s Court; Sturmfuehrer in the SA; Ortsgruppenleiter in the NSDAP Leadership Corps.

Rudolf Oeschey—Judge (Landgerichtsrat) of the Special Court in Nuernberg and successor to the defendant Rothaug as Chief Justice (Landgerichtsdirektor) of the same court; member of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party at Gau executive level (Gauhauptstellenleiter); an executive (Kommissarischer Leiter) of the National Socialist Lawyers League.

Hans Petersen—Lay Judge of the First Senate of the People’s Court; Lay Judge of the Special Senate (Besonderer Senat) of the People’s Court; Obergruppenfuehrer in the SA.

Oswald Rothaug—Senior Public Prosecutor (Reichsanwalt) of the People’s Court; formerly Chief Justice of the Special Court in Nuernberg; member of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party at Gau executive level.

Curt Rothenberger—State Secretary (Staatssekretaer) of the Reich Ministry of Justice; deputy president of the Academy of German Law (Akademie fuer deutsches Recht); Gaufuehrer of the National Socialist Lawyers League.

Franz Schlegelberger—State Secretary; Acting Reich Minister of Justice.

Carl Westphal—Ministerial Counsellor (Ministerialrat) of the Criminal Legislation and Administration Division (Abteilung[17] IV) of the Reich Ministry of Justice, and officially responsible for questions of criminal procedure and penal execution within the Reich; Ministry coordinator for nullity pleas against adjudicated sentences.

COUNT ONE—THE COMMON DESIGN AND CONSPIRACY

1. Between January 1933 and April 1945 all of the defendants herein, acting pursuant to a common design, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree together and with each other and with divers other persons, to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Article II.

2. Throughout the period covered by this indictment all of the defendants herein, acting in concert with each other and with others, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving, the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

3. All of the defendants herein, acting in concert with each other and with others, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices in the formulation and execution of the said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises to commit, and which involved the commission of, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and accordingly are individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts performed by any person or persons in execution of the said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises.

4. The said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises embraced the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as set forth in counts two and three of this indictment, in that the defendants unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly encouraged, aided, abetted, and participated in the commission of atrocities and offenses against persons and property, including plunder of private property, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, unlawful imprisonment, torture, persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, and ill-treatment of, and other inhumane acts against, thousands of persons, including German civilians, nationals of other countries, and prisoners of war.

5. It was a part of the said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises to enact, issue, enforce, and give effect to certain purported statutes, decrees, and orders, which were criminal both in inception and execution, and to work with the Gestapo, SS, SD, SIPO, and RSHA for criminal purposes, in the course of which[18] the defendants, by distortion and denial of judicial and penal process, committed the murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts, more fully described in counts two and three of this indictment.

6. The said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises embraced the assumption by the Reich Ministry of Justice of total control of the administration of justice, including preparation of legislation concerning all branches of law, and control of the courts and prisons. The supreme administration of justice in all German states was transferred to the Reich Ministry of Justice in 1934. Thereupon, certain extraordinary courts of a predominantly political nature, with wide and arbitrary criminal jurisdiction, were superimposed upon the existing ordinary court system. The People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) became the court of original and final jurisdiction in cases of “high treason” and “treason.” This court itself had jurisdiction over the investigation and prosecution of all cases before it, and there was no appeal from its decision. The court’s territorial jurisdiction was extended not only to all annexed countries of the Reich but also to the “Protectorate” (Bohemia and Moravia) in 1939. Beginning in 1933, Special Courts (Sondergerichte) also were superimposed upon the ordinary court system under the Reich Ministry of Justice. These Special Courts were of a character which had been outlawed until the NSDAP seizure of power. Jurisdiction of these Special Courts extended to all “political” cases, as well as to all acts deemed inimical to either the Party, the government, or continued prosecution of the war. At least one Special Court was attached to every court of appeal (Oberlandesgericht); public prosecutors could arbitrarily refer thereto any case from the local courts (Amtsgerichte) or from the criminal division of the district courts (Landgerichte). Despite guaranties in the Weimar Constitution and the German Judicature Act, that no one may be deprived of his competent judge, and prohibitions against irregular tribunals, these courts were imposed upon Germany, as well as upon the “Protectorate” and the occupied countries.

7. The said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises embraced the use of the judicial process as a powerful weapon for the persecution and extermination of all opponents of the Nazi regime regardless of nationality and for the persecution and extermination of “races.” The special political tribunals mentioned above visited cruel punishment and death upon political opponents and members of certain “racial” and national groups. The People’s Court was presided over by a minority of trusted Nazi lawyers, and a majority of equally trusted laymen appointed by Hitler from the Elite Guard and Party hierarchy. The People’s Court in collaboration[19] with the Gestapo became a terror court, notorious for the severity of punishment, secrecy of proceedings, and denial to the accused of all semblance of judicial process. Punishment was meted out by Special Courts to victims under a law which condemned all who offended the “healthy sentiment of the people.” Independence of the judiciary was destroyed. Judges were removed from the bench for political and “racial” reasons. Periodic “letters” were sent by the Ministry of Justice to all Reich judges and public prosecutors, instructing them as to the results they must accomplish. Both the bench and bar were continually spied upon by the Gestapo and SD, and were directed to keep disposition of their cases politically acceptable. Judges, prosecutors and, in many cases, defense counsel were reduced in effect to an administrative arm of the Nazi Party.

COUNT TWO—WAR CRIMES

8. Between September 1939 and April 1945 all of the defendants herein unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed war crimes, as defined by Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving the commission of atrocities and offenses against persons and property, including, but not limited to, plunder of private property, murder, torture, and illegal imprisonment of, and brutalities, atrocities, and other inhumane acts against thousands of persons. These crimes included, but were not limited to, the facts set out in paragraphs 9 to 19, inclusive, of this indictment, and were committed against civilians of occupied territories and members of the armed forces of nations then at war with the German Reich and who were in the custody of the German Reich in the exercise of belligerent control.

9. Extraordinary irregular courts, superimposed upon the regular court system, were used by all of the defendants for the purpose of and in fact creating a reign of terror to suppress political opposition to the Nazi regime. This was accomplished principally through the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) and various Special Courts (Sondergerichte), which subjected civilians of the occupied countries to criminal abuse of judicial and penal process including repeated trials on the same charges, criminal abuse of discretion, unwarranted imposition of the death penalty, prearrangement of sentences between judges and prosecutors, discriminatory trial processes, and other criminal practices, all of which resulted in murders, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, plunder of private property, and other inhumane acts.

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10. Special Courts subjected Jews of all nationalities, Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, and other nationals of the Occupied Eastern Territories, indiscriminately classed as “gypsies”, to discriminatory and special penal laws and trials, and denied them all semblance of judicial process. These persons who had been arbitrarily designated “asocial” by conspiracy and agreement between the Ministry of Justice and the SS were turned over by the Ministry of Justice, both during and after service of prison sentences, to the SS to be worked to death. Many such persons were given a summary travesty of trial before extraordinary courts, and after serving the sentences imposed upon them, were turned over to the Gestapo for “protective custody” in concentration camps. Jews discharged from prison were turned over to the Gestapo for final detention in Auschwitz, Lublin, and other concentration camps. The above-described proceedings resulted in the murder, torture, and ill-treatment of thousands of such persons. The defendants von Ammon, Engert, Klemm, Schlegelberger, Mettgenberg, Rothenberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

11. The German criminal laws, through a series of expansions and perversions by the Ministry of Justice, finally embraced passive defeatism, petty misdemeanors and trivial private utterances as treasonable for the purpose of exterminating Jews or other nationals of the occupied countries. Indictments, trials and convictions were transparent devices for a system of murderous extermination, and death became the routine penalty. Jurisdiction of the German criminal code was extended to the entire world, to cover acts of non-Germans as well as Germans living outside the Reich. Non-German nationals were convicted of and executed for “high treason” allegedly committed against the Reich. The above-described proceedings resulted in the murder, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and ill-treatment of thousands of persons. The defendants Barnickel, Cuhorst, Klemm, Lautz, Mettgenberg, Nebelung, Oeschey, Petersen, Rothaug, Rothenberger, Schlegelberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

12. The Justice Ministry aided and implemented the unlawful annexation and occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France. Special Courts were created to facilitate the extermination of Poles and Jews and the suppression of political opposition generally by the employment of summary procedures and the enforcement of Draconic penal laws. Sentences were limited to death or transfer to the SS for extermination. The People’s Court and Special Courts were projected into these countries, irregular prejudicial regulations and procedures were invoked without notice[21] (even in violation of the Reich Criminal Code as unlawfully extended to other occupied territories), sentences were prearranged, and trial and execution followed service of the indictment within a few hours. The above-described proceedings resulted in the murder, ill-treatment, and unlawful imprisonment of thousands of persons. The defendants Klemm, Lautz, Mettgenberg, Schlegelberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

13. The Ministry of Justice participated with the OKW and the Gestapo in the execution of Hitler’s decree of “Night and Fog” (Nacht und Nebel) whereby civilians of occupied territories who had been accused of crimes of resistance against occupying forces were spirited away for secret trial by certain Special Courts of the Justice Ministry within the Reich, in the course of which the victims’ whereabouts, trial, and subsequent disposition were kept completely secret, thus serving the dual purpose of terrorizing the victims’ relatives and associates and barring recourse to any evidence, witnesses, or counsel for defense. The accused was not informed of the disposition of his case, and in almost every instance those who were acquitted or who had served their sentences were handed over by the Justice Ministry to the Gestapo for “protective custody” for the duration of the war. In the course of the above-described proceedings, thousands of persons were murdered, tortured, ill-treated, and illegally imprisoned. The defendants Altstoetter, von Ammon, Engert, Joel, Klemm, Mettgenberg, and Schlegelberger are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

14. Hundreds of non-German nationals imprisoned in penal institutions operated by the Reich Ministry of Justice were unlawfully executed and murdered. Death sentences were executed in the absence of the necessary official orders, and while clemency pleas were pending. Many who were not sentenced to death were executed. In the face of Allied military advances so-called “inferior” or “asocial” prison inmates were, by Ministry order, executed regardless of sentences under which they served. In many instances these penal institutions were operated in a manner indistinguishable from concentration camps. The defendants Engert, Joel, Klemm, Lautz, Mettgenberg, Rothenberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

15. The Ministry of Justice participated in the Nazi program of racial purity pursuant to which sterilization and castration laws were perverted for the extermination of Jews, “asocials”, and certain nationals of the occupied territories. In the course[22] of the program thousands of Jews were sterilized. Insane, aged, and sick nationals of occupied territories, the so-called “useless eaters,” were systematically murdered. In the course of the above-described proceedings thousands of persons were murdered and ill-treated. The defendants Lautz, Schlegelberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

16. The Ministry of Justice granted immunity to and amnesty following prosecutions and convictions of Nazi Party members for major crimes committed against civilians of occupied territories. Pardons were granted to members of the Party who had been sentenced for proved offenses. On the other hand, discriminatory measures against Jews, Poles, “gypsies,” and other designated “asocials” resulted in harsh penal measures and death sentences, deprivation of rights to file private suits and rights of appeal, denial of right to receive amnesty and to file clemency pleas, denial of right of counsel, imposition of special criminal laws permitting the death penalty for all crimes and misdemeanors, and finally, in the transfer to the Gestapo for “special treatment” of all cases in which Jews were involved. The defendants von Ammon, Joel, Klemm, Rothenberger, and Schlegelberger are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

17. By decrees signed by the Reich Minister of Justice and others, the citizenship of all Jews in Bohemia and Moravia was forfeited upon their change of residence by deportation or otherwise; and upon their loss of citizenship their properties were automatically confiscated by the Reich. There were discriminatory changes in the family and inheritance laws by which Jewish property was forfeited at death to the Reich with no compensation to the Jewish heirs. The defendants Altstoetter and Schlegelberger are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

18. The Ministry of Justice through suspension and quashing of criminal process, participated in Hitler’s program of inciting the German civilian population to murder Allied airmen forced down within the Reich. The defendants Klemm and Lautz are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

19. The said war crimes constitute violations of international conventions, particularly of Articles 4–7, 23, 43, 45, 46, and 50 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, and of articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Prisoner of War Convention (Geneva, 1929), the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal[23] laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and of Article II of Control Council Law No. 10.

COUNT THREE—CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

20. Between September 1939 and April 1945 all of the defendants herein unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed crimes against humanity as defined by Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving the commission of atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, illegal imprisonment, torture, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds, and ill-treatment of and other inhumane acts against German civilians and nationals of occupied countries.

21. Extraordinary irregular courts were used by all of the defendants in creating a reign of terror to suppress political opposition to the German Reich, in the course of which German civilians and nationals of occupied countries were subjected to criminal abuses of judicial and penal process, resulting in murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, plunder of private property, and other inhumane acts. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 9 of this indictment, which is incorporated herein by reference.

22. Special Courts subjected certain German civilians, and nationals of occupied countries to discriminatory and special penal laws and trials, and denied them all semblance of judicial process. Convicted German civilians and nationals of other countries who were deemed to be political prisoners and criminals designated as “asocial,” were turned over to the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) for extermination in concentration camps. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 10 of this indictment, which is incorporated herein by reference. The defendants von Ammon, Engert, Joel, Klemm, Lautz, Mettgenberg, and Rothenberger are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

23. The German criminal laws, through a series of additions, expansions, and perversions by the defendants became a powerful weapon for the subjugation of the German people and for the extermination of certain nationals of the occupied countries. This program resulted in the murder, torture, illegal imprisonment, and ill-treatment of thousands of Germans and nationals of occupied[24] countries. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 11 of this indictment, which is incorporated herein by reference. The defendants Barnickel, Cuhorst, Klemm, Lautz, Mettgenberg, Nebelung, Oeschey, Petersen, Rothaug, Rothenberger, Schlegelberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

24. The Ministry of Justice, through the People’s Court and certain Special Courts, aided and implemented the unlawful annexation and occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 12 of this indictment, which is incorporated herein by reference. The defendants Klemm, Lautz, Mettgenberg, Schlegelberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

25. The Ministry of Justice participated in the decree of “Night and Fog” whereby certain persons who committed offenses against the Reich or the German forces in occupied territories were taken secretly by the Gestapo to Germany and handed over to the Special Courts for trial and punishment. This program resulted in the murder, torture, illegal imprisonment, and ill-treatment of thousands of persons. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 13 of this indictment, which is incorporated herein by reference. The defendants Altstoetter, von Ammon, Engert, Joel, Klemm, Mettgenberg, and Schlegelberger are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

26. In penal institutions operated by the Reich Ministry of Justice, hundreds of German civilians and nationals of other countries were subjected to murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts. The particulars concerning these crimes are set forth in paragraph 14 of this indictment. The defendants Engert, Joel, Klemm, Lautz, Mettgenberg, Rothenberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

27. Special health courts (Erbgesundheitgerichte) perverted eugenic and sterilization laws or policies regarding German civilians and nationals of other countries which resulted in the systematic murder and ill-treatment of thousands of persons. Thousands of German civilians and nationals of other countries committed to institutions for the insane, were systematically murdered. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 15 of count two of this indictment, which is incorporated herein by reference. The defendants Lautz, Schlegelberger, and Westphal are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

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28. The Ministry of Justice granted immunity to and amnesty following prosecutions and convictions of Party members for major crimes committed against civilians of occupied territories. Pardons were granted to members of the Party who had been sentenced for proved offenses. On the other hand, discriminatory judicial proceedings were imposed against so-called “asocial” German nationals and civilians of the occupied countries. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 16 of count two of this indictment and are incorporated herein by reference. The defendants von Ammon, Joel, Klemm, Mettgenberg, Rothenberger, and Schlegelberger are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

29. Discriminatory changes made in the German family and inheritance laws for the sole purpose of confiscating Jewish properties, were enforced by the Justice Ministry. All Jewish properties were forfeited at death to the Reich. Jews and Poles, both in Germany and in the occupied countries, were deprived of their citizenship, their property was seized and confiscated, and they were deprived of means of earning a livelihood, by the State, by Party organizations, and by individual members of the Party. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 17 of this indictment, which is incorporated herein by reference. The defendants Altstoetter and Schlegelberger are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

30. The Ministry of Justice through suspension and quashing of criminal process, participated in Hitler’s program of inciting the German civilian population to murder Allied airmen forced down within the Reich. This program resulted in the murder, torture, and ill-treatment of many persons. These crimes are further particularized in paragraph 18 of this indictment, which is incorporated herein by reference. The defendants Klemm and Lautz are charged with special responsibility for and participation in these crimes.

31. The said crimes against humanity constitute violations of international conventions, including article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and of article II of Control Council Law No. 10.

COUNT FOUR MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

32. The defendants Altstoetter, Cuhorst, Engert, and Joel are guilty of membership in an organization declared to be criminal[26] by the International Military Tribunal in Case 1, in that each of the said defendants was a member of DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONAL SOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) after 1 September 1939.

33. The defendants Cuhorst, Oeschey, Nebelung, and Rothaug are guilty of membership in an organization declared to be criminal by the International Military Tribunal in Case 1, in that Cuhorst, Oeschey, and Rothaug were members of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party at Gau level after 1 September 1939, and in that Nebelung was an Ortsgruppenleiter of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party after 1 September 1939.

34. The defendant Joel is guilty of membership in an organization declared to be criminal by the International Military Tribunal in Case 1, in that the said defendant was a member of DER SICHERHEITSDIENST DES REICHSFUEHRER SS (commonly known as the “SD”) after 1 September 1939.

Such memberships are in violation of paragraph 1 (d), article II of Control Council Law No. 10.

Wherefore, this indictment is filed with the Secretary General of the Military Tribunals and the charges herein made against the above-named defendants are hereby presented to the Military Tribunals.

Acting on Behalf of the United States of America

Nuernberg, 4 January 1947

The Marshal: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.

The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal III.

Military Tribunal III is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.

There will be order in the courtroom.

Presiding Judge Marshall: The Tribunal will now proceed with the arraignment of the defendants in Case 3 pending before this Tribunal.

The Secretary General will call the names of the defendants.

The Secretary General: Josef Altstoetter, Wilhelm von Ammon, Paul Barnickel, Hermann Cuhorst, Karl Engert, Guenther Joel, Herbert Klemm, Ernst Lautz, Wolfgang Mettgenberg, Guenther Nebelung, Rudolf Oeschey, Hans Petersen, Oswald Rothaug, Curt Rothenberger, Franz Schlegelberger.

Mr. LaFollette: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present. I wish to advise the members of this Tribunal that subsequent to the filing of the indictment in this case the defendant therein named Carl Westphal died, and he died while in the custody of the Marshal which may be confirmed by the Tribunal.[8]

Presiding Judge Marshall: It will be so entered in the record.

Counsel for the prosecution will proceed with the arraignments of the defendants.

[Here Mr. LaFollette read the indictment. See pp. 15–26.]

*******

Presiding Judge Marshall: The microphone will now be placed in front of the defendant Josef Altstoetter.

I shall now call upon all defendants to plead guilty or not guilty to the charges against them. Each defendant, as his name is called, will stand and speak clearly into the microphone.

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At this time there will be no arguments, speeches, or discussions of any kind. Each defendant will simply plead guilty or not guilty to the offenses with which he is charged by this indictment.

Josef Altstoetter, are you represented by counsel before this Tribunal?

Defendant Altstoetter: I do not consider myself guilty.

Presiding Judge Marshall: The question is, are you represented by counsel before this Tribunal?

Defendant Altstoetter: Yes, I am represented by counsel.

Presiding Judge Marshall: How do you plead to the charges and specifications and each thereof set forth in the indictment against you, guilty or not guilty?

Defendant Altstoetter: I consider myself not guilty.

Presiding Judge Marshall: You may be seated.

[At this point the other defendants were asked similar questions. Each defendant indicated that he was represented by counsel, and each pleaded “Not guilty” to the charges of the indictment against him.]

*******

Presiding Judge Marshall: The pleas of the defendants will be entered by the Secretary General in the records of the Tribunal.

Military Tribunal will be at recess until Wednesday, 5 March 1947, at 9:30 o’clock a.m., at which time the trial of Case 3 will begin.

The Marshal: Military Tribunal III will be at recess until Wednesday, 5 March 1947, at 9:30 o’clock.

Dr. Schilf: I wish to make a request. I wish to ask the prosecution, in due time before the opening of the trial, to make their document books available to the defendants and to their counsel.

We make the following objections against the indictment: Ordinance No. 7, by the Military Government, says, in article IV under paragraph (a), that the indictment is to set forth the counts simply, distinctly, and in sufficient detail, and that the defendants should be instructed on the details of the charges made against them.

The defendants, or rather the two clients I represent, failed to find certain details in the indictment. With the exception of possibly the charge in regard to the Night and Fog Decree, no legal decree is referred to which could possibly be considered illegal.

In that manner the preparation by the defendants is frustrated because the indictment, according to our opinion, is conceived[29] much too generally, and the requirements of article IV of Ordinance No. 7 just referred to by me are not fulfilled. This could be remedied in that the prosecution, in due time, before the opening of the trial, makes the document books available to the defense counsel.

That is what I should like to ask for on behalf of my two clients.

Presiding Judge Marshall: Does the prosecution desire to make any comment at this time upon the point raised?

Mr. LaFollette: Unfortunately, and it is no fault of the defendants’ counsel, I didn’t hear what was coming through the phones. As I understand two points were raised—the fact that no documents were filed with defendants’ counsel in their room. Those will be furnished. Secondly, with reference to the objection raised to the indictment, I believe the rules require the objections should be reduced to writing. In any event I think it would serve the purpose if the objection to the indictment was reduced to writing, and then Your Honors would pick such time as you see fit to dispose of the motion, and we can argue it at that time more intelligently than we could at this moment. I do not desire to take advantage of technicalities, but I hope the record will note that defense counsel have duly raised the objection, and at such time as it is to be disposed of it will be reduced to writing before it is disposed of. I think it only reasonable that it be reduced to writing.

Presiding Judge Marshall: The defendants’ counsel will be required to reduce certain matters to writing, as requested by the prosecution, and it is possible that we will want to dispose of that matter between now and 5 March if it is agreeable to counsel on both sides.

Dr. Koessl: I have already submitted the same request in writing.

Mr. LaFollette: If that has been submitted in writing I think Your Honors have indicated we may, within a reasonable time after you have seen it, wish to dispose of that prior to 5 March, or on 5 March, whichever Your Honors shall see fit. That will be satisfactory to us.

Presiding Judge Marshall: I suggest, in that connection, after you have seen the written matter that you advise the Tribunal when we are not in session as to your wishes.

Mr. LaFollette: I shall be glad to do that, Judge. I assume we will wait and take not only the objections on behalf of the defendant Rothaug, but also any objections which have been filed by counsel on behalf of any other defendants. After they have been submitted and I have had an opportunity to see them, I will confer[30] with defense counsel, and perhaps after that we will have time to confer with the Court as to the time of disposition.

Presiding Judge Marshall: Are there any other counsel representing defendants who desire to present any matters at this time? If not, the order for recess will stand.

A. Opening Statement for the Prosecution[9]

Brigadier General Taylor: This case is unusual in that the defendants are charged with crimes committed in the name of the law. These men, together with their deceased or fugitive colleagues, were the embodiment of what passed for justice in the Third Reich.

Most of the defendants have served, at various times, as judges, as state prosecutors, and as officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice. All but one are professional jurists; they are well accustomed to courts and courtrooms, though their present role may be new to them.

But a court is far more than a courtroom; it is a process and a spirit. It is the house of law. This the defendants know, or must have known in times past. I doubt that they ever forgot it. Indeed, the root of the accusation here is that those men, leaders of the German judicial system, consciously and deliberately suppressed the law, engaged in an unholy masquerade of brutish tyranny disguised as justice, and converted the German judicial system to an engine of despotism, conquest, pillage, and slaughter.

The methods by which these crimes were committed may be novel in some respects, but the crimes themselves are not. They are as old as mankind, and their names are murder, torture, plunder, and others equally familiar. The victims of these crimes are countless, and include nationals of practically every country in Europe.

But because these crimes were committed in the guise of legal process, it is important at the outset to set forth certain things that are not, here and now, charged as crimes.

The defendants and their colleagues distorted, perverted, and finally accomplished the complete overthrow of justice and law in Germany. They made the system of courts an integral part of dictatorship. They established and operated special tribunals obedient only to the political dictates of the Hitler regime. They abolished all semblance of judicial independence. They brow-beat, bullied, and denied fundamental rights to those who came before the courts. The “trials” they conducted became horrible farces, with vestigial remnants of legal procedure which only served to mock the hapless victims.

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This conduct was dishonor to their profession. Many of these misdeeds may well be crimes. But, in and of themselves, they are not charged as crimes in this indictment. The evidence which proves this course of conduct will, indeed, be laid before the Court, as it constitutes an important part of the proof of the crimes which are charged. But the defendants are not now called to account for violating constitutional guaranties or withholding due process of law.

On the contrary, the defendants are accused of participation in and responsibility for the killings, tortures, and other atrocities which resulted from, and which the defendants know were an inevitable consequence of, the conduct of their offices as judges, prosecutors, and ministry officials. These men share with all the leaders of the Third Reich—diplomats, generals, party officials, industrialists, and others—responsibility for the holocaust of death and misery which the Third Reich visited on the world and on Germany herself. In this responsibility, the share of the German men of law is not the least. They can no more escape that responsibility by virtue of their judicial robes than the general by his uniform.

One other word of clarification. Some of the evidence in this case will relate to acts which occurred before the outbreak of war in 1939. These acts will be proved in order to show that the defendants were part of a conspiracy and plan to commit the crimes charged to have been committed after the outbreak of war, and to show that the defendants fully understood and intended the criminal consequences of their acts during the war. But none of these acts is charged as an independent offense in this particular indictment.

The charges in the indictment have been so limited for purposes of clarity and simplicity. There is no need to test in this case delicate questions concerning the criminality per se of judicial misconduct since the accusation and the evidence cut much deeper. The defendants are charged with using their offices and exercising their powers with the knowledge and intent that their official acts would result in the killing, torture, and imprisonment of thousands of persons in violation of international law as declared in Control Council Law No. 10. Nor is there any need to inquire here into what acts committed before the war are cognizable as crimes against humanity under Law No. 10, since the bulk of the proof relates to acts which occurred during the war.

In summary, the defendants are charged with judicial murder and other atrocities which they committed by destroying law and justice in Germany, and by then utilizing the emptied forms of legal process for persecution, enslavement, and extermination on[33] a vast scale. It is the purpose of this proceeding to hear these charges and to render judgment according to the evidence under law.

The true purposes of this proceeding, therefore, are broader than the mere visiting of retribution on a few men for the death and suffering of many thousands. I have said that the defendants know, or should know, that a court is the house of law. But it is, I fear, many years since any of the defendants have dwelt therein. Great as was their crime against those who died or suffered at their hands, their crime against Germany was even more shameful. They defiled the German temple of justice, and delivered Germany into the dictatorship of the Third Reich, “with all its methods of terror, and its cynical and open denial of the rule of law.”[10]

The temple must be reconsecrated. This cannot be done in the twinkling of an eye or by any mere ritual. It cannot be done in any single proceeding or at any one place. It certainly cannot be done at Nuernberg alone. But we have here, I think, a special opportunity and grave responsibility to help achieve this goal. We have here the men who played a leading part in the destruction of law in Germany. They are about to be judged in accordance with the law. It is more than fitting that these men be judged under that which they, as jurists, denied to others. Judgment under law is the only just fate for the defendants; the prosecution asks no other.

THE GERMAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM

There are fifteen defendants in the box, all of whom held high judicial office, and all but one of whom are trained lawyers. To understand this case, it is necessary to understand the general structure of the German judicial system and the places occupied by the several defendants within that system.

To assist the Court in this regard, the prosecution has prepared a short expository brief which is already in the hands of the Court and which has been made available to defense counsel in German and English. The brief includes a glossary of the more frequent German words or expressions which will occur during the trial—most of them from the vocabulary of governmental and judicial affairs. It includes a table of equivalent ranks between the American Army and the German Army and SS, and a table of the civilian ranks used in the German judicial system. It also includes two charts, showing respectively the structure of the Reich Ministry of Justice, and the hierarchy of German courts.[11] Finally, it[34] includes a copy of the composite chart now displayed on the wall of the courtroom, which shows the positions occupied by the defendants in the general scheme of things. This chart has been certified by the defendant Schlegelberger, and will be introduced as an exhibit in this case when Mr. LaFollette commences the presentation of evidence. It is being displayed at this time as a convenient guide to the Court and to defense counsel, to enable them more easily to follow the opening statement.

JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION PRIOR TO 1933

Because Germany was divided into a multitude of states and provinces until modern times, German law is not the product of a continuous or uniform development. However, while some elements of old Germanic law have survived, German law has for many centuries been based primarily on the principles of Roman law. As is the case in most continental nations, German law today is enacted to a substantial degree in the form of codes.

Even at the present time, the principal source of German criminal law is the Criminal Code of 1871. Amendments have been frequent, but it has never been completely overhauled. For our present purpose, it is sufficient to note the code’s threefold division of criminal offenses. Serious crimes, punishable with death or imprisonment for more than 5 years, are called “crimes” (Verbrechen); lesser offenses, punishable with imprisonment or substantial fines, are called “delicts” (Vergehen); and minor offenses are called “contraventions” (Uebertretungen).

Questions of criminal procedure are regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure of February, 1877; matters of jurisdiction and of court organization are prescribed in the General Judicature Act of January, 1877.

Under both the German Empire and the Weimar Republic, the authority to appoint judges and prosecutors and the power to execute sentences were jealously guarded prerogatives of the individual German states. The Reich Ministry of Justice, therefore, remained predominantly a ministry of federal legislation. The anomaly of a highly unified federal law, as contrasted with a court system administered by the individual states, endured until after the advent of Hitler.

In spite of the fact that the authority for supervision and appointment of judges rested with the numerous states, the German court system was well organized and highly unified before Hitler came to power. The basis of the court system was the local courts (Amtsgerichte), of which there were over 2,000, which had original jurisdiction over minor civil suits and over the less serious criminal offenses (“delicts” and “contraventions”). Original jurisdiction[35] in the more important civil and criminal cases was exercised by the district courts (Landgerichte), of which there were some 180.

The principal appellate courts in Germany were called the district courts of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte). Of those there were 26, or generally one to each state and province.[12] The district courts of appeal entertained civil appeals from all decisions of the local and district courts, and second criminal appeals from cases originally heard in the local courts. The president of the district court of appeals (Oberlandesgerichtspraesident) was also the administrative head of all the courts in his district.

The Supreme Court of the Reich (Reichsgericht) in Leipzig formed the apex of the judicial pyramid. It determined important legal questions involving the interpretation of Reich laws, and entertained appeals from the decisions of the district courts of appeal and from criminal cases originally heard in the district courts. It was also the court of first and last instance for important treason cases.

The judges of the Reich Supreme Court were appointed by the President of the Reich. The judges of the lower courts were appointed by the respective state governments. Before the advent of national socialism, a judge could not be removed by the government, but only by formal action before a disciplinary court composed of his peers. This security of tenure was guaranteed by articles 102 and 104 of the Weimar constitution.

JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE THIRD REICH

The impact of Hitler’s seizure of power on the German judicial system was swift and drastic. The Enabling Law of 24 March 1933 authorized the executive to issue decrees with the force of law and provided that these “decree laws” could deviate from the Weimar constitution, the civil rights provision of which had already been suspended by a decree of 28 February 1933. For practical purposes, therefore, legislative and executive powers were merged in Hitler’s cabinet, and the constitution was robbed of all practical effect.

In 1934, the administration of justice was taken entirely out of the hands of the German states and was concentrated exclusively in the government of the Reich. The first law for the transfer of the administration of justice to the Reich was proclaimed 16 February 1934; it provided that thereafter all courts should pronounce judgment in the name of the German people, vested in the President of the Reich all clemency powers formerly held by the states,[36] and authorized the Reich Minister of Justice to issue regulations for the transfer of the administration of justice to the Reich. This general directive was put into execution by the second and third laws for the transfer of the administration of justice to the Reich, promulgated in December 1934 and January 1935, respectively. The Justice Ministries of the several states were thereby abolished, and all their functions and powers were concentrated in the Reich Ministry of Justice, which became the supreme judicial authority, under Hitler, in the Reich. Hitler had already proclaimed himself the “Supreme Law Lord of the German people” in his speech to the Reichstag defending the killings which occurred during the suppression of the Roehm putsch.[13]

1. The Reich Ministry of Justice (Reichsjustizministerium)—The centralization of the German administration of justice brought about, of course, a great increase in the scope and functions of the Reich Ministry of Justice. Its more important divisions are shown in the composite chart on the wall of the courtroom; a more detailed chart of the Ministry alone is included in the expository brief.

For the first 8 years of the Hitler regime, the Minister of Justice was Franz Guertner, who had taken this office under the von Papen cabinet and retained it until his death in January 1941. Under Guertner, the two principal officials were the defendant Schlegelberger and Roland Freisler, each with the title of under secretary. Schlegelberger took charge of the Ministry from Guertner’s death until August 1942, but throughout that period he was “Acting Minister” and was never officially given cabinet rank. In August 1942, Dr. Georg Thierack, then president of the People’s Court, was appointed Reich Minister and Schlegelberger was retired. Freisler succeeded Thierack as president of the People’s Court.

Under Thierack, there was only one under secretary. Thierack first appointed the defendant Rothenberger, but in January 1944 Rothenberger was put on the retired list and replaced by the defendant Klemm.

Besides the defendants Schlegelberger, Rothenberger, and Klemm, four of the other defendants held high office in the Ministry of Justice, and still others served in the Ministry at various times during their careers. The defendant Klemm, as well as being the under secretary, headed Division II of the Ministry, which concerned itself with legal education and training. The defendants von Ammon and Mettgenberg, as well as the deceased Westphal, were officials of Divisions III and IV, which were ultimately merged, and which governed virtually all questions of[37] criminal legislation and procedure, and prosecutions. The defendant Altstoetter headed Division VI, which dealt with civil law and procedure. The defendant Engert, after having served on the People’s Court, became the head of Division V, Penal Institutions, and of Division XV, first created in 1942 and dissolved in 1944. Division XV concerned itself with the secret transfer of certain classes of persons from ordinary prisons to the Gestapo. The Ministry of Justice controlled a variety of other judicial institutions, including various Special Courts and the examining office for candidates for admission and qualification of judges and lawyers. It controlled the Academy for German Law and various other associations of attorneys, as well as a special training camp for the Nazi indoctrination of young attorneys. Most important of all, it supervised and administered the entire court system from the Reich Supreme Court clear down to the local courts. This function included the assignment, transfer, and promotion of all judges.

2. The Hierarchy of regular courts—The centralization of judicial administration in the Reich Ministry of Justice did not at first have any pronounced effect upon the structure of the regular court system. The established hierarchy of courts—local courts, district courts, district courts of appeal, and the Reich Supreme Court—continued in effect. The most important development in the early years of the Third Reich was the creation of extraordinary and special courts, which increasingly cut into the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

Under the impact of war, however, the system of regular courts was substantially altered, although its general outlines remained the same. These alterations were intended for economy and expedition, and to reduce the number of judicial personnel. This was accomplished chiefly in two ways: by reduction in the number of judges required to hear particular kinds of cases, and by drastic curtailment of the right of appeal.

Many of these changes were made at the outbreak of war in 1939. Thereafter, all cases in the local courts and all civil cases in the district courts were heard by one judge only; criminal cases in the district courts were heard by three judges, but the president of the court could hear such cases alone if the issues were simple. Criminal cases heard by the local courts could be appealed only as far as the district courts; civil cases heard in the local courts could be appealed directly to the district court of appeals, bypassing the district court.

Further drastic curtailments of the right of appeal occurred in 1944 and 1945. In general, appeals could only be taken by permission of the court which heard the case, and permission was[38] granted only to settle legal questions of fundamental importance. The judicial functions of the district courts of appeal were almost, if not entirely, eliminated, although their supervisory administrative functions continued.

3. Extraordinary courts—The most crucial and radical change in the judicial system under the Third Reich, however, was the establishment of various extraordinary courts. These irregular tribunals permeated the entire judicial structure, and eventually took over all judicial business which touched political issues or related to the war.

Within a matter of weeks after the seizure of power, by a decree of 21 March 1933, “Special Courts” (Sondergerichte) were established. One Special Court was set up within the district of each district court of appeal. Each court was composed of three judges drawn from the judges of the particular district. They were given jurisdiction over offenses described in the emergency decree of 28 February 1933, which included inciting to disobedience of government orders, crimes in the nature of sabotage, and acts “contrary to the public welfare.” There were drastic provisions for the expedition of proceedings before the special courts, and no appeal whatsoever lay from their decisions.

A few weeks later, special military courts, which had been abolished by the Weimar constitution, were reestablished and given jurisdiction over all offenses committed by members of the armed forces. In July 1933, special “Hereditary Health Courts” more generally known as “Sterilization Courts” were established at the seats of the local courts, with special appellate “Hereditary Health Courts” above them.

But the most notorious Nazi judicial innovation was the so-called “People’s Court” (Volksgerichtshof), established by the decree of 24 April 1934, after the Reich Supreme Court’s acquittal of the defendants in the Reichstag fire trial. The People’s Court replaced the Supreme Court as the court of first and last instance for most treason cases.

The People’s Court sat in divisions, or “senates,” of five members each. Two of the five had to be qualified judges; the other three were trusted Nazi laymen selected from high ranking officers of the Wehrmacht (armed forces) and SS, or from the Party hierarchy. They were appointed for 5-year terms by Hitler, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice. Six “senates” were established, each of which heard cases from a particular geographical section of Germany. In 1940 a “special senate” was established to retry cases where, in the judgment of the chief public prosecutor of the Reich, an inadequate punishment had been imposed.

[39]

As time went on, the concept of “treason” was much enlarged by a variety of Nazi decrees, and both the Special Courts and the People’s Court were given jurisdiction to try a great variety of offenses. In 1936, for example, the smuggling of property out of Germany was proclaimed an offense against the national economy, and the People’s Court was given jurisdiction over such cases. In 1940, a new decree defined the jurisdiction of the Special Courts and People’s Court, and all sorts of offenses, such as evasion of conscription and listening to foreign broadcasting stations, were brought within their purview.

Toward the end of the war, by a decree of February 1945, emergency civil courts martial (Standgerichte) were set up in areas “menaced by the approaching enemy.” Each consisted of three members appointed by the Reich Defense Commissar, usually the Gauleiter (regional leader) of the district; the president was a professional judge, who sat with one associate judge from the Nazi Party, and one from the Wehrmacht or SS. These courts martial could only condemn the accused to death, acquit him, or transfer the case to a regular tribunal.

Thierack was president of the People’s Court prior to his appointment as Reich Minister of Justice. He was then succeeded by Freisler, the former under secretary of the Ministry of Justice, who remained as president until nearly the end of the war, when he was killed in an air raid. The defendant Engert was vice president of the People’s Court prior to his transfer to the Ministry of Justice in 1942. The defendant Nebelung was president of the Fourth Senate of the People’s Court. The defendant Petersen, the only nonlawyer in the dock, was an SA Obergruppenfuehrer (lieutenant general) who sat as a lay judge on many occasions in the First and Special Senates of the People’s Court.

Three of the defendants were judges of the Special Courts. The defendant Cuhorst was president of the Special Court in Stuttgart, and the defendant Rothaug was president of the Special Court in Nuernberg. The defendant Oeschey also sat on the Special Court in Nuernberg and succeeded Rothaug as its president when the latter became a public prosecutor. Oeschey was also president of the emergency civil court martial at Nuernberg.

4. Public prosecutors—The prosecution of criminal offenses, under the Third Reich, was handled by a special group of state attorneys (Staatsanwaltschaft) directed by the Ministry of Justice. Increasingly under the Third Reich there was interchange of personnel among judges and prosecutors.

The defendant Rothaug, for example, left the bench of the Special Court at Nuernberg to become a senior public prosecutor of the Reich (Reichsanwalt). The defendant Barnickel also held[40] this title. The defendant Joel, in 1943, left the Ministry of Justice and became the public prosecutor of the district court of appeals for Westphalia, at Hamm.

The most important prosecutor among these defendants, however, was Ernst Lautz, Chief Public Prosecutor of the Reich (Oberreichsanwalt). In this capacity, Lautz prosecuted many important cases before the People’s Court.

COUNT ONE

THE DESTRUCTION OF LAW AND JUSTICE IN GERMANY

I turn now to an examination of the means by which the defendants and their colleagues seized control of Germany’s judicial machinery and turned it into a fearsome weapon for the commission of the crimes charged in the indictment.

The destruction of law in Germany was, of course, part and parcel of the establishment of the Third Reich dictatorship. Initially, the dictatorship arose out of the decrees in the early part of 1933 which suspended the constitutional guaranties of freedom and vested Hitler’s cabinet with legislative power, unrestrained by constitutional limitations. These early decrees put an end to law as we know it in a democracy.

But much more had to be accomplished in order to achieve a dictatorship of the proportions envisaged by the authors of the Third Reich. Freedom of the ballot had to be suppressed so that a false veneer of electoral approval could be spread over the Nazi edifice. The civil service had to be purged of dissident officials. An ubiquitous and ruthless police system had to be created. A multitude of other measures were necessary. But, above all, law and justice had to be utterly stamped out.

At first blush, the reason for this may not appear. The Nazi cabinet could decree any law it wanted to with the flourish of a pen. The courts, unless they were bold enough to deny the very basis of Hitler’s authority, which they did not do, were bound to punish violations of these laws. Was this not enough for even Hitler’s purposes?

The answer is twofold. Particularly in the early years of the Third Reich, Hitler’s government pursued aims and employed methods which it did not, at that time, see fit to authorize by formal, public legislation. The regime was not yet strong enough, externally or internally, to face the storm of disapproval which such legislation would have encountered. The Nazi government thought it wise to pursue these aims and employ these methods outside of, and often in violation of, the letter and spirit of the law. And it did not wish to be embarrassed or obstructed by an[41] independent judiciary respectful only to the law. The outcome of the Reichstag fire trial, for example, was highly embarrassing and promptly bore sinister fruit in the creation of the People’s Court.

But there was another and much more fundamental reason. The ideology of the Third Reich was totally incompatible with the spirit of the law. It could not live under law, and the law could not live under it. To take but one example: even under stringent anti-Jewish legislation, there were bound to be situations where an overgreedy German in a civil suit or an overzealous police official in a criminal case had erroneously haled a Jew into court. In other words, even under Nazi legislation, there were bound to be cases when the Jew was legally right. Yet, it was unthinkable that a German court should exalt the Jew and discredit the German with a decision in favor of the Jew. Such perplexing problems could be dealt with only by courts which were not true courts at all, and which could be trusted to suppress the law and to render an ideological judgment or, as was done later, to declare the Jew to be an animal beyond the judicial pale entirely, who could not, any more than a wrongfully beaten dog, ask judicial intervention or protection.

This sort of problem was far more delicate in the case of the Poles, whom the Nazis chose to regard as less than human but more than Jewish. Later on in this case, we will, I think, derive some macabre humor from the documentary spectacle which some of these defendants made of themselves in vainly wrestling with the insoluble problem of how to achieve a certain amount of legal order and stability in occupied Poland, without at the same time giving the Poles any true law on which they could rely.

In short, the very idea of “law” was inimical to the ideology of the Third Reich, and it is not surprising that its principal authors recognized this fact at a very early date. In 1930, Hitler himself declared with reference to a court decision against certain Nazis—

Joseph Goebbels expressed the same thought even more bluntly in 1934 after the Nazis were in power—

Later on in this case, the Tribunal will have offered to it documents which speak at length about the creation of a new, National[42] Socialist system of law. By then, it will be apparent, I believe, that a “National Socialist system of law” is a preposterous contradiction in terms. It never was an objective of the Third Reich to create any system of law. On the contrary, it was its fundamental purpose to tear down every vestige of law in Germany, and to replace it with a mere bureaucracy which would mete out reward and punishment in accordance with the tyrannical ideology and tactical necessities of the dictatorship. The one-time sage of Nazi jurisprudence, the late Dr. Hans Frank, summed this up aptly in 1935 (NG-777, Pros. Ex. 19)—

And the defendant Schlegelberger expressed the same thought in 1936 (NG-538, Pros. Ex. 21)—

We may now retrace some of the steps which the law lords of the Third Reich took to turn the judicial system into a subservient but effective agent of the regime. Some of these we have already noted. The centralization of the administration of justice in the Reich government, the vesting of over-all authority in the Reich Ministry of Justice, and the creation of extraordinary courts were essential steps in the process. Standing alone, these acts might have been unobjectionable, though the creation of special courts was expressly prohibited by article 105 of the Weimar constitution. But these first moves were but the prelude to a series of deadly thrusts at the vitals of the judicial system. The early history of this organized attack on the fundamentals of law is summarized in the decision of the International Military Tribunal—

The destruction of the judicial process continued throughout the era of the Third Reich. The period from the beginning of the new regime in 1933 until the outbreak of the war was characterized by the rise of special tribunals, and the steady decrease of procedural guaranties. After 1939, the war accelerated the conversion of criminal justice into dictatorial administrative procedure until, at the end of the war, all resemblance to legal process had vanished. We turn now to an examination of the particular steps in the process.

a. 1933–1939

Immediately after the seizure of power, the Nazis struck hard at the independence and integrity of the judiciary by dismissing or demoting politically unreliable judges and officials of the Ministry of Justice. The temporary decree of 7 April 1933, under which this was done, provided that—

In 1937 similar language was embodied in permanent legislation in the Civil Service Act.[20] The result of these measures was the elimination of all Jews and part-Jews, Social Democrats, and other opponents of the Nazi regime, from the bench and from the staff of the Ministry of Justice.

Substantive criminal law during this period was radically affected by the introduction of the authoritarian ideology of the Third Reich, and the concept of the criminal as the enemy of the nation. The prime purpose of the new criminal provisions was to make the new holders of power secure against all competition or[44] attack. The decree for the protection of the German people[21] initiated a never-ending stream of legislation intended to protect the persons, institutions, and symbols of the Third Reich against all attacks of political enemies. The field for the application of treason and high treason was vastly enlarged by investing the most preparatory and auxiliary acts with the character of treason. The range of application of the death penalty, in the past restricted to murder and some cases of homicide, was greatly widened. Hand in hand with the sharpening of penalties and the extension of the scope of punishable atrocities went the attempt to widen the scope of German criminal jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits. The new “race defilement” prohibitions for example were made applicable to offenses committed abroad.[22]

Examples of such draconic and tyrannical decrees are legion. The decree of 24 April 1934 provided that the death penalty, or hard labor for life, or hard labor for 2 years or more, should be inflicted—

By August 1938, this tendency had progressed to a point where the following acts were all made punishable by death:

But the Nazi jurists were not content to sharpen the letter of the penal laws; they subverted the spirit and method of interpretation of the criminal law in order to enable the courts to impose punishment, outside the law, in accordance with the political ideology of the regime. Thus, in June 1935, article 2 of the penal code was amended to read as follows:

At the same time, the following articles were added to the code of criminal procedure:

And, simultaneously, the Reich Supreme Court was ordered to set aside its prior decisions in order to bring the law into conformance with the ideology of the Third Reich. The decree is as follows:

This tyrannical doctrine of “punishment by analogy” was given a sugar coating by Dr. Hans Frank (NG-777, Pros. Ex. 19):

But once again, Josef Goebbels was shameless enough to state the doctrine with complete frankness (NG-417, Pros. Ex. 23):

On the administrative side, the prewar years were characterized by ever closer collaboration between Himmler’s Gestapo and the Reich Ministry of Justice. In February 1937, Himmler directed that all Gestapo matters be made available to the district public prosecutors. The next month, the Reich Minister of Justice (Guertner) addressed a letter to all the district public prosecutors, calling attention to Himmler’s directive and stating (NG-323, Pros. Ex. 32):

The German jurists, who collaborated so closely with Himmler’s minions, were equally willing to protect “overzealous Nazis” against the penal consequences of their worst excesses. Late in[47] 1933 a group of “Storm Troopers” (SA) committed vicious assaults and tortures on some political prisoners who had been confined in the concentration camp of Kemna, near Wuppertal in the Ruhr. The description of this outrage by the Reich Minister of Justice reads as follows:

Proceedings against the storm troop leaders in a disciplinary tribunal of the Nazi Party ended in a mere reprimand and deprivation of the right to hold public office for 1 year. The files of the Ministry of Justice concerning this atrocious episode contain the recommendations of various officials, including the defendant Joel, that criminal proceedings against the perpetrators should be cancelled. This recommendation was adopted and forwarded to Hitler by Minister Guertner, who, for justification, pointed to the circumstances that the culprits were not experienced concentration camp guards, that the majority of the victims were Communists, that, in some cases, the victims had been obstinate and insubordinate, and that communism had an especially strong hold in the Wuppertal area.

b. 1939–1945

Before the outbreak of war, the main objective of Nazi penal innovations was to suppress internal opposition to the new regime, and to render life intolerable for the Jews. During the early years[48] of the war, the Nazi jurists were largely concerned with legal problems incident to the occupation of Poland, France, and the other nations overrun by the Wehrmacht. The extension of German law to the occupied areas, and the outrages committed thereunder, constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity on a grand scale, which will be described in due course. German criminal law was also applied extensively to acts committed outside the Reich, even when committed by foreigners.[29] Acts committed by a foreigner outside the Reich could even constitute treason against the Reich.

But the war also brought a mass of new criminal legislation within Germany. This new legislation was influenced by the necessities of war, but also contained matured concepts of National Socialist criminal policy. The principal aim was to guarantee the security of the Nazi regime, and bolster the economic and military strength of Germany, through extremely harsh criminal punishments. The chief weapon was the unsparing and almost indiscriminate use of capital punishment.

Later on, as Germany’s military situation worsened, the death penalty became an ordinary sentence for a great variety of offenses. The increased severity of air raids resulted in capital punishment or long prison sentences for crimes committed during black-outs, even very minor looting. Economic hardship and shortages of materials were accompanied by laws prescribing penal servitude, or even death, for anyone who destroyed or removed food or other supplies. Toward the end of the war, a desperate attempt was made to cope with the growing defeatism by imposing the death penalty for spreading rumors, listening to foreign broadcasts and even for the most minor derogatory remarks about the Hitler regime or pessimism concerning Germany’s chances of military success.

The war brought new and extraordinary procedures, as well as new crimes. Despite all that had been done in prewar years, the courts were still handing down some sentences which, in the eyes of Berlin, were too mild, and once such a final judgment had been given, nothing could be done about it. The whole idea of the finality of judgments had long been a thorn in the flesh of the Nazi jurists. Accordingly, 2 weeks after the outbreak of war, a decree[30] was promulgated which provided that, if the Chief Reich Prosecutor had “serious misgivings” concerning the justice of a sentence, he could, within 1 year thereafter, file an extraordinary appeal and secure a second trial of the case. The officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice, who controlled the public prosecutors,[49] reviewed the criminal decisions and directed the chief prosecutor to file appeals in cases where they deemed the punishment insufficient. If the first decision had been rendered by the regular courts, the second trial was held by the Special Penal Senate of the Reich Supreme Court. If the first decision had been made by the People’s Court, on the other hand, the second trial was held by the Special Senate of the People’s Court.

In 1940, an analogous procedure was authorized[31] under which the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Reich could lodge with the Supreme Court a petition for “nullification” against final judgments of the regular criminal courts or the Special Courts “if the judgment is not justified because of an erroneous application of law on the established facts.” The Supreme Court was authorized either to render a new judgment or to send the case back to a lower court for a new trial under binding instructions as to the legal principles which should govern. Not content with this elaborate system for punitive double jeopardy, the right of the Chief Public Prosecutor to attack final judgments by means of the nullification procedure was again enlarged in 1942, by extension to questions of law and to the adequacy of the punishment.[32] This new regulation provided the prosecution, but not the defense, with an unlimited right to ask for a new trial within one year after the decision had been rendered.

On the day of the attack on Poland, a new assault on the tenure and independence of the judiciary was made.[33] By this new decree, judges were obliged to take any assignment whatsoever, as judge, prosecutor, or administrative official, and on any regular or Special Court, according to the orders of the Reich Minister of Justice. Similar powers were given to the presidents of the district courts of appeal within their respective districts.

It might have been thought that, after the purge of Jewish and politically dissident judges in 1933, the permanent subjection of the judiciary to dismissal for political reasons in 1937, and their complete subordination to the Reich Ministry of Justice in 1939, Hitler would have at last obtained a suitable judiciary for his most extreme purposes. Apparently, however, pre-Hitler legal training sometimes had the unfortunate effect that even trusted Nazi judges failed in their decisions to measure up to the ideology and expectations of the Third Reich. At all events, something like a crisis in the German judicial system occurred in 1942.

On 26 April 1942 Hitler made a speech before the Reichstag in which he reviewed the effects of the hard winter of 1941–1942 and exhorted the German people to even greater sacrifices in order[50] to achieve victory. In the course of this speech, Hitler made certain remarks about the German legal profession and the administration of justice which had an immediate and pronounced effect. Hitler said (NG-752, Pros. Ex. 24):

Immediately after Hitler’s speech, the Reichstag adopted the following resolutions:

This menacing blast from the Fuehrer, and the resolution of the Reichstag, wiped away the last remains of judicial independence in Germany. Furthermore, within a few months a complete reorganization of the upper levels of the Ministry of Justice took place. Schlegelberger, who had seen the storm coming and made desperate efforts to meet Hitler’s wishes, was nevertheless retired and replaced by Thierack. A special Hitler decree in August 1942 gave the new Reich Minister sweeping powers to bring the administration of justice into conformity with the needs of the regime; it read:

At the same time, Roland Freisler left the Justice Ministry to become president of the People’s Court, and the defendant Rothenberger took Freisler’s old job as under secretary. Earlier in the year, Rothenberger, previously president of the district court of appeals at Hamburg, had attracted the Fuehrer’s attention by submitting to him a long thesis on “judicial reform.” This thesis is a curious document; it speaks at length of the honor and dignity of the judges’ function and of the need for justice as the foundation of the Third Reich, but the reason it won the Fuehrer’s approval can perhaps be more clearly inferred from the two following quotations (NG-075, Pros. Ex. 27):

At the time he was appointed Minister, Thierack also became the president of the German Academy of Law, and of the National Socialist Association of Jurists. The temper of the new administration of justice was reflected in Thierack’s announcement to the German Academy of Law as follows:

At the time of their appointments, Thierack and Rothenberger envisaged an ambitious program for simplifying the hierarchy of German courts, drastically reducing the number of judges, and “modernizing” the education and training of judges in accordance with prevailing political thought. Much of this program was never realized, but Thierack and Rothenberger did succeed in developing new devices for direct control of judicial decisions by the government. This has been also foreshadowed in Rothenberger’s thesis submitted to Hitler:

In part, this executive control was accomplished by conferences between the prosecutors and the judges, in which the prosecutor advised the judge what measure of sentence the Ministry of Justice thought fitting in a particular case. But an even more effective device was a series of confidential circulars to the judges known as Judges’ Letters (Richterbriefe) which Thierack dispatched, under his own signature as Minister of Justice, to the judges and prosecutors throughout the German judicial system. Thierack announced this forthcoming series in September 1942 in the following letter:

The first letter was published on 1 October 1942. In a sort of hortatory prelude, many thoughts and ideas from the Rothenberger thesis were embodied. Thereafter, a number of criminal cases and the sentences therein imposed were set forth and commented upon.

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Four cases dealing with crimes committed during black-outs were described; those decisions in which the death penalty had been imposed were approved, the others were all criticized for being too mild. Six cases dealing with sex offenses followed; the sentences in five of them were condemned as utterly inadequate. No case was cited where the sentence was thought too severe.

At the end of the letter, three cases dealing with Jews were discussed in great detail. One of these dealt with the racial law which required all Jews to adopt the surname “Sarah” or “Israel” according to their sex. A Jewish woman had neglected to apply to the telephone company to change her listing by the addition of the name “Sarah.” The district court sentenced her to a fine of thirty reichsmarks, or 19 days in prison. The court set forth in its opinion that certain other courts had construed the law as not requiring an application to change a telephone listing, and that the Jewess might have relied on these decisions. Thierack’s letter described the Jewess’ action as “typical Jewish camouflage in her business dealings” and stated that the lack of uniformity in the decisions in no way justified leniency in the punishment.

In the second case, a special coffee ration had been distributed in a certain town, in the autumn of 1940. A large number of Jews had applied to receive the ration. However, since Jews were automatically excluded from the distribution, they did not receive any coffee. The following year, the food authorities imposed a fine on the Jews for the offense of having applied for the coffee; thereupon several hundred Jews sought relief against the fine in the district court. The judge rescinded the fine on the basis of the statute of limitations and for other legal reasons, and expressed the opinion that the Jews had not committed any punishable act in merely applying for the coffee. On this decision, the Reich Minister’s letter commented as follows (NG-298, Pros. Ex. 81):

In the third case, a wealthy young Jew had committed certain violations of the German foreign currency regulations. The district court, although it found certain extenuating circumstances, imposed a heavy fine on the Jew and sentenced him to 2 years’ imprisonment. This decision particularly provoked the Reich Minister of Justice, who said (NG-298, Pros. Ex. 81):

Beginning with this issue in October 1942, the Judges’ Letters were issued regularly and continued to be filled with exhortations to the utmost ruthlessness in the imposition of sentences. Later on, they were supplemented by Lawyers’ Letters (Rechtsanwaltbriefe). As time went on, German criminal law and procedure scarcely retained any other elements than that of threatening wavering elements of the population into submission. The wholesale destruction of legal process culminated at the very end of the war in the creation of the emergency civilian courts martial, which have already been mentioned. These courts martial were given jurisdiction “for all kinds of crimes endangering the German fighting power or undermining the people’s defensive strength”[38] and, if they found the defendant guilty, could impose only the death sentence. The end of the war cut short the life of these tribunals, after ten weeks of judicial terrorism.

Throughout the war, the administrative and penal branches of the Ministry of Justice continued to cooperate in protecting loyal followers of the Third Reich from criminal prosecution for their innumerable atrocities against Poles, Jews, and other “undesirable elements.” At the successful conclusion of the Polish campaign,[56] an unpublished decree suspended all prosecutions against racial Germans in Poland for any punishable offenses which they might have committed against Poles during the Polish war “due to anger aroused by the cruelties committed by the Poles.” In 1941, the defendant Schlegelberger assured Rudolf Hess that he would consider “benevolently” an amnesty in any particular case of atrocities committed after the conclusion of the Polish campaign. An example of this “benevolent consideration” may be worth noting. Two Germans, one of whom was a sergeant of police, shot two Polish priests in Poland in the spring of 1940 “for no reason other than hatred for the Catholic clergy.” A Special Court imposed 15 years’ penal servitude for manslaughter. After 2 years of the sentence had been served, Himmler asked that the Germans be pardoned, and that it be made possible for them to “win their reprieve” through service at the front. At Himmler’s request, the Ministry of Justice reduced the sentence to 5 years, and both men were released from confinement and assigned to duty in a Waffen SS [armed SS] unit.

After the advent of Thierack and Rothenberger, cooperation between the Ministry of Justice and Himmler’s police became even closer. On 18 September 1942 Thierack and Rothenberger held a long conference with Himmler and other high ranking SS leaders at Hitler’s headquarters. Thierack’s notes of the meeting included the following (654-PS, Pros. Ex. 39):

We said at the outset that the defendants and their colleagues accomplished the complete overthrow of justice and law in Germany. The foregoing recital of the steps in this process and the proof to be introduced will, we think, make this abundantly clear. The Third Reich became a realm of despotism, death, and finally, of despair.

But the very perversion and brutality of the Nazi penal system may lead us to think of it as aimless cruelty, which it is not. Fanatical, ruthless, and even unbalanced as the German leaders might have been, they were never purposeless. Law and justice were destroyed for a reason. They were destroyed because by their very nature they stood athwart the path of conquest, destruction, and extermination which the lords of the Third Reich were determined to follow. The Nazi Special Courts, double jeopardy, the flouting of the letter and the spirit of the law—those things were not ends in themselves. They were methods deliberately adopted for the purpose of causing death, torture, and enslavement. Now that we have traced the steps in the conspiracy, it is timely that we examine the murders and other atrocities which were its intended and actual outcome.

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COUNTS TWO AND THREE

WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Two facts stand out when we study the crimes charged in this indictment. First, the diabolical novelty presented by the designed use of a nation’s system of justice and its machinery by the governing power of that nation, as a weapon of destruction—an instrumentality of murder, kidnapping, slavery, torture, brutality, and larceny. Second, the mass character, and therefore the enormity of the crimes committed by these defendants with this new weapon—this headman’s axe fashioned from the scales of justice in a forge, stoked with national greed and racial bigotry and hatred, fanned by blasts of directed propaganda and shaped by the calculated blows of designedly infamous legislation, controlled and dominated courts, and a studied effort to make ineffective or to eliminate completely, the defensive aids customarily enjoyed by defendants in the courts of civilized nations.

These facts in turn have the definite effect of confusing and dulling the minds of lawyers and laymen alike, so that they do not clearly understand either the right and the power of this Tribunal to try these defendants under international law or the simple standards by which their crimes can be measured and judged.

It follows, therefore, that we should now pause at the threshold of this trial to make clear the authority under and by which we act, and the time honored standards under which we shall assert and prove the guilt of these defendants.

A concise review of recent history will be helpful and therefore proper.

On 30 October 1943 Prime Minister Churchill, Premier Stalin, and President Roosevelt issued their Moscow Declaration. That part which is pertinent to an understanding of what we do here reads as follows:

It is clear that those criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localization, are to be “punished,” not necessarily tried, by the “joint decision,” not necessarily a joint or international tribunal, of the Allies. The basic policy to punish is thus clearly laid down.

Thereafter, the same three powers met at Potsdam after the[59] unconditional surrender of Germany. At this meeting representatives of the French nation also participated. There agreements and understandings relative to the future policies to be pursued by those governments toward Germany and war criminals were reached. Two of them should be recalled, because they throw light upon the stature and the international character of this Tribunal and also of the purpose behind the definition of the crimes for the commission of which these defendants have been indicted and are being tried.

In the statement released at Potsdam on 2 August 1945, they said:

We thus see that the three powers have now advanced from their thinking at Moscow, in that they have determined the method by which these criminals are to be “punished.” But the method of trial is still to be the result of the “joint decision” of the powers who signed the Moscow Declaration, concurred in by the representatives of the French nation. The decision to try by judicial proceeding came six days later at London.

But another significant decision was reached at Potsdam. The powers concerned reached agreement on “The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period.” Among these we find the following which are pertinent to an understanding of what we do here.

On 8 August 1945 the powers which were represented at Potsdam, through their equally accredited representatives, brought forth at London an agreement which in its preamble refers to “major war criminals,” and in article I, to “war criminals.” The agreement also contemplated an International Military Tribunal for the trial of such criminals and for a charter to define the constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of that Tribunal, which charter was in fact made a part of said agreement on the same day. Two things deserve our attention at this point. The charter defined crimes and thus fixed an objective standard by which “war criminals” were to be identified. The adjective “major” was thereupon immediately relegated to the role of superficial invective or at most to that of fixing a comparative standard of criminal importance, measured solely by the judgment of the committee of chief prosecutors or the practical and mechanical necessities of the actual trial. The crimes of most of these defendants are so great that if they choose, they may consider themselves slighted by the committee of chief prosecutors. The prosecution in this case shall do its ethical best to see that they were not fortunate.

On 20 December 1945, the same three Allied Powers which had issued the Moscow Declaration, and the same four Powers which had reached the Potsdam Agreements and entered into the London Agreement and created the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, also enacted Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany.

Law No. 10 provided for this Tribunal and the method by which it was thereafter to be brought into existence; defined the crimes over which it exercises jurisdiction, and adequately described the persons it had jurisdiction to try and punish and the punishment it was authorized to impose. The preamble clearly discloses that Law No. 10 was enacted and therefore this Court was created to accomplish two purposes, first—

and second,

Although this preamble does not expressly say so, it is clear that the second purpose is to implement the Potsdam Agreement, which required “uniform treatment of the German population throughout Germany” as an inter-allied multipowered policy. The policy was thus made inter-allied. The method of implementing it was all that was delegated as a matter of right, not power, to the several contracting nations acting within their zones of occupation through their zonal commander. This Tribunal therefore is international in its source as well as in its jurisdiction over subject matter and persons.

On 30 September and 1 October 1946, approximately 13 months after the London Agreement and Charter were created and more than 9 months after Law No. 10 was promulgated, the International Military Tribunal rendered its decision and judgment upon the individual defendants whom it found guilty.

After the judgment of the International Military Tribunal on 18 October 1946, the Zone Commander of the American Zone, for the purpose of implementing Law No. 10 of the Inter-Allied Control Council for Germany, and to carry out the purposes therein stated and previously agreed upon by the four signatory powers at London and Potsdam, promulgated Ordinance No. 7, concerning the organization and powers of certain military tribunals. That ordinance brought this Tribunal into existence and laid down many of the procedures under which it operates, but it did not restrict nor limit its jurisdiction over persons or subject matter set out in Law No. 10 nor did it define new crimes.

Nothing that has been done since the four Powers adopted the London Agreement and Charter has operated to materially limit the jurisdiction over persons and subject matter of this Tribunal from that conferred upon the International Military Tribunal by those international instruments.

A study of the charter, Law No. 10 and Ordinance No. 7 discloses that Law No. 10, article II, paragraph 5 tolls any and all statutes of limitations for the period from 30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945. It also contains provisions which have the effect of depriving this Tribunal of recognizing as a valid defense in this trial any immunity, pardon or amnesty granted to any of these defendants by the Nazi government. This is a limitation not imposed by the charter upon the International Military Tribunal.

Likewise, Ordinance No. 7, article X is in no wise a limitation upon the powers of this Court to determine the guilt or innocence of these defendants.[41] It reads as follows:

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This provision is couched in language calculated to adequately safeguard the rights of defendants, so that, by the same reasoning, it cannot be said to operate as an oppressive rule, which in any material manner unduly restricts this Court in making its own ultimate determination as to the guilt or innocence of these defendants. It is a reasonable rule designed to avoid undue repetitious production of acknowledged facts in the trial of this cause. As such it does not detract from the dignity of this Court nor affect the concurrent nature of the jurisdiction which this Court enjoys in relation to the International Military Tribunal.

In conclusion, therefore, we take the position that this Tribunal, like the International Military Tribunal, derives from the “joint decision” of the signers of the Moscow Declaration and of the French nation; that the subject matter over which it has jurisdiction, the crimes which it has jurisdiction to try, are codified by the same powers, and that it has jurisdiction over the same persons, those persons who are charged by indictment with having committed these crimes. These are the basic elements upon which concurrent jurisdiction as a matter of law has always been determined to exist by all courts which have had occasion to decide this question.

We have belabored this question of the equal dignity and concurrent jurisdiction of this Tribunal with that of the International Military Tribunal for reasons which are legal and also arise from the standpoint of policy. To us they seem important and because they do, a due regard for the candor owed to this Tribunal and to the world obligates us to state them.

Mr. LaFollette: First, we believe that this Tribunal has the right and power to decide all questions of law, other than the “criminal nature” of those groups or organizations which the International Military Tribunal found to be criminal, and as distinguished from the ultimate facts set out in Ordinance No. 7, article X, as original questions of law which it has the right to decide, contrary to the decisions reached by the International Military Tribunal, if it is convinced that a proper interpretation[63] of the Charter and Law No. 10, or of the ultimate facts to be inferred from the evidence in this case, require it logically, and therefore, by the exercise of intellectual integrity, to reach a contrary decision. We do not deny the persuasive authority of the decision and judgment of the International Military Tribunal, but we point out that between the International Military Tribunal and this Tribunal the relationship of a court of superior jurisdiction to that of one of inferior jurisdiction does not exist in fact or in law. Therefore the decision and judgment of the International Military Tribunal is not binding upon this Court; except to the extent fixed by said article X and the other provisions which are referred to.

Second, from the standpoint of policy the prosecution believes it owes it not only to this Tribunal but to the world to establish the concurrent jurisdiction and therefore the equal dignity of this Tribunal and of the proceedings before it, with those before the International Military Tribunal, which preceded it. We try here war criminals charged with the commission of international crimes, codified as such, by the same nations which codified the crimes for which the International Military Tribunal tried the defendants indicted and arraigned before it. This is not an American side show, national in character. On the contrary, it is the avowed program of the Government of the United States to carry on the obligation assumed at Moscow in 1943 by living up to the inter-Allied agreements made at Potsdam in 1945. Finally, we assert the high character of this Tribunal and therefore of the proceeding before it, in order that we ourselves may understand the high judicial character of our actions and the obligations of candor and ethical conduct which these proceedings of necessity impose upon counsel appearing before this bar.

We try these defendants, therefore, in a Court whose authoritative source and whose jurisdiction over subject matter and persons is equal to, and concurrent with, the International Military Tribunal (IMT). We try them for crimes, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, which were unlawful, as alleged in the indictment, when committed because they were in violation of the “universal moral judgment of mankind” as attested by the judicial decision of the International Military Tribunal.

We try them in an international court for crimes under international law which finds its authority not in power or force, but in the universal moral judgment of mankind.

We shall now present our general theory of the prosecution’s case. In doing so, we shall outline the broad legal principles which establish the relevancy of our evidence to the crimes charged. We shall not, at this time, except perhaps for the purpose of illustration,[64] relate it to each of these defendants. That will be done adequately enough to satisfy the Court and disconcert the defendants when we sum up.

In count two of this indictment, we charge these defendants with the commission of war crimes as defined in article II, paragraph 1(b) of Law No. 10, and in count three we charge them with the commission of crimes against humanity as defined in Law No. 10, article II, paragraph 1(c). We have demonstrated that as we have charged these crimes in this indictment, we only ask for convictions for the same crimes for which the defendants before the IMT were tried; therefore, we adopt basically the following statements from the decision of the IMT:

There’s a parenthetical statement in there, Your Honors will note.

It is proper to point out also, that in order to establish the guilt of any of these defendants for crimes against humanity, it is not necessary that they themselves shall be indicted for or convicted of a crime against peace; that is, the waging of aggressive war, which the IMT held began on 1 September 1939.

In the trial before the IMT the record discloses that seven defendants were convicted of crimes against humanity, who either were not indicted for, or were found not guilty of, participation in a conspiracy to commit crimes against peace or of the commission of a crime against peace.

We want to discuss briefly the substantive law under which we try this case.

Law No. 10, article II, paragraph 2 is part of the substantive law under which this indictment is brought. An effective presentation of the meaning and effect of this paragraph is aided by presenting those parts of it which are relevant to this case verbatim at this time:

Clause (f) of the above paragraph applies only to crimes against peace, for which none of these defendants is indicted.

We are not concerned in this opening statement with discussing niceties of legal draftsmanship nor shall we now use American legal terminology to describe the ultimate relationship of defendants, whose guilt is fixed by paragraph 2 of article II to the overt act; namely, any crime as defined in paragraph 1 of article[66] II. But we are concerned with offering to this Court our observation upon its legal effect.

We do not concern ourselves now with principals or accessories. We do discuss the relationships arising out of the words “abetted” and the relationships set out in clauses (c), (d), and (e), paragraph 2 to the overt act. At the threshold, we point out that the crime, which defendants who occupy any of the relationships last referred to are guilty of committing, is any crime as defined in paragraph 1 of article II. The proof must show that a crime as defined in Law No. 10, article II, paragraph (1), that is, a crime within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, was committed, but if it was committed by any of the defendants or a person other than the defendants in the dock or any of them, and any of these defendants abetted the doing of that act, was connected with a plan or enterprise to commit it, consented to its commission, or was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, he is guilty of committing that crime.

The IMT has given two persuasive interpretations of the meaning of the words “being connected with” which we cite.

In the case of the defendant Streicher who was found guilty of committing crimes against humanity, the IMT said:

The case of von Schirach is also most enlightening. Anschluss with Austria took place on 12 March 1938. Von Schirach was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna in July 1940. Von Schirach was found guilty of committing crimes against humanity.

The IMT said:[46]

It seems clear from these cases that there need be no prearrangement with, or subsequent request by, the person or persons who actually commit the crime and a defendant, to make him guilty as the IMT interpreted the words “being connected with.” It would appear to be sufficient that the defendant knew that a crime was being committed, and with that knowledge acted in relation to it in any of the relationships set out in paragraph 2 of article II which we have heretofore been discussing.

We think it is also helpful to call to the attention of the Court one rule of evidence by which the existence of a conspiracy, that is, the relationship of individuals to the doing of the overt act, is held to be established.

The case from which we quote arose out of the activities of the Ku Klux Klan during the height of its power in Indiana. The people of the United States, on that occasion, at least, had enough courage and foresight not to let that organization acquire the control of all of its judicial system, the way the people of Germany let these defendants and their fellow Nazis acquire control of and pervert theirs. Consequently, our incipient Nazis were tried. The court in the cited case held that the proof of the doing of the overt act was in itself evidence of the intent of the conspirators to commit the act so as to establish their intent to conspire. I quote from the decision:

We point out that proof of murders, enslavement, kidnapping, and mayhem, which are a few of the crimes committed through the device of a so-called legal and judicial process, are competent evidence that the preceding acts which perverted a judicial system into a means for committing such crimes were part of a plan and enterprise to make the commission of those crimes possible.

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Presiding Judge Marshall: You are not giving the citation of the Indiana case?

Mr. LaFollette: I beg your pardon, Your Honor. It’s a C.C.A. case.

Presiding Judge Marshall: What was the page of the Federal second?

Mr. LaFollette: 365. This mimeograph may not be completely correct. I am sure that’s right. Otherwise, if that should not be correct I will advise the Court.

The overt acts are evidence under counts two and three of this indictment not only of the intent with which the preceding acts were done, but also of the fact that each of those defendants who knew that the preceding acts were being performed—and it is legally inconceivable to believe that they did not know—had knowledge of the fact that there was probable danger that the preceding acts would result in the overt crimes or that the preceding acts, being unlawful eo ipso and therefore felonious, would result in the overt acts as the natural consequence of preceding felonious acts. This is murder—whenever a homicide resulted from the foregoing act. And the murder being “an act usually done pursuant to” the “previous scheme and plans” establishes the guilty intent of each and all of the defendants to commit that murder who stood in any of the relationships to the murder defined in paragraph 2, article II of Law No. 10.

We have also said that it is an inevitable result of the murder of hundreds of thousands and millions of humans that such mass murder dulls our realization that the basic simple principles of the law which define the crime of murder of a single human furnish the standard by which was determined the guilt of those who have murdered those humans.

A review of these basic rules is therefore proper.

In 1877 Mr. Justice Stephen undertook to restate the English common law of homicide as he then found it. He states that an unlawful homicide, without adequate provocation, was murder, if it followed from an act accompanied by one of the following states of mind: (1) an intention to cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to any person; (2) knowledge that the act will probably cause either of the results, even though the actor hopes that they might not occur or is indifferent about them; or (3) an intention to commit a felony or to resist a peace officer in the execution of his duty.

As to the first category, no one can quarrel and there is evidence to support the commission of such murders by individual defendants.

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As to the second category, Mr. Justice Holmes thought that the actor’s awareness of the danger was immaterial, that the standard was completely objective. In Comm. vs. Pierce (1884) 138 Mass. 165, page 178, he stated his view succinctly—

In any event, in this case before this Tribunal, we shall ask the Court to bear in mind that lawyers, by the very nature of their legal training and experience, knew that the enactment of ex post facto laws, specially designed racial legislation and other legislation directly designed to restrict and destroy the right to make an adequate defense to a criminal charge; the handpicking of judges and their control by state and party; the submergence of the courts and prosecutors to the superior authority of the police; pretrial agreement of judges and prosecutor on judgment and penalty; unlawful extraterritorial extension of German law and the issuance of the Nacht und Nebel [Night and Fog] decree contrary to the laws of war, would probably cause death of human beings, subjected to such a perverted judicial system. These defendants are not farmers or factory workers.

As to the third category, that of homicide resulting from the intention to commit a felony or while resisting arrest, it is not amiss to point out that those who are connected with a plan to extend, or who consent to, or abet the unlawful extension of German law and German courts into overrun countries contrary to the laws of war, are doing acts which amount to larceny while armed or robbery; and that those individuals who commit acts which abet or are connected with the waging of an aggressive war or a plan to do so, or who consent thereto, are resisting the efforts of the peace enforcing nations of the world to arrest the criminal. The evidence in this case will establish the unprovocated homicide of countless numbers as the result of the doing of such acts by these defendants which are clearly felony murders.

These are but the most apparent applications of the three categories of murder to the evidence in this case. Time will not permit our further exemplifying them now. They will be presented adequately when we summarize the evidence. We do not wish to be understood by furnishing these few examples as having exhausted the cases, where the application of the principles so readily understood when one life is taken by murderous homicide, to the evidence of this case, will establish murders and mass murders by these defendants. Furthermore, other crimes common to the criminal laws of civilized nations, such as enslavement, kidnapping, or mayhem, have been committed by these defendants, which can[70] be established by the application of similar basic principles to the evidence, which should make the task more simple and at the same time, by reducing the seeming complexities of mass criminality under international law to concepts with which the average citizen of a nation is acquainted, seem to serve the salutary purpose of increasing the hatred of the average man for war and to warn him of the dangers inherent in the totalitarian police state, dominated by the philosophy that the end justifies the means used to attain it.

The crimes charged in count two and in count three fall generally into several categories.

Substantively, there are first those war crimes which arise out of the violation of the laws and customs of war, including section I, articles 4–7; section II, article 23; section III, articles 43, 45, 46, and 50 of the Hague Regulations of 1907; and chapter 6, title I, articles 2–4 of the Prisoners of War Convention (Geneva 1929); and the decision and judgment of the IMT of 30 September and 1 October 1946.

These defendants, in one or more of the relationships set out in paragraph 2 of article II of Law No. 10, committed numerous criminal acts as defined in Law No. 10, article II.

These include, as the first substantive group of crimes, the wrongful extension of German law and German courts into and over the Eastern Territories and other overrun nations and the Protectorate, each of which, we contend, was not only an act done by these defendants in connection with, and in furtherance of, aggressive war, but also done by them for purely political reasons which made no pretense of being based upon military necessity, so that it was ipso facto unlawful or malum per se and made every act initiated thereafter under such wrongful extension, as against any of the defendants who are responsible under Law No. 10, article II, for that wrongful extension of German law, fall into the category of a felony, murder, or a criminal enslavement, mayhem, or atrocity; or a larceny while armed, or a robbery as to plunder of public or private property.

The other large group in this category of war crimes is the acts done in connection with the promulgation of the Nacht und Nebel decree of 7 December 1941 and the acts thereafter done in carrying out that program.

The second substantive group consists of the crimes arising out of the activities of the defendants in connection with the Gestapo, SIPO, SS, and other police groups in which either under the façade of judicial proceedings or by open violation of the meager protection afforded the individuals under Nazi law, Germans and non-Germans were turned over to enslavement and in many cases to[71] demonstrable certain deaths in concentration camps, or in prisons where no pretense was made to operate them other than as concentration camps or human slaughterhouses.

The third group is the cases where, under alleged trials, in the People’s Court, Special Courts, and civilian courts martial, certain of these defendants, by the use of the prescribed procedures or those actually practiced, the fixing of penalties which outrage the universal moral judgment of mankind, and through convictions based only upon the subjective conclusions of the prosecutor or judge, which we describe now only as examples, give rise to the legal conclusion that the defendants thus convicted were murdered or unlawfully enslaved under the guise of exercising a judicial process.

The Court will get a better understanding of these basic categories of substantive crimes by the following illustrations from the evidence, which I will now ask Mr. Douglas King to first present at this time.

a. Murder Committed in Violation of Articles 43, 46, etc. of the Hague Convention

Mr. King: The extension of German law and German courts into conquered and occupied countries followed as a matter of course after the victorious German armies had done their work. In Poland and the Eastern Territories decrees of 4 October 1939 and 6 June 1940 introduced and extended the German jurisprudence into these countries. It was, however, unthinkable to the Nazi mind that a Pole should be able to appeal to German law, that he should have the right to sue a German before a German court in the capacity of a plaintiff, or to appear against a German in a case, or even to serve a writ of execution with the assistance of a bailiff.

To remedy this intolerable situation, the defendant Schlegelberger drafted a decree which, by its terms, placed beyond the reach of the Poles and Jews in the Eastern Territories the last vestige of protection of even the German law. This decree was made effective on 4 December 1941 and from time to time was later amended as the need arose. For instance, approximately a year later, it was amended and made retroactive for crimes committed prior to 4 December 1941. We think it will be of interest to the Court to have in Schlegelberger’s own words some of the background of this special treatment for the Poles and Jews in the Eastern Territories and his own statement as to the purposes which the decree was intended to accomplish. This letter was addressed to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery (Lammers) and refers to Schlegelberger’s draft of the decree[72] which a few months later was made effective on Hitler’s orders (NG-144, Pros. Ex. 199):[49]

In referring to the various provisions of the ordinance, Schlegelberger has this to say (NG-144, Pros. Ex. 199):

One of the amendments to this decree, on 3 December 1942 states that no German attorney is to undertake the defense of Polish persons before tribunals in the Incorporated Eastern Territories. This, in effect, prevented any accused person before these courts from having defense counsel, since Polish lawyers were prohibited from engaging in any legal practice. That this provision was received favorably by Ministry officials is indicated by a letter from the president of the court of appeals in Koenigsberg addressed to the Reich Minister of Justice shortly after this supplementary decree became effective. The judge, in the course of his letter, says this:

To put to rest any fear that the ban of German attorneys would result in a competitive hardship on them, this judge has the following to say:

The Court will, in due course, have an opportunity to examine all of these documents and an opportunity to observe the ruthless manner in which this “special legislation” was administered. It is[74] perhaps superfluous to quote a statement by the president of the court of appeals of Danzig summarizing the “situation” in his district for a 2-month period in 1942 following the effective date of the decree of 4 December 1941. “There were,” he says, “no complaints about too lenient decisions during the period reported on.”

The defendant Schlegelberger, shortly after the decree became effective, conferred with the Reich Governor of Eastern Territories and worked out a system of administration pursuant to the decree of 4 December 1941, which (1) provided for summary courts martial, (2) delegated to the Reich Governor the sole right to grant amnesty, and (3) agreed to the holding of civilian prisoners as hostages. In summarizing the results of this conference the defendant Schlegelberger assured the Reich Governor that the “interest of the State can best be served by regulating matters along the lines of our unanimous consent.”

Thus, it is clear that the extension of German law and German courts into the Eastern Territories, especially insofar as the Poles and the Jews were concerned, eventually deprived them of any legal recourse whatsoever.

What has been said respecting the part played by key officials of the Ministry of Justice in extending German Law and the German court system to the occupied territories is equally true of Czechoslovakia and particularly the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. In one sense, by virtue of the fact that Czechoslovakia fell to the Nazis before the war, the experience there served as a proving ground for measures which were later extended to the Eastern Territories and other occupied countries.

The decree of 14 April 1939 and the decrees of 2 November 1942 and of 1 July 1943, the texts of which, among others, will be presented in evidence, mark the progress of the Nazis in extending German jurisdiction to Czechoslovakia and are mute evidence of the “legal” justification for the robbery, extortion, and atrocities, the knowledge of which has already shocked the world. The prosecution will show that the Ministry of Justice not only had full knowledge of what was going on in the Protectorate, but its “experts” took a leading part in the establishment and administration of the court system in the Protectorate from the very outset to the end of the war as they did in the Eastern Territories.

As the evidence unfolds we will see the defendant Schlegelberger active in drafting “legal justification.” We shall see the defendant Lautz concerned with even minute matters of administration of the People’s Court in the trial of Czechoslovak nationals both in Prague and those removed for trial to Berlin, and we shall note that many of the other defendants were called upon[75] from time to time for their assistance in making the court system function to the maximum required by National Socialist policies as they were enforced upon the Czechoslovak nation.

In refusing citizens of occupied territories protection of the law, the defendants abetted and brought about the murder of thousands of persons. The acts of the defendants violated the laws of the countries where committed and were repugnant to the laws of every civilized country. In administering occupied territory, the defendants were bound by the Hague Convention to respect “family honor and rights.” These obligations the defendants ignored, and so squarely placed themselves in the category of common war criminals.

b. The Night and Fog Decree

On 7 December 1941 the so-called Nacht und Nebel, or Night and Fog Decree was issued pursuant to the orders of Hitler and Keitel. Perhaps never in world history has there been a more perverted and diabolical plot for intimidation and repression than this. Its terms provided that in case of continued resistance on the part of the inhabitants of certain of the occupied countries, but largely aimed at France, Belgium, and the Low Countries, the suspected perpetrators should be spirited away without any indication of their whereabouts or eventual fate. The victims were to be tried by the OKW in the occupied territories only when it appeared probable that death sentences would be quickly passed and executed. The others were to be taken to Germany, there to be tried by Special Courts. Whether the death sentence was there imposed, prison sentences given, or the individuals “acquitted,” the first and foremost purpose—that of complete secrecy so far as their family and friends were concerned—was to be preserved. Thus, it is clear that the cognomen of Night and Fog was well chosen since in theory and practice the victims vanished as in the blackness of night and were never heard of again.

In the IMT opinion, the Court observed that—

Preparations for the carrying out of the decree on the part of the Wehrmacht were entrusted to Lieutenant General Lehmann[51] of the legal department of the OKW. He conferred with various members of the Ministry of Justice to determine whether the Ministry would be able and willing to assume the trials of the captured individuals shipped to Germany from the occupied countries. It is more than interesting to note from a statement signed by General Lehmann that, in his opinion, the defendant Schlegelberger was the only official in the Ministry of Justice at that time who had the authority to agree to assume the trial of these cases.

The total number of victims of Nacht und Nebel may never be known, but we do know that as of 1 November 1943 the Wehrmacht had delivered a total of more than 5,200 Nacht und Nebel prisoners for trial to the several courts throughout Germany designated by the Ministry of Justice for that purpose.

Originally there were four Special Courts assigned to handle the Nacht und Nebel cases. The Special Court at Kiel was assigned to the cases arising in Norway; Cologne to the French cases; Essen to Belgium; and Berlin for cases of a special nature. In the later stages of the Nacht und Nebel program the effectiveness of Allied bombing made it necessary to shift the location of some of these courts, principally in the transfer of the Cologne court to Breslau.

When we call the roll of the defendants before us today who acted in and were principally responsible for the large part which the Ministry of Justice played in the Nacht und Nebel program, we find there the names of Schlegelberger, von Ammon, Mettgenberg, Lautz, Engert, and Joel, in addition to others who played less conspicuous, if not less important, roles. If we were to select one of these men who above all others should have known the criminal nature of the Nacht und Nebel program, such a man might very well have been the defendant von Ammon who was the Ministry of Justice’s specialist in international law. Yet the fact is that the name, von Ammon, together with that of Mettgenberg recur again and again as the principal negotiators with the OKW in matters concerning the application of law and the administration of the Nacht und Nebel program.

The Reich Minister of Justice, in a letter to the public prosecutors charged with trying Nacht und Nebel cases, outlined in[77] detail the measures which were to be taken to assure complete secrecy of the trials. This letter, from which we quote extensively as follows was endorsed, among others, by von Ammon (NG-269, Pros. Ex. 319):

It is not our purpose here to review all of the gruesome details of carrying out the spirit of the Nacht und Nebel program which became the daily routine of these defendants. As the Court will see, all of the stipulations regarding the secrecy of the original decree and indeed the addition of other unbelievably harsh and inhuman provisions were systematically executed and improved upon by these men. If, to take one example, the Wehrmacht erroneously arrested in the occupied countries individuals who were patently innocent of any resistance to the Nazis, these victims, in order to preserve the secrecy of the program, had to be treated in exactly the same way as other individuals who managed to escape with a prison sentence. Never did the families and friends of the convicted or innocent know their fate. In the alleged trials before the Special Courts none of the accused was, at any time, ever able to introduce evidence from his own country as to his innocence and, in no case, were the accused permitted to choose legal counsel other than that assigned to them by the court.

Again the defendants flagrantly violated rights secured by the Hague Convention of citizens of countries occupied by the German armed forces—the right of family honor, the lives of persons, and the right to be judged under their own laws.

c. Illegal Transfer of Prison Inmates to Concentration Camps

Mr. Wooleyhan: A Ministry of Justice policy of extermination through calculated denial of all judicial and penal process, in close collaboration with the Gestapo and SS, characterizes the second substantive group of crimes previously mentioned. By 1939, inspections of Reich penitentiaries operated by the Ministry of Justice disclosed that large numbers of political prisoners in security detention were engaged in paid labor on projects incompatible with the rearmament effort which then was at a climax. At Hitler’s order these prison inmates were transferred to concentration camps where their work could be both unpaid and of[79] more use to munition requirements. Thus was initiated a program which was to eventually erase any practical difference between the fates of those victims who were put through the shams of criminal court procedure, and those who were thrown by the police into concentration camps without the formality of a hearing.

Apparently noting that transfers from Reich prisons to concentration camps aroused no immediate public clamor or official opposition, judges saw therein an outlet for increasingly burdensome numbers of criminal cases, particularly political cases, as the defendant Engert has stated (NG-471, Pros. Ex. 276):

About the time that Engert, then vice president of the People’s Court, made this overture to Himmler, he began to complain officially that it was incompatible with the respect, dignity, and tasks of the People’s Court to try minor political cases. He opined that such cases could be settled more quickly and effectively by transferring the culprit to a concentration camp. Thierack, then president of the People’s Court, in heartily endorsing Engert’s attitude, wrote to the Minister of Justice in 1940 in part as follows:

These opinions and desires of Engert and Thierack found eager and sympathetic audience with the Gestapo and SS, resulting in[80] working agreements between these agencies and the Ministry of Justice whereby such illegal transfers could be accomplished outside the law. As the International Military Tribunal in its judgment has found—

This agreement, it will be noted, expanded the initial ideas of Engert and Thierack far beyond any more hastening of minor political court cases or exploitation of prison labor. The agreement introduced the ideas of exterminating the so-called “asocials,” i.e., persons who for either racial, political, or personality reasons were deemed unfit to live. Within a month after this agreement had been worked out and put into practice, it was expanded further to include not only those “asocial” elements who had finished their prison sentences, but also all Jews, gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians who were detained under arrest or imprisonment in any Reich penitentiary or work house, as well as all Poles who were sentenced to more than 3 years.

Now, since the intentional design was to literally work these people to death once they were transferred to concentration camps, this expanded illegal agreement actually rendered any court sentence for any crime tantamount to a death sentence.

In some cases the death awaiting these unfortunates was not long in coming. For example, a situation report in 1942 from the Attorney General of the Court of Appeals in Berlin to the defendant Schlegelberger, while the latter was Acting Minister of Justice, revealed the following episode:

Then follows the citation of the case in the German files:

Still operating completely beyond any existing law, decree or regulation, this same cabal of justice officials, SS and Gestapo extended this policy of extermination through the Occupied Eastern Territories. As the SS and SD offices throughout those eastern countries were instructed in November 1942—

These instructions to the SS and SD in the East continue:

With the Jews, Poles, gypsies, Ukrainians and other so-called “asocial” persons throughout the occupied east relegated to a carefully prepared death, this same unholy alliance returned its attention to the Reich and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. There, by the infamous decree of 1 July 1943,[53] signed among others by Thierack, all of the foregoing perversions of judicial and penal process were tardily “legalized” by officially denying to all Jews any recourse to the criminal courts and committed any Jews accused of an undefined “criminal action” to the police.

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With grim humor the following article of that statute ordered the confiscation by the Reich of a Jew’s property after his death.

This decree completed the absolute disfranchisement and expropriation of property of Jews in the Third Reich and Bohemia and Moravia who had not already, by that time, been deported or slain.

Prison inmates not transferred to concentration camps, pursuant to the foregoing program, were hardly better off in Reich prisons under the hospitality of the Minister of Justice. The defendant Joel had a working agreement with a deputy of Himmler’s whereby he turned over to the SS, for shooting, those defendants whose sentences by the courts were deemed insufficient by Hitler who followed published decisions in the newspapers. A number of charts tabulating the shootings of such defendants, many of whom had received only minor sentences, attest to Joel’s zealous activity on this score. Schlegelberger, too, studiously concocted what was deemed a “legal basis” for these shootings of prison inmates serving minor sentences.

d. Judicial Murders in Violation of International Law

Victims of the People’s Court, Special Courts, and civil courts martial were judicially murdered by certain of the defendants using a variety of legalistic artifices, all of which had the obvious common denominator of a zealous desire to exterminate even trifling activity not even deemed misdemeanors by the community of civilized nations. One such artifice frequently employed was a subjective, conclusive assumption by the judges and prosecutors of proof of the very issues tried. For example, after the Nazi importation of forced labor from the occupied East had collected large numbers of foreign workers within the Reich at various war jobs against their will, escape efforts by such workers across Reich frontiers to their homeland or elsewhere became frequent. These escapees, when apprehended by border officials, were normally handed over to the People’s Court for trial for preparation of high treason, which bore a mandatory sentence of death. The applicable section of the German criminal code defined high treason in this context “as an attempt to incorporate by violence or by threat of violence the German territory in its entirety or in part into a foreign State or to detach from the Reich territory belonging to the Reich.” The escapees were indicted, inconceivable as it may be, for the violation of this provision.

In grasping for some legal straw upon which to base a conviction on these grounds, the courts created a whole-cloth assumption that such escapees were heading through Switzerland, or wherever they might have been picked up, in an effort to join some military[83] legion hostile to the Reich. The Reich prosecutors were drawn into this scheme. Walter Brem, a former assistant to the chief Reich prosecutor at the People’s Court, described the situation thus (NG-316, Pros. Ex. 79):

This contention was acceptable to judges of the People’s Court. On 12 August 1942, three Polish defendants, Mazur, Kubisz, and Nowakowski, pursuant to an indictment signed by the defendant Lautz, were sentenced to death by the People’s Court for preparation of high treason and attempting to separate a portion of the Reich by force. They had left their factory in Thuringia and proceeded across the Swiss border, where they were apprehended by Swiss officials and returned to the Reich. As reasons for their escape the defendants cited the hard working conditions to which they had been exposed. Kubisz testified that the meals consisted only of soup. Mazur stated that his work in the quarry was so hard that he feared he would not survive the winter. The defendants stated they had hoped to find better working conditions in Switzerland. They denied having had any knowledge of the existence of a Polish Legion in Switzerland. The prosecution offered no evidence to impeach these statements in any way.

Nevertheless, the People’s Court found that the defendants’ statements were mere excuses, that the existence of a Polish Legion in Switzerland was “generally known,” and that the defendants intended to join this legion. This judicial assumption was buttressed by a physician’s certificate which showed all three defendants to be in excellent health and qualified for active service. Therefore, the court “was convinced” that the defendants had discussed the fate of Poland and her people with their camp mates in the factory barracks and had decided to join the Polish Legion in Switzerland. The court said that it knew of a pact with Russia that the Polish government in exile had formed, and that[84] this fact had been broadcast by the British radio. The court knew, furthermore, that in the past Polish workers had repeatedly fled to Switzerland where they were recruited for the Polish Legion, and I quote a portion of the court’s decision:

With regard to verbal remarks deemed seditious or deleterious to the “German people’s defensive strength,” People’s Courts sentences were not only outrageously unjustified, but reached the climax of judicial caprice. The Austrian taxicab driver, Rudolf Kozian, pursuant to an indictment signed by Lautz, was sentenced to death on 26 June 1944 for making certain uncomplimentary remarks concerning Hitler and the progress of the war. In the course of conversation while driving a female customer, who later denounced him to the Gestapo, he made remarks typified by the following:

The court found the defendant guilty of having attempted to undermine the German morale to such an extent that he was deemed to come within the special Emergency Decree authorizing death for impairing German defensive strength.

Contrast the foregoing case of the Austrian taxi driver, resident of a country occupied and annexed by illegal aggressive acts, with that of Mrs. von Brincken, a German Nazi, who was indicted in August 1944 for having made similar statements in a conversation with friends at the seashore. When the man who had rented her a beach chair became angry about the careless way in which his chair was treated, Mrs. von Brincken was alleged to have said: “Well, don’t worry, the Russian commissars will be sitting in them next year.” She was also vocally indignant to her neighbors because her 17-year-old daughter had just been drafted for labor assignment in the country, and said: “It would do the farmers no good; they would only get more work and more worry since the girl could not do anything but eat.” Due to the intercession of[85] both her husband, a colonel, and a notorious SS general who was a friend of the family, she was released with an admonition.

Such judicial discrimination with death as the forfeit, is explained by the defendant Petersen, a lay judge at the People’s Court from 1941 until the end of the war (NG-396, Pros. Ex. 176).

Dr. Aschenauer (defense counsel for defendant Petersen): By my motion of 21 February 1947 I objected to the submission of the affidavit of the defendant Petersen. On 27 February 1947, I specified the motion. It says: “The defense is not permitted to introduce the affidavit and the interrogations under oath of the defendant Petersen into the proceedings.” On 21 February 1947 I gave the reasons for the motion which are as follows: From 12 June until the end of 1946, the defendant Petersen was in the Langwasser camp. As a patient, he was moved to the Regensburg camp where his medical treatment was continued. Already at Langwasser, Petersen was pronounced unfit for transport. In spite of medical treatment, he was moved to Nuernberg. As he collapsed in Regensburg, medical treatment for circulation disturbance was continued at the court prison here; the circulation disturbance improved only at Christmas 1946. Accommodation in a cell in which half a window was missing, was naturally very detrimental to the state of health of the 61-year-old defendant Petersen. Therefore—

Presiding Judge Marshall: Counsel for the defendant is advised that the statement of counsel is not evidence in this case. It is merely a statement of what later will be introduced in evidence. If this statement is introduced in evidence, you can make your objection and it will then be ruled upon. For the moment, the prosecution will continue its statement.

Dr. Aschenauer: I should only like to point out that this is the same affidavit which is being presented here and that this affidavit is due to the psychological condition of the witness.

Presiding Judge Marshall: I repeat. This is not evidence. This is merely a statement of what will later be introduced in evidence. At that time, if you have an objection, it will be considered. At this time, you may not interrupt the statement of the prosecution.

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Dr. Aschenauer: I will raise my objection at a later time.

Mr. Wooleyhan: To get the proper context, I will begin at the beginning of the excerpt included in the opening statement (NG-396, Pros. Ex. 176).

The further artifice of “punishment by analogy,” previously mentioned generally, was as tyrannical in practice as it seems in theory. Revolting examples of this procedure in action are legion. A particularly notorious case that turned on this ground was that of Lehmann Katzenberger, 68-year-old former chairman of the Nuernberg Jewish congregation. Katzenberger was indicted before the Nuernberg district court for so-called “racial pollution,” having been accused of sexual relations with one Irene Seiler, an Aryan woman. The police tried desperately without success to secure the necessary conclusive evidence, but Katzenberger and Seiler, both well-known figures of some prestige in the community, denied under oath any illicit relationship. There were no witnesses to or other evidence of the accused act. Since an acquittal of the Jew was unthinkable, particularly in Nuernberg which was the hearthstone of the Jew-baiter Streicher, and whose newspaper “Der Stuermer” widely publicized the story, Katzenberger was remanded to the Nuernberg Special Court, tried as a “public enemy,” sentenced to death, and executed. Seiler was indicted for perjury and was joined with Katzenberger as codefendant; her sentence of two years’ imprisonment was later suspended.

As Hans Groben, Nuernberg district court judge for preliminary investigations, describes the case (NG-554, Pros. Ex. 153)—

One further sampling of the prosecution’s evidence will serve to reveal how the protection against double jeopardy, keystone of criminal procedure the world over, was abrogated and used for the murder of civilians of occupied countries.

The Nuernberg Special Court, under the leadership of the defendants Rothaug and Oeschey, used this fiendish practice in the case of Jan Lopata, a Polish youth brought during the war to work on a German farm. The accused was sentenced in 1940 to 2 years’ imprisonment by the Neumarkt local court for indecent[88] assault on his employer’s wife. A plea of nullity against the decision was filed by the prosecution on the grounds that the sentence was too lenient and the case was reviewed by the Reich Supreme Court with the result that it was referred to the Nuernberg Special Court for retrial. In the court’s verdict sentencing Lopata to death, the presiding judge (the defendant Rothaug) observed (NG-337, Pros. Ex. 186)—

In reliance upon the decrees “legalizing” nullification and retrial of criminal cases at the prosecution’s behest, defendants were deprived of any assurance that a sentence of less than death was their final fate. Ministry of Justice officials, working through the prosecution, joined in this infliction of double jeopardy. For example, in a case involving a non-German, the defendant Klemm wrote to the president and attorney general of the Stuttgart District Court of Appeals on 5 July 1944 and directed the following (NG-676, Pros. Ex. 178):

It is technically true that an extraordinary appeal or plea of nullity could, on the face of the enabling decrees, operate to a defendant’s benefit as well as to his detriment; but this possibility was illusory in practice. Dr. Josef Grueb, former judge of the[89] Nuernberg District Court of Appeals, says (NG-672, Pros. Ex. 179):

A terrifying glimpse of the actual extent to which double jeopardy was exploited during the Third Reich’s last years, is furnished by the defendant Nebelung (NG-333, Pros. Ex. 177).

By the foregoing samples from actual case records and comments thereon by German jurists involved, the prosecution has sought to typify rather than specify the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the defendants. Detailed accounts are unnecessary at the moment to exemplify the judicial murders and legalistic perversions for which these defendants have been indicted; that will be fully developed by the evidence.

e. Evidentiary Considerations

Mr. LaFollette: We believe it will expedite the trial of this case and be of assistance to the Court and evidence a proper attitude of fairness toward the attorneys for these defendants if we discuss now some of the theories of evidence and of the relevancy and materiality of evidence under which we shall present the proof in this case.

Law No. 10, which is the inter-power act from which this Court springs, contains some matter relevant to the issue, while Ordinance No. 7, of necessity, treats the matter very fully. Between them they deal adequately with the matter of the competency[90] of proof, intelligently relaxing the rules of the necessities of presenting proof in a country which has not only been physically destroyed, but which has had its government disintegrate and also suffered the demoralization which follows the defeat of a vicious ideology which has permeated the thinking of far too many of its people.

But relevancy and materiality—the relationship of primary facts to the ultimate fact—involves a cerebral process, the method of finding the existence of an ultimate fact by logical processes from objective proof.

These latter standards lie within the consciousness and the conscience of man. Thus, they are not affected by the external considerations which justify the relaxation of the rules regulating the competency of proof. They should not have been and they were not relaxed. We endorse the decision to retain them and welcome the opportunity to work under them.

Article II, paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of Law No. 10, are the same in substance, although differing slightly in the use of language to express the substance as articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, respectively.

These paragraphs of article II of Law No. 10 read as follows:

Paragraph 4 (a) is a sound rule and applies to most, if not all, of these defendants. Paragraph 4 (b) is likewise sound. We point out, however, that these defendants are lawyers who are charged fundamentally with perverting or converting a system of justice into an instrument for committing crimes under international law. Since this paragraph affords them the right to offer evidence in mitigation and to plead for mitigation from that evidence, the prosecution is entitled to answer that plea by two arguments. First, that a lawyer has special knowledge of the perverting effect upon the dispensation of justice not only of his own acts, but of the acts of others of which he has knowledge—knowledge as an ultimate fact. Second, that a lawyer entrusted by his very calling with a sacred duty must of necessity offer strong proof indeed in mitigation of the prostitution of that duty.

We shall introduce proof on this issue from which knowledge, as an ultimate fact will arise, and also proof from which the plea of mitigation will be shown to be fanciful and hypocritical.

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Again upon the subject of relevancy and materiality—probative value—we shall offer evidence of other acts of these defendants and also acts of persons other than these defendants, knowledge of which as an ultimate fact can be inferred to the defendants. These acts shall include those which constitute evidence of other crimes committed both by these defendants and by others. We are convinced that this evidence is relevant and material, and therefore admissible under accepted rules of evidence supported by Wigmore, an acknowledged authority.

Certainly, a brief exposition of our position will expedite the trial by enabling the Court to rule expeditiously, but at the same time judiciously, and it is also our hope that by furnishing defense counsel with an understanding of the legality of the rules under which this evidence will be offered, they will not find it necessary to resort too frequently to empty objections.

We can afford to be candid with Court and counsel. It is only the lazy, the uninformed, or inherently dishonest and therefore unethical lawyer who seeks recourse to silence or obtusion. We refuse to follow a course of conduct from which either of the foregoing can be charged to the prosecution of cases before this Tribunal and its sister Tribunals.

Evidence of acts, including other crimes not only of the defendants but of others, is permissible and most often offered to show knowledge, intent or design. They are also relevant upon the issue of motive. Because of the nature of the crimes charged in this indictment, each of the foregoing, knowledge, intent, or design and motive, is an essential ultimate element or ingredient of those crimes. Therefore, the rules which authorize the introduction of such proof are of concern to this Court.

Before treating the subject affirmatively, we shall prepare the way by eliminating the supposed objection of unfair surprise. We offer the following quote:

The above quote referred to the further objection of undue prejudice. That objection does not arise here. This is a trial by the court—by judges. It is a trial by judges who by training and character rely only upon objective standards in determining guilt or innocence. The rule was never considered in America as a necessary protection to a defendant in trials by court.

In fact, the very contrast between the system and standards of judicial conduct by which these defendants are being tried and the subjective personality yard sticks which they, particularly the judicial defendants, will be proved to have acted under and used, it is to be hoped, will have some effect in serving the declared purpose of Potsdam, “to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of a German political life on a democratic basis * * *.”

In treating the subject under discussion, we must refrain, because of time limitation, from presenting Wigmore’s excellent philosophical discussion of the basic principles which govern the proof of knowledge, intent, and design. Therefore we limit ourselves, from necessity, to an exposition of those statements which are applicable to the crime which most, if not all, of these defendants have committed—murder.

We shall offer the type of evidence under discussion, first under the knowledge principle:

We point out that in this case “knowledge of the nature and injurious effect of a lethal weapon” is of first importance. The defendants had full knowledge of the character of this lethal weapon—a judicial system deliberately fashioned into a headman’s axe. In fact, most of them directly and actively fashioned it. Consequently, under each of the categories of the substantive law of murder, which we have heretofore expounded, and particularly under the second, proof of prior acts, including crimes of those defendants and of others of which they had knowledge, are clearly relevant.

The same type of evidence shall be offered under the following rule relating to the intent principle:

Also the rule of anonymous intent authorizes the introduction of proof of such other crimes and of the crimes of others.

This Court shall be called upon to determine whether a so-called judicial execution was a true judicial decision or poison handed the defendant in a disguised chalice having the exterior appearance of judicial purity. When we produce innumerable cases of such acts, can a defendant be heard to say he did not know his monstrous chalice was lethal and intended it so to be?

Also the principle of design or system is applicable for identical reasons.

And finally prior acts of violence, including crimes, are evidence of motive as well as of design:

Certainly, when we shall offer so many cases of death of Poles and Jews, no one of these defendants will have the temerity to say we cannot show proof of their own prior utterances, as well[94] as those of others of which they had knowledge, as a clearly inferred ultimate fact, demanding death to Poles and Jews, and also that haste and more haste must be made to turn the Nazi judicial system into a headman’s axe, for the purpose of showing their motive when they killed Poles and Jews with their so-called “judicial” system and processes.

It would be a strange law, indeed, which would say that if a man killed the Pole or one Jew, his prior threats to and assaults upon that Pole or Jew were relevant evidence of the motive with which he acted, but would deny the same proof, when the same man, or in this case men, killed millions of Poles and Jews.

Of course, the law is neither so blind nor so callous.

The accepted rules of proof in an objective system of law justify every offer of proof of prior statements, acts, and crimes of these defendants, and of those others of which they had knowledge, as an ultimate fact, which we should make in this case.

We need not, nor shall we attempt to, evade or circumvent those salutary rules.

These defendants can and should be convicted, but only under law. Because we believe that, we have not been afraid to predeclare our understanding both of the substantive law and the rules of evidence under which just convictions shall be asked, and which we believe will be rightfully rendered under the proof adduced.

Although the matter is not related to the theories under which evidence will be offered by the prosecution, there is one other matter relating to the evidence which the prosecution feels it is entitled to discuss at the opening of this case.

During the introduction of the evidence, certain names of important officials recur—Thierack, Freisler, Vollmer, Westphal, Crohne, Laemmle, Haffner, and others. Since these men are not in the defendants’ dock, the Court is entitled to know why. Thierack committed suicide on 26 October 1946. Freisler was killed in an air raid which demolished the People’s Court building in Berlin, early in 1945. Vollmer forsook the Ministry of Justice for the Luftwaffe (air force) during the last days of the battle for Berlin in 1945, and was reported to have died in action. Westphal committed suicide in the Nuernberg prison following service of the present indictment upon him. Crohne, Laemmle, and Haffner cannot be located, despite all efforts.

THE GERMAN LEGAL PROFESSION UNDER THE THIRD REICH

We have sketched the steps by which the judicial organization of Germany was turned into a mere agent of the criminal policies of the Third Reich, and have outlined some of the crimes which[95] the defendants committed by means of the perverted judicial machinery. Before taking up the fourth and final count of the indictment, which rests upon a somewhat different footing than the first three counts, it is appropriate to examine very briefly the German legal profession and its degradation under the Third Reich. This brief survey, we think, will help to explain why these atrocities came to pass.

a. Before 1933

During the pre-Hitler decades, the professional life of German jurists flourished. Independent societies were formed which published law reviews of high caliber and participated in international conferences of jurists and in international legal institutions, such as the International Arbitration Courts.

Originally, the judges of the various German States had separate professional organizations, but in 1908 these were combined into the Association of German Judges (Deutscher Richterbund). This organization sponsored lectures on new legal problems, on comparative law, on modernizing penal law, and similar subjects. The association edited the “German Judges’ Times” (Deutsche Richterzeitung), which published court decisions and articles by learned jurists. Another organization of German judges was the Association of Republican Judges (Republikanischer Richterbund), founded in 1926. Its members were primarily interested in the reformation of the German court system and in bringing German legal institutions into line with the democratic principles of the new Weimar constitution. They published the periodical “German Justice” (Deutsche Justiz).

Most practicing German attorneys at law belonged to the Association of German Attorneys at law (Deutscher Anwaltsverein), the largest professional organization of jurists. This association, founded in 1871, comprised about 15,000 members in 1933. It published the “Juridical Weekly” (Juristische Wochenschrift), which had thousands of subscribers inside Germany and abroad.

Before the Nazis came to power, all organizations of jurists consisted of members of all political parties and creeds. Their officers were eminent scholars or jurists, and many of them had a high international reputation. Their yearly meetings acted according to democratic principles without interference from the executive branch of the government.

Legal education and training in Germany maintained high standards. After studying law for 3 or 4 years at a law school of one of the State universities, the candidate served a law apprenticeship, lasting another 3 or 4 years, at various courts and law firms. Only then was he admitted to the Great State Examination, known[96] as the Assessor Examination, which might be compared with our bar examination. The successful completion of this examination was the legal prerequisite for any appointment as judge, public prosecutor, or higher civil servant, or for admittance to the bar. The men and women who had passed this examination were highly respected by the German populace.

b. The Impact of Nazism

In the years immediately preceding the establishment of the Third Reich, the National Socialist Party started a nationwide campaign directed against the legal profession. The Nazi leadership realized that they could not gain absolute dictatorship by the seizure of the government alone, but that they must also completely subjugate German legal life. As an affiliate of the Nazi Party, a National Socialist German Jurists’ League (Bund Nationalsozialistischer Deutschen Juristen) known as the BNSDJ, was formed in 1928 by the late Hans Frank. In 1931, the members of this organization, then about 600 in number, or less than 1 percent of all German jurists, were instructed to report on the political attitude and behavior of judges and lawyers. The general attitude of the Nazi Party toward independent judges was reflected in the statement—

There were many other occasions when Hitler and his henchmen expressed their distaste for law and the legal profession.

Immediately after the Nazis came to power, they started to pervert German legal life and to develop it as a tool of the totalitarian machine. This was accomplished in part by measures which have already been described, such as the dismissal of judges, prosecutors, and Ministry officials considered politically unreliable, and by depriving judges of the guaranties of independence and immunity from removal from office.

But these measures were not confined to the governmental judicial organization. It extended into all branches of the legal profession. The first step was the subjugation, and later the complete elimination, of the old professional associations, such as the Deutscher Richterbund, the Republikanischer Richterbund, and the Deutscher Anwaltsverein. Their destruction was accomplished by the same sort of maneuvers that effected the dissolution of the pre-Nazi medical and other professional societies at about the same time.

In the early spring of 1933, the former officers were ousted under duress, and new officers, all of them members of the Nazi[97] Party, were appointed according to the newly proclaimed leadership principle (Fuehrer-prinzip). This procedure also became known under the term “coordination” (Gleichschaltung). At the same time, the membership of well-known anti-Nazi or Jewish jurists was canceled in all these professional organizations. Many of them were threatened and forced to emigrate.

Shortly afterward, in May 1933, the old organizations were completely dissolved. All organizational and professional activity was centered in the National Socialist German Jurists’ League, which became one of the most important tools in the Nazi penal program.

Hans Frank reported to Hitler in May 1933 that all existing professional organizations and associations of lawyers had joined the BNSDJ.[63]

The cooperative entry of these organizations into the BNSDJ did not, however, imply individual membership of its members in the BNSDJ. This required an individual application. Actually by the end of 1934 there was hardly a lawyer left who had not joined the BNSDJ. Those very few who had the courage to stay out laid themselves open as opponents of the regime with the grave risks which this implied. One of the conditions of membership in the BNSDJ was membership in the Nazi Party, but non-Party members could be admitted as so-called “supporting members” (Foerdernde Mitglieder).

The constitution of the BNSDJ dates from 4 May 1933. It declares as its program the realization of the National Socialist program in the legal field. According to Hitler’s order of 30 May 1933, the BNSDJ was the sole representative of the German Law Front and the exclusive professional organization of all lawyers. The seat of the BNSDJ was Munich, its leader Hans Frank, and its executive secretary Dr. Wilhelm Heuber. Regionally, it was divided into 26 regions (Gaue). Leader of the Gaue “Hanseatic Cities” was the defendant Rothenberger. At the end of 1934, the Nazi organization of jurists had approximately 80,000 individual members and its executive secretary could boast that it was the biggest lawyers’ organization in the world. In 1936, the name was changed to “Nationalsozialistischer Rechtswahrerbund” (NSRB). Through the disciplinary boards of this organization, the legal chieftains of the Nazis held the lawyers under close political surveillance.

c. Under the Third Reich

Within a short time after the advent of the Nazis, the editorship of all legal journals was taken over by newly appointed Nazi[98] editors, such as Hans Frank and his accomplices of the BNSDJ. A number of the scientific legal journals whose editors were known as anti-Nazis, such as “Die Justiz,” were suppressed. The new editors perverted the legal journals by turning them into mere propaganda instruments of the Nazi government. In these journals, the jurists were informed that they were to be nothing but the legal soldiers of the Fuehrer. The legal journals were flooded with such material. The Deutsche Justiz, the mouthpiece of the Ministry of Justice, frequently printed directives of which the following by the late Under Secretary Freisler is typical:

While, on the one hand, the legal thinking of the older generation of jurists was perverted, on the other hand the future Nazi jurists received a thorough indoctrination at the law schools of the universities where they were instructed by Nazi lawyers or by opportunists who had sold their legal reputation for promotion within the Nazi hierarchy. Respected professors, who were suspected of so-called “Roman-Jewish individualistic” legal ideas were discharged, and references to such ideas were eliminated from the textbooks. The standard of legal education was considerably lowered. The students had to spend a considerable part of the time which was once devoted to the study of law, on compulsory labor and military service and exercises in the student cadres of the SA Storm Troopers and the SS Elite Guards. During the period of their law clerkship, Nazi indoctrination and exercises in military formation were substituted for the once thorough legal training. Eventually, no young lawyer was admitted to the bar whom the examination board did not consider a reliable legal soldier of the Nazi Fuehrer. In analyzing the new Nazi examination decree for lawyers, Freisler stated:

In the early stages of this prostitution of German legal education, the Prussian Ministry of Justice took a leading part. The Prussian Minister of Justice was a Nazi zealot named Hanns Kerrl, a budget clerk without legal education who attained this high position under the Nazis, and who became the Reich Minister for Churches after the Prussian Ministry of Justice was absorbed by the Reich government. In April 1933 Kerrl issued a decree concerning the selection of candidates for positions as judges,[99] public prosecutors, and attorneys in the State of Prussia, which provided in part that—

Two months later, Kerrl issued another decree which required that all candidates for the final State legal examination had to attend a special “Community Camp” for 6 weeks before they would be admitted to the final examination. This Prussian decree provided, in part, as follows:

This preposterous institution for the perversion of young lawyers was established, and given the name “Gemeinschaftslager Hanns Kerrl,” after its creator. It was located at Jueterbog, near Berlin. An illustrated pamphlet describing the activities in this lawyers’ madhouse will be introduced in evidence. According to the basic statute of the camp, the inmates were to become familiar with the leadership principle and would “experience the ideas of the Fuehrer.” The commandant of the camp was a lawyer named Spieler, who had become favorably known to the Nazis through his activities as defense counsel in their behalf. He was an old[100] Party member and a colonel in the Storm Troopers (SA). He was assisted in supervision of the young lawyers by a motley group of storm troopers and army officers. The extracts from this pamphlet will bear quotation:

After the dissolution of the Prussian Ministry of Justice in 1934, the Gemeinschaftslager Hanns Kerrl was brought under the supervision of the Reich Ministry of Justice. The illustrated pamphlet to which I have just referred contains photographs of Reich Minister Guertner, Under Secretary Freisler, and others visiting the camp. The photographs also show a gallows from which was suspended a symbol of German statutory law, the sign for the paragraphing of legal codes. Guertner and Kerrl are both photographed standing under the gallows. It would be hard to conceive a more appropriate symbol for the degradation of the legal profession under the Third Reich.

COUNT FOUR

MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

General Taylor: The fourth and final count in the indictment contains the charge that seven of the defendants are guilty of[101] membership in organizations declared to be criminal in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal. Four of the defendants, Altstoetter, Cuhorst, Engert, and Joel are accused of membership in the SS. The defendant Joel is also accused of membership in the Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the SD). The defendant Cuhorst is also accused, together with three others, Oeschey, Nebelung, and Rothaug, of membership in the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. All three of these organizations were declared criminal in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal.

The legal basis of the charges in count four is quite distinct from that of the first three counts in the indictment. The charge derives from article 9 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which authorized that Tribunal, under specified circumstances, to declare that certain “groups” or “organizations” were “criminal organizations.” The prosecution before the International Military Tribunal sought such declarations in the case of each of the three organizations involved in count four of this indictment, and the International Military Tribunal rendered such declarations. In the meantime, it had been provided in article II of Control Council Law No. 10 that “membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal” should be “recognized as a crime.” Paragraph 3 of article II of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies the punishments which may be imposed for membership in such organizations.

In its decision, the International Military Tribunal set forth certain limitations upon the scope of its declaration that these organizations were criminal.[68] Under these limitations, in order to render membership criminal, two things, in addition to membership, must be shown—

The prosecution believes that, once it has established that a defendant was a member of one or more of the criminal organizations, it is incumbent upon the defendant to come forward with evidence that he neither knew of the criminal activities of the organization, nor participated in their commission, or that he[102] ceased to be a member prior to 1 September 1939. We believe that any question concerning the burden of proof will be entirely academic in this case, in as much as the positions which these defendants held, and the evidence embodied in the documents which we will offer in evidence will show beyond question that they both knew of and participated in the criminal activities.

a. Membership in the SS

I will deal first with the four defendants charged with membership in the SS. The evidence will show that the defendant Altstoetter became a member of the SS in 1937, that he remained a member after 1939, and attained the rank of Oberfuehrer (senior colonel) in June 1944. The defendant Cuhorst became a sponsoring member (Foerderndes Mitglied) of the SS in January 1934 and remained such after 1939. The defendant Engert joined the SS in 1936 and thereafter attained the rank of Oberfuehrer (senior colonel). The defendant Joel joined the SS in 1938, and attained the rank of Obersturmbannfuehrer (lieutenant colonel).

The activities for which the SS was declared a criminal organization are set forth in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal.[69] These activities included the extermination of numerous “undesirable” classes, including Jews, and the transfer of numerous Jews and foreign nationals to concentration camps where they were murdered and tortured.

It will be abundantly apparent from the proof that if any member of the SS knew of, and participated in, its widespread criminal activities, surely these defendants did. They were directly concerned with penal problems, and, as we have seen, of necessity their cooperation with the SS was extremely close. In fact, Himmler himself took special pains to insure that the German judiciary would be fully advised on the ideology of the SS and of its nefarious aims and purposes. In July 1944 at the special invitation of Thierack as Reich Minister of Justice, Himmler made a speech to the presidents and the attorneys general of the courts of appeal. A report from the files of the Ministry of Justice describing this occasion reads as follows:

Himmler’s well-known views on the value of non-German human life were thereby made available to all German judges and chief prosecutors. They surely came to the attention of the defendant Cuhorst, in this and numerous other ways. They surely were well known among the higher officials of the Ministry of Justice, including Altstoetter, Engert, and Joel.

Indeed, long before Himmler’s speech to this judicial assembly, the Ministry of Justice had been collaborating actively with Himmler in turning over Jews, Poles, Russians, gypsies, and others from the ordinary prisons to the concentration camps. The whole evil process must have been particularly well known to Engert, who was in charge of Division XV of the Ministry of Justice, which was charged with carrying out these transfers. A Justice Ministry document written in October 1942 gives complete information concerning the agreement between the Ministry and Himmler, and specifically delegates the execution of the agreement, on behalf of the Ministry of Justice, to Engert and his associates in Division XV. Engert thereafter visited various prisons throughout the Reich, checked over the lists and arranged for the delivery of these unfortunates to the SS.

Nor could these arrangements, or other activities of the SS, have been any secret from Altstoetter, who was a division chief of the Ministry of Justice throughout this period. Furthermore, Altstoetter was a particular personal favorite of Himmler’s. Correspondence which we will introduce will show that the most cordial relations existed between Altstoetter and Himmler and between Altstoetter and other high SS officers including Mr. Karl Gebhardt, the Chief Surgeon of the SS. At a conference in 1942 with Thierack, Rothenberger, and other judicial officials, Himmler singled out Altstoetter as being “reliable.” The defendant Joel was not only an officer of the SS, but also a member of the Sicherheitsdienst, the branch of the SS particularly concerned with intelligence and with the extermination of Jews in Poland and the Soviet Union. Joel was particularly familiar with these murderous activities. A memorandum signed by Joel in 1942 described a plan which Goering had concocted for picking out “daring[104] fellows” from among the prison inmates who would carry out special tasks behind the lines on the eastern front. Joel’s memo recites that Himmler had already selected a large number of such men for his purpose, but that Goering wanted the field picked over again. Joel’s memo goes on to state:

b. Membership in the Nazi Party Leadership Corps

The defendant Cuhorst again, along with Nebelung, Oeschey, and Rothaug, is involved in the charge of membership in the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. The declaration of criminality rendered by the International Military Tribunal includes all the “leaders” in the hierarchy of the Nazi Party from the Reichsleiter down through Gauleiter and Kreisleiter, to Ortsgruppenleiter. It also includes the heads of the various staff organizations, down to the staffs of the Kreisleiter.

The evidence will show that Cuhorst became a member of the Nazi Party in 1930 and in 1933 was given the status of Gaustellenleiter. The defendant Oeschey joined the Party in 1931 and in 1940 was given the status of Gauhaupstellenleiter. Rothaug joined the Party in 1938 and attained the status of Gaugruppenleiter. All three of these defendants were therefore heads of staff organizations at Gau level. The defendant Nebelung joined the Party in 1928 and soon thereafter became an Ortsgruppenleiter. All four of the defendants, therefore, fall within the categories of the Leadership Corps specified in the decision of the International Military Tribunal.

The criminal activities of the Nazi Party Leadership Corps are also set forth in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal.[70] These included the persecution and extermination of Jews,[105] administration of the slave labor program, mistreatment of prisoners of war, and the lynching of airmen who had bailed out over Germany. The evidence which we will offer will show knowledge of and participation in all or most of these activities by all four of the defendants.

c. Summary

In conclusion on count four, the prosecution wishes to point out certain factors which it believes should be borne in mind in considering the degree of culpability to be attributed to membership in organizations declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal. The charge of membership in these organizations, coupled with knowledge of the crimes that were committed or participation in those crimes, is a very serious one. Its consequences will, we believe, have to be more closely examined at the conclusion of this proceeding, but certain factors can be pointed out here and now.

It is true, for instance, that in a sense none of the seven defendants involved in count four were “full time” or “paid” members of these organizations. All seven of them had full time jobs as judicial officials but, under the circumstances which the evidence in this case will disclose, we do not believe that this fact is significant in estimating culpability.

It is true that the high officers’ ranks in the SS held by Altstoetter, Engert, and Joel were chiefly honorary. It was part of Himmler’s calculated policy to draw support to himself from all quarters by distributing honorary SS ranks and decorations. But those who accepted special ranks thereby lent the weight of their names and prestige to Himmler and to Himmler’s policies. If they did not agree with these policies, they prostituted themselves for whatever prerequisites or security these shameful ranks and awards might bring.

Where it can be shown, as it will be here, that the defendants not only were fully familiar with the horrifying scope of Himmler’s program, but also participated directly in its execution, it should be considered no defense whatsoever that an individual’s SS activities were extracurricular rather than his daily bread and butter.

Similar considerations apply to the defendants who were members of the Party Leadership Corps. Cuhorst, Nebelung, and Oeschey were all members of the Party years before Hitler came to power; all three of them, and Rothaug, too, played a leading[106] role in Party affairs. They too, by the very nature of the positions they occupied in the judicial system, to say nothing of the fact that they were high in the Party councils, must have been aware of the activities recited by the International Military Tribunal as the basis for its declaration of criminality.

Indeed, the guilt of these seven defendants under count four is, in many respects, deeper than that of many full-time officers of these organizations. The defendants were highly educated, professional men, and they had attained full mental maturity long before Hitler’s rise to power. Their minds were not warped at an early age by Nazi teachings; they embraced the ideology of the Third Reich as educated adults. They all had special training and successful careers in the service of the law. They, of all Germans, should have understood and valued justice.

Conclusion

Crimes, theoretically and, more often than not, actually, are these acts, which are so contrary to the moral conscience of the community or so dangerous to the maintenance of a reasonable degree of order, justice and peace in the community, that the community, by appropriate processes, demands their elimination and suppression in the interest of the individuals who constitute the community. Therefore, those within a nation or a state who institute proceedings to enforce this community decision as prosecutors, speak for the community conscience or community decision. For this reason, criminal prosecutions within states or nations are brought in the name of the State or the Commonwealth, or by the use of words suitable to describe the offended community.

In this proceeding at Nuernberg, the world is the community. The four nations which have written the substantive law under which we proceed, their responsible government heads and their elder statesmen, have proclaimed it as a codification of crimes denounced as such by the moral conscience of that community where the crimes we try were committed.

Therefore, although this indictment is brought in the name of the Government of the United States, this case in substance is the people of the world against these men who have committed criminal acts against the community we know as the world. For surely few spots on this earth are so remote that they have not felt in some degree the disruptive, if not indeed the destructive, impact of the criminal acts of these men or those others whom they served and with whose acts they were criminally connected. Therefore, unless all the countries of the world fight a continuous struggle to match the moral conscience of the world which has[107] been asserted here, the result will be a cynical Germany and an apathetic amoral world which drifts aimlessly because it sees no national conduct which matches the standards of moral conduct which are proclaimed here. The true significance of these proceedings, therefore, far transcends the mere question of the guilt or innocence of the defendants. They are charged with murder, but this is no mere murder trial. These proceedings invoke the moral standards of the civilized world, and thereby impose an obligation on the nations of the world to measure up to the standards applied here.

Although this Tribunal is internationally constituted, it is an American court. The obligations which derive from these proceedings are, therefore, particularly binding on the United States. True it is that two wrongs do not make a right, and equally true that the crimes charged against these defendants and the other leaders of the Third Reich were “so calculating, so malignant, and so devastating” that they find no modern parallel. But, underlying these crimes, there are myths, superstitions, and more sophisticated distortions of philosophy which do not know national boundaries. If we, of all nations fail to rise above these malignant doctrines by actions which manifest a steady growth in national fiber and character, then all that we do here will come to nothing, and will leave us and mankind an easy prey to their next violent eruption.

We have still other obligations here which must not be overlooked. As was pointed out earlier, we have undertaken, together with other nations, the task of preparing “for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life in Germany.”

These proceedings are dedicated to that end. Punishment of these leaders of Germany whose crimes made this task necessary is only a part of what we seek to accomplish here. We seek to resurrect the truth in Germany, and to reinvigorate those ideals that have been so long desecrated. The people of Germany sense the need for this, but they will measure our efforts by the measure of our own devotion to the ideals which we proclaim.

The United States cannot evade the challenge of these responsibilities. We can fulfill only the smallest part of them at Nuernberg. But Nuernberg must be a symbol, not of revenge or of smug self-satisfaction, but of peace and good will among nations and peoples. It is the crime of shattering the foundations of peace and denying the very fact of humanity that is charged in this and other proceedings at Nuernberg. It is by trying these charges under law, and in quest of truth, that Nuernberg will find its full measure of justification.

[108]

B. Opening Statement for all Defendants[71]

Dr. Kubuschok (counsel for defendant Schlegelberger, speaking on behalf of all the defendants): May it please the Tribunal. In the following statements I shall briefly describe the manner in which the defense believes, by summarizing the treatment of individual general problems, it will expedite the trial. My following statements are to be interpreted in that sense.

The prosecution views the development of justice in administration and jurisdiction during the period of the National Socialist State. It limits its reflections to this period and perceives in everything the consequent execution of National Socialist totalitarian thought. It believes to be able to reduce all phenomena to this denominator.

It must be the task of the defense to extend the boundaries of this reflection beyond this period. The defense will show that no new legal system was created, and that no new system of jurisdiction was developed. Thus, the historical development which had been built on, also in the period from 1933 onward, must be presented in its fundamental traits.

The defense must also be aware of the difficulties encountered in the treatment of the subject matter before a non-German court. The difference between the Anglo-American legal system and the German law, in accordance with which the acts of the German defendants are judged, lies not only in the solution of individual legal questions and problems, but is fundamental and systematic. Anglo-American law appears to us vitally progressive by the effect which decisions of the highest courts carry in setting precedents. German law, on the other hand, is a codified law, much less suitable to development by the administration of justice, but a law which in itself demands observance of the legal standard. The written law is inflexible. New concepts of the law cannot succeed in the administration of justice as is the case in the gradual development of the “common law.” The German—as well as the continental—principle of the codified law permits the incorporation of new legal concepts only through sudden changes [sprunghafte Veraenderungen] of the written law. Thus the supplementary laws of the penal code in force in Germany since 1877 show an abrupt change at shorter or longer intervals. For this reason the positivism of law has played a far more important part in Germany since the end of the nineteenth century than has been the case in legal systems outside the continent. Only the written[109] law [statutory law] and not general ideas on morals and rights constituted the directive for administration of law and justice. Also in Germany this principle of absolute codification has, with regard to its expediency, been the object of legislative discussion for some time. Finally, in 1935, it culminated in the amendment of article 2 of the penal code, and thus, a synthesis was found between codified law and the development of law as interpreted by the decision of the judge; and historical reflection on this event will show the inaccuracy of the prosecution’s conclusion that, being instituted during the period of the National Socialist State, it must of need be the product of National Socialist thinking and its corresponding political aim. We shall prove that the fundamental basis for this norm was created by plans for reform drafted long before 1933, and that the necessity of supplying the judge with a means, enabling him to counterbalance the defects of an absolutely codified law to a limited degree by analogous application of a penal regulation had been realized long before that. It was recognized that the multiformity of life, the constant change of its forms with regard to social, political and economic aspects could not be regulated by codified law alone; especially so, because codified law always lagged one step behind the case in need of settlement of law. Such cases could not, as is possible in “common law,” be regulated and decided on by general concepts of law; they merely gave cause for establishing new legal standards. This one example already reveals the necessity of dealing with the existing German legal system and with plans for reform entertained in Germany for decades.

German law will form the basis for all considerations. We will, therefore, also have to deal with constitutional law and the technique of legislation. We shall proceed from the provisions of the Weimar constitution. We shall observe there the legislative functions of the Reichstag, the Reichsrat [Council of the Reich] and the Reich President. It will be shown that, since Bruening was Reich Chancellor, the weight of legislation shifted in ever increasing measure toward the right of the Reich President to issue emergency decrees.

The turning point was formed by the Enabling Act [Ermaechtigungsgesetz] of 24 March 1933 which represents the basis for all future legislation. The cabinet was now empowered to pass laws on its own authority and even the right of the Reich President to draft and promulgate laws was abandoned. Thus, under consideration of article 56 of the constitution which allocated powers of policy determination to the Reich Chancellor, the right to legislate was practically conferred upon Reich Chancellor Hitler who, in the absence of time, made increasingly extensive use of it. The[110] lawful passing of a law and its legal effects will necessarily be the subject of presentation.

Thus, we are faced with the legal problem of the binding effect of the Fuehrer order. It will have to be examined whether this Fuehrer order was a literal order in the meaning of the Control Council Law, the effect of which is not to be looked upon as exempting from guilt, or, at the most as mitigating, or, whether we are not dealing here with a legislative act, to which this provision of the Control Council Law does not apply.

We shall have to deal with the entire legislative machinery as it was developed at that time. It will be shown that meetings of the cabinet took place even after Hitler’s cabinet had been formed, that they were, however, of an essentially different character already than formerly. Questions were no longer put to the vote. In individual questions of legislation too, Hitler stood on his right as Reich Chancellor to determine directives of policy, in accordance with article 56 of the constitution. As Hitler’s position grew stronger, especially after, in August 1934, the positions of Reich Chancellor and President of the Reich had been combined in his person, cabinet meetings served actually only the purpose of issuing Hitler’s instructions. In accordance with instructions, members of the cabinet were to submit bills that concerned their departments. In accordance with Hitler’s request these bills were submitted to other participating members of departments prior to the cabinet meetings, in order to obtain their opinion and at this stage only objections with regard to departmental competency of other ministries were taken into consideration. The bill, thus having become “ripe for the cabinet” [kabinettreif] was then passed in the cabinet meeting without debate. Since the uselessness of the cabinet meetings thereby became obvious, they were discontinued completely in 1937. Laws were then legislated by means of a so-called circulation procedure [Umlaufsverfahren] in which the individual ministers were given opportunity to voice their objections. These objections could, however, deal with purely departmental aspects only, whereas objections against a basic political idea founded on one of Hitler’s instructions could not be raised or remained ineffective. As we will show, this had, at the same time, the effect of declassifying certain ministries and resulted in their being subordinated to other ministries. This started already in 1935. By the secret National Defense Law, the OKW, [High Command of the Armed Forces], the Minister of Economics as Plenipotentiary General for the Economy, and the Minister of the Interior as Plenipotentiary General for the Administration of the Reich, were brought into prominence as legislative bodies and were combined in Board of Three [Dreierkollegium]. The other[111] Ministries were subordinated to them and depended on them for instructions. The Ministry of Justice was subordinate to the Plenipotentiary General for the Administration of the Reich and was permitted to present bills only through him. The Ministry of Justice’s signature on a law was therefore only of nominal significance; it indicated that the judicial departments had been concerned with the contents of the law. We will show that after the outbreak of the war the Ministerial Council for National Defense was added as legislative body to the Board of Three. Here too, the Ministry of Justice was subordinated to the Plenipotentiary General for the Administration of the Reich, who was a member of the Ministerial Council for National Defense. Bills were drafted in accordance with his instructions. If the initiative for drafting a bill came from the Ministry of Justice itself the Plenipotentiary General for the Administration of the Reich had to concur in the matter.

To judge the position of the individual defendant in the Ministry, a detailed presentation of the organization of the judicial administration becomes necessary. We must deal with the problem of subordination of the various offices in their relations with each other. In particular, the defense will attempt to give the Tribunal a picture of the actual workings of the Ministry of Justice. Within the framework of a bureaucratic organization the sphere of activity of a minister, an under secretary, division chiefs, subdivision chiefs, a Referenten, and co-workers [Mitarbeiter], will be defined and certain organizational changes wrought in the course of time will be taken in consideration. The scope of authority pertaining to the superior-subordinate relationship is also of importance. Of equal importance are the limits of signing power fixed for each individual official of the Ministry of Justice as well as the degree of responsibility he assumed whenever he affixed his signature. A signature does not always imply the assumption of a responsibility nor does it always signify that someone in particular was charged with the handling or discharging of a specific task. A document has quite frequently been submitted to an official of the Ministry of Justice for the sole purpose of having him take official notice of its contents, i.e., the only object being to apprise the official in question of some measure or other. This method of passing on information, of course, could serve many other purposes which remain to be discussed. A simple request, however, to take official notice, combined with an accompanying acknowledgment of receipt signed by an official, never meant that the official had, by affixing his signature, assumed responsibility for the matter on hand. Finally, there remains the problem of throwing light upon the relationship existing between individual[112] departments of the Ministry of Justice and that of defining the meaning and aim of a cosignature. The act of cosigning indicated primarily that the subject matter and its treatment as viewed in the light of the cosigner’s own field of activity, i.e., from an expert’s point of view alone, gave rise to no objections.

A study of departmental limitations will afford insight into the nature of the judiciary in its relationship with, and its dependency on, other Reich Ministries and Party offices. An understanding of the reciprocal connection between the Ministry of Justice and the Reich Ministry of the Interior, as well as the limitations imposed upon both will yield enlightening information on many questions. We shall also find these necessary connections with other Ministries existing before 1933 and thereby refute the assumption of the prosecution that these intersectional connections which are to be found in any system of government constitute a creation of the Nazis and were adopted by them for the purpose of achieving their own ends. It will be necessary, in this connection, not only to discuss the strictly legal aspects involved, but also to show what the actual conditions were with respect to power and authority. We will have to reconstruct the events as they occurred at that time in a state under dictatorship and show what legal consequences a necessary examination conducted from the viewpoint of constitutional law will yield. The question will be raised as to what would have been the consequences of a failure to comply with an order, and would obedience, therefore, legally exclude guilt. A factor of great importance in considering that problem is the determination of the relationship between the judiciary and the police. The effective role played by Himmler, as chief of the entire police force, must also be taken into consideration. The full presentation of facts will show how the police interloped in affairs of the judiciary, and how this interference led, during the course of the years, to an appreciable weakening of the position held by the judiciary. We shall see what means were and had to be employed to fight that battle. The contrast between the position of the justice administration which was weak by nature and that of the police which was equipped with all the instruments of power it employed ruthlessly through the offices of Himmler and Hitler will become manifest. Again and again one will perceive how the judiciary was confronted with accomplished facts, how it strove to defend or recapture lost ground, how all of its activities, as a matter of fact, were overshadowed by the constant pressure and expansionistic aims brought into play by the police. It will be shown how everyone in the Ministry sought to retain as a last bulwark the concept of the constitutional state for practical usage. It will be brought out how the police, beginning with the[113] protective custody order and ending up with the establishment of its own preserve in the concentration camps and the subsequent creation of its own SS jurisdiction over its members finally secured their exemption from the judiciary. Yet in spite of the constant rivalry between the judiciary and the police we must not lose sight of the fact that certain contacts between both offices had to be maintained because of the very nature of German criminal procedure. Since the judiciary had no investigation agencies of its own, it was dependent upon the cooperation of the police in that respect. Finally, I shall also show how Himmler attempted to wrest all public prosecutor offices from the justice administration for systematic absorption by his police machine, although he did not succeed in doing so. When the unique position held by the judiciary within the entire administrative system is made clear in the presentation, one will become aware of the difficulties of the situation in which the judiciary found itself in this battle. We need but have a clear conception of the difference in denotation of the terms “dictatorship” and “justice” in order to gain an appreciation of the difficulties of that situation. The dictatorship derived both stimulus and pattern from the Party in its manifold manifestations. We will show up the predominance and influence of the Party offices, some of which were legally established, and demonstrate how both expanded in all directions and by the employment of any and all means through the person of the Fuehrer of the Party, namely the dictator.

The defense will show, at the proper time, how the Party sought to push its interests ruthlessly in opposition to the judiciary. The activities of the Party constituted a perpetual obstacle to the progressive administration of justice. It will be shown how the Gauleiter, either directly or indirectly through Bormann, deliberately added fuel to Hitler’s repugnance against the judiciary and thereby shoved the Reich Ministry of Justice into a spot similar to that of an isolated animal at bay.

The various aspects just outlined will also furnish us with a broad foundation for those laws to which objections were raised in the indictment, and the substance of which we shall subject to an exhaustive examination.

We will show, when dealing with the problem of violation of the principle nullum crimen sine lege, that all those laws with which the indictment is concerned and which had been made retroactive do not furnish a basis for punishment. The punishable offense itself, to which they referred, had already been made punishable by laws in force at the time the deed was committed.

The rules of penal laws were not only already part and parcel of the general body of law, but had also been fixed long before[114] by virtue of positive law at the time the appropriate supplementary laws went into effect. In every instance revisions were applied only to the evaluation of a crime in relation to the amount of punishment. Since the prescribed rules of the German Penal Code, generally speaking, did not allow a judge much leeway in awarding punishment, it was found necessary to provide for changes with regard to the fixing of penalties.

We will show that conditions of public distress in Germany were in each instance responsible for the changes and, furthermore, that these legislative measures were, above all, inspired by criminological propositions that had played an important part in scientific discussions long before 1933. We will also show that the drafting of such legislative measures was strongly influenced by the knowledge and experience of other countries.

We shall have to proceed from the assumption that a retroactive measure characterized only by an increase in severity of punishment does not constitute a violation of the principle nullum crimen sine lege according to common German continental legal conceptions.

If the prosecution should construe the substance of various laws as crimes against humanity, we will have to enter into an investigation of the actual living conditions which gave rise to the necessity for the legislation of strict measures. One of the cardinal determinants of any system of penal law is the principle of the deterrent influence of punishment. Variations in the forms and uses of deterrents are at all times dictated by circumstances. Thus, when living conditions everywhere are at high tension, deterrents, if they are to be effective at all, must be accompanied by a corresponding increase in severity of legislative measures.

Some of the legal terms found in German court decisions that are to be examined by the Court will require explanation. Such terms as “dangerous habitual criminal,” “perpetrators of crimes of violence,” “juvenile major criminals,” “public enemies,” “asocials,” and “criminal type” [Taetertyp]. In defining these terms it will become apparent that they were used as necessary aids in the quest for laws and that they represented, by no means, a one-sided attempt at increasing the harshness of measures in the administration of justice. These terms were established for the purpose of setting up clear-cut, definable boundary lines encompassing a definite group of major criminals. Such a move paved the way for pronouncements of restricted judgments, i.e., less severe ones upon those who did not fall within that group.

In answer to the question of sterilization, we shall outline its historical development in Germany and other countries both in theory and practice. We will find that sterilization, as a program,[115] was advocated long before 1933 in Germany and even found champions in Socialist and church groups. Closer examination of the law under consideration will reveal the great care and caution exercised in hedging in its specific provisions. Should the law itself, however, lie beyond the pale of any possible extensive explanation, we shall then furnish proof that it has never been misapplied for political or race-political purposes.

The subject of euthanasia will be dealt with at length and judged with fairness and justice. We will show that the measures originated with Hitler himself, and in the Chancellery of the Fuehrer. We will also show—and this is symptomatic of the position held by the judiciary in the administration—that the judiciary did not receive word of the existence of those measures directly but in trailing stages from outside sources. We will bring out how the Ministry of Justice attempted to thwart the execution of those measures, and then disclose how those same attempts led to a premature discontinuance of the program. In order to decide the question of whether the judiciary is responsible for these measures, which they neither caused to be put in effect nor carried out, we again must consider the actual existing facts.

A trial which concerns verdicts rendered by various courts calls for a study of the organization of these courts as well as their manner of functioning. We will deal with the structure of the Special Courts and of the People’s Court as well as the courts before them. We will consider whether the Special Courts are extraordinary courts in the sense of the indictment, which were prohibited by the constitution. We will also define the term “extraordinary court,” and we shall see that a court which has not been established for the purpose of bringing certain persons to trial, but for the purpose of passing judgment on certain punishable acts cannot be considered an extraordinary court. The legal regulations which are prescribed for proceedings in Special Courts and which deviate from regulations prescribed for regular proceedings will be scrutinized with regard to extent and purpose. We will deal with the structure of the People’s Court in like manner.

In order to discuss these questions, it will also be necessary to give the Tribunal a clear-cut, plastic picture of German criminal procedure. We hope to be able to achieve this by interrogating an expert on the characteristic features of German criminal procedure. Thus, we will be able to show the fundamental differences between German and Anglo-American criminal procedure. We will become acquainted with the preliminary proceedings as well as with the actual main proceedings. Preliminary proceedings are in the hands of the public prosecutor. The necessary investigations to ascertain the facts of the case must be carried out with the[116] aid of the police and through its own or judicial interrogations. The public prosecutor is bound by law to an objective consideration of the matter. The prosecutor in so doing of course represents the instance which later on submits the indictment in court; yet he is under obligation to draw up the indictment not as an agent of an interested party, which he will represent later on in the main proceedings, but as a purely objective agent engaged in clearing up the facts of the case. He is also charged with procuring and submitting facts which serve the purpose of the defense. After the facts of the case have been established in this manner and the transcript of the interrogations of the defendant, the witnesses, and the experts as well as the record on any inspections, seizures, or searches have been recorded to the court, then the public prosecutor draws up a written indictment and submits to the court the documents which contain the entire material collected by him with the request that a date be set for the trial. In considering the question whether action should be brought, or whether proceedings should be quashed beforehand, he must take into consideration whether the findings are sufficient to justify the suspicion that a punishable act has been committed. This question will then be examined by the court, which has to decide on the opening date of the trial. If, in the opinion of the court, the findings as laid down in the documents are not sufficient to warrant a conviction of the accused, then the court may decide against instituting trial or it may request the public prosecutor to collect further material, which will be of an exonerating nature also. After the trial has been ordered, the proceedings are entirely in the hands of the judge, and in the case of the courts attended by several judges [Kollegialgerichten], in the hands of the presiding judge. By studying the documents, the court finds out how the preliminary proceedings were conducted as well as the results obtained. However, except in a few instances, the court may make use of the preliminary proceedings for informational purposes only, so to speak, only as a jumping-off point for the main proceedings, which alone are decisive for the final decision. In these main proceedings the oral principle alone applies. Only that which is presented at these proceedings by the defendant himself, by witnesses, experts, and documents can be considered by the court in passing judgment, but not the interrogation transcript of the police or the public prosecutor. The presiding judge guides the proceedings. He examines the defendant who can make statements pertaining to the case in question, but who may not take the stand as a witness as is the case in American proceedings and who can also not be sworn in. Should the public prosecutor or the counsel for the defense desire to ask questions of the defendant, they[117] may do so only through the presiding judge. The examination of the defendant is followed by the hearing of the witnesses and of the experts. This is also carried on by the judge. The public prosecutor and the defense counsel have the right to put pertinent questions to the witnesses and to the experts, which the judge must permit in accordance with the regulations within the framework of the code of criminal procedure.

The role played by the counsel for the defense must be described in detail. In comparison with his role in the Anglo-American procedure, he is not so important here. Whereas in Anglo-American procedures the prosecution as well as the defense, so to speak as two parties, submit their case for the decision of the court, in German procedures the investigation of the facts of the case in the trial, the rules concerning the extent of evidence to be collected, the serving of summons to witnesses for the prosecution and defense, without the prosecution or the defense filing any requests, are in the hands of the court. According to that, the public prosecutor and the counsel for the defense in reality only support the court in investigating the facts of the case, which is the duty of the court itself. Because of this role played by the counsel for the defense, it follows that in German criminal proceedings the defendant is represented by a counsel only in a comparatively small percentage of cases, and in all the other cases the defendant just does not employ a counsel for his defense.

The question regarding the contesting of a verdict rendered by a court of first instance demands thorough clarification. In this connection, we will demonstrate the meaning and the purpose of the nullity plea and of the extraordinary objection. We will prove that it was not National Socialistic thinking in terms of violence [Gewaltdenken] which gave rise and impulse to their introduction, but rather considerations regarding the technique of procedure. By extending the competency of such courts, which had to decide only in one instance, the necessity arose for a higher instance to be able to take care of reviewing decisions. To be sure, considerably eased regulations regarding the review of verdict rendered by special courts had already been introduced when these courts were first established. However, these regulations proved by providing a resumption of proceedings [Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens] insufficient in practice, particularly after it became evident that economic offenses called for uniform laws throughout Germany. Considerable divergence insofar as the legal interpretation of the new laws was concerned and with regard to the meting out of punishment became apparent in the procedure of the different courts, through a constant surveillance, which became especially necessary in view of the changing economic conditions.[118] To obtain uniformity in this respect, new opportunities for additional legal redresses were created. We shall demonstrate that the nullity plea is a method of procedure which has been taken over from the former Austrian law. The diversity in legal conceptions concerning the principle of ne bis in idem [double jeopardy] with regard to legal remedies will be treated in this respect.

The indictment also makes it necessary for us to decide how far a state may and can consider itself competent to extend its power to punish [Strafgewalt] acts committed abroad. Is it consistent with international law to prosecute foreigners for punishable acts committed abroad? The extent to which a state may take it upon itself to take action for acts committed abroad depends on whether such state inclines toward the principle of personality [Personalitaetsprinzip], the principle of territoriality [Territorialitaetsprinzip], the principle of protective law [Schutzrechtsgrundsatz], or the principle of universal law [Weltrechtsgrundsatz]. As can be seen from a study of comparative law and from the history of law, diverse and variable opinions are held about this in the different countries, and the science of international law after the First World War shows this in particular. We shall point out the basic principles which are contained in sections 3 and 4 of the Penal Code of 1870, and we shall find again in the Supplementary Law (Novelle) of 6 May 1940, which extends the sphere of authority of the penal law, and which is now being assailed by the prosecution, ideas drafted for the reform of the penal law conceived long before 1933. Article 153a of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, to a certain degree, intended to act as a safety valve against a too exaggerated application, and has in fact greatly reduced prosecutions, and it shall be dealt with in this context.

The discussion on the introduction of German law and the establishment of German courts in the Protectorate will cover the three decrees of the Ministry of Justice, which were also issued as a result of a decree published by Hitler in the form of a law, and an ordinance supplementing this decree, both of which were not countersigned by the Reich Ministry of Justice. In this connection, it is necessary to clarify the international relations existing between the so-called Protectorate and the German Reich. Are we concerned with a bilateral international treaty negotiated between Hacha and Hitler, an intervention, an annexation, or an occupation? From the subjective point of view, what the German public and what the defendants actually knew about conditions then prevailing will be decisive in each case. We shall have to discuss here and at other occasions—and this is not dependent on the above—whether[119] within the scope of the indictment concerning a crime against humanity, the actually selected form of legislation and administration of justice is not also justified in its scope under different international conditions. Can one, to give an example, consider it inhuman if members of the Protectorate were subjected to the provisions of the German Criminal (Penal) Code regarding treason and high treason, if the provisions of the law governing occupied territories would also have justified the same penalties for aiding and abetting a hostile army?

With regard to the introduction of German law in the Eastern territories we must first of all consider that they were essentially divided into the following three groups, namely:

If, therefore, we have to concern ourselves with the question of the introduction of German jurisprudence only in the so-called Incorporated Eastern Territories, then we shall call attention to a point of view widespread in science and actual application, whereby a declaration of war renders treaties [staatsrechtliche Vertraege] meaningless between the parties at war. Not only was this point of view especially advocated in a detailed justification by the Reichsgericht, as the German Supreme Court, already after 1918, but it was also championed in French works on international law, as for instance in Foignet’s Droit International Public [International Public Law]. It will be shown that other states have in fact also accepted this point of view. The recognition that this viewpoint concerning international relations was actually followed in practice will be shown by an agreement concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union, which pertains to judicial procedure in civilian matters in Polish territories incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940.

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The answer to the question—which has already come up many times during the examination of witnesses by the Court—namely the question, whether it was permissible to apply the criminal ordinance for Poles [Polenstrafrechtsverordnung] also to those Poles who did not come to Germany of their own volition, will depend on whether we consider the introduction of German jurisdiction in the above-mentioned extent admissible. I don’t believe that the evidence presented by the prosecution covers a case which proves that a Pole who did not come to Germany voluntarily, was sentenced. Generally speaking however, we will have to take into consideration the fact that the Pole who came to Germany was subject to that law which then applied in his former place of residence.

So that the jurisdiction in so-called Night and Fog [Nacht und Nebelsachen—NN] cases, can be judged, we shall put in evidence that in the main the military courts alone were competent. Section 3, paragraph 2, of the Decree for Military Jurisdiction During Wartime [Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung] formed the legal basis for handing over those cases to the general courts. This decree concerning military jurisdiction during wartime and special operations was issued on 17 August 1938, and published in the Reich Law Gazette 1939, part I, page 1457. It was only signed by the Fuehrer and Reichskanzler and by the Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht [Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces].

This decree fixes the scope of military jurisdiction and subordinates all foreigners and Germans to this military jurisdiction for all criminal offenses committed by them in the area of operations. According to section 3, paragraph 2, of this decree, military courts however are to prosecute such crimes only if it is judged necessary for military reasons. It is within their discretion to turn over the prosecution of criminal cases to the general courts.

On the basis of this legal foundation, and in accordance with an agreement between the Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department, Dr. Lehmann—who has appeared here before the Tribunal as witness—and the former Under Secretary Dr. Freisler, prisoners held in Night and Fog cases were placed before a German court in the sense of paragraph 30 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare.

The fact that the proceedings [of an NN case] were kept secret in all its phases was justified for military reasons. According to paragraph 6 of the basic treaty of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, military interests come first, and then comes the protection of the civilian population. The administrators of justice could not decide about the scope of the military interests. It[121] could never be the task of the civilian judicial authorities to judge whether the military commanders correctly interpreted the competition of military necessity in the sense of subparagraph 8 of the introduction to the basic treaty of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare.

Within the framework of these military necessities we will also clarify the motive of intimidation which follows from this. A deterrent could, according to the views of the parties concerned, be achieved only by the severest punishment, with a judgment in the enemy country. The legal basis for this was given without more ado in accordance with those existing provisions of military law which correspond to international law. It concerned cases throughout which can be punished with death, according to general military law, such as espionage, sabotage, aid and comfort to the enemy, and illegal possession of arms. Is it then a violation of the law of humanity if allowance was made for the principle of a deterrent in another manner, and standards were introduced into the proceedings before the courts in Germany which, regarded absolutely, are attacked by the prosecution, but which have been introduced here to avoid an administration of justice which would pronounce the death sentence excessively? We will prove that in the proceedings before the Night and Fog courts, sentences of imprisonment were pronounced in an overwhelming proportion, and that the quota of death sentences was very small. It will be clearly shown that the deviations from the normal proceedings which were shown by the Night and Fog proceedings were all conditioned by the principle of secrecy. A full consideration of German criminal procedure will show that many limitations in the leading principles of German criminal procedure mean either no disadvantage at all, or at any rate merely a far lower degree of disadvantage than it may appear to a person accustomed to thinking only along American principles of procedure.

Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Military Criminal Procedure will also prove that the Night and Fog prisoners had been handed over to the civil authorities only for the purpose of the execution of the criminal proceedings, and that moreover the power of disposal over these prisoners was reserved for the offices of the Wehrmacht.

When we see that the Night and Fog proceedings had been taken over by the judicial administration by virtue of an order of the Fuehrer and by virtue of the delegation of the military authorities competent therefor, the question of the relationship of international law to the German State law will also be submitted for consideration. The German science of political and international law has always unanimously advocated the view that state law[122] takes precedence over international law. This would be of significance in each case for the question of a consciousness of injustice on the part of the defendants.

The prosecution has also concerned itself with “lynch justice” [Lynchjustiz]. The defense will present documents proving that the judicial authorities criminally prosecuted, in spite of the violent opposition of the Gauleiter concerned, Germans who had mistreated or shot Allied fliers forced to abandon their planes, and that they protected Germans who treated such Allied fliers humanely. This positive attitude of the judicial offices will constitute an illustration of the relations of the powers [Machtverhaeltnisse] at that time. The Party and the police in their attitude were opposed to each other. The leader of the Party Chancellery had ordered all State and Party offices not to interfere with the execution of “lynch justice” on Allied fliers. The Minister of Justice could not ignore this order. He applied it in a manner that could be interpreted as quashing the proceedings. This weakening of an order instigated by the Party and the cases in practice mentioned show here, too, the basic tendency in the consideration of the actual relation of the powers.

Arguments from the aspect of reprisal will also be made, which are supplementary to the question of “lynch justice.”

The German Law of Pardons needs also to be presented and dealt with in detail, since it represents the basis, after all, for the proper evaluation of numerous documents presented by the prosecution, including the report lists of the Reich Ministry of Justice in matters of the death sentence. It has been fully codified, and we will refer to the numerous legal provisions. The entire system of pardon will justify the statement that it was most painstakingly built up with every safety measure and must withstand any criticism as a system. The law of pardon was incumbent upon the head of the State. Hitler transferred his executive power to Reich Minister Thierack, even for death sentences, whereas the latter’s predecessor in office, Reich Minister Guertner, and after his death, Under Secretary Schlegelberger, were restricted in the execution of the law of pardon in that they could recommend to Hitler to pardon a person sentenced to death, but they themselves could not pardon a person. What resulted is necessarily an orientation toward the utmost which could be obtained from Hitler. The manner they used and how the whole tendency on the part of the participating offices was to exhaust fully the possibilities for pardon which were offered will be shown in the evidence.

From the individual provisions we will see that in matters of death sentences, for example, the Oberstaatsanwalt, regardless of whether the condemned person had personally submitted a petition[123] for pardon, had to make a thorough report on the question of pardon after he first gathered the attitude of the court, the presiding judge, the prison authorities, the police, and still other offices prescribed in special cases. This report goes to the Generalstaatsanwalt who on his part must then state in detail his attitude about the pardon report. In the Reich Ministry of Justice, special Referenten had been appointed for dealing with pardon questions. These Referenten were supported by numerous co-workers. The co-worker had to present an opinion with an exact report of the facts, an opinion on the legal question of the individual case, a criticism of the judgment with regard to the factual and legal aspects, and a detailed statement on the question of pardon. The Referent, on his part, as well as the division chief, had to add their attitude to this opinion. Only if all reporting offices, the co-worker, the Referent, and the division chief unanimously recommended that the sentence be carried out was the matter designated as a so-called smooth affair [glatte Sache]. In this case the Referent in charge of death sentences reported personally to the Minister, calling special attention to all the circumstances of the case worth remarking on. On the other hand, even if one of all these participants recommended commuting the death sentence to a prison sentence, then the co-worker had to present his detailed opinion in person to the Minister; and the Referent, the division chief, and the under secretary stated their attitude at the request of the Minister.

The same procedure was also used in principle in cases of so-called immediate execution [Blitzvollstreckung]. This concerned cases from the last years of the war, in which the facts of the case and the legal question to be decided on were straightforward; moreover, it concerned cases in which, on account of the fact that the deed had caused considerable stir among the public, a special deterrent effect should be obtained by carrying out the sentence as soon as possible after the deed had been committed and judged. The only difference in dealing with these immediate executions and the usual procedure was that all reports and opinions were given by telephone, telegraph, teletype, or verbally, and on account of its being a straightforward case no files were submitted.

The indictment also contains the charge that the amnesty laws were administered according to political view. The provisions in question will be discussed in detail when the evidence is presented.

Hitler’s constitutional right to quash pending criminal proceedings [Abolitionsrecht] will be shown in its practical meaning.

Regarding the carrying-out of sentences we will deal with the legal provisions and the regulations applicable in penal institutions.[124] The defense will prove that no crimes against humanity were committed in penal institutions of justice by its officials with the exception of occasional violations which are unavoidable even under the best directions. The rules of the strict legal provisions of the German Penal Law against the ill-treatment of prisoners will emphasize this point. The cases mentioned which date from the last days before the collapse offer, as a singular sign of that moment, no basis for a general judgment of the German execution of punishment and will be referred to as each individual case comes up.

The action of the Spruchrichter dealt with in the indictment and the charges raised in this connection will bring the legal position of the German judge up for discussion. We shall see the judge as an independent official who is not bound to directives but only to the law. We will discuss the positivism of the German interpretation of law. We will deal with the prosecution’s charges arising from the directing regulations. We will show that they are merely a reference to the motive and aims of the law in question, and that they, to some extent, give a clear conception of the policy of the legislator regarding crime. They are a clue to the way in which the legislator imagines punishment should be awarded by the judge. They are in no case a general directive or a directive pertaining to an individual case.

In dealing with the position of the public prosecutors we will refer to the principle of legality which is laid down by law, and according to which the public prosecutor was bound to prefer a charge as soon as there was sufficient suspicion that the criminal facts as laid down in a legal provision existed.

In conclusion the defense will also deal with the legal questions, arising from Control Council Law No. 10 itself. We know that the Tribunal has been called together in order to pass judgment on the basis of this law.

On the basis of this actual fact and in compliance therewith, we will for practical reasons refrain from repeating the relevant objections already raised in the proceedings before the IMT and other proceedings before similar Tribunals in session. On account of these considerations we will restrict ourselves to the real legal questions as to whether an indictment is permissible from the point of view of conspiracy in war crimes and crimes against humanity of Control Council Law No. 10. In this respect my colleague, Dr. Haensel, will provide detailed statements hereon in due course.

At the beginning of the evidence for the defense and in connection with the opening statements on behalf of the individual defendants, the defense intends to call in two experts for the legal[125] questions of general interest, namely Dr. Jahrreiss, Professor of Public and International Law at the University of Cologne, and Dr. Niethammer of Tuebingen, formerly attorney at law, now Honorary Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure.

As far as documents being introduced with regard to the general questions discussed—

We will not be able to produce Dr. Jahrreiss at this time. Professor Jahrreiss cannot get away; he will only be available later on in July, and perhaps a suitable moment will come then when he can be examined when we have dealt with the cases of the officials of the Ministry of Justice.[72]

As far as documents being introduced with regard to general questions discussed, they will be handed over during the defense of the individual defendants. For the purpose of survey we will at the conclusion hand over the documents relative to a particular subject compiled in a special document book.

The defense has distributed the subjects which have arisen as a result of my survey among the individual counsel for the defense. Counsel in question will go into these cases during the proceedings and in particular at the time of the closing statement.

The subjects are classified in the following manner:

1. General questions on public law and international penal law—Dr. Schilf.

2. Legislative—machinery and technique—myself [Dr. Kubuschok].

3. Relationship between judicial authorities and police—myself.

4. Relationship between judicial authorities and the Ministry of Propaganda and the news service in the Nazi State—Dr. Schilf.

5. System and structure of Reich Administration of Justice—Dr. Schilf.

6. Introduction of German law and German jurisdiction in the Protectorate and the Occupied Eastern Territories—myself.

7. Sovereignty of justice in the incorporated and occupied territories—myself.

8. German court organization, Special Courts and People’s Court—Dr. Brieger and Dr. Grube.

9. German criminal procedure—Dr. Doetzer.

10. Extraordinary objection—Dr. Grube.

11. Nullity plea—Dr. Schilf.

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12. Retrospectiveness of penal laws and legal analogy—Dr. Aschenauer and Dr. Schilf.

13. Types of perpetrators—Dr. Schubert.

14. Military penal law—Dr. Koessl.

15. Independence of judges and directive measures—Dr. Aschenauer and Dr. Schilf.

16. Law of pardon—myself.

17. Execution of sentence—Dr. Marx.

18. Lynch law—Dr. Orth.

19. Sterilization and Euthanasia—Dr. Orth and myself.

20. Conspiracy and Control Council Law No. 10—Dr. Haensel, Dr. Doetzer, and Dr. Wandschneider.

May I now begin making my statement for the defendant Schlegelberger?

Presiding Judge Brand: Do you have that in the translated form for us? We have it, thank you.

C. Opening Statement for the Defendant Schlegelberger[73]

Dr. Kubuschok: If, in my statement concerning the defense in general,[74] I have just pointed out that the administration of justice in the National Socialist State cannot be judged separately but must be judged in the light of the whole administration of the Reich and its head, the dictatorship, I shall have to refer thus in defending the defendant Schlegelberger again and again to his personality, quite apart from dealing with the objective facts as propounded by the prosecution in order to judge and interpret actions in their proper light.

Franz Schlegelberger was, after many years of service to both the administration of justice and the jurisprudence, already Under Secretary when Hitler came to power. He kept this position until August 1942 when Hitler, according to his pronouncements wanted to build up a National Socialist administration of justice. Schlegelberger had always been dealing with civil law. We will outline this, his activity, in general. When in January 1941 after the death of the Minister of Justice Guertner, he took over the administration of the Ministry of Justice as the then oldest Under Secretary according to rank, so to speak; only then did he, in this[127] position, and to the extent of that position, have to deal with criminal cases.

If the prosecution on account of this, his position, has indicted him on these individual counts and included him in the common legal framework of conspiracy, the defense will first of all show that Control Council Law No. 10 does not provide a legal basis for an indictment of conspiracy to war crimes and crimes against humanity. My colleague, Dr. Haensel, responsible for the entire defense, has taken over this subject and will make the necessary statements and put forward motions. In addition, I, myself, will submit sufficient evidence to prove that with a person of Schlegelberger’s caliber, conspiracy and violent thinking are incompatible. I shall submit proof, as to his basic attitude during the whole of his tenure of office, that he could never have either favored or promoted principles of violent thinking, that on the contrary, all his activities were aimed at preventing or at least modifying the course set by Hitler’s dictatorship. We shall see, how he wrestled with the opposing forces of the Party, and how unequally distributed the powers were, and how his defensive attitude was breached but forcibly. We shall learn how much Hitler had always disliked the administration of justice and its expert administrators, and that, at a time, when not only the whole of the administration in Germany but also the entire public life, even to a certain extent private life, had already been “coordinated” and shaped according to National Socialist ideas. On 20 August 1942, he had to realize the fact that he had to build up a “National Socialist administration of justice.” Does this not constitute the truest judgment of Schlegelberger that he be judged by a man, who after all, was best qualified to judge? Is it not evident that the administration of justice under Guertner and Schlegelberger had done their utmost to face the avalanche? Is Hitler not best qualified to testify against the charges brought by the prosecution, namely that Schlegelberger had lent himself to the carrying out of National Socialist ideas of violence as personified by Hitler?

With this point of view in mind we shall have to judge the defendant Schlegelberger: A man, known to us only by his work, performed with integrity, and whose activities, viewed from National Socialist aspects, Hitler criticized in the above-mentioned way both in his Reichstag speech on 26 April 1942 and in his decree of 20 August 1942. Such a person has a right to point out: “The charges brought by the prosecution which superficially regarded, appear to be against me, and the charges that the prosecution has brought against me in order to incriminate me for my 10 years of service as Under Secretary cannot be judged as isolated facts and without considering motives but must be evaluated[128] as a whole.” Thus, we will best be able to gain breathing space after the speech of the prosecution, which is necessary in order to reach impartial judgment and which culminates in the conclusion that Schlegelberger “had indeed played a prominent part in the destruction of German law,” a reproach which he rightly rejects: with which also the statement of the British Broadcasting Corporation on the occasion of his retirement from office in August 1942, namely, that with Schlegelberger, the last judge in Germany, had disappeared—is incompatible.

Schlegelberger, under secretary for civil law, certainly knew how to supervise the orphaned Ministry of Justice for a year and a half in an administrative capacity. The one who succeeded him, his appearance already threateningly forecast, and to the stemming of whose course Schlegelberger devoted his whole self, escaped judgment. The aspect of being the representative [Gesichtspunkt der Repraesentanz] which obviously has influenced the prosecution essentially, has to be disregarded.

We will also have to take the fact into account, that Schlegelberger’s position as interim administrator of the Reich Ministry of Justice, did by no means equal that of a minister. If, in spite of these hectic times when everything was being infected by the National Socialist virus, he succeeded in retaining the position taken over from Guertner, his decision alone to remain in office until the limits of what could normally be expected of anyone, certainly not an easy decision, would fully justify this step. Judging by his personality and studying in detail the real and true situation during those years we shall explain what really was behind the Rostock speech mentioned by the prosecution. Evidence will be offered as to Schlegelberger’s real relations with the Party and how this was evident in the policy he pursued concerning questions of personnel.

His attitude toward Hitler will be subject to a careful examination. We shall be unable to do justice to this task if we do not also acquaint ourselves with those who blindly followed Hitler, and rendered the task of Schlegelberger and prior to that, Guertner’s, so difficult. Freisler, his antipode, whom Hitler by entrusting him with all matters concerning criminal law had made into a guardian of National Socialist ideas within the Ministry of Justice and all the other party officials who hated the last bulwark of constitutional thought.

With reference to individual counts of the indictment I shall point out that as “seditious undermining of the military power” [Wehrkraftzersetzung], so-called passive defeatism only became a punishable offense in 1943, and it was precisely for this purpose that the competency of the People’s Court was established as per[129] decree of 29 January 1943. The practice of seditious undermining of the military power, to which the indictment refers, therefore did not take place until Schlegelberger’s retirement. At the time of Schlegelberger’s tenure of office these cases of defeatism were judged according to the Insidious Statement Law [Heimtueckegesetz] and were not punishable by death but by a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment. The extension of the German criminal jurisdiction to include crimes committed abroad as well was practiced before Schlegelberger took over the administration.

I shall deal in detail with the legal question of the extension of German law to the occupied territories and I shall throw some light on the origin and the application of the ordinance concerning crimes of Poles and Jews. I shall show by means of the documents already submitted by the prosecution what demands were made by the Party concerning the treatment of the Poles and Jews and how these requests were opposed by law and in practice. Schlegelberger’s general attitude toward the Jewish question will be the subject of the discussion.

Even if the prosecution connects the defendant Schlegelberger with the extradition to the police of so-called asocial persons as well as of Poles and of Jews, the defense will prove that those orders were only given according to an agreement made between Himmler and Thierack in September 1942. Previous, special cases only concerned direct orders by Hitler given to the police and which could not be prevented by the administration of justice. We shall see that the police had started during the time of Guertner to remove prisoners from the prison by command of Hitler if Hitler considered the sentence passed during the criminal proceedings, a too mild one. Only in order to prevent this if possible or at least to restrict it did Guertner insist that he be informed of this order at the same time as were the police. It was only because of that request that the administration of justice dealt with these matters at all. It will be proved that everything possible was done in order to prevent extraditions to the police.

I shall also speak of the practice of granting pardons and find here also a confirmation of Schlegelberger’s general attitude.

The indictment also deals with the so-called euthanasia. We shall see that Schlegelberger opposed the carrying out of the euthanasia program soon after taking over the administration. He obviously succeeded, for we shall establish that the measures were stopped in August 1941 and were only started again at the time of Thierack as can be seen from the meeting described by the witness Suchomel.

Concerning sterilization, we shall offer abundant evidence to prove that the practice of the courts for protecting the hereditary[130] health of the German people was unobjectionable, that those courts had examined conscientiously whether evidence as to the facts required by the law had been submitted and especially sterilization for political or racial reasons was never decreed. I shall produce a witness to show that this procedure had been carried out in an unobjectionable way, even where Jews were concerned.

Regarding the question of the Night and Fog cases, it will be explained for what reasons and with which results the Night and Fog cases were taken over by the general courts. It also will be set forth what regulations were in force up to the date of Schlegelberger’s retiring from office. The extent and the consequences of restricting the proceedings necessitated by maintaining secrecy will be explained.

By submitting documents I shall present evidence about the political development of the National Socialist State and the structure of its administration. I shall present documents referring to legal provisions and their explanations concerning the questions raised by the prosecution. Finally, I shall submit several affidavits which deal with certain questions and help to form a judgment of Schlegelberger’s entire personality. I shall produce a witness for the political and administrative conditions in the National Socialist State. Another witness will, as already mentioned, give evidence on the practice of the courts for the protecting of hereditary health of the German people and on general questions regarding sterilization. Finally, I shall name as witness the personal Referent of the defendant who for many years held this position up to the time of Schlegelberger’s retirement from office, and who by virtue of his knowledge gained through professional and personal experience will be able to give evidence on numerous questions which have to be discussed.

D. Opening Statement for Defendant Klemm[75]

Dr. Schilf: May it please the Tribunal. By way of introduction, I should like to call attention to the fact that the indictment also clearly implies with regard to my client Herbert Klemm that, permeated as he was with National Socialist convictions, his one endeavor was to realize, by judicial methods and throughout the judicial field, the aims of National Socialist despotism. The indictment also, indeed, implies that he was acquainted himself from the start in detail with the great extent of these aims. The prosecution has tried, in connection with each action and with each event that came to light anywhere in the files, to refer everything with which my client was concerned back to that fundamental[131] conception. Yet in my opinion the prosecution does not make any effort to embark upon proof that the defendants had come to a mutual agreement in their own minds, such as must constitute the prerequisite for the conspiracy of justice, for the furtherance of the Hitler regime as alleged by the indictment. Instead, the prosecution is content to trace in every statement and every action simply a sign of malicious intent and bad faith without stopping to consider how such actions are to be estimated in the light of historical development and within the limits of the phenomenon as a whole and the practical possibilities. Just as the indictment desires to see in the legislative power [Rechtsschoepfung] conferred upon the judge by the alteration of paragraph 2 of the German Criminal Code an example of the judicial intention to try cases unrestrictedly and arbitrarily, without attention to legal guaranties, so also my client Klemm is credited with completely false motives in detail. Just as it will be proved by the defense that such legislative power for the judge had already been planned, long before 1933, in draft proposals for reform, with the object of creating the necessary synthesis between merely codified law and the actual development of law through the giving of legal judgments, so also shall I show, in my defense of the defendant Klemm, in general, that he, too, was concerned, in his measures, with the preservation of real justice. Reference will therefore inevitably be made to the background of historical development behind the measures with which he is charged, to the related points in the German legal system, and to the actual distribution of power existing during the Hitler regime. In this connection a great deal will depend on the view that is taken of his position, his potential influence and the limits of his authority.

In particular, I shall divide the subject matter of my proof into sections.

In the first place, it will be necessary to begin with the fact that, outwardly, the defendant Klemm has to bear a certain amount of odium: he had joined the NSDAP before it took over power, and he remained in it until the capitulation; he was at first Oberstaatsanwalt and Ministerial Councilor in the Reich Ministry of Justice, he was chief of liaison with the SA and reached high rank in that organization, he was a group leader in the Party Chancellery, and he was finally to become Under Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Justice, the last position he held, and a personal friend of and very close collaborator with Thierack, the Minister. The indictment evidently intends, by giving this outward impression, to exhibit Klemm as a man who considered justice to be a means, and treated it as a means, to exclusively[132] political ends. I shall prove that this was not the case. In order to demonstrate the seeming contradiction between outward appearance and actual private character, I consider it my duty to give the Tribunal a comprehensive picture of the personality of my client as a jurist and as a man. It will become evident that he was and remained a simple and straightforward person, even after he rose higher in his career, that he was a man of sensitive disposition and refined feeling and always endeavored to act objectively and above all justly. I shall therefore have to ask my client to explain in the witness box the ideas he had conceived as to the aims of the NSDAP, the hopes he had before him in the legal and political field, and the way in which he believed it possible that the political intentions of the leadership of the state could be combined with the idea that law has to prevail. He will have to explain to the Tribunal how many things he actually did not know in order to enable us to gain an accurate picture of the situation at that time and of the developments.

So far as the separate phases of the activity of the defendant Klemm are concerned, it must be said—

The indictment takes as the first phase his activity as Oberstaatsanwalt and Ministerial Councilor in the Reich Ministry of Justice. The two charges specially raised against him in this field are concerned with the so-called “more severe interrogations” through organs of the Gestapo and with the fact that he was the Ministry’s chief of liaison with the SA. I shall prove that it was not the duty of the defendant to suggest in certain cases “more severe interrogations,” in other words, maltreatment of prisoners by the Gestapo. It was, on the contrary, his duty to prosecute such cases through criminal proceedings, since also the Gestapo and its organs were prohibited from ill-treating prisoners. In this connection I shall be able to take the opportunity to describe the attitude of my client by reference to the documents which were submitted in the IMT trial. It was the defendant Klemm who as an official in the Ministry of Justice of Saxony suggested the strict prosecution which was made so much of both in indictment and in the judgment given in the IMT trial of those SA men who had rendered themselves guilty of ill-treatment of prisoners in the concentration camp at Hohenstein in Saxony. There is no ground for the assumption that Klemm’s attitude changed at a later date, when he worked in the Reich Ministry of Justice.

The position of a chief of liaison between the Ministry and the SA leaders will be described by me through reference to the documents. The judiciary as a public authority, had the duty to inform the SA leaders of any prosecution or condemnation of a member of the SA. It was the purpose of such information to[133] give the SA leaders the possibility of removing criminal elements from their ranks. This purpose was known to the Reich Ministry of Justice. The chief offices of both organizations had to exchange information and experience and were obliged to ascertain in which special cases they had to be interested. It was necessary to appoint a special Referent for this purpose, merely in order to simplify the handling of these matters. This post was filled by my client Klemm, since he was simultaneously both a member of the SA and of the Ministry of Justice. I hope, indeed, to prove with special effect that it was absolutely opposed to Klemm’s conception of his office as such a liaison chief to suppress criminal proceedings against SA members or protect them against prosecution, but that on the contrary he thought it necessary to support vigorously the interests of justice against the SA leaders. An individual case will give me the opportunity to demonstrate how also in this field Klemm was guided by legal consideration alone, and this individual case will be symptomatic of the attitude of my client.

In order to be able to judge correctly the activity of my client in the Party Chancellery, I consider it my duty to describe first of all the sphere of work and problems with which the Chancellery itself had to deal. This seems to me all the more necessary, as evidently completely false ideas of this organization are prevalent. I shall therefore have to show that by reason of legal regulations the latter had to take part in all the legislative and administrative work done by the Ministry of Justice and that it was not simply an office that carried out tasks concerned purely with Party politics. In the constitutional structure of the Third Reich, the Party Chancellery had to perform public functions. I may already at this point draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that my client is not affected by count four of the indictment, in spite of the fact that he was employed in the Chancellery of the Party. It is indeed a significant indication that the prosecution has formed an incorrect view of the Party Chancellery, if an official could be employed there who did not belong to the corps of leaders of the Party.

An explanation of the bureaucratic structure of the Party cannot be avoided; its division into separate departments and groups will have to be described. The defendant Klemm was at the head of only a subordinate group in the Party Chancellery. Its number was IIIc. I would ask the Tribunal to be so good as to take due note of this number IIIc in my speech for the defense, so far as the latter is concerned with the Party Chancellery, and also when I come to explain the documents relative to the Party Chancellery. My client was employed exclusively in this legal group. This outward sign alone is an important circumstance to be considered[134] in arriving at a correct estimate of the work of my client. The special task of this Group IIIc was to deal with all matters which affected law, codification, and the administrative work of the Ministry of Justice. The officials in this legal group remained, as did Klemm also, officials of the Ministry of Justice; they were merely delegated by that ministry. They also therefore represented in the Party Chancellery the idea of justice and the concerns of their own ministry. Whenever different questions were raised in Group IIIc, for example, questions as to the legal disposition of the affairs of foreign peoples, a different department or group of the Party Chancellery dealt officially with and decided upon the matter. Owing to this restriction of the field of their work the legal group could only raise objections against the treatment of any matter in another department if formal questions were handled. The legal group had no right of appeal if a matter had been decided on principle by other groups. Thus, it will be shown that the decree about penal law with regard to Poles was not dealt with or decided upon in Klemm’s legal group but in Group IIIa of the Party Chancellery, which was concerned with questions on ethnic origin [Volkstumsfragen]. The defendant Klemm, therefore, could not exercise any influence whatever, during the period of his employment in the Party Chancellery, on the provisions of this law.

Through further evidence it will be made clear that Klemm’s position in the Party Chancellery, as a consequence of the latter’s special method of working, could only have slight influence on decisive matters. Really important affairs concerned with politics or both politics and law, so far as they may interest the Tribunal and the prosecution, were not handled by the legal group headed by Klemm.

The officials of the Party Chancellery, so far as they were group leaders, had no influence whatsoever on politics. On the contrary, this was done by the Party’s own office. The latter had no state functions as had the Party Chancellery. The NSDAP had offices for agricultural policy, people’s welfare, people’s health, a national legal office, an organization of Germans living abroad, and many more. There the political principles were planned, there the influence was exercised that found expression in the sentence: “The Party gives orders to the State.” All these offices of the NSDAP must be separated clearly from the Party Chancellery with its function of a public nature. These Party offices transmitted their plans through the competent “Reichsleiter” directly to Hitler as the Party leader and head of State.

Also the position of Bormann must be explained. He also had a variety of offices and functions as Reich leader, secretary of the[135] Fuehrer, and leader of the Party Chancellery. At the time when Klemm was working in the Party Chancellery, Bormann was regularly in the Fuehrer’s headquarters and thus away from Munich. All important questions of a general nature, also those affecting justice and its policies and organizations went directly to Bormann in the Fuehrer’s headquarters. There Bormann himself ordered that most of the matters be handled at once. In such cases Klemm’s legal group often received no information at all of his decision, or at the most a copy subsequently. When Bormann transferred a job to the legal group in Munich he included as a rule instructions for the handling of the matter. When things were handled in this way by Bormann no objections could be raised. Moreover, the evidence I will produce will destroy the rumor that my client had close contact with Bormann. They disliked each other very much. The main reason was that Klemm did not accede willingly enough to the wishes of Bormann. It occurred only very rarely that Klemm reported to Bormann. To a much greater extent than other subdepartment heads of the Party Chancellery, Klemm also informed Bormann about his own point of view.

After I shall have tried to clarify the unclear and dark picture of the Party Chancellery, I shall discuss in detail the working method of my client and I will outline in what matters he participated and how far he is, therefore, responsible and in what matters he did not participate.

(a) A series of documents submitted by the prosecution carry the dictation symbol of Bormann; I shall show that all these documents can have nothing to do with my client, Klemm. They were prepared solely by Bormann and his staff at the Fuehrer headquarters. No copy was sent to the Party Chancellery at Munich, so that the legal group never received any knowledge of them. This is the reason why it is so important to draw attention to the symbol of the legal group, namely, IIIc. Klemm neither prepared, nor had any knowledge of, any letters of the Party Chancellery which do not bear this file number. Just as an example I mention Thierack’s letter to Bormann on the collaboration of the judicial authorities in the extermination of Poles, Jews, and gypsies (NG-199, 199A, Pros. Ex. 243). As “Top Secret Reich Matter” this writing never reached section IIIc of the Party Chancellery.

(b) I will show that the defendant cannot be held responsible for a possible crime in which the huge organization of the Party Chancellery may have been involved, but not the defendant, if he had never participated in the planning, and if he could never have received information about it. It is my opinion that this is also[136] not possible by using the concept of conspiracy or the broadly defined forms of participation according to the Law No. 10 of Control Council. Such a reasoning is not possible especially if I will prove how strongly Klemm advocated—especially in the Party Chancellery—the idea that law has to prevail in a state, and how he tried to prevent that Party organs be influenced in any unfavorable way. Every day the Group IIIc received complaints against the justice, the judges, and against the offices of the administration of justice which wanted to influence pending proceedings or even to change sentences which had already been passed. Work in connection with such complaints made up the biggest part of the working time of this group. In all these cases the complaints were rejected by stating that the judge is independent. I shall submit evidence to show that the Party Chancellery, particularly Group IIIc, expressly forbade all political leaders (that is, the Fuehrer Corps of the NSDAP) to interfere in the jurisdiction. It will be demonstrated that this circular decree was issued on Klemm’s initiative. I shall disprove the assertion of the prosecution and shall show that my client advocated emphatically the punishment of Party members who were found guilty of an offense. Accordingly, Klemm did not use his position in the Party Chancellery to keep justice under pressure but on the contrary tried to promote the interests of justice and the idea that law has to prevail in a state. In the year 1941, for example, he succeeded in persuading Bormann in a memorandum to reject the plans of Himmler, who attempted already at that time to transfer the jurisdiction over the Poles to his police.

(c) The documents submitted by the prosecution, so far as they really affect the legal group of the Party Chancellery, will not be able to invalidate my above assertions. When I will submit the evidence for the defense I will have the opportunity to explain the purpose and the context of these documents. It will be possible to correct many misinterpretations.

In this connection it seems to be necessary to explain briefly the fact that Klemm’s influence in the Party Chancellery was never so great that it could have played any part in the appointment of Thierack to Minister of Justice in the year 1942. Many a person who could not know the actual events and their background may have had some fantastic ideas in this respect. The explanations of the defense will destroy these conceptions.

(d) With regard to the activity of my client as Under Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Justice, it will be the task of the legal presentation to separate those actions and measures for which he is responsible from those for which he is not responsible. Also with regard to this point I shall emphasize my point of view that[137] on basis of Law No. 10 of the Control Council, my client cannot be held responsible for what he himself did neither instigate nor approve. In order to be able to find the facts which will serve as the basis for such legal arguments, I must give you during the proceedings of evidence a detailed picture of my client’s position as Under Secretary, of his working field, and of the extent of his personal influence. Even externally the position of the Under Secretary had changed considerably since the appointment of Thierack. While before this time the Under Secretary in the Ministry of Justice stood on principle between a section chief and the minister, after that time his function declined to the extent of being a figure [figurehead] beside the minister. Formerly the Under Secretary had a broad working field and had authority to make important decisions himself, and only the most important matters reached the minister himself, such as bills or critical matters with regard to policies of the State and of justice. Thierack himself on the other hand, handled all matters with regard to the administration of penal law which the section chief was not permitted or did not want to decide, and he degraded the under secretary to a position in which the latter could merely give his opinion like any other expert. It is correct, that from an external point of view the working field of my client seemed to be greater than that of his predecessor, Dr. Rothenberger. The sections of Ministries III (legislation in the sphere of criminal law), IV (administration of criminal law), and V (execution of sentences), which were not under the latter’s jurisdiction were formally reassigned to Klemm. This seeming extension—my client was thus practically in charge of the whole Ministry of Justice with all its main sections but with the exception of section XV (section for secret matters) which was already in the process of dissolution—actually resulted in a curtailment of his executive powers. Only in a limited field did he receive the authority to make independent decisions, namely as chief of section II, which was concerned mainly with educational problems and whereby Klemm was entitled in personnel matters to propose appointment and promotion of officials up to the grade of Landgerichtsdirektor and officials of equivalent rank. In all other fields he was subjected to the domineering orders of the minister in the same way as every other official of the Ministry. Although he could call for the report of an expert and could thus bring a matter to be decided within his sphere, he was prevented from doing so if the minister himself reserved the final word for himself. Through presentation of my evidence it will be made clear how Thierack, because of his previous career, directed his interest, perhaps his only interest, to problems of criminal law and execution of sentences.

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Thus, we will recognize that the above-mentioned main sections of the Ministry were only formally under the jurisdiction of Klemm and that no change “in the line of the direction of justice,” as Thierack expressed it in a discussion of the section leaders on 7 January 1944 (NG-195, Ex. 45) resulted from the appointment of a new Under Secretary. It will be proved through the evidence how little the Under Secretary could care for other sections, and that because of the external circumstances, as for instance the evacuation of whole sections from Berlin, he was only rarely present at conferences with the minister or was left out intentionally.

(e) This limitation of the tasks of the under secretary through the organization was furthered through the personal qualities of the Minister, Thierack. A picture of Thierack will result from the documents and the statements of witnesses. He was an autocratic, brutal, and even a rude person. He pursued his views and objectives with remarkable stubbornness. Accordingly, he was hardly to be persuaded from an opinion once formed. He tolerated no one next to himself in his struggle for power. For such a person it must have been easy to suppress such a soft and yielding personality as Klemm. Thierack was not interested in problems of the jurisprudence in concepts of law. He thought that he was a politician and merely a practitioner of the administration of justice. The contrast in the characters had an especially unfavorable effect on Klemm’s method of working since Thierack thought he could treat Klemm merely as an official dependent on him personally. That resulted from the previous personal relations of the two men. When Thierack filled the post of Minister of Justice for Saxony immediately after the seizure of power by the NSDAP, Klemm was his adjutant. When Klemm after many years again had to come into personal contact with Thierack through his appointment to under secretary, he was in the opinion of Thierack, not more than his adjutant again. When he contacted his Under Secretary Klemm, his manners were just as rough as in his contact with other subordinate officials. Even in the presence of other officials he showed tactlessness, and treated him, too, with disdain and certainly not as a “friend and confidant,” as the prosecution obviously assumes. Thierack would not attach such weight to an opinion voiced by Klemm as would have been appropriate because of the latter’s official position. In my defense plea this personal relationship is of importance, so that it must also be shown that Thierack was an extremely reserved person. He disclosed his plans and intentions to nobody before they were carried out. He kept the most important political-judicial events and decisions secret even from his under secretary. When he received[139] the visits of other Ministers, or higher Party and SS officials nobody else was present as a rule. This was particularly true in his contacts with Himmler and the people surrounding him, such as Kaltenbrunner. Of the contents of the discussions Klemm like the other officials of the Ministry was not informed until a decree of Thierack was published for the individual sections of the Ministry.

As to the outside Thierack used Klemm only if he considered it as advisable to emphasize his position as Under Secretary. Thus, Klemm signed legal decrees not really as deputy of the Minister who was absent, but only when Thierack thought that he should put his signature under a document of little significance. Klemm had to sign the correspondence with other ministries if Thierack preferred this procedure for reasons of prestige. This is the only reason for the fact that the so-called directing letters [Lenkungsbriefe] to the presidents of the Appellate Courts Stuttgart and Hamburg do not bear Thierack’s name but that of Klemm in spite of the fact that it was Thierack who, in individual reports, complained about the sentences as being too light.

(f) Starting from this general statement with regard to the evidence concerning Klemm’s position as Under Secretary, I will have to discuss in detail the documents submitted by the prosecution and the statements of the witnesses. Here it will be proved that the main counts of the indictment have no relation at all to the activities of my client. Almost all the measures which the prosecution declared as objectionable, were completed when Klemm took over the position of Under Secretary. The special regulations against members of foreign nations were issued, the Jews were already excluded from the jurisdiction of the justice authorities, the so-called transfer of asocial “prisoners to the police”—handled by department XV, which was never subordinated to Klemm, not even formally—was carried out. My client practically had nothing to do anymore with the Nacht und Nebel cases. The interpretation of the laws by the courts was distinctly crystallized; a steady practice had already developed during the preceding 4 years of war, when the sentences became more severe because of the conditions caused by the war. The prosecution did not submit any evidence showing that Klemm during his time in office as under secretary advocated more severe sentences, especially in cases of high treason. The award of punishment and the granting of clemency took place in accordance with distinctly developed standards. In this connection I will have to demonstrate in detail the proceedings which developed for the clemency questions in cases where a death sentence had been imposed. It will be proved that Klemm did not adopt Thierack’s severity-on-principle[140] [grundsaetzliche Haerte], but that on the contrary, especially if the absence of the Minister offered an opportunity, he was inclined to be lenient. Impressive examples for this fact will be given to the Court from the document book of the prosecution 3-L, Document NG-414, Prosecution Exhibit 252.

In this connection the opportunity will arise to prove in general that it is only a mere assertion of the prosecution that the Ministry of Justice illegally ordered that a death sentence be carried out. Klemm did not participate in the issuance of directives concerning the clearing of jails when the enemy approached. These were affairs which were ordered by the executive department of the ministry (Dept. V). Evidence will be submitted which will prove that my client had practically nothing to do with Department V. They will prove that all decisions in these questions were always made by Thierack, without consulting his Under Secretary. Concerning the individual case about the illegal murder in the penitentiary Sonnenburg, the evidence obtained up to now through the cross-examinations of witnesses will be supported by additional evidence. It will clearly be shown that the Ministry of Justice was not responsible for these measures. It will be seen that Klemm did not know anything about the common plan of the Reich defense commissioner and the general public prosecutor and that therefore, he did not have the possibility to prevent that their intentions were carried out.

By reference to individual cases I will prove that, in accordance with the plea made by the entire defense the judiciary did not do anything which made the lynching of Allied fliers who were shot down possible. The contrary will be proved. It was Klemm who ordered that criminal proceedings should be started against Germans who had killed Allied fliers illegally. The disputes with the Party offices with regard to these orders will be shown. Furthermore, it will be proved that Klemm saw to it that Germans, who treated bailed-out enemy fliers decently were protected from subordinated authorities of justice who showed over-great zeal.

(g) When discussing the individual counts of the indictment I will try to find the basis of the evidence for subsequent legal considerations. This includes especially the question, whether it can be at all important for the judging of the facts of a crime, to examine the actions of a superior Minister in which the subordinate Under Secretary had also no part. Here the problem will not be the importance of an order with regard to criminal law, but it will be discussed that the necessary causal connection is missing. Going further we will have the opportunity to produce evidence before this Tribunal with regard to the subjective side.

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I will demonstrate that Klemm, due to his conviction that law had to prevail in the state and due to his generally decent human attitude interceded on behalf of the law. It will be proved that my client was held in high regard by his co-workers in the Ministry, that he tried in many individual cases to mitigate the fundamental harshness of Minister Thierack who was severe on principle, that he always was ready to listen to other officials, that he always was ready to accept sensible suggestions; in general he was thus just the opposite of Thierack. This attitude also showed results, as will be proved, in the sphere of personnel policy. On principle he did not give any preference for positions to so-called “old Party members.” In case of promotions and appointments he recommended persons who did not belong to the NSDAP. I shall be able to show cases where he also recommended persons who were on the other side [gegnerischen Lager], if they had special professional qualifications. He tried to aid officials of justice who, for political reasons, were personally in difficulties.

(h) Extended fields which Klemm handled in the Ministry of Justice have not been mentioned by the prosecution. When submitting evidence I will have the opportunity to show especially that my client had to spend most of his working time in the Ministry for Department II of the Ministry. This department handled all questions which were concerned with the general training of all German jurists. Here the special difficulties which arose with regard to the personnel of the authorities of justice on account of the events of the war had to be surmounted. The evidence will show that my client in training the young jurists omitted all politics, that his work was absolutely unpolitical. Thus, the so-called ideological training and examinations which were very much favored in the time shortly after the assumption of power of the NSDAP and which found a specially exact expression in the “Referendar Lager [camp for prospective lawyers] Hanns Kerrl” were excluded from the professional education of the jurist. At the time when Klemm, at the beginning of the year 1944, took over his position in the ministry, all these things had been settled a long time ago. The most urgent practical problems, where one should get young judges, when and in what manner young jurists should make their examinations, how former soldiers were to be treated, and similar questions belonged to Klemm’s working field. This was practical work, also this field had nothing to do with “politics.” Thus, if the picture and the activity of my client will be made clear to the Tribunal, then it will be proved that it is not a cheap attempt of throwing the blame upon dead persons, then it will become clear that it has been tried to make my client here in the dock the deputy of Thierack and[142] perhaps also of Bormann. Klemm is, however, not responsible for their guilt.

E. Opening Statement for Defendant Rothenberger[76]

Dr. Wandschneider: May I begin my opening statement? At the beginning of my opening statement I want to say a few words about the task of the defense as I see it.

I. The task of the defense

With the presentation of its theory of proof [Beweistheorie], the defense really starts its task in this trial. It is confronted with an indictment presented in the name of the world community against the justice officials in National Socialist Germany and referring to the moral conscience of just this world community. This situation requires a few words about the duties and position of the German defense in this trial. It is a cheap trick, if Germans now, subsequently, merely because the National Socialistic State has collapsed, declare very simply and without resistance that Hitler was “not right,” and if these same Germans during the National Socialist regime, completely renouncing their own attitude and personality, were opportunists and cooperated with the entire National Socialist Policy with just as little resistance. Such a confession on the part of the defense, which would be considered suitable only because the sentence of the International Military Tribunal established the amoral character of national socialism, would also be a cheap trick and valueless. Opinions are not formed on the basis of outward conditions, but on the basis of one’s own knowledge. Of course, we do know on the basis of our knowledge that under national socialism the basic rights and worth of the free individual and of the human community whose interests are inextricably bound together became corrupt and were destroyed and that is, by misuse and waste of the most valuable sources of power of the German nation itself and of other non-German nations. Only self-recognition, self-education, and efficient responsible cooperation of all members of a community lead to a really democratic way of life and state.

The above statements which were made in order to be honest and above board have not been made from the standpoint of any disinterested neutral third party. How could a German defense counsel be inwardly untouched by the arguments of the prosecution, regardless of whether and to what extent he, as a German, considers himself “guilty.” In view of the fact that the German[143] people were entangled into error, misery, and guilt, should he not feel even more that he is one of them, and should he not try to gain that which cannot be lost—self-reflection, principles, and dignity. The defense wishes to thank the Tribunal for having given it full opportunity to represent the interests of its client in this spirit during this trial.

Dr. Rothenberger is charged with the crime of conspiracy, committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to the prosecution, the same concrete facts form the basis for the last two charges. In like manner, the charge of conspiracy is connected with the planning of the afore-mentioned war crimes and crimes against humanity. The facts presented by the prosecution to prove these crimes are in accordance with the IMT judgment only relevant from the penal point of view since the beginning of the war. We are concerned with the following facts:

Numbers 9 and 21 of the indictment—Use of the Special Courts and the People’s Courts for the oppression of political enemies.

Numbers 10 and 22 of the indictment—Participation in the discussion between Himmler and Thierack of 18 September 1942.

Numbers 11 and 23 of the indictment—Sentencing and execution of Germans and non-Germans for high treason.

Numbers 14 and 26 of the indictment—Illegal execution.

Numbers 16 and 28 of the indictment—Preferential treatment shown Party members who are to be punished and collaboration in the introduction of the special penal law for Jews and others.

III. Nonexistence of a conspiracy on legal grounds

Before starting to discuss the basis for the above charges in the indictment, it seems fitting to treat briefly the question of conspiracy. From a legal standpoint, attention must be called to the fact that according to the statute of the London Treaty, as well as the Control Council Law No. 10, the conspiracy, or plan, can only be considered as a crime in itself if it concerns a crime against peace but not if it concerns a war crime or crime against humanity. This viewpoint was maintained also by the IMT in trial No. I.

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IV. The general circumstances of the case which form the basis for the charges of the indictment

1. Memorandum of Dr. Rothenberger—In its opening statement against Dr. Rothenberger the prosecution called particular attention to his memorandum to Hitler for the year 1942 and entered it as Document NG-075, Prosecution Exhibit 27. The prosecution characterized this as a “peculiar document” and commented upon it from its own point of view. The defense will also have to analyze the memorandum minutely and discuss in detail its previous history and what has happened to it. It appears that the chief problem here is the basically important question of the dominating position of the judge in the life of a nation. The appointment of Dr. Rothenberger as Under Secretary can be traced back to this memorandum, the character of which is clearly open to a psychological judgment. Naturally the reasons for his appointment will have to be discussed in greater detail. The memorandum presents therefore the very first of those important developments which put Dr. Rothenberger in the defendant’s dock in Nuernberg.

2. Dr. Rothenberger’s reaction to the Hitler speech of 26 April 1942—The prosecution has further produced against Dr. Rothenberger his report on conditions to the Reich Ministry of Justice, dated 11 May 1942, as Document NG-389, Prosecution Exhibit 76, which describes the reaction to Hitler’s speech of notorious fame, dated 26 April 1942. The prosecution blames him for the measures taken after the Hitler speech, just as for the corresponding measures of autumn 1942. It will therefore be the task of the defense to show how the measures taken by Dr. Rothenberger in 1942 following the Hitler speech were meant, and what was their effect.

The documents specified under this as well as the previous number, in fact in the opinion of the defense, touch upon crucial questions of the whole trial; namely, the place of the judiciary in the National Socialist state. They require therefore a full description in the presentation of evidence by this side.

3. Dr. Rothenberger’s ideas on reform—Dr. Rothenberger failed with the plans for reform contained in his memorandum. It may also be conceded that they were bound to fail, by virtue of a historical necessity. However, that is not the point, but rather to demonstrate that Dr. Rothenberger exerted himself again and again to the utmost for the preservation of the foundations of justice, in particular for an independent judiciary, and used all his strength to that end. The defense will clearly show that in the case of his discharge after he had served only 15 months as Under Secretary, not personal but decisively factual[145] differences were at stake, on account of which Dr. Rothenberger was no longer acceptable to the rulers in the Third Reich.

4. Dr. Rothenberger’s personality and career from the prewar period and into the Second World War—The above events falling directly within the war period, become fully understandable only by showing the development of Dr. Rothenberger’s personal and professional circumstances before the war. It will be demonstrated that even before 1933 he was a professionally able lawyer, interested solely in civil law, energetic and conscious of his responsibility. It will further be shown that after 1933 he succeeded in having his proposals for a constitutional state adopted in Hamburg. He did become involved, in constantly growing opposition to radical Party circles and to the SS, especially after the outbreak of the war.

All the facts of the case expounded above under IV are legally relevant from the viewpoint of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as from that of conspiracy; they are therefore presented with reference to all charges against my client.

V. The various facts of the case in the order of the indictment and the position taken with regard to them

All the charges made against Dr. Rothenberger have to do with the field of criminal law and administration of punishment. It will be shown by the prosecution’s own documents and by further evidence, that Minister of Justice Thierack reserved for himself all matters of criminal law and criminal law procedure as well as of administration of punishment, and accordingly by the exclusion of Dr. Rothenberger, placed Departments III, IV, V, and XV of the Ministry under his own direction. Dr. Rothenberger, therefore, neither had influence on the whole field of criminal law nor was he responsible for it. Neither Special Courts nor the People’s Court, neither general public prosecutors nor any sort of criminal courts nor prisons were under his direction. The description of Dr. Rothenberger as successor of Freisler in the opening statement on page 64 of the German translation is therefore incorrect and an error. Without question, the entire criminal law was under the direction of the latter as Under Secretary, which from the beginning was not the case with Dr. Rothenberger.

1. Concerning numbers 9 and 21 of the indictment—According to the above general statements, therefore, Dr. Rothenberger did not cooperate in the improper use of the Special Courts and the People’s Courts for the suppression of political opponents.

2. Concerning numbers 10 and 22 of the indictment—On 18 September 1942 an agreement was reached between Himmler and[146] Thierack which according to a file note by Thierack, among other things, provides for the delivery of criminal prisoners to the SS for the purpose of “extermination by work” and for the transfer to Himmler of criminal justice in cases concerning Jews, Poles, etc. It will be shown that Dr. Rothenberger did not take part in the discussion of these points, was not responsible for them, and had no knowledge of them at that time.

3. Concerning numbers 11 and 23 of the indictment—Dr. Rothenberger never took part in the sentencing of political opponents for high treason. If the prosecution takes the view that nonexercise of the right of clemency after valid sentence applies, then in the cases in question with which Dr. Rothenberger dealt in the absence of Minister Thierack, an opinion having regard to factual and legal points will be given.

4. Concerning numbers 14 and 26 of the indictment—Insofar as the four executions which took place erroneously on 8 September 1943 in Ploetzensee, may be referred to by the charge of illegal executions, Dr. Rothenberger’s lack of responsibility will be demonstrated by the documents of the prosecution and by further evidence.

5. Concerning numbers 16 and 28 of the indictment—Dr. Rothenberger had no share in the preference given to Party members in clemency proceedings, as is also established on the basis of the documents of the prosecution. Nor did he take a responsible part in depriving the Jews, and others, of their civil rights [Entrechtung], as will be shown in detail.

VI. General aspects of criminality

To understand the line of reasoning on which this presentation of evidence is based, attention is called to the following general criminalistic points of view which in themselves of course are known to the Tribunal. If, nevertheless, they are emphasized here, it is because the Tribunal is confronted with the extraordinarily difficult task of having to form a judgment of events, people, and mental processes from a world of thought which is alien to it.

1. Limited sphere of activity of individuals under a dictatorial regime—Undoubtedly it is a characteristic of a dictatorial regime that the great majority of the population sinks into more than average passivity and paralysis of responsibility, in contrast to a democracy where the average citizens, too, the majority of the population, display a far greater initiative out of the practical experience of their liberty and their own sense of responsibility. However, it is a certainty that the few, who, under such a regime[147] stand in opposition to the rulers, thereby doing something which in a democracy would carry no risk worth mentioning, thus risk their lives and liberty. Consequently, it is not possible to do justice to the circumstances involved, if one minimizes the courageous actions of individuals in a dictatorial system by inept comparisons with conditions obtaining in a democracy. It is obvious, that the question to which degree an individual had the power and opportunity in a police-state system to call a halt to developments felt by him to be wrong, must in all fairness be judged by other standards.

2. Necessity of individual method of observation—A dictatorship blurs, especially to the foreign observer in a completely inconclusive manner the actually existing, great individual and basic differences, on account of the “coordination” which to begin with was effected in the exterior sphere. Thus, for example a German or Frenchman will hardly succeed in picking out one Chinese face out of a crowd of Chinese. One looks just like another. For that reason it is the more imperative to take into consideration the individual personality and its historic as well as geographical background, like that which binds Dr. Rothenberger to the Hanseatic tradition of the old trading and harbor city of Hamburg; the more inapplicable generalization and standardization may lead to misjudging the specific importance of a personality and the particular nature of his work.

3. Methodical ineptness of a retrospective view—Evaluation from the point of view of criminal law is concerned with the possible participation in the commission of a criminal act and the possible personal guilt. It is decisive for judging a person’s guilt to establish whether he shared in and had knowledge of the crime and whether he is conscious of it; so for instance in the case of the conspiracy which is alleged to have existed since 1933, knowledge of the criminal development of national socialism since that time is decisive. In spite of some disappointments and bad experiences in individual cases surely none of the defendants considered the National Socialist development in principle and as a whole as criminal, nor was he necessarily compelled to do so. It is not intended to question the statements of the IMT about the destructive development of the NSDAP, which according to article X of Ordinance No. 7, are binding until the contrary is conclusively proved. Nevertheless, it so happened that the National Socialist era produced a number of events and institutions which were either politically indifferent or even appeared as the expression of peaceful reconstruction; they were not mentioned in the findings of the IMT. Public opinion, however, was formed on the basis of those manifestations. Questions such as the revival[148] of trade, the construction of Autobahnen [super highways], the elimination of unemployment, the creation of great social institutions, as for instance the National Socialist Public Welfare Association (NSV) and the Winter Relief Scheme (WHW), continuously, year in, year out, were in the limelight with the German public and overshadowed everything else, not to mention events in the field of foreign policy like the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, international sport events such as the Olympic games, etc. The greater part of the population, even the educated classes, were not aware that unemployment was only eliminated by an ever more formidable increase of the economic capacity for the purpose of the coming war, and that the donations and subscriptions which the people collected by hard work for their social institutions, disappeared in the gorge of rearmament. Did not Hitler’s protestations that the construction of Autobahnen was to be considered proof of Germany’s peaceful intentions of reconstruction, and not as the expression of militaristic mentality, sound entirely convincing in view of the fact that should it come to the point these same Autobahnen would operate strategically to Germany’s disadvantage which actually did happen?

By his systematic and indubitably extremely cunning propaganda policy, Dr. Goebbels brought about step by step a constantly increasing isolation from foreign countries which made it more and more impossible to form a truly objective judgment about other countries and questions of foreign policy. It is true, treaties with foreign countries were heralded with much publicity as proof of the desire for amicable cooperation with other nations. Considering these circumstances, were men, even those in higher positions, as for instance, Dr. Rothenberger, who did not have the slightest insight into matters of foreign policy, to show less confidence in the National Socialist leadership of the state than evidently was manifested by the foreign statesmen who concluded treaties with the Third Reich. Suspicious events were not discussed by the press and the public and thus escaped public attention and judgment to a large extent. Insofar as dangerous practices of national socialism were still discernible in domestic and foreign policy, they never appeared as naked facts before the German public as is stated by the IMT verdict but were exhaustively “disguised” in comments rendered harmless or even excused and justified as the results of alleged intrigues by the opposing camp.

Without wishing to deny that there exists a certain predisposition on the part of the German people for the reception of authoritarian wisdom, bad though it may often be, one cannot get around the fact, that, based on the circumstances described above, the[149] process by which Germans, even those on a higher level, arrived at an opinion and judgment, of necessity moved and was bound to move along certain lines. The question as to knowledge of certain criminal acts and developments, or better yet, the question as to recognition of the criminality of certain acts and developments can therefore be judged psychologically correctly only on the basis of all the conditions and contexts prevailing at that time. That applies particularly to wartime, which in all countries produces special exigencies and places the strongest emphasis on certain desirable facts while suppressing undesirable ones. Retrospective observation which, in examining facts, does not put itself into conditions existing at that time, projects into the past, knowledge and opportunity of knowledge gained later. Applied to this trial, the above-named method imputes to the defendants a knowledge, an awareness of the criminality of circumstances, which they did not have at that time and makes demands on their faculties of perception which they could never have satisfied under the circumstances then prevailing.

VII. Principles of the constitutional state: “nulla poena sine lege,” “nullum crimen sine lege”

The inner connection between the afore-mentioned train of thoughts and the principles nulla poena sine lege and nullum crimen sine lege is obvious. The question is whether facts constituting criminality were created after the war by the Charter of the London Agreement and the Control Council Law No. 10 which, in violation of the above principles, are applied retroactively to previous acts, which at the time of commission did not constitute criminal acts. The resulting cardinal problem will be discussed by the defense.

VIII. Conclusions

The great and famous American judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, said in 1896, “The real reason for a decision are considerations of a political or social nature. It is erroneous to believe that a solution can be found solely with the aid of logic or general legal doctrines which no one contests.” (Quoted from quotation in “Majority Rule and Minority Rights” of Henry Steele Commager, page 46 of the German translation.)

The defense can but concur in these words. The defense requests that consideration be given to its train of thoughts as derived from this attitude, and stated in VI, 3, which are the corollary of similar thoughts of the prosecution, without the Court having to fear a misunderstanding concerning the above quotation.

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F. Opening Statement for Defendant Lautz[77]

Dr. Grube: May I begin my opening statement? The prosecution in its arraignment of Lautz has obviously started from three wrong suppositions. The first erroneous supposition was that Lautz evidently was confused with the Ministry official Letz and therefore it was erroneously assumed that Lautz had also been working in the Reich Ministry of Justice. Only thus can it be explained why in several counts of the indictment with which the prosecution is expressly charging the Reich Ministry of Justice only, Lautz also is mentioned. I do not want to lose myself in details. That the defendant Lautz never worked in the Reich Ministry of Justice has been proved without a doubt by the evidence submitted so far. But I shall furnish further proof that Lautz did not take part in any of the measures, with which the Reich Ministry of Justice is charged.

The second erroneous supposition from which the prosecution sets out is the assumption that there was only one chief Reich public prosecutor [Oberreichsanwalt], viz, defendant Lautz. The evidence taken so far has shown that beside the chief Reich public prosecutor of the People’s Court, viz, defendant Lautz, there was still another chief Reich public prosecutor, viz, the chief Reich public prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court. It is due to this error on the part of the prosecuting authority that matters have been made the subject of this procedure with which defendant Lautz had nothing to do. It is the nullity plea for instance of which I am thinking here; I shall prove in the course of my submission of evidence that this nullity plea could be filed only by the chief Reich public prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court and not by the chief Reich public prosecutor of the People’s Court. It is due to the same erroneous supposition on the part of the prosecution, according to which there was only one chief Reich public prosecutor, that in the “information on the outlines of the German judicial system,” which was submitted by the prosecution at the beginning of the trial, it is stated on page 5—“The criminal prosecution in cases before the People’s Court and before the Special courts, as well as those before the ordinary courts, lay in the hands of the chief Reich public prosecutor. Defendant Ernst Lautz was chief Reich public prosecutor.” I shall prove in the course of the evidence to be submitted by me that defendant Lautz was not a superior official to the public prosecutors of the Special Courts and other courts and that he was not competent for the criminal prosecution before these courts. I shall prove that he had only a quite limited competence, viz,[151] competence for the criminal prosecution of those crimes for which the People’s Court was competent, and that he was superior only in regard to the personnel of the Reich public prosecutors at the People’s Court. The position of defendant Lautz as chief Reich public prosecutor at the People’s Court did not differ in any way from the position of the chief public prosecutors [Oberstaatsanwaelte] at the district courts. When these two points have been clarified, there remains of all accusations made against defendant Lautz only the one accusation of his being coresponsible for the criminal procedure carried through before the People’s Court. This brings me to the third erroneous supposition on which the indictment against Lautz is based. It is the fact that the prosecution in its indictment of Lautz, as well as the other Reich public prosecutors under indictment here, obviously started from the assumption that the function and position of a German public prosecutor are the same as that of the prosecuting authority in Anglo-American criminal procedure. As will be proved by the evidence of the defense the position of public prosecutor in the German criminal procedure as well as the position of the prosecution in general in European jurisdiction always has been and still is today fundamentally different from that of the prosecution in Anglo-American jurisdiction. The evidence will prove that the position of a German public prosecutor in relation to the law, the Ministry of Justice and the court in general, as well as his function in individual criminal trials always have been such that he cannot be made responsible in criminal law for the sentences and their execution, neither objectively nor subjectively. The indictment in the case in question is based among other things on the general principles of penal law, such as they are contained in the penal laws of all civilized nations. As an example of this, the prosecution has quoted legal statements by the judges Stephen and Holmes in its verbal indictment. These legal statements concerning penal responsibility are not complete however. I shall prove by further quotations from legal statements by these two judges, that also according to Anglo-American conceptions the German prosecutor is not responsible before criminal law for the sentences, provided one starts from the position which the public prosecutor always held in relation to the law, the Ministry of Justice and the court, and from the functions which he carried out in accordance with German law at all times in individual criminal trials. Although I am convinced by virtue of this legal position that defendant Lautz cannot be made responsible before criminal law for the sentences pronounced by the People’s Court, I shall, nevertheless, help to prove by my submission of evidence that the People’s Court was an unobjectionable institution; that any trial before it gave the defendants every guaranty of justice; and that the[152] sentences of the People’s Court and their execution did not constitute any violation of international law, of the general principles of penal law, or of article II of Control Council Law No. 10. I furthermore shall prove that defendant Lautz had nothing to do with penal administration. It will be proved that the institutes for penal administration were not subordinated to him and that he had no possibility of influencing them or penal administration in any way.

G. Opening Statement for Defendant von Ammon[78]

Dr. Kubuschok: May it please the Tribunal. The prosecution has submitted no evidence connecting the defendant von Ammon with paragraphs 10, 16, 22, and 28 of the indictment. The defense will therefore deal only with the count concerning the NN matters while disputing the legal admissibility of the accusation of conspiracy. The defense will explain the origin and the legal basis of the NN regulations. It will be shown that the legal authorities participated in the work on the NN matters only to such an extent and so long as they were delegated to do so by the competent Wehrmacht authorities.

As regards the participation of the defendant von Ammon in this department which has been allocated to him in the course of the allocation of duties in the Ministry, the following will be dealt with: von Ammon’s position as an expert, who was subordinated to the subsection chief, Ministerialdirigent Mettgenberg; section chief at first Ministerialdirektor Crohne, later Ministerialdirektor Vollmer; Under Secretary, at first, Freisler and later Klemm; and lastly the Minister himself. If, therefore, von Ammon only ranked fifth in seniority, then this fact determines also his authority to sign and his actual responsibility. All important matters required the signature of, at least, the subsection chief, in most cases that of the section chief. We therefore find that none of the letters from the Reich Ministry to another office, which have been submitted by the prosecution, were signed by von Ammon.

I shall prove that von Ammon did not participate in drawing up the basic legal regulations. Thus, the legal argument arises whether a person who has merely to carry out administrative tasks without thereby causing a wrong to be done in the sense of sufficient causality by this activity itself, bears a criminal responsibility for this.

I shall describe how the NN proceedings were carried out and shall show that no special regulations were issued restricting the[153] proper trial beyond the secrecy decreed by law. As can be seen from the circular of 6 March 1943, Document NG-269, Prosecution Exhibit 319[79] submitted by the prosecution, care was taken that the prisoners did not forego their otherwise customary rights, as long as the purpose of this secrecy was not endangered. I shall disprove the view of the prosecution that persons who had obviously not committed any act of resistance, were treated in the same way as guilty NN prisoners. I shall explain that, on principle, the Wehrmacht authorities in the occupied territories handed over only such cases to the legal authorities in Germany where the evidence was materially complete, as the witness Lehmann testified earlier. It will be proved that even where the innocence of the prisoner was established only in Germany, there was the possibility of being released to the occupied territories.

Evidence will be produced from the proceedings of the courts that the NN trials were in no way conducted differently from other trials, except for the restrictions for reasons of secrecy. It will particularly be shown that the difficulties in procuring evidence from the occupied territories favored the defendant insofar as he was protected by the principle of in dubio pro reo, i. e., the defendant had to be acquitted in case of doubt where the evidence in support of the indictment was incomplete. I shall endeavor to give a summary of the sentences given in actual practice.

In regard to the handing over of NN prisoners to the police, no responsibility can be attached to the defendant von Ammon for participation.

Documents will prove that the defendant von Ammon always showed a tendency towards leniency, considering the prevailing circumstances and the extent of his competence. This will also be clearly in keeping with the whole personality of the defendant. We shall find him an official who entered the ministerial career solely on the strength of his expert knowledge immediately after he passed his legal examination with special distinction, the type of man with a sense of duty who lives only for his work. Von Ammon was not an active National Socialist, this is confirmed by his entering the Party only in 1937, comparatively late for a ministerial official. I shall produce testimonials characterizing the defendant as a deeply humane and strictly religious man. I feel also that the trial will enable the Tribunal to form their own impression in this respect. In these circumstances it will have to be examined all the more carefully whether the evidence shows that this man is guilty of a crime against humanity irreconcilable with his character.

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H. Opening Statement for Defendant Rothaug[80]

Dr. Koessl: May it please the Tribunal. If I correctly understand the unuttered yet cogent logic of the charges listed in the indictment, the effect and example of that legal system to which the prosecution tries to attach the stigma of a criminal government institution begins with the Rothaug case. The evidence against him, out of proportion considering the entire framework of the indictment is in contrast to his mere functional position, based on his activities as judge and prosecutor.

Although I am aware of the fact that such purely external disproportion between the importance of the matter on the one hand and the deployment of means on the other hand, as seen from a higher point of view, may cause a shifting of the focus in the eyes of a superficial observer, I am however certain that the desire for a true and just sentence will prevent the overlooking of the limitations and degrees of responsibility.

Yet the direction of the main thrust of the prosecution has become rather clearly discernible by the few submitted documents, out of thousands of files. We face it with a clear conscience, calm and courageously, for documents do not lie.

What distresses us is the evidence submitted in order to impress and otherwise help the main thrust, evidence which has been available in accessible localities and without difficulties, with incriminating tendencies, sometimes even willfully incriminating, and which has offered in hundreds of variations and superlatives an almost unfathomable jungle of assertions, estimates, and opinions.

The mobilization of this evidence compels us to handle the most enervating and tedious detail for truth’s sake.

I expect to relieve us of much of this wearisome detail by first treating and solving problems, touched upon by coarsening efforts, misrepresentations, distortions, and half-truths in their entirety and from the broadest viewpoints possible.

At this point in the proceedings, I do not wish to put to the fore legal questions within the framework of the defense, such as the concept of conspiracy or the subjective fact and the confines of the crimes against humanity.

On the other hand, it will be unavoidable within the frame of the producing of evidence to convince the court that the entirely individual biased power position between the state on the one hand and the individual judge or prosecutor on the other hand in accordance with the regulations governing German civil servants allows no scope in the field of the application of the law for[155] a simultaneously existing intellectual alliance in the sense of a conspiracy, but that a connection of this power position, in full knowledge of its legal nature, with a simultaneous assumption of a conspiracy would mean a contradiction in itself. Here it becomes necessary to prove that the activity of a judge at the Special Court or a Reich public prosecutor is limited to the application of the law which is based on the official Reich legislation in the field of criminal law. I shall demonstrate that this Reich legislation in all its harshness has, in its purpose, neither lost nor limited its character of purely criminal law and that, on this point, it has not been misinterpreted as clearly proved by the literature on the subject and the jurisdiction by the supreme judicial authorities and others.

Here must be proved a fact evident in itself, namely that judges and prosecutors in the same position as Rothaug were never and in no context expected to have objects alien to the field of criminal law in carrying out their official duties.

Records of sentences already submitted and others still to be submitted will prove that this had in no way been intended.

This touches on the legal question, whether official functions resting on the official Reich legislation which, up to this very moment, is covered in international law by the principle of nationality and sovereignty, functions which were carried out in public, may be conceived as actions of persecution on racial, religious, or political grounds and may be treated as being on the same level as actions which were carried out secretly and without control, and which could be recognized as wrong already by their cruelty and severity by every person concerned as offending against justice and law.

Here, I wish to convince the Court that offenses of the latter kind, if they ever did happen within the legal sphere could and should only be known to the immediate participants but not to persons who held positions like the defendant Rothaug.

In the concrete reflection on the relationship to the law of the position of judges and likewise prosecutors, it is of decisive importance to elucidate in public law that the German judge, under any regime, had merely to examine whether a law had been announced in accordance with rules and regulations whereas an examination from other points of view was outside his jurisdiction. In this context it is further necessary to elucidate the significance and import of the judge being subject to the law and the meaning of a sentence in the sense of German public law especially in relationship to the legislative and executive power in an authoritarian state, thus to the governing power.

Here we cannot omit to clarify the basic legal principles and corresponding regulations which determine this relationship or to[156] prove the practical application based on files. Thus, the question of the judge’s subjection to the law calls for a clarification of the consequences on his task resulting thereof. It necessitates the recognition of the law as a form of expression of justice, as part of the legal system and as immediate emanation of the ruling state doctrine at any given time, as well as the recognition of the judge’s actual position in this legal system. Therefore, it is also necessary to show in a condensed form the general basis and principle of the legal doctrine which since 1933 was decisive for the German judge in establishing the intentions of the law in a concrete individual case. The accusations which have been made in general or in individual cases concerning Rothaug’s method of handling proceedings or which have been connected with such proceedings become meaningless or lose in importance if their explanation is tackled in general from the angle of the correct basic procedure regulations or from the available records of individual proceedings. This leads, as a matter of course, to a basic discussion of the individual cases which have been particularly stressed by the prosecution, and which lie in the direction of the prosecution’s main thrust. No one knows better than the judge the human inadequacy and fallibility because by the very nature of his profession he deals with that aspect of life. Thus, he would be the last to believe himself immune from human error, least of all at a time of intellectual revolution and under the effect of the very highest wartime pressure. Nevertheless, I beg the Tribunal not to think me presumptuous if I try to prove that the sentences pronounced by the Special Court at Nuernberg were in keeping with the basic principles of jurisdiction of the Reich courts, and that among thousands of cases only very rarely one has been successfully contested or otherwise amended.

In this connection, one could discuss the outward development of the judgment and all those legal questions allegedly discussed in individual cases or in general in Rothaug’s circle during the course of 6 years.

The submitted records of individual proceedings provide plenty of opportunity to form an opinion on all individual questions thrown up by this trial especially on the aim of judicial activity, the sentence in its relationship to the requirements of the proceedings and its assailability in the interest of legal security, from which it will clearly emerge that the sentence, even that of the Special Court, was only an intermediate and by no means the final stage of the work of ascertaining justice either when finding the defendant guilty or when pronouncing the sentence. Thereby it may be possible too, to clear up the linguistically unfortunate term of “psychological producing of evidence” which has found its way into this trial. Thus, the legal and psychological task of the presiding[157] judge in accordance with German criminal law will have to be explained, and it will have to be shown how Rothaug confronted his task, solved it in the practical legal procedure, and which objections he had to face in connection with the results of his work by departments which in the course of their own duties had to examine, control and, if necessary, correct.

Furthermore, it will be my task to prove that in Rothaug’s official working sphere without exception all defendants without consideration of nationality, national origin, or race, were granted the same legal guaranties as any German according to German criminal law, thus that no case was treated as an exception to the general rule, that this was also done in all proceedings against Poles, who apart from one outstanding case bearing a special character, were the only foreigners against whom Rothaug proceeded.

This, generally and in particular, touches upon the problem which determines the judge’s and the prosecutor’s position to the legislation for Poles from an objective legal point of view, of which have to be discussed the actual and legal basis and aspects from and through which the German judge and prosecutor whether in the North, South, East, or West, had to view matters under the spell of the German legal doctrine.

Here the greatest importance has to be attached to the kind of offense in question, the place of the crime and last, but not least, the question whether these Poles had really been deported and had not voluntarily, accepting certain conditions, placed themselves at the disposal of the German war power.

In this context, we cannot omit to discuss the principles which the highest judicial authorities have pronounced in connection with this whole complex. Here I must leave the justification of the legislation as such to others who are responsible for it.

To this, from a psychological viewpoint, belongs the discussion of Rothaug’s actual basic attitude toward the Jewish problem in order to do away with all insinuations which have willfully and on purpose been made during this trial by persons who seem to have cause to stress and demonstrate their innocence in this connection by calling “catch the thief.”

Another complex fitted into the direction of the main thrust of the prosecution is Rothaug’s alleged political power position, inflated so as to appear almost like a myth, which to begin with is supported by an assertion which is the object of count four of the indictment. I shall prove that Rothaug’s duties did not extend beyond the professional organization of the Rechtswahrerbund and that, beyond that, he held no political post, and that in particular he did not belong anywhere, at any time, and in any function to the so-called corps of political leaders.

[158]

In this I shall take special care to reduce the case Doebig which has been brought into this context for the purpose of substantiation, to the proportions it deserves in the knowledge of the true facts of the case, as we ourselves feel urged to clear Rothaug’s real relationship to the Security Service (SD) as expressed in its principles, development, contents, and Rothaug’s inner attitude to it down to minute details.

Especially here as in all positions where the witnesses are interested in a certain presentation of conditions, we are fully conscious of the difficulties, and we know how easy it is today to find witnesses who by incriminating statements are given the chance to clear themselves. On the other hand, bearing in mind the totality of present psychological conditions it is difficult to find a person who would be prepared to stand up for truth’s sake if he were asked to do so for a person who by reason of biased evidence has been publicly defamed in such a manner that it has given rise to the fear of becoming involved in the greatest difficulties by confessing to a mere acquaintance with Rothaug. Because Rothaug’s political power position has extensively been brought in, in an attempt transparent to our eyes, to reduce the responsibility of others, he feels pressed to clarify his real relationship to his collaborators and the prosecutors within his sphere of work minutely and in its totality in its official and personal aspect irrespective of whether it concerns Rothaug’s official or unofficial statements, his alleged relationship to Streicher, Holz, and Zimmermann; his actual relationship to Haberkern, the “Blaue Traube” [Blue Grape], the mysterious “Stammtisch;” his “TeNo-Rang” [rank in Teno[81]]; his attitude toward the judicial administration, his “recording section” [Schallplattenbetrieb] in alleged spectacular proceedings; or his representation of the devil on earth. In all these matters and questions we have but one aim—To restore the truth in all its glory, for only in truth can we see the way which honorably and serenely will lead us out of this endangered vital position.

A. Introduction

Throughout the trial and in the judgment of the Tribunal, references were frequently made to various laws and decrees issued during Hitler’s Third Reich. Some of these laws and decrees were introduced by the prosecution, some by the defense, and some by both the prosecution and the defense. Most of these laws and decrees are relevant in connection with more than one of the principal issues of the case. Hence, with respect to laws and decrees selected for publication herein, it has often been difficult to decide where a particular law or decree should appear within the sections of this volume. To reduce the complexity of this matter, more than 30 laws and decrees have been reproduced together in the chronological order of their promulgation. (Section B, “Selected Laws and Decrees, 1933–1944.”) A number of other laws and decrees appear in the later sections of the volume. In a further effort to reduce the difficulties inherent in this situation, cross-references by way of footnotes have often been made to laws or decrees mentioned in the documents and in the testimony.

Since the main issues of the case involved the organization and administration of justice in the Third Reich, it was also thought appropriate to include early in the volume some general materials on the organization of the Reich Ministry of Justice and the German judicial system (sec. C). First appears a brief excerpt from the testimony of the defendant Mettgenberg concerning the position and responsibility of leading officials in the Reich Ministry of Justice (sec. C1). This is followed by parts of a “Basic Information” of justice (sec. C2). This “Basic Information” was submitted by the prosecution at the beginning of the trial not as evidence, but rather as an aid to the understanding of the evidence later submitted. The parts reproduced herein include a “Summary of the organization of the administration of justice in Germany” and two charts purporting to show graphically the structure of the regular and extraordinary courts and the main positions held by the defendants in the over-all administration of justice. The next following materials are all contemporaneous documents, principally laws and decrees, concerning the establishment and functioning of the Special Courts (sec. C3), the People’s Court (sec. C4), the hereditary health courts (sec. C5), and civilian courts martial (sec. C6).

[160]

These materials on the general structure and organization of the administration of justice are followed by extracts from the testimony of the defense expert witness, Professor Jahrreiss, whose testimony dealt comprehensively with the development of German law and justice from a period far antedating the Nazi regime (sec. D). This section concludes with extracts from the testimony of the defendant Schlegelberger, under secretary (Staatssekretaer) in the Reich Ministry of Justice (sec. E). In addition to giving a leading defense point of view concerning general legal developments during the Hitler regime, this testimony introduces a number of the leading figures who played a role in the administration of justice and whose names frequently arise in the later appearing documents and testimony.

B. Selected Laws and Decrees, 1933–1944

DECREE, 28 FEBRUARY 1933,

BY REICH PRESIDENT VON HINDENBURG, COSIGNED BY REICH CHANCELLOR HITLER AND REICH MINISTERS FRICK AND GUERTNER, SUSPENDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND INSTITUTING OTHER MEASURES[84]

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 83

Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State of 28 February 1933.

Pursuant to article 48, paragraph 2 of the German constitution, the following is decreed as a defensive measure against Communist acts of violence endangering the State:

[161]

Article 1

Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further notice.[85] Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on the right of assembly and the right of association and interferences with the secrecy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications, and warrants for house searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.

[All footnote quotations from the Weimar constitution used in this volume have been taken from the translation in Select Constitutions of the World, edited by B. Shiva Rao (Mylapore, Madras, The Madras Law Journal Press, 1934), page 208 and following pages.]

Article 2

If in a state [Land] the measures necessary for the restoration of public security and order are not taken, the Reich government may temporarily take over the powers of the highest State authority.

Article 3

The authorities of the states [Laender] and local communities have to comply, within their competency, with the orders of the Reich government issued on the basis of article 2.

[162]

Article 4

Whoever disobeys the orders issued by the supreme State authorities or by the authorities subordinate to them for the implementation of this decree, or the orders issued by the Reich government in pursuance of article 2, or whoever solicits or incites others to disobey such orders, will be punished with imprisonment of not less than 1 month or a fine from 150 up to 15,000 Reichsmarks, unless other regulations make his act liable to a more severe punishment.

Whoever, by a violation of paragraph 1, induces a common danger for human life, will be punished with hard labor, or, in case of extenuating circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than 6 months, and, if the violation causes the death of a person, with death, or, in case of extenuating circumstances, with penal servitude of no less than 2 years. In addition, his property may be confiscated.

Whoever solicits or incites to commit a violation under the qualifications of paragraph 2, will be punished with hard labor or, in case of extenuating circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than 3 months.

Article 5

The crimes, which under the penal code are punishable with hard labor for life, are to be punished with death; i.e., in articles 81 (high treason), 229 (poisoning), 307 (arson), 311 (use of explosives), 312 ([intentional] flooding), 315 paragraph 2 (damaging of railroad installations), and 324 (poisoning causing public danger).

Insofar as a more severe Punishment has not been previously provided for, the following are punishable with death or with hard labor for life or with hard labor not to exceed 15 years—

1. Whoever undertakes to kill the Reich president or a member or a commissioner of the Reich government or of a state government, or solicits such a killing, or volunteers to commit it, or accepts such an offer, or conspires with another for such a killing.

2. Whoever under article 115(2) of the penal code (serious rioting) or of article 125(2) of the penal code (serious disturbance of the peace) commits the act with arms or cooperates consciously and intentionally with an armed person.

3. Anyone who deprives a person of his liberty under article 239 of the penal code with the intention of making use of the person deprived of his liberty as a hostage in the political struggle.

[163]

Article 6

This decree comes into force on the day of its promulgation.

Berlin, 28 February 1933

The Reich President

von Hindenburg

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

THE “ENABLING ACT”[86]

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 141

Law for the Solution of the Emergency of People and Reich of 24 March 1933

The Reichstag has decreed the following law, which is hereby promulgated in agreement with the Reich Council [Reichsrat], after it has been duly established that the prerequisites of legislation changing the constitution have been fulfilled.

Article 1

Laws of the Reich can be decreed, apart from the procedure provided by the constitution of the Reich, also by the government of the Reich. This also applies to the laws mentioned in articles 85, paragraphs 2, and 87 of the constitution of the Reich.

Article 2

The laws decreed by the government of the Reich may deviate from the constitution of the Reich as far as they do not concern[164] the institution of the Reichstag and the Reich Council [Reichsrat] as such. The rights of the Reich President remain untouched.

Article 3

The laws decreed by the government of the Reich are certified by the Reich Chancellor and promulgated in the Reichsgesetzblatt. Unless they dispose otherwise, they will come into force on the day following the promulgation. Articles 68 through 77 of the constitution of the Reich do not apply to laws decreed by the government of the Reich.

Article 4

Treaties of the Reich with foreign countries concerning subjects under Reich legislation do not require the approval of the authorities taking part in the legislation. The government of the Reich issues the ordinances which are necessary to carry into effect these treaties.

Article 5

This law comes into force on the day of its promulgation. It will become invalid on 1 April 1937; it will further become invalid if the present government of the Reich will be replaced by another one.

Berlin, 24 March 1933.

The Reich President

von Hindenburg

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Reich Foreign Minister

Baron von Neurath

The Reich Finance Minister

Count Schwerin von Krosigk

LAW, 7 APRIL 1933, CONCERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 188

The Reich government has enacted the following law which is promulgated herewith:

[165]

Article 1

The admission [to the bar] of attorneys who, according to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt, Part 1, page 175), are of non-Aryan descent, may be revoked before 30 September 1933.

The provision of paragraph 1 does not apply to attorneys who were already admitted on 1 August 1914 or who, during World War I, fought for the German Reich or her allies, or whose fathers or sons were killed in action in World War I.

Article 2

The admission to the bar can be refused to persons, who, according to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt, Part 1, page 175) are of non-Aryan descent, even though the reasons for this measure provided by the Attorneys’ Ordinance do not apply. The same applies to the admission, at another court, of attorneys designated in article 1, paragraph 2.

Article 3

Persons who have undertaken Communist activities are excluded from admission to the bar. Admissions already granted will be revoked.

Article 4

The administration of justice can suspend the admission of an attorney until it has been decided whether the right to revoke his admission according to article 1, paragraph 1, or article 3 will be used or not. The provisions of article 91b, paragraphs 2 through 4 of the Attorneys’ Ordinance (1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part 1, page 120) apply in case of a suspension.

Attorneys of the kind described in article 2, paragraph 2, can only be suspended in those cases where article 3 is applicable.

*******

Berlin, 7 April 1933.

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

[166]

LAW OF 1 DECEMBER 1933 CONCERNING SPECIAL NAZI PARTY AND STORM TROOPS’ (SA) JURISDICTION OVER MEMBERS OF THE NAZI PARTY, THE SA, AND THEIR SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS[87]

Law for the Safeguarding of Unity of Party and State decreed on 1 December 1933

The Reich government has passed the following law, which herewith is promulgated.

Article 1

(1) Since the victory of the National Socialist revolution the National Socialist German Workers’ Party is the bearer of the German State ideology and merged with the State inseparably.

(2) It is a corporate body under public law. Its statutes are determined by the Fuehrer.

Article 2

In order to guarantee closest cooperation between Party and SA offices on the one hand and public authorities on the other hand, the deputy of the Fuehrer [Hess] and the chief of staff of the SA [Roehm] become members of the Reich government.

Article 3

(1) Because they are the leading and moving power of the National Socialist State, the members of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party and of the SA (including their subordinated organizations) have an enhanced duty toward the Fuehrer, the Nation, and the State.

(2) For violation of these duties they come under a special Party and SA jurisdiction.

(3) The Fuehrer can rule that these regulations be extended to members of other organizations.

Article 4

A violation of duty is represented by any action or omission, which affects or endangers the existence, the organization, the activities, or the reputation of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party; for members of the SA (including all organizations subordinated to it) especially every offense against discipline and order.

[167]

Article 5

In addition to the usual disciplinary penalties, terms of imprisonment and arrest can be imposed.

Article 6

Within the limits of their competence, the public authorities must render official and judicial assistance to Party and SA—offices which have been entrusted with the execution of the Party and SA jurisdiction.

Article 7

The law, concerning the right of imposing disciplinary penalties on members of the SA and SS, decreed on 28 April 1933 (Reich Law Gazette I, page 230) is repealed.

Article 8

In his capacity as leader of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party and supreme commander of the SA, the Reich Chancellor issues the necessary regulations for the carrying-out and completion of this law, especially those regarding the structure and the procedure of Party and SA jurisdiction. He determines the date on which the regulations pertaining to this jurisdiction will take effect.

Berlin, 1 December 1933

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

EXTRACTS FROM THE FIRST LAW FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TO THE REICH, 16 FEBRUARY 1934[88]

1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 91

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

[168]

Article 1

All courts shall pronounce sentence in the name of the German people.

Article 2

The Reich President exercises the right to quash pending proceedings, apart from his clemency prerogative.

Amnesties can only be issued by Reich law.

Article 3

Whoever has obtained the qualification to act as a judge, must be admitted to the bar in each State in pursuance of the existing Reich regulations.

*******

Article 5

The Reich Minister of Justice is authorized to issue all regulations which the transfer of the administration of justice to the Reich requires.

Berlin, 16 February 1934

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice, at the same time for the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture

Dr. Guertner

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Reich Minister of Finance

Count Schwerin von Krosigk

The Reich Minister of Economics

Dr. Schmitt

The Reich Minister of Labor

Franz Seldte

The Reich Minister of War

von Blomberg

[169]

EXTRACTS FROM THE LAW, 24 APRIL 1934, AMENDING PROVISIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 341

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Part I

In the second part of the criminal code, the first section (articles 80 to 93) is amended as follows):

Section 1

High treason[89] [Hochverrat].

Article 80

Whoever undertakes to incorporate, by violence or by threat of violence, the German territory [Reichsgebiet] in its entirety or in part into a foreign state, or to detach from the Reich any territory belonging to the Reich, will be punished by death.

*******

Article 81

Whoever undertakes to deprive the Reich President, the Reich Chancellor or any other member of the Reich government of his constitutional power, or to force or prevent such a person by violence or threat of violence or perpetration of a crime or offense, from exercising his constitutional rights altogether or in a certain sense, will be punished by death or hard labor for life or hard labor of not less than 5 years.

Article 82

Whoever conspires with another person in a treasonable act (articles 80, 81) is subject to punishment by death, hard labor for life or hard labor of not less than 5 years.

Whoever contacts a foreign power for the purpose of the preparation of a treasonable act or misuses his official authority or recruits men or trains them in the use of arms will be liable to the same penalty. If the perpetrator contacts a foreign government in a written declaration, the crime is considered accomplished once this declaration has been sent off.

[170]

*******

Article 83

Whoever publicly solicits, and incites to, an undertaking of high treason shall be punished by hard labor up to 10 years.

Whoever prepares an undertaking in any other way shall be liable to the same penalty.

The death penalty or hard labor for life or hard labor for not less than 2 years will be inflicted—

1. If the act aimed at establishing or maintaining an organized structure for the preparation of high treason; or

2. If the act was directed toward making the armed forces or police unfit for the execution of their duty to protect the stability of the German Reich from internal or external attack; or

3. If the act was directed toward influencing the masses by composing or distributing writings, recordings and pictures, or by the installation of radio, telegraph, or telephone; or

4. If the act was committed abroad or in such a manner that the perpetrator undertook to import writings, recordings or pictures from abroad for the purpose of distribution within the country.

*******

Article 87

Undertakings, within the meaning of the criminal code, embrace both completion and attempt.

Section 1 a

Article 88

Treason [Landesverrat]

State secrets in the meaning of the provisions of this section are documents, drawings, other objects, facts or reports thereof, which the welfare of the Reich, especially in the interest of national defense, requires to be held secret from a foreign government.

Whoever passes on or publicizes such a state secret to another person, especially to a foreign government or to a person acting for a foreign government, with the intent of endangering the welfare of the Reich, commits an act of treason in the meaning of the provisions of the section.

Article 89

Whoever undertakes to give away a state secret will be punished by death.

[171]

If the perpetrator is a foreigner he may be sentenced to hard labor for life.

If the act could not have constituted a danger for the welfare of the Reich, the verdict may be hard labor for life or for not less than 5 years.

Article 90

Whoever undertakes to procure a state secret in order to give it away will be punished by death or hard labor for life.

If the crime could not have brought about a danger for the welfare of the Reich the verdict may be a term of hard labor.

*******

Article 91

Whoever establishes contact with a foreign government or a person acting for a foreign government with the intention of causing a war or forcible measures against the Reich or other serious disadvantages to the Reich, will be punished by death.

Whoever establishes contact of the kind described in paragraph 1 with the intention of causing serious disadvantages for a national of the Reich, will be punished with hard labor for life or for not less than 5 years.

Article 82, paragraph 2, second sentence shall apply.

Article 91 a

A German who, during a war against the Reich, serves in the armed forces of the enemy or carries arms against the Reich or its allies shall be punished by death or hard labor for life or not less than 5 years.

Article 91 b

Whoever, during a war against the Reich, or with regard to an impending war, undertakes within the Reich, or being a German abroad, to either aid and abet the enemy power, or to cause a detriment to the armed forces of the Reich or its allies shall be punished by death or by hard labor for life.

*******

Article 92

Whoever conspires with another in a crime of treason under articles 89 through 90a, or 90f through 91b shall be punished by hard labor.

[172]

Whoever solicits or volunteers to commit a crime as described in paragraph 1, or accepts such a solicitation or offer will be liable to the same punishment. If the perpetrator declares his solicitation, offer, or acceptance in writing, the crime is accomplished when the declaration is sent off.

*******

Part III. People’s Court[90]

*******

Berlin, 24 April 1934

The Reich Chancellor

Adolph Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice at the same time for the Reich Minister of the Interior

Dr. Guertner

The Reich Defense Minister

von Blomberg

EXTRACTS FROM THE SECOND LAW CONCERNING THE TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TO THE REICH, 5 DECEMBER 1934[91]

1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1214

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

In the National-Socialist State, the administration of justice is uniform. It is under the jurisdiction of the Reich and requires uniform administration by the Reich. After the Ministries of Justice of the Reich and of Prussia have been combined, the Reich takes over the immediate direction of the administration of justice in the other states [Laender] in accordance with the following provisions:

Article 1

The competencies of the Supreme Justice Authorities of the[173] States [Laender] are transferred to the Reich Minister of Justice; he is authorized to delegate them to agencies subordinate to him.

*******

Berlin, 5 December 1934

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

LAW, 20 DECEMBER 1934, ON INSIDIOUS ACTS AGAINST STATE AND PARTY FOR THE PROTECTION OF PARTY UNIFORMS HEIMTUECKEGESETZ

1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1269

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Section I

Article 1

1. Unless heavier punishment is provided for in other provisions, imprisonment up to 2 years shall be imposed upon anybody deliberately making false or grossly distorted statements, which are apt to debase the welfare of the Reich or the prestige of the Reich government, the NSDAP or its affiliated agencies. Whoever makes or disseminates such statements in public, will be imprisoned for not less than 3 months.

2. Anyone committing the offense with gross neglect shall be punished with imprisonment up to 3 months, or with a fine.

3. If the offense is directed solely against the prestige of the NSDAP or its affiliated agencies, the offender shall be prosecuted only with the consent of the Fuehrer’s Deputy or of agencies authorized by him.

Article 2

1. Whoever makes statements showing a malicious, inciting or low-minded attitude toward leading personalities of the State or[174] the NSDAP, or about orders issued by them or about institutions created by them, which are apt to undermine the confidence of the people in its political leadership—shall be punished with imprisonment.

2. Statements of this kind which are not made in public shall be punished equally if the offender reckons or has to reckon that his statements will eventually circulate in public.

3. The offender shall be prosecuted only by order of the Reich Minister of Justice; in case the offense was committed against a leading personality of the NSDAP, the Reich Minister of Justice will issue the order in agreement with the Fuehrer’s Deputy.

4. The Reich Minister of Justice in agreement with the Fuehrer’s Deputy shall determine who is to be regarded as a leading personality according to paragraph 1.

Article 3

1. Anyone who, when committing or threatening to commit a punishable act, is wearing or is carrying on his person the uniform or an insignia of the NSDAP, without being entitled to do so as a member of the NSDAP or its affiliated agencies, will be punished with hard labor or in minor instances with imprisonment for at least 6 months.

2. Anyone who commits the offense with the intention to bring about disorder or to sow fear or terror among the population, or to create difficulties for the German Reich with a foreign power, shall be punished with hard labor for at least 3 years or with hard labor for life; in particularly grave cases the death penalty may be imposed.

3. According to this law, a German national may be punished also if he committed the offense in a foreign country.

Article 4

1. Anyone who for his material advantage or for political ends poses as a member of the NSDAP or its agencies, shall be punished with imprisonment up to 1 year, plus a fine or both.

2. The offender shall be prosecuted only with the consent of the Fuehrer’s deputy or of agencies authorized by him.

Article 5

1. Anyone who manufactures, holds in stock, sells or otherwise brings on the market official Party uniforms, parts of Party uniforms, uniform cloth, or insignia of the NSDAP, its affiliated agencies or organization, without the permission of the Reich[175] Treasurer of the NSDAP, shall be punished with imprisonment up to 2 years. By a directive to be published in the Reichsgesetzblatt the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics will determine for what parts of uniform and uniform cloth a permission is required.

2. Anyone who has in his possession official Party uniforms and insignia without being a member of the NSDAP or its affiliated agencies or organizations, or without being entitled to possess them for any other reason, shall be punished with imprisonment of up to 1 year. Anyone who wears any of the above-mentioned items, shall be punished with imprisonment for at least 1 month.

3. To be put on a par with Party uniforms, parts of uniforms and insignia, are those uniforms, parts of uniforms, and insignia which can easily be taken for them.

4. In addition to the penalty those uniforms, parts of uniforms, uniform cloth, flags, or insignia which are involved in the punishable act shall be confiscated. In case no particular person can be prosecuted or condemned, the confiscation shall take place automatically, provided conditions justify it.

5. The confiscated items shall be turned over to the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP or to those agencies appointed by him, for future use.

6. The prosecution of the offense and the confiscation (article 4, paragraph 2) can be carried through only in agreement with the Fuehrer’s deputy or agencies authorized by him.

Article 6

According to this law, anyone who has obtained membership of the Party through false pretenses, is not a member of the NSDAP, its affiliated agencies or organizations.

Article 7

The Fuehrer’s deputy, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Justice and the Reich Minister of the Interior, shall issue the regulations necessary for the application and supplementation of articles 1 to 6.

Section II

Article 8

1. The regulations set forth in this law, with the exception of article 5, paragraph 1, apply accordingly to the Reich League for Air Defense [Reichsluftschutzbund], the League of German Sports[176] Fliers [Deutscher Luftsportverband], the Voluntary Labor Service [Freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst], and the Technical Emergency Corps [Technische Nothilfe—TeNo].

*******

Section III

Article 9

Article 5, paragraph 1, will come into force on 1 February 1935. The other rules set forth in this law will come into force one day after their promulgation; the decree on malicious acts against the Government of the National Revolution, of 21 March 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 135) as well as article 4 of the law on the Reich Aviation Administration of 15 December 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 1077) are declared invalid.

Berlin, 20 December 1934

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

The Fuehrer’s Deputy, Reich Minister without Portfolio

R. Hess

The Reich Minister of the Interior also for the Reich Minister of Aviation

Frick

EXTRACTS FROM LAW OF 28 JUNE 1935 AMENDING THE CRIMINAL (PENAL) CODE

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 839

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Section I

Creation of law by analogous application of penal laws. Articles 2 and 2a of the penal code are amended as follows:

[177]

Section I

Article 2[92]

Whoever commits an act which the law declares as punishable or which deserves punishment according to the fundamental idea of a penal law or the sound sentiment of the people, shall be punished. If no specific penal law can be directly applied to the act, it shall be punished according to the law whose underlying principle can be most readily applied to the act.

Section I

Article 2a

*******

A law issued for a limited time only is to be applied to those criminal acts which were committed during its validity, even after its validity has expired.

*******

Berlin, 28 June 1935

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

EXTRACTS FROM THE LAW, 28 JUNE 1935, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE JUDICATURE ACT

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 844

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Section I

Freer Position of the Judge

1. Creation of law by analogous application of the penal laws.

(a) As articles 170a and 267a, the following stipulations will be inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure:

[178]

Article 170a

If an act deserves punishment according to the sound sentiment of the people, but is not declared punishable in the law, the prosecution will examine whether the underlying principle of a penal law can be applied to the act and whether justice can be helped to triumph by analogous application of that penal law. (Article 2 of the Penal Code).

Article 267a

If the trial shows that the defendant has committed an act which deserves punishment according to the sound sentiment of the people, but is not declared punishable by the law, the court will examine whether the underlying principle of a penal law applies to the act and whether justice can be helped to triumph by analogous application of that penal law (Article 2 of the Penal Code).

Article 265, paragraph 1, applies accordingly.

*******

4. Removal of one-sided limitations of the courts deciding on legal appeals. The code of criminal procedure is amended as follows:

(a) Article 331 is amended as follows:

Article 331

Even if the judgment has been contested only by the defendant or his legal representative or by the prosecution in his favor, it can be changed against the interests of the defendant.

(b) Article 358, paragraph 2, is amended as follows:

Even if the judgment has been contested only by the defendant or his legal representative or by the prosecution in his favor, it can be changed against the interests of the defendant.

(c) Article 373, paragraph 2, is amended as follows:

Even if resumption of the proceedings has been applied for only by the defendant or his legal representative or by the prosecution in his favor, the sentence can be changed against the interest of the defendant.

*******

Section II

Exemption of the Reich Supreme Court from being bound by precedents.

[179]

The Reich Supreme Court as the highest German tribunal must consider it its duty to effect an interpretation of the law which takes into account the change of ideology and of legal concepts which the new state has brought about. In order to enable it to accomplish this task without having to show consideration for the jurisdiction of the past brought about by other ideologies and other legal concepts, it is ruled as follows:

When a decision is made on a legal question, the Reich Supreme Court can deviate from a decision laid down before this law came into force.

*******

Section IV

Freer Position of the Prosecution

1. Removal of the necessity of proceedings before the investigating judge; Introduction of assistant judges.

The investigating code of criminal procedure is amended as follows:

(a) Article 178 is amended as follows:

Article 178

In those penal cases, which belong to the competency of the People’s Court, the courts of appeal or the courts of assize, a preliminary court investigation is to be held at the request of the prosecution, if the prosecution, according to its own discretion, deems this necessary.

Also, in other penal cases a preliminary court investigation will be held, if the prosecution so requests. The prosecution should make such a request only if extraordinary circumstances require a preliminary court investigation by a judge.

*******

2. Discretion with regard to victims of blackmail:

As article 154b, the following stipulation is inserted:

Article 154b

If duress has been applied, or blackmail has been committed, by threatening to reveal a criminal act, the prosecution can refrain from prosecuting the act whose revelation has been threatened, if it is required as expiation and for protection of the community of the people.

[180]

*******

Berlin, 28 June 1935

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

LAW, 15 SEPTEMBER 1935, FOR THE PROTECTION OF GERMAN BLOOD AND HONOR[93]

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1146

Imbued with the conviction that the purity of the German blood is the prerequisite for the permanence of the German people, and animated by the inflexible will to safeguard the German nation for all future, the Reichstag has unanimously enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Article 1

(1) Marriages between Jews and German nationals of German or related blood are prohibited. Marriages concluded despite of this are void, even if concluded abroad in order to circumvent this law.

(2) Only the public prosecutor can file an action for nullification.

Article 2

Sexual intercourse (except in marriage) between Jews and German nationals of German or related blood is forbidden.

[181]

Article 3

Jews may not employ female German nationals of German or related blood below 45 years of age in their households.

Article 4

(1) Jews are forbidden to show the Reich and national flag or the colors of the Reich.

(2) They are, however, allowed to show the Jewish colors. The exercise of this right will be protected by the State.

Article 5

(1) Whoever violates the prohibition of article 1 will be punished with hard labor.

(2) Any man violating the prohibition of article 2 will be punished with imprisonment or hard labor.

(3) Whoever violates the regulations under articles 3 or 4, will be punished with imprisonment up to 1 year or with a fine, or with both of these penalties.

Article 6

The Reich Minister of the Interior, in agreement with the deputy of the Fuehrer and the Reich Minister of Justice, will issue the legal and administrative regulations required for carrying out and supplementing this law.

Article 7

This law comes into force on the day following its promulgation; article 3, however, not until 1 January 1936.

Nuernberg, 15 September 1935, at the Reich Party Congress for Freedom.[94]

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

The Deputy of the Fuehrer Reich Minister without Portfolio

R. Hess

[182]

EXTRACTS FROM THE LAW AGAINST ECONOMIC SABOTAGE, 1 DECEMBER 1936

1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 999

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Article 1

(1) A German citizen who deliberately and unscrupulously, for his own gain or for other low motives, contrary to legal provisions smuggles property abroad or leaves property abroad and thus inflicts serious damage to German economy is to be punished by death. His property will be confiscated. The perpetrator is also punishable, if he commits the act abroad.

(2) This crime is subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Court.

Article 2

The law becomes effective on the day of its promulgation.

Berlin, 1 December 1936

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

Goering

Minister President

The Reich Minister of Economics as Deputy

Posse

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

EXTRACT FROM THE GERMAN CIVIL SERVICE LAW (DEUTSCHES BEAMTENGESETZ, OR “DBG”), 26 JANUARY 1937[95]

4. Obligation to render obedience

Article 7

(1) The civil servant is responsible for the lawfulness of his official acts.

[183]

(2) Insofar as nothing else has been legally provided, he has to comply with the official directives given by his superiors or by persons authorized to give him directives by virtue of a special order; the responsibility then rests with him who gave the directive. The civil servant must not comply with an order the execution of which would obviously contravene the criminal laws.

(3) The civil servant may accept directives for his official acts only from his superior or from persons authorized by virtue of a special order to give him directives; his obligation to comply with the law and with such regulations has the precedence of any other obligations to render obedience.

(4) The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor decides whether and to what extent it is admissible to call a civil servant who is a member of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party to account before a Party court.

DECREE, 10 JULY 1937, OF THE FUEHRER AND REICH CHANCELLOR CONCERNING APPOINTMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND TERMINATION OF CIVIL SERVICE STATUS

1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 769

On the basis of Articles 24, 31, 66, and 78 of the German Civil Service Law of 26 January 1937 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 39) I hereby order under concurrent suspension of my decree on the appointment and termination of Reich and Land [State] civil servants of 1 February 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, pages 74, 73) and on the participation of the deputy of the Fuehrer in the appointment of civil servants of 24 September 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 1203) as follows:

I

(1) I reserve to myself the power to appoint and retire civil servants of permanent status [Planstellen] of the civil service pay groups A 2 c 2 and upward and in the equivalent Land civil service pay groups, if not otherwise directed by special regulations. These civil servants will be dismissed by me in accordance with articles 60, 61, 63 of the German Civil Service Law, but according to article 61 only in as far as they can be placed in inactive status [Wartestand]. Civil servants whom I have placed in inactive status, and who are to be returned to active duty in permanent positions which do not require a formal appointment on my part can only be returned to active duty with my concurrence. I reserve to myself the power to retire the following civil servants[184] in inactive status: under secretaries, ambassadors, ministerial directors, ministers first class, and Oberreichsanwaelte.

(2) Suggestions will be submitted by the appropriate Reich Minister, for Prussia by the Minister President.

(3) Before suggestions for appointment of civil servants and the employment in accordance with sentence 3, Article I, is made, the advice from the deputy of the Fuehrer [Hess] is to be sought, except in cases where they are civil servants of the armed forces.

II

(1) I delegate the implementation of the powers reserved to myself on appointment, retirement, and dismissal of the other civil servants, in as far as I have not made reservations in article I, to the Reich Ministers, for Prussia to the Minister President, who can further delegate their authority with concurrence of the Reich Minister of Interior and the Reich Minister of Finance.

(2) In special cases I reserve to myself the right of personal decision also in cases of these civil servants.

III

The necessary regulations for the implementation of this decree will be published by the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich Finance Minister.

Berchtesgaden, 10 July 1937

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Interior

Frick

EXTRACTS FROM DECREE, 17 AUGUST 1938, FOR SPECIAL CRIMINAL LAW IN TIME OF WAR AND SPECIAL EMERGENCY[96]

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1455

*******

Article 5. Undermining of Military Efficiency[97]

(1) The following shall be guilty of undermining German defensive strength, and shall be punished by death:

[185]

1. Whoever publicly solicits or incites others to evade the fulfillment of compulsory military service in the German or an allied armed force, or publicly otherwise seeks to paralyze or undermine the will of the German or allied people to assert itself by force of arms.

2. Whoever undertakes to induce a soldier or conscript in the reserves to disobedience, opposition, or violence against a superior, or to desertion or illegal absence, or otherwise to undermine the discipline of the German or an allied armed force.

3. Whoever undertakes to avoid or cause another person to avoid the fulfillment of military service entirely, partly, or temporarily by means of self-mutilation, by means designated to deceive, or by other methods.

*******

Berlin, 17 August 1938

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

DECREE, 1 SEPTEMBER 1939, CONCERNING EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1683

*******

Article 1

Deliberate listening to foreign radio stations is prohibited. Violations are punishable by hard labor. In less severe cases a sentence of imprisonment may be passed. The radio receivers used will be confiscated.

Article 2

Whoever deliberately spreads news from foreign radio stations which is apt to undermine the defensive strength of the German people will be punished by hard labor, in particularly severe cases by death.

Article 3

The provisions of this decree do not apply to actions taken in execution of official duty.

[186]

Article 4

The Special Courts have jurisdiction to try and decide on violations of this decree.

Article 5

Criminal prosecution under articles 1 and 2 takes place only on request of the State Police authorities.

*******

Berlin, 1 September 1939

The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich

Field Marshal Goering

The Deputy of the Fuehrer

R. Hess

The Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

Copy

DECREE, 3 SEPTEMBER 1939, OF THE FUEHRER AND REICH CHANCELLOR CONCERNING EXECUTION OF THE RIGHT OF PARDON[98]

During my absence from Berlin I delegate to the Reich Minister of Justice the execution of the right of cancellation [Niederschlagungsrecht] as well as the power to grant pardon and to dismiss petitions for pardon, in cases which come under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts insofar as I have reserved these decisions to myself in the decree of 1 February 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 74).

The same applies to revocation of decisions based on the decree of 23 November 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 729).

I reserve to myself the right to decide personally in individual cases.

[187]

Berlin, 3 September 1939

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

[Signed] Adolf Hitler

[Great Reich Seal]

The Reich Minister of Justice

[Signed] Dr. Guertner

Minister of State and Chief of the Presidential Chancellery

[Signed] Dr. Meissner

EXTRACTS FROM THE WAR ECONOMY DECREE OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1939

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1609

To protect the borders of our Fatherland, supreme sacrifices are demanded from each of the members of the people’s community [Volksgenossen]. The soldier protects the Fatherland with a weapon, risking his life. In view of the greatness of this commitment, it is the obvious duty of every member of the people’s community in the Fatherland to put all their strength and wealth at the disposal of the people and the Reich, in order to guarantee the continuation of an orderly economic life. This also means that every member of the people’s community restricts himself in his way of living and his standards.

*******

Section 1

Conduct Detrimental to War

Article 1

(1) Whoever destroys, removes, or conceals raw materials or products belonging to the vital requirements of the population and thereby malevolently endangers the supply of such requirements will be punished with hard labor or imprisonment, and in particularly serious cases by death.

(2) Whoever conceals payment certificates without any justified reason, will be punished with imprisonment and, in particularly serious cases, with hard labor.

[188]

*******

Berlin, 4 September 1939

The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich

Field Marshal Goering

The Deputy of the Fuehrer

R. Hess

The General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

The General Plenipotentiary for the Economy

Walther Funk

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

DECREE, 5 SEPTEMBER 1939, AGAINST PUBLIC ENEMIES[99]

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1679

The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich decrees with the force of Law:

Article 1

Looting in Liberated Territory

(1) Whoever is found looting in liberated territory or in buildings or rooms voluntarily vacated will be punished by death.

(2) This crime is subject to the jurisdiction of the Special Courts,[100] insofar as field military courts have no jurisdiction.

(3) The death penalty may be executed by hanging.

Article 2

Crimes During Air Raids

Whoever commits a crime or offense against the body, life, property, taking advantage of air raid protection measures, is[189] punishable by hard labor of up to 15 years or for life, and in particularly severe cases by death.

Article 3

Crimes of Public Danger

Whoever commits arson or any other crime of public danger, thereby undermining German defensive strength, will be punished by death.

Article 4

Exploitation of the State of War as a Reason for more severe Punishment

Whoever commits any other criminal act by exploiting the extraordinary conditions caused by war is punishable beyond the regular punishment limits with hard labor of up to 15 years or for life, or by death if the sound sentiment of the people requires it because of the particular wickedness of the act.

Article 5

Speeding up of Special Court Proceedings

In all trials by Special Courts the verdict must be pronounced at once without observation of time limits if the perpetrator is caught redhanded or if his guilt is otherwise obvious.

Article 6

Sphere of Jurisdiction

The provisions of this Law are also applicable in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, also for those persons who are not German nationals.

Article 7

Final Regulations

The Reich Minister of Justice will issue the legal and administrative regulations required to carry out and supplement this decree.

Berlin, 5 September 1939

The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich

Field Marshal Goering

The Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

[190]

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 2107

Decree on special jurisdiction in criminal proceedings against members of the SS and members of police formations on special tasks, dated 17 October 1939.

The council of ministers for the defense of the Reich decrees that the following become law in the territory of the Greater German Reich:

Article 1[101]

Special jurisdiction is established for the prosecution of—

1. Professional members of the Reich leadership of the SS,

2. Professional members of the staffs of those Higher SS and Police Leaders who command organizations listed under numbers 3 to 6,

3. Members of the SS Special Duty Troops,

4. Members of the SS Death Head units[102] including their replacement units,

5. Members of the SS Junkers’ Schools,

6. Members of the police formations on special tasks.

Article 2

(1) The persons specified under article 1, numbers 1 to 5, come under special jurisdiction in all cases of unlawful actions for which army courts are competent. The persons specified under article 1, number 6, come under special jurisdiction only if these unlawful actions have been committed while on special duty.

(2) The competence of the army courts remains unchanged.

Article 3

(1) If not ordered otherwise, the regulations of the military penal code, the regulations of the criminal procedure of courts[191] martial as well as their introductory laws will be applied correspondingly under this special jurisdiction. As far as nonmilitary offenses are concerned, general criminal law applicable to members of the armed forces will be applied.

(2) The place of the Reich Minister for War or of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht is taken by the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police. He appoints the judges and specifies the regional sphere of their jurisdiction.

Article 4

(1) Courts martial will be replaced by SS courts and, wherever cases against members of police units are concerned, by SS and police courts. The army appeal courts will be replaced by an SS and police appeal court.

(2) A special decree will be issued as to which court will take over the tasks of the Supreme Army Court in Wehrmacht affairs.

Article 5

(1) Civilian army judges will be replaced by SS judicial officers [Justizfuehrer] who are qualified to be judges. They will be appointed by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, and in disciplinary matters, are directly subordinate to the Reich Leader SS.

(2) If the proceedings involve a member of the SS, SS members will be appointed as associate judges, otherwise the associate judge will be appointed from the ranks of the police.

(3) The registrars of the office will be replaced by SS Beurkundungsfuehrer [SS officers having registrar’s functions].

(4) Further regulations as to the legal status of SS judicial officers and SS Beurkundungsbeamte [SS officials having registrar’s functions] remain reserved.

Article 6

The regulations of the military penal code concerning special honor penalties [Ehrenstrafen] against soldiers are not to be applied. They are superseded by regulations concerning the penalties of dishonorable discharge and dismissal from the SS.

Article 7

The Reich Minister for the Interior and the Reich Leader SS, in agreement with the Reich Ministers of Justice and of Finance, are authorized to decree in their own field of activities the regulations necessary for articles 4 and 5 as well as the regulations for the carrying out of this ordinance.

[192]

Article 8

This ordinance becomes effective on the day of its proclamation.

Berlin, 17 October 1939

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich

Field Marshal Goering

The Plenipotentiary General for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

EXTRACTS FROM DECREE, 25 NOVEMBER 1939, SUPPLEMENTING PENAL PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTION OF THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE[103]

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 2319

The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich decrees with the force of law:

Article 1

Damage to Military Equipment

(1) Whoever intentionally destroys, renders unserviceable, damages, abandons or removes military equipment of an installation intended for the German defense, and thereby intentionally, or through negligence, endangers the fighting power of the German armed forces, will be punished with imprisonment of not less than 6 months. In serious cases the death penalty, or hard labor for life, or a term of hard labor will be imposed.

(2) The same punishment will be inflicted upon a person who intentionally builds, manufactures or delivers in a defective manner military equipment or installations of the kind described above, and thereby intentionally or through negligence endangers the fighting power of the German armed forces.

(3) The attempt is also punishable.

(4) Whoever acts carelessly and thereby negligently endangers the fighting power of the German armed forces will be punished with imprisonment.

(5) This regulation replaces article 143 a of the penal code.

[193]

Article 2

Disturbance of an Essential Enterprise

(1) Whoever disturbs or endangers the orderly function of an enterprise essential to the defense of the Reich or to the supply of the population by making any object serving the enterprise completely or partially unusable or by putting it out of commission will be punished with hard labor or in especially serious cases with death.

(2) In less serious cases the penalty will be imprisonment.

*******

Article 5

Endangering of the Armed Forces of Friendly States

(1) Whoever in Germany gathers or forwards information concerning military matters for a foreign military intelligence service to the prejudice of another state, or forms, maintains, or supports an information service concerning such matters will be punished with hard labor or in less serious cases with imprisonment.

(2) The act shall be prosecuted only upon order of the Reich Minister of Justice.

Article 6

In the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia the provisions of articles 1, 2, 4, and 5 of this decree apply also to persons who are not German nationals.

Berlin, 25 November 1939

The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich

Field Marshal Goering

The Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

As Deputy, Himmler

The Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

DECREE OF 5 DECEMBER 1939 AGAINST VIOLENT CRIMINALS

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 2378

The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich decrees the following with the force of law for the area of the Greater German Reich:

[194]

Article 1

Armed Violence

(1) Whoever uses a firearm, a cutting or stabbing weapon, or any other equally dangerous object while committing rape, street robbery, bank robbery or any other serious act of violence, or whoever threatens another person’s body or life with such a weapon will be punished by death.

(2) The criminal who attacks his pursuers or defends himself against them with the use of arms will be subject to the same penalty.

Article 2

Protection for People Assisting in the Pursuit of the Criminals

Whoever takes part personally in the pursuit of a criminal for the purpose of his apprehension has the same privileges under criminal law as policemen and officers of the law.

Article 3

Competence of the Special Court

In cases of crimes which fall under the provisions of articles 1 or 2 of this decree, the indictment will be filed with the Special Court.

Article 4

More Severe Punishment for Attempted Crimes and Aiding and Abetting

Where an attempted crime or offense or the aiding and abetting in such a crime or offense are punishable, the same punishment is generally admissible as is provided for the accomplished crime.

Article 5

Retroactive Force

This decree is also applicable to punishable acts committed before it came into force.

Article 6

Final Regulations

The Reich Minister of Justice will issue the legal and administrative provisions required to carry out and supplement this[195] decree, and the special provisions concerning the application of this decree in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

Berlin, 5 December 1939

The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich

Field Marshal Goering

The Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

DECREE OF 6 MAY 1940 ON THE EXTENSION OF THE APPLICATION OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW

1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 754

The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich decrees, for the territory of the greater German Reich, with the force of law:

Section I

Extent of the Application of Criminal Law

Articles 3 through 5, 8 and 37 of the Reich Penal Code will be replaced by the following regulations:

Article 3

German criminal law will be applied to the crime of a German national, no matter whether it is committed in Germany or abroad.

For a crime committed abroad, which according to the laws of the place of commitment is not punishable, German criminal law will not be applied, if such an act according to the sound sentiment of the German people—on account of the particular conditions prevailing at the place of commitment—is not considered to be deserving punishment.

An act shall be deemed to have been committed in any place where the perpetrator has acted, or, in case the act consists in an omission, where he ought to have acted, or where the results of the act came about or were intended to come about.

Article 4

German criminal law will be applied also in case of acts committed by a foreigner in Germany.

[196]

German criminal law will be applied to a crime committed by a foreigner abroad, if it is punishable according to the penal code of the territory where it is committed, or if such territory is not subject to any punitive authority [Strafgewalt] and if—

German criminal law will be applied to the following acts committed by a foreigner abroad, independently of the laws of the place of commitment:

Article 5

German criminal law will be applied, independently of the laws of the place of commitment, to crimes committed on a German vessel or a German airplane.

Section II

Regulations Amending the Rules of Criminal Procedure:

1. As article 8 a of the Code of Criminal Procedure the following regulation is being inserted:

[197]

Article 8 a

Jurisdiction shall also be established at the court in the district of which the defendant is being detained by order of an authority at the time the indictment is filed.

2. As article 153 a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following regulation is being inserted:

Article 153 a

*******

An act committed by a foreigner abroad will be prosecuted by the public prosecutor only if so demanded by the Reich Minister of Justice.

The public prosecutor may abstain from the prosecution of a punishable act if for the same act punishment has already been carried out abroad and the sentence to be expected in Germany, after deducting the time served abroad, would not be heavy.

*******

Berlin, 6 May 1940

The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense

Field Marshal Goering

The Plenipotentiary General for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

DECREE OF 11 JUNE 1940 CONCERNING EXECUTION OF PRISON SENTENCES FOR CRIMES COMMITTED IN TIME OF WAR

1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 877

The Ministerial Council for National Defense decrees the following with legal force for the territory of Greater Germany:

Article 1

(1) If a court martial or an SS and police court sentences a person to hard labor for crimes committed in time of war, or,[198] sentences him, in addition to imprisonment, to loss of the right to bear arms, or loss of civil rights, and if the sentence is to be carried out within the scope of the Reich Administration of Justice, the period spent in prison during the war will not be included in the time of imprisonment. In special cases the judiciary can decide differently.

(2) If a person has within the scope of the Reich Administration of Justice been sentenced to hard labor for a crime committed in time of war, the executing authority should give an order which complies with the legal consequence of article 1, paragraph 1.

(3) The provisions of articles 1 and 2 apply also to prison sentences which have been passed before the effective date of this decree.

(4) Prison sentences which are covered by the provisions of article 1, paragraph 1, or for the execution of which an order according to article 2 is given, will be executed under more strict conditions.

Article 2

The Reich Minister of Justice is authorized to issue the necessary legal and administrative provisions for the carrying out or supplementation of this decree. He may determine that article 1, paragraph 2, should be applied accordingly if imprisonment is to be imposed.

Article 3

This decree applies also in the Incorporated Eastern Territories.

Berlin, 11 June 1940

The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense

Field Marshal Goering

The Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

[199]

EXTRACTS FROM LAW OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1941 AMENDING THE CRIMINAL (PENAL) CODE

1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 549

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Article 1

The dangerous habitual criminal (article 20a of the penal code) and the sex criminal (articles 176 through 178 of the penal code) are subject to the death penalty if the protection of the national community or the need of just expiation require it.

*******

Article 3

The usurer (articles 302d and 302e of the penal code) will be punished with hard labor in especially serious cases. Moreover, a fine of an unlimited amount can be imposed.

*******

Fuehrer Headquarters, 4 September 1941

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The President of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich

Reich Marshal Goering

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Schlegelberger

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

[200]

EXTRACTS FROM THE ELEVENTH REGULATION ON THE REICH CITIZENSHIP LAW, 25 NOVEMBER 1941[104]

1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 722

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Article 1

A Jew, having his regular abode abroad, cannot be a German national. Regular abode abroad shall be presumed if a Jew is abiding abroad under circumstances indicating that he abides there not only temporarily.

Article 2

A Jew loses German nationality—

a. If at the date this amendment becomes effective, he has his regular residence abroad, with that same date.

b. If he takes up his regular residence abroad later on, at the same time replacing his regular domestic residence by a residence abroad.

Article 3

(1) The property of the Jew who is losing his German nationality under this amendment shall be forfeited for the benefit of the Reich at the moment he loses his nationality. For the benefit of the Reich shall further be forfeited the property of Jews who are stateless at the moment this amendment becomes effective, and who were of German nationality, prior to this amendment coming into effect, if they have taken up or take up their regular residence abroad.

(2) The property thus forfeited shall serve the furthering of all purposes in connection with the solution of the Jewish question.

Article 4

(1) Persons whose property is forfeited for the benefit of the Reich under article 3, shall not be able to inherit anything from a German national.

[201]

*******

Article 8

(1) It is for the chief of the Security Police and the SD to decide whether the conditions for a forfeiture of property are given.

(2) The administration and liquidation of the forfeited property is up to the chief of the Regional Finance Office, Berlin.

*******

Article 10

(1) Claims for pensions of Jews who lose German nationality under article 2 expire with the end of the month during which the loss of nationality occurs.

*******

Article 12

This amendment is also valid for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Incorporated Eastern Territories.

Berlin, 25 November 1941

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Chief of the Party Chancellery

M. Bormann

The Reich Minister of Finance

As Deputy, Reinhardt

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Schlegelberger

ORDER OF 16 JANUARY 1942 FOR EXECUTION OF THE FUEHRER DECREE CONCERNING THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF THE PARTY CHANCELLERY

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 35

Pursuant to the Fuehrer decree of 29 May 1941 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 295) defining the position of the chief of the Party Chancellery, the following is hereby directed:

Article 1

(1) Any Party contribution toward national legislation is the exclusive responsibility of the chief of the Party Chancellery[202] unless otherwise directed by the Fuehrer. Legislative proposals or suggestions emanating from the Party, its formations or affiliated organizations are to be submitted exclusively by the chief of the Party Chancellery to the top-level Reich authorities concerned.

(2) Likewise, all assistance of the Party in dealings with personnel matters of civil servants is the exclusive responsibility of the chief of the Party Chancellery.

Article 2

In all matters of national legislation the chief of the Party Chancellery occupies the same position as that of any Reich minister concerned. Therefore he is to be consulted by the highest Reich authorities with regard to the drafting of Reich laws, decrees, and directives of the Fuehrer, directives of the Ministerial Council for National Defense, as well as directives issued by the highest Reich authorities, and regulations and provisions for the execution of these directives. The same applies to the endorsement of laws and directives issued within the jurisdiction of the German States [Laender] or of directives of Reich governors.

Article 3

In all matters of general principle and national policy, particularly in matters pertaining to the drafting, amendment, or execution of laws, decrees, or directives, all communications between the highest Reich authorities and the highest authority of the German States including several political districts on one hand, and the agencies of the Party, its formations and affiliated organizations on the other hand, are to be channeled exclusively through the chief of the Party Chancellery. In such cases there shall exist no direct correspondence between either the highest Reich authorities or the highest authorities of the German States, and any agencies of the Party other than the chief of the Party Chancellery. The same applies to personnel matters of civil servants, unless such matters are otherwise regulated by special provisions.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 16 January 1942

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

The Chief of the Party Chancellery

M. Bormann

[203]

FUEHRER DECREE, 21 MARCH 1942, CONCERNING SIMPLIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 139

The defense of people and Reich necessitates smooth and quick work in the administration of justice. In order to enable the courts and the public prosecutors to continue the fulfilling of their tasks under the extraordinary conditions, I decree the following:

I

The procedure in penal cases including the administration of punishment, in civil cases and in matters of voluntary jurisdiction, is to be simplified and expedited, by eliminating all dispensable measures and by utilizing all available manpower, as far as it is compatible with the purpose of the procedure. In particular, in penal cases the enforcement of the indictment by the offended party, and the formal decree of the court opening, the trial will be eliminated; the authority of the local court in penal matters is to be enlarged, and the admissibility of writs of punishment to be extended.

II

Indictments and judicial decisions will be written in concise style and cut down to the absolutely necessary.

III

The participation of professional associate judges in judicial decisions is to be restricted.

IV

Appeals against judicial decisions will be adapted to war conditions; they can be made subject to special admission. In civil cases of appeal the introduction of new factual material is to be further restricted.

V

(1) The term of office of the members of the Special Senates of the Reich Supreme Court and of the People’s Court, as well as the honorary members of the People’s Court, is extended to the termination of the war.

(2) The units and members of units of the Reich chamber of attorneys, the Reich chamber of notaries public and the notaries’[204] finance office will remain in office until the termination of the war; their appointment can be revoked at any time.

VI

I commission the Reich Minister of Justice, in agreement with the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery, and the chief of the Party Chancellery, to issue the legal provisions necessary for the execution of this decree. I empower the Reich Minister of Justice to make the necessary administrative provisions and to decide any doubtful questions by administrative means under due observation of article 2 of the decree of 16 January 1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt Part I, page 35).

Fuehrer Headquarters, 21 March 1942

The Fuehrer

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

UNANIMOUS DECISION OF THE GREATER GERMAN REICHSTAG, 26 APRIL 1942, CONCERNING UNRESTRICTED POWERS OF ADOLF HITLER

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 247

Decision of the Greater German Reichstag, 26 April 1942

At the proposal of the president of the Reichstag, in its session of 26 April 1942, the greater German Reichstag has unanimously approved of the rights which the Fuehrer has postulated in his speech[105], with the following decision:

At the order of the Fuehrer this decision is hereby promulgated.

Berlin, 26 April 1942

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT I, PAGE 475

Order Concerning the Jurisdiction of SS Courts and Police Courts in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, 15 July 1942

In pursuance of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, dated 16 March, 1939 (RGB1.I, p. 485) and in agreement with the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the following order is issued:

Article 1

In case of direct attack by a non-German citizen against the SS or the German police or against any of their members, the Reich Leader of the SS and chief of the German police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior may establish the jurisdiction of a combined SS court and police court, by declaring that special interests of parts of the SS or of the police require that judgment be given by an SS and police court.[106]

This declaration shall be sent to the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. The SS and police court, which shall have jurisdiction in individual cases, shall be specified by the Reich leader of the SS and chief of the German police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

[206]

Article 2

If the offense directly injures the interests of the armed forces the Reich Leader of the SS and chief of the German police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and the chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces shall reach an agreement as to whether the case shall be prosecuted by an SS and police court or by a military court.

Article 3

This order shall become effective 1 week after its publication.

Berlin, 15 July 1942

The Reich Minister of the Interior

As deputy, Dr. Stuckart

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Schlegelberger

EXTRACTS FROM DECREE OF 13 AUGUST 1942 FOR THE FURTHER SIMPLIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 508

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Article II

Extended penal authority of the Local Court

The local court may pass sentence of hard labor up to 5 years.

Article III

Extension of the Admissibility of the Writ of Punishment

A writ of punishment of up to 6 months’ imprisonment is admissible for crimes, too.

Article IV

Economizing on Manpower in the Composition of Penal Court

Decisions by the penal chamber of the district court, the Special Court and the penal senate of the courts of appeal may be made[207] by the president or his regular deputy alone, if he considers the cooperation of his associates dispensable in view of the factual and legal simplicity of the case, and if the public prosecutor agrees.

Article V

Trial without Public Prosecutor

In proceedings before the local court the public prosecutor may abstain from participation in the trial.

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Article VII

Reorganization of the System of Legal Remedies

Article 1

Restriction of Legal Remedies

Appeal and complaint by the defendant or the plaintiff in penal cases, prosecuting on his own or beside the public prosecutor, against a decision issued after this decree comes into force, are subject to special admission. This will be granted in cases where a refusal would be unfair.

Berlin, 13 August 1942

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Schlegelberger

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 535

Decree of the Fuehrer concerning Special Powers of the Reich Minister of Justice

To fulfill the tasks of the Greater German Reich, a strong administration of justice is necessary. Therefore, I commission and empower the Reich Minister of Justice[107] to establish a national socialist administration of justice and to take all necessary[208] measures in accordance with my directives and instructions and in agreement with the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery and the chief of the Party Chancellery.[108] In doing so, he can deviate from any existing law.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 20 August 1942

The Fuehrer

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

EXTRACTS FROM THE REICH JUVENILE COURT LAW OF 10 NOVEMBER 1943

1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 639

First Part

Juvenile Delinquencies and their Consequences

First Section

General Rules

Article 1

Sphere of Application

(1) This law applies whenever a juvenile commits a delinquency subject to punishment. A juvenile is one who, at the time of the deed, is 14 but not yet 18 years old.

(2) This law applies to Germans. It shall be applied accordingly to members of other nationalities, as far as not otherwise provided.

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Seventh Section

Application of the General Criminal Law

Article 20

Juvenile Major Criminals

(1) If at the time of the deed the juvenile was morally and mentally developed to such an extent that he can be considered[209] like a perpetrator over 18 years old, the judge will apply the general criminal law, if the sound sentiment of the people requires it because of the particularly wicked character of the perpetrator and because of the seriousness of his deed.

(2) The same applies, if the juvenile at the time of the deed, according to his moral and mental development, cannot be considered like an adult, but if the over-all appreciation of his personality and his deed shows that he is a major criminal of a degenerate character and the protection of the people demands such treatment.

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FIFTH DECREE, 5 MAY 1944, AMENDING THE DECREE CONCERNING SPECIAL CRIMINAL LAW IN TIME OF WAR AND SPECIAL EMERGENCY

1944 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 115

Pursuant to Article 10 of the Decree concerning Special Criminal Law in Time of War and Special Emergency[109] (Special Penal Decree for Wartime) of 17 August 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt 1939, I, p. 1455) the following is ordered:

Article I

Article 5a of the Special Penal Decree for Wartime is amended as follows:

Article 5a

Excess of the Regular Penalty Limits

(1) With regard to all offenders who through an intentional, punishable act have become guilty of causing a serious detriment or danger to the conduct of the war or the security of the Reich, the penalty can be increased in excess of the regular penalty limits, up to the statutory maximum of a given type of penalty, or to a term of hard labor, or to hard labor for life, or to death, if the regular penalty limits are an insufficient expiation according to the sound sentiment of the people. The same applies to all punishable acts committed by negligence, if they have caused a particularly serious detriment or danger to the conduct of the war or the security of the Reich.

[210]

(2) In the case of punishable acts committed against the discipline and courage required of a soldier, the regular penalty limits may be likewise exceeded, if the maintenance of discipline and the security of the military unit require it.

Article II

Article I applies also to acts committed before this decree becomes effective.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 5 May 1944

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

DECREE OF 25 AUGUST 1944, FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE TOTAL WAR EFFORT

1944 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 184

Pursuant to the decree of the Fuehrer concerning special powers of the Reich Minister of Justice,[110] of 20 August 1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 535), in connection with the decree of the Fuehrer concerning total war effort of 25 July 1944 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 161) the following is ordered in agreement with the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery, the chief of the Party Chancellery, and the Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich.

Article I

(1) He who willfully or negligently violates an order or prohibition contained in a legal decree or a duly promulgated administrative order of the Reich government, any Supreme Reich Authority or any other authority on the same level with it concerning measures for implementing total war effort, will be punished with imprisonment and/or a fine.

(2) If the perpetrator is guilty of causing, by a willful violation, a serious disadvantage or a serious danger or, by a negligent violation, a specially serious advantage or a specially serious danger to the war effort or the security of the Reich, he may be punished with hard labor for a limited period, or for life, or with death.

Article II

This decree is also applicable if the legal decree or administrative[211] order has been promulgated before this decree comes into force, but after 25 July 1944.

Berlin, 25 August 1944

The Reich Minister of Justice

As deputy, Klemm[111]

1944 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 339

In pursuance of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning special powers of the Reich Minister of Justice, dated 20 August 1942,[112] (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 535), in connection with the decree of the Fuehrer concerning total war, dated 25 July 1944 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 161), and in agreement with the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery, the chief of the Party Chancellery, and the Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, the following is ordered:

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Part II

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Article 12

Limited Admittance of Defense Counsel

(1) In one criminal case, several lawyers or professional representatives may not act side by side as chosen counsel for one defendant.

(2) The rules about obligatory representation by defense counsel do not apply. The presiding judge appoints a defense counsel for the whole or part of the proceedings if the difficulty of the factual or legal problems makes assistance by a defense counsel necessary, or if the defendant, in due consideration of his personality, is unable to defend himself personally.

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Berlin, 13 December 1944

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Thierack

[212]

C. Organization and Structure of the German Judicial System and the Reich Ministry of Justice

I. THE POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADING OFFICIALS IN THE REICH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT METTGENBERG[113]

DIRECT EXAMINATION

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Dr. Schilf (counsel for defendant Mettgenberg): Dr. Mettgenberg, at the Reich Ministry of Justice you last held the position of a subdepartment chief. In the course of this trial a great many things have been said about that subdepartment chief,[114] but you are the only defendant who last held that position. Therefore, would you please give the court an outline of that last position you held?

Defendant Mettgenberg: Perhaps I may somewhat exceed the scope of the question and say a few words about the structure of the Reich Ministry of Justice as a whole, of which so far nothing has been said here. The entire personnel of the Reich Ministry of Justice amounted to approximately 800. Those 800 people composed three groups, the workers, the employees, and the officials. As an example for the workmen may I perhaps mention the cleaning women and the boilermen. As an example for the employees, the majority of the secretaries and typists. Officials were those who held the posts of civil servants. Conditions to fulfill the status of a civil servant were mainly of a formal nature. Within the body of civil servants there were three groups which must be distinguished—the lower grade, the intermediate grade, and the higher grade. Lower officials were, for example, those who carried the files, the chief messengers, etc. Officials of the intermediate grade were the men whose task it was to keep the registers and to draft documents which were made by the dozen. The higher grade of officials were those beginning with assessor [junior judge or prosecutor] up to the Minister himself. The scope of work for the higher grade civil servants was distributed in such a way that the younger of these civil servants were employed as so-called co-workers [Mitarbeiter] or assistants.[213] Above the co-workers there were the Referents.[115] They were older officials who held the rank of Oberregierungsrat or ministerial counsellor [Ministerialrat].[115] Above them the next category was the subdepartment chiefs [Unterabteilungsleiter]. These subdepartment chiefs were either senior ministerial counsellors [Ministerialraete] or Ministerialdirigenten.[115] Above them there were the department chiefs [Abteilungsleiter], as a rule a ministerial director.[115] Sometimes it was a Ministerialdirigent. Above them, but only temporarily, there was an assistant under secretary [Unterstaatssekretaer]. Above him there was one or several under secretaries [Staatssekretaeren].[115] At the very top there was the Reich Minister.[115] When one keeps that survey in mind, the answer to the question which counsel put to me becomes fairly clear. The subdepartment chief was between the Referent and the department chief. His task was to take reports from the Referent on matters which were of a somewhat supernormal importance; matters which were altogether normal and clear and unambiguous, where there were no misgivings, no doubts, there the Referent made the decision. But as soon as a matter, from any point of view, assumed somewhat greater significance, he had to report on it to the chief who, in turn, had to consider as to whether he himself was competent to decide on the question. If it was of real significance, a report had to be made to a higher authority, to the department chief, to the State Secretary, and possibly to the Minister. In the absence of the department chief, the subdepartment chief had to deputize for him in his business as department chief. And the organization with us was such that every subdepartment chief for his sphere of work had to undertake that work as a deputy. In the big department IV, which has been discussed here such a great deal, there were in the end six subdepartment chiefs, each of whom had his own sphere of work. When the department chief was absent, each one of the six subdepartment chiefs had to deputize for the department chief within and for his own sphere of work. In the main, my defense counsel has already explained the matter in his opening statement, and I may therefore refer to it. As concerns myself as a subdepartment chief, I too had to deputize for the department chief when matters were concerned which belonged within my sphere of work as a subdepartment chief.

[214]

2. EXTRACTS FROM THE “BASIC INFORMATION”

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE COURT SYSTEM[116]

Following the practice of most continental nations, German law (based primarily on Roman law principles) is largely enacted into codes. The criminal code dates from 1871, and the code of criminal procedure from 1877.

Before Hitler’s seizure of power, the individual German states (Laender) retained their sovereignty in the administration of justice and the establishment of courts. There was, however, a Supreme Court of the entire German Reich (Reichsgericht), which sat at Leipzig.

Under the Supreme Court, there were 34 district courts of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte), established in the several states and provinces. Under the district courts of appeal were some 180 district courts (Landgerichte) and about 2,200 local courts (Amtsgerichte).

Both the Judicature Act of 1877 and the Weimar constitution (article 102) provided that the courts and judges should be independent. The general administration of the courts, however, was controlled by the Justice Ministries—the Reich Supreme Court by the Reich Ministry of Justice and the intermediate and lower courts by the Justice Ministries of the individual states. The Reich and state prosecutors were appointed and controlled by the respective Reich and state ministries.

*******

The regular courts. Original jurisdiction, both in civil and criminal matters, was divided between the local courts and the district courts. The local courts served for civil cases where the claim did not exceed 1500 reichsmarks, and criminal cases where the crime was punishable with penal servitude up to 5 years. Cases where these limits were exceeded were brought originally in the district courts.

The appellate procedure was much simplified as a war measure in 1939. Criminal cases heard in the local courts could thereafter be appealed to the district courts, and criminal cases heard originally in the district courts could be appealed directly to the Reich Supreme Court. Civil cases from the local courts could be taken on appeal directly to the district courts of appeal; civil cases from the district courts could be appealed to the district courts of appeal and thereafter to the Reich Supreme Court.

[215]

Under the impact of the war and the resulting shortage of judges and judicial personnel, a decree in September 1944 further curtailed the right of appeal and entirely eliminated the judicial functions of the district courts of appeal.

The Reich Supreme Court was the court of first and last instance for cases of treason against the Reich but, as set forth below, in 1934 this function was absorbed by the People’s Court.

Extraordinary courts. Immediately after the seizure of power, by a decree of 21 March 1933,[117] Special Courts (Sondergerichte) were established in order to combat the activities of opponents of the new regime. One Special Court was established within the area of each district court of appeal. Each court was composed of a president and two associates, drawn from the professional judges of the district. The Special Courts were given jurisdiction over various crimes, including inciting to disobedience of governmental orders, crimes in the nature of sabotage, and acts “contrary to the public welfare.” There was no appeal from decisions of the Special Courts.

The following year, the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) was established by the law of 24 April 1934.[118] The People’s Court tried cases of treason, which were withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Reich Supreme Court. During the following years, the jurisdiction of the People’s Court was vastly increased by the expanded concept of treason.

The People’s Court sat in six divisions, or “senates”; later on, a “special senate” was created to retry cases where, in the judgment of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Reich, an insufficient punishment had been imposed. Ordinarily a senate of the People’s Court was composed of five judges, of whom two were professional judges and the other three were laymen specially appointed from the SS, the armed forces, and the Nazi Party hierarchy. There was no appeal from decisions of the People’s Court.

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Other special tribunals established under the third Reich included the “hereditary health courts”[119] (Erbgesundheitsgerichte) and in 1945, emergency civilian “courts martial”[120] (Standgerichte) in those parts of Germany which were near the front lines.

[216]

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REGULAR AND EXTRAORDINARY COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH

[217]

CHART SHOWING POSITIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS AND OTHERS IN THE REICH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND THE GERMAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM UNDER HITLER[121]

[218]

3. SPECIAL COURTS[122]

DECREE OF THE REICH GOVERNMENT, 21 MARCH 1933, ON THE FORMATION OF SPECIAL COURTS

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 136

Pursuant to chapter II of part six of the third decree of the Reich President to safeguard economy and finances and to combat political excesses, of 6 October 1931, (Reichsgesetzblatt I, pp. 537, 565) the following is decreed:

Article 1

(1) A Special Court will be created for the district of each court of appeal.

(2) The Special Courts are courts of the States.

(3) The Legal Administration of the respective States determines the seats of the Special Courts.

Article 2

The Special Courts have jurisdiction over crimes and offenses enumerated in the decree of the Reich President for the protection of people and State of 28 February 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 83) and in the decree concerning the defense against insidious attacks against the government of the national revolution of 21 March 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 135), provided that such crimes and offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the Reich Supreme Court or the courts of appeal.

Article 3

(1) The Special Courts shall also be competent if a crime or offense within their jurisdiction constitutes at the same time another punishable act.

(2) If another punishable act is factually connected with a crime or offense within the jurisdiction of the Special Courts, the proceedings against the perpetrators and participants of the other punishable act may be brought before the Special Court by way of combination.

[219]

(3) The extension of jurisdiction according to paragraphs 1 and 2 does not apply to matters within the jurisdiction of the Reich Supreme Court or the courts of appeal.

Article 4

(1) The Special Courts are composed of a president and two associate judges. A deputy has to be appointed for each member in case of his absence.

(2) The members and their deputies must be permanently appointed judges of the district for which the Special Court is established.

(3) The members will be appointed and the distribution of their tasks undertaken by the presidency of the district court in the district in which the Special Court is located.

Article 5

The prosecutors will be appointed by the legal administration of the States from those prosecution officials who are legally qualified for the office of a judge.

Article 6

The regulations of the code of criminal procedure and of the judicature act will apply correspondingly to the proceedings, provided nothing else has been determined.

Article 7

Proceedings may be instituted also before the Special Court in the district in which the defendant was caught or where he is in custody. The release of the defendant does not affect this jurisdiction once it has been established.

Article 8

Applications for disqualification of a judge will be decided upon by the Special Court to which the respective judge is assigned. For this decision the respective judge is replaced by his deputy. The deputy cannot be disqualified.

Article 9

(1) No hearings relating to the warrant of arrest will be held.

(2) The decisions concerning arrest pending trial are made by the president of the Special Court. The president of the Special Court is, apart from the local court, also competent for those decisions, which, according to articles 125, 128 of the code of[220] criminal procedure, fall under the jurisdiction of the local court. Complaints against the decisions of the president and the local court will be decided upon by the Special Court.

(3) The president of the Special Court can delegate the interrogation of the defendant and the decision about the warrant of arrest to an associate judge. The same applies to the decisions which are to be made according to articles 116 and 148 of the code of criminal procedure.

Article 10

For the defendant who has not yet chosen counsel, counsel has to be appointed at the time when the date for the trial is fixed.

Article 11

A preliminary court investigation will not be held. If a preliminary court investigation is pending at the time this decree becomes effective, the records are to be transferred in due time to the prosecutor of the Special Court.

Article 12

(1) The indictment must contain a summary of the results of the investigations.

(2) The order of the court to open the trial can be dispensed with. Instead of the request of the prosecution for the order to open the trial, there will be the request of the prosecution to fix a date for the trial. After receiving the indictment the president will set a date for the trial, if in his opinion the legal prerequisites for it are fulfilled. Otherwise he will put the decision to the court. When setting the date for the trial, the president will also decide upon the warrant of arrest or the continuation of the arrest pending trial.

(3) The legal administration of the State can decree that the clerk of the Special Court will issue the summons for the trial and produce those objects which are to serve as evidence (art. 214, par. 1 of the code of criminal procedure). The legal administration of the State can delegate this power.

(4) The term of the summons (art. 217 of the code of criminal procedure) is 3 days. It can be shortened to 24 hours.

(5) The effects which the code of criminal procedure connects with the opening of the trial take place with the filing of the indictment. The effects, which the code of criminal procedure connects with the reading of the order of the court to open the trial,[221] take place at the moment when the interrogation of the defendant as to the facts of the case begins.

Article 13

The Special Court can refuse any offer of evidence, if the court has come to the conviction that the evidence is not necessary for clearing up the case.

Article 14

The Special Court has to pass sentence even if the trial results in showing the act, of which the defendant is accused, as not being under the jurisdiction of the Special Court. This does not apply if the act constitutes a crime or offense under the jurisdiction of the Reich Supreme Court or the courts of appeal; in this case the Special Court has to proceed according to article 270, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the code of criminal procedure.

Article 15

The results of the interrogations (art. 273, par. 2 of the code of criminal procedure) need not be incorporated in the record of the trial.

Article 16

(1) There is no legal appeal against decisions of the Special Courts.

(2) Applications for a reopening of the case are to be decided upon by the penal chamber of the district court. The reopening of the case in favor of the defendant will also take place if there are circumstances which point to the necessity of reexamining the case in the ordinary procedure. The stipulation of article 363 of the code of criminal procedure remains unaffected. If the application for the reopening of the case is justified, the trial will be ordered to take place before the competent ordinary court.

Article 17

Proceedings initiated on a punishable act within the jurisdiction of the Special Courts and pending at the date this decree becomes effective, will be continued according to the general rules if the trial has already started. Otherwise they will be transferred to the procedure regulated in this decree.

Article 18

(1) When the activities of the Special Courts end, the pending cases will be transferred to the ordinary procedure; the indictment[222] filed according to the stipulations of this decree will become ineffective.

(2) If the trial has once started before the Special Court, it will be carried on according to the stipulations of this decree.

(3) The administration of punishment will be transferred to the authority for the administration of punishment in whose district the Special Court had its seat; the court decisions occurring in the course of the administration of punishment will be made by the penal chamber of the district court without hearings being held.

Article 19

This decree becomes effective on the second day after its promulgation.

Berlin, 21 March 1933

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

For the Reich Minister of Justice

The Vice Chancellor

von Papen

DECREE OF 21 FEBRUARY 1940 CONCERNING JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS, SPECIAL COURTS, AND ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 405

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PART II

SPECIAL COURTS

Section 1

Organization and Jurisdiction of the Special Courts

Article 10

Organization

(1) A Special Court will be established with one or several district courts within the district of each court of appeal.

(2) Location and district of the Special Courts are determined by the Reich Minister of Justice.

[223]

Article 11

Composition

1. Decisions of the Special Court are to be rendered by three professional judges.

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Article 13

Exclusive Jurisdiction

The Special Court has jurisdiction for:

1. Crimes and offenses committed under the law concerning insidious attacks against State and Party, and the protection of Party uniforms, of 20 December 1934.[123] (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1269, and under articles 134a and 134b of the criminal (penal) code.)

2. Crimes under article 239a of the criminal (penal) code and under the law against highway robbery by means of highway traps, of 22 June 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 651).

3. Crimes under the decree concerning extraordinary measures with regard to radio, 1 September 1939[124] (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1683).

4. Crimes and offenses under article 1 of the war economy decree, 4 September 1939[125] (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1609).

5. Crimes under article 1 of the decree against public enemies, 5 September 1939[126] (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1679).

6. Crimes under articles 1 and 2 of the decree against violent criminals, 5 December 1939, (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 2378).

Article 14

Establishment of jurisdiction of the court by the prosecution.

(1) The Special Court also has jurisdiction over other crimes and offenses, if the prosecution is of the opinion that immediate sentencing by the Special Court is indicated by the gravity or the wickedness of the act, by the public excitement aroused or in consideration of a serious threat to public order or security.

Article 15

Extension of Jurisdiction

(1) The Special Court is also competent if a crime or offense[224] belonging to its jurisdiction at the same time constitutes another punishable act.

(2) If there is a factual connection between a crime or offense belonging to the jurisdiction of the Special Court and another punishable act, the latter can be brought before the Special Court by way of combination.

Article 16

Limitations of Jurisdiction

The Special Court is not competent for offenses indicated in articles 13 through 15, in as far as the competency of the People’s Court or of the court of appeal is established.

Section 2

Proceedings before Special Courts

Article 17

Application of General Rules of Procedure

(1) For the proceedings before the Special Courts, the code of criminal procedure, the judicature act, and their amendments apply, unless otherwise specified.

(2) The rules of the second chapter of the juvenile court law are not applicable.

Article 18

Local Competency of the Court

The Special Court shall also be competent for those defendants who are seized or kept in confinement in its district. The jurisdiction, once established, will not be affected by the release of the defendant.

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Article 23

Speeding up of the Proceedings

(1) In all proceedings before a Special Court the sentence must be passed immediately without observation of any time limits, if the delinquent was caught in the very act or if his guilt is otherwise obvious.

(2) In all other cases the term of summons (arts. 217 and 218 of the code of criminal procedure) shall be 24 hours.

[225]

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Article 25

Relationship between the Special Courts and the regular courts

(1) The Special Court must hand down a decision in a case, even if the trial shows that the act with which the defendant is charged is of such a nature that the Special Court is not competent to deal with it. If, however, the trial shows that the act comes under the jurisdiction of the People’s Court, the Special Court will refer the case to the latter court; article 270, paragraph 2, of the code of criminal procedure applies accordingly.

(2) If the trial of a case before the People’s Court or the court of appeal, after the filing of the indictment, shows that the Special Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the act with which the defendant is charged, the People’s Court or the court of appeal can either decide the case themselves or direct the trial to take place before the Special Court. In the latter case the act with which the defendant is charged has to be described, with emphasis on its legal characteristics and on the penal law.

Article 26

Incontestability

(1) There is no legal appeal against a decision of the Special Court.

(2) Applications for a reopening of the proceedings will be decided on by the penal chamber of the district court at the seat of the Special Court. The reopening of the case in favor of the defendant will take place also if circumstances should make it necessary to re-examine the case in ordinary proceedings. Article 363 of the code of criminal procedure shall remain unaffected. If the application for reopening is justified, the trial shall be directed to take place before the competent ordinary court.

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Part VI

Final Regulations

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Article 40

Validity in the Protectorate

This decree is also valid for the German courts in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

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Berlin, 21 February 1940

The Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

[226]

The Reich Minister of Justice

3234-III a4 1187

To the Presidents and Public Prosecutors at the Courts of Appeal and for the information of—

a. The President of the Reich Supreme Court

b. The Chief Reich Prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court concerning prosecution of wartime criminality—

Wartime crimes, particularly those involving the decree against public enemies, the war economy decree, the decree against violent criminals, and the decree against “Black Listening” [Listening to prohibited broadcasts][127], should, as a matter of principle, be indicted before Special Courts, in order to speed up proceedings as much as possible.

In the event that, because of the great number of proceedings, the necessary rapid handling of such cases should not prove possible, I wish to be informed promptly, in order that I may have new Special Courts established or new senates added to already existing Special Courts. The overload of work on a Special Court should never result in the handing over of cases to other courts.

A Special Court is, as a rule, to be considered overloaded if a monthly average of more than 40 new indictments has been filed with it.

Acting for the Minister

[Signed] Dr. Freisler

Certified:

[Signed] Benicke

Chief Clerk, Ministry of Justice Executive Office

[227]

The Reich Minister of Justice

3234-IVa 4 877/43

[Stamp] Court of Appeal Cologne 26 July 1943

To: The Presidents of Courts of Appeal and the Generalstaatsanwaelte

Subject: Relief of the Special Courts

The following has been discussed here:

Special Courts were established by the decree of 21 March 1933[128] as a keen weapon for the conviction of political criminals. Their jurisdiction was initially limited to crimes and delicts as defined by the decree of the Reich President concerning the protection of people and State[129] as well as in the Heimtueckegesetz.[130] By the decree on the extended jurisdiction of the Special Courts as of December 1934 and through a series of subsequent laws the functions of the Special Courts were steadily increased. The decree of 20 November 1938 then made it possible to bring before the Special Court such cases in which immediate action by this court seemed necessary in view of the gravity and the wickedness of the act or of the excitement aroused in public. After the outbreak of the war, by the decree of 21 February 1940 concerning court jurisdiction there was established exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court for a series of offenses, in particular for crimes and transgressions covered by the war economy decree. Thus, the amount of work accruing to the Special Courts increased extraordinarily during the last years, especially during the war. Practically all somewhat important criminal cases are now under the jurisdiction of the Special Court.

[228]

This increase in work caused the establishment of a great number of new Special Courts, the enlargement of existing Special Courts and the formation of new Special Court sections.

I

This development is commented upon as follows:

1. Sentences by the Special Court in the first years after its establishment had a strongly intimidating effect. Prompt and severe punishment by the Special Court was dreaded. Moreover it was considered particularly shameful to have been sentenced by the Special Court. Since the focus of the entire system of criminal justice shifted in the meantime from the ordinary courts (local courts, criminal sections of district courts) to the Special Courts, a certain watering down of the original conception of the Special Courts could not be entirely avoided. Today the Special Courts basically are to be considered merely as special divisions of the criminal courts, their verdicts no longer having that full intimidating effect they had before. The only essential difference from ordinary criminal jurisdiction is left in the fact that there is no legal appeal remedy against verdicts of Special Courts. The standing of Special Courts suffered from their having to deal with comparatively small offenses such as small scale illegal slaughtering, unauthorized fishing by a Pole, and the like.

2. The concentration of jurisdiction in political and other most important criminal cases led at first to an essentially homogenous and coherent jurisdiction. The establishment of new chambers in the Special Courts and the increase of these courts tends to endanger this homogenousness. Since the verdicts of Special Courts were not regularly but rather casually published in the press, and since equalizing measures were taken only recently, the jurisdiction of the Special Courts, even of the individual chambers of one Special Court, developed partly in a very different manner. The first chamber of one Special Court, for instance, is reported to have punished the theft of some items from a collection of textiles as the deed of a people’s enemy with 4 years of penitentiary, while the second chamber of the same Special Court in a very similar case imposed a sentence of only 8 months.

3. The strong increase of the number of Special Courts had brought about that, due to the scarcity of apt candidates, the selection of judges officiating in these courts could no longer be carried through as carefully as it was done in the first years. While, in principle, only professionally and in particular politically highly qualified judges were supposed to work in Special Courts, the increase of positions made it necessary to draft judges frequently[229] from criminal courts and civil sections who hardly were up to the required standards. Quite a number of judges in the Special Court are not even members of the Party.

4. Due to the development of the Special Courts, the ordinary criminal courts, especially the criminal court sections, have undergone an extreme decline in importance. While Special Courts are overburdened with work, some criminal court sections have hardly as much to do as they had in peacetime. Furthermore, the latter now having only to deal with trifling transgressions, they are gradually becoming less familiar with severe cases. It is reported that the prosecution now shows a tendency to bring many cases before the Special Courts which actually do not belong to their jurisdiction. On the one hand this is due to the prosecutors having greater confidence in the Special Courts, on the other to the fact that thus a delay of the execution of the sentence through appeal is made impossible.

5. The permanent overburdening of the Special Courts had led in some districts to a gradual vanishing of their particular advantage, their rapid sentencing. The Special Courts are said to proceed with such delay that at times the prison term imposed by the court is already absorbed by the custody preceding trial.

II

It may be stressed that said development of the Special Court jurisdiction is undesirable. In the interest of a rapid and severe punishment of the really outstanding crimes and transgressions it should be attempted to maintain the character of the Special Courts as “Courts Martial of the Home Front” [Standgerichte der Inneren Front].

1. In regard to organization, the following is pointed out:

a. At some Special Courts several chambers were established. Experiences with several chambers are varying, but in general not favorable. If the chambers are proceeding under different presidency and with different personnel, several chambers are actually equal to several Special Courts. Consequently it is possible that the uniformity of jurisdiction disappears even within one Special Court. Not in all places and instances the ability to preserve a uniform jurisdiction within the Special Court through an exchange of ideas and experiences and through an exchange of associate judges among the different chambers is to be found.

b. Even greater is the danger of a not uniform jurisdiction if new Special Courts with competence in a limited district are established. It is yet considerably harder to bring about an exchange of ideas and experiences and exchange of associate judges[230] among different Special Courts than among several divisions of one and the same Special Court. Therefore, no advantage can be seen in the establishment of a whole series of new Special Courts as it has been noticed during the last years.

c. Reinforcement of the existing Special Courts by assigning a number of additional associate judges is considered to be the most suitable method. The uniformity of the direction of the Special Court is being secured by the presiding judge, while the most experienced associate judge should be made his deputy.

This strengthening of the Special Courts will in any case secure the uniformity of jurisdiction and will make possible a more extensive performance than in separated Special Courts. This strengthening of course is limited by the working capacity of the president and by his ability to exert influence. The president has to bear both in the preparation and in the conduct of the trial, the bulk of physical and intellectual work, a circumstance which sets a natural limit to this form of strengthening of the Special Courts.

2. Furthermore it is stressed that the Special Courts’ return to their proper task cannot be seen in organizational measures, but that a sensible relief of the Special Courts from inappropriate criminal cases must be accomplished.

a. A means thereto is already at hand now in article 24 of the decree concerning court competence. According to it, Special Courts are entitled to transfer trivial cases to the local or the criminal courts. Apparently practice is not uniform in this respect. While some Special Courts, in view of their excessive pressure of work, have already made an extended use of the opportunity to transfer cases to the regular courts, other Special Courts appear to have entirely renounced such a transfer, carrying through themselves even unimportant criminal cases. In general they base this on the bad experiences they made when they transferred cases to the regular jurisdiction.

In spite of that, transfers according to article 24 ought to be practised to a far greater extent. Through the sentences as suggested by the prosecutions, through judges’ letters and through directing of the criminal procedure, care has been taken that local and criminal courts are being integrated into the framework of Special Court jurisdiction. Thus, for instance, minor cases of illegal slaughtering, contact with prisoners of war, etc., could be transferred. If the penal courts were continuously entrusted with these matters, then they would also develop a uniform experience, which as yet is not possible. As a further means of relief, according to the present state of legislation, a directive to the public prosecutors is suggested with the purpose that all minor cases[231] should be prosecuted before the penal court and not before the Special Court. Only political and really important cases arousing public excitement should be reserved for the Special Courts.

b. Hitherto the possibility of letting the president (one single judge) take decisions in the Special Court has not been sufficiently made use of. In simple typical cases it is not necessary to call in assessors and to mobilize the whole apparatus of the Special Courts.

Kindly let me have your opinion of these arguments before 1 August 1943. Will you kindly especially express your opinion as regards the advantages and the expediency of the three possibilities—criminal chamber system, central Special Court with several deputy presidents, and separate regional Special Courts, as well as about the question of the restriction of competence.

[Seal of Ministry of Justice]

Dr. Thierack

Certified:

[Illegible stamped signature]

Clerk

4. PEOPLE’S COURT[131]

EXTRACT FROM LAW OF 24 APRIL 1934 AMENDING REGULATIONS OF PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 341

*******

*******

CHAPTER III. PEOPLE’S COURT[132]

Article 1

(1) For the trial of cases of high treason and treason the People’s Court is established.

[232]

(2) Decisions of the People’s Court are made by five members during the trial, by three members outside the trial. This includes the president. The president and one further member must be qualified judges. Several senates may be established.

(3) The prosecution is represented by the Chief Prosecutor of the Reich.

Article 2

The members of the People’s Court and their deputies are appointed for the duration of 5 years by the Reich Chancellor at the recommendation of the Reich Minister of Justice.

Article 3

(1) The People’s Court is competent for the investigation and decision in the first and last instance in the cases of high treason according to articles 80 through 84, treason according to articles 89 through 92, assault against the Reich President according to article 94, paragraph 1 of the criminal (penal) code, and the crimes listed in article 5, paragraph 2, No. 1 of the decree of the Reich President for the protection of people and State of 28 February 1933[133] (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 83). In these cases the People’s Court also make the decision listed in article 73, paragraph 1 of the judicature act.

(2) The People’s Court is also competent in such cases where crimes or offenses subject to its competency constitute at the same time another crime or offense.

(3) If another punishable act is in factual connection with a crime or offense subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Court, the proceedings against the perpetrators and participants of the other punishable act may be brought before the People’s Court by way of combination.

Article 4

(1) The Chief Reich Prosecutor can transfer the prosecution of the crimes of preparation of high treason listed in articles 82 and 83 of the penal code and of the treasonable offenses listed in articles 90 b through 90 e of the penal code to the prosecutor at the court of appeal. The Chief Reich Prosecutor can withdraw the transfer before the opening of the investigation.

(2) In the cases mentioned in paragraph 1 the People’s Court can transfer the trial and decision to the court of appeal, if the Chief Reich Prosecutor requests this when filing the indictment.

(3) Article 120 of the judicature act applies accordingly.

[233]

Article 5

(1) As far as not otherwise stipulated, the procedure is subject to the provisions of the judicature act and the code of criminal procedure concerning the procedure before the Reich Supreme Court in the first instance.

(2) Against the decisions of the People’s Court no legal appeal is permitted.

*******

Berlin, 24 April 1934

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice, at the same time for the Reich Minister of the Interior

Dr. Guertner

The Reich Defense Minister

von Blomberg

EXTRACTS FROM LAW OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1939 AMENDING REGULATIONS OF GENERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, MILITARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE PENAL CODE

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1841

*******

Article 5

The Special Senate of the People’s Court

(1) The special senate of the People’s Courts consists of the president and of four members.

(2) The special senate is presided over by the president of the People’s Court[134] and, if he cannot be present, by the vice president. One of the members must be a president of a senate or a professional associate judge at the People’s Court.

(3) The members and their deputies are appointed for the duration of two business years by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor upon recommendation of the Reich Minister of Justice.

[234]

*******

Fuehrer Headquarters, 16 September 1939

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

EXTRACTS FROM DECREE, 21 FEBRUARY 1940, CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS, SPECIAL COURTS, AND ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 405

Upon the basis of legal authority and with the consent of the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan [Goering] and the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the following is ordered:

Chapter I

Jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts

*******

Article 5

Jurisdiction of the People’s Court

(1) The People’s Court has jurisdiction for—

1. High treason (articles 80 through 84 of the Reich criminal code).

2. Treason (articles 89 through 92 of the Reich criminal code).

3. Attacks against the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor (article 94, paragraph 1 of the Reich criminal (penal) code).

4. Severe cases of damaging military equipment and endangering the armed forces of friendly states (arts. 1–5 of the decree supplementing penal provisions for the protection of the defensive strength of the German people of 25 November 1939, Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 2319).

5. Failure to report an intended crime (art. 139, par. 2 of the criminal (penal) code), insofar as this crime was intended to be high treason or treason under the jurisdiction of the People’s Court, or a severe case of damaging military equipment.

[235]

6. Crimes under article 5, paragraph 1 of the decree concerning protection of people and state, of 28 February 1933 (1933 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 83).

7. Crimes under article 1, paragraph 1 of the law against economic sabotage, of 1 December 1936[135] (1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 999).

(2) In cases of acts punishable under articles 82, 83, 90b through 90e, 92 of the criminal (penal) code, the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court can transfer the prosecution to the attorney general at the court of appeal.

(3) In the cases described in paragraph 2, the People’s Court, in agreement with the Chief Reich Prosecutor, can transfer the trial and decision to the court of appeal, as long as the trial has not been directed to take place before the People’s Court.

(4) The Chief Reich Prosecutor can withdraw the transfer and his consent to a transfer as long as the trial has not begun before the court of appeal.

*******

Final Regulations

Section 40

Validity in the Protectorate

This decree is also valid for the German courts in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

Berlin, 21 February 1940

The Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

Kl/Hz

Supreme Chief of the SA

Adjutant’s office of the Chief of Staff

SA Liaison officer in the Reich Ministry of Justice.

Correspondence Record: None

[236]

Subject: Members of the SA as members of the People’s Court

Enclosures: [Handwritten] Proposal for supplementary appointments of the below-mentioned five nominees. W. 4 December.

To: The Reich Ministry of Justice, Section I, Special attention: Ministerial Counsellor Wanger, Berlin W, Wilhelmstrasse 65.

I understand that more honorary associate judges [ehrenamtliche Beisitzer] of the People’s Court are to be appointed. On behalf of the Chief of Staff [of SA] the following SA leaders are proposed:

• Obergruppenfuehrer Arthur Boeckenhauer, Munich, Barerstrasse 11
• Gruppenfuehrer von Hoerauf, Munich
• Brigadefuehrer Hanns Bunge, Munich
• Brigadefuehrer Daniel Hauer, Stuttgart, Herdweg 72
• Oberfuehrer Erich Kaul, Berlin, Wilhelmstrasse 106

I should be grateful if the above-named would be included among the nominees proposed to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

Chief of the adjutant’s office

By order:

[Signed] Klemm

Obersturmbannfuehrer

The President of the People’s Court

1440 E-1. 123g

[Stamp] 01/3

18 January 1944

[Stamp] Secret

To: the Reich Minister of Justice

Berlin W 8

2 Enclosures

[237]

[Stamp] Reich Ministry of Justice

18 January 1943

Dept. IV

[Initial] Th [Thierack]

My dear Reich Minister!

Attached please find two enclosures giving you a summary on the activity of the People’s Court from 1 January to 31 December 1943. The activity of the special senate is not contained therein as the documents were lost in the terror attack of 24 November 1943.

Heil Hitler!

Obediently yours

[Signed] Freisler

[Handwritten] taken out 1 copy [signed] Klemm

1440E-1. 116

SUMMARY ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT FROM 1 JANUARY UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 1943

[Handwritten] IV a 35. 44g

[238]

[Handwritten] To the Minister

3204-1. 65

The examination of the charges filed during the first quarter of 1944 shows the necessity of a change in the procedure. For the charges coming in after 1 April 1944, I distribute our work as follows:

A

The first senate will take up—

I. a. Attacks against the Fuehrer,

b. Attacks against leading men of the State, the movement [Nazi Party] or the armed forces,

c. Attacks against Germans in foreign countries, on grounds of their German nationality to thereby hit the Reich, or against representatives of the Reich, insofar as these attacks go beyond verbal attacks; in this category also belong all crimes against section 5 of the decree of 28 February 1933.[136]

II. a. Punishable acts of Germans of the intelligentsia or of the economic leadership,

b. Acts hostile to the State based on religious convictions from the Gauen: Baden, Bayreuth, Berlin, Danzig-West Prussia, Duesseldorf, Essen, Franconia, Carinthia, Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Main-Franconia, Moselland, Munich-Upper Bavaria, Lower Danube, Upper Danube, Upper Silesia, Salzburg, Swabia, Styria, Sudetenland, Tyrol-Vorarlberg, Wartheland, Westmark, Vienna, Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, and from the Government General, excepting both treason [Landesverrat] and Marxist high treason.

III. Punishable acts of Germans from Alsace, from Luxembourg, Lower Styria, or Upper Carinola and punishable offenses in these areas; punishable acts of Germans in Bohemia and Moravia.

IV. Marxist high treason from Berlin and the areas incorporated since the beginning of the war.

[stamp] The Minister is informed 20 April

V. Non-Marxist high treason, with the exception however of[239] separatist (often called legitimist) high treason, insofar as it concerns the Alps and Danube and Gauen or Bavaria.

VI. Defeatism, cases of undermining of morale and intentional evasion of military service (Art. 5, KSSVO) from the Gauen Berlin, Brandenburg, Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia, Mecklenburg, Sudetenland, Upper Silesia, and the Reich Gauen Danzig-West Prussia, and the Wartheland.

VII. Punishable offenses of foreigners [Fremdvoelkischer]—except high treason—from Bohemia, if these offenses were committed after the establishment of the protectorate.

VIII. Impeachment of non-German civilians for punishable offenses against the Reich or the occupying power in the occupied northern areas according to the special instructions for the area.

IX. Chiefly punishable acts committed abroad—with exception of high treason.

B

The second senate will take up—

I. All other cases of Marxist high treason within the borders of the Altreich [pre-1938 Reich].

II. Impeachment of non-German civilians for punishable offenses against the Reich or the occupying power in France and Belgium in accordance with the special directions pertaining thereto.

III. Acts hostile to the State based on religious convictions from the Gauen Halle-Merseburg, Hamburg, Hessen-Nassau, Kurhessen, Magdeburg-Anhalt, Mark Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Lower Silesia, East-Hannover, East Prussia, Pomerania, Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, South Hannover-Brunswick, Thuringia, Weser-Ems, Westphalia-North, Westphalia-South—with exception of high treason.

IV. Endangering of the armed forces of befriended states (sec. 5 of the decree of 25 November 1939).

C

The third senate will take up—

I. High treason in favor of the Soviet Union and Poland.

II. Defeatism, undermining of morale, and intentional evasion of military service (Art. 5, KSSVO) from the entire Reich, as far as these affairs are not dealt with by the first senate (A II and A VI) or the second senate (B III), excepting however the Gauen[240] Essen, Duesseldorf, Cologne-Aix-la-Chapelle, Moselland, Westphalia-North, Westphalia-South, and Saxony.

D

The fourth senate takes up—

I. High treason in favor of all countries of the world except the Soviet Union and Poland.

II. Damaging of means of defense.

III. Punishable offenses of Germans from Lorraine and punishable offenses in Lorraine.

IV. Punishable offenses of foreigners from Moravia, in case they were committed after the establishment of the protectorate, however not high treason in favor of the Soviet Union or Poland.

E

The fifth senate takes up—

I. Punishable crimes except high treason and defeatism, undermining of morale as well as evasion of military service, in the Reich Gauen Vienna, Upper and Lower Danube.

II. Separatist high treason involving the Reich Gauen Vienna, Upper and Lower Danube, Styria, Carinthia, Salzburg, and Tyrol-Vorarlberg.

F

The sixth senate takes up—

I. Punishable offenses except treason and defeatism, undermining of morale and evasion of military service in the Reich Gauen Styria and Carinthia, Salzburg, and Tyrol-Vorarlberg.

II. Separatist high treason involving Bavaria.

III. Accusations according to the law against sabotage of the economy of 1 December 1936.

IV. Accusations according to the decree of the Fuehrer for the protection of the armament economy from 21 March 1942.

V. Defeatism, undermining of morale, intentional evasion of military service (Art. 5, KSSVO) from the Gauen Essen, Duesseldorf, Cologne-Aix-la-Chapelle, Moselland, Westphalia-North, Westphalia-South, and Saxony, insofar as these cases are not taken care of by the first (A II and A VI) or the second senate (B III).

G

Impeachment for failing to report a crime to be dealt with by the senate, competent for the crime involved.

[241]

H

If a defendant is accused of high treason or treason against his country, the assignment is to be determined by the accusation of treason, if this is not irrelevant.

Favoring the enemy by treasonous activities, defeatism, undermining of morale, or evasion of military service does not bear any influence on the assignment.

Interrelated cases may be handled by one single senate in agreement with the other senates involved. Cases of nonagreement are to be submitted to me.

J

For charges, entered before 1 April 1944 the former plan of distribution of work applies, however, I wish to be notified by 1 June whether and which of these accusations are not yet settled.

Berlin, 1 April 1944

Dr. Freisler

[Handwritten] MIi Berlin, 18 October 1944 [Handwritten]T 276

Copy

The Reich Minister of Justice

To: The President of the People’s Court, Dr. Freisler

Berlin W 9

Bellevuestrasse 15

[Handwritten] 18 October Bz

Dear Mr. President:

The importance of the People’s Court for the maintenance of the home front has greatly increased and is bound to increase still further after carrying into effect of the Fuehrer’s decree of 20 September 1944. The functions of the People’s Court must, therefore, not be confined to meting out adequate punishment to the accused, they must moreover fulfill the specific task of political leadership.

This is inherent in the fact that the population not only recognizes the sentences of the People’s Court as right, but that, moreover,[242] it also learns why any particular sentence has become expedient.

The President of the senate is often hampered in conducting the proceedings, because in some particularly important political cases—including cases occurring frequently—the political evaluation of the offense is not always sufficiently shown up with a view to the prevailing situation of the people and of the Reich. If it is sufficient in nonpolitical criminal cases to show up the perpetrator, the deed and the effects of both on the national community and thus to find a just sentence, this is not sufficient for cases tried in the People’s Court. With due stress for the political aspect of the case it is necessary to discuss the conditions of the Reich and of the people. When conducting proceedings the president must be able to justify why this particular offense is especially dangerous for the population and the Reich and why it is especially grave. Everybody who is taking part in the proceedings must have the inner conviction when leaving the courtroom not only that the punishment was just but also why it was just. This also and quite particularly applies to the so-called cases of defeatism which from now on will be tried in an increased measure. Likewise, utterances must not be allowed to spring up which, for instance, say that proceedings before a certain senate mean certain death, or that the term “general public” is stretched too far in its legal definition. Whenever such utterances occur they can only be parried by a manner of conducting the proceedings which is superior, calm and—if need be—stone cold. In that case the people must always understand why in these crucial months of the war the instigator deserves death—but not so the gossip monger unless it happened not to be merely silly gossip but a gossip which became dangerous because it was unscrupulous.

The above applies in corresponding measure to all other cases tried before the People’s Court.

I, therefore, would like to ask you, Mr. President, to make a special endeavor especially that only such judges will preside in particularly important political cases, who master the material involved also along political lines and who warrant that they are able not only to pass just sentences but also by their manner of conducting the proceedings to convince those present of the correctness of the sentence. If any difficulties as to personnel should occur here, please let me have your oral report.

Heil Hitler!

Yours

Dr. Thierack

[243]

5. HEREDITARY HEALTH COURTS[137]

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 529

The Reich government has enacted the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Article 1

1. Whoever is afflicted with a hereditary disease can be sterilized by operation, if according to experience of medical science a hereditary impairment of his progeny, either physical or mental, is to be expected in all likelihood.

2. Whoever suffers from one of the following diseases is afflicted with a hereditary disease according to this law—

• (1) Hereditary imbecility.
• (2) Schizophrenia.
• (3) Circular (manic-depressive) psychosis.
• (4) Hereditary epilepsy.
• (5) Hereditary St. Vitus’ dance (Huntingtonian Chorea).
• (6) Hereditary blindness.
• (7) Hereditary deafness.
• (8) Bad hereditary physical malformation.

3. Any person suffering from chronic alcoholism can also be sterilized.

Article 2

1. The right to file such an application rests with the person to be sterilized. If he is incompetent or has been put under tutelage because of feeble mindedness or being under 18 years of age, this right rests with the legal representative and is subject to approval by the court of guardianship. In all other cases of limited competence, the consent of the legal representative is needed for the application. In case an adult person has been under guardianship, the guardian’s consent is mandatory.

2. A certificate of a physician, approved in Germany, has to be attached to this application, stating that the person to be sterilized has been familiarized with the meaning and the consequences of a sterilization.

[244]

3. The application can be rescinded.

Article 3

Sterilization can also be proposed by—

1. A public health officer.

2. The superintendent of a hospital, sanatorium, asylum, or of a penitentiary for its inmates.

Article 4

The application is to be made in writing and is to be submitted to the attention of a hereditary health court. The facts, upon which this application is based must be corroborated by a medical expert opinion or in some other way. The office [of the hereditary health court] must inform the public health office of this application.

Article 5

The hereditary health court of the district where the person to be sterilized resides has jurisdiction over the decision.

Article 6

1. The hereditary health court is to be affiliated with a local court. It is composed of a local court judge as president, a public health officer and another physician approved in the German Reich, with expert knowledge of matters pertaining to eugenics. A deputy is to be appointed for each member.

*******

Article 10

1. The higher hereditary health court is to be affiliated to a district court of appeal covering the same district. It consists of a member of the district court of appeal, a public health officer and another physician, approved in Germany, with expert knowledge of matters pertaining to eugenics. A deputy is to be appointed for each member. Article 6, paragraph 2 applies accordingly.

*******

3. The decisions of the higher hereditary health courts are final.

Article 11

1. The operation necessary for the sterilization is to be performed only in a hospital and by a physician approved in Germany. He can perform this operation only after the decree for[245] sterilization has become valid. The supreme provincial authority will appoint the hospitals and physicians authorized to perform the sterilization. The operation is not to be performed by the physician who made the application or who was a member of the board during the proceedings.

Article 12

1. Once approved by the court, this sterilization has to be performed even against the will of the person to be sterilized, unless he made the application himself. The public health officer has to arrange the necessary measures with the police. Direct force may be used if other measures do not suffice.

2. If circumstances demand a re-examination of the facts, the hereditary health court has to reopen the case and to suspend the sterilization order temporarily. In case of a rejection of the application a reopening of the case is permissible only if new facts have appeared which justify the sterilization.

*******

Berlin, 14 July 1933

The Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

EXTRACTS FROM DECREE OF 5 DECEMBER 1933 FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE LAW FOR THE PREVENTION OF PROGENY WITH HEREDITARY DISEASES

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1021

*******

Section 1

(Concerning article 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the basic law)[138]

A condition for sterilization is that the disease, although only temporarily manifested from a latent tendency, has been established beyond any doubt by a doctor approved by the German Reich.

[246]

*******

Section 3

(Concerning Articles 3 and 4)

*******

If an approved doctor in the course of his official activity learns of a person suffering from a hereditary disease (art. 1, pars. 1 and 2) or from chronic alcoholism, he must report this without delay to the competent district public health officer using the form printed as supplement 3 (p. 1024). Other persons who are concerned with the treatment, examination, or advising of sick persons, have the same obligation. In the case of inmates of institutions, it is the head of the institution who has the duty to report the case.

*******

Berlin, 5 December 1933

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

THIRD DECREE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW FOR THE PREVENTION OF PROGENY WITH HEREDITARY DISEASES, 25 FEBRUARY 1935

1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 289

*******

Article 4

Authorized persons and counsel can be barred from appearance before the hereditary health courts and higher hereditary health courts for important reasons; this decision is uncontestable.

*******

Article 12

1. The Reich Minister of Justice determines the location and the district of the court which is to render the decision, and the number of court chambers to be established. He may transfer the exercise of this authority to the presidents of the district courts of appeal.

[247]

2. The hereditary health courts are to be regarded as parts of the local courts, and higher hereditary health courts are to be regarded as parts of the district courts of appeal, with respect to administration and official supervision.

3. The president of the district court of appeal determines the number of medical members and deputies of the hereditary health courts, as needed.

*******

Berlin, 25 February 1935

The Reich Minister of the Interior

The deputy: Pfundtner

The Reich Minister of Justice

The deputy: Dr. Schlegelberger

The Reich Minister of Labor

The deputy: Dr. Krohn

The Reich Minister of Justice

No. 6234-IV. b 472

To: All Presidents of the Courts of Appeal

Subject: Courses for judges dealing with hereditary disease cases

It is intended that during the second half of the month of June courses will be held in Berlin and Munich to train presiding judges of the courts and courts of appeal dealing with cases of hereditary diseases in matters of the marriage health law. The course in Berlin will probably take place between 15 and 17 June and the course in Munich between 22 and 24 June. In order to save expenses, only the presiding judges of the courts and courts of appeal dealing with cases of hereditary disease will be admitted to these courses, but not their deputies. The course in Berlin is intended for the judges of the district courts of appeal of Berlin, Brunswick, Breslau, Celle, Dresden, Duesseldorf, Hamburg, Hamm, Jena, Kassel, Kiel, Koenigsberg Pr., Marienwerder, Naumburga.[248] S., Oldenburg, Rostock, and Stettin. The course in Munich is intended for the judges of the courts of appeal in Bamberg, Darmstadt, Frankfurt/Main, Karlsruhe, Munich, Nuernberg, Stuttgart, and Zweibruecken. The nonresident participants will have their traveling expenses refunded in accordance with paragraph II of the traveling expenses law. The expenses will be paid by the director of the office to which the official belongs. The amounts paid are to be recorded under chapter 4, title 25 of the budget. Please inform me of the names of the participating judges by 31 May 1936.

An opportunity for a discussion will probably be given on the last day of each course. During the course of these discussions questions may be raised concerning the marriage health law and the law on prevention of progeny with hereditary disease. In consequence of the large number of participants it is however necessary that each judge who wishes to discuss a question will submit it in triplicate directly to us (Berlin W. 9, Vosstrasse 5, Office b) not later than 31 May 1936. If several questions are submitted a separate sheet is to be used for each question. In the case of medical questions a summarized statement of the case is to be attached, if possible; in other cases it is also advisable to state briefly which particular case led to the question. The name, official position, and the court of the judges should be marked at the top of the page on the left hand side.

Enclosed are copies for the presidents of the district courts and for the presiding judges of the main hereditary health courts.

Deputy

Certified [Signed] Dr. Volkmar

[Signature illegible]

Clerk

[Stamp: Reich Ministry of Justice]

[initials] Kle [Klemm]

Internal Regulation

Reference: The consideration of racial, hereditary, and criminological-biological [kriminalbiologische] viewpoints in educational questions

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With regard to the necessity of putting more emphasis on the racial, hereditary, and criminological-biological viewpoints in connection with educational questions within the meaning of my internal regulation of 12 June 1943—1200 E—Ip 2 340—Oberlandesgerichtsrat Meinhof, without prejudice to his sphere of office in department VI, is also assigned to department II as Referent.

The range of his duties comprises—

The training of judges, public prosecutors, jurists, and other officials, as well as of the entire new generation in a racial, hereditary, and criminological-biological line of thought.

Berlin, 17 December 1943

Dr. Thierack

1200 E—Ip 2 383

[Handwritten] Adjutant Klemm

1944 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 330

Seventh decree concerning the execution of the law for the prevention of progeny with hereditary diseases

On the basis of Article 17 of the law for the prevention of progeny with hereditary diseases of 14 July 1938 (Reich Law Gazette I p. 529) in combination with the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the total war effort of 25 July 1944 (Reich Law Gazette I p. 161) it is decreed in agreement with the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery, the chief of the Party Chancellery and the Plenipotentiary General for the administration of the Reich:

Article 1

(1) The higher hereditary health courts discontinue their activity temporarily—for the duration of the suspension the definite decision is with the hereditary health courts.

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(2) A trial pending in the higher hereditary health courts ends with the coming into effect of this decree. With the termination the contested decision becomes legal. The hereditary health court investigates officially, whether a resumption of the proceedings according to article 12, paragraph 2, of the law for prohibiting carriers of inherited diseases to reproduce is ruled in consideration of the terminated proceedings.

(3) Paragraphs 1 and 2 are not valid for cases in which the higher hereditary health court has already passed a resolution at the time when this decree came into effect and has merely not yet delivered it.

Article 2

This decree goes into effect on 1 December 1944.

Berlin, 14 November 1944.

The Reich Minister of the Interior

As deputy: Dr. L. Conti

The Reich Minister for Justice

As deputy: Klemm

6. CIVILIAN COURTS MARTIAL

DECREE OF 15 FEBRUARY 1945 ON CIVILIAN COURTS MARTIAL PROCEDURE

1945 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 30

The seriousness of the fight for existence of the Reich demands of every German determination to fight to the last, and devotion to the utmost. Whoever tries to withdraw from his duties towards the common cause, especially if it is done through cowardice or for personal profit, must at once be called to account with the necessary severity, so that the State will not suffer damage through the failing of one single person. Therefore, the following has been decreed upon the order of the Fuehrer in agreement with the Reich Minister and chief of the Reich Chancellery, the Reich Minister of the Interior and the chief of the Party Chancellery:

I

Courts martial are to be established in Reich defense districts which are menaced by the approach of the enemy.

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II

1. The court martial consists of a judge of a criminal court as president and a member of the Leadership Corps [of the Nazi Party], or a leader of a unit affiliated with the National Socialist Party, and of an officer of the armed forces, the Waffen SS [armed SS] or the police, as associate judges.

2. The Reich defense commissioner appoints the members of the tribunal and designates a state attorney as public prosecutor.

III

1. The courts martial have jurisdiction for all kinds of crimes endangering the German fighting power or undermining the people’s fighting strength and will to fight.

2. For these proceedings, the regulations of the code of criminal procedure will be applied.

IV

1. The sentence of the court martial will be either death, acquittal, or commitment to the regular court. The consent of the Reich defense commissioner is required. He gives orders for the time, place, and kind of execution.

2. If the Reich defense commissioner is not available, but the immediate execution is indispensable, the public prosecutor is authorized to act in his place.

V

The necessary regulations for amendment, changes and execution of this decree are issued by the Reich Minister of Justice in agreement with the Reich Minister of the Interior and the chief of the Party Chancellery.

VI

This decree goes into effect immediately upon its promulgation over the radio.

Berlin, 16 February 1945

The Reich Minister of Justice

Thierack

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D. Expert Opinion by Defense Witness Professor Jahrreiss concerning the Development of German Law

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS PROFESSOR JAHRREISS[140]

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Dr. Schilf (counsel for defendants Klemm and Mettgenberg): Professor Jahrreiss, may I ask you to tell us your name, your profession, and your residence.

Witness Jahrreiss: Professor at Cologne University; at present on the staff of editors of the record of IMT. Do you also wish me to name my residence, Counsel?

Q. Yes.

A. At this time, in Nuernberg. I was born at Dresden; the date of birth is 19 August 1894.

Q. So that I can afford the Court the opportunity to acquaint itself with your particular research field, may I ask you briefly to describe to us your field of research as professor of law.

A. My work since 1923 has dealt with the fields of constitutional law, international law, and the law by the League of Nations, general constitutional law, and philosophy of law.

Q. May I ask you, just by way of example, to mention your own publications—those of a scientific nature.

A. Well, that is rather a lot; but publications which concern this subject here, I could mention—Law and Calculability, on the foundations of law and state; another publication on The Relation of the Constitution of the Reich to the League of Nations; then in the textbook which Anschuetz and Thoma edited on German Constitutional Law, my work about The Equality of the Citizens before the Law; and above all, my own version of The German Constitutional System, of the year 1930.

Q. Concerning the first problem, the German constitutional law, that is the subject on which I wish to start. My first question will open the direct examination. Is it correct that Hitler in the order of the so-called Third Reich was the supreme law giver?

A. Yes, that is correct, although that was not so from the very beginning of that era. That only happened in the course of events. But at the latest, if you’d like me to mention a date, that occurred[253] when the offices of Chancellor and Reich President were united in him; that is to say, 1 August 1934.[141] That is the latest date.

Q. It was like this then—Hitler’s authority developed gradually until it reached its final culmination?

A. Yes, that is correct. If I may add this, one must say that the development under Hitler followed a development which occurred prior to his own era.

Q. Do you mean to say by that, that 30 January 1933 did not bring about a complete break of the development prior to Hitler?

A. Yes, that is what I would say.

Q. Do you also mean to say by this that the so-called change-over, that is the seizure of power by the National Socialist Party, was legal?

A. That is a very difficult question. First of all it is difficult because one would have to say in greater detail what events represented the change-over, whether one adheres to the formation of the government on 30 January 1933, or whether one discusses the enabling act, promulgated on 24 March 1933,[142] or how far altogether one wants to extend the events of the change-over. I can only answer conditionally. If one considers only the formation of the government, that is to say the act of entrusting Hitler with the Chancellorship on 30 January 1933, and if by “legal”, one means the purely outward formality, then it cannot be denied that the operation was carried out legally, namely, under Article 53 of the Weimar constitution,[143] according to which the Reich President forms the cabinet, and the Parliament—the Reichstag—only afterwards has the opportunity to have a destructive influence on the formation of the cabinet. Under the Weimar constitution, the Reichstag does not form the cabinet alone or together with another organ, but the President does that. The other organ is immediately elected by the people of the Reich. That is why the Weimar constitution contains quite rightly article 54[144] which incorporates the parliamentary system by establishing the institution of the vote of nonconfidence and entrusts the President with[254] the formation of the cabinet. Yes, in fact one has to say a little more. In the formation of the government, the appointment of the Reich Chancellor is the sole act of the President; side by side with, let us say, the dismissal, with which the countersignature of the Chancellor is purely formal.

In the development of the Weimar constitution, after initial wavering, there evolved the principle that the new Chancellor appointed or signed the dismissal of the old Chancellor and his own appointment, which is really illogical. I don’t think there is any need for me to explain that any further. But as the Weimar constitution in Article 50[145] provided that every provision made by the president should be countersigned by the Reich Chancellor, or one of the Reich ministers—at least one—one was compelled to have even the appointment of the new Chancellor countersigned. That means naturally for the new Chancellor that he drags himself out of the mire by his own efforts. Counsel, if your question refers to 30 January—formally the procedure was orderly; a great deal more difficult is the question concerning the Reich law of 24 March 1933, that famous law [the Enabling Act], the validity of which was doubted so much; it is much more difficult to answer if your question refers to that. That law has as its main contents—I can almost say with a little exaggeration—the elimination of the division of powers. Three provisions or groups of provisions of the Weimar constitution are excepted, but for the rest the government could now promulgate laws even if that meant changing the constitution of the Reich; for the normal life of the people, legislators, and supreme administrators are one and the same thing. That is a basic change of the entire structure of the Weimar constitution. And I can say frankly if I, during the first years of the Weimar constitution, as an expert on constitutional law, had been asked whether the Reichstag, even if there was a majority, could not change the constitution under article 76[146]—if the Reichstag would make such decisions, could pass a law which, in effect, eliminates the Reichstag,—if I had been asked such a question I would have said there is nothing about that in article 76 that restricts the passing of such laws; but[255] there is not only legality, there is also legitimacy in every constitution; there are certain basic decisions contained in any constitution which one cannot abandon without the entire losing of his character. But I must say the German science of constitutional law, particularly in the person of the most fanatic champions of democracy, did not take that point of view. Gerhard Anschuetz, who if it is permitted to say anything like that about a republic, was the crown jurist of the Weimar republic, wrote the commentary to the constitution of the German Reich which is the authoritative commentary. Gerhard Anschuetz whose last position was that of professor at Heidelberg, was, I might say, a temple guard of the Weimar constitution, and if he only thought an attempt had been made to shake the foundations of democracy, perhaps by creating a group of judges who could have reviewed decisions by the Reichstag, he would have been furious. I must say that because only now it becomes understandable what authority Anschuetz’ opinion carried, which was concurred in by all German constitutional lawyers, that there were no limits for article 76, concerning the amendment of the constitution. Anschuetz stated repeatedly that the Reichstag, with the majority that can amend the constitution, could abolish the republic, the federal state, democracy, even basic laws. No judge was entitled to doubt the constitutional validity of such a law. If previously I said that concerning that law of 24 March, one might have legal misgivings, I had something different in mind. I believe if I had been the President of the Reich, and if I had had the knowledge of the events, I would have refused to issue that law and to promulgate it, for it is the Reich President who has to examine whether the law has come about in a constitutional manner. I am convinced, however, that on no account procedures can be constitutional when the majority present, that is, the majority which passes the resolution, did not constitute the majority of the Reichstag as elected [by the people] but constituted the majority of a Reichstag that had been curtailed by the executive. Much has been said about that, and there is something else that enters into that question, and I have to say that quite openly that has not been discussed before. At that session at which the Reichstag passed that law which changed the constitution, the Reich Chancellor felt that the Reichstag might make difficulties, and he threatened with revolutionary forces; but even that doesn’t help and, particularly, it doesn’t help according to Anschuetz. Anschuetz and [other] German experts on constitutional law consistently upheld the view that the assurance of the Reich President, given by his signature, that the law had been passed in an orderly manner excluded all scrutiny. Therefore, we have to say, under objective law there[256] may be misgivings, serious misgivings about that procedure, but according to what at the time was the guaranteed practice of constitutional law which was upheld by the opinion of the most fanatic upholders of the Weimar constitution, the signature by the Reich President excluded any scrutiny as to whether the law came about in an orderly manner. I believe that I have now indicated that the question for the so-called legality of the change-over, even purely formal, is very difficult to answer, but for the rest it seems to me that this is only an argument about words; [actually, it was] a revolution, and it was meant to be a revolution. Hitler even thought it was the only real revolution. And according to its aim and meaning it [i.e., a revolution] cannot be legal; but in any case, if it comes off—that is how it always will be in the world of states—it provides the soil on which the new order, slowly or more quickly, evolves, according to custom, and custom after all is the source of all law.

Q. Professor, we are particularly interested to explain to the Tribunal the constitutional status of the so-called Hitler decrees. May I ask you, now that you have answered the question of legality on the one hand and theories of legitimacy on the other hand, would you now, from the developments, explain the constitutional status of the Hitler decrees within the meaning of my first question as to whether he was supreme legislator of the Reich.

A. I am afraid I shall have to go back a bit for that because that question really concerns the entire question of the so-called constitution of the Third Reich. Even for many a German, Hitler’s authority is a mystery, but it must be that for all those who are not Germans. Many misunderstandings which I encounter again and again in conversations are due to the fact that certain unavoidable factors which are involved in any ruling, are ascribed to Hitler’s regime. A further difficulty consists in the fact that the peculiar constitutional insecurity in which most of the states in Europe have lived for many years, from the point of view of their constitution, produces phenomena which do not restrict themselves to Hitler’s regime, but only appeared there particularly clearly. But above all—because otherwise I cannot provide you with the background—I should like to explain that a little further to the Tribunal—above all, there is considerable ignorance about certain peculiarities of the German situation, in particular concerning the constitution. I believe I may say without encountering any contradiction that in this courtroom jurists are fighting for clarity among themselves which belonged to various schools of legal thought. Above all, there is between the European continental states and their constitutional and legal thought on the one hand and the Anglo-Saxon legal thought, as far as I understand[257] it, a great difference which cannot be overestimated. On the continent of Europe, in the course of four centuries, a development has taken place by which law and morality in legislative thought are separated sharply; and so as the question of morality arises, the lawyer on the continent of Europe says as a lawyer, “That has nothing to do with me. That may be regrettable, and I myself do think it is regrettable, but after all, that is the historical reality.” How far that development goes, I can show to the Tribunal by giving an example which perhaps is the most important, and again that concerns the opinion of Gerhard Anschuetz concerning article 102 of the constitution[147] as to whether the courts in Germany concerning the validity of the law passed by the Reichstag are entitled to doubt it for ethical reasons. I quote—this is in the commentary of the 14th edition, page 476—“If it cannot even be conceded that the judge is entitled to examine the law as for its being constitutional or not, so it can be conceded even less that he may refuse obedience to a law which was passed constitutionally because according to his opinion concerning certain standards which again according to his opinion are above the legislator, that is to say, morality, ethics, natural law, they contradict these points or because they cannot stand up to certain evaluations.”

I had to read this out verbatim. Therefore, it was rather difficult for the interpreter because of the position of the verbs.

The reason for that situation in Germany, which is a situation that applies to the whole of Europe, is this—and I now have to broach a subject, the effect of which did not affect England or the United States. The state of the European continent came into existence from the fragments of the Corpus Christianum of western Europe. The break of the medieval realm is the soil on which the modern sovereign states grew. These states starting with Italy believe ever more strongly in the idea that they are sufficient to themselves, that they can live by their own efforts, that they are under no obligation to the past or to the future. The state becomes a purpose to itself. That has been emphasized again and again, and that development goes on from Macchiavelli, the great Florentine; Jean Bodin, the great Frenchman; and as far as Hegel, the great German. As a result, ethical evaluations may be made by the legislator, parliament, or the monarch, but the resolution passed by the monarch or parliament deprives those who are governed by these laws of all right of objection.

May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to one event that occurred under the Weimar constitution. During the first years of the republic it became known among the public that Berlin was thinking of forbidding any revalorization [or revaluation—[258] Aufwertung] by law.[148] The judges of the Reich Supreme Court of Leipzig at that time formed their own association, and that association of judges, in view of that rumor, held a meeting and passed a resolution to the effect that if such a law were to be promulgated, they would refuse to apply it. That happened in 1924, and it was emphasized that such a law would run counter to morality. There was a storm of indignation among the Reich government. The Reich Minister of Justice protested using very sharp expressions, and the Reich Supreme Court did not carry out its threats. However, in 1927 the Reich Supreme Court in a decision published in volume 118 declared—“The legislator in the autocracy is not bound to any other restrictions but those which he draws for himself from the constitution or from other laws.”

Now, I ask to be permitted to speak about a second point which concerns only Germany, at least to that extent. It is easy to forget that the German people for 33 years have never had really normal conditions. If one looks at that from the human point of view, it means that about 50 age-groups of German people—that is more than two-thirds—50 age-groups of people have never seen normal conditions; that is, all the people who were born after 1914, and those who, before 1914, did not have any conscious experiences. For all these people, life—and that was the normal thing for them—was a continuous change from open to latent crisis. One was always exposed to danger and always with a longing for stable conditions. The consequence is that for most Germans, order, which deserves that name, is something hard to imagine. To the German people order has become to mean something transitory, something unstable, something upon which one cannot depend, and doubtless it did not contribute to the stabilization of legal thought that, beginning with the time of the Weimar republic the machinery of legislation was running incredibly fast. I would, indeed, desire for the judges [of this Court] to see the maze of decrees and laws published and showered upon the German people since 1919. Most of those were laws or paragraphs of short existence. We had real inflation of legislation, as far as I know, in history without example at any other period. And that was not only so during the Weimar era, it became worse indeed during the period of the Third Reich. Before Hitler came [to power] he turned with strong criticism against that positive manufacturing of laws. In his opinion, only the “sound sentiment of the people”[259] should find its inclination in laws. But when he was in power, the machinery, if this was possible, then was in even higher gear.

I believe that I do not have to credit it to my own inefficiency but I have to believe that no German jurist can say anything else of himself, but, none of us were in a position to know all the headlines of all the laws and decrees that have been passed. With things as they were, one has to understand that a large portion of the German nation, many jurists among them, became tired and apathetic toward authority, and skeptical. And on the other hand it could not be avoided that many impulsive individuals revolted, wanted to take action, wanted to do something about it, wanted to come to a decision, to a clarification, to a simplification, to find a way to see through all that.

In our era—at least one can say that for Europe—the political disease of fanaticism and doctrinism has broken out; tolerance became more and more rare; each single technical question was tainted with the question of religious allegiance. Under these circumstances, one can easily obtain a picture of the chaotic condition of legal thinking; small wonder that a state, to see to it that laws once decreed have to be carried out by the authorities, demanded particular emphasis because otherwise not even the minimum of order could be guaranteed which was at most possible. Particularly because the entire situation, the entire atmosphere was so unstable. The essence that “an order is an order” had to become the last refuge of those actually in power.

And now, a last part of it. Inflicted against this background of all that we find in the constitution which, on paper, perhaps structurally is the most sympathetic, the most logical democratic constitution of the world, with a tremendous, carefully thought-out system of checks and balances, safety valves in order to assure that the individual citizen would be the one to have its full advantage. But that constitution was worked through elaborately, and I say openly, that my determination to study constitutional law was in part based on that constitution which enthused me as a young man; this constitution, at the same time, was very complicated in its structure, its structural power and in legislative procedure.

With the permission of the Tribunal I shall try to explain that life itself demanded to have these matters simplified—rather less artistry but more efficacy. With that I believe, in all brevity, to have said something of that which is absolutely necessary to know if one wants to understand the essence of the Weimar constitution and its development which, long before Hitler, had led to a situation which does not permit to recognize any longer the situation of 1919.

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In German we call a law which was brought about by the legislative authority, a law in the formal sense. And the basic thought for all, which is to be found in all European constitutions, is this. If the government wants to, let us say, increase taxation, then that means it wants some acts of legislation which authorize the authorities, or the various agencies, to interfere with property. The government, therefore, wants a law in the material sense; therefore it must have a law in the procedural sense or in the formal sense, through legislation. That is what we call the principle of the necessity of the law, the fact that a law is required. Where this is brought about, we have a division of power. And if it were brought about—and it has never actually been carried out—then this is the way it would have to come about. The legislative body then would have to make all substantive laws, but it would do nothing but just that.

Both these cases do not apply. Parliaments, time and again, are given the privilege or the right to come to resolutions or decisions which have different content, for example, decisions on budget. These decisions on budget are not acts of legislation in the sense of setting standards. In German constitutional law it is definitely prohibited to include into the budgets acts of legislation or standards in that sense. The Parliament has a part in the forming of the cabinet. That is one thing. The other—and this is what we need—is the following. It may happen that the government is authorized to enact legislation by virtue of the constitution itself, or by virtue of later laws passed by the parliament. In German one calls these acts of rule making [Akte der Normsetzung] of the government, that is of the executive—which have a legal maxim as content—legal decrees [Rechtsverordnungen]. “Legal” on account of their content, and “decrees” on account of the method.

This institution, which we find in every European state, was the starting-point for the further development and the paving of the way of the orders by Hitler, because in the Weimar constitution there is a law for the government to decree laws, the utilization, or I should say the exploitation of, which led to the fact that since the middle of 1930 the normal legislative body in Germany was really the government. That is the famous provision of article 48, paragraph 2. As a rule, legal decrees on the basis of this article are called dictatorial decrees, but also apart from that during the Weimar era, much authority was received for the government to issue decrees. In countless laws the Reichstag empowered the government, in order to carry out a law, or in some cases in order to amend a law or repeal a law, to issue legal decrees.

However, not only in the Reich do we find this institution or this instrument of legal decrees, but also in the German states,[261] the German Laender. In the constitution one always finds a [provision concerning the] right to issue emergency decrees (Notverordnungsrecht) and the legislatures of the various states frequently authorize the [state] government to issue decrees in regard to substantive law.

A law of the Reichstag of 13 October 1923, which is called Enabling Law, “Ermaechtigungsgesetz”, signed by Reich President Ebert, conferred upon the Reich government the power, among other things, to issue decrees in regard to substantive law, even deviating from the legal principles of the constitution of the Reich. This law is particularly important. It was published in the first years of the Weimar constitution under Reich President Ebert, and it cleared the way for a development which the founders of this law to this day probably regret deeply.

May I refer the Tribunal to the following:

Several months ago, in Munich, a book was published, “The History of the Weimar Constitution.” The author is Professor Willibalt Apelt, now at the University of Munich. We used to be together at the University of Leipzig, and I also had the honor to lecture for him in addition to my lectures when he became the Minister of Interior in Saxony; that is, the Police Minister.

He was one of the most outspoken democrats we had in Germany. This book throughout is a [settling of an] account [Abrechung] with Hitler. It altogether lauds the Weimar constitution, and therefore it is particularly important to note that Apelt considers this law the beginning of all the evil in this development and states explicitly that this law cleared the way to that other enabling law of 24 March 1933. * * * The date of the law is 13 October 1923. It appeared in the Reichsgesetzblatt of 1923, volume I on page 943. Since the middle of 1930 one did no more work with enabling law decrees, but one used article 48, paragraph 2. Earlier already that had been applied. If I am informed correctly under Ebert alone, 136 decrees of that kind were passed, that is to say, until 1925 when Hindenburg became President. At first a little less use was made of this means. It was reactivated again when the economic crisis of 1929 was nearing Europe. Conditions in Germany deteriorated from week to week, and under Bruening whole bundles of emergency decrees, of dictatorial decrees, were passed. In 1932 we had progressed so far in that direction that the Reichstag was practically excluded as a legislative body, and the Reich President, together with the Reich government (the Reich cabinet because according to article 50 they had to work together) was really the normal source of legislation. From then on until Hitler’s acts of legislation it is indeed only a short step, and if Hitler himself would not have set out to[262] give the whole matter a triumphant dictatorial aspect, if he had been satisfied with an enabling act like that of 1923, if he had not had laws enacted by the government but decrees, the entire enabling act would not have caused so much rumpus as it did.

Q. Professor, may I ask you to explain briefly to the Tribunal who Reich President Ebert was, because we have to assume that the name alone does not give a plain indication. * * *

A. We had two Reich Presidents. The first, Friedrich Ebert, who came from the social democratic party of Germany, not elected by the people but by the national assembly, and then the second, von Hindenburg, who was elected by the people.

Q. And my second and other request is that you quote to the Tribunal article 48, paragraph 2 of the Weimar constitution.

A. Article 48, paragraph 2. Concerning the so-called dictatorial powers of the president—and with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall formulate these sentences linguistically in a way which make them easily translatable—“The Reich President may take those measures which are necessary to reestablish public security and order if, in the area of the German Reich, public security and order are considerably disturbed or endangered. If required, he may also intervene with the aid of the armed forces. For that purpose he is authorized temporarily to invalidate in whole or in part the basic laws which are laid down in the articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 153.”[149] May I add, these seven basic laws are the so-called “liberal principles,” [basic liberties], the same which we find, for instance, in the Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights.

Q. Professor, we are now concerned with an attempt to explain the Hitler decree to the Tribunal. After all we have heard from you now, the development which has led to it that the government governed by decrees rather than by legislation, that development started already as early as 1923, and according to the information we have from you was again stipulated in 1930 at the time of a different government. I think it will be necessary to explain to the Tribunal that this development led up to the Hitler decree; went through various stages of development, and I may ask you still to describe this to us, because in the course of this case it has become necessary that this development be shown asclearly as possible.

[263]

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The cabinet assumed responsibility [for all orders and directives issued by the Reich President] to the Reichstag by countersigning them, and the Reichstag could react rather disagreeably; the cabinet, if the Reich President and the Reichstag were of different opinions, was forced to make a decision. If the cabinet took the opinion of the Reichstag, then the Reich President either had to give in or change the cabinet; if the cabinet went along with the President, then nothing else was left than to risk the vote of lack of confidence; an essential vote of the Reichstag could lead, therefore, to a struggle of that kind, and in German practice the cabinet which went with the president against the Reichstag was called a “fighting government” [Kampfregierung]; not the other way around. In the long run it showed that the Reich President, when the Chancellor went with him, was stronger than the Reichstag. That also I may be permitted to describe briefly. If the Reichstag did not agree with the president, was not satisfied with the president’s decisions, it could not, properly speaking, do anything. Even though the constitution in article 43[150] reserved to the Reichstag the right to ask the people of the Reich that they demand the resignation or the dismissal of the president. That, in practice, never occurred, and for a very simple reason. If the Reichstag would have come to a decision of that kind, and the people would not have gone along, then that president would have been automatically reelected for another 7 years, and also, the Reichstag would have been dissolved, and that would mean suicide [for the Reichstag]. However, the president is in a much better position; if he is in agreement with the Chancellor, he can dissolve the Reichstag himself. That is where the famous red folder comes in.[151] If, therefore, the president and the cabinet are in agreement, and there is a threat of censure on the part of the Reichstag, then the president can turn over to the Reich Chancellor the order for dissolution [of the Reichstag]. The Reich Chancellor is present in the session, and when it comes to the last, he just shows that red folder and that settles the entire matter. Now, the Tribunal will certainly understand why in discussing article 48, paragraph[264] 2, I did not even read paragraph 3,[152] because there it is expressed that the Reich President has to notify the Reichstag of every dictatorial measure and if the Reichstag wants it withdrawn, and the demands are made of the president, the president has to repeal his measures. If he and the cabinet do not wish to do that, they have the possibility of dissolving the Reichstag, and that brings me back to what I pointed out before. Maybe one cannot understand why the Reichstag permitted itself to be dispossessed, as far as legislation is concerned. It would have had to be made entirely different to be in a position to oppose due to the fact that the major change could not depend upon them. The Reichstag in every demand of repeal risked its own life.

*******

Perhaps at this moment I can jump ahead into the Hitler era. When the Hitler government had received the right to pass laws it no longer needed the Reichstag. If one wanted to use the Reichstag at all as a legislative body, one did so to save face. But, now the government did no longer make any suggestions as was, in former times, the normal procedure. The government was the legislator itself. But that way was chosen; a way, which during the Weimar era played no part.

Under Hitler the Reichstag since November 1933, consisted only of one faction. That is just as senseless as one party. This faction introduced a bill with the name of Adolf Hitler and three others. Frick, the faction chairman accomplished this, Goering acted surprised, being the president, and then, the whole game went on as you know it. That abnormal way, therefore, was chosen in order to stage the play. Now I go back to the Weimar era. As to whether the bill was introduced this way or that way, for the Reichstag, that was only raw material. It could say, “We will not do anything.” It could say, “We will pass it.” It could say, “We will change it.” If a bill is passed, it means that the bill is accepted or amended; then the Reich President received the law which was had been passed by the Reichstag for his signature. Signing a law, that meant as to whether the law was passed in the proper way, and as to whether the text which had been submitted to the president was actually the text which was passed under the law by the Reichstag. (It did, in effect, happen that other documents were submitted to him than those passed by the Reichstag, of course, by mistake. Next, the Reichsgesetzblatt had to publish it with a special wrapper in the changed form.) And when that happened,[265] then, the president gave the order for promulgation. In Germany we usually call it promulgation, too. So far so good.

So much so good. But, now, it could happen that the Reich council or the Reich President with the consent of the government or the government with the consent of the president or some of the members of the Reichstag, itself, were dissatisfied with the law, and, in that case, the constitution provided that those unsatisfied persons or bodies could appeal to the people. That is very complicated, Your Honors, and I do not think that we need it for our purpose here. You will find it written down but I don’t think I need to elaborate on it here.

If such an appeal would have been made to the nation—it never happened, it got stuck in the beginning—then that had to be fought out at the time between signature and promulgation. But the constitution had provided for a special procedure, an act of absolute democracy became possible—the people of the Reich, that is to say, at least one-tenth of the whole electorate,—at that time, that was at least four million voters—could join together and demand that a bill which had to be drafted up to the very last [detail], was to be submitted by the Reichstag, and, in that case, the Reichstag was not as free toward the draft as in the other case. But it was under pressure of an ultimatum. It was only left with the choice either to accept it as it was or the government had to ask the nation. That was attempted a few times but it was never carried out properly.

I should assume that those remarks were sufficient to show to the Tribunal that on the one hand the Weimar constitution was very democratic, with the intent to protect the people and its rights; but that on the other hand the constitution was so complicated in the structure of the bodies and in the legislative procedure, that one need not wonder if an ever stronger movement urged for simplification. Furthermore, the constitution in itself had something unclarified, something provisional and that in severe respects and that always happens if a dualism is created; for every dualism of power endeavors at its own dissolution. * * * We had, furthermore, the small dualism between Reich President and Reich Chancellor; and, I haven’t mentioned that yet, there was the old grave German problem of dualism between Reich and Laender; all these various problems of dualism were urging for dissolution and they were in process of dissolution prior to Hitler. Hitler then completed that development. May I explain that in a few remarks?

First of all, the dualism between Reichstag and Reich President was abolished. The Reich President is the victor. Under Hindenburg the formation of the cabinet more and more came under[266] the power of the Reich President and that of the Reichstag decreased. The end of this development was 30 January 1933. The Reichstag was no longer asked to do any work. Purely formally, under article 53, the president appoints the new government. Article 54 was no longer considered a serious threat. The parliamentary system is dead and we have the first demoting of the Reichstag. The second had already started in the meantime, as I have shown. The Reichstag had already resigned more and more as a legislative body; it is only the culmination of the development, what we see in the law of 24 March 1933 [Enabling Act] and the aftermath, the new reconstruction law [Neuaufbaugesetz] of 30 September 1934; the division of powers is dead. The Reichstag in its original and foremost function has been dethroned. What was its purpose now? In July 1933, political parties were definitely prohibited. A genuine parliament was no longer possible. The first Reichstag elected after this July law, in November 1933, was the Reichstag of one faction only elected by voters of one party only. It has been said that it was purely an assembly of acclamation. The great dualism in the Reich ended thereby and on the grave of the Reichstag there are three crosses. The small dualism between Reich President and Reich Chancellor ended with the death of Hindenburg and is expressed in the law of 1 August 1934, concerning the head of State [Staatsoberhaupt-Gesetz]. The greatest and most serious dualism between Reich and Laender in effect was eliminated before that. Usually one says in the German constitutional science that only the reorganization law of 30 January 1934 had turned the Laender into Reich provinces but that is certainly not correct. Looking at the facts themselves, that step was already taken by the Reich governor law [Reichsstatthaltergesetz] of 7 April 1933. When one summarizes all that and looks at those results together, the final phase is this—the entire power of the State in the German Reich is combined in the hand of that one man who quite arbitrarily can use that power to decide individual cases or to set new norms. It depends only on him, from the practical point of view of power, as to how long he refrained from interfering in the field of judiciary. * * *

Q. Professor, that was the question about the development up to the point when this one man, Hitler, held everything in his hand. I would say the result of historical development. We are interested in explaining to the Tribunal, if I may say so, the dogmatical position of the Hitler decree as a legislator. Therefore, my question concerning your statements up to now concerned the development of constitutional law up to that historical point. But now, the Hitler decree and the act of lawmaking became actually[267] one and the same. What was the effect of that on the legislative, on the executive, and on all forms of the state life after that time?

A. Perhaps I may begin with the procedure of the Hitler decrees, that is to say, with the exterior manifestations. I have shown that in German constitutional law we had the difference between statute, in the formal sense, and ordinance. The one was the act of the legislature—the other of the executive. On account of the enabling act and as a consequence of the first acts of the Hitler government, the procedure of legislation became a dual one. We still had more or less—for Sundays only, so to speak—the procedure of legislation through the Reichstag. The normal course of legislation was the statutes enacted by the Reich government, which should not have been called that way. We also had, from the imperial days, and we kept it up during the days of the president, the decree by the head of state, especially distinguished in the way of ordinance, for instance the organization act and we had the ordinance by the government. Hitler, by and by—but it happened rather quickly—emancipated himself from those regulations of the laws which were previously valid and concerning the various forms of norms, he used them arbitrarily. As to whether a statute passed by the Reichstag, as I described it, was brought in by suggestion of the National Socialist Party with Hitler as the first mover of the motion, was passed by way of acclamation, without debate; or whether the law was decided on by the government—that happened very quickly by way of circulation—or whether Hitler called it “Decree by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor”—later called “Fuehrer Decree” or ordinance, such as the famous ordinance on the Enforcement of the Four-Year Plan—for the legal value that did not matter at all. In all cases Hitler alone decided, whether he would take advice or not, whether there was a cosignature or not, for genuine cosignature in the constitutional meaning, of course, could not exist any more. There have been many arguments as to what the cosignatures which weren’t always affixed meant. People have tried very hard to find a meaning, but the only thing that is really certain is that these cosignatures did no longer have the meaning or significance of the proper countersignature. There was nobody toward whom one could have assumed any responsibility by countersigning. Therefore, all fixing of norm, signed by Hitler’s name alone or together with other names, is merely an act of will of that man—whether it calls itself a law or something else.

The only difficulty is represented by the so-called secret laws, although I can’t quite see where the difficulties are when you look at it properly; that a law which is kept secret before the people[268] whom it concerns cannot bind those people is obvious. That is not because of some particular legal system but that is because of the very nature of an order. Nobody can be given an order if he doesn’t know of the order and if he is not meant to have knowledge of that order. But one must not forget that if Hitler passed a secret law, that as an official directive it was binding for those persons to whom it was made known. Then it was not just a legal norm, but it was an official instruction. As for the citizen, that amounted to the same in effect. If I may use an expression from Germanic law, these various forms by which Hitler announced his will were only different as far as the number of people in his entourage were concerned.

Much more difficult than that question about the form is the question about the restrictions on those contents to which Hitler was subject as a legislator. According to the valid order, limitations in the matter of the contents existed also for Hitler. Already last year, before the International Military Tribunal, I stated clearly that naturally for Hitler too, the limitations of ethics did apply. As to how he himself thought about such matters, I don’t know. I never met him, and I would not like to rely on hearsay; but that he knew that others believed him bound by a moral restriction, that is quite evident from the fact that again and again, be it in preambles to the law, be it by the rest of the propaganda machinery, he formulated moral justifications. Whether that was in accordance with his own real ideas, that question may be left open.

But I have already told the Tribunal that these restrictions, as moral restrictions which are no doubt for a great man the most difficult and the most important restrictions, in the conception of the European state on legal matters, are no legal restrictions. The absolute state of the continent passed on that conception to its parliamentary successor.

A little while ago, I had an occasion to show, by the example of Anschuetz, that that remained so until the latest era, until the time of the extreme democratic era of the Weimar republic. If one does regret that or not does not matter here. I simply have to describe what actually happened. If now, in the European meaning, one asks about legal restrictions—and first of all one asks about restrictions of the German law—one will have to say that restrictions under German law did not exist for Hitler. He was legibus solutus in the same meaning in which Louis XIV claimed that for himself in France. Anybody who said something different expresses a wish that does not describe the actual legal facts.

On the other hand, certainly there were legal restrictions for Hitler under international law. He, as the head of the State, was[269] the representative of the German Reich with foreign countries. After the development of affairs, he had to represent the German Reich without the restrictions which the Reich President still had. Hitler alone concluded the treaties and terminated them. He alone concluded alliances and could renounce them. He was bound by international law. Therefore, he could commit acts violating international law. He could issue orders violating international law to the Germans.

Now we are confronted with the most difficult problem: What were the consequences of the violation of international law by an act or an instruction by Hitler? The nonjurists will probably say that the order did not exist. But every jurist knows everywhere in the world that matters for the state, for every state, are not so simple. It is not true that there is even one state in the world which would say, “Every wrong act of state is not an act of state at all,” but every government system had inherent in itself, in varying form, a second order so to speak—a kind of self-purification system—a system concerned with finding out whether faulty acts of state are void or valid or are only partly valid. Every state commits faulty acts—acts of which everybody knows that they are not in order and knows it at a certain time. Acts which all the same are maintained, merely because during a legal procedure the end has to come one day.

In the Germany of the Weimar republic, for example, this is what happened. When the Reichstag—I just showed it by the example of Anschuetz—had passed a bill pursuant to article 76, that is, with a majority which could change the constitution, that law, if it had been properly promulgated, was binding for every official agency, even, for example, if it did not comply with an obligation of the Reich under international law.

In this commentary—would you kindly wait a moment—it’s a long time since I looked at it last, but I think I can remember where it is. [Reading] Anschuetz says in his commentary on article 10, under figure 7, “International law too, places an obligation on the German judge within the meaning of article 102 and according to article 4, but only insofar as it is generally recognized; in particular, also recognized by the German Reich and does not contradict the Reich laws. Whether that is the case, that the judge has to examine but he does not have to examine Reich laws, for the fact whether they are or are not in accordance with international law, and even if they don’t pass this examination, he cannot deny their application.” That means if the Reichstag, let us say, with a majority that can change the constitution had passed a law which was contradicting international law, that law was binding for all German official agencies. The Reich had to act as a[270] sovereign State under the international law governing offenses against international law.

I return to Hitler. What applied to the democratic set-up applied all the more to the set-up under a “leader,” and everybody knows that who knew about the conditions surrounding Hitler’s decisions. If Hitler issued an order which was faulty from the legal point of view, that did not give the German official agencies any reason to refuse obedience, for in every state there has to be an authority beyond whom there is no appeal.

In the case of Hitler something else, something special applies. He who sees things differently and believes that the German official agencies were not merely entitled but perhaps even under an obligation to examine Hitler’s orders as to their legality not from the scientific point of view, but merely with the practical purpose of possibly refusing obedience, claims no more, no less than that Germany had no dictatorship at all. Then it would not be comprehensible what was the sense of a fight of the whole world against that regime.

I believe I have now answered your question. I would like to say one more thing, so as to emphasize the gravity of the development. I had the permission to show the Tribunal the structure of the acts of the State. Naturally that structure can also be applied to Hitler’s acts, but only one of those acts lost its meaning almost completely under Hitler. If Your Honors will kindly recall chart 1 to your memories, where on the left side we had the norms and then the authorization norms, the norms which authorized interference, I had differentiated between special and general relationship or subordination—pointing to the soldier and the citizen.[153] Those differentiations under Hitler gradually lose meaning. Hitler exerted and overburdened the strength of the German people to such an extent that finally he no longer saw before him citizens and smaller groups of persons under special obligation among them, but for him the Germans, all Germans were always on duty. A private sphere of activity no longer existed for him. With him there is no meaning in the differentiation between substantive laws and official instructions. It is all the same to him. The citizen is dead, because all have become officials. That is the final point of a development which, from a complicated state of affairs, was working towards simplicity, and that is the gruesome result.

Presiding Judge Brand: Dr. Schilf, would you pardon a question directed to the witness at this time? Dr. Jahrreiss, if this question interferes with the orderly course of your presentation,[271] I suggest that you ignore it. But you told us in your discussion of procedure your views as to decrees signed by Hitler and one or more ministers. Would you care to specify or to indicate to us a little the view you have with reference to the justification of authority decrees not signed by Hitler, but signed by one or more of the ministers? I think we have seen a good many of those in the record. In other words, decrees executed or signed only by various of the ministers, but not by Hitler. Do you understand my question?

Witness Jahrreiss: Yes, thank you. I have spoken so far only about orders by Hitler, but in German constitutional law dating back to the days of the monarchy and the Weimar republic we have not only norms fixed by the Reichstag or the head of the State, but also many norms laid down by the government, in the narrower sense by the minister. The ordinance [Verordnung], of which I spoke in the beginning differentiating it from the statutes passed by legislators, is normally the ordinance of a minister, and under German constitutional law the following is valid. That was not changed in the Hitler era. Administrative ordinances, that is to say, norms which are not legal principles in the narrower meaning, are issued by every minister within the framework of his own department, without any special basis. Other ordinances, that is to say, legal ordinances, can only be issued—he can issue them, but he can only issue them if he has been authorized to do so by the constitution or by a legislative act. That was, in fact, what I described at the beginning. And so, in the Weimar era, we had many ministerial ordinances if the law empowered the minister to issue them. If I may add this, the result of that differentiation was this, if the courts had to apply an ordinance by a minister, or to be more precise, when it was doubtful whether it was to be applied, then the court had to examine whether the minister was empowered, was authorized to issue it. If the court denied that question, the ordinance did not exist. May I ask whether this was in answer to your question, Your Honor?

Presiding Judge Brand: I was interested especially in the source of authority, of decrees signed by various ministers after Hitler came into power. Would it be accurate to say that such decrees received their validity because of a delegation of power to the minister directly from Hitler?

Witness Jahrreiss: Yes, for legal ordinances. Hitler was the legislator. He could issue the ordinances himself but he could also delegate authority.

Dr. Schilf: Professor, I should like to follow up your words. In the Hitler state, so to speak, all people were on duty. There[272] were no longer any citizens. You said the citizen was dead. May I ask you, in our legal language we call an order by a phrase which is very concise and which might explain it better to the Tribunal, that the law also in the former meaning was a law that was the same as an order to a servant. May I ask you to tell me whether that general instruction to an official, a civil servant, to a servant was the same as the law which had been solemnly promulgated in the Reichsgesetzblatt?

Witness Jahrreiss: If I have understood your question properly, you want to know whether the obligation was the same?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, no doubt. For those who were concerned, those to whom the order was addressed, the order issued by Hitler, whether it was concerned with an individual case or whether that was a legal norm or whether it was an official instruction, was binding.

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Dr. Schilf: Now I want to ask you, what, in principle, was the relation between international law and the law of the individual state, and I would like to ask you whether that relationship was changed under the Hitler state?

Witness Jahrreiss: Counsel, I suppose I am right in assuming that by that question you refer mainly to Article 4[154] of the Weimar constitution?

Q. Yes, that is my intention.

A. Among the methods by which human beings are directed in social intercourse, there is, as one of several, the order [Befehl]. That in itself, unsympathetic as it appears to people everywhere as a method, has the one characteristic that it is unavoidable. Consequently, there is nowhere among human beings a sphere where there is no rule. On the other hand, all mankind in effect today stands in permanent relation of life with one another without, as a whole, being subject to one rule. Both together result in the situation which again and again worries people, which we call the situation referring to international law. Only groups of mankind, smaller groups or larger groups, are under a common rule. Therefore, if a continuous life, in spite of being divided into various units of rule, is to be made secure, and that in a proper manner, then there must be norms which hold together in an entity those various units of rules.

Or to express it in a different way, the power of authority of the various units must be brought in line in such a way that a[273] community life is possible. That means, however, the ruling authority of the individual units must be restricted by the whole. The central point of international law is therefore constituted by those norms which lay down that limitation of the authority of the individual groups. Therefore, I suggested, and I was the first person to demonstrate that in science, that the law of an individual state, that is to say the constitutional law, should never be described without also describing the limitations under international law. If we were to achieve the situation, if I may say so here, whereby everywhere in the world all young jurists from the very beginning would be accustomed to see the constitutional questions of their own country always in connection with those of international law, then a great deal would have been done to strengthen international law.

Summarizing, that means the individual state is placed under an obligation by international law to arrange its own order by legislation in such a manner that the authorities in their decisions work in such a way as is demanded by international law. In [legal] science, that is called—the state is under an obligation to organize its law in accordance with international law. How can that be done?

There are several methods available. The legislator can, from case to case in his own system, amend those provisions which need changing so as to comply with international law. He does not need to mention international law at all in doing so. That is the way states proceed again and again. A different method is the one which is called the method of transformation. That is, the legislator does not trouble to bring into line the law of his country, word by word, and paragraph by paragraph, with international law, but he tells his official agencies, “Consider the norm of international law which in itself only binds me, as if I had cast it into a law.”

That method, which in German we also call “Recasting” [Umgiessung], can be applied specifically or generally. That is to say, the legislator, as soon as he has to consider a new treaty under international law, can recast that treaty or he gives general instructions for the application of the international law which is valid in the particular case. Both methods have been used among states.

Concerning this method of transformation, a difficult problem arises. In all states which have laws of different rank, as in the German Reich under the Weimar constitution—that is to say, either laws which have the validity of the constitutional laws, or ordinary laws—the legislator has to ask himself whether he intends to apply the recast international law to the highest group[274] or not. Under the Weimar constitution, for example, it was indisputable that the recast international law had merely the position of an ordinary law. There might even be a state which would place the recast international law above constitutional law. What do we need that for? Every official agency in every state finds itself in the situation where it is confronted with several laws of its own state which appear to contradict one another, or in fact do contradict one another, which, however, all claim validity. I need not tell you jurists that since the days of Roman law everywhere norms have developed concerning the elimination of such conditions; where state laws have varying status, further norms of collision have been constituted. If a state would have a general norm under which international law takes precedence over all domestic law, that would be the greatest safeguard which is possible at all, that the law of the country is handled in accordance with international law. I do not know whether there is such a state. The German Reich at any rate was not one of those states. I think with this background I can now answer your question.

The relation between international law and the law of the Reich has been regulated in the Weimar constitution in article 4 and article 45, paragraph 3.[155] There have been many arguments about article 4, at the time when the national [Constituent] assembly was sitting [in 1919]. After many arguments and after sufficient attention had been paid to article 45, paragraph 3, eventually the following legal situation evolved. As far as the German Reich, by treaty, enters into obligations under international law, in such spheres of life which are subject to the legislative authority of the Reichstag, the President of the Reich may not ratify the treaty for Germany before the Reichstag has agreed by law. That is a transformation of a special nature, and anticipated transformation, for if the treaty is concluded, because the other partners ratify it also, then, at the moment the treaty becomes valid, the special recasting has already been effected. For the rest, all other international law, as far as it is generally recognized, but also acknowledged by Germany, is generally speaking recast by article 4. Both ways of recasting gave international law the status of an ordinary law of the Reich. Yesterday I had opportunity—concerning the question as to the moral limits of rule—to point out that under the Weimar constitution the courts were not authorized to examine a law as for its validity under international law, and certainly not the administrative authorities. Under Hitler that attitude was not changed. The general method of transformation of article 4 was kept on, and the specific one[275] was needed even less frequently because the approval of the Reichstag was no longer required for the conclusion of treaties. Hitler could conclude every treaty under international law himself. As soon as the treaty had been concluded, as soon as it had come into force, it had already been recast, for Hitler’s ratification was, from the domestic point of view, a Fuehrer Order.

Q. Professor, to supplement your explanations, may I ask you to read out to the Tribunal article 4 and also article 45, paragraph 3, so that the passages you mentioned become quite clear.

A. Article 4 says: “The generally recognized rules of international law are valid as binding constituent parts of the law of the German Reich law.” Article 45 says: “Alliances and treaties with foreign states which refer to matters in which the Reich has legislative power require the consent of the Reichstag.”

Q. Another supplementary question, Professor. You told us that treaties under international law were concluded by Hitler alone. I would like to ask you to explain to us how the question can be solved concerning the person who was subject to Hitler’s order if there were contradictions?

A. I believe I understand your question to mean that among the laws or ordinances which were valid in Germany at the time, there were some which were contradictory to that which Hitler had decreed concerning the treaty. That is not a particular problem. I have already pointed out that that problem was merely the problem of collision, and if Hitler, in contradiction to the treaty he had concluded later on, issued an order in a general way or in a specific case contradicting the former order, the later order, if the contents were the same, was to apply and the old maxim applied—lex posterior derogat priori—that was so concerning the relations of the laws under the Weimar constitution, and it was the same under Hitler; but I think it will be necessary for me to say a little more on that subject. It can happen, and it does happen again and again, that a state knowingly, in its legislation, gets itself involved in a contradiction with international law. The last will of the state is decisive for the official agencies. In that case, the nation until that collision has been eliminated, lives under constitutional law which contradicts international law. The settlement, which is bound to come, is brought about by international law by the state being regarded as one which has committed an offense under international law, and entails and holds that responsibility to the provisions of international law, and as quickly as possible that inconsistency has to be removed by later legislation. As to whether further consequences arise, that we need not discuss here. In the case of every state the following applies. For[276] the official agencies which have to apply the law to a certain specific case, there are frequently, if one proceeds logically, several laws—there are after all many situations in life which extend beyond the frontiers from the human point of view or from the material point of view.

One can bear in mind that instead of the state’s own law or side by side with the law of that state, foreign law can be applied, or it may be a case of church law possibly having to be applied. The question as to the application of international law, therefore, belongs to a wider scope of the great problem which is called the problem of the norm concerning the application of law, or in other words in every legal system there is, by the side of the system which regulates the relations between human beings as such, a system which instructs the authorities as to which law they are to apply in each case. I do not know of any state nor do I know what law could be possible which does not proceed in this way. The officials have to apply the law of the state which is in force at the time except if the legislator admits or orders another solution. Consequently, the provision of the status of recast international law is, therefore, only one possibility of the various possibilities of applying international law.

Q. Professor Jahrreiss, for the purpose of this trial we are interested in establishing whether an official himself was confronted with the question that international law deviated from the state law. If he himself was confronted with that situation, I want to ask you in what direction did he have the choice, or did he have any choice at all? Was he restricted to one norm according to the general view or to the view of the Reich constitution as far as it was still in force under the Hitler regime? Was he bound by that?

A. First of all, I have to explain the underlying facts of your question. Apparently you have in mind the case where a law or an individual decision exists which, in the view of the official, is inconsistent with international law.

Q. Inconsistent with international law, but which unilaterally is the law of his country, and this official now is confronted with the question to what norm is he to adhere?

A. I have already said that under the Weimar system which on that point was not changed under the Hitler regime the official had to apply the recast international law as an ordinary Reich law, and now he had to solve that problem of collision which you have mentioned, in the same way in which he solved the problem of collision between two ordinary Reich laws which were contradicting each other. In effect if the law under Hitler had been[277] issued and afterwards the Reich assumed a new obligation under international law which was recast, then that had to be applied and not the former law, and vice versa. Have I answered your question?

Q. Yes, but there was one more possibility for the imaginary official. If the law of a country perhaps intentionally deviated from international law, what norm did the official then have to apply?

A. I have already said that in the Weimar era already the moral background or the background of international law of a legislative act was removed from the scrutiny of the official and even removed from the scrutiny of the judge and of the Reich Supreme Court. The background of international law could not even be examined by the Staatsgerichtshof, [supreme constitutional court]. The supreme constitutional court was only allowed to examine whether it was constitutional, but it was not allowed to examine it from the point of view of international law. To express it differently, whether the law had been passed by the State in such a way that it was inconsistent with international law on purpose or not, that could not play any part at all; and that was the legal state of affairs, regrettable as it may be.

Q. For the purpose of our trial we are particularly interested in the norm of the Hague Convention of Land Warfare. May I ask you to explain to the Tribunal with special reference to whether the principles of transformation which you have explained apply to the Hague Convention of Land Warfare as well?

A. Counsel, with that question you have approached a particularly difficult problem. You know that the validity of the Hague Convention of Land Warfare also concerning the clause of general participation has very often been doubted. The Hague Convention of Land Warfare with us was recast, and specifically—that cannot be doubted in my view—most of what is said in the Hague Convention should be considered as recast pursuant to article 4 of the constitution even if a specific recasting did not occur. That follows from the history preceding the Hague Convention of Land Warfare. When the parties to the treaty, among them the German Reich, in 1907 signed the “Convention Concerning Land Warfare,” for the most part they only laid down in law such points which in any case were already international laws by customs and, therefore, assured. It would not always be easy to say whether a provision of the Hague Convention belongs to that group in part or not or as a whole. Have I answered your question correctly?

Q. I would like you to refer to article 1 of the Hague Convention and to read it to the Tribunal.

[278]

A. Yes. You mean article 1 of the Convention, or the appendix? Article 1 of the Convention you mean. Very often when one talks of the Hague Convention of Land Warfare, one means the appendix. Article 1 is a particularly concise example for the fact that the states were conscious of the character of international law such as I described, because it places the states under an obligation to give instructions to their land armies which are in accordance with the enclosed Hague Convention. As to the methods they employ, they are left open to the various states. For example, the German Reich could without mentioning the Hague Convention have passed a German law as to the behavior of the German army in wartime. It was technically easier to give the order to pay attention to the Hague Convention in the event of war. And thus, the points laid down in the treaty as international law, and which in the proper meaning do not affect the individual human being but only bind the state as a whole, were reinterpreted by the legislative authority to mean regulations applying to the conduct of the individual.

Q. Thank you, that answers the question.

*******

Q. Professor, I had the opportunity to show you the book of Heinrich Triepel, International Law and State Law. I would like to submit to you pages 153 and 154 and ask you to read that part to the Tribunal and to explain whether that is in accordance with your opinion.

A. I have in front of me the book of Heinrich Triepel, International Law and State Law of 1899. This book—

Q. Excuse me, Professor. Is it the first edition? I have just been asked if there are several editions.

A. No, there are not several. It is the first edition. This book, at the time, was a sensational book for the science of international law in the whole world. It was the first book which systematically treated the questions which I am supposed to supply information about here today. And what Heinrich Triepel laid down at that time basically has been recognized in the entire science of international law and only after the First World War a certain lack of security in theory, not in practice, developed because the so-called “Vienna theory of law” [Wiener Rechtsschule] founded by Hans Kelsen, who was my predecessor in Cologne, and who is now teaching in the United States, with its so-called “pure theory of law” or “norm logic” conceived the things logically. This did not affect the practice of international law at all, and thus the sentence is applicable which Triepel formulated on page 153 of this book,[279] “Judges and subjects are under the obligation to apply the law of the state, even if contrary to international law, and to follow it. It is not up to them, but up to the government to take into consideration the differences and the divergencies with international law which may arise out of this.”

Dr. Schilf: May it please the Tribunal, I have concluded my questions to Professor Jahrreiss.

*******

CROSS-EXAMINATION

*******

Mr. LaFollette: * * * I do want to ask you, Dr. Jahrreiss, a hypothetical question. You may not agree with the hypothesis which I hypothesize or the implications perhaps inherent in them, but just for my own purpose and for orderly procedure I ask you to consider my question and answer it on the basis of the facts which I hypothesize, purely. Let us assume that I was subject to the complete power of an individual we will call “A” to force me to obey his orders implicitly; and, under those circumstances, I saw “A” procuring a strong rope, strong enough to bind a man completely and securely. Secondly, that I saw him preparing a strong wooden frame upon the ground, with iron rings through which he could pass the rope; and, so placed, that they could bind the legs and arms of a man securely. Third—a wooden block so shaped that a man’s neck could be placed on it with his head extended beyond it. And four, that I saw this man “A” sharpening an axe large enough and strong enough to cut through the neck of a man. And suppose at this same time I also saw, standing always in view, from one to six men, each of whom I know that this man “A” has a violent hatred for and has threatened to kill; and each of whom I know that this man “A” has the power to capture if he chooses. Now then, let us assume that this man “A” captures one or more of these men that he hates, and that I know he hates; and binds this man with the rope that I saw him prepare, upon the frame that I saw him build; and places his neck on the block that I saw him prepare; and that then “A” hands me the axe which I saw him sharpen and orders me to cut off the head of this captured, bound man. Would you say that under those circumstances I would be guilty or not guilty of killing the man whose head I severed at the direct order of “A” who had the full power to order me to do so.

Dr. Jahrreiss: I understand it this way—that guilty or not guilty is to be considered as guilt under criminal laws.

[280]

Q. On the assumed facts, yes.

A. I just want to ask you a question. Do you mean it as a legal question or as a question of morality?

Q. As a question of law.

A. Of law, yes. And according to what criminal law, and in what state?

Q. You can name the state; I don’t care.

A. Well, is that supposed to be a question in Utopia?

Q. Let’s put it in Germany.

A. In Germany?

Q. In Germany, yes, after 1933.

A. Yes, all right. Here then, we would be faced with terrible problems with which all of us since last year have been torturing ourselves so terribly, and I confess that in spite of having thought about it a great deal, that I have not yet found my way out of the dilemma into which we have been brought. Perhaps I can answer this hypothetical question by saying, by stating first, the points of view which in a conflicting manner make the answer more difficult. Perhaps first of all I should say, so that this should be clear, Mr. Prosecutor, how I, myself would behave.—I don’t know. No matter how horrible the whole thing is, I don’t believe that I—well, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal anticipates that an appeal to higher orders should not be admissible. It is not my task to criticize those regulations. However, perhaps I may be allowed to say that this regulation, if it should really be valid law in any state whatsoever, would have very dangerous consequences for order in general. One of the four judges of the IMT, the French judge, Donnedieu De Vabres, in a lecture which he gave this last April expressly stated that this regulation brings with it many difficulties for the idea of the discipline imposed by the state. I have the text of his lecture here. It is a lecture which Professor Donnedieu De Vabres gave before the Association des Etudes Internationales Criminologiques. May I quote a short passage from it? May I read it in French?

The Interpreter: Yes, you may.

Witness Jahrreiss: “Since the statute was interpreted this way under the rules imposed by the IMT, it has in a sense of individualism gone beyond regulations of international law and domestic law, this regulation is open to the objection that it will endanger the necessary discipline for the preservation of the state. Such a regulation can be applied in the future only with prudence and circumspection.” I am quoting this here only in[281] order to demonstrate that if any rules exist at all, a certain harshness is absolutely necessary, unavoidably necessary. I always told my young students who started out on a study of law that they would have to devote themselves to perhaps the most bitter fact in life of man, and that is the rule, because by nature man hates the rulership, at least if he is subjected to it, but if this is the case every state basically has to require that its laws are executed, even if the person concerned, for moral or religious reasons, or other reasons, is of a different opinion. On the other hand, Mr. LaFollette, every state knows that there is some limitation somewhere. For example, the German Reich had a military penal law. In it there was the quoted article 47. In the jurisdiction of the Reich court, however, this paragraph was applied more and more in a restricting sense because discipline had to be above all.

Now, Mr. Prosecutor, before the IMT, I, in the expert opinion which I gave, which you were kind enough to quote here, stated expressly and emphatically, I believe, what the limit of humaneness or humanity is, but at the same time I pointed out that this limit is frequently not sharply drawn; and I believe, and this comes closer to your question, that perhaps after all the problem with which we are concerned here cannot quite be done justice to, if a case is described quite as drastic as you just said.

Last year during the first 4 months of the trial I experienced it, and those were the most difficult times of my entire life. I experienced and saw what terrible things happened under Hitler’s regime, and I have no way to express my horror and to describe this sufficiently in any language, but I believe that you will agree with me if I say that those are occurrences which are outside of legal discussion entirely, for, Mr. Prosecutor, even about injustice one can, if one is exact, speak with legal reasons only in cases where—excuse me—the injustice is within normal limits.

I myself was a criminal judge. One single murder frequently, in the court of assize, occupied our time for 2 to 3 weeks, and it was a terrible thing. Two murders by one person—that was horrifying. If someone had eight to ten murders on his conscience, then he was described as a mass murderer in the press of Europe, and people asked themselves whether this was something that could be handled by means of the penal code at all.

When, last year, in the courtroom of the big trial I listened to the witness, Hoess, of Auschwitz, when he answered the question of the prosecutor as to how many people he had killed, if I remember correctly, he answered he didn’t remember exactly whether two and a half or three million. At that time it was quite obvious to me that neither positively nor negatively this had anything to do anymore with legal considerations because, Mr. Prosecutor,[282] no matter what a state regulates concerning the question of review of a law the state has to think of normal conditions. These occurrences and matters cannot be measured by any order of the world at all. Therefore, I believe that these things that happened in Germany behind a complicated system of secrecy, a system of mutual delimitation, and if then one adds the pressure of conscience of millions of people who felt themselves hemmed in between patriotism and hatred of the system, then the question which you put to me attains a very bitter human weight, and I can only say I don’t know any way out.

*******

Presiding Judge Brand: In order to better understand your views which you have ably expressed, I would like to ask you a few questions. I understand your view to be that judges were obliged to obey the law of their State of Germany even though in doing so they violated a principle of international law. That is a fair brief statement, is it not, of the matter?

Witness Jahrreiss: Yes. During the Weimar republic this was already uncontestedly applicable, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I read the commentary of Anschuetz to article 102.

Q. And you would apply the same principle after 1933, would you not?

A. After 1933? There was much less the question whether this was different than before.

Q. What court or tribunal ordinarily enforced the rule that judges must obey the law of their State under such circumstances? I assume the answer is obvious.

A. Excuse me. I didn’t understand your question, sir.

Q. What tribunal ordinarily enforced against the judges or upon the judges this obligation to obey the law of the State even though they in doing so, violated international law?

A. I never heard that a court violated this principle so that there was no need to force the judges to conform to it. Mr. President, I never heard that a German court did not apply a Reich law because in the opinion of the court it was contrary to international law. I never heard of such a case. You see, it was entirely uncontested. The court, just in such a case, couldn’t do anything but through official channels call the attention of the government to this contradiction so that the government, in accordance with its obligation under international law, would see to it that the laws were changed. Let us assume the case that the Reich Supreme Court, for example, in deciding a case had come to the conclusion[283] that a German Reich law was contrary to an obligation of the Reich under international law. Then the Reich Supreme Court was not able to say—the indictment is refused because the Reich law which supports the indictment is contrary to international law. The Reich Supreme Court could do nothing but either to postpone the trial and to report to the government so that perhaps changes would be made in time, but it was not even obliged to do that. It was obliged only if it did make a decision to decide in accordance with national law if it was contrary to the international law. That was the legal situation during the Weimar republic.

Q. That answers my question. * * * The Reich Supreme Court would in proper cases lay down the rule that the lower court judge should enforce the German law even though it violated some principle of international law for which Germany as a state might be diplomatically held responsible, is that true?

A. No, that is not quite correct. I said that the Reich Supreme Court, just the same as the other German courts, in regard to this question, did not have any doubts at all, and therefore, it did not make any rules with which the lower courts had to comply. That was not necessary at all.

Q. Then the lower courts themselves recognized this rule of which you speak that they must enforce the law of the State even though it violates a principle of international law?

A. Yes, and they only had to look at the Anschuetz commentary; that said so expressly.

Q. Well, at least prior to 1918, was there any tribunal other than the court of the state which could punish the public officer or a judge, for making a decision which was contrary to international law, if it was made in compliance with the law of the state?

A. No.

Q. If the principle enunciated among other bodies by the first tribunal, the IMT Tribunal, namely, the principle of the penal responsibility of an individual officer for violations of international law, should be applied, then you have, do you not, a modification of your principle which you have stated with reference to the necessity that judges must obey the law of the state. In other words, if that principle of penal responsibility of the individual has become a part of international law, then the anomalous situation would arise where the officer, perhaps the judge, may have been required by his state law to make a decision, but may, nevertheless, be responsible if any tribunal has jurisdiction to try him, for a decision contrary to international law. Isn’t that true?

[284]

A. If I understood your question correctly, Your Honor, the general validity of the principles of the charter as international law could, in regard to judges of those states which require that their officials apply the law of the state as the final will, bring about tragic conflicts of conscience, for which, in my opinion, there is no indubitable legal solution at all. But, Mr. President, I do not know whether I quite understand your question correctly.

Q. I do not think I will attempt to repeat it further. I understood your position. It is true, is it not, that there was no tribunal in Germany, perhaps anywhere else, which had statutory jurisdiction to apply international law in a penal proceeding against a public officer of the state who had complied with the state law?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Then, if there were a tribunal that had jurisdiction to apply that law, might it not perhaps, arrive at a different decision, legally, from the decision which this court of the state itself, would arrive at; might not an international tribunal, having jurisdiction to pass upon the question, arrive at a different answer as to criminality of an individual officer who had violated international law, but had not violated the law of the state?

A. Yes, that would be so, but, Mr. President, if I may say so, that is the very thing which I call the tragic situation of the official concerned.

*******

E. General Development of the Administration of Justice under Hitler

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT SCHLEGELBERGER[156]

Dr. Kubuschok (counsel for defendant Schlegelberger): Witness, what is your career, your professional career in particular?

Defendant Schlegelberger: I was born in 1875. After I had finished my legal studies and had passed my doctor’s examination, I became judge in the first and second instance. In 1904 I became judge of the Lyck District Court in East Prussia. In 1909 I became assistant at the Prussian Court of Appeals, Kammergericht. In 1914 I became Kammergerichtsrat. The Kammergericht is the Court of Appeals of Berlin, the highest court in Prussia.

[285]

At the Kammergericht, I worked in several senates: in the civil senate which dealt with the ordinary cases of civil law; in the commercial senate; in the patent senate, and in the senate for voluntary jurisdiction. During that period I wrote my first scientific works in that field which dealt with the experiences I have gained in practice. In 1918, that is to say at the end of the First World War, I became assistant at the then Reich Justice Office which later on became the Reich Ministry of Justice. That agency had very little to do with administrative tasks. At that time, it only dealt with one court. It was the highest court, in fact the Reich Supreme Court in Leipzig. Apart from that, the Reich Justice Office only dealt with legislative tasks.

As an assistant, I was put in charge of legislative preparatory work in the field of commercial and economic law, and I continued to do that work when after a few months I became Geheimer Regierungsrat and Vortragsrat at the Reich Justice Office. When in 1927 I became ministerial director, I still continued to deal with the same tasks. In 1931, the only Under Secretary of the Reich Justice Office, Dr. Joel, an old gentleman—not to be confused with the defendant Joel—was appointed minister, and I took his position as Under Secretary. I retained that position when in 1932 the Bruening cabinet was replaced by the Papen cabinet, and when Guertner, who had previously been Minister of Justice of Bavaria became Reich Minister of Justice. Reich Minister Joel, as well as Reich Minister Guertner at that time dealt with penal matters themselves. I merely dealt with matters of civil law.

Only when in 1934 the Prussian Ministry of Justice was merged with the Reich Ministry of Justice, and now a vast number of administrative tasks were transferred to the Reich Ministry of Justice, then a new Under Secretary position was created, and that for penal matters. The Under Secretary of the former Prussian Ministry, Under Secretary Freisler, obtained that post. That division of tasks in civil and penal matters remained in force when on 27 January 1941 quite suddenly Reich Minister of Justice Guertner died, and I, as the most senior Under Secretary, was placed in charge of the conduct of affairs. I retained my civil cases and Freisler dealt with penal matters. I was placed in charge of the conduct of affairs of the ministry as the senior Under Secretary. I was never appointed Deputy Minister of Justice, and I never had myself called so, because that was, of course, impossible. I only was in charge of the conduct of affairs.

This picture, that is to say, that I merely acted as a representative, but that I actually dealt with the same work which I had dealt with before, that became also outwardly apparent. On purpose, I never worked in the Minister’s office; I never moved into[286] the Minister’s home; and I drew the salary of an Under Secretary, not that of a Minister. On 20 August 1942, at my own request, I resigned.

Q. You have described your work as Under Secretary, and you have said that you worked largely in the sphere of civil law. Which were the most important tasks with which you dealt?

*******

A. In accordance with the particular interest which I had always had in economic matters, and in accordance with the work I had done previously, I was allotted the task of cooperating during two particularly fateful years of the German Reich in the maintenance of support of the economic life of the country. It was the stabilization and maintenance of currency: that was in 1923 because of, and until the end of, the inflation, and later on in 1933 on the occasion of the economic collapse. The inflation period was followed by the establishment of the Rentenmark currency, a new currency which replaced the paper mark. The inflation was also followed by the ordinance at which I worked, under which businessmen had to draw up a balance in gold marks, and it was also followed by the tremendous task of remonetization legislation. The collapse of the banks necessitated many discussions and consultations, and ordinances as for instance concerning rates of interest. Later, I worked on the new law concerning drafts and checks, and I may quote as my special work the two big economic laws promulgated in 1937, the law on shares and the law on patents. When in 1942 I resigned from my office, a new law on companies with limited liability was just about to be issued. At that time the general reform of civil law had been started, not immediately by way of a new codification, but by individual laws. When I left my office, the marriage law and the testament law were completed.

Q. Apart from your professional work as a judge, and later on as an official in the Ministry, did you ever engage in any scientific research work?

A. I can wholeheartedly affirm that question. Immediately after I took my state examination, I started on my first big project, and the first book of mine, which appeared in 1904, was a treatise on the law of retention; it was a work of historical nature. At that time I intended to take on a university career, but nothing came of that, because my home university, Koenigsberg, did not create a new chair for commercial and economic law. But I could not give up my literary work, and ever since then that has occupied me consistently side by side with my official work. The special[287] fields with which I dealt were economic law and voluntary jurisdiction, that is to say the law concerning the procedure in matters concerning family, hereditary, commercial law and document regulations. In 1923 I became Honorary Professor at the University of Berlin. Naturally, I followed that call while retaining my official position, and I held lectures at the University of Berlin until the outbreak of the war. In 1925 the University of Koenigsberg conferred upon me an honorary doctor’s degree of political science.

Q. Did you also deal with foreign law?

A. Yes, foreign law, too, has occupied me intensively for a long time. Perhaps I may first mention one of my latest works, a large comparative encyclopedia, the “Manual of Comparative Civil and Commercial Law.” That book summarizes reports on civil and commercial law of all countries, written mostly by national experts, and I may say the law of the United States is dealt with by Professor Atkinson of Kansas University. This work which necessitated a tremendous amount of correspondence, brought me in touch with eminent jurists all over the world. I have deepened those contacts since 1929, because I went abroad to hold lectures, and those trips were above all to give me an opportunity to observe the effect of the law, at least in some countries, actually on the spot. I did succeed in doing so in Argentina; in Chile, where I dealt especially with banking laws, I wrote an essay on that subject; and in Brazil where I became an honorary member of the Brazilian Lawyers’ Association. I held lectures in Budapest, Madrid, Warsaw, Stockholm, Copenhagen. I should like to add that I am coeditor of the periodical “Foreign and International Private Law”, a publication of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Association; and, also coeditor of a publication on Scandinavian law.[157]

*******

Q. Witness, were you active in party politics?

A. No, I never joined any party; I always stayed away from politics. My life was devoted to the practical administration of justice, and to legal research. If looking back now, I should say which one of parties of the German people I fitted into, I would call myself as belonging to the right one of the progressive, conservative direction which was promoted by the German People’s Party, [Deutsche Volkspartei] and which was also represented by the German Nationalist Party [Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei].

[288]

Q. What was your attitude towards the NSDAP and national socialism?

A. In 1933 I was approached on the subject of joining the NSDAP; I refused. My reason was, first the fact that I could not subscribe to the program of the NSDAP. Furthermore, another reason was my view that Under Secretary of justice should remain neutral even on the surface and, therefore, must not be obliged to any parties. I was never a National Socialist. It is obvious that a party program, in its manifold aspects, has many a point which one can adopt; for example, the program’s aim of bridging class differences, that is to say, the creation of a true national community; that point I welcomed heartily, but, concerning the program of the NSDAP as a whole above all, the way in which it was to be put into effect, that was far removed from my own ideas. My own conservative attitude as a human being and as a jurist accounted for that. It came as a great surprise to me when, on 30 January 1938, the Fuehrer’s Chancellery informed me in a letter, signed by Bouhler, that Hitler had ordered that I was to join and be accepted by the NSDAP. I said that that came as a great surprise to me. I myself, like other Under Secretaries who had also come from the middle classes, had never heard of that order, and it was impossible to refuse because that would not merely have meant I would have given battle not only to the Party, but the State itself. But I never departed from that view. The membership which was ordered against my will and forced upon me, I never made use of. I never attended a Party conference or meeting. Naturally, I did not hold any office in the Party either.

Perhaps the fact that I never changed my attitude is also demonstrated by the fact that neither my wife nor my sons ever belonged to the Party. My social contacts, too, as far as they were not conditioned by official affairs, moved almost exclusively within the circles of non-Party members.

Q. The Hitler order by which Schlegelberger’s membership in the Party was decreed will be submitted by me as Schlegelberger Document 34, Schlegelberger Exhibit 92,[158] as soon as the document books shall have been completed.

Witness, what effect did that attitude of yours have on your official position?

A. I always saw to it that Party members and Party functionaries were treated just like every other citizen. That played a part particularly in personnel matters. I only appointed that person to an office who, in my view, was properly qualified; and I refused to reward Party stars by appointing them to an office.

[289]

On the other hand, the attitude of the Party toward the Ministry and myself—and I shall have to come back to that later on—made great difficulties and brought about many inner conflicts.

At this moment I should like to point out the case to which the prosecution referred concerning notaries and their hostile attitude to the Party. They demonstrated it so obviously that when I came to hear of it in my official capacity I could not form a proper opinion on it. If I had tried to suppress those cases it would have been unavoidable that the Party would interfere, which definitely would have claimed that the notaries had violated their duty of allegiance toward the State and the head of the State. Perhaps the Party would have welcomed it, because such opposition would have been a welcome cause to discredit the administration of justice and to jeopardize my personnel policy, on which depended the fate of many officials.

Dr. Kubuschok: The witness has referred to the case of the notaries which, under Document NG-901, Prosecution Exhibit 436,[159] was submitted by the prosecution.

Presiding Judge Brand: What was the exhibit number?

Dr. Kubuschok: Exhibit 436.

The prosecution refers to your lecture held at Rostock University in 1936.[160] That lecture is compared as to its aim with a speech by Reich Jurist Leader Frank, and the prosecution sees in it an avowal of national socialism. Please give us some explanations about that speech.

Defendant Schlegelberger: Counsel, you have pointed out that that speech was made in 1936. Before I discuss the details about that speech I should like to say a few words as to how, at that time, one was able at all to discuss political questions in public. It wasn’t that way that, when National Socialist quarters laid down program points, one was allowed to make a frontal attack. I ignore altogether the point of personal danger that might have arisen for an opponent. I would not have fought shy of that danger, because a person who held the office which I held was in daily danger. However, such a frontal attack would have resulted in the opposite of what I wanted to achieve, that is an increase of the opposition against reasonableness.

One had to look for opportunities which one could use, and for example, the locality had something to do with that. I chose the university for the place of my speech, and that had a decisive influence on my audience. I had to see to it that the National[290] Socialist ideas which I wished to attack were beaten with their own weapons.

The actual reason for my speech was the fact that Freisler again and again, before the public, pointed out that the Party program was enforceable like law and was at least the framework of the law. Therefore, one was obliged to carry out that program immediately and completely.

I do not think I need to enter into any details here as to what it would have meant if that doctrine had been recognized. In the practice of the judges it would have meant separation from all legal provisions; the Party program could have been applied at random everywhere. It would, so to speak, have been the roof law under the protection of which, according to the wishes of those extreme National Socialists, legal life would have developed.

It was my aim to point out that such a construction would not be necessary at all, that the existing laws would also do justice to the fact that Germany was now a state under National Socialist government. I must point out that the law adapts itself automatically to changed conditions of life and ideologies, and from that the standard and the speed of legal changes are decided.

I intended to put in the place of the revolutionary changes of law, advocated by Freisler, an evolutionary development of law. I based myself on the principle of the interior change of the legal system, a principle which, for the first time, I propounded already in 1929 in one of my works where I also elucidated that principle. That was at a time when one could really not say that I might have based my arguments on the National Socialist thought. The compromise laws, which had already been promulgated, I mentioned intentionally without evaluating them. That was how I had argued against that thesis, and I believe had refuted it. I also used the opportunity to give my views concerning other important topical questions as well. I turned against the interference with the carrying out of sentences which I considered inadmissible. Due to previous incidents, I warned the judges against currying favor with high Party officers. I appealed to the pride of the judges and the consciousness of their independence. I also found reason to turn against it that some jurists in an absolutely inconsiderate manner, placed their own egotistic endeavors in the foreground, and did not show any understanding whatsoever for the sound idea of a true people’s community.

Generally, I used a tactic which I had employed repeatedly: I committed the high Party leaders to adhere to many of their good words which they had probably spoken without reflection. I reminded them that Hitler during his first speech before the Reichstag had declared the independence of the judges as necessary.[291] I pointed out that Frank[161] had mentioned the internal value of justice; and, that Goering, in public, had spoken against interference with the administration of justice.

Q. What was your relationship with Hitler?

A. I believe that one must distinguish between the personal and the material evaluation, and at the same time one must connect the two. I believe that Hitler, concerning my own person, had a certain measure of respect. I believe he saw in me the experienced civil servant, who was without ambitions, and who devoted himself to work and research. Concerning my sphere of work, civil law, he had not the slightest interest in it. The fact that I was unpolitical, aroused a certain amount of distrust in him; that, I suppose, explains the fact that in contrast to civil servants of the same rank, I was never offered an honorary position either in the SS or the SA. That I, in contrast to other high civil servants of the same rank, was not awarded the Golden Party Badge; and that he restricted my connection with the Party to the absolute minimum, again explains in particular, I believe, the positively brutal attack on me in the well-known Reichstag speech of 26 April 1942. The fact that I was placed in charge of affairs after the death of Guertner certainly was not a demonstration of confidence. This is how I would like to put it: It was just a makeshift solution. At that time Hitler could not yet make up his mind to appoint a new Minister of Justice. What played a certain part, perhaps, was that the chief candidate for the office, Frank, was at that time Governor General of the Government General and was not available. Thus, there was no way out, but to let the Ministry put the Under Secretary, who had seniority in the office, in charge of the Ministry. Hitler’s distrust, as far as I was concerned, was altogether justified from an objective point of view. I may say, and I wish to place special emphasis on this, that I was never fooled or influenced by Hitler’s demoniacal qualities, and I saved my own conscience, as far as he was concerned. For myself, Hitler was the declared opponent, in fact, the person who held the administration of justice in contempt. That conviction naturally placed me in a clear position. As far as it did not jeopardize my goal, I upheld my different opinion quite openly toward Hitler. That was already the state of affairs at the time of Guertner. I may say that all my life, as long as I held office, I was out to fight for justice and against arbitrariness. In the avowal of justice there was no difference between Guertner and myself. Guertner was the recognized protector of justice, but[292] he was not a fighter. If in the development, which was slow to begin with and later became faster, he gave up his opposition in some respects, that certainly is not due to a lack of the honest will to uphold justice. Frequently he came to me for advice and assistance. But that time was overshadowed by a continuous struggle with the Reich Jurists’ Leader [Reichsjustizfuehrer] Frank. In continuous attacks, Frank tried from his position as Reich legal office leader to achieve his final goal which was to get the office of Minister of Justice and then to change the Ministry and make it into a National Socialist Ministry. That struggle can only be understood if one knew who Frank was. Frank was the legal adviser and in difficult times the defense counsel of Hitler, and, therefore, he was particularly close to him. Before 1933 even, he had been the leader and propagandist of National Socialist legal ideas. If one bears that in mind, then one sees already on the one hand, the Ministry with its expert officials, the official activities; on the other hand, the combination of National Socialist ideas on law with the aim of overrunning the Ministry. Frank recognized Guertner’s qualities; therefore, he tried by the tactics of continuously wearing him down, to achieve his aim. If one knows National Socialist methods, one knows how stubborn and tenacious such a battle was in the methods with which it was waged, and that struggle had reached its climax when Guertner died, and I took over the conduct of affairs.

Q. What was the situation at that time?

A. One gets a true idea of that situation if one forms a picture in one’s mind of those three groups or parties which were fighting against the administration of justice with the aim of conquering the administration of justice in order to destroy it. I call these fighting groups by the names of their leaders, Himmler, Bormann, Goebbels; and, in so doing I would like to emphasize that during the whole time I only talked once to each of those three men.

Himmler proceeded by different roads; the undermining of confidence in the legal administration of justice and the conquering of its competence. Attacks were being made continuously on the administration of justice in the periodical of the SS which had already been mentioned in this trial, Das Schwarze Korps [The Black Corps]. They were not content with criticizing sentences, but proceeded to defame in public the judges who had passed the sentences. Himmler collected material by sending secret observers to the court sessions. The officials of the Ministry were watched and spied upon. Anonymous secret reports, in which the Ministry was attacked, were sent out. Persons who had been acquitted by court sentences were taken into police custody. Others, who had[293] been sentenced to a term in prison, were seized by the police, and as the administration of justice heard later, many of those persons were killed by shooting. All these things were intended and designed to undermine the confidence in the administration of justice. The administration of justice was to be discredited in public again and again as a backward and outmoded institution both as regards personnel and the subject matter. Himmler proceeded, I should like to say, with cynical frankness, on the basis of this propaganda. He deprived the Ministry of Justice of many fields of competence, and claimed for himself even many more fields of competence from the Ministry of Justice. He invoked the power of his position under Hitler and demanded that the competence for penal cases concerning Poles and Jews should be transferred to the police. His attempts to conquer the public prosecutor’s offices for the police continued until the end. It is obvious that that aim, which was placed higher and higher, by necessity would lead to the thought of whether one would not have to show that by new and more stringent measures one was in a position to overcome the criticism which Himmler used as a pretense, and thereby take the wind out of his sails.

*******

Q. What part did Bormann play in that struggle against the administration of justice?

A. Bormann’s work extended, above all, to personnel policy. Under the existing provisions, no ministry could appoint an official or promote him against the opposition of the Party Chancellery. The Reich Ministry of Justice always made its selection entirely on the basis of professional qualifications. Bormann, on the other hand, attached importance exclusively to the political opinion and the merits for the Party. If he objected to a suggestion made by the Ministry of Justice, and it was not possible to overcome the opposition, there was nothing else to be done at first, but to wait for a better situation perhaps, and leave the position unfilled. I experienced it myself that the position of a president of a district court of appeal remained vacant for that reason for more than a year. But it is obvious that the possibilities of such action had a certain limit. It was inadvisable to leave an unlimited number of positions vacant. And sometimes one was forced to appoint to the administration of justice personnel of only moderate qualifications, whereas persons who were better qualified were left out. Bormann knew very well how to promote Hitler’s antipathy for the administration of justice on the one hand, and on the other hand how to exploit the naturally weak and unpolitical position of the Ministry under Hitler. Hitler continuously[294] received newspaper clippings about court proceedings and sentences. Usually, the facts were distorted, or the reports, in any case, were always inadequate. Hitler was always approached on these subjects only at a moment when for some other reason he was disgruntled and his attention had to be distracted. Those reasons very often resulted from the war situation. For Bormann, the administration of justice was the lightning conductor. The Gauleiters cooperated with him. They collected the material with great glee by getting newspaper clippings from provincial newspapers. The Gauleiter of Munich [Gau Munich-Upper Bavaria], Wagner, excelled. Every opportunity was used to discredit the administration of justice before Hitler with entirely inadequate documentation. The key to that situation lies in a statement which Goering made to me at the time the administration of justice became centralized.[162] I will revert to that later. Therefore, our main endeavor had to be to inform Hitler at the earliest possible moment, and, of course, completely and honestly. I shall have an opportunity to explain how those attempts were constantly sabotaged by Bormann.

I should like to say now that our attempt was to prevent Hitler from changing sentences after they had been passed by suggesting that the presidents of the district court of appeal should confirm the sentences whereby merely a technical, nonpolitical review would have been carried out. That attempt was intentionally brought to naught by Bormann for he realized that thereby it would have been impossible for Hitler to reopen, on the initiative of Party, trials which had been concluded.

Q. The possibility which the witness mentioned concerning the possibility of Bormann’s interference with every appointment of an official results from the decree of 10 July 1937 published in the Reichsgesetzblatt of 1937, page 769.[163] I shall submit that decree in a supplement to my document book.

Witness, concerning the evidence submitted by the prosecution, could you discuss a case which reveals such efforts being made by the Party?

A. I am able to do that. I refer to the statements made by the prosecution witness Ferber. He dealt with a case about which Guertner had frequently talked to me. That was the case against Heller in which the law against motor car traps [Gesetz ueber die[295] Autofallen-Stellung] had been applied. For the information of the Tribunal I may say that law was promulgated on 22 June 1938. It is based on the particular initiative of Hitler.

The facts of the case were as follows: Soon after that law had been promulgated, Heller and his mistress as the riders of a driving school [sic][164] had attacked a driver and had robbed his money. While the case was being tried before the Special Court in Nuernberg in the presence of Gauleiter Streicher, and Denzler, the Gau legal office leader, Hitler appeared in Nuernberg unexpectedly. A death sentence against Heller was expected for certain. Evidently Streicher and Denzler intended to submit to Hitler in his presence a proposal for a death sentence on the basis of this new law in which Hitler was particularly interested. A telephone call was put through to the Ministry of Justice to hear an opinion on the question of clemency. Opposition was encountered there on the part of the Referent. That Referent was Ministerialrat Westphal, who was indicted here.[165] He refused to give his opinion because the legal problem which had arisen in the Heller case was being dealt with in a case before the Reich Supreme Court which was still pending and was there to be submitted for the opinion of the Reich Supreme Court judges. At that point the Party representatives became busy. Denzler reported this information to Hitler implying that Guertner obviously was sabotaging the application of this law, which Hitler himself had promoted, and he boasted that that was enough to bring about Guertner’s fall. At any rate, that interference on the part of the Party led to the fact that Hitler, following Denzler’s report, ordered the death sentence to be executed without waiting for the Ministry of Justice to give its opinion.

In Berlin, Hitler took to account the Referent Westphal in great anger for sabotaging the law, and only because Guertner acted on behalf of his own staff and only with the greatest effort was it possible to save Westphal.

Q. The Heller case which has just been mentioned begins in the transcript, page 1324, English text.[166]

What part did Goebbels play in that struggle against the administration of justice?

A. Goebbels set the machinery of propaganda to work against the administration of justice. He deluded the public by telling[296] them that the people no longer had any confidence in the judiciary. That was a delusion for the opposite was true.

His propaganda machine not only made direct or camouflaged attacks against the judiciary in public and tried to lower their prestige, but he also tried by his art of dialectics in his speeches on the administration of justice quite deliberately to lead the judges astray and to put their consciences as judges to sleep. He coined the concept of the exigency of the State, and said that the courts, too, ought to make that their starting point. For a sentence, first of all expedience was decisive, and only later, perhaps, justice might also be considered.

Q. Goebbels’ speech before the members of the People’s Court is contained in Document NG-417, Prosecution Exhibit 23.[167]

What were the opportunities at the disposal of those power groups and which they made use of in their struggle against the administration of justice?

A. Himmler, Bormann, and Goebbels were the closest confidants of Hitler. They had access to him at any time. For him they represented the uncompromising incarnation of national socialism. He listened to them when they alleged national socialism was being endangered by the administration of justice. The entire apparatus of Party politics, police, and espionage was at their disposal. On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice was entirely isolated. Contact between the ministries, which would have strengthened its position, no longer existed.

Q. Here I would like to refer to the verdict of the IMT, English transcript, page 16963[168], and I would like to quote that passage briefly: “As to the first reason for our decision, it is to be observed that from the time that it can be said that a conspiracy to make aggressive war existed the Reich cabinet did not constitute a governing body, but was merely an aggregation of administrative officers subject to the absolute control of Hitler.”

Witness, will you continue, please?

A. In view of that situation, what could a Ministry of Justice do which was directed merely by an Under-Secretary as acting Minister who, furthermore, was not a member of the Party and whose words, naturally, did not get the same hearing as those of a Minister; a man who, as the indictment said, never attained cabinet rank? According to an express instruction by Hitler, the chief only was told those things which were necessary for him to fulfill his own task. It is evident that that instruction made possible all kinds of limitations. * * *

(Recess)

[297]

Q. Witness, before the recess we discussed the possibilities at the disposal of these power groups. Please, will you continue.

A. I ventured to point out that Hitler had given an explicit order that a chief of any office should only be instructed about that which he had to know in order to carry out his tasks. And that went very far. That situation is better explained by the fact that Minister Guertner, for instance, only found out about the euthanasia decree[169] when in reports on the situation rendered by the presidents of the district courts of appeal, a certain suspicion arose that this decree was carried out, and Guertner categorically demanded an elucidation. Whereas other ministers were authorized to listen to foreign broadcasts, that was prohibited to the Minister of Justice under threat of punishment. When I objected against this, I was told in reply that I should turn to the Ministry of Propaganda which would inform me about everything that happened.

I may point out that the opinion of the International Military Tribunal states that on account of the control over broadcasting and the press, and the propaganda machine, an independent judgment based on freedom of thought became an absolute impossibility. I, from my own experience, can only confirm that statement. A significant example is given by the following occurrence—an example showing the extent of that spy system. The Gauleiter of East Prussia had protested against the administration of justice in his district. In order to examine these complaints in 1940 or 1941—I do not know the date precisely any more—I traveled to Koenigsberg and found out that as for the reports by the president of the district court of appeal, the Gauleiter was informed about these reports sooner than I was. Based on warnings received from reliable sources, I had to expect that in the various offices of the municipality which I had to visit, special microphones had been installed for the occasion of my visit, and I could only talk with my personal Referent by driving out to the beach and picking out an isolated beach chair there in order to be able to talk to him without anybody listening to us and spying on us.

[298]

Q. The passage in the opinion of the International Military Tribunal, to which the witness referred, is contained in the English transcript on page 16,813.[170] Witness, the prosecution charges you with the fact that the Ministry of Justice was in an official contact with these offices which you have just mentioned. What can you say about this?

A. I believe that that contact is inherent in the structure of the State: the distribution of tasks to the various agencies. A cooperation with the police was certainly to a certain extent unavoidable. According to German law of criminal procedure, the prosecution is not in a position at all, without the cooperation of the police, to carry out the required investigations pending trial. If a denouncement has been received by the prosecution, the prosecution has to conduct the necessary investigation first of all. That the prosecution should do all that itself, considering the large number of things to be done, is quite impossible. The prosecution, therefore, has to turn to the local police and, for good reasons, in the German Judicature Act and the German Code for Penal Procedure, the police are designated as an auxiliary organ for the prosecution and directed to cooperate upon request of the prosecution.

Apart from the police, frequently the SD is mentioned in the trial. On the part of Hitler, the SD apart from its function within the Party had received important tasks, such as the delivery of information to various Reich agencies, and therefore even the court authorities had to refer to that source of information.

Q. In this connection, may I refer to Document NG-219, Prosecution Exhibit 42.[171] Please continue.

A. The position of the Party Chancellery, was regulated legally in a way that changes of personnel, that is to say, promotions and appointments could only take place with the cooperation on the part of the Party Chancellery. That I have already pointed out. Added to this was the fact that in 1942, the Chief of the Party Chancellery was given the position of a Reich Minister participating in legislation. It was therefore necessary to let him participate in the preparation of every law.

Q. The decree of 16 January 1942, to which reference was just made, I shall submit as Schlegelberger Document 23, Schlegelberger Exhibit 63.[172]

A. And then finally the Ministry of Propaganda. The fact that this Ministry was directed by Goebbels may cause, to a non-German’s[299] mind, the misconception that this was a Party function. That, as I said, would be a misconception because the Ministry of Propaganda was not a Party office but a Ministry, just as the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Finance, or the Foreign Office, and that there was an official channel between all the ministries is a matter of course in every state. But that connection was also a necessity from the point of view of [self] defense. Only thus was it possible, at least from time to time, to guard oneself against surprises. Only thus was it possible, perhaps in the very last moment, to make successful objections.

Q. The witness referred to a provision of the Code of Penal Procedure according to which the prosecution could authorize the police to make investigations. That is article 161 of the Code of Penal Procedure. Furthermore, in this connection, article 146 of the Judicature Act has to be considered. About the importance of reports and information from the SD, I shall submit as Schlegelberger Document 92, Schlegelberger Exhibit 85, a report from the handbook for allied troops.

Witness, in your own camp, that is to say in the field of the administration of justice itself, did you have to fight against opposition?

A. That question, unfortunately, I have to confirm emphatically. First of all, and very briefly, I again have to mention Frank in this connection, the representative of the National Socialist legal ideology, who through all available channels succeeded in bringing this thought before the public. As means, he had at his disposal, first the legal publications under his influence, the National Socialist Legal Workers’ League whose president he was, and the Academy of German Law which he had created. That academy which possibly, in view of its composition, could be considered a sort of scientific institute to aid the administration of justice, evolved by Frank as a competition in order to direct the Ministry of Justice, to overrule and to discredit it with the Party. As soon as he found out, from his own information sources, that the Ministry of Justice intended to carry out reforms, he mobilized his academy immediately which on its part was to prepare plans and to publish them, and not much emphasis was placed upon their quality. But the main purpose was to demonstrate that Frank was the leader of the living young justice in opposition to the old senile machinery of justice of the State. Apart from that goal to carry out his famous thesis, “Right is that which serves the German people,” he also for personal ambitions and, last but not least, for that ambition, had intentions to take over the post of Ministry of Justice.

[300]

Q. Could you name other personalities who in that manner fought against the administration of justice?

A. From the inside, unfortunately, yes. I have not completed my statement. I am thinking of Thierack. Thierack had very close connections to Bormann. He concentrated his efforts at first on the President of the People’s Court, a position he held at the time. Behind the back of the Ministry of Justice in 1936, he arranged that Hitler make a speech before the People’s Court. As these proceedings have shown, in 1937 he had attempted to arrange another speech of that kind.

Q. The witness refers here to Document NG-209, Prosecution Exhibit 105.[173]

A. The judges of the People’s Court in this manner should be brought to understand that the People’s Court was an institution of a special nature, in closest connection to Hitler himself; and that it was only by a mistaken step that the People’s Court had been incorporated into the administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice; and concerning that administrative connection in 1938, again in all secrecy, he tried through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, to have the presidency of the People’s Court, following the Italian example, subordinated immediately to Hitler. To my knowledge, Thierack, after he became Minister,[174] did not continue with these attempts. As I was informed from various sources, in his attempts to become Minister, he is alleged to have promised to the Party that the office of the prosecution should be turned over to the police. I shall later refer to the occurrences during the trial of the Czech Minister-President Elias; but in the end I still have to emphasize what extraordinary difficulties were made for me by the personality of Freisler.

Q. Who was Freisler?

A. Well, the witness Behl once characterized Freisler as the representative of the Party interests in the Ministry of Justice. That was correct. His career was the following: Freisler was a prisoner of war in Russia during the First World War. After the end of the war he remained in Russia for a considerable period of time. About his activities during that period of time in Russia, a veil has never been completely lifted. After he returned, he became an attorney at Kassel, mainly acting as defense counsel for National Socialists. When the Prussian Ministry of Justice was put in the hands of Minister Kerrl, the latter called the old[301] Party member, Freisler, to the post of Under Secretary. He remained there until in 1934, on the occasion of the merger of both offices in 1934, he was transferred to the Reich Ministry of Justice. Freisler no doubt possessed a high degree of intelligence, but quite apparently he was of abnormal spiritual inclinations that ranged from extreme brutality all the way to a rather feminine weakness. After he had insulted his assistants in the worst possible manner without any reason, it would occur that soon after he came to them to ask for their forgiveness in a very servile manner. The Tribunal has actually made the acquaintance of Freisler optically and acoustically.[175] He was quite well informed about problems of criminal law, but he lacked any continuity and seriousness in his work. He was restless and imbued with a lust for power, always looking for new tasks and new problems. He was an old Party member, and he had the Golden Party Badge, but he represented that type of National Socialist who again and again fearfully vied for the favor of Hitler. Hitler definitely recognized him as a one hundred percent National Socialist, but personally did not think as much of him as Freisler would have liked. Therefrom, and from his task to supervise the Ministry from the National Socialist point of view, and from his indisputable intelligence and his expert knowledge in the field of criminal law, the dangerous qualities in his personality could be seen. He knew where he had to start in order to achieve his goals. To work with him was extremely difficult, and I may well say here that Freisler was the one, after all, who undermined the work and the strength of Guertner and contributed to his early death. And so, as far as I was concerned, my continuous attempts to restrict Freisler made it extremely difficult for me in my position. He did not stick to decisions which we had made in long debates. He made secret promises to the [Nazi] Party which, after they became apparent, restricted the Minister in his possibilities of action.

Again and again I discovered that, partly intentionally, partly out of neglect, he had failed to report to me on important occurrences. He had prohibited his ministerial directors from reporting to me directly. He wanted to do everything alone. In addition, although he did not drink much, he could not restrain himself once he started to drink, and in a condition of that kind he frequently made statements which gave an entirely wrong picture of the intentions of the Minister. Then when the disappointment came, when the agencies concerned found out that the practice of the Ministry was not according to these statements, then, of[302] course, there were serious accusations on the part of the Party and a renewed struggle.

His unstable nature brought it about that when I made objections to him he, frequently in tears, promised to better himself; but his moral strength was not sufficient to make him keep these promises for any length of time.

Of course, my position with regard to Freisler was weaker than that of Guertner. I was, indeed, in charge of the work of the Ministry, but only due to the fact that I was the senior Under Secretary; otherwise we were on the same level. The possibility of influencing him or influencing others against him, was very limited for me, all the more because my mission was not set for a certain time, but could be repealed any day. Therefore, I could only find the optimal accomplishment of my tasks in maintaining the status quo in the Ministry of Justice as it was at the time of Guertner’s death; especially if one takes into consideration as a matter of course that on the one hand the attacks from the Party became stronger, being faced with a weaker man in charge of the Ministry, and that on the other hand this weaker man was always confronted with the necessity of an increased resistance on his part.

In these proceedings here the witness, Father Wein,[176] confirmed that during the time when I was in charge of conducting the affairs, the administration of justice had not deteriorated and that only the appointment of Thierack brought about an absolute change-over. I ask you to try to understand that in that I found a justification for the work of my life under these conditions as I have described them.

Q. What did the taking over of the post of Minister by Thierack mean to you?

A. I believe I should continue at the point where the speech made by the prosecution left off. The prosecution said, “Schlegelberger had seen the storm brewing.” That is quite correct. I anticipated a storm, and I tried to prevent it. The attitude of Thierack up to that time and his close relations with Bormann did not leave any doubt as to his program, and just as I interpreted that, it came about. As soon as Thierack assumed office, a complete change-over occurred. It was not a gradual deterioration, but it was that famous construction of a strong National Socialist administration of justice as it had been ordered by Hitler. I merely point to the changes in the administration of justice and in legislation which are contained in material submitted by the prosecution. If one sees what had been demanded for a long time and which by all means was tried to achieve, if one sees how that[303] all of a sudden now came into effect, I believe then only one can find the right measure for that which I, in a continuous struggle, had prevented or had delayed. I do not want to omit but to describe briefly the complete change in personnel policy. With the exception of the man in charge of the budget department, all ministerial directors were released by Thierack and many Referenten transferred. The entire top level of the Ministry had changed overnight. Furthermore, twenty-two presidents of district courts of appeal, eleven of them the best ones on the basis of their qualifications, and four general prosecutors were retired.

If in the dire situation of war such a unique measure is taken, one demonstrates most clearly that my dismissal and the appointment of Thierack, in the feeling of Hitler and Thierack, represent the point at which an entire new development starts. The purge measures by Thierack were extended also to the many non-Aryan judges or judges with Jewish relatives who at that time were still in service and to many officials who did not just belong to the Party.

I believe that my decision to fight until the very limit, and to stay that long in the Ministry, has found its justification. Clearly anticipating that with that new man [Thierack] chaos would start for the administration of justice, there was only one thing left to me; although the burden physically and psychologically was at times almost impossible to bear, to try and bear it, and to fight as resiliently as possible. Of course, it was clear to me, and I had to experience the fact too, that I would be beaten at times, and had to decide to make detours wherever I could take that upon my conscience.

Q. In your opinion, what was that extreme limit which could still be justified—of those which you have just mentioned?

A. If the Tribunal was good enough to follow me in the description of my life, then it will easily recognize what my work at that time meant to a man whose life was devoted to the law. At times, today, it is hard even for me to transfer myself back again into those days and to bring those days back. In a system which was worked out to the very last detail of expediency and power, there was a lonely island amidst the continuous storm in those days—that was the administration of justice. I had to experience how the storm hit again and again, and how certain sacrifices had to be made to this storm of power in order to prevent it from triumphing completely. For me, in that situation, there was only one consideration—can a measure be made compatible with the uncompromising principles of law such as I had considered them so far as a matter of course? Was not everything now only a question of power? How could I avoid that lust for power and[304] prevent the accomplishment of these designs? What will go through regardless of my cooperation and what can I prevent without cooperation? And that deliberation led me to find that extreme limit which I have mentioned before. It was for me the final abolition of the independence of the courts. I had to try to maintain this independence at all costs. In spite of and in the face of the devilish propaganda on the part of Goebbels, I was of the firm conviction that the German courts and German judges were still in good shape. Although, now, from the large number of the many sentences, particularly of the more recent period, the prosecution may select a few in order to prove that legal principles were abandoned in the sentences. To deal with individual cases is not my task in these proceedings. A full examination of the entire field of the administration of justice would show that this conviction of mine was very well founded, and that the maintenance of the integrity of the German courts was a goal which was well worth my work and my trouble; because I was, and still am, of the opinion that the work of the courts is the most secure guaranty for the law. Therefore, I tried again and again to draw various fields within the scope of work of the courts. For instance, in the economic field, the problem of getting agriculture [farms] out of debt [Landwirtschaftliche Entschuldung], the question of hereditary and marriage health, but the basic prerequisite was that the courts had to remain independent. When, in 1937, in the German Civil Service Law, Hitler was given the right to retire any civil servant if this civil servant could not be expected at any time to fight for the National Socialist State, in my capacity as chief of the Department for Public Law at the Ministry, I had a security clause inserted for the judges; this clause provided that measures regarding the judicial civil servant could not be based on the objective contents of a judge’s decision. Once the independence of the courts was lost, the protection of the courts was lost, too. The activity of the courts could even become a danger. Therefore, I drew for myself this extreme limit for my stay in office. With the resolution of the Reichstag of 26 April 1942,[177] my struggle reached its final stage. It was not quite clear, as it appeared frequently with Hitler’s speeches whether or not his speech had attacked the administration of justice merely for tactical reasons, and whether the true objects were general ones.[178] Dr. Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, to whom I spoke immediately after the speech about all these matters, confirmed that background to me as being the true objective of Hitler’s polemics. I had to create clarity. I wrote to Hitler a report[305] [Fuehrerinformation] to the effect that the judges were extremely disturbed by that speech. I had explained to the judges that with all the weight of my office, I would protect every judge who acted according to his conscience and to the law. That clarified the situation as far as I was concerned. If Hitler’s speech really meant the beginning of the end of the independence of the courts, then he had to consider my statement as an open declaration of war. That was what I wanted, and I wanted to bring about a breach, in that case, on purpose.

Q. How did your dismissal come about?

A. Hitler at first did not answer that letter which I just mentioned. There was a lot of talk behind the scenes about a new appointment for the post of Minister. A few weeks later, Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, called me to him and told me that Hitler had made up his mind to appoint a new Minister of Justice, and he asked me what my attitude would be if the choice fell on Thierack. I replied that to work with Thierack was quite out of the question. Literally, I added, “I would not sit at the same table with Thierack.” Lammers replied, that was what he had thought, and for that eventuality he was instructed by Hitler to offer me another office comparable to the position I was holding. He had thought it over and was now prepared to offer me the position of President of the Reich Supreme Administrative Court. I rejected that offer and asked Lammers to inform Hitler that I would accept a new office under no circumstances, but wanted to be retired. Soon after, Lammers wrote me that I should come to his quarters at Zhitomir and receive the document concerning my retirement from office and thereafter, to report to Hitler at his headquarters at Vinnitsa in order to take my leave. That order I carried out. On that occasion, Lammers, on order from Hitler, gave me a check for 100,000 marks, which should make it easier for me to bridge the transition into retirement.

I was not happy about that donation; on the contrary, I was greatly disturbed. I got in touch with the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, Dr. Meissner, and asked how I could avoid accepting that amount. Meissner replied that refusal was impossible, because it would mean an unfriendly act toward Hitler, and all the bad consequences would have to be accepted. Thereupon, I did not return the check and when the Russians came, that amount was still untouched in the bank. At Vinnitsa, Hitler received me. The conversation lasted about 20 minutes. Hitler told me approximately the following: He required his officials to carry out his instructions without criticism of any kind. He added, “Since you have already criticized my measures, I believe it is better if we separate.” He was referring to the report which I have already[306] mentioned. I took advantage of that opportunity to tell Hitler with all the frankness at my disposal that an intact and independent administration of justice was a vital question for Germany; that his method to form his judgment on the basis of information received from Gauleiters, and his intention to retire judges who had done their duty, was an impossibility. The very concept of a judge required independence. People would never respect the judgment of a dependent judge as an expression of law. I added that if I had remained in office, I would have continued to protect anybody who was prosecuted unjustly.

Hitler took these statements on the whole quite calmly. Time and time again he even nodded approval; but when I touched upon the question of the independence of judges in connection with his Reichstag speech he suddenly harangued against the generals and got into a hot fury which slowly ebbed like a dying flame.

Q. The prosecution alleges that there was a conspiratorial cooperation between you and your codefendants. Will you briefly describe your relations with the codefendants?

A. As for these relations I have, in part, to answer absolutely in the negative. A number of my codefendants I have only met here. Not with a single one of the defendants here did I have any personal contact beyond official connections. These official contacts in most cases consisted of just occasional conferences required by the work.

As the defendants’ dock shows, the prosecution has selected a mere few from the large number of officials of the administration of justice. All of them, together with other colleagues, worked only in that field to which they were assigned. If one would follow the principle of conspiracy as expounded by the prosecution, the entire administration of justice since 1933 would have to be considered one organization in the meaning of the count of the indictment. And I believe that an opinion of that nature would best be rebutted by the fact that when I left the Ministry of Justice, that great change took place. That is sufficient rebuttal for the assertion of personal homogeneity of the officials and the judges.

Q. We want to depart now from personal matters and discuss the complaints made against you. The objective charges made against you begin with the centralization [Verreichlichung] of the administration of justice. Will you give us your general point of view concerning that question?

A. When the empire was founded in 1871, certain agencies of the Reich were founded as an over-all authority beyond the limits of the individual federal state. The same occurred in the field of[307] justice. At that time, it was called the Reich Justice Office [Reichjustizamt] and, in fact, was a Reich Ministry. Later, it got that name. The Reich Justice Office had almost exclusively legislative functions. It had to deal with regulations for the administration of justice.

Once such a regulation had been passed, all states had to issue executive laws for the execution of the respective regulation. That meant that after each major Reich law had been passed, more than 20 laws had to be passed in the various states to carry out the principles of the Reich law.

What that machinery meant can be seen if one looks at the collection of these executive laws of various states. With great surprise you find that this fills two fat volumes. As for administrative tasks, the Reich Justice Office, as already mentioned, only had to take care of the Reich Supreme Court, and in the course of time, the Reich Patent Office. Here, also, the various states [Laender] had to cooperate. The selection of judges for the Reich Supreme Court required most difficult negotiations. One has to have seen that, in order to realize fully with what jealousy each individual state saw to it that these various posts were filled according to a definite key.

It could happen that a small state could not even offer an appropriate candidate for such a position at the Reich Supreme Court, but then one had to preserve the claim and register it very carefully so that the next time, they could be given it. It was just as difficult to select officials for the Ministry of Justice. That, too, required negotiations and thus it came about that, long before 1933, everywhere, the desire for a uniform administration of justice for the entire Reich was expressed. I may remind you that the witness Behl[179] has stated that even the Social Democratic Party of Germany was expressly of that same opinion.

Q. Witness, you referred to the assumption of the administration of justice by the Reich.

A. Before the recess I pointed out that the desire for a uniform, centralized administration of justice had already existed in the period prior to 1933. The Reich Minister of Justice, Guertner, worked for that idea of the centralization of the administration of justice with great energy. The fact that he as a Bavarian did so, although it is generally known how very much Bavaria was interested in a life of its own, explains best the fact that Guertner had very good reasons for doing so. As often occurs in life, by accident a circumstance arose which speeded up the execution of that idea. This is what happened:

[308]

Once when I had a conversation with Kerrl, the Minister of Justice of Prussia at that time, and visited with him the training camp for Prussian law students—a camp which has been repeatedly referred to in this trial—I said to him that it must have cost a great deal of money to set up that camp; Kerrl laughed and replied, quite frankly:

I was more than disgusted when I heard about those practices he thus unveiled. I made a report to Guertner.

The right of supervision over the Ministries of Justice of the Laender, was not in the hands of the Reich Minister of Justice. Guertner and I agreed that those practices must be stopped at the earliest possible moment, all the more so since one did not know whether or not in other Laender, similar things might be happening as were happening in Prussia. One could not tell what was happening because the ministries of the Laender throughout had new men working with them concerning whose persons, in some cases, one had certain misgivings, and justified misgivings. Frank was the Minister of Justice for Bavaria, and Thierack was the Minister of Justice for Saxony.

That experience increased Guertner’s energy in carrying out his work of centralization. The basis for that work was laid down in the first and second centralization laws dated 16 February and 5 December 1934.[180]

The result of the centralization, the transfer of the tasks of the Ministries of Justice of the Laender to the Reich, was this, from the political angle: The entire administration of justice from now on lay in the hands of a minister who was not a member of the Party and who, as Minister of Justice for Bavaria, had enjoyed the confidence of all parties from the extreme right to the extreme left. I myself, who also was not a member of the Party, remained at my post. The National Socialist Ministers of Justice of the Laender lost their official positions in the administration of justice.

The opinions of the Party as to the centralization of the administration of justice is evidenced best by a statement of Goering’s, which he made to me in 1941 when, in the course of a[309] conversation, I said to him that the Party at every opportunity made difficulties for our ministry, he said to me: “That cannot surprise you. The reason lies in the centralization of the administration of justice under the circumstances under which it was achieved. That is the reason why the Party as a group is opposed to the Reich Ministry of Justice and makes life as difficult as possible for that ministry. The Party is of the opinion that the administration of justice should again be taken over by National Socialist hands.” Goering added, “I myself will never pardon Guertner and you for the way you acted in 1934.”

Q. I shall submit Schlegelberger Document 26, Schlegelberger Exhibit 66,[181] in reference to the aforesaid statements. Will you please give us a brief description of the organization of the Reich Ministry of Justice?

A. Under the very top, that is, under the Reich Minister of Justice, there were two separate under secretariats: the under secretariat for civil law matters, the head of which was myself; the direction of the secretariat for penal law matters which was in the hands of Freisler. Further, he was in charge of the so-called organization section [Organisationreferat], the Hereditary Farm Law [Erbhofrecht] and the Inspection Office for Judicial Affairs [Justizpruefungsamt].

Under the two under secretariats there worked a total of six ministerial directors each of whom was the head of his specialized divisions. The number of these divisions and their sphere of work changed several times in the course of time.

Inside some departments, subsections had been created which were in charge of a Ministerialdirigent. The number of higher officials[182] in the Reich Ministry of Justice amounted to approximately 250. Personnel matters were divided into regions. As regards the East, I was only in charge of my own home province, East Prussia. Otherwise, I dealt with western and southern Germany, Freisler was in charge of the remaining [regions]. Freisler was in charge of the People’s Court. The Reich Supreme Court and the Reich patent office were in my charge. The two divisions, directed by Under Secretaries were entirely separate from one another. Freisler and myself had different times at which we went to report to the Minister. The Minister asked me to come to see him when Freisler had finished his report and had left the room. Only very rarely, and only when one of my officials was to be appointed to a head office in Freisler’s sphere, or vice versa, did[310] the two of us meet at the Minister’s. If one of the under secretaries was absent, his affairs were dealt with by the Minister together with the competent ministerial director. The other under secretary did not deputize for the one who was absent.

May I cite an example? In 1938 I had to go to the hospital as a result of an accident, and at that time the Minister did not discuss the new German marriage law with Freisler, but with the head of the respective department. If the Minister were also absent, the Under Secretary, who was present in Berlin, did only a certain amount of duty for his colleague. That is to say, he was available for matters which could not possibly be postponed. In my recollection, that happened only very rarely, for this was one point over which Freisler and I were in absolute agreement. Neither had the wish to meddle with the other’s affairs.

Furthermore, Freisler when he went on a business trip or when he went away for the summer holidays was practically always in contact with Berlin. Therefore, he told Dr. Guertner that a deputy for which I was the only possible candidate was neither necessary nor desirable. It did happen that when the Minister did not feel well and left the office earlier, he asked me by telephone to sign and to dispatch letters which he had already signed in draft form. Now and then that could have concerned matters which fell into Freisler’s sphere when Freisler could not be reached.

I should like to cite as example the letter which the prosecution submitted about the fight against political Catholicism. Concerning details accompanying that letter, I know nothing about this. In particular, I do not know what particular pressure was exercised or what instructions Hitler had issued in virtue of his right to lay down the directives of policy but I should like on this occasion to say something about what was the practice of the Ministry in regard to church affairs. I should like to point out what the witness for the prosecution, the Catholic Priest, Schosser, testified here on 9 May. According to his testimony, the Ministry refused on the occasion of a church funeral for Poles to take steps against the Catholic clergymen.

Dr. Kubuschok: The letter which you have mentioned is Document NG-630, Prosecution Exhibit 428.[183] The examination which you mentioned here of Father Schosser is on page 3021 in the English transcript.[184]

[311]

*******

A. Introduction

This major section of the volume contains selections from the evidence concerning leading questions or issues of the trial. The evidence selected for publication herein constitutes only about one-twentieth of the total mimeographed record. Hence, all issues of the trial are not covered, and numerous items of evidence mentioned in the printed materials are not reproduced herein. Where extracts from testimony have been reproduced, a footnote indicates the pages of the official mimeographed transcript where the entire testimony can be found.

Both prosecution and defense evidence is contained in each of the sections into which the evidence selected has been organized. The prosecution evidence consists in the main of contemporaneous documents of the Nazi era, most of them discovered in German archives by Allied investigators after Germany’s unconditional surrender. The defense evidence consists principally of extracts from the testimony of defendants. A substantial number of the contemporaneous documents offered by the defense have also been selected for publication. With one or two exceptions, the contemporaneous documents have been reproduced within the various sections in chronological order, regardless of whether they were offered by the prosecution or the defense. In selecting defense testimony under the various topical sections, considerable emphasis has been given to the testimony of the three defendants Schlegelberger, Rothenberger, and Klemm who were appointed Under Secretaries in the Reich Ministry of Justice, and to the testimony of the defendant Rothaug, presiding judge of the Nuernberg Special Court.

The defendants were charged with participation in various types of criminal conduct “by distortion and denial of judicial and penal process.” The selections from the evidence below have been grouped into five main sections (sec. VB through VF) treating of various types of conduct by which it was alleged that the defendants engaged in criminal acts as principals or accessories.

In Hitler’s Third Reich many persons were placed entirely outside the judicial process. Therefore the first section (B) is concerned with measures under which persons were committed to[312] the “protective custody” of the police (usually the Gestapo) or to the concentration camps of Himmler’s SS.

The next four sections (C through F) deal with various methods whereby it was charged that perversions of law and the judicial process were employed to persecute, imprison, and execute or exterminate large numbers of persons. Section C, which contains evidence on numerous topics, has been divided into three periods of time: 1933—January 1941 when Guertner was Reich Minister of Justice; January 1941—August 1942, when the defendant Schlegelberger was acting Reich Minister of Justice; and August 1942—1945, when Thierack was Reich Minister of Justice. The next section (D) deals with large groups of persons allegedly subjected to discriminatory treatment of many kinds: Germans, Poles, Jews of several nationalities, the Night and Fog prisoners from occupied western Europe, and others. Section E deals with the growth, development, and application of such concepts as treason, undermining the defensive strength, and public enemies. These concepts were applied in cases against persons who were not nationals of Germany as well as against Germans. The final section (F) deals with the handling of religious matters.

Because of the close relationship of the developments of these various topics to the crowded history of the Nazi regime, there necessarily is considerable over-lap between the several sections into which the evidence has been organized. A case where a Pole was convicted of treason against Germany (reproduced here in sec. E) cannot be divorced from the materials concerning the general treatment of Poles (included in sec. D2). The Night and Fog prisoners offer another example, since these prisoners were ordinarily kept incommunicado in concentration camps, and the evidence concerning them (D3) is closely related to the evidence dealing with protective custody and concentration camps (B). The over-lap is often quite pronounced in the extracts from the testimony of defendants. Most of the defendants were active in a number of different fields and held different official positions during the 12 years of the Nazi era. In making out his case, each defendant chose his own course in grouping together various items. In facing this unavoidable problem of over-lap, the editors have employed footnotes extensively in making cross-references between the materials contained in various sections, particularly in extracts from testimony where mention is made of decrees and other documents reproduced in various parts of the volume.

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B. Measures Outside the Judicial Process—Protective Custody, Transfer of Persons to Concentration Camps and the Police

No. 76 Order concerning measures of protective custody, Executive Order of the Prussian Ministry of Justice of 15 March 1934 (I 3540), German Justice, page 341.

On account of its importance also with regard to the official sphere of activities of judicial authorities, I hereby inform these authorities of the following decree, by the Prussian Ministerpraesident (Secret State Police), dated 11 March 1934.

Berlin, 11 March 1934

The Prussian Ministerpraesident [Goering]

Secret State Police

Insp. 1946/11 March 34

Subject: Order concerning protective custody

Effective immediately I order the following:

1. The regulations which so far dealt with competence with regard to the application of protective custody for political reasons are cancelled. In future restrictions of personal freedom in accordance with article 1 of the Decree for the Protection of the People and State, dated 28 February 1933, may be ordered with effect on the entire state territory [of Prussia] by the Secret State Police Office only, and within their local fields of jurisdiction by the Oberpraesidenten, Regierungspraesidenten, the police president in Berlin and the local state police offices.

The district police authorities, especially the Landraete, are no longer competent for such measures. The measures hitherto ordered by them will be rescinded as per 31 March unless they have been extended by order of the competent police authorities of the constituent states.

[Page 342]

Offices of the Party and the affiliated organizations may not carry out arrests on their own initiative. In case of disobedience[314] to this order the competent authority will interfere, and report to me, at once.

To the Ober- and Regierungspraesidenten

Secret State Police Office in Berlin

Police President in Berlin

State Police Offices

Copy

3751 PS of the IMT

The Reich Minister of Justice

Z.F.g 10—1717.34

Personal

Berlin, 14 May 1935

To the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior,

Berlin

Subject: Mistreatment of Communist prisoners by policemen

Enclosure: 1 loose sheet

My Dear Reich Minister!

Enclosed you will find copy of a report of the inspector of the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935.[188]

This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental attitude toward the question of the beating of internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have come to the knowledge of the administration of justice can be divided into three different causes for such ill-treatment of prisoners.

1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment [Hausstrafe] in concentration camps.

2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to make them talk.

[315]

3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer fun, or for sadistic motives.

I should like to make the following detailed comments on those three categories:

About No. 1. In the remand prisons and penal establishments under the Ministry of Justice, there was no need to introduce corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure. The experience of the administration of justice has taught that a well trained, reliable, and conscientious personnel of wardens is in a position to set up and to maintain model order under a strict discipline, even without corporal punishment. The more training and discipline the prison guards have, the less need exists to introduce corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure.

But if, contrary to this view, one is to suppose that there might be a need to introduce corporal punishment in concentration camps, it appears indispensable that this disciplinary measure and the manner of its application should be determined, uniformly and unambiguously, for the whole territory of the Reich. It has happened recently that camp orders of individual concentration camps concerning this matter and the use of weapons, contained unusually severe instructions which were brought to the knowledge of the internees as a stern warning, while the warden personnel was administratively informed that these regulations which dated mostly from 1933 were no longer applicable. Such a situation is equally dangerous for the warden personnel and for the internees. It would therefore appear, after the question of imposing protective custody was generally settled by the competent minister, that in the interests of all concerned, one should urgently and clearly define responsibility and legal aspect, furthermore that the same responsible authority would have to settle, by means of camp regulations generally applicable, the question of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure, which is still unclarified, as well as the question of the use of arms by the warden personnel.

About No. 2. I cannot concur with the opinions expressed in the enclosed letter. The present penal law, which I have to enforce, renders liable to particularly severe penalties those officials guilty of inflicting ill-treatment in the performance of their duties, especially when such ill-treatment is used to extort admissions or statements. That these legal provisions also reflect the will of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor is shown by the fact that, during the suppression of the Roehm revolt, the Fuehrer ordered the shooting of three members of the SS who had ill-treated prisoners in Stettin. That being the legal situation, it is out of order to grant[316] silently one part of the police forces permission to extort statements by means of ill-treating prisoners. Such a measure would destroy the respect for the existing laws and would thereby lead necessarily to the confusion and demoralization of the officials concerned.

Furthermore, such statements extorted by force are practically without value if they are supposed to serve as evidence in trials for high treason. The courts which have jurisdiction in cases of high treason consider to an ever increasing degree statements of the defendants made before the police as worthless and without any evidenciary value for court decisions. This was the result of their getting convinced in the course of numerous proceedings that confessions and statements made before the police were extorted by ill-treatment.

Moreover, I cannot follow the statements contained in the attached report in as much as the beating of Communists held in custody is regarded as an indispensable police measure for a more effective suppression of Communist activities. These explanations of the Gestapo office show precisely that the methods used up to now have not been successful in combatting the illegal Communist machine or to hinder its development.

Experience shows that such police measures may perhaps partially be successful but that they never can attain a total suppression and destruction of an illegal revolutionary organization which alone is of importance in the long run. Behind such revolutionary organizations there are professional revolutionaries of great experience and frequently exceptional intelligence. These succeed very soon by means of cleverly camouflaging all more important functionaries in excluding for all practical purposes the possibility of betrayal as a result of mistreatment.

About No. 3. The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally lose pretty soon the feeling for the purpose and meaning of their actions and permit themselves to be governed by personal feelings of revenge or by sadistic tendencies. As an example, members of the guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow near Stettin completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a fashion that 2 months later the woman still showed two open and infected wounds on the right side of her buttocks, one 17.7 by 21.5 centimeters and the other 12.5 by 16.5 centimeters, as well as a similar wound on the left side of the buttocks 7.5 by 17 centimeters. In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then tortured by blowing in cigarette[317] smoke, upsetting the locker, etc. In some cases the prisoners were given salt herring to eat, so as to produce an especially strong and torturing thirst. In the Hohenstein concentration camp in Saxony, prisoners had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this purpose until the drops of water which fell down in even intervals caused seriously infected wounds in their scalps. In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed for days—once without interruption for 3 days and nights, once 5 days and nights—to a grating in the form of a cross, being fed so meagerly with dried bread that they almost died of hunger.

These few examples show such a degree of cruelty which is an insult to every German sensibility, that it is impossible to consider any extenuating circumstances.

In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these three points to you, my dear Reich Minister, in your capacity as cabinet member in charge of the establishment of protective custody and the camps for protective custody.

1. It seems now absolutely necessary that the competent minister should decree unified camp regulations for all camps for protective custody, which shall regulate completely and unmistakably the question of corporal punishment as disciplinary measure, and the question of use of weapons by the guards.

2. It appears necessary that the competent cabinet minister order valid for all police authorities an absolute prohibition against mistreatment of prisoners for the purpose of forcing statements.

3. All mistreatments which are entirely or partly due to personal reasons must be prosecuted vigorously and punished under close cooperation of all governmental offices concerned.

Heil Hitler!

[Signed] Dr. Guertner

Copy

The Chief of the Security Police

Berlin, 12 June 1937

S-P (II B) No. 4021/37

[Handwritten] Annulled 28 August 1937

[Handwritten] Ku

[318]

Subject: Protective custody for Jewish race defilers.

From what I can see from a statistical survey, cases of race defilement have increased considerably recently. In order to take preventive measures against this danger, it is to be examined in every single case of race defilement whether protective custody is necessary after the sentence inflicted by law has been served.

For this purpose I request that a short report be made 1 month prior to the discharge of the condemned from prison with the valid judgment concerning the case of race defilement attached.

Apart from this I request that immediately after termination of legal proceedings in a case of race defilement in which a male person of German blood has been sentenced, the Jewess involved be taken into protective custody and reported to this office.

No publicity whatever is to be made of this order.

[Signed] Heydrich

S. Certified: [Signed] Kaskath

Clerk

To all—

• Higher State Police Offices
• State Police Offices
• Higher State Police Offices
• Criminal Police Offices

EXTRACTS FROM THE REGULATIONS OF THE REICH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, 25 JANUARY 1938,[189] CONCERNING PROTECTIVE CUSTODY

*******

Circular Decree[190] of the Reich Minister of the Interior

25 January 1938—Pol. S-V I No. 70/37—179 g

Secret

Article 1

Admissibility

1. For the protection against potential enemies of the people and the State, the Secret State Police [Gestapo] is hereby authorized[319] to impose protective custody as a compulsory measure on all persons who through their behavior endanger the welfare and the security of the people and the State.

2. Protective custody shall not be decreed for punitive purposes or to take the place of legal imprisonment. Punishable acts are to be judged by the courts.

Article 2

Competence

1. Competence to order a person into protective custody rests exclusively with the office of the Secret State Police.

2. Motions for an order of protective custody are to be addressed through the local and regional State Police agencies to the office of the Secret State Police. With every motion detailed reasons are to be given which must include defensive statements [Einlassungen] made by the arrested person. As soon as the person under provisional arrest has been interrogated, a copy of this interrogation will be forwarded immediately.

3. An order for protective custody can only be issued after the accused has been heard on the charges raised against him.

Article 3

Temporary Arrest

1. The office of the Secret State Police, and the regional and local state police agencies are authorized to order the temporary arrest of any person to whom the provisions of article 1 apply, provided—

a. That such person is likely to engage in subversive activities unless detained.

b. That there is danger that evidence may be destroyed [Verdunklungsgefahr].

c. That the person is suspected of preparing for his escape.

[320]

2. The record must show that the accused has been advised of his provisional arrest within 24 hours after he has been seized. Likewise the record must show that he has been advised of the reasons for his being placed under temporary arrest.

3. A person under temporary arrest must be released not later than 10 days from the day of his arrest, unless an order for protective custody has been issued within that period by the office of the Secret State Police.

Article 4

Right to Issue Directives

The right of the Reich governors, the Land government, the Oberpraesidenten, and the Regierungspraesidenten, to issue directives to the superior State Police and Police offices, is not affected by articles 2 and 3.

Article 5

Order for Protective Custody

1. To place a person under protective custody an order for protective custody must be issued in writing by the office of the Secret State Police. At the time of his arrest or not later than the day after the order for protective custody has been transmitted, the accused will be handed a copy of the order for which he has to sign a receipt.

2. Any order for protective custody must include a brief statement of the reasons for which protective custody was ordered.

3. The next of kin (wife, parents, children, brothers, or sisters) of a person under protective custody are to be informed that he has been placed under protective custody and where he is located, unless special reasons render such action inadvisable.

4. If a civil servant is taken under protective custody the Secret State Police must immediately notify his superior agency and state the reasons for his protective custody.

5. If a member of the NSDAP or of any of its formations is taken under protective custody, the Secret State Police must notify the Party agency concerned and state the reasons for his protective custody.

Article 6

Execution

As a matter of principle, persons under protective custody are to be placed in State concentration camps.

[321]

Article 7

Duration

1. Protective custody is to last no longer than necessary to achieve its purpose.

2. Release from protective custody is ordered by the office of the Secret State Police. It is the responsibility of the Secret State Police to examine at regular intervals of not more than 3 months whether the protective custody is to be lifted. The arrested person must be released not later than 3 days after the protective custody has been lifted.

Article 8

Foreigners

Foreigners, who have been taken into protective custody, are to be deported unless special reasons render such action inadvisable.

Article 9

Executory Regulations

Executory regulations to implement the preceding provisions shall be issued by the chief of the Security Police.

To the Office of the Secret State Police, the regional, and local State Police Agencies.

For information only:

• The Reich Ministers, Reich Governors, Land Governments,
• The Prussian Oberpraesidenten, Regierungspraesidenten, and
• the Police President of Berlin.

(Not published)

Berlin, 31 January 1938

Copy

The Reich Minister of Justice

4611—1a^7 194/38

The Presidents of the District Courts of Appeal

[322]

Subject: Defense of prisoners in protective custody by attorneys

To prepare a decision of the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police on whether certain attorneys can generally be allowed to defend prisoners held in protective custody, you are requested to examine immediately whether attorneys in your district, and which ones, could be considered in this respect. To defend prisoners held in protective custody, qualification and reliability are necessary to a particularly high extent. Therefore, in making the selection, a very strict standard will have to be applied. Mere membership in the NSDAP—as far as it was acquired only after 30 January 1933—will generally not warrant the necessary extent of reliability; on the other hand, this qualification will not have to be denied merely because the attorney is no Party member. Only such attorneys can be considered whose attitudes prove beyond doubt that they fully approve of the political plans of the State and of the ideological aims of the movement. For the rest, it will have to be assumed that attorneys not acting as counsel for the defense in criminal cases—will generally not defend prisoners held in protective custody either.

I request that attorneys qualified according to these rules to defend prisoners held in protective custody and who, if possible, ought to reside at various places of your district be in sufficient number entered into a list arranged according to State Police Offices. As to their qualification I request that the president of the bar then be consulted, the necessity of a strictly confidential treatment will have to be pointed out to him. Agencies, other than the judicial administration, will not be consulted. I then request that two copies of the list be submitted and that the opinion of the president of the bar be attached. Concerning the attorneys mentioned in the list, personal data and qualification for each of them have to be attached in addition to the character and political attitude of the attorney, particularly the manner of his professional training as counsel for the defense in criminal cases has to be explained in this statement; furthermore, if possible, whether it can be assumed that the attorney enjoys the confidence of the State Police Office.

Negative reports, if such is the case, are requested.

As Deputy

[Signed] Schlegelberger

Note

I have discussed the question with the attorney Dr. Dormann today. He received from me 3 copies of the decree to deal with[323] them; it was especially pointed out to him that the affair was strictly confidential. After contacting Dr. Droege he will try to compile for Hamburg and Bremen a list of such attorneys who are qualified to defend prisoners in protective custody.

Note

After 2 weeks

11 February 1938

[Signed] Letz

Note.—I have reminded Dr. Dormann by telephone. The list is under deliberation at present.

Note

1. To be submitted to the Senator.

2. Two weeks.

5 May 1938

[Signed] Letz

When opinion arrives, report has to be made.

[Signed] Rothenberger

Certified true copy.

Hamburg, 9 August 1947

[Signed] von Thaden

Justizoberinspektor

[Stamp]

Hanseatic District Court of Appeal

Hamburg

Conference with the Attorneys General [Generalstaatsanwaelte][191] on 23 January 1939

Protective custody after serving punishment, after acquittal, after release from arrest pending trial.

[324]

From the individual districts:

Munich (Leimer)—In Memmingen 4 cases of arrest for protective custody occurred and 2 of those after penal detention, 2 after arrest pending trial (not advisable, because executed in the same prison, probably even in the same cell), 8 in Augsburg, 1 in Kempten, 7 in Munich, altogether 359 after penal detention. The cases are decreasing.

Hamm (Semler)—No detrimental cases. 1 case in Arnsberg with the explanation that there is no intention to criticize the sentence. There have been frequent requests for calling back in cases where no warrant of arrest is issued.

Berlin (Jung)—The State Police [Stapo] takes functionaries of the KPD [Communist Party] into protective custody after penal detention. In cases where a warrant of arrest in high treason affairs is rejected, protective custody is to be ordered at once. Furthermore, in 1937 and 1938 a few priests and Jews in protective custody in cases of refusal of warrants of arrest. Protective custody justified on an acquitted sexual criminal (later conviction). No further annoying clashes.

Jena (Wurmstich)—Penitentiary inmates as a rule always in protective custody after penal detention likewise traitors and defaulters [violating restrictions acknowledged by signature upon release]. As regards the detrimental cases, improvement since 1936. Jehovah’s Witnesses are arrested on principle after penal detention, but are mostly released after 3–4 days.

Duesseldorf (Hagemann)—3–4 percent of the released are taken into protective custody. Jehovah’s Witnesses are released, if they countersign. There are frequent requests for calling back in cases, where no warrants of arrest are issued.

Stettin (Staecker)—Only in very few cases protective custody after penal detention. In 2 cases (abortion by female defendant Dr. Buchholz and 1 other case in accordance with section 175a of the penal code [Sodomy]) protective custody was entirely justified as the result of the appeal has shown. (Case Buchholz 4 years of hard labor.) As a rule, Jehovah’s Witnesses and high treason criminals are arrested pending trial.

Celle (Schoenering)—On principle, traitors, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, and persons guilty of abortion are taken into protective custody after penal detention. 4 detrimental cases of protective custody: priest, RM 10,000 bail; race defiler, RM 15,000 bail; acquitted because of proved innocence; Jew (after being acquitted of acting maliciously against the State); insulter of the SS (after penal detention).

[325]

Hamburg (Drescher)—Protective custody as preventative measure after penal detention, etc., has to be acknowledged as justified, but not as a correction of a judicial decision. No special details.

Karlsruhe (Lautz)—Jehovah’s Witnesses as a rule are taken into protective custody after penal detention. Protective custody after repeal of the warrant of arrest was justified in 2 cases.

Graz (Meissner)—The Chief Public Prosecutor asked the State police in 2 cases for actions of protective custody, because a 13-year-old gangster could not be prosecuted and because the use of violence could not be clearly proved to a priest in a case of sexual crime.

Brunswick (Mueller)—There is one case, where protective custody as a correction of a judicial decision is embarrassing, because protective custody is justified (priest, sexual criminal). In another case, (priest, sexual criminal) the protective custody is not justified. In general the State Police is trying to act in agreement with the public prosecutor.

Oldenburg (Christians)—On principle, functionaries of the Communist Party are taken into protective custody after penal detention, furthermore, Jehovah’s Witnesses in almost all cases. Only a few unsatisfactory cases.

Naumburg (Hahn)—Frequent request for calling back if no warrant of arrest is issued. The impression has been given that judges are deciding for a warrant of arrest, because protective custody seems to them harder than arrest pending trial. Often the criticism of justice because of actions of protective custody is not absolutely unjustified.

Special example: A former SS Sturmfuehrer (disloyalty) after 1 year of penal detention was given another year in protective custody.

Nuernberg (Bems)—Cases of protective custody after penal detention, etc., have decreased, although frequently protective custody is exercised, if no warrant of arrest is issued. Protective custody as criticism of justice has not occurred any more. On principle, high treason criminals, Jehovah’s Witnesses and race defilers are taken into protective custody after penal detention.

The minister ends the conversation by stating that in the interest of justice those cases are to be regretted where protective custody is to be regarded as justified criticism of justice, besides no objections can be raised against preventative measures.

[Signed] Klemm

25 January 1939

[326]

Conference with the Presidents of the Courts of Appeal on 24 January 1939

Protective custody after serving term of imprisonment, after acquittal, after release from arrest pending trial.

Hamm (Schneider)—Conditions have improved during the year 1938. The most important cases are the ones after arrest pending trial. The taking into protective custody is performed more carefully today because of the reputation of justice. The complaint has been made that the length of protective custody is assuming the character of punishment. In one case (public notary) protective custody after release from arrest pending trial was justified. Some lawyers refrain from submitting a complaint of arrest because protective custody is pending. There are judges who in case of doubt issue a warrant of arrest in order to avoid protective custody. In one case of criminal proceedings homosexuals were released from arrest pending trial and later on legally acquitted; during the trial, however, they were brought to court from protective custody every day. Monks from Dorsten were taken into protective custody after their acquittal.

Darmstadt (Scriba)—In one case defendant taken into protective custody while still being in court after acquittal. In some cases protective custody was inflicted after repealing arrest pending trial, release, however, was obtained after objecting by the administration of justice. General picture: Decline of measures of protective custody in face of contradictory legal decisions.

Berlin (Hoelscher)—In 1938 only 3 cases of protective custody. A decline of arrests has been observed.

Duesseldorf (Schwister)—Frequent requests for calling back if warrant of arrest has been refused. It has even been noticed that corresponding agreements were made between the investigating or examining judges and the State Police (Duesseldorf). In one case protective custody was justified and in another case one additional year of protective custody. Those cases are very rare now; good understanding exists between the court and the State police. Therefore the impression that justice is being criticized does not exist.

Naumburg (Sattelmacher)—A mitigation has been noticed, however, there are frequent requests for calling back if warrant had been refused.

Hamburg (Rothenberger)—Cases of protective custody have been increased, because the warrants of protective custody are decided on in Berlin. In 6 cases, Jewish women have been taken into protective custody because of sexual intercourse with Aryans.[327] In the case of Laeiss vs. half-Jewess, she has already been under protective custody for 1½ years. State police file notes from police records state:

(1) Protective custody, “to make the punishment finally effective.”

(2) Protective custody, “to make the served sentence still more effective.”

(3) Protective custody, “because of the big number of previous convictions.”

(4) Protective custody, “to prevent prejudicing the course of justice through the interference of lawyers as defense counsel.”

Rostock (Goetsch)—Good cooperation with the State Police, only preventive measures have been noticed.

Graz (Meldt)—No difficulties, not the slightest disharmony, or criticism of the law.

The minister concludes the discussion by indicating that it is to be the task of the presidents of the courts of appeal to see that arrests in the courtroom by the State Police are avoided and recommends for the rest to remain in contact with the State Police.

[Signed] Klemm

25 January 1939

Report on the conference of [court] presidents on 1 February 1939

[328]

Senator Dr. Rothenberger and the attorney general reported on the discussions at the meetings of the presidents of the courts of appeal and attorneys general with the Reich Minister of Justice.

Senator Dr. Rothenberger first asked for a report on the attitude of the judges with reference to the articles in the “Schwarze Korps” [Black Corps, official newspaper of the SS] before his speech on 28 January 1939, and wanted to know whether his address had put their minds at ease. With the exception of Wandsbek where the articles of the “Schwarze Korps” evidently were not noticed, it was the general opinion, expressed particularly by the district court president of Hamburg and Director Hansen, Altona, that the judges were actually extraordinarily disturbed by the attacks of the Schwarze Korps. The statements made by Senator Dr. Rothenberger have had a rather soothing effect since there was now some hope for improvement. However, there were doubts as to whether the Reich Minister of Justice would succeed in carrying his point against the Schwarze Korps i.e., the SS. These doubts were based especially upon the former passive attitude of the ministry.

I. The attorney general then reported on the penal development of the events of 9 to 11 November.[195] The former regulation according to which the State Police is the final authority in deciding whether or not such a case should be followed up, has been abolished following a decision by the Reich Ministry of Justice. The Reich Minister of Justice and Chief Public Prosecutor Joel have stated that it would, of course, be impossible to handle these things the normal legal way; if, at first, the law as such has been changed by order from higher authorities, then it would not be possible to prosecute those people involved in the perpetration. Therefore, by way of example the conception of violation of the public peace would have to be abandoned. This can be legally justified because the perpetrators lacked the knowledge of illegality since they acted on order. As far as the criminal offenses committed during the encounter are concerned, negligible acts should be disregarded. Otherwise, cases will be withdrawn, but only by order of the Fuehrer, while serious criminal offenses, as for instance rape and race defilement have to be prosecuted. The order for prosecuting will be issued in every case by the minister after, to begin with, the perpetrators in case they are Party members or members of a Party organization have been expelled by a special department of the Supreme Court of the Party which has been established in Berlin.

[329]

Goering had strongly disapproved of the events. In his opinion, it was the hardest blow the Party had ever received.

Comments concerning these events should not be prosecuted under the Heimtueckegesetz if they were occasioned by well founded protest.

Senator Dr. Rothenberger pointed out that nothing had happened in Hamburg, thanks to Gauleiter Kaufmann’s attitude which Ministerpresident Goering had expressly recommended. He asked for understanding in the attitude of the Reich Minister of Justice and to pass that understanding on to the judges.

As far as prosecution under the Heimtueckegesetz is concerned, because of comments about the events between 9 and 11 November, he stated that the court might find itself in the position where it would have to investigate the facts. Such cases would have to be reported.[196]

*******

IV. The discussion on the question of protective custody by the police was then reported upon. The standpoint of the ministry is, which also finds approval here, that protective custody measures, insofar as they are purely of a preventative nature, cannot be objected to; that, however, corrective measures such as have become known in various cases should not be permitted.

Senator Dr. Rothenberger requested immediate presentation of all cases in which the judge is under the impression that the police are attempting to correct the verdict through their arrest measures. In addition to this, all cases should immediately be reported in which the police effect an arrest in the courtroom.

*******

The Chief of the Chancellery of the Fuehrer in the NSDAP

To the

Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers

[330]

Subject: People in security detention

Dear Party Member Dr. Lammers,

Some time ago the Reich Leader SS made a request to the Reich Minister of Justice to the effect that some of the people in security detention be put at his disposal for important work in the concentration camps. The urgency for this increased, when on the 50th birthday of the Fuehrer a great number of persons in protective custody were dismissed. The request of the Reich Leader SS was refused in the letter of 14 July 1938 because these persons apart from carrying out work to fulfill the requirements of the penal institutes also did such work as appeared urgent under the Four Year Plan. When, however, the penitentiary Brandenburg-Goehrden was inspected by the chief of the office for matters concerning pardoning, the Chancellery of the Fuehrer, it was established that a large number of the people in security detention were busy painting cardboard soldiers for private firms. Considering the far more important work (which can actually be regarded as urgent in connection with the Four Year Plan) which is being carried out by prisoners, for example, in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen and in the adjoining brick yard, the Fuehrer has ordered that all dispensable persons in security detention are to be put at the disposal of the Reich Leader SS immediately.

At the request of the Reich Leader SS, after inspecting the concentration camp Sachsenhausen in the spring, I supported the request he made to the Fuehrer. I was then given the order to ascertain the way in which the persons in security detention were occupied at the present time. During the process of my investigation I established what was required, and I also received the following report from the Reich Ministry of Justice concerning this matter:

There can be no doubt that the persons in security detention who are working on the toys mentioned, and who, per person, enable the institute to earn daily RM 1.20-1.80 are inserted under the heading of “urgent work for the Four Year Plan.”

[331]

In consequence of my report in Obersalzberg, the Fuehrer, who already had leanings toward this interpretation after my first report, decided that the persons in security detention were to be incorporated into the concentration camps under jurisdiction of the Reich Leader SS.

I have on purpose refrained from informing the Reich Minister of Justice directly. I request you to inform the Reich Minister of Justice of the decision of the Fuehrer.

I have informed the Reich Leader SS of the decision of the Fuehrer and of my letter to you.

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully

[Signed] Bouhler

1. Note by Reich Minister of Justice Guertner to Lammers, 28 September 1939, Concerning Executions of Three Persons Without Trial and Urging Clarification of Problems Created by Punishment “Without Criminal Proceedings and Without a Sentence.”

Note

1. Publications in the press

a. The Reich Leader SS and chief of the German police reports that Johann Heinen, Dessau, was shot on 7 September 1939, because of his refusal to cooperate in tasks for the protection of the security of the national defense. In addition, Heinen was a criminal who had been convicted previously for theft.

b. The Reich Leader SS and chief of the German police reports the following have been shot:

(1) On 11 September 1939 Paul Mueller from Halle because of arson and sabotage. Mueller had been convicted previously 8 times to imprisonment and penitentiaries because of crimes violating property rights.

(2) On 15 September 1939 August Dickmann from Dinslaken, born 7 January 1910, because of his refusal to fulfill his duty as a soldier. D. stated as a reason for his refusal that he was a Jehovah’s Witness. He was a fanatical follower of the international[332] sect of the serious explorers of the Bible [ernste Bibelforscher, Jehovah’s Witnesses].

2. Statement of facts—Details are not known here since the judicial authorities had nothing to do with the matter. Whether the military judicial authorities have knowledge of it (case Dickmann) is not known here either.

3. Legal basis for the executions without trial—The Fuehrer is said to have ordered these executions, or to have approved them. Furthermore, he is said to have ordered that the Reich Leader SS should maintain by all means the security within the territory of the Reich, and this order includes also immediate execution in cases of actions in violation of war laws (report of SS Brigadefuehrer Dr. Best).

Upon the request for information about this order of the Fuehrer, Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich replied that the Minister of Justice should contact the Fuehrer directly in regard to the executions.

4. Legal situation—Should the information made available to the Ministry of Justice be correct, then a concurrent jurisdiction would now exist in the nonoccupied territory of the Reich, that is outside of the area of combat and operation. There would exist in this area a concurrent jurisdiction for the punishment of war crimes between the People’s Court, the military courts, and the Special Court on one hand, and the police on the other hand. According to which criteria should the question of the competency be decided in the individual case?

Within the nonoccupied territory the state of public order and security does not permit that any authority should be hampered or disturbed in its activities.

The criminal procedure according to the war laws is practically the same as the procedure before the courts martial. The Special Courts have just not been called courts martial. I refer to the case of the farmer Glein from Obersleben near Weimar, who during the night of 18 September 1939 put fire to his grain-rick and thus destroyed 100 hundred-weights of grain. He was sentenced to death by the Special Court on 18 September 1939.

5. In a further case (Ernst Georgi of Freiberg), a warrant of arrest had been issued against the defendant on charges of fraud. The State Police, Office Plauen, suggested to place Georgi at the disposal of the Secret State Police, and to cancel the trial fixed for the 18th of this month, since this file should be treated in a special way according to an order of the chief of the Security Police and, therefore, a transfer to the trial in Freiberg would not be feasible.

[333]

In this case the crime was committed before the war decree [Kriegsverordnung] took effect. After a short period the defendant was returned to the public prosecutor. The trial took place, and the sentence (10 years penitentiary, and protective custody) was passed on 26 September 1939. The Security Police did not refer to a general order in this case. What the legal basis was for the interference with the court proceedings, is not known to me.

6. I think it to be urgent that the problem, whether crimes committed in the nonoccupied territories should be punished according to the war laws, or by the police without criminal proceedings and without a sentence, be clarified in general.

Berlin, 28 September 1939

[Signed] Dr. Guertner

The above note, I handed over to colleague Lammers on 28 September 1939.

Berlin, 30 September 1939

[Signed] Dr. Guertner

2. Handwritten File Note by Guertner, 14 October 1939, on a Conference with Lammers Concerning Executions Without Trial upon Order of Hitler

Note: 14 October 1939, 12:00 V. [Noon]

Lammers saw me by order of the Fuehrer.

He said that yesterday he had informed the Fuehrer about the contents of my manuscript. The Fuehrer said he had not issued general directions. He said he had ordered the 3 executions [Erschiessungen]. He also could not give up this right in individual cases, since the courts (military and civilian) did not prove capable of coping with the peculiar conditions of war.

Thus, he had ordered now the execution of the Teltow bank robbers. Himmler would contact me in this matter before the day is over.

14 October 1939

[Signed] Guertner

Berlin, 30 November 1939

The Reich Minister of Justice

To the

• Reich Leader SS and Chief of the
• German Police in the Reich Ministry of the
• Interior, Heinrich Himmler

[334]

Subject: Carrying-out of death sentences

Enclosures: 2 documents (one copy of sheets 110–115 of the file IIIg 19 5039/39 and one of the attached list II, sheets 67–72 of the file IIIg 10a 5010/39)

[Handwritten marginal note] To be submitted again on 30 November 1939

[Initialed] Gtr [Guertner]

Dear Herr Himmler!

For your information I submit in the enclosure[197] two copies of list reports to the Fuehrer about the death sentences passed since 3 September 1939, the day I have been put in charge of decisions about appeals for mercy in regard to death sentences—and about the decisions I made, or intend to make.

In regard to the shootings, mentioned at the end of list II it has been published in the press that the perpetrators, as for instance in the cases of Latacz, Jacobs, and Gluth, had made themselves guilty of resistance by force or, as for instance in the case of Potzleschak, had tried to escape. Let me point out that these publications—always using the same phraseology—were apt to attract the same attention of at least those persons who participated in the criminal proceedings. On the day before the shooting of Latacz the press had reported about the trial which took place in the hospital for prisoners on remand. Latacz who prior to his transfer was lying in the prison hospital, had a bandage with metal braces. Thus, also the broad public was informed about his physical condition, and knew that a resistance was hardly possible in such a condition.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very much devoted

To be signed by the Minister

[initialed] Dr. C.[198] [Crohne]

28 November

[335]

4. List compiled by the Reich Ministry of Justice tabulating information concerning 18 persons executed without sentence or after sentences for a term of years[199]

[339]

1. Gluth case—In the summer of 1939 the almost 18-year-old locksmith apprentice Gluth set 4 fires in Marquardt near Potsdam in order to disturb the population, and to show off afterwards as an especially efficient member of the fire brigade. The medical expert stated that Gluth was still in the age of puberty and that the state of his development was equal to that of a 16½-year-old boy. In the opinion of the experts his acts were caused by the physical and mental changes connected with the age of puberty, and further by the awakening of the desire to do important things, which is typical for this age. Sentence: 10 years’ imprisonment.

The Fuehrer ordered his execution. According to the statement of SS Brigadefuehrer Mueller, the expert opinion was known to the Fuehrer, but the latter stated that it would be foolish to save such persons, who are a danger for society for further infamous actions. On 19 November 1939 Gluth was shot for offering resistance.

2. Trampe case—Trampe stole jewels and clothes from the apartment of a friend, who was the wife of a soldier, and pawned these articles for RM 200. He had access to the apartment in his capacity of repair man. Afterward the soldier’s wife and her husband agreed with Trampe on the damage. Trampe defended himself by stating that he was by want compelled to steal, that he intended to redeem the stolen objects later and that he was sure from the beginning that the couple would forgive him afterward because of their friendship and because of his distressed condition. The court accepted his statement as true and sentenced him to 6 years of penitentiary. The press reported that his defense was untruthful, and that it was not accepted as true by the court.

Trampe was shot on 27 September 1940 by order of the Fuehrer. It is not known here whether the shooting took place merely on account of the incorrect reports of the press.

3. Jackubetzki case—The milker Jackubetzki had a savings account in the Landeshaus in Breslau. These were the savings from his wages. One day he came to Breslau without money and wanted to withdraw his savings. Since the Landeshaus was already closed, he got the idea of taking away the handbag from a woman walking in front of him in order to get money for his trip home. He did that, and was sentenced to 10 years penitentiary.

Referring to a press report in the “Nachtausgabe” [Evening Edition] (not in the file) the Fuehrer expressed, on 9 December 1940, by phone through the SS Gruppenfuehrer Schaub his astonishment[340] about the fact that J. was not sentenced to death. In the “Nachtausgabe” the case was misrepresented; it could not be seen from the article that the deed concerned was prompted by the occasion.

On 26 February, Under Secretary Dr. Freisler conferred with SS Gruppenfuehrer Schaub and related to him the details of the perpetration, whereupon Schaub considers the case as settled.

4. Kuhlmey case—Kuhlmey in his capacity as an auditor knew a number of manufacturers who were drafted into the army. He asked their wives to authorize him to adjust their allowance cases. He cheated the wives of 4 soldiers by giving them altogether about RM 375 less than he had received at the public welfare office. He cheated the public welfare office of about RM 3,000 by obtaining allowances on false pretenses and without the knowledge of the woman concerned, and by keeping the money for himself. Sentence: 5 years penitentiary. There still are some minor cases to be sentenced.

On 14 October 1940, Schaub notified us by phone that the Fuehrer had learned about the case through an article in the V.B. [Voelkischer Beobachter] of 9 October 1940. If, in the still open cases the death sentence should not be imposed, a transfer to the State Police will be ordered. It cannot be seen from the report of the “Voelkischer Beobachter,” under the headline, “Soldiers’ wives thoroughly cheated” that K. caused detriment first of all to the welfare office and in addition also to a few women. It contains some hints though that K. also received subsidies which were not due to the women, but creates the impression that the total amount of about RM 3,500 was withheld to the detriment of soldiers’ wives.

[Handwritten note] Submitted to Under Secretary Dr. Schlegelberger according to order. Case 1 does not belong here.

[Illegible initial] 6 March 1941

[Illegible initial] 6 March

7 March

[Signed] Dr. Crohne

The President of the People’s Court

1400-I, Confidential!

[341]

To the Reich Minister of Justice

Berlin W 8

Wilhelmstr. 65

[Stamp]

Immediately after I was recalled from the war, I realized that things were not as I had expected when plans for the People’s Court were worked out. It was overloaded with trials and this because it had to handle cases which it had certainly not been intended to judge. This happened especially in cases which arose in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia because as yet there was no possibility of transferring the cases to the courts of appeal. But even among cases which are ready for such a transfer there are some which should not be dealt with by the courts of appeal for various reasons.

However right it is to exterminate harshly and uproot all the seeds of insurrection, as for example we see them in Bohemia and Moravia, it is wrong for every follower [Mitlaeufer], even the smallest, to be given the honor of appearing for trial and being judged for high treason before a People’s Court or, failing that, before a court of appeal. In order to deal with these small cases and even with the smallest, the culprits should surely be shown that German sovereignty will not put up with their behavior and that it will take action accordingly. But that can also be done in a different manner, and I think in a more advantageous one, than through the tedious and also very expensive and ponderous channels of court procedure.

I have therefore no objection whatsoever if all the small and smallest followers who are somehow connected with the high treason plans which have been woven and plotted by others are brought to their senses by being transferred to a concentration camp for some time. This would have the further advantage that dispositions would be taken quickly and that they would be doubly effective because of that, and that these dispositions could be rapidly modified if by the measures taken the culprit were brought to a better attitude.

One can think, in addition to this, of the many cases of article 90c of the Criminal (Penal) Code, in which, by inconsiderately exploiting the strong position of the foreign state, persons who[342] had to cross the border for some reason or other (work, or visiting relatives) were used to find out something about the neighboring state. This occurred particularly frequently in the border areas which were at that time Polish or Czech.

In any case, I consider it to be an absolutely essential prerequisite that all these cases should be submitted first of all to the Chief Reich Public Prosecutor of the People’s Court for penal prosecution. If he considers that article 153, Code of Penal Procedure can be made to apply, then the People’s Court will be able to give its consent to this in nearly all cases. Then the accused would be put at the disposal of the Security Police with the injunction that he be placed in a concentration camp for a certain period of time.

I start from the principle that the conception of minor guilt in the sense of article 153, Code of Penal Procedure is naturally not the same in cases which are suitable for the People’s Court, as in those cases in which the official judge has to decide. Even if this conception is relative and depends on the nature of the offense, a legal extension of article 153, Code of Penal Procedure should surely be made in order to presume insignificance of guilt for an act which can be characterized as a crime, as, e.g., crimes in the nature of high treason in the territory of Bohemia and Moravia.

[Signed] Thierack

LETTER FROM MEISSNER[200] TO DEFENDANT SCHLEGELBERGER, 22 APRIL 1941, CONCERNING TRANSFER OF CONVICTED PRISONERS TO THE GESTAPO

The Minister of State

and Chief of the Presidential

Chancellery of the Fuehrer

and Reich Chancellor

RP 83/41 Secret

02/312

[343]

Personal

Confidential

Dear Herr Schlegelberger!

In the matter of the transfer of convicted prisoners to the Secret State Police, Reich Leader Martin Bormann has meanwhile informed me by order of the Fuehrer that the Fuehrer does not consider it necessary to procure opinions from the Reich Ministry of Justice on sentences which are submitted to him for reviewing. The question remained unsettled of whether the Fuehrer wants to request the transmittal of sentences himself or to hear your opinion in cases in which no sentence is submitted. At present, however, I do not consider it expedient to pursue the matter by sending another letter to Reich Leader Bormann. I would, however, leave it to your discretion to inform me briefly and with the utmost speed prior to the transfer of the prisoners to the Secret State Police about the factual and legal situation of all those cases in which you think that essential details for the evaluation of the perpetrator’s character or of the crime have not been brought to the Fuehrer’s attention. I shall then inform the Fuehrer of the details I learn from you as far as the case requires this. The transfer of the convicted prisoners to the Secret State Police may be postponed in these cases for a short period until you hear from me again.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly

[Signed] Dr. Meissner

To State Secretary Dr. Schlegelberger

Reich Ministry of Justice

Berlin W 8

Wilhelmstrasse 65

Reich Minister of Justice

IV a 1665/42 g.

[344]

To the Attorneys General

For information

[Stamp] Secret

A. Chief Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court

B. Presidents of the District Courts of Appeal,

• Graz
• Innsbruck
• Linz
• Vienna

Subject: Transfer of asocial prisoners to the police

I. In agreement with the Reich Leader SS, the following group of lawfully sentenced prisoners confined to penal institutions will be transferred to the custody of the Reich Leader SS.[201]

1. Jews—men and women—detained under arrest, protective custody, or in the workhouse.

2. Gypsies—men and women—detained under arrest, protective custody, or in the workhouse.

3. Russians and Ukrainians residing in the Reich as non-refugees (excluding Latvians, Esthonians, and Lithuanians) detained under arrest, protective custody, or in the workhouse.

4. Poles residing in the former Polish state territory on 1 September 1939, men and women, sentenced to penal camps or subsequently turned over for penal execution, if sentence is over 3 years, or includes subsequent protective custody, (including Kriegstaeter [perpetrators of crimes during war time] and persons in protective custody).

5. Men only, in protective custody (except those sentenced by Austrian Law to workhouse according to sec. 1, par. 2, Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 165, dated 10 June 1932).

6. Convicts sentenced to subsequent protective custody—men only (including Kriegstaeter). Excepted from this transfer are—

a. Those sentenced by an armed forces court and by an SS and police court.

b. Prisoners of war.

c. Those sentenced by Dutch courts.

d. Those sentenced by former Yugoslav courts.

[345]

e. Foreigners, not coming under groups 1–4. People from the Protectorate and stateless persons are considered natives.

Until further notice, the transfer is to be postponed for—

a. Those sentenced by former Polish courts or by the present courts of the Government General. Poles, sentenced by former Polish courts in the Occupied Eastern Territories can however be transferred.

b. Germans sentenced by German courts in the Occupied Eastern Territories, in the Government General, in Holland, in Norway, Alsace, Lorraine or Luxembourg.

c. Those sentenced by the courts of Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg.

d. Nationals of the Protectorate.

Those in protective custody and in the penitentiary with subsequent protective custody are to be selected for special screening by the [department] concerned, Department XV of the Reich Ministry of Justice, and, therefore, are also not to be transferred immediately if the institution is convinced that release from protective custody would enter into the question within a predictable time. On account of their favorable development during the execution of punishment (not merely because of old age or similar reasons). Those who are sentenced to additional protective custody upon completion of punishment for high treason and sedition are generally to be selected for this special screening. Department XV of the Reich Ministry of Justice will decide which of the prisoners who are not to be transferred according to this shall be excepted permanently from the transfer.

The director of the institution is personally responsible for the selection of prisoners to be transferred.

If doubt arises in individual cases whether the transfer shall be made, the decision of the Reich Ministry of Justice has to be requested. The same applies if a prisoner who is considered for transfer is still needed as a witness, etc., in other proceedings or in cases of additional sentence by a court.

II. The decisive day fixed for lawful sentence is 1 November 1942. Only prisoners lawfully sentenced before 1 November are liable for transfer. Further directives concerning arrest, confinement in special institutions, and so forth, of those legally convicted later, are reserved.

III. Sick prisoners are not exempted from transfer, they are to be transferred as soon as they are transportable. Final decision on insane prisoners is reserved, transfer at the present is postponed.

[346]

IV. In preparation for transfer of prisoners belonging to groups I, 1–6, excluding cases of postponement, lists bearing name and current number of each prisoner, separate for each group, and 1–4 for men and women, are to be executed by the institutions. Four copies have to be sent directly from the institution to the Reich Ministry of Justice for the attention of President of the Senate Hecker. The first lists are to be executed according to the status existing on 1 November of this year. Supplementary lists, compare II, also, on the status at 1 December of this year and 1 January 1943, and are to be submitted up to the 8th day of the month in question. Institutions having over 100 prisoners for transfer, submit partial lists for 100–200 prisoners, whenever completed.

The lists must be divided as follows:

•  1. Number of list.
•  2. Surname and Christian name.
•  3. Date of birth (day, month, and year).
•  4. Place of birth.
•  5. Last residence.
•  6. Nationality.
•  7. Institution number.
•  8. Sentence or measure of security and improvement.
•  9. a. Acting court.
•   b. Executing authority and its reference number.
• 10. Start and completion of sentence—in case of ex-servicemen, note that term has not yet started.
• 11. Offense—main offense only.
• 12. Able to work—yes, no.

V. Prisoners not yet consigned to the proper institution, or temporarily consigned to other institutions, will be specified by the competent institution, to which they are to be delivered as soon as possible.

VI. Slowdown of production in vital armament factories, is to be avoided during transfer of prisoners. Therefore, the transfer has to be effected gradually with distribution over several months, as deemed necessary by the individual institutions, in consideration of the factories. At the same time, the institutions most affected are already filled up because of changes in the execution plans. The number of prisoners and the time of transfer for the different districts, will be announced here from time to time.

VII. With completion of the transfer to the police, the penal term is considered interrupted. Transfer to the police is to be reported to the penal authority, and in cases of custody to the superior executive authority, with the information that the interruption[347] of the penal term has been ordered by the Reich Ministry of Justice.

VIII. Preparatory to examinations of all male penitentiary prisoners, sentenced to terms over 8 years, the directors of institutions concerned received verbal instructions at the Reich Ministry of Justice. These instructions are valid correspondingly for persons in protective custody and penitentiary prisoners with additional protective custody, whose transfer has been postponed until examination of case by department XV of the Reich Ministry of Justice (compare I, par. (4)).

IX. The information of this statute is to be given exclusively to such directors of institutions, for whom its knowledge is an absolute necessity in consideration of the incarcerated prisoners. The number of these directors is to be kept as small as possible, by concentration of the prisoners concerned, in some cases in agreement with the adjacent districts. Concerning convicts with a sentence of more than 8 years, such concentration has already been ordered from here.

X. I request that special care be taken for the apprehension of all prisoners, including those not delivered to the competent institution, or those transferred to other institutions for industrial reasons.

By order:

[Typed signature] Dr. Crohne

Certified: [Signed] Kirsten

As Administrative Assistant

[Ministerialkanzleiobersekretaer]

[Seal]

Reich Ministry of Justice

Office of the Ministry

The Reich Minister of Justice

4410 b Vs 1 379/43g

To the Public Prosecutors of the Courts of Appeal,

To the Commissioner of the Reich Minister of Justice for the penal camps in Emsland Papenburg, Emsland

[348]

Subject: Poles and Jews who are released from the penal institutions of the department of Justice[202]

Additional copies for the independent penal institutions.

I. With reference to the new guiding principles for the application of article 1, section 2 of the decree of 11 June 1940 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 877), enclosure I of the decree of 27 January 1943-9133/2, enclosure I-III a2 2629, the Reich Security Main Office has directed by the decree of 11 March 1943, II A 2 number 100/43—176—

a. Jews who, in accordance with number VI of the instructions are released from a penal institution, are to be committed by the State Police (Regional) Office competent for the district in which the penal institution is located, for the rest of their lives to the concentration camps Auschwitz or Lublin, in accordance with the regulations for protective custody that have been issued.

The same applies for Jews who in the future are released from a penal institution after serving a sentence of confinement.

b. Poles, who in accordance with number VI of the instructions are released from a penal institution, are to be taken by the State Police (Regional) Office competent for the district in which the penal institution is located, for the duration of the war to a concentration camp in accordance with the regulations on protective custody that have been issued.

The same applies in the future to Poles, who after serving a term of imprisonment of more than 6 months, are to be discharged by a penal institution.

Conforming to the request of the Reich Security Main Office, I ask that in the future, (a) all Jews to be discharged, (b) all Poles to be discharged, who have served a sentence of more than 6 months be designated for further confinement to the State Police (Regional) Office competent for the district and are to be placed promptly at its disposal, before the end of sentence for conveyance.

II. This ruling replaces the hitherto ordered return of all Polish prisoners undergoing imprisonment in the Old Reich condemned in Incorporated Eastern Territories. The decree of 28 July 1942-4410 b Vs 1 1731, has lost its validity. Imprisonment up to 6 months imposed within the Incorporated Eastern Territories, excluding exceptions, is to be carried out in these territories, and not in the Old Reich.

[349]

By order:

[Typed] Dr. Eichler

Certified: [Signed] Freyer

Clerk

[Seal]

Reich Ministry of Justice

Office of the Ministry

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT SCHLEGELBERGER CONCERNING TRANSFERS OF PERSONS TO THE POLICE[203]

DIRECT EXAMINATION

*******

Dr. Kubuschok (counsel for defendant Schlegelberger): I should like to refer to another complex of questions. Witness, in the course of this trial you have often heard that persons against whom prosecution was pending or who had already been sentenced were turned over to the police. How did these transfers to the police come about?

Defendant Schlegelberger: These transfers are a very sad chapter for anybody who has a sense of justice. They came shortly after the beginning of the war in 1939. From publications in the press Guertner found out that the police had killed people. Guertner made notations about these notices in the press, had them filed and gave a compilation of these notices through Lammers to Hitler together with his compiled notes, and he explained the situation in detail. The purpose was clear. Hitler should be made to discontinue these things. Lammers actually submitted these compilations to Hitler, but told Guertner later that Hitler had said that he had not given a general directive to carry out these shootings but in individual cases he could not do without these measures, because the courts, that is, military courts as well as the civil courts, were not able to take care of the special conditions created by the war. At the same time Lammers announced that Hitler in a further case had already ordered the execution by shooting.

Q. I refer to Document NG-190, Prosecution Exhibit 284.[204]

A. I am certainly not making a mistake in saying that that decision on the part of Hitler was probably the most serious thing[350] which ever happened to this man Guertner, whose main intention was to serve justice. It was an order which Hitler had given through administrative channels to the police, and the execution of it was assured on the basis of the means of power then prevailing. The attempt on the part of Guertner to reinstate the respect for court decisions therefore had failed; but he was not satisfied with that. He wanted to insure that the administration of justice should be given the authority to intervene in time and to attempt at least to thwart the execution of the order given to the police. That, of course, was only possible if the administration of justice was informed in time about the order that had been given to the police, and that request by Guertner was actually granted. Subsequently the administration of justice as a rule was informed by Hitler’s adjutant, Schaub, wherever an order of that kind was given to the police.

The question, therefore, as to how after one has been informed, one can make an attempt to prevent the execution of Hitler’s order involved great difficulties particularly because the police had a time limit of 24 hours after which it had to report to its superiors that the order had been executed. Guertner then was of the opinion that for these matters he had to assign the one official in his ministry whom he could use as a capable man with the police—who shared Guertner’s opinion in these matters—and from whom one could expect, on the basis of previous experience, that he would show sufficient cleverness. Guertner therefore charged my codefendant Joel with that mission.

When the information about such an order was received, feverish work started. First one had to try to extend the police time limit; that is, to persuade the police to delay the report. That alone brought great difficulties, because the police official incurred considerable risk. But in some individual cases it succeeded. At the same time, the files of the case were called to Berlin and all other bits of information which probably had caused Hitler to order the transfer of the person concerned to the police. Then a detailed report was made of the act and the culprit which justified the sentence, and telephone calls took place with various agencies whenever that seemed to have chances for success. Some individual cases were successful. But if it could not be achieved that the order turning over the individual to the police was rescinded, although everything had been tried, then there was no other alternative than to issue a directive to the authority which was about to carry it out, telling them that they should no longer resist but should turn over the man to the police.

If the Reich Ministry of Justice had failed to give the man up, the police would have broken the resistance by force; the condemned[351] person could not be saved. During the war, civilian and military command offices in numerous cases were seriously charged with the fact that through a defense which they had to consider as useless, they had sacrificed many lives. Such a useless sacrifice it would have been if the Reich Ministry of Justice had instructed the prison authorities, via the executive office, to resist the police. The subject of this sacrifice would have been not only threats to officials or civil servants, but to the entire administration of justice, which would have been eliminated and its opponents would have triumphed. The acting official in the ministry would have been eliminated as a saboteur; and already at that time he would have been replaced by a person who would willingly and without exception have put the administration of justice in the service of the Party. The individual cases of transfer which the prosecution has described have to be evaluated from these points of view. I myself, after taking charge of the Ministry of Justice, immediately established contact with Minister Meissner in order to determine basically that no order for transfer made by the police was to be executed as long as the administration of justice did not have a report. This intention of mine was again foiled by Bormann. A letter from Meissner to me makes this apparent. Hitler had me informed by Bormann that the obtaining of the opinion of the Ministry of Justice was not necessary. Meissner, who shared my opinion, asked me in spite of that, in those cases where the ministry believed that Hitler was not properly informed, that a report should be sent to Meissner. I did that in all cases.

*******

Q. What do you have to say about the Markus Luftglas case, a case of transfer to the Gestapo, Document NG-287, Prosecution Exhibit 88?[205]

A. This case, too, I no longer remember even though the name recalls certain memories. In my statements I have to refer to the documents that have been submitted, and by referring to them I would like to determine the following: the Fuehrer order to the police was given to the Reich Ministry of Justice on 24 October 1941, through the usual channels by the Presidential Chancellery. That nothing happened in this case is absolutely impossible. It would have been inexplicable why my letter to Lammers in which I informed him of the release was written only 4 days later, on the 29th, for letters of that kind were answered immediately in our office as a matter of course. The fact that our letter is dated[352] only the 29th shows me rather that in the meantime unsuccessful interventions had taken place.

Now I notice that in this letter to Lammers I informed him that Luftglas had been transferred to the police for the purpose of execution. That is noticeable because the information about the orders given by the police never said anything about executions, but merely stated “transfer” as the subject of the order. If in this letter to Lammers, I therefore informed him that Luftglas was transferred for the purpose of execution, this can only be based on the information we received from the police, and I am quite sure that I formulated the letter in that way in order to inform Lammers how the direct Fuehrer order—that is, the order to the police—was actually worded and in order to point out to him the effects of such transfer orders.

In conclusion, in regard to this question of transfer I would like to say that the Hitler order went to the police through administrative channels. The police had legally and by authority the possibility to execute the order. The Ministry, on the other hand, had only one weapon, and that was the word. If this weapon remained without success, the Ministry was defenseless and had to submit to force.

*******

C. Measures to Influence or Avoid the Judicial Process

1. DEVELOPMENTS PRINCIPALLY DURING THE PERIOD WHEN GUERTNER WAS REICH MINISTER OF JUSTICE (1933–JANUARY 1941)

a. Example of relations of officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice, judges, and public prosecutors with officials of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, the SD, the SS, and the SA

1. Letter from Guertner to Hess

Copy

The Reich Minister of Justice

Berlin, 5 June 1935

Z.F.g¹⁰ 1696.34

Letter to the Deputy of the Fuehrer Reich Minister Hess

[353]

Secret!

Personal!

Subject: Criminal proceedings against the merchant and SA Obersturmbannfuehrer Jaehnichen and 22 party members for causing bodily injury in the performance of their official duties (protective custody camp Hohenstein/Saxony)

Dear Colleague!

With reference to the indictment which I submitted on 20 March 1935 in the above-mentioned criminal case I wish to state the following:

On 3 May 1935, after a trial lasting approximately 6 weeks, the prosecutor, and public prosecutor, Dr. Walther, proposed the following sentences:

Against—

• Jaehnichen (camp commander), 5 years, penitentiary.
• Zikera, 1 year 6 months imprisonment.
• Heinz Meier, 3 years imprisonment.
• Herbert Meier, 3 years 2 months imprisonment.
• Tuerke, 3 years imprisonment.
• Volkmar, 2 years 3 months, penitentiary.
• Leuschner, 2 years 3 months imprisonment.
• Romkopf, 2 years 6 months imprisonment.
• Karche, 1 year 8 months imprisonment.
• Hausch, 1 year 4 months imprisonment.
• Lehmann, 3 years 3 months imprisonment.
• Kuehnel, 1 year imprisonment.
• Stachowski, 1 year imprisonment.
• Ude, 1 year imprisonment.
• Friedrich, 1 year 3 months imprisonment.
• Schmeling (police), 1 year imprisonment.
• Konitz, 1 year imprisonment.
• Uhlmann, 1 year imprisonment.
• Sturzkober, 10 months imprisonment.
• Schupp, 1 year 6 months imprisonment.
• Hensel, 2 years 3 months imprisonment.
• Heinicker, 1 year 6 months imprisonment.
• Putzler, 3 years 9 months, penitentiary.[354]
• Liebscher, 7 months imprisonment.
• Heeger, quashed by reason of the amnesty.

On 15 May 1935 the 12th Great Criminal Panel of the District Court [12. grosse Strafkammer des Landgerichts] in Dresden pronounced sentence according to which the following were sentenced for violation of Article 340[206] of the Criminal (Penal) Code:

• Jaehnichen to 6 years imprisonment.
• Zikera to 1 year 6 months imprisonment.
• Heinz Meier to 3 years imprisonment.
• Herbert Meier to 3 years imprisonment.
• Tuerke to 3 years imprisonment.
• Volkmar to 2 years 3 months imprisonment.
• Leuschner to 2 years 6 months imprisonment.
• Romkopf to 2 years 6 months imprisonment.
• Karche to 1 year 8 months imprisonment.
• Hausch to 1 year 4 months imprisonment.
• Lehmann to 3 years imprisonment.
• Kuehnel to 1 year imprisonment.
• Stachowski to 1 year 6 months imprisonment.
• Ude to 1 year imprisonment.
• Friedrich to 1 year 3 months imprisonment.
• Schmeling to 1 year imprisonment.
• Konitz to 1 year imprisonment.
• Uhlmann to 1 year imprisonment.
• Sturzkober to 1 year 10 months imprisonment.
• Schupp to 1 year 6 months imprisonment.
• Hensel to 2 years imprisonment.
• Heinicker to 1 year 6 months imprisonment.
• Putzler to 3 years 9 months imprisonment.

The proceedings against Liebscher and Heger were quashed by virtue of the law concerning exemption from punishment [Straffreiheitsgesetz].

After the sentences had been proposed, but before they had been actually pronounced, the president of the 12th Great Criminal Panel received the following communication from the Reich Governor in Saxony:

[355]

Office seal

The Reich Governor in Saxony

II 84/35

To the President of the District Court, Dr. Roth

Dresden—A.

Pillnitzer Strasse 41

Dear President:

I have been informed that a sentence of 3½ years penitentiary has been proposed for the defendant Standartenfuehrer Jaehnichen. Without wishing to interfere in the proceedings nor wanting to influence you as judge in any way, I should like to point out to you again before the passing of the sentence that the circumstances created by the revolution in 1933, which—no doubt—were still affecting conditions at the beginning of 1934 should not be disregarded when passing sentence.

Another point which seems to me worthy of consideration is the fact that one cannot accuse Jaehnichen of a villainous disposition and, above all, that the scum of the earth were to be guarded in Hohenstein. In view of these facts I leave it to you to examine whether the offenses actually demand a punishment of such great severity or whether an acquittal might be considered.

As Gauleiter I consider it my duty to point once more to the exceptional circumstances.

Heil Hitler!

[Signed] Martin Mutschmann.

Furthermore news was received here that the two lay judges who acted as judges during the trial, Regierungsamtmann Helbig and the merchant Pesler, were expelled from the NSDAP after the sentence had been pronounced. I do not know who was responsible for this expulsion.

Finally, the prosecutor, Public Prosecutor Dr. Walther, an SA man, was approached by his Obersturmfuehrer after the sentence had been passed, suggesting that he withdraw from the SA.

The fact that these measures coincided with the passing of judgment suggests some internal connection. This, however, would mean that very dubious and most unwelcome consequences have[356] resulted from the proceedings which were legally perfectly correct. If, from the communication of the Reich governor, which is reproduced above, the receiver was apt to gain the impression that here his decision as a judge was being influenced by high quarters, the same might be said, only to a larger degree of the measures taken against the two lay judges. Such action as was taken against lay judges after the verdict was returned, would naturally leave them under the impression that they are responsible before a certain authority for all their actions, carried out in their line of duty while acting as judges. This would destroy judicial independence, a factor which until now had been considered the basis of an orderly administration of justice. Apart from that the lay judge who when commencing his duties is made to take an oath that he will vote to the best of his knowledge and belief will in this way be subjected to great inner conflicts. The consequences resulting from such measures against the prosecutor would be no less serious. This official also would be faced by great conflicts in the performance of his duty. Thereby the orderly unbiased work of the legal authorities would be endangered to such an extent that I would feel it my duty to examine, whether under these circumstances it is at all possible for public prosecutors and judges to be party officials or members of the SA.

It therefore seems necessary—

I beg to let me have your opinion concerning this matter and to inform me of the measures taken over there. In view of the importance of the case I should welcome a speedy settlement.

Heil Hitler!

[typed] signed: Dr. Guertner

2. Letter to the Chief of Staff of the SA of the NSDAP with the copy of the indictment attached

insert page 1
Enclosure: 1 separate document

Secret!
Personal!

[357]

Dear Chief of Staff:

In the above-mentioned criminal case, where severe ill-treatment of prisoners in protective custody at the Hohenstein/Saxony internment camp is the subject of the indictment, the trial took place before the 12th Great Criminal Panel of the District Court in Dresden between 20 March and the middle of May 1935. Regarding the details of the incidents on which proceedings were based, I beg to refer to the enclosed copy of the indictment, dated 25 October 1934, and particularly to page 21 of the result of the inquiry.

On 3 May 1935 the prosecutor, Public Prosecutor, Dr. Walther, proposed the following sentences:

insert page 1 and 2 up to

News was received here that the prosecutor, Public Prosecutor Dr. Walther, an SA man, had been approached by his Obersturmfuehrer after the sentence had been passed, suggesting that he withdraw from the SA. The fact that this measure coincided with the passing of judgment suggests that there might be some internal connection between the two. This, however, would represent a very dubious and most unwelcome result of the procedure, which was legally perfectly correct. As a result of such measures the officials would be faced by the greatest of conflicts in the performance of their official duty. This would endanger the orderly unbiased work of the legal authorities to such a degree that I consider it my duty to examine whether under these circumstances it is at all possible for public prosecutors and judges to be also party officials or members of the SA.

It appears therefore necessary—

May I ask you to let me have your opinion regarding this matter and to inform me of the measures taken over there. In view of the importance of the case I should welcome a speedy settlement.

Heil Hitler!

[typed] signed: Dr. Guertner

3. To the Minister, secret

4. 2 weeks

[358]

D.RM.d.J.

[The Reich Minister of Justice]

4606—IIa^3 146/248

To the

• Chief Public Prosecutor
• at the Kammergericht[207] and
• to the Chief Public Prosecutors
• at the Courts of Appeal
• (with———* copies for the Public Prosecutors)

[Handwritten]* insert figures from distribution plan below.

[Stamp] received at office 11 March 1937

[illegible handwritten notes]

[Handwritten] according to distr. plan forwarded 17 March 1937

Concern: Collaboration between the office of the public prosecutor and the Gestapo.

[Handwritten] (Copy Circular letter Reich Leader SS of 18 March 1937)

1 Enclosure forwarded 17 March 1937

For your information I forward the enclosed copy of a circular decree of the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior of 18 February 1937.[208]

In order to have this decree fulfill its purpose and in the interest of the closest possible collaboration between the office of the public prosecutor and the authorities of the Gestapo, I hereby issue this supplementary order that in future public prosecutors routinely address all requests for investigations to be conducted on the basis of reports of political nature received by them directly, to the local and district police authorities via the competent State police offices. When in cases based on such reports the necessary interrogations of the accused or the witnesses are procured by the court itself or by the expert of the prosecution, and the police authorities are not at all involved in the proceedings, I request that[359] State police offices be informed of the proceedings as soon as possible. If, because of the urgency of a matter, the transfer of files is deemed inadvisable, the State police office is to be informed when the proceedings are instituted and if the occasion warrants, a copy of the indictment is to be submitted.

The enclosed circular decree was issued with my approval; but I also made it known that I expect this interpolation of the competent State police offices not to cause any great delay in the forwarding of the proceedings to the public prosecutor, and that the State police offices are merely transit agencies during this part of the proceedings. They will be exclusively concerned with information on the proceedings and not with the decision about the necessity of further inquiries or perhaps even the question as to whether proceedings are to be turned over to the public prosecutor at all.

With these aspects in mind, I request that the effects of this circular decree for the police be carefully noted, and that I be informed in the event of any considerable delays.

By order:

[Signature] Crohne

10 March

[Handwritten]

Distributed [Signed] Eck 19/3

1(a) copies of circular decrees distributed to all Dept. Chiefs and assistants.

1(b) copy with enclosure to Depts.

3262, 4026, 4007/1

taken care of [Initial] E. 19/3

2. resubmit

(notice to Reich Leader SS)

to 2: Submitted

Gsta [signed] Eck 19/3

[Initials] Kle [Klemm]

9 March

Draft

Dept. IIa^3 323/37

Copy of circular decree to Reich Leader SS, for information

2. Request for copy of circ. decree.

E 22/3

3. Illegible

[Initial] Kle [Klemm] 22/3

[Illegible initials] 20/3

[360]

Plan for distribution

TOTAL 167

[Signed] Behrens, 11 March

Political dept. chiefs

Political assistants[209]

*******

[Handwritten:]

A few surplus copies are available. Distribution completed.

Gsta [Initial]   E. [Eck], 8 May

to 4606—IIIa³——248

Berlin, 18 February 1937

The Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior

S V 1 No. 341/36

To:

• a. The Gestapo Office in Berlin,
• for forwarding to all Regional State Police
• Offices and
• State Police Offices
• b. for information of:
• State Governments in Prussia:
• to the Regierungspraesidenten

Concerning: The forwarding of Gestapo affairs to the office of the public prosecutor.

It is the Gestapo’s task, to investigate and to combat all seditious movements, and to collect and evaluate evidence of such[361] investigation. These tasks can only be accomplished by the State police offices, if all political police-affairs dealt with by the local and district police authorities within their district are submitted to them promptly. As auxiliary organs of the Gestapo, it is the duty of the local and district police authorities to do so.

Thus, all matters in the affairs of the Gestapo are on principle to be submitted to the office of the public prosecutor via the competent State police office. In urgent matters of arrest, records may be submitted directly to the office of the public prosecutor after notifying the State police office previously by telephone. In such a case, a copy of the interrogation record is to be forwarded at once to the State police office.

The Reich Minister of Justice will instruct the office of the public prosecutor to direct the requests for investigations of reports of political nature, received directly by him, to local and district police authorities via the competent State police office.

It is the responsibility of the State police offices to speedily evaluate the proceedings channeled through their offices and to forward them without delay.

By order:

[typed] signed: Dr. Best

[Stamp] The Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior

Certified:

[Illegible signature]

Assistant

to IIIa³——248/37

Administration of Penal Law

Imposing of Fines by Party Offices

A. 108/37

31 August 1937

[362]

For special reasons, I draw your attention to the fact that the prosecution of punishable offenses is exclusively the concern of the judicial authorities.[211] All cases, where persons have committed a punishable offense, must be turned over or reported to the appropriate authorities.

It is not admissible that sentences, especially fines, are imposed on punishable persons by offices of the NSDAP or its affiliated organizations. Party members disregarding this warning, who demand from the person who has committed an offense e.g., the payment of a fine, possibly with an additional hint that this would settle the affair, will run the risk of a criminal prosecution.

*******

A. 15/38

9 February 1938

The question of prosecuting or not prosecuting punishable offenses committed by Party members, is exclusively a matter of decision by the public prosecutor’s office or by the Reich Minister of Justice.

It has been noted, that Party offices have frequently approached the regional State police office or other State police offices with the request not to prosecute punishable offenses committed by Party members, or not to submit their investigations to the public prosecutor’s office. Since the officials of the Secret State Police are at the same time assistant officials of the public prosecutor’s office, and as such are obliged to prosecute all punishable offenses without respect to the person of the offender and without any special invitation from the public prosecutor’s office, unpleasant discrepancies would result if such wishes were satisfied. Nobody but the public prosecutor’s office or the Reich Minister of Justice can decide whether or not a punishable offense shall be prosecuted. The public prosecutor’s office therefore has always the opportunity to make investigations of its own, concerning incidents which, by the Party’s request are not prosecuted any longer by the Gestapo, or to have investigations made by the police authorities or by the constabulary, which would not exactly be in the interest of the Party. In the future, the lawful duty of the Secret State Police to prosecute all punishable offenses must be respected, and all cases of doubt with regard to such prosecution have to be reported directly to the appropriate Chief Public Prosecutor through the appropriate Gauleiter, or to the Reich Minister of Justice through the chief of the Party Chancellery, the aim being to[363] accomplish an administration of criminal prosecution which will comply with the interests of the Party.

However, this procedure must be adopted sparingly since the same, and under certain circumstances more severe, principles will be applied to Party members as to non-Party members.

The Chief of the Chancellery of the Fuehrer of the NSDAP

To Under Secretary Dr. Schlegelberger

Berlin

Dear Mr. Under Secretary,

The Fuehrer has directed [verfuegt], on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the National Socialist rise to power, that you be accorded membership in the NSDAP.

I take pleasure in bringing this to your attention while requesting that you submit to me your personal data such as your first name, last name, place and date of birth, and correct address.

Heil Hitler!

[Signed] Bouhler

Copy

Order for the Initiation of Criminal Proceedings

In accordance with article 38, paragraph 3 of the Reich Notary’s Code, and article 71, paragraph 2, German Civil Service Law, I initiate an inquiry against notary Karl Walbaum of Goettingen.

[364]

Notary Walbaum can no longer be relied upon to lend his active support to the National Socialist State at all times. This suspicion is proved by his general attitude, for instance—

(1) The notary joined the German National People’s Party [DNVP] towards the end of 1932 in order to help in preventing the National Socialist German Workers’ Party from taking over exclusive State leadership.

(2) In 1933 he was expelled from the Stahlhelm,[212] because he worked openly against the affiliation of the Stahlhelm to the National Socialist State.

(3) He did not adopt the German Salute in Court until fall 1937, and in the streets he fails to use it even today. On the occasion of his interrogation by the president of the district court on 13 April 1938, he referred to the German salute as the ancient salute given by German gladiators to the Roman emperor.

(4) He is opposed to the existence of the National Socialist Party and its union with the National Socialist State, and he expressed this attitude not only in a letter to the Kreisleiter of Goettingen, dated 11 April 1938, but also during his interrogation on 12 April at the branch office of the Secret State Police, and on 13 April 1938 by the president of the district court.

(5) In the plebiscite and general election on 10 April 1938 he voted “No.” I appoint District Court Judge Weissgerber of Goettingen head of the inquiry.

Berlin, 19 May 1938

The Reich Minister of Justice

As deputy

[typed] signed: Dr. Schlegelberger

Carbon copy

Order for the Initiation of Criminal Proceedings

By request of the deputy of the Fuehrer[213] I initiate an inquiry against notary Dr. Kurt Prelle of Naumburg (Saale) in accordance with article 38, paragraph 3 of the Notary’s Code; article 71 of the German Civil Service Law and with the Executive Decree to article 71 of the German Civil Service Law.

It has become doubtful whether notary Dr. Prelle can still be relied upon to lend his active support to the National Socialist[365] State at all times. These doubts are based on the following occurrence:

Since 1 August 1932, Dr. Prelle had been a member of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, Membership No. 1 255 200. In the course of a Party court proceedings he was accused of having made a purchase from the Jew Max Cohn in Naumburg (Saale) on 24 December 1935. On 18 February 1936, during the proceedings he submitted a questionable justification in which he explained that not he himself but his wife without his knowledge had bought picture postcards from the Jew Cohn for a total of 10 Reichspfennig. He continued, however, to explain that in view of the speech made on 18 August 1935 by the president of the Reich Bank, Dr. Schacht, and in view of the fact that the Reich government was using Jewish banks for raising Reich loans, every State citizen was entitled to buy as much as he wanted from Jews. As a result of this, Dr. Prelle was expelled from the Party by a decision of the Party’s Kreis Court at Naumburg (Saale) dated 30 June 1936, because he had not made the Party’s fight against Jewry his concern and did not even support it.

The right to commission someone with the establishment of these facts is being reserved.

Berlin, 6 December 1938

The Reich Minister of Justice

As deputy

[typed] Signed Dr. Schlegelberger

(Seal)

Conversation between Senator Dr. Rothenberger, SS Sturmbannfuehrer Eckhardt, SD Subsection Hamburg and SS Oberschar [Oberscharfuehrer], Amtsgerichtsrat Moeller.

Subject: Cooperation of the Administration of Justice in Hamburg with the SD Subsection Hamburg

1. There prevails agreement that it would be purposeless to appoint special informants in the various branches of the administration of justice to inform the Liaison Officer, Amtsgerichtsrat[366] Moeller. The already existing circle of informants, to which Moeller should from now on belong, is abundantly sufficient to inform the senior president [of the court of appeal] about wishes and difficulties, views on the reaction to new laws, moods of the judges, etc. If from this circle things are brought forward which cannot be settled directly by the senior president, Sturmbannfuehrer Eckhardt is prepared to put his SD apparatus at their disposal on instructions from Moeller.

2. Senator Dr. Rothenberger expressed the wish to be able to fall back on the information apparatus of the SD in necessary cases, e. g., to ascertain whether there is any truth in rumors which by repetition have become the subject of a criminal procedure. Sturmbannfuehrer Eckhardt consents to this.

3. Senator Dr. Rothenberger declares that he is prepared to put at the disposal of the SD subsection current copies of such sentences as are significant on account of their importance for the carrying-out of National Socialist ideas in the field of the administration of justice, and which are being collected in the appellate court. Sturmbannfuehrer Eckhardt considers a current transmission of important judicial sentences in this way to be particularly valuable for the work of the SD.

4. Sturmbannfuehrer Eckhardt requests that employees of the judicial authorities be reminded before they travel abroad to keep their eyes open in foreign countries and to record their experiences and impressions in a report on foreign opinion. Senator Dr. Rothenberger points out that he has been kept informed up to now as to essentials, of one employee’s impressions on journeys abroad. In future, each employee of the judicial authorities is to make a report on foreign opinion at the close of his journey, a carbon copy of which will be forwarded to the SD subsection for information.

5. Up to now, informants who are at the disposal of the SD have not been nominated for the local court districts Harburg and Wandsbeck. Senator Dr. Rothenberger wants to seek out suitable individuals and to nominate them to the SD subsection.

For the rest, the parties concerned are in agreement that cooperation, with the wide consideration for the importance of the sphere of work on both sides, is best guaranteed by any debatable questions being dealt with directly by the liaison officer Moeller, either in writing or orally.

Hamburg, 22 August 1939.

[367]

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS FRIEDRICH ELKAR[214]

Mr. King: Will you please state your name?

Witness Elkar: Elkar.

Q. Will you tell us briefly what your educational background and training has been?

A. I was born in July 1911 in Altenberg. Then, for 14 years I went to elementary school, and I went to the Oberrealschule, Fuerth, and there in the year 1931 I made my final examination. Then I studied for four terms each at the Universities of Erlangen and Munich. In the year 1935 I made the first state examination, the so-called Referendar Examination. Then for about 3 years I was at the Nuernberg-Fuerth court as a legal clerk in the administration for training. Then, in July 1939, I made the second state examination, that is, the assessor examination, at Munich. Thereafter, for a short time, I worked for a Nuernberg lawyer. Then, due to wartime conditions, I was unemployed for a while. In October I was taken into the Security Service at Nuernberg. That was on 16 October 1939. I was there at the SD during the entire war. In 1945 after the collapse I worked for some time as an agricultural worker.

Q. After you had passed your first state examination and prior to the time that you had taken your second examination were you at any time assigned, while you were in Nuernberg, to the defendant Rothaug?

A. Yes, first I had two cases when I was appointed defense counsel before the Special Court, and that is where I met Rothaug. And then for 2 months I was there for my legal training. That was at the end of my legal training period in February or March 1939.

Q. You said that in October of 1939 you became a member of the SD.

A. Yes, on 16 October 1939.

Q. Before I put several questions to you concerning your activities with the SD, will you explain briefly the relationship between the SD, (Security Service) of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) and the SS?

A. Relations between the Reich Security Main Office and the SS—well, the Security Service, SD, belonged to Office III of the Reich Security Main Office. That was the central office of the SD[368] at Berlin. A large number of the employees of the SD, had been taken into the General SS. To that extent a rather loose connection existed between the SS and the SD. In particular, the Supreme Chief of the Reich Security Main Office was first Heydrich and after his death, Kaltenbrunner, whereas the chief of the SD who was under Heydrich and Kaltenbrunner was Ohlendorf.[215] Is that sufficient?

Q. Tell me how the SD was organized at Gau level?

A. At Gau level principally every Gau had an SD department. That, according to the Gau level, was the SD sector, and the extent of this SD sector was usually the same as that of the Gau.

Q. How were these SD organizations which were attached to each Gau organized? Were there departments in each SD organization within each Gau, and if so, what were these departments?

A. In the SD districts there were departments [Referate], as we called them. Essentially there were four—III was the designation of the SD office in general; III-A, law and administration; III-B, folkdom and public health; III-C, cultural fields, including education; and III-D, economy.

Q. When you were assigned to the Gau here in Nuernberg for the SD, to which one of these four departments were you assigned?

A. I was assigned to the department of law and administration.

Q. And what was your position in that department?

A. I was in charge of it. That is to say, for quite some time there was only one man in it, really. There was only one person.

Q. Can you tell me in general—I will later ask you some specific questions, but now tell me in general what your duties were as head of law and administration of the SD in the Franconia Gau.

A. The SD as home information service, in our case through the Reich Security Main Office had to inform about all developments in various fields of German life. I personally had to report about all developments in the field of law and administration, positive and negative developments which occurred in that field of law and administration, to investigate and to report about them.

Q. Being assigned to the law and administration section, did you confer with the defendant Rothaug in connection with your official duties?

A. Yes. On the basis of an instruction received from the inspector of the Security Police and SD at Munich who was our[369] administrative superior, from an instruction through him we had to take up in connection with the prosecution of the Special Courts in order to inform the inspector, and in the last event, the Reich Security Main Office, about the pending criminal cases, that is to say, the activity of the Special Courts. In the course of this action, it came to a conference of my chief with the president of the court of appeal, and in the course of that conference Doebig, the president of the court of appeal, stated that he was not competent for any agreement that had to be passed here, because as the Public Prosecutor, the prosecution was under his control. For that reason on the same day, practically at the same hour, a conference was brought about with the General Prosecutor Dr. Bens. On that occasion, the presiding judge of the Special Court, Rothaug, was present. Bens justified that by saying that the first hand information about pending criminal cases before the Special Court could best be obtained from the presiding judge himself, because it was he who was in charge of scheduling the cases and therefore could give the best information, and for that reason Rothaug was drawn into that conference. The oral agreement came about to the effect that from time to time if my superior office was interested, I should get the appropriate information from Rothaug.

Q. In connection with this series of conferences, when did you first see Rothaug?

A. Well, the conference in question you mean?

Q. No. As I understood the answer to the previous question, after you had seen Doebig and Bens, you were finally told that you would confer in connection with your official duties with Rothaug. When then did you have your first conference with Rothaug concerning your official duties?

A. The first short conference took place immediately after that conference with Bens and Doebig on the same day in Rothaug’s office. On that occasion, Rothaug stated that he was quite ready to work together with the SD, as far as information was concerned.

Q. And thereafter, did you see him at regular intervals, and if so, how often did you see him?

A. At that time, an agreement was reached between Rothaug and myself that principally I should come into his office every Saturday, and there he would inform me about matters which in his opinion were interesting for me—criminal cases—and give me all the information. On that occasion, we were also able to discuss any other legal questions of interest that actually came up; and particularly during the first half year I met Rothaug pretty regularly on Saturdays.

[370]

Q. Now after these Saturday conferences with Rothaug, did you make a report to your superiors on what was said?

A. I sent reports to the Reich Security Main Office about everything in the way of information which I received from Rothaug.

Q. And these reports which you sent to the Reich Security Main Office went first to your superior located in Nuernberg, and then, as far as you know, to Berlin and possibly to the head of the SS? Is that right?

A. It really occurred that way, that whatever Rothaug considered important he reported himself. I took stenographic notes, and I had them transcribed at my office, and on the basis of this information, I wrote my report to Berlin—of course without any opinion on my part and without making essential changes which would not have been within my duties.

Q. In these conferences with Rothaug, which occurred fairly regularly every Saturday morning, can you tell the Court in general what was discussed? Later on, I want to ask you several specific questions, but now, if you will, please tell us in general what Rothaug discussed on these occasions with you?

A. Mostly the information which he gave me was in a form of instructions about developments of criminality which he explained with examples of individual cases. He informed me, for instance, that mail robberies or black-out crimes were increasing and that they constituted most of the criminal cases at that time. Then he explained to me in what manner criminal procedure had to be developed in order to present effective measures against that undesirable development of criminality and to manifest that in the way of jurisdiction. On that occasion, of course, individual cases were also discussed. In addition to that, he also mentioned matters of legal and political development; also in the field of substantive law, matters which came to his attention in the course of these proceedings, sometimes in the form of short dictation or of handwritten slips which he prepared. It was not only that the current cases were explained to show the development in criminality but also anything that occurred in the field of law and had to be corrected by higher offices, be it that it needed a negative or positive decision that he wanted to have written down and reported to higher offices.

Q. Rothaug knew, I take it, that these notes and reports which he handed to you were passed on by you in line with your official duty—passed on to higher authorities in the Reich Security Main Office and in the SS?

A. That he knew for certain, and in my opinion that was what he wanted. It could be seen from remarks to the effect that such[371] matters had to be reported to higher offices so that from these higher offices appropriate countermeasures could be taken.

Q. Did Rothaug discuss in these conferences with you the sentences he expected to give in cases that were to be heard in his court in the near future?

A. Yes, the proceedings in the next period of time which were to be tried sooner or later, as far as they were important, were discussed partly on the basis of the files, partly on the basis of his knowledge of the files; he gave me a short explanation of the facts and also his opinion about the legal procedure, the legal dealing with the cases as far as the application of the facts was concerned in consideration of the sentence to be expected.

Q. What in general was Rothaug’s attitude, so far as he reported it to you, on the interpretation of criminal law?

A. Rothaug, in principle, was of the opinion that particularly in times of war on account of a certain laxity of security measures, be it due to shortage of personnel or other things, criminality would increase; that not only an increase of serious criminal cases would occur, but also of so-called political criminality; and that the activity of the Special Courts should be conducted in such a manner that an increase of serious criminality of that kind should be forestalled; that any attempt against the State in a political, criminal, or other manner would have to be wiped out by severe penalties.

Q. Can you tell us what Rothaug’s apparent attitude was toward foreigners, especially Poles, so far as the application of criminal law to them was concerned?

A. In my opinion, Rothaug’s position was that particularly toward foreigners—Poles and others—that no clemency should be applied; that especially these elements had to be met with severe measures in order to assure that attempts which would be made to counteract the successes of the armed forces should be choked off at the outset. It may be that he would have used more clemency towards German criminals than to foreigners.

Q. Can you tell us whether you are familiar with the decree against Poles and Jews promulgated in 1941?[216]

A. Yes, that is a concept for me.

Q. You are in general familiar with the provisions of this decree, are you not?

[372]

A. Well, in detail—of course today I couldn’t say—but in general, yes.

Q. What was Rothaug’s attitude toward Poles and Jews prior to the time that this decree was promulgated so far as you know from the conversations that you had with him and from the reports that you passed on from him?

A. I believe that it was clear to Rothaug that here, if I may say so, there was a gap in the law; that that gap should be bridged; but that a judge with the right political attitude should be in a position, in spite of this gap, to sentence accordingly. He found the juridical way to pronounce the sentences which he considered appropriate.

Q. In other words, would you say that Rothaug achieved, without a decree, and prior to the time that it was promulgated, the same legal effect that later could be achieved under it?

A. That is correct, beyond doubt. As a Special Court judge in Nuernberg, he achieved the same success. I should only think that perhaps measured by conditions all throughout the Reich, he thought that a formulation of these principles was needed.

Q. Is it your feeling that Rothaug’s outspoken comments on the need for such a decree, as was later formulated, was influential in the final promulgation of that decree?

A. Well, as far as the various things are concerned that finally led to the decree, I am not well informed about that; but that Rothaug’s information may have contributed, that I believe.

Q. In any event, prior to the time that that decree was formulated in 1941, you had sent up in line with your official duty many of Rothaug’s comments on what the law, or what the situation lacked at that time?

A. That was certainly the case.

Q. In discussing the cases with Rothaug in these Saturday morning conferences, do you recall any particular case to which Rothaug referred?

A. You mean in a particular category of a criminal act?

Q. No, I do not refer to that. Perhaps my question was not clear. I meant in spectacular cases which were to be tried by Rothaug, or other judges in his court. In other words, did you discuss, or did he discuss with you the more spectacular cases at any time?

A. Yes, he did. I remember, for instance, the case of the Dachau criminal, I think it was Poelmann.

[373]

Q. One moment. I did not get that name.

A. Poelmann. That man Poelmann, if I remember correctly, had taken a large quantity of lard from a barn in Fuerth, I believe at night. There may have been several hundred pounds and also other things. If I remember correctly, Poelmann was sentenced to death by Rothaug. The verdict I believe was not executed, but through a pardon was commuted into a long prison term, I think 8 years of hard labor. Rothaug talked to me at that time about that pardon, which technically reduced the death sentence, which in Rothaug’s opinion was a correct sentence, to a prison term.

Q. Do you remember any other cases that you discussed with Rothaug?

A. Yes, one typical case, the case of Katzenberger. That case Rothaug and I discussed also once, and I expressed my opinion that on the basis of information I had received, and also on the basis of opinion on what was known of the criminal, that the sexual relationship was not an accomplished fact, because the law, insofar as I knew, required the act of sexual relation between a German and a party of non-Aryan descent.

Dr. Koessl: May it please the Tribunal, I object against the examination. I object to the examination in this manner, because the opinion which is stated by the witness, the legal opinion which is stated by the witness shows that he is not an expert, and furthermore, he has not been called as an expert witness.

Presiding Judge Marshall: We see nothing in the answer in the nature of which shows anything other than he was just stating a conversation, the way we get it.

Witness Elkar: I do not in any way wish to give an expert opinion here. I only wanted to explain why I came to speak about the case of Katzenberger, because I was asked whether he spoke of any other case, and particularly this case is one which was mentioned as the case of Katzenberger. Therefore, may I continue with my statement? At the time the facts were not complete, because it was not proved so far as I know that the German woman was doing anything more, according to the proof, other than that she was sitting on his lap, and Rothaug—I remember that quite clearly here—said that one had to take the human facts into consideration and could hardly expect that a man of that kind, he meant the man Katzenberger, would act otherwise once the girl had been sitting on his lap, and that consequently, he considered the proof as given.

Mr. King: Now may I for a brief moment digress to another subject. In your position with the SD you undoubtedly had an[374] opportunity to observe the political influence that various people with whom you came in contact exercised?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you know about Rothaug’s influence with the Party men who ran the Gau Franconia. What are your impressions?

A. Rothaug had some close connections to the Gau Inspector Haberkern. Haberkern as Gau Inspector could gain an insight in all matters going on in the Gau, and in my opinion for a discussion of such matters, particularly in the legal field, he took the advice of Rothaug, so that, since the Gauleiter depended on Haberkern, Rothaug certainly could have his opinion go to the Gauleiter on legal matters.

Q. What men besides Haberkern were influential in directing the affairs of the Gau Franconia?

A. Well, first, Streicher was Gauleiter. After he left, there were several staff office chiefs who were acting, and then Holz became acting Gauleiter. Then Holz went to the army, and at that time the Kreisleiter Zimmermann was in charge of the official business of the Gauleiter and as far as I know, the relationship between Zimmermann, Haberkern, and Rothaug was very close.

Q. May I at this point ask you to clarify one matter. You say that Streicher, Haberkern, Holz, and Zimmermann, as leaders of the Gau, were, of necessity, members of the Party Leadership Corps?

A. Yes.

Q. Now in your opinion from what you were able to observe, did Haberkern’s reliance on Rothaug, and Rothaug’s influence over him result in Rothaug having a very great influence on the Party Leadership Corps here in the Franconia Gau?

A. Insofar as Haberkern could indulge in the influence as to the Leadership Corps, Rothaug through Haberkern had the same influence, and I should like to assume that in the question of law Rothaug certainly was the man who was the higher authority so far as the Gau was concerned.

Q. Do you know whether Rothaug had ever taken an oath of secrecy as a collaborator with the SD?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Do you know when that happened?

A. That must have been in 1940, because in May 1940, approximately in the spring of 1940, that is before the French campaign, the conference of prosecutors which I had mentioned took place, and I believe a short time afterward Rothaug was drafted for the SD and was put on oath by the SD.

[375]

Q. What was the higher, more responsible position in the SD, the position of informer [Nachrichtenmann], or the position of collaborator [Mitarbeiter]?

A. May I correct that? There were no official informers. You mean the confidential agent [Vertrauensmann]? Then there was also the term of honorary collaborator [ehrenamtlicher Mitarbeiter]. The confidential agent was the man who in a certain field of law, penal law or the administration of justice, occasionally was used for information that had to be kept secret. On account of the shortage of men, which existed during the war, it had become necessary to bring in also honorary staff members [ehrenamtliche Maenner] who had certain functions, and who in a definite special field, also had the function of rendering information; the informative material which had come from other places was digested by them and put together in reports. All such people in the special field, that is the field of penal law, were a source of information. The honorary collaborator I would like to put on a higher level than the confidential agent.

Q. I think I did use the wrong term in referring to the confidential agent as informer, but in any event, you understood my question, and I think I understand your answer.

Did you ever attend a trial which was presided over by Rothaug?

A. Yes.

Q. From your observation, can you tell us briefly how Rothaug conducted his trials?

A. Once it was the case Heller and Muendel, well known highway trap-setters [Autofallensteller]. Then the case Feldstengel. There were several others. These were cases of burglary during the black-outs, black-out crimes.

May I pick out here the principal matters such as they presented themselves to me after my experiences as an SD man. I think I am not mistaken in assuming that Rothaug considered the trial before the Special Court as a means of direction and education and that accordingly he conducted the main trial on a broad basis and facts which constituted transgressions against the program of the Party, the directives of the political leadership, such facts were developed to such an extent that the illegal elements which were contained in the opposition against the political leadership were brought to the foreground. I would like to say that he rather disregarded other circumstances concerning the defendant, his office, his position. He wanted to remove those circumstances, to leave them aside, in order to develop clearly the criminality of the act of the defendant, and just because he considered the trial as[376] a means for the direction and education of the people, he used every means to make it possible for as many people as possible to attend and underline matters which offered possibilities for the political education in order to exert influence on the listeners in that manner.

Q. In your conferences with Rothaug did he express the view that trials were to be used as a means of political education?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. From your observation of Rothaug’s conduct of trials where he was the presiding judge, your answer is that in practice they actually were conducted that way, as a means of political education; that was the purport of the answer to the next to the last question, I believe.

A. Yes, that was my personal impression, which I gathered from the comparatively few trials which I attended myself and also from information on the basis of the material about the trials. From those reports, it could be seen that Rothaug had the intention to use the many trials as a means for political education.[217]

*******

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Dr. Koessl (counsel for defendant Rothaug): Witness, your position was that of chief of a department?

Witness Elkar: No, in an Abschnitt. May I point out that there was no such expression as Abteilung; there were special departments, Referate.

Q. So it was Referat III-A?

A. Referat III-A.

Q. Referat III-A was part of the home forces?

A. Yes.

Q. Your work with Rothaug was based on general directives, on the basis of which the SD groups had to get in contact with the Special Courts; is that correct?

A. The real cause for the contact with Rothaug as presiding judge of the Special Court was, as I explained yesterday, the desire of the inspector of the Security Police and the SD in Munich to be informed about the decisions of the Special Courts, or to remain currently informed about their decisions, because[377] the inspector of the Security Police and the SD in Munich was, at the same time, supposed to send reports to the Reich defense commissar who, at that time, was in Munich, but whose field was all of Bavaria. A measure of that kind was of a local nature, at first only for Bavaria, an internal instruction, let us say, from the RSHA, because a contact of that kind did not exist at that time.

Q. But it was a contact which was taken up all over Bavaria?

A. Yes.

*******

Q. Do you still know what the purpose of the visit of the SD leaders with Doebig and Bens was and what considerations, what principal considerations were discussed on that occasion?

A. As I have already explained, subject at first on the occasion of that official contact, taking up of contact, was that from an authoritative source the reports should be received about pending criminal cases, and of course also about legal problems in connection therewith. The SD through all its reports from the outside, received information about the consequences of court decisions on morale. It is clear to us today that the layman’s point of view frequently deviates quite essentially from the facts established in court. And in order to provide a correction, a possibility of checking our reports, it was necessary that we establish the official connection to the court authorities.

Q. Therefore, it was intended that this contact should correct mistakes in the reports received from other sources, which mistakes were based on reports from laymen and frequently caused misunderstandings of the facts?

A. That is essentially true.

Q. Now, you discussed at first the conferences. You came to Rothaug first on Saturday mornings in order to get information?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you stick to that in the course of the following period, or were there larger intervals between these meetings?

A. If I should indicate a period first—

Q. I asked only, was that regularly on Saturdays?

A. In the beginning yes, the first half year.

Q. And later?

A. Later, either if an inquiry had been sent to us from some other source or when, on the basis of reports which we had received[378] from other sources we had questions to put before him, or when Rothaug on his part had to report anything on the basis of his activity, and I emphasized yesterday that he was very productive for us, that in the field of political law, not only in the field of general law, but beyond that and also in the field of civil law, he brought to us experiences and inspirations.

Q. If I understand you correctly, Rothaug dealt with matters of principle of a general nature not, for instance, the treatment of individual cases, the manner in which individual cases were handled.

A. You have to distinguish here between the—you have to start here from the assignment which the SD had as information sources for the whole country. As I emphasized yesterday, the purpose was to eliminate wrong developments first, to point them out. In case of these developments in the wrong direction it could only be matters of principle in the beginning. According to the instructions we had received, it did not suffice to point out a principal wrong, that is to say a gap in the law, but it was necessary that on the basis of concrete examples of definite individual examples that gap be proved, and if possible at the same time in this case, of course, by the expert, recommendations had to be made for modifications. And on the basis of this activity individual cases were the subject of discussions and conferences. Frequently, as far as I remember, it occurred that at times the individual case itself was discussed as, for instance, the case of Katzenberger and another case which I still remember.

Q. So it was a matter of justifying opinions if individual cases were mentioned?

A. Yes.

Q. It was not a matter of interfering into an individual case on the part of superior offices, an interference into a pending, into an actual proceeding?

A. Well, of course it was possible that the individual case itself, through the leadership office, became known to the Ministry and caused individual measures. I can give you an example. In the directives concerning files there is a provision according to which wills are to be attached to the files of the court. Furthermore, there is some directive of some sort according to which last letters of soldiers who have been killed could be considered, under certain circumstances, as having the force of a “last will.” That was particularly customary in the air force, that, in case a flier died, these letters were considered, and if there were any provisions in these letters concerning the heritage, and there was no[379] other proof of any will existing, they were considered to represent the will. That happened, for instance, in one case. There was a soldier by name of Schneiderbanger. The woman who had lost her husband in the First World War, and I believe already one son in this war, lost her last son. It was in air combat over London, I believe. She presented to the court the letter in which some provisions were included about his luggage, I believe. The court considered that letter to represent his will, and asked for the original from the woman—asked that the original be put in the files. Since for sentimental reasons she objected to that, she was threatened with a fine or a prison term. That affair raised a lot of discussion. Various offices of the Party intervened, and it came before us. I reported that case. In the opinion of the RSHA it was not a rare case, but a development which would have to be taken into account either by law or by directive from the Ministry. It was strange that in this case the reaction of the Ministry of Justice was not the issuance of a general instruction, but an order through channels that the woman in this particular case be permitted to keep the letter.

Presiding Judge Marshall: One moment, please. The witness answered, some little time ago, that these reports to the RSHA and the answers from them were for the purposes of justifying the opinions of the lower court. At that point, Dr. Koessl asked the question whether it was intended as an interference of those opinions. I couldn’t observe that the witness answered that question, and I should like to know whether it was an interference and not merely an attempt to justify.

Witness Elkar: In as much as we discussed these cases at our level, one could not speak of interference in the individual cases. How far the RSHA, through conferences with the various ministries—in this case, the Ministry of Justice—could interfere, I am not in a position to estimate.

Q. I am not so much concerned as to how much they could do, but I am very much interested in knowing what they did do, if anything, in the matter of interference.

A. Well, of course we reported with the intention that a wrong development in individual cases should find correction occasionally, but I am not so familiar with that in the legal field. We received instructions from superior offices that in this one or the other case a measure from the Ministry or the respective superior office was caused by the report.

Dr. Koessl: Wasn’t it so that at that time the fact had become apparent and noticed that offices which were outside the administration[380] of justice were frequently concerned with matters of justice; for instance, offices of the NSDAP, Kreisleiters, and so on?

Witness Elkar: Yes.

Q. Were the conferences also concerned with the attempt of preventing such interference?

A. I can hardly remember that when speaking to Rothaug that problem was ever discussed to any extent. Occasionally, when mention was made from the outside, that question was touched too; but if I remember correctly, Rothaug was of the position that the Party, for instance, was definitely justified to make its intentions known to the court; he said in the same manner which, for instance, the administration of mail service—in case of a fraud on the part of one of the officials—gives its expert opinion about the case, then in the same manner that right should be conceded to the Party. For that reason, he offered at all times information to the Party and gave also advance information about pending cases and an opportunity to state its—the Party’s—point of view.

Q. That was originated by law, if I remember correctly, Witness. Wasn’t it provided that in penal cases against members of the Party, on the basis of a legal decision, the Party had to be informed?

A. Yes, that of course.

Q. That is what I mean. Was there more involved?

A. For instance, in cases of insidious attacks[218], a directive by the Ministry of Justice was required. That directive, as far as I know, came about in cooperation with the Party Chancellery.[219] It is true that the Party Chancellery, certainly before it rendered its decision, received information from the Gauleitung concerned with that case. But I believe that I am not mistaken to assume that Rothaug, even beyond that in local cases of political significance, tried to get the opinion of the Gauleitung concerned.

Q. You told us yesterday that you discussed pending cases on the points of view of the general development of criminality. Was that the basis of your conferences on Saturdays and later on at more frequent occasions?

A. Perhaps I can make the answer a little clearer by emphasizing the circumstances under which this more intense cooperation with the Special Court under Rothaug, in particular, came about. The conference between Doebig and the others was concerned[381] with the official agreement, as I have said. The position and the tasks of the SD are known to you. I assume that the SD was in a position to obtain these official informations and opinions from the official sources, but we had to try to find out about the matters which were, for instance, in the more detailed files—matters about which information cannot be obtained through regular channels—or to find out about matters which went beyond the pattern of an official opinion about a penal case; that is to say, as we have explained before, a particular experience or an opinion about another court. The obtaining of that information could only be the case if as an SD man I had a closer connection to Rothaug beyond the official character of my mission. And Rothaug, after that first official conference with Doebig—in a conference between himself and myself—stated that he was prepared to do so.

Q. Did you take up contact with other officials of the administration of justice in your position at that time?

A. Here again I have to deal with the administrative organization. As you have heard yesterday, the Abschnitt, after the SD Main Office, was the next lower echelon. It was not our task as such in all fields, let’s say of law and of administration, to obtain and to collect material of information. That task remained to the so-called field offices. I believe we had five in Nuernberg. These field offices as far as I am informed had their confidential agents again; and that there were legal men—members of the court—among those, is quite known. As far as my mission was concerned, that is to say, in order to appraise and evaluate the material which came from the field offices, I needed of course a qualified person, an expert, who had a wider field of experience; and for that purpose I needed Rothaug. He agreed, and he also had the right attitude.

Q. Yesterday you spoke about the slackening of the security machinery during the war. Could you remember that preventive measures against danger arising through conditions of war was part of the discussions and conferences with Rothaug?

A. You mean measures to be taken by leadership offices?

Q. In order to prevent possibilities of dangers arising from special conditions, arising from emergencies of war.

A. Of course.

*******

Q. Witness, I want to go over to another point. What concrete reasons do you have for judging what influence Rothaug had on Haberkern in regard to the leadership of the Gau; what influence was exerted through Haberkern on the Gau leadership?

[382]

A. I know that Rothaug was at the Hotel Haberkern, at the so-called Stammtisch [club table], that he was seen there frequently; I know, furthermore, partly from having been present there myself, in the “Blaue Traube” restaurant [Hotel Haberkern] that other leading men of the Gau were also present there. For example, the Kreisleiter Zimmermann occasionally; also the Higher SS Police Leader Dr. Martin and several other people; and I know furthermore that, at this Stammtisch, matters concerning the Gau were discussed. I can further say with quite a good deal of certainty that Haberkern, especially in legal questions, based himself on the advice and actions of Rothaug, since Haberkern, as I believe I emphasized already yesterday, as Gau Inspector, at any time could have insight into any matters which were of interest to the Gau and what was going on inside the Gau; he could, of course, on the basis of this insight inform the competent Gauleiter.

Q. Did the Gau not have a definite office for handling legal questions?

A. Yes, the Gau had a legal office, the Gaurechtsamt.

Q. Was Rothaug in charge of this office?

A. No. Rothaug was in the National Socialist Legal Workers Association [NSRB] the head of which in Gau Franconia, at times was also the head of Gaurechtsamt, namely Oeschey. In the NSRB, Rothaug had the position of a Gau group leader of the [group] judges and prosecutors; you know that the NSRB was composed of [several] groups.

As Gau group leader of [group] judges and prosecutors, Rothaug was in the Gau Franconia, the judge, the leading jurist, politically; who also from the political point of view, especially the personnel policies of the Party had the primary influence on it—the most important influence, that is, on the Gau leadership. The Gau leader depended a great deal on its own initiative or due to the questions by the Party Chancellery, who had to advise and give opinions on certain personnel policies, questions of personnel policy. The Gau leader and the Gaurechtsamtleiter had to find out Rothaug’s attitude.

Q. But, Witness, is it not evident already from the fact that the Gau leadership had to turn to Rothaug via the Gaurechtsamtleiter that the Gaurechtsamtleiter was the decisive man, the advisor of the Gau leadership?

A. One should suppose that from the outside, just from looking at the organization, but actually I should suppose—I think I can say that with certainty, that the Spiritus Rector, shall we say[383] the guiding and thinking spirit even under the leadership of Oeschey, was Rothaug.

Q. Now, did you have an insight into the attitude of Rothaug with his associates from the political point of view?

A. Do you mean the association on the Special Courts?

Q. Yes.

A. In order to do so it is necessary—

Q. Please, did you have an insight or not?

A. Yes.

Mr. King: May I ask if the witness wants to expand his answer or not. I think the witness should be permitted to if he so wishes. What is the ruling of the Court on that?

Presiding Judge Marshall: Yes, he may answer it further if his answer requires an explanation. Sometimes a question calls for a direct answer; sometimes that answer is not fair to the witness unless he explains why. In this instance he may answer.

Witness Elkar: Rothaug was operating on the principles from the National Socialistic point of view, that was correct; that a judge in a Special Court had to fulfill a certain minimum requirement from a political point of view; that it was not enough for Rothaug that Special Court judges were appointed who, from the technical point of view, met the requirements, but they must also have, politically, a certain maturity—shall we say, a certain political maturity.

Dr. Koessl: Are you finished?

A. Yes.

Q. Insofar as the political maturity of the associate judges goes, did Gross and Ferber fulfill that and Hoffmann—were all of those taken from the Special Court by Rothaug removed from the Special Court, or am I correct?

A. It was so, the basic attitude of Rothaug toward the requirements of judges in the Special Courts was that he emphasized occasionally, again and again, that these requirements were, of course, not fulfilled in all the points of the requirements, because in his opinion the political orientation did not exist to the extent he desired it. He said, however, that under his leadership, weaker judges would, shall we say, fall in line.

Q. Did the associate judges of Rothaug suffer politically in any way, such as through the SD, because they had different legal opinions and different conceptions of law, because they had voted differently in the discussions?

[384]

A. By the SD? Do you mean to say by that that steps were taken from the higher authorities?

Q. Did Rothaug report about the unfavorable comments about his associate judges in order to have them reprimanded?

A. That was not the case, for Rothaug stated again and again that under his leadership the judges followed the corresponding course.

*******

Q. Can you remember whether it was Rothaug who made efforts to have the severity of wartime legislation explained to the people—whether these efforts of his were successful?

A. You mean to say that the hints upon the enlightening form of these sessions brought it about also that the population would understand it better now?

Q. Understanding on the part of the population, of the severity as well as a warning.

A. As far as I remember, the material that was reported was not sufficient in order to judge this—in order to draw such summary conclusions.

Q. Did you, yourself, make observations that the people, the population, felt that they had been warned?

A. That there was a fear of the Special Court is a matter of general knowledge. That this was in connection with the efforts of Rothaug, I cannot judge whether this was so.

*******

Q. You, yourself, were SS Hauptsturmfuehrer or SD Hauptsturmfuehrer, how was that called?

A. During the course of the war I came to the rank of SD Hauptsturmfuehrer, in 1942.

*******

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT KLEMM[220]

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Dr. Schilf (counsel for defendant Klemm): I shall now ask you to describe to the Tribunal the work you performed at the[385] Reich Ministry of Justice. First of all, how was it that you got into the Reich Ministry of Justice?

Defendant Klemm: That happened in the course of the centralization [of the administration of justice in Berlin]. The Minister of Justice, Dr. Guertner, appeared to have the desire that the Reich Ministry of Justice, which comprised the administration of justice of 16 states [Laender], have the Laender represented at the agencies of the Ministry approximately according to their size and their importance. That is how it happened that on 1 April 1935, officials from every former Ministry of Justice in the states were at that time, I believe, transferred to Berlin. From the Ministry of Justice for Saxony, four officials were transferred to Berlin. I never expressed the wish to be transferred to Berlin. The fact that I too was transferred to Berlin is probably due to the fact that negotiations had been held between Thierack and Guertner. I don’t know though. About my being transferred to Berlin, I heard at the middle of March 1935. A fortnight later, I was due to start work in Berlin.

Q. What was this sphere of work which was transferred to you at the Ministry in Berlin?

A. Because from 1929 I had worked for the prosecution, and also because at the Ministry of Justice for Saxony, I had dealt with special measures concerning penal law, I was given at the Ministry of Justice a position in Division III at that time, which later became Division IV. I was appointed auxiliary advisor on high treason cases, and as district Referent [Bezirksreferent] for several districts of district courts of appeal, both in political and nonpolitical cases.[221]

*******

Q. As an expert on political penal cases in those days, that is in 1935 and 1936, did you have close connections with the Gestapo?

A. The Referent for political penal cases for district courts of appeal entertained no relations with the Gestapo. When general questions, questions of particular importance arose, they were dealt with by the Special Referat, or if there was just one question, it was handled by the one Referent charged as the SS liaison officer to the police.

[386]

Q. The prosecution submitted a document, which is Exhibit 31, NG-266. Unfortunately, I can only quote the pages of the German text. In the German document book, page 44, following. Mr. Klemm, I suppose you have Exhibit 31 before you?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. You know the contents?

A. Yes, I know the contents.

Q. This is a letter of 13 June 1936 from the Reich Minister of Justice to the chiefs of the various agencies, particularly the Oberlandesgerichtspresidenten, and general public prosecutors, informing them that in September or October of the same year, that is 1936, a discussion with experts of the Gestapo was to be held, I ask you now whether that document is suitable to confirm your personal statement that you never had anything to do with the Gestapo?

A. That conference was a conference of prosecutor generals and of the Presidenten of Oberlandesgerichte. They were to be informed about stopping crimes, particularly concerning high treason and treason. For that reason police experts discussed the subjects. I did not attend this conference, but the speeches made there dealt purely with technical matters. They were speeches by experts from the central organization of the police, which had the most comprehensive view of these matters. I know that it has been tried to find out a little more about this exhibit.

Q. Mr. Klemm, in this connection the prosecution has submitted another exhibit, that is, Document NG-323, Exhibit 32.[222] The first part of the document is a letter from the Reich Leader SS, Himmler, of 18 February 1937 to the Gestapo office in Berlin; and on that subject the Reich Ministry of Justice stated his opinion on 10 March 1937 giving instructions to the general public prosecutors concerning the collaboration between the office of the public prosecutor and the Gestapo.

I ask you whether what you have said before is to be changed by this Exhibit 32?

A. No, I do not have to change it. That circular instruction by the Ministry of Justice, as one can see from the file note, was drafted in Department II, not in Department III to which I belonged. Besides, this regulation is a purely technical one as to how the files are to be handled during the investigation made by the police.

Dr. Schilf: May it please the Tribunal to refer to the fact that the file note which the witness mentioned is to be found on[387] the letter of 10 March 1937, left upper corner. It is IIA and then there are some Arabic numbers. In this connection, the prosecution has not submitted any further documents against you.

*******

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROTHENBERGER[223]

DIRECT EXAMINATION

*******

Dr. Wandschneider (counsel for defendant Rothenberger): Now [beginning in 1933], a great change occurred in your career. Could you tell the Court when and on the basis of what considerations you decided to give up this quiet and secure life?

Defendant Rothenberger[224]: The year 1933 came. On 5 March 1933, there were parliamentary elections in Hamburg, as everywhere throughout the Reich. In these elections the National Socialist Party obtained about 40 percent of the votes. Therefore, it was ordered to form a new government, because it was the strongest Party in the Parliament.

Until that time Hamburg had the government majority which consisted of Social Democrats and Democrats. The NSDAP, which was ordered to form a new government, formed a coalition government with the Democratic Party, the German People’s Party, and the German National People’s Party.

The day after the election, that is on 6 March, the Reich Governor and Gauleiter of Hamburg Kaufmann, called me up. Until that time I had not known him personally. He asked me whether I would be willing to assume the position of the acting mayor in this new government of Hamburg. He told me that he had heard about me, and therefore he was making this offer to me. I requested him to give me one day to think the matter over, and then I refused his offer. I gave as a reason that I considered that my task lay in the administration of justice, that I wasn’t inclined for representative nor for political tasks, and these were connected with the position of mayor of a city like Hamburg. Thereupon, he asked me whether in that case I would be willing to take over the administration of justice of Hamburg as its chief, and I answered that I would.

[388]

Q. In the subsequent time did you again refuse leading positions in the Reich? Perhaps you can mention that in this connection here now.

A. In March 1933 I thus became Justizsenator, as he was called, in Hamburg, chief of the administration of justice. And the Tribunal already knows that these Ministries of Justice of the individual states, of which there were, I believe, 18 at the time, in 1935, were dissolved by the so-called centralization of the administration of justice. Therefore, toward the end of 1934, the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Guertner, approached me in Kiel where we met on the occasion of a university festival, and asked me whether I would be willing to become presiding judge of the People’s Court, which at that time was being created. I rejected that offer, even though this was the second position of a judge in Germany next to the president of the Reich Supreme Court. But for administration of criminal law I had neither the experience nor the inclination. The political development of the People’s Court, of course, one could not predict in any way at that time. But I remained in Hamburg and when in 1935 the administration of justice was incorporated into the Reich and my office as chief of the administration of justice, Justizsenator, was eliminated. I became president of the Hanseatic District Court of Appeals. That is a position of judge which, however, at the same time also includes administrative jurisdiction. I believe that the Tribunal is already familiar with the fact that, from 1935 on, Germany was divided into, I believe, 35 or 37 areas of district courts of appeal, and at their top there was each time a president of the district court of appeal. In 1936 to 1937 the Reichjustizfuehrer [chief of NSRB] Frank[225] approached me through a representative and asked me if I would like to be his representative in Berlin in his capacity as Reichjustizfuehrer. It was not difficult for me to reject that offer, because during the course of those 2 years I got to know Frank. The personal characteristics of Frank have repeatedly been emphasized in this trial, but I want to add one more attribute, that he was extraordinarily vain and that he never forgave me that I could refuse to become his assistant.

Q. In conclusion, in regard to this question, would you please state something about your additional positions in Hamburg which you had in addition to your position as president of the district court of appeals?

A. In Hamburg I had several extra duties during the years when I was still in Hamburg, that is, from 1935 on. That is in[389] addition to my main duty. I was Honorary Professor at the Hamburg University for civil law, and there I, in a certain sense, continued my activity as repetitor, that is, tutor, so to say. That is, I held lectures for students. From 1938 on I was president of the Reich Maritime Office. That was the final authority in decisions about collisions at sea and about the litigations regarding the withdrawing of a license which resulted from this for captains who were found guilty in case of a collision. From the beginning of the war I was president of the Prize Court [Prisenhof] in Hamburg. The Tribunal probably knows the functions of such a Prize Court. Until August 1942 I remained at Hamburg, and from August 1942 until December 1943 I was in Berlin as Under Secretary. In December 1943 I again left there, returned to Hamburg, and was a notary in Hamburg.

*******

Q. We now come to the question as to why you became a Party member and a Gau Leader [Gaufuehrer] of the NSRB. Those are phases of your political life during which you participated actually and formally in the NSDAP. Can you explain why you first became a Party member?

A. For reasons of full conviction I became a Party member in 1933, because at that time this party appeared to me to be more united and less split up than the other, earlier parties; and in 1934 or 1935 when Gauleiter Kaufmann approached me and asked me to take over the Gau leadership of the NSRB, I had already gained my first impressions and experiences in the struggle between the administration of justice and the Party. It has been emphasized here time and again how, during the first period, after the revolution of 1933, every Kreisleiter attempted to interfere in court proceedings; the Gestapo tried to revise sentences, and it is known how the NSRB tried to gain influence with the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter in order to act against the administration of justice. In this respect I gained very bad impressions in Hamburg with the Gaufuehrer at this time of the NSRB, Dr. Haecke. The Reichsstatthalter removed him from office and asked me to take his place, and I do not regret having taken that step because only owing to the fact that I myself held that office, I was in a position to eliminate attacks on the part of the Party against the administration of justice from the outset. And that may only have been possible because I had a Reichsstatthalter in Hamburg who was smart enough and objective enough to realize pretty soon that any fight against the administration of justice can only lead to the destruction of the state itself. I gained influence on the man particularly by two events. First, because at the[390] first opportunity when the attempt was made to put an incapable man in charge of a penal institution, I refused to do so. I asked to be sent on leave and asked him to assure me that that man would be removed. The case was mentioned here again—a man by the name of Laatz.

Q. I shall submit an affidavit about that case.

A. To describe the attitude of the Reichsstatthalter in Hamburg, it is important also to stress that the mayor of Hamburg today, who, after the surrender in 1945 was appointed officially and publicly expressed his gratitude for the calm and objective attitude displayed by Reichsstatthalter Kaufmann during all these years in Hamburg. It belongs to the same field that 2 years later I took over the Gau legal office and thereby excluded any competition; and it belongs to the same complex of questions that during the same year my membership in the Party was put down as 850,000, which gave me a possibility to stand up more strongly against the so-called “old fighters” [Alte Kaempfer—earliest Nazi Party members]. On account of the identity, of course, between president of the district court of appeals and Gaufuehrer, I was envied by all other district court of appeals because they continually had to struggle against the Party while I was saved this struggle.

Q. How long did you hold these offices?

A. I held these offices until August 1942 when I was transferred to Berlin; then the Gau legal office was dissolved; and the office of the Gaufuehrer of the NSRB, I gave up.

Q. Then, you became deputy [Under Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Justice] in Berlin.

A. Yes, I became deputy in Berlin until December 1943.

Q. What was your attitude toward the SD in Hamburg; could you tell us something about that? I am referring to Document NG-825, Prosecution Exhibit 433,[226] in that connection.

A. The SD in Hamburg during the first few years had a bad selection of personnel. There was the usual system of informers; I was spied upon; the Reichsstatthalter was spied upon and that led to their removal. The Reichsstatthalter, when he found out about that, removed the entire personnel from office from Hamburg. The new men whom he appointed, as far as they were concerned with matters of administration of justice, came to me in 1939. In the meantime, the directive had been sent down from the Reich Ministry of Justice to the effect that the SD should be[391] considered and used as a source of information of the state by agencies of the administration of justice; and here also I was independent to nominate individuals who would not submit reports intended to go against the interests of the administration of justice, but who themselves were in favor and sympathy with the principles of the administration of justice, and that is the basis for the conference with the SD Fuehrer in Hamburg which is contained in NG-825, the fact that I made suggestions to nominate men who were judges and whom I knew would never submit reports which were against the administration of justice. Since that time, also in Hamburg, no SD informer appeared in court proceedings, and, as far as I know, no reports were submitted which were against the administration of justice.

*******

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROTHAUG[227]

DIRECT EXAMINATION

*******

Dr. Koessl (counsel for defendant Rothaug): In what places and what official positions were you employed before you became presiding judge of the Special Court of Nuernberg?

Defendant Rothaug: I have already mentioned that after the result of the state examination had become known, I was soon called into the Bavarian administration of justice. My appointment was first with the public prosecutor’s office in Ansbach for the so-called post-practice [Nachpraxis]. This post-practice was supposed to last for about 3 months. In my case, however, it was interrupted after only 3 weeks. Perhaps I had proved myself a good student, and after that I was first transferred to the local court in Weissenburg. I want to mention that I was called to the prosecution in Ansbach on 1 May 1926. Until approximately August 1926, I was working at the local court at Weissenburg. Subsequently I came to the local court at Pfaffenhofen on the Ilm.

Q. You just mentioned Pfaffenhofen on the Ilm. Where were you living at that time?

A. I would consider it more to the point if I would first describe my official positions now, up to the Special Court in Nuernberg. That’s what you asked me, isn’t it?

I believe I have already mentioned that I came to the local court at Pfaffenhofen on the Ilm. There I was employed until the[392] turn of the year 1926–1927. Subsequently I came to the local court at Ingolstadt on the Danube. I was court assessor during all this time up till 1 June 1927. At that time I became public prosecutor in Hof. In the late fall of 1929 I became Amtsgerichtsrat at the local court of Nuernberg. In the middle of 1933, I became first public prosecutor at the public prosecutor’s office of Nuernberg-Fuerth; in the late fall of 1934, district court judge at the Schweinfurt District Court; and on 1 April 1937, district court director at the District Court Nuernberg-Fuerth, and there I was, among other positions, employed as presiding judge of the Special Court of Nuernberg.

Q. You mentioned Pfaffenhofen on the Ilm. With whom were you living at the time?

A. In Pfaffenhofen on the Ilm I was looking for a room. I was advised to take a room with a family who were from Franconia because I myself was from Franconia. This family had a small meat factory outside of Pfaffenhofen on the Ilm. The family’s name was Haberkern. That was in 1926.

Q. Is that the later Gau Inspector Haberkern who was the owner of the “Blaue Traube” where the club table [Stammtisch] was that was supposed to have been the basis for your political position of power?

A. That is correct. That is the same Haberkern who later on became Gau Inspector of Nuernberg or more correctly was working with Gauleitung of Nuernberg.

*******

Q. On 1 May 1947 [30 April 1947], the witness Elkar[228] called you, and I quote, “the highest authority on legal questions in the Gau of Franconia.” (Tr. p. 2896.) A little later he calls you “the Spiritus Rector in the NSRB.”

Doebig says you had been the leading spirit in the NSRB. (Tr. p. 1775.)

What influence did you exert on the NSRB as a whole?

A. First of all, may I say in general, particularly to the introductory question, that I consider that those opinions expressed about me are considerable exaggerations. As for having been an authority on legal questions, that is out of the question. I have always found that other people found it a great deal easier; they always dealt with problems far more quickly, particularly those who passed these opinions. In effect, the way with us was that questions which concerned my Gau group, that is to say, the[393] judges and prosecutors’ groups, were passed on to me. I then gave my opinion on those questions. My opinion was passed on to the Gauwalter and he then passed the matters on in the routine way which is the custom in every state; it was just passed on then to the next authority.

I really don’t think that at any time or at any place I had to cope with a problem of world importance.

Q. Did you receive immediate instructions from the NSDAP and the Gauleitung concerning your work in the NSRB?

A. I never received such direct instructions from the Gauleitung.

Q. What were your duties as Gaugruppenwalter in the NSRB for the judges’ and prosecutors’ groups?

A. In part, that question has already been answered. All problems which fell within the scope of that professional organization, the Jurists’ League, all problems which reached that organization could come to us from any quarter, as they could come from the population itself. All those problems were passed on to the Gaugruppenwalter to deal with, and they were forwarded to that group, the members of which were in some way affected by the event under discussion.

On the other hand, naturally, we also had to cope with the particular difficulties and problems of our members and we had to take care of their affairs because, after all, they had joined a professional organization like ours for that purpose.

I should like to give a practical example to explain this matter, and I will give an example of an event which actually occurred, an event with which we had to deal.

When the administration of justice was centralized, certain offices of judges were downgraded. Here at the district court of Nuernberg, for example, the department chiefs who had had the rank of local court directors [Amtsgerichtsdirector], overnight, and only because the administration of justice was being centralized, were downgraded by one grade. That was done without it being their fault in any way. Naturally that caused a tension, and naturally the people whom it affected were very much annoyed. They came to see me and told me about the matter. As far as I remember they were not Party members, they were of the older generation, and they said that they had been treated in a way in which people should be treated only if they had violated service regulations. I then gave a precise account of the occurrence, made a report, and drew attention to the fact that such treatment of officials was untenable. To begin with, Berlin was against taking any interest and they used the well known slogan, “The interests[394] of the people have to take precedence over the interests of the individual.” However, by again and again digging away at the matter, we succeeded in solving the problem in a way which was satisfactory to everybody concerned.

That was, for example, one of the duties with which we had to deal.

Q. As Gaugruppenwalter for the judges’ and prosecutors’ groups, did you have an office of your own?

A. I neither had an office of my own nor a staff of my own. I merely had my chair and my two hands. The work that I had to do there I did as an individual, and as a rule I wrote it out with my own hand. I then submitted the matters to the Gauwalter.

Q. Did you wear a uniform in that capacity?

A. Except when I was in the army, all my life I have never worn a uniform.

*******

Q. What offices were asked about the political attitude of a judge and a prosecutor, and who made out the final qualifications?

A. Political qualifications were exclusively made under the responsibility of the competent bearer of the sovereignty, that is, the Kreisleiter or the Gauleiter. For these questions they had a so-called Kreis personnel office, or Gau personnel office. When a so-called political qualification of a civil servant was to be made, these offices addressed inquiries to offices where the civil servant or official concerned was known; that is to say, if he was a member of the NSRB, they addressed an inquiry to the Gauwalter of the NSRB, or in another instance to the competent office of the Civil Service League, or to the Ortsgruppe, local group of the Party, or to the SA, or SS. The answers to these inquiries were then gathered at these offices and from there, if necessary, by reviewing or examining the facts that were reported the so-called political qualifications report of an official was made out. This political qualification report was made out because the supervisory offices of this civil servant by provisions of the law were obligated to form a judgment on this question with the intervention of the Party.

Q. How did this develop in your case, and according to what principles did that proceed?

A. That was an affair which caused the least difficulty. The Gauwalter gave the slip that had been sent in by the competent Party office to the Gau group administrator who was competent for that official. That was I, myself, in the case of inquiries regarding[395] judges and prosecutors, as long as I was entrusted with that function. I then returned the slip after it was filled out to the Gau administrator again, who on his part then reported to the Party office.

It is important to know here that according to an express order a man who was a Party member was not permitted to be judged as politically unreliable as long as a Party disciplinary proceeding had not been carried out against him because of some established facts.

During the time of my activity in regard to that function, it is of significance that at that time almost all judges and prosecutors were members of the Party on account of the well known action on 1 May 1937.

Q. Did you hear of a case in which a judge or a prosecutor was described as politically unreliable? And if so, what happened to that man?

A. In my time I did not hear of such a case. The declaration which we made in every case had the following stereotyped contents: “Circumstances which could raise doubts as to the political reliability of the person concerned did not occur.”

*******

Q. The witness Elkar said literally, and I quote, “As far as I know, the relations between Zimmermann, Haberkern, and Rothaug were very close.” (Tr. p. 2896.) [Page 374, herein.]

How did you come to know Zimmermann, and what were your relations with him?

A. I have already pointed out that it was only in the course of 1940 that I met Zimmermann by accident when he was at the Blaue Traube.

Q. How often did he attend sessions of the Special Court when you were presiding judge, and do you know why he attended those sessions?

A. I cannot remember one single case when Zimmermann attended one of my sessions. However, it is possible that he attended at the case of Schmidt-Fasel, which has been discussed here several times.

Q. As to Haberkern, you have already testified that quite by accident, as a young assessor, you met him in 1926 and that for many years you had no contact with him. How and when did you hear that Haberkern was in Nuernberg?

A. That was in connection with the National Socialist change-over in 1933. In those days his name often appeared in the newspapers,[396] and that was how I discovered that he was in Nuernberg and that he played a political role.

Q. You have already said that you did not resume contact, not even when against your will you were transferred to Schweinfurt. You have also given us your reasons. When and how was it that you renewed your relations with Haberkern?

A. It was in 1938 as far as I recollect. One day Haberkern rang me up and asked whether I was that Rothaug who in 1926 had stayed in his home. I told him that I was that man, and he was very pleased and asked me to come to see him and his wife. They were the owners of the Hotel Blaue Traube, Nuernberg. I told him that I would go to see him some day, and one day I did go to see him. That was how I came to the Blaue Traube.

Q. What were Haberkern’s offices in Nuernberg and the Gau Franconia?

A. He was Gau inspector, the leader of the Hotel and Restaurant Association, and he was also an Ortsgruppenleiter. I believe he was the Ortsgruppenleiter of the old city.

Q. Through this function did he have any contacts with your official position as judge?

A. No. The Gau inspector, according to his official duties, has to take care of internal matters of the Party. As a leader of the Hotel and Restaurant Association all he could have done was to find me some rooms for my summer holidays. I had nothing to do with his local group [Ortsgruppe] because I belonged to a different group.

*******

Q. Witness, did the Party offices in Party affairs have their own legal consultants?

A. In this connection, one must point out that every Party office, even the Ortsgruppenleiter, the leaders of the local groups, had their own legal offices. I had nothing to do with that matter.

Q. When were matters concerning legal questions brought to you?

A. Only if simultaneously they affected the interests of the NSRB, and even then only if they affected the interests of the Gau Group for judges and public prosecutors.

Q. Did the Gauleitung take any interest in the general administration of justice?

A. I never noticed that the Gauleitung of Franconia ever took any interest in the development of the legal situation.

[397]

Q. Did the legal situation play a decisive part in the Gauleitung?

A. I never noticed anything of that sort.

Q. At the table at the Blaue Traube that has been mentioned here so often, were there ever any discussions which have been laid down previously?

A. May I summarize my statement and perhaps say for the last time that I went to the Blaue Traube with the same intentions that other people had when they went there, and with which other people are in the habit of going to other pubs. As for conferences with agendas, they weren’t held there for the simple reason that that would have been parliamentary. I met other people there, too, but I didn’t meet anybody who went there with any political aims.

Q. Were official matters discussed there?

A. Not official, though Party matters were discussed there; but there, as I think happened in those days at every table in every pub, political things were discussed, and the war was discussed. If somebody were to ask me today what we talked about, I would not be able to give an account of even one trend of ideas that we discussed there.

Q. Did you ever go to Haberkern with your own affairs, that is to say, to get any of your own wishes of a personal nature fulfilled?

A. I never bothered Haberkern on any matter of that kind.

Q. Do you know whether other people from your entourage asked Haberkern for his help on their own behalf?

A. I heard that they did.

*******

Q. When the witness Ferber[229] mentioned the doubts which the Reich leadership harbored for your political reliability, he said that the SD took an interest in your remaining at Nuernberg. From the account of the witness Elkar, English transcript, page 2888, [page 369, herein,] we know that approximately in May 1940, you were called to a conference which was attended by Doebig, Bens, and the SS section leader, Friedrich, and that in that way you got into contact with the SD. What was the topic of those discussions when you joined in?

A. That matter was rather different. To begin with, Elkar came to me at my office. Then Obersturmbannfuehrer Friedrich called and also a Standartenfuehrer whose name I no longer remember.[398] All those three men belonged to the SS. Those three men told me that they had come to call on me because they wanted to introduce themselves to me, and they wanted to try and establish good relations between their office and the administration of justice authorities.

Conditions in general were then discussed, in particular the fact that the administration of justice in certain press organs, above all the Schwarze Korps, was being subjected to continuous attacks. They considered that state of affairs undesirable, all the more so as they also knew that those articles were generally written on the basis of one-sided information. They also asked for my opinion as to what I would think of all questions which arose here in Nuernberg concerning the administration of justice, if they were to be dealt with to start with on a lower level before a report was made on a higher level. I thought that was a good idea. They asked me whether I would care to be the mediator. I suggested district court of appeals and the general public prosecutor since as it was, they had told me that they intended to call on those officials, too.

I would like to point out that the three of them had only called on me because Elkar had brought them along. As you know Elkar had been with me for training as a Referendar. At that time I had no idea what the SD was about, and what its functions were. The conference with Doebig and Bens was along the same lines and both men saw the point and agreed that it was quite a reasonable plan which had been submitted to them. They suggested that it might be a good thing to let these matters be dealt with through me because the cases which occurred with me were cases which were to be treated later.

I would subsequently be asked to attend that conference. I, myself—and I think it would have been the same with every human being—couldn’t imagine, or anyway, couldn’t imagine very well what was going to happen at that conference. That was the basis on which developments went along.

Q. What was Doebig’s attitude to Friedrich’s wishes?

A. I believe I have already answered that question. As usual, he was in favor of cooperation.

Presiding Judge Brand: May I ask you a question. It wasn’t entirely clear what you meant in your testimony. You suggested that investigations on a lower level should take place before the higher level. Investigations of what—what kind of matters?

Defendant Rothaug: Investigations is not the word I meant to say. I wanted to say that by negotiations, matters which concerned[399] the administration of justice were to be settled on a lower level.

Q. What kind of matters—which concerned the administration of justice?

A. What we had in mind was attacks which within the sphere of the Party were made against the administration of justice. I can illustrate that by an example.

Q. It is not necessary now. No, I understood you to act under this suggestion as an intermediary. Was that your word?

A. That I was to become the intermediary?

Q. Yes, between what parties or what groups?

A. Between the SD and the administration of justice.

Q. Yes, and then you said since these matters are all matters to be dealt with by me afterwards, it was reasonable that you should be the intermediary. Did you refer to legal matters?

A. That concerned matters—cases which might be brought before me or which were already pending before me. Matters in which those agencies were interested for reasons of criminological developments, but they were not interested in the individual case as such, in its treatment, or in the decision.

Q. And what was the lower level where the matters were to be first discussed?

A. The main difficulties which arose and which gave cause to discuss this matter at all were made from up above—from a higher level. A report was made on some occurrence or other to the SD; the SD passed the matter on to Berlin; from there it was passed on as a rule without having been settled or even examined to the press where it caused a great deal of sensation.

Q. Was this lower level, to which you refer, the local representatives of the SD?

A. Yes, naturally.

Presiding Judge Brand: Go ahead.

Dr. Koessl: Now, Witness, tell us please, what was to be prevented by the discussions, the report to the higher level; what was it—was it that things were to be clarified after the higher level had dealt with it?

Defendant Rothaug: One cannot state all that in one reply in such a general way. With these questions it always depended on what the individual case was like; what the attending circumstances of the individual case was like; and it depended upon[400] what the aims and object of the participants were. Without going into the matter of the individual case, it is impossible to give an objective answer.

Q. The witness Doebig said, “It was only a great deal later after I had left Nuernberg that I heard for certain that Rothaug worked in the SD.”[230] Later, Doebig stated that he remembered that the SD Leaders Friedrich and Elkar paid him a visit, but that he could not remember the subject which was discussed. Anyhow, he had never given an inference that the administration of justice would cooperate with the SD. (Tr. pp. 1865–1866.) What position did Doebig take?

A. I have already answered that question when I said that Doebig was altogether in favor of settling matters in that way.

Q. How often would Elkar call on you in the subsequent periods?

A. He said on Saturdays, and that makes it sound as if he had come every Saturday, but that is quite out of the question. He came on some Saturdays, but sometimes weeks passed or months until he came to see me again about some matter or other. As was the case with many other things that were organized within the sphere of the Party, they dragged on and finally nothing much was done.

Q. What did Elkar tell you during these discussions about the functions of the SD, regarding the state of the Party?

A. He told me, and I think that was probably right, that the SD as we saw it was an institution of the nature of an official agency; that is to say, it was an organization of the police type; its activities and functions can best be described as an agency that gathered the opinions of the people; one intended to find out what the people really thought on official measures taken by the government, that is to say what they thought about laws, about judgments, about other administrative measures, etc. Those reports were then to be evaluated and passed on the competent Supreme Reich Authorities to enable them in their governmental transactions and measures, to remain aware of the thoughts of the people. In all these reports therefore, what mattered was not to find out who the people were who were critical and undesirable, but on the contrary, the intention was to find out what people were really thinking; and therefore, it was undesirable and prohibited to prosecute in any way an individual who stated his opinion in this connection. That was roughly the scope of the functions of the SD.

[401]

Q. In the English transcript at page 2912, the witness Elkar mentioned the official character of the SD. I am showing you a book, and would ask you to tell the Tribunal what the title is.

A. The book is entitled Ministerial Gazette [Ministerialblatt]; it was issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior; it was published in 1938.

Q. Please turn to page 1906. At the right hand corner you will find a circular decree by the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, dated 11 November 1938. Please read out section 1 of that circular decree.

A. Under the heading police administration, it says, “Collaboration of the authorities of the administration with the SD was the subject of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) circular decree by the Reich Ministry of Interior, dated 11 November 1938.” Then, there is a file note. Then—“one: The SD of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD), as information organization, intelligence organization for Party and State, has to work in particular in support of the security police and has to fulfill important duties. The SD thereby acts on the instructions of the State. That necessitates close understanding and cooperation between the SD and the authorities of the general and internal administration. In reply to inquiries by the SD, information has to be imparted therefore to the same extent as if inquiries had come from a government authority. The official agencies of the SD, in the same way, are under obligation to reply to inquiries of the general and internal administration.”

Q. Witness, what were the motives for which you met with Elkar and discussed matters with him?

A. The main cause was that he knew me from his former training period.

Q. You may continue.

A. I said Elkar knew me since the time when he was in training, because he was assigned to me. He was by nature a very faithful person, and at the time when he was not yet with the SD, I was connected with him by purely human relationships. That is how it came about that at that time, after he had taken up service with the SD and a connection with the administration of justice and the SD was sought, he came to me first for I was known to him; and that is how in the subsequent period the entire relationship was purely a matter of comradeship. This is shown best perhaps by the fact that one day Elkar informed me that he would probably be transferred to the RSHA in Berlin for further training. Thereupon, I told him that in that case I would also[402] discontinue my activity because I would not start all over again with a new man.

Q. What descriptions did Elkar give you about the further handling of the SD reports in Berlin?

A. He said that the information which I gave him—which was usually an opinion on problems which were connected with the collection of comments from the people—he would incorporate into his reports. These reports in Berlin would then be divided according to whichever participating Reich agency was interested and put at the disposal of those offices.

Q. Did you have an insight into questions and tasks which were outside of the administration of justice?

A. I did not gain any insight into those questions.

Q. Did Elkar tell you anything about the activity of the SD Einsatzgruppen in the east?

A. No. I only found out about that now.

Q. Did Elkar speak to you about the so-called final solution of the Jewish problem by extermination, execution, or gassing?

A. No word was ever spoken about this. I do not believe that Elkar was informed about matters of that kind either.

Q. Did Elkar tell you about individual SD Fuehrers being entrusted with special tasks, as for instance, the feigned attack on the Gleiwitz radio station, or similar undertakings which were the subject of the IMT Trial?

A. Matters of that kind were not discussed among us. The examples you have cited became known to me only here in Nuernberg in the course of this trial.

Q. What was the basic line of your conversations with Elkar, or the basic topic?

A. As I have already stated, the conversations were mainly on problems which were raised by opinions which were gathered from the population. That then led to problems of a general nature, for example, the general development of wartime criminality in one field or another.

In general, that was the direction in which our conversations developed and that was also the aim of such conversations.

Q. Could everything be said in such conversations without restrictions?

A. I believe that that was the only possibility at that time in Germany where a person could say exactly what he was thinking; and the reason for that is because, in this connection in particular,[403] only the truth was at stake for they were interested in finding out what the population was actually thinking in regard to certain events, measures, laws, speeches, judgments, etc.

Q. Do you know in what form these reports were forwarded?

A. That is not known to me; I never read such a report.

Q. According to Elkar’s testimony you directed your attention to the development of criminal and penal proceedings. (Tr. p. 2890.) What ideas did you represent?

A. I believe I have already stated my position on that question. I do not remember a great deal in detail regarding what was discussed at that time. One question, for example, which interested us and which demonstrates how we came to speak about these matters and what opinion we represented is the question which was frequently discussed in this trial, and that is the contact of the prosecution during the trial with the court because of the application for penalty. Opinions from circles of lawyers and judges and from the prosecution were gathered for this purpose at that time. I myself represented the opinion that this problem grew into a problem only because it was treated in a wrong manner on the part of the administration of justice. The entire question could be solved by a small remark in the “Deutsche Justiz,” namely, by pointing out that the law does not provide that a formal application has to be made, and therefore it would have been sufficient to instruct the prosecutors to refrain from a formal application for penalty and to be satisfied with adducing the evidence and then stating the reasons which spoke for and against the defendant. With that, the entire excitement and fuss which was caused by the formal application for penalty could have been avoided.

Q. What reason did you give for this suggestion?

A. The reason which I have just explained.

*******

Q. Elkar alleges that you had also talked about pending trials and had discussed also the facts as well as the legal situation and future judgment. (Tr. p. 2891.) Was the name of a defendant ever mentioned as long as trial was still pending?

A. The names of defendants never played any importance in these conversations. The manner of expression was general. The individual cases, as such, were of no importance at all and their outcome even less so. It is possible that in the most infrequent cases—as an example of a definite criminal deed, in order to demonstrate, for example, the method of the consequences of this[404] crime and to use it in the discussions of general questions, that an individual case was mentioned, but not in a single case was it like this that Elkar ever was interested in a certain pending trial or even wanted to get information about the final outcome in advance; such an evaluation was not possible in practice at all for the decision could be given only on the basis of the trial after it was concluded. Thus, Elkar’s activity was not aimed at such a goal.

Q. By mentioning an individual case, did you ask for the opinion of the RSHA in order to find a basis for the political evaluation of the offense?

A. Never. I had no connections whatsoever to the RSHA. Moreover, such a method even in the Third Reich would have been an absolute impossibility, and it was never alleged that this occurred.

Q. Did you, in any individual case, receive an instruction from the RSHA or a recommendation to direct the trial in a certain direction under a certain point of view, or to pronounce a certain definite penalty?

A. This, too, was never alleged so far. Such a procedure, too, would have been an absolute impossibility. No office would have dared to suggest anything of that nature even.

*******

Q. We started with your relationships to the SD. On what formal basis were your relationships with the SD? Were you a member of the SD?

A. I was never a member of the SD; I don’t know either whether there was such a thing as a membership in the SD; or, whether the people were assigned to the SD from the SS. Only during this trial did I hear that there was such a thing as an actual membership in the SD. At that time I assumed that it was an institution of the nature of an official agency, the personnel for which was appointed by the SS. I never made any application for any membership in this institution; I never signed anything.

Q. Elkar says that in 1940 you had taken an oath as collaborator of the SD; that is in the English transcript at page 2896. Did you take an oath?

A. I can say this with absolute certainty, that I never took an oath in that connection. The possibility exists that it was called to my attention that matters which I found out in connection with such conversations were supposed to be kept secret. However, I do not have the slightest recollection of this either, so I cannot imagine that I was approached on this matter in a solemn ceremony.[405] It is a fact, in any case—and this is why the people who worked for me also knew about these occurrences—that the matters which were discussed there, without exception, I believe, I had also discussed with them and among them. Thus, I had no thought of violating any secrets or any pledges of secrecy.

Q. What was the status called that you had with the SD?

A. In former times I never worried about that because for me it was not a question of practical importance as to what I would be designated as, since I had agreed to hold conversations of the type that I used to carry on with Elkar. Thus, in former times, there was no need to have some kind of a rank for that, or whatever you want to call it.

Q. Did you ever become a member of the SS?

A. I was never a member of the SS.

*******

b. New devices to change final court decisions—The “Extraordinary Objection” and the “Nullity Plea”

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1841

*******

Part 2

Extraordinary Objection [Ausserordentlicher Einspruch]

Article 3

Extraordinary Objection to final judgments [rechtskraeftige Urteile][231]

(1) Against final penal sentences the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court can file an objection within 1 year after the sentence has become final, if, because of serious misgivings as to the justness of the sentence, he deems a new trial and decision in the case necessary.

(2) On the basis of the objection, the special penal senate of the Reich Supreme Court will try the case a second time.

[406]

(3) If the first sentence was passed by the People’s Court, the objection is to be filed by the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court, and the second trial is to be held by the special senate of the People’s Court. The same applies to sentences of courts of appeal in cases which the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court has transferred to the public prosecutor at the court of appeal, or which the People’s Court has transferred for trial and sentence to the court of appeal.

(4) If there is a connection with a case which is under the jurisdiction of the military courts, the proceedings can be transferred to the jurisdiction of the armed forces by agreement between the Reich Minister of Justice and the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. On the basis of the objection the case will then be decided by the special senate of the Reich Supreme Military Court (art. 410b of the Military Code of Criminal Procedure).

*******

Fuehrer Headquarters, 16 September 1939

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Guertner

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Keitel

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT LAUTZ CONCERNING THE EXTRAORDINARY OBJECTION[232]

DIRECT EXAMINATION

*******

Dr. Grube (counsel for defendant Lautz): When, in effect, did you assume your office as Chief Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court?

Defendant Lautz: Due to illness, I only assumed office on 20 December 1939, in Berlin.

*******

Q. * * * Witness, first of all what general remarks do you have to make on the subject of the extraordinary objection?

[407]

A. The extraordinary objection, which was introduced in 1939, was based on a bill which had already been drafted. The purpose was to be able to correct obvious mistakes in judicial decisions, and thereby to effect uniformity in the practice of the courts.[233]

Q. In article 2, section 3 of the law of 16 September 1939, it says: “Against final criminal sentences, the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court can file an objection within 1 year after the sentence becomes final, if, on account of serious misgivings against the justness of the sentence, he deems a new trial and decision in the case necessary.” In paragraph 3 of the same section, it says, “If the first sentence was passed by the People’s Court, the objection is to be filed by the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court, and the second trial is to be held by the special senate of the People’s Court.” According to this, one should assume that the two Chief Reich Prosecutors were those who had to decide whether an extraordinary objection was to be made or not. Please comment on this.

A. This assumption would be incorrect. According to all the regulations and the constitutional basis of this law, it was without doubt that such a far-reaching statement could be made only by the head of the State for the government, because the extraordinary objection repealed the sentence which had been pronounced, and returned the case to the stage at which it was before the trial. Thus, if an extraordinary objection was raised, a new trial had to take place as if nothing had happened before. Therefore, through internal instructions, it was assured that the two Chief Reich Prosecutors, the one at the People’s Court and the other at the Reich Supreme Court, could raise an extraordinary objection only by virtue of an order of the Minister of Justice as the representative of the leadership of the State. And this is not expressed in the law because according to the German conception of a trial, the Minister of Justice cannot make any direct statements in a trial. The two Chief Reich Prosecutors, therefore, made these statements, as I said, only from case to case on orders of the Minister, which as a rule, were even issued so unequivocably that the statement which had to be made, with the reasons for it, was in each case prescribed to the Chief Reich Prosecutors. Thus, the Chief Reich Prosecutor just as the other authorities, for instance, the attorneys general or the presidents of the courts were not[408] prevented, if they thought that there was a cause for it, from suggesting on their own to the Minister of Justice that he should issue such an order.

Q. Witness, the material decision as to whether an extraordinary objection should be raised or not was thus made in the Ministry?

A. The material decision was made exclusively by the Minister of Justice. That is, only he personally made it on the basis of a report made to him by his Referent personally. In particular it was like that; in case of every decree issued by the Ministry it had been assured that either by the signature of the Under Secretary or the Minister, or the division chief, it was made clear that the decision had actually been made by the Minister in this case.

Q. Did you ever raise an extraordinary objection without having an order from the Minister?

A. That never happened.

Q. You just said that the two chief Reich prosecutors as the officials, as supervising authorities of the administration of justice, for example, attorneys general, presidents of the courts of appeal, etc., had the right to suggest to the Minister of Justice that he should issue an order to raise an extraordinary objection. Did you make use of that possibility?

A. I only did so very infrequently on my own initiative. I still remember a few cases in which sentences pronounced by the senate presided over by Freisler were concerned. We were per se not very much inclined to attack sentences pronounced by our own court by such a legal recourse. However, Minister Thierack, though not much inclined to admit objections, occasionally could be made to do so in cases presided over by Freisler. The cases which are pertinent here, I may perhaps describe briefly. The first Senate of the People’s Court in one case had condemned a person to death because of treason. The facts were as follows: The defendant had transferred a model 38 machine gun into the hands of the enemy; he had obtained the machine gun and given it to an enemy agent. The enemy had known about this machine gun for a long time because they had captured many of these machine guns on the battlefield. Thus, only attempted treason could be the case, and the indictment was filed in that manner. Nevertheless, the Senate passed the death sentence. Here the extraordinary objection was permitted. A second case was a death sentence against a member of the Protectorate, the opinion of which consisted of three-quarters of a page by Freisler. In this case I suggested that this was not an opinion at all, since from the facts one could not find out at all what the defendant had done; and because of this[409] legal mistake the extraordinary objection should be allowed. This extraordinary objection, therefore, was permitted.

Q. Witness, could the defense suggest an extraordinary objection?

A. Yes, the defense counsel could do it, too. The contents of such petitions frequently showed that pure clemency reasons were used by them as arguments in favor of an extraordinary objection, and not basic legal questions. In such cases it was suggested to them that they make a clemency plea. But, if the extraordinary objection was based on such grounds that there was a hope that it might succeed, I submitted it to the Minister of Justice and supported it. However, and I have stressed that here before, it was very difficult to get Thierack to allow extraordinary objection to be made in favor of a defendant.

Q. May I interpolate a question? Were you, as chief prosecutor, the competent official who had to deal with such extraordinary objections?

A. No, no, that was the Chief Reich Prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court at Leipzig.

Q. Can you tell us something as to whether extraordinary objection was made frequently?

A. During the early part of the war, when the extraordinary objection was introduced, that is, until approximately 1942, it was a very infrequent occurrence. It was altogether the exception that it was made. From that time onward, however, their number increased slowly, but I cannot even give a rough estimate as to the number of extraordinary objections that were ordered. Originally, the Ministry of Justice, if a report was made by me as to whether an extraordinary objection was to be made—for example, in the case of a sentence passed by the court of appeals—originally the ministry was agreeable to my using again and again the phrase that the sentence gave rise to misgivings on some points, but these points were by no means of such a serious nature that the unusual recourse of the extraordinary objection should be used. That became different only when the new chief of Department IV of the Ministry of Justice, Ministerialdirektor Vollmer, assumed office. I asked him about this one day, and inquired from him how it was that these days the Minister more frequently ordered an extraordinary objection to be made. In reply he said, since the Fuehrer decree of August 1942, Thierack had all authority in the field of the administration of justice and, therefore, in the sphere of the extraordinary objection, too, he had more scope than hitherto.

[410]

*******

DECREE OF 21 FEBRUARY 1940 CONCERNING THE NULLITY PLEA

1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 405

Decree concerning the jurisdiction of the criminal courts, the Special Courts, and additional provisions of criminal procedure of 21 February 1940.

*******

Part V

Nullity Plea [Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde] of the Chief Reich Prosecutor

Article 34

Prerequisites of the Nullity Plea

The Chief Public Prosecutor may lodge a nullity plea with the Reich Supreme Court against a final judgment of the local court, the penal chamber of the district court, or the Special Court, within 1 year from the date of its becoming final, if the judgment is unjust because of an erroneous application of law on the established facts.

Article 35

Decision on the Nullity Plea

(1) The nullity plea is to be filed in writing with the Reich Supreme Court. This court will decide thereon by judgment based on a trial; with the consent of the Chief Reich Prosecutor it can also reach a decision without a trial.

(2) The Reich Supreme Court can order a postponement or an interruption of the execution. It can order a warrant of arrest already before the decision on the nullity plea. Outside of the trial, the penal senate, composed of three members including the president, decide thereon. Article 124, paragraph 3, of the Code of Criminal Procedure remains unaffected.

(3) If the Reich Supreme Court reaches a decision based on a trial, articles 350 and 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply accordingly. The president can order the personal appearance of the defendant.

(4) If the Reich Supreme Court quashes the contested sentence, it can make its own decision on the case if the facts found by[411] the contested judgment are sufficient for this; otherwise it will refer the case to be retried and newly decided upon to the court whose sentence is quashed or to another court.

*******

Part VI

Final Regulations

Article 40

Validity in the Protectorate

This decree is also valid for the German courts in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

Berlin, 21 February 1940

The Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich

Frick

EXTRACTS FROM AFFIDAVIT OF DR. ESCHER, GERMAN ATTORNEY,[234] CONCERNING THE USE OF THE NULLITY PLEA

Dr. Ernst Escher, Attorney

Sworn Affidavit

As a result of questioning by the American prosecutors in the Nuernberg courthouse, I have the following declaration to make in connection with the questions set before me concerning the procedure of the so-called nullity plea by the Chief Reich Prosecutor:

1. Previous legal situation—It is true that the legal principle that a man cannot be tried twice for the same offense [ne bis in idem] is not clearly stated in the German Criminal Code, dated 22 March 1924, and since subjected to frequent editorial changes; this maxim, however, was repeatedly acknowledged in the so-called “motives” of that law. In all of the German legal terminology and literature, no doubt had ever occurred that an individual, once legally tried, could not be resummoned before a court for the same criminal act, without the introduction of additional evidence of[412] proof. New proceedings against an accused who had been legally acquitted, could only be initiated in accordance with the rules concerning such a reconsideration of a once legally concluded trial (arts. 359 ff., in particular, art. 362 of the Criminal (Penal) Code).

The accused was therefore assured that, once he had been legally acquitted, he would not be summoned a second time before the court on the same charge.

These principles were never repealed in the Code of Criminal Procedure itself; they remained unaltered until the present, and the Criminal Code of 1946, issued by the [Allied] Control Council also incorporated them.

2. During the war, Hitler’s government, in a decree pertaining to the competence of the criminal and Special Courts and covering other regulations of criminal procedure, dated 21 February 1940 (Reichsgesetzblatt 1940, I, p. 405, in art. 5, pars. 34 to 37), created the procedure of the so-called nullity plea[235] by the Chief Reich Prosecutor and thereby annulled and destroyed this fundamental legal maxim. Within a year after a verdict became valid, according to this decree, the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court was empowered to use the nullity plea against the final sentences of the local courts of the criminal divisional courts and of the Special Courts if, due to an error in the application of the law to clearly established facts, the sentence could be regarded as unjust.

In a later decree, dated 13 August 1942, allowance was made for a further extension in the use of the nullity plea. Published in the Reichsgesetzblatt in 1942 (p. 508 ff.), this decree in article 7, paragraph 2, established the right of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court to employ the nullity plea, if the decision due to an error in the application of the law was unjust, or if there were serious objections to the validity of the evidence on which the decision was based, or to the sentence itself.

By this decree, it became practically possible to employ the nullity plea against every final judgment and of summoning an accused man the second time before a criminal court despite the fact that his case had already been legally decided.

As is evident in the literature, and especially in the published decisions of the Reich Supreme Court, the nullity plea was not infrequently employed. I refer to the official collection of Reich Supreme Court decisions, volumes 74, 75, and 76 of the published decisions involving the nullity plea.

[413]

*******

I have been asked how the nullity plea of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court was obtained legally. In this connection, I am only able to state that, according to regular procedure, the chief of the local prosecution—thus in Nuernberg, the Chief Public Prosecutor at the district court of Nuernberg-Fuerth—Chief Public Prosecutor Schroeder in the cases with which I was concerned—would send the documents with an appended suggestion to use the nullity plea first to the attorney general at the court of appeal (during the last years, Bens) and from there to the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court in Leipzig.

According to the text of the law, the nullity plea could also be employed to the advantage of the condemned. In one case, I myself filed a nullity plea with the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court. I was, however, informed that there was no justification for the instigation of the nullity plea.

[Signed] Dr. Ernst Escher

Attorney

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ERNST ESCHER[236]

CROSS-EXAMINATION

*******

Dr. Schilf (counsel for defendants Klemm and Mettgenberg): Now I am going to refer to the factual contents of your affidavit. (NG-677, Pros. Ex. 188.[237]) This statement concerns itself exclusively with the problem of the nullity plea. Therefore, Witness, I will ask you whether you consider yourself a particular specialist on this problem and held yourself to be such an expert when, on 7 December 1946, you made that statement.

May I point out that the first part—I should like to say one half, the first half, is concerned with theoretical matters, that is to say, with the interpretation of the law. The remainder is concerned with facts. Furthermore, you refer to literature and also to decisions made by the Reich Supreme Court. May I ask you to give me your point of view?

Witness Escher: On no account can I say that I am an expert or that I have special knowledge of the problem of the nullity plea. We defense counsels, generally speaking, do not have much time to devote ourselves to scientific problems. As a rule we deal[414] with problems only when they have been brought to us by our practical work. Concerning the theoretical aspect of the nullity plea, I have never in my practice studied it, in detail, but when the nullity plea, became topical, I examined the questions which a defense counsel has to investigate. When in December 1946 I was asked what I knew about the nullity plea, what I had to say about my knowledge of this matter, I mentioned the two cases which occurred in my practice. It seemed necessary to me, however, to give a brief introduction concerning the situation such as it was before the introduction of the nullity plea and such as I saw it after the introduction of the nullity plea. I read several decisions, but I would consider it conceit if I were to say that I possessed thorough knowledge of the problem of the nullity plea.

Q. Witness, in your practice you only came across two cases, isn’t that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. In spite of your statement, Dr. Escher, I have to discuss one theoretical question with you. In your introduction such as you characterized it just now, on page 2 under 2 of your affidavit, you have drawn a conclusion, that is a conclusion as to what the introduction of the nullity plea led to. You said, and I am going to quote literally: “The so-called nullity plea of the Oberreichsanwalt was created and thereby the basic legal principle, ne bis in idem, double jeopardy, was revoked and destroyed.” As you made such a far-reaching statement on that point, I would like to hear in brief as to what, at the time you deposited your affidavit, you understood by the legal principle ne bis in idem, double jeopardy. I noted you mentioned that principle twice. May I ask you to give a brief account to the Tribunal of your opinion as you held it at that time?

A. The principle of double jeopardy meant that a person on whom a legal verdict had been passed could not without new facts having emerged or without the condition of articles 359 and following of the Code of Penal Procedure applying, be retried by a court. Neither the prosecution nor the defendant after legal sentence had been passed could demand a new trial unless the conditions such as they are laid down in the law were fulfilled. That is, for example, perjury on the part of a witness, the finding of new documents or similar fundamental new aspects. By that principle the possibility of the nullity plea was eliminated. And that and not more is what I believe to have stated in my affidavit.

*******

Q. Witness, concerning your opinion on the principle of double jeopardy, your view that that principle was eliminated by the[415] nullity plea, will you maintain your opinion in the face of what I am going to read to you now? It is a paper by Oberreichsanwalt Retzer, Leipzig, published in Deutsche Justiz, volume 1941, No. 20, page 562, I quote:

That is the end of the quotation. To make it clearer, the Supreme Reich Court revoked these decisions by way of the nullity plea, and four cases are quoted and the file numbers are given. My question—now that I have read this to you—do you maintain your opinion?

A. May I say briefly the nullity plea could only be made by the Oberreichsanwalt, but not only against the defendant but also in favor of the defendant. It was, therefore, altogether possible that the Oberreichsanwalt, if he considered a verdict unjust, should use the nullity plea in favor of the defendant. Such a case does exist, even if through certain circumstances or errors a man is sentenced twice for the same crime by different courts, which happened occasionally because, for example, it wasn’t known in the case of a Nuernberg case that this man had already been sentenced in Berlin. When that was revealed, the Oberreichsanwalt naturally could make use of the nullity plea in favor of the defendant. Such cases evidently are discussed in the decisions which my colleague has just put to me. In those cases, the nullity plea was a blessing and worked in favor of the defendant, but in most cases, or at least in very many cases, the nullity plea was used without any new facts or conditions, according to article 359 by the Oberreichsanwalt against the defendant.

Q. Witness, the essence of what I put to you is this: You said, by the nullity plea, the principle of double jeopardy has been destroyed, and the other author says that the nullity plea was in fact to protect that principle. I wanted to ask you whether you maintain your opinion, and you have not answered that question as yet.

A. I am of the opinion that the question, the way it is put, contains a little misunderstanding insofar as Retzer deals only with one special case of the nullity plea where it was made in order to revoke decisions which had been made in violation of the principle of double jeopardy. Naturally, the principle of double jeopardy was not expressly eliminated by so many words, but the[416] effect of the introduction of the nullity plea was that a man, on whom a legal sentence had been passed without new facts or circumstances having come to light, could be retried by a court. Sometimes it could operate in his favor, but in the majority of cases it went against his interest, in my experience, that is.

*******

DIRECT EXAMINATION

*******

Defendant Rothaug: * * * In order to elucidate how severe, for example, the Reich Supreme Court, in particular, generally judged the situation in those cases [sabotage cases during wartime] is demonstrated by the case in the list of the death sentences of the Special Court Nuernberg in which the notation is made—Sentence of the Reich Supreme Court. I believe it was in 1941. The following were the facts:

A Pole had given a civilian pair of pants to a Serbian PW in order to enable him to flee into his home country. In fact, the Serbian prisoner did escape. The Pole confessed; however, he denied decisively that he had intended that the Serb should join the Tito forces; that he only did it out of compassion. Therefore, we sentenced him to a penal camp, 3 years in a penal camp. Thereupon, a nullity plea was filed, the Reich Supreme Court changed the sentence, did not even refer it back to us, but quickly sentenced the Pole to death by stating that, in their opinion the facts which we had already determined ourselves, as I have just told you in a few brief sentences now, were absolutely sufficient to pronounce the death sentence.

And I still recall that the important point of view was—and I remember it, because I was interested—that it could not matter in wartime what concrete intentions he had but that it was absolutely sufficient that the Pole could have counted upon the possibility that the Serb would join Tito’s forces.

[417]

*******

2. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS PRINCIPALLY DURING THE PERIOD WHEN THE DEFENDANT SCHLEGELBERGER WAS ACTING REICH MINISTER OF JUSTICE (JANUARY 1941–AUGUST 1942)

a. The Influence of Hitler and Others upon the Administration of Justice

[Stamp]

Reich Chancellery 5197 B-4 April 1941

The Acting Minister for Justice

Berlin, 10 March 1941

My Fuehrer,

In continuing the work of the deceased Reich Minister Dr. Guertner, I will do my utmost to install the administration of justice with all its branches more and more firmly within the National Socialist State. In the course of the large number of verdicts pronounced daily there are still judgments which do not entirely comply with the necessary requirements. In such cases, I will take the necessary steps. In order that such judgments be dealt with rapidly you, my Fuehrer, have created the nullity plea and the extraordinary objection for criminal cases. For civil proceedings, the right of application by the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court for the resumption of the procedure, could serve the same purpose as provided in an ordinance drafted by myself. So as to avoid all such wrong verdicts, the public prosecutor’s office is called on, in this draft, to participate in civil proceedings, and should stress the right of the national community against the individual interests of the opposing parties.

Apart from this it is desirable to educate the judges more and more to a correct way of thinking, conscious of the national destiny. For this purpose it would be invaluable if you, my Fuehrer, could let me know if a verdict does not meet with your approval. The judges are responsible to you, my Fuehrer; they are conscious of this responsibility and are firmly resolved to discharge their duties accordingly.

[418]

I feel that it is my duty to you, my Fuehrer, to bring it to the attention of the judges if a decision does not conform to the opinion of the State leadership.

Heil, my Fuehrer!

[Signed] Dr. Schlegelberger

[Stamp] 3868 B

[Handwritten] 1508/1

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

[Handwritten] 11 March 2 enclosures

Dear Reich Minister Dr. Lammers:

In connection with our telephone conversation of today, I am sending you a copy of my letter addressed to the Fuehrer.[239] I consider it of great importance that the Fuehrer receive this letter as soon as possible. It has come to my knowledge that just recently a number of sentences passed have roused the strong disapproval of the Fuehrer. I do not know exactly which sentences are concerned, but I have ascertained for myself that now and then sentences are pronounced which are quite untenable. In such cases I shall act with the utmost energy and decision. It is, however, of vital importance for the administration of justice and its standing in the Reich, that the head of the Ministry of Justice should know to which sentences the Fuehrer objects; for nothing is more dangerous than the creation of a so-called atmosphere, of the causes of which the Minister of Justice is unaware. That is the reason for my request to the Fuehrer in the last paragraph of my letter. I repeat, this attempt to establish a direct contact between the Fuehrer and the Minister of Justice must be made at once if irreparable damage is to be avoided.

In explanation of the first paragraph of my letter, I enclose the mentioned draft of the decree, which is to be provisionally discussed here on the 17th of this month with the Reich Chancellery. Basic approval has already been received from the Reich Finance Minister, the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich Minister of Economics. Participation by the prosecuting authorities in civil cases was already known in Roman law. Nowadays, in the recently published Italian code of civil procedure, this participation has been extended, following the general line of my draft, because, as is indicated in the report to the king, a purely platonic participation is no longer sufficient.

[419]

The deceased Reich Minister Dr. Guertner, during the last days he was still in office, advised me to examine the question of whether an extraordinary objection should be created for civil as in criminal cases. I have adopted the right of the Chief Reich Prosecutor to ask for the reopening of a case but deliberately with such limitations, that by human standards no offense can be created thereby; this special reopening will only be put into practice in so-called secular cases.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly

[Signed] Dr. Schlegelberger

Enclosure to the Letter of 10 March 1941 from Defendant Schlegelberger to Lammers

Draft of a Decree Concerning Participation by the Public Prosecutor in Legal Proceedings of matters of Civil Law

dated....................1941

The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich issues the following decree with force of law:

Article 1

(1) The public prosecutor is authorized to participate in civil law proceedings in order to plead the circumstances which have to be considered from the point of view of the national community and for the final judgment. For this purpose, the public prosecutor may be present at all proceedings and may give his opinion regarding the judgment which is to be passed. He may submit facts and evidence insofar as this does not affect the rights of either party with regard to the disagreement.

(2) Regulations which already provide for participation by the public prosecutor in matters of civil law, are not affected.

Article 2

In matters of civil law where a valid final judgment has been passed, the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court may, within a year after the decision has become valid, file an application for reopening the proceedings if there are serious legal and factual objections against the justness of the decision, and if he considers new proceedings and a new judgment to be necessary because of the special importance of the judgment to the national community.

[420]

Article 3

(1) The high senate for civil matters at the Reich Supreme Court makes a decision by writ, on application.

(2) The participants in the previous proceeding may be heard.

Article 4

(1) If the Reich Supreme Court grants the application of the Chief Reich Prosecutor, it will again take up—as far as this is necessary—the previous proceedings and the judgments passed, and will order new proceedings and a new judgment.

(2) The Reich Supreme Court determines whether the new proceedings and judgment will be dealt with by the court previously concerned with the case, or will be replaced by another court of the same standing, or whether it will be dealt with by a senate of the Reich Supreme Court.

Article 5

(1) The new proceedings will be considered a continuation of the previous proceedings.

(2) The court is bound by the legal and factual judgment on which the Reich Supreme Court based its writ.

(3) No court fees will be charged for the new proceedings and judgment.

Article 6

The president or a member of the high senate for civil matters, appointed by him, may issue temporary orders regarding the execution of judgments concerned in the application of the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court.

Article 7

The Reich Minister of Justice is authorized to issue supplementary regulations and regulations for the implementation of this decree.

Article 8

In the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, this decree is only valid for proceedings before German courts.

[421]

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

Berlin, 24 March 1942

My Fuehrer:

When I took office, I asked you to inform me whether, if a sentence did not meet with your approval, you would allow me to correct it. I ask permission to consider the telephone call made on Sunday, 22 March, concerning the case of Schlitt at Wilhelmshaven as granting my request, and I express my sincerest thanks for this.

I entirely agree with your demand, my Fuehrer, for very severe punishment for criminals [Verbrechertum], and I assure you that the judges have honest will to comply with your demand. Constant instructions in order to strengthen them in this intention and the increase of threats of legal punishment have resulted in a considerable decrease of the number of sentences to which objections have been made from this point of view, out of a total annual number of more than 300,000.

I shall continue to try to reduce this number still more, and if necessary, I shall not shrink from personal measures as before.

In the criminal case against the building technician Ewald Schlitt from Wilhelmshaven, I have applied through the Chief Reich Prosecutor for an extraordinary objection against the sentence at the special senate of the Reich Supreme Court. I will inform you of the verdict of the special senate immediately it has been given.

Heil my Fuehrer!

[Signed] Dr. Schlegelberger

To the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Greater German Reich, Adolf Hitler

Berlin, 28 March 1941

Pertaining to Reich Chancellery 4729

Subject: Sentences against Poles

1. Memorandum:

According to information from Reichsleiter Bormann a sentence of the Lueneburg District Court (apparently in a rape trial)[422] against a Polish farm hand has been submitted to the Fuehrer, in which the defendant is granted extenuating circumstances because it was felt that he did not have the same restraint in his relations to female co-workers as German farm hands have. The Fuehrer rejected this view of the court as totally misleading. Under Secretary Schlegelberger is to take the necessary steps to preclude a repetition of this view.

[Initial] F [Ficker]

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Reich Chancellery 4729 B

[Handwritten] See Reich Chancellery 5021 B

2. To: Under Secretary Dr. Schlegelberger

Reich Ministry of Justice

Dear Mr. Schlegelberger:

The sentence of the Lueneburg District Court of 21 October 1940 on the Polish farm hand Wolay Wojcieck from Rolfsen has been transmitted to the Fuehrer. In it the court states:

The Fuehrer rejected the view of the court as totally misleading. The Fuehrer urges you to take immediately the steps necessary to preclude repetition in other courts of the view of the Lueneburg court. I should be obliged if you would inform me what steps you have taken in the matter.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

(Name of the Reich Minister)

[Handwritten] with final copy

3. To Reichsleiter Bormann

Dear Mr. Bormann:

I transmitted the instruction of the Fuehrer as contained in your letter of 26 March 1941, concerning the consideration of[423] extenuating circumstances in crimes committed by Poles, to Under Secretary Dr. Schlegelberger with the request for information about what steps he has taken in the matter.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

(Name of the Reich Minister)

[Initial] L

(with original copy)

4. [to be submitted again] on 28 April

[Initials] Ri 29/3

F 28/3

Reich Chancellery 5021 B—2 April 1941 Kri-Fi Record RH 4729 B 1b, 392 B

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

Berlin, 1 April 1941

See Reich Chancellery 5194

Dear Reich Minister:

Upon receipt of your kind letter of 29 March 1941 I immediately consulted the files of the criminal case against the Polish farm hand Wolay Wojcieck. In the statement of the court the passage quoted in your letter is indeed to be found. By means of a circular letter with the order for immediate transmittal to all judges and public prosecutors I brought the mistake in the viewpoint, as it is shown in this passage of the court’s statement, to the attention of the administration of penal justice [Strafjustiz] without delay. I consider it impossible that such an incident will occur again.

I also had the responsible president of the Appellate court and the judges concerned ordered to report here tomorrow with the intention of changing responsibilities at the Lueneburg district[424] court with a view to excluding the judges who cooperated in issuing the sentence from further employment in criminal jurisdiction.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

[Signed] Schlegelberger

1. Reported to the Fuehrer. Also reported on the letter of Under Secretary Schlegelberger of 3 April 1941.

2. Office—The above letter is to be filed.

3. To be submitted to me again.

Berlin, 3 April 1941

[Handwritten]

1. Schl. has been provisionally informed by phone.

2. [Illegible] above Count 2

3. Min. Counsellor Kritzinger [illegible] L 4 April

[Stamp]

Reich Chancellery 5914 B—4 April 1941

[Handwritten] submitted with File Reich Chancellery 5021 B

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

Berlin, 3 April 1941

[Initial] L [Lammers] 3 April

Your Excellency, Herr Reich Minister:

In addition to my letter of 1 April 1941 I beg to inform you that the presiding judge of the penal chamber which passed the sentence in the case against the Polish farm hand Wolay Wojcieck is no longer presiding and that the two associate judges have been replaced by other associate judges.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

[Signed] Schlegelberger

[Handwritten]

Reich Chancellery 5021, 5194 B

1. No further steps will be taken.

2. The Reich Minister of Justice is going to transmit the [Illegible].

3. To be submitted again on 24 April.

[425]

[Initials] Kr [Kritzinger] 10 April

See Reich Chancellery 5929 B

Justice 11

[Handwritten] Reich Chancellery 7593 B

Reich Leader Martin Bormann

To Reich Minister Dr. Lammers,

Berchtesgaden

Reich Chancellery

[Handwritten]

1. [stamp] Miss Frobenius: (Reich Chancellery)

2. To Ministerialrat Ficker

[Initial] L [Lammers] 26 May

[stamp] See document of 29 May

Dear Mr. Lammers:

In yesterday’s edition of the “Voelkischer Beobachter” the Fuehrer read the enclosed report according to which the Special Court of Munich in a trial in Augsburg sentenced the 19-year-old Anton Scharff to 10 years’ hard labor for theft under cover of the black-out; the public prosecutor had asked for the death sentence.

In the Fuehrer’s opinion this sentence is entirely incomprehensible. The Fuehrer believes that in such cases capital punishment must definitely be given if crimes committed under cover of the black-out are to be kept to a minimum from the outset. The Fuehrer has also emphasized time and again that the criminals should receive severe punishment considering the heroic fighting of our soldiers.

[426]

The Fuehrer requests you to inform Under Secretary Schlegelberger again of his point of view.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

[Signed] M. Bormann

[Typed] (M. Bormann)

1 enclosure

[Handwritten] War 12

[Enclosure]

JUST MISSED THE SCAFFOLD

10 Years’ Hard Labor for a Pickpocket—Death penalty demanded

Augsburg, 23 May

The 19-year-old Anton Scharff was tried for theft under cover of the black-out before the Special Court of Munich in session in Augsburg. On the evening of 18 April in the Jesuitengasse in Augsburg, the perpetrator snatched the handbag from a young woman as she was going to unlock the door of her house. Upon the woman’s screams for help, the perpetrator was pursued and caught by passers-by. He was sentenced to 10 years’ penitentiary and corresponding loss of civil rights.

The public prosecutor had asked for the death penalty.

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Reich Chancellery 7593 B

Fuehrer Headquarters, 29 May 1941

1. To Under Secretary Dr. Schlegelberger

[Handwritten] Charged with the management of the affairs of the Reich Minister of Justice.

Subject: Crimes committed under cover of the black-out
Enclose copy of enclosure of Reich Chancellery 7593 B

Dear Mr. Schlegelberger:

The Fuehrer took from the Munich edition of the “Voelkischer Beobachter” dated 24 May, a report, a copy of which is enclosed, according to which the Special Court of Munich in a session in Augsburg sentenced the 19-year-old Anton Scharff to 10 years’ penitentiary for theft under cover of the black-out; the public[427] prosecutor had asked for the death penalty. The Fuehrer considers this sentence entirely incomprehensible. The Fuehrer believes that in such cases the death penalty must definitely be given, if crimes committed under cover of the black-out are to be kept down to a minimum from the outset. The Fuehrer has also emphasized time and again that the criminals should receive especially severe punishment considering the heroic fighting of our soldiers.

The Fuehrer requested that I reiterate his point of view to you.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

(Name of the Reich Minister)

2. To Reich Leader Martin Bormann

In reply to the letter of 25 May 1941—Bo/Si—

Enclose copy of 1

Dear Herr Bormann:

Enclosed please find a copy of my letter of today to Under Secretary Dr. Schlegelberger for your information.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

(Name of the Reich Minister)

3. After dispatch to Ministerial Director Kritzinger for his information.

[Initial] Kr [Kritzinger] 2 June

4. To be filed.

(Name of the Reich Minister)

[Initial] L [Lammers]

[Initial] F [Ficker] 27 May

Berlin, 28 June 1941

Reich Chancellery 9687 B/29 June 1941

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

III secret 23 1548/41

[Initial] Kr [Kritzinger] 20 June

[Initial] F [Ficker] 30 June

To: The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Berlin W 8

Voss Strasse 6

[428]

Submitted to the Reich Minister for his information.

[Initial] Kr [Kritzinger]

1 July

Subject: Crimes committed under cover of the black-out

Reference: Letter Reich Chancellery 7593 B dated 29 May 1940.[240]

[Handwritten]: To be filed. [Initial] L [Lammers]

Dear Reich Minister Dr. Lammers:

I am very much obliged to the Fuehrer for having complied with my request to take the sentence of the Special Court in Munich against Anton Scharff as an opportunity to have me informed about his views as to the proper expiation for crimes committed under cover of the black-out. I shall again inform the presidents of the district courts of appeal and the attorneys general of this view of the Fuehrer as soon as possible.

The short notice in the Munich edition of the “Voelkischer Beobachter” dated 24 May, which was enclosed in your letter of 29 May, does not make the sentence comprehensible in my opinion either. In the judgment the following facts are stated. Scharff, who was not quite 19 years old when he committed the crime, is the only child of a painter’s family and comes from a very poor home. On account of an infection of the lungs his father is unable to work as a painter and his only occupation is in the office of the Nazi Party Public Welfare Organization in Pfaffenhofen on the Ilm. The parents have barely the necessaries of life.

Since the middle of 1937 the defendant was thrown on his own resources and gained his living without parental help and away from home on poorly paid jobs, first by agricultural work and recently as an unskilled worker with a firm in Augsburg. His conduct and efficiency were satisfactory. As the defendant, whose wages amounted to 50 pfennig per hour, could not make both ends meet and contracted harassing debts, he absented himself from work several times in order to get better earnings through odd jobs, such as helping in the loading of wagons at the railroad station and also in this way to obtain dismissal from his employers who would not discharge him.

Around Easter 1941 he left his job after having spent his last wages. He reckoned with his early drafting into armed forces, since he had volunteered for an antitank unit and, with consent of his father, had enlisted for 12 years in order to bring his financial troubles to a final stop. This time he did not find work at the railroad station. Thus, it happened that he soon found himself[429] without means, and hit upon the idea of getting money by stealing a handbag. After having watched the district in question, he thought that on 18 April 1941 at about 2200 hours he had found a fitting opportunity and snatched the handbag from under the arm of a young woman whom he had followed for some time when she was about to unlock the door of her house. When the woman, a war widow, called for help and people approached, the defendant fled and threw away the handbag but was arrested a short time later without offering resistance.

On the basis of these facts which help to elucidate the peculiarity of the offense and the character of the perpetrator, the court was induced to pass a mild sentence. Since no violence could be proved, the defendant was not convicted of robbery, but only of theft. As extenuating circumstances, the clean conduct sheet, satisfactory work, his youth and immaturity, as well as the hard life, full of deprivations, led by defendant, were put to his account by the court and for these reasons the death penalty was dispensed with.

I ask you to assure the Fuehrer that my unwavering attention is directed to the safeguarding of the protection of the people against public enemies through the severe punishment of criminals.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

[Signed] Dr. Schlegelberger

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Rk/ 15506 B

[Handwritten] 393A

1. To: Under Secretary, Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Schlegelberger, charged with the management of the affairs of the Reich Minister of Justice

[430]

Berlin W 8

Wilhelmstrasse 65

[Handwritten] Refer to newspaper

Dear Mr. Schlegelberger:

The enclosed newspaper clipping about the sentencing of the Jew Markus Luftgas to imprisonment for 2½ years by the Special Court of Bielitz has been submitted to the Fuehrer.[242] The Fuehrer wishes Luftgas to be sentenced to death. May I ask you urgently to instigate what is necessary and to notify me about the measures taken so that I can inform the Fuehrer.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

(Signature of the Reich Minister)

[Handwritten] Justice 11

2. To: SS-Gruppenfuehrer Julius Schaub[243]

Fuehrer Headquarters

Subject: Markus Luftgas

Dear Mr. Schaub:

After receiving your letter dated 22 October 1941 I got into touch with the Reich Minister of Justice and asked him to instigate the necessary measures.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly,

(Signature of the Reich Minister)

3. Copy of the newspaper clipping to be filed.

4. After dispatch—For the attention of Ministerial Director Kritzinger for information.

5. After 1 month.

(Signature of the Reich Minister)

[Initial] L [Lammers]

Copy

[Enclosure] to Rk. 15 506 B

[431]